


~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Intelligence Information Handling Committee  
WASHINGTON, DC 20505

ICS  
IHC/MM 86-29  
14 April 1986 *mc*


25X1




*attended*

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

25X1

FROM:   
Executive Secretary, IHC

SUBJECT: IHC Conference, 20-22 April 1986

Attached please find the conference agenda, conference guide which focuses on speaker presentations and topic discussions, your transportation arrangements and directions, and the DCI-approved open source exploitation program report highlights. If you have any last minute changes or unanswered questions, call them to  or myself (secure).

25X1



Attachments:  
As stated

25X1

This memo becomes UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of attachments.



~~SECRET~~

**Page Denied**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IHC 1986 Off-Site Conference  
Agenda

Sunday, 20 April 1986

25X1

[Redacted]

1730-1815 Cocktails  
1815-1915 Dinner  
1915-2015 Keynote Session

Monday, 21 April 1986

0700-0800 Breakfast  
0800-0815 Admin/Security Brief  
0815-0830 Conference Introduction  
0830-1000 Community Information Systems: Performance Requirements and Objectives

25X1

COINS

[Redacted]

COINS PMO

25X1

DODIIS

[Redacted]

DIA

25X1

CIRS

[Redacted]

NSA

25X1

Open Source

[Redacted]

Chmn/IHC

25X1

1000-1015

Break

[Redacted]

25X1

1015-1025

Inter-Community Information Systems:  
Introduction

[Redacted]

Chmn/IHC

1025-1115

Statutory Constraints on Inter-Community  
Information Support

Mark S. Evans  
Justice

25X1

1115-1145

[Redacted]

Patrick Tarr  
Justice (DEPB)

25X1

1145-1200

[Redacted]

Information Element

[Redacted]

IHC

1200-1315

Lunch

25X1

1315-1345

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

NIO

25X1

1345-1415

DESIST

[Redacted]

CIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25X1	1415-1445	Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Support: Operational Experience and Requirements	<input type="text"/> NIO
	1445-1500	Break	
	1500-1530	Special Operations Information System: Capabilities, Management Issues	MAJ Robert Peden HQS, JSOC COL Duncan Briggs HQDA (DAMI-AM)
	1530-1630	Justice Department (FBI) Intelligence Information Handling Support: Plans and Programs	TBD
25X1	1630	<input type="text"/>	
	1630-1730	Discussion: Management and Planning Implications of Inter-Community Information Handling Requirements	
	1730-1800	Cocktails	
	1800-1900	Dinner	
25X1	1900-1920	COMPUSEC Program Status	<input type="text"/> IHC
25X1	1920-1940	COMPUSEC Threat Brief	<input type="text"/> IHC
25X1	1940-2010	National Computer Security Evaluation Center: Near Term Programs and Objectives	<input type="text"/> NCSC
	2010-2030	DoD-DCI Computer Security Guidance Initiatives	Dr. Robert Krell/ James Dyer (OASD/C <sup>3</sup> I)

Tuesday, 22 April 1986

	0700-0800	Breakfast	
	0800-0830	DCID 1/16 Revision Proposals Discussion - Shortfalls of Current Policy - Outline of Proposed Modifications	
25X1	0830-1000	Open Source Initiative Overview	<input type="text"/> ICS/HUMINT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

1000-1015 Break

25X1

1015-1100 FBIS Modernization Program

[Redacted]

D/FBIS/CIA

1100-1200 Community Systems' (COINS, CIRS, et al)  
Role in Open Source Support

1200-1300 Lunch

1300 (First Flight for Washington Departs)

1300-1500 Discussion: Open Source Initiative  
Development Strategy

25X1

[Redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

DCI/ICS 86-4070

IHC 1986 Off-site Conference GuidePreface

The principal mission of the DCI's Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC) and its permanent staff is to facilitate efficient interchange among Intelligence Community organizations--and between the Community and those it supports--of information necessary to the most effective performance of their missions. While the primary instruments of this endeavor are computer hardware and software, its most critical elements are people and organizations, their perceptions, intentions, and resources with respect to the jobs to be done. The development and operation of automated information handling systems are properly reflections of the latter rather than ends in themselves.

The IHC's 1986 Off-site Conference will seek to implement this recognition in focusing on the Community's near term (roughly the next three years) operational requirements and capability goals in four major areas of concern and endeavor: Community Information Systems, Inter-Community Information Systems, Computer Security, and Open Source Intelligence Support. All have received significant investment, and are scheduled for continued emphasis during the period in view. They are in various ways interrelated, insofar as things done (or not done) in one area will affect one or more of the others. A major objective of the Conference will be to explore such interactions, actual and potential, to see how they might be used to further Community operational interests and programs or, where bullets have to be bitten (as in the case of computer security), to mitigate their impact on operations and resources. Current agency and Community goals in these areas will also be reviewed in the context of specific development programs, ongoing and planned, briefed by their sponsoring organizations. Looking at specific programs and capabilities from the less constrained vantage point of broader requirements and resource availability can yield a different slant on possible development approaches. While no grand strategy is likely to emerge, we will be seeking recognition of opportunities for focused Community action in problem solving and meeting mission performance requirements.

Community Systems

The Intelligence Community has made a very substantial investment in the development of COINS, and proposes to continue its improvement and expansion. At the same time, however, there appears to be insufficient appreciation of the system's capabilities and potential, particularly at senior management levels within the Community. Deployment of system access terminals, the roster of data files maintained, as well as system usage reflect primary orientation toward support of military intelligence production activities and customers.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Activation of the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) and its intended interconnection with COINS will expand user access to the latter. Achievement of an initial operating capability for the Community Information Retrieval System (CIRS) in 1986 will provide COINS users high speed query and retrieval capability against in-depth files of finished intelligence/end product reporting. The COINS PMO has developed a sophisticated graphics terminal (FULCRUM) to expand the display capabilities of COINS users, and is also planning to upgrade the standard COINS terminal suite, an initiative that will be supported by FY 1988 DCI fiscal guidance.

[Conference briefers addressing the above-mentioned systems are asked to, inter alia, review their current capabilities, established development plans, as well as anticipated problems and constraints.]

Given the existence in COINS of a major operational information handling capability, supported by a well-established technical base and a competent PMO, should the Community adopt it as the base for its future wide-access information support services, if only to reduce development costs and technical risk? For example, would there be merit in building a parallel (but separate) COINS network to operate at the SECRET level (or, perhaps, UNCLASSIFIED) for support of users who cannot access the current SCI system? Are there incremental technical improvements or added resource investments that would significantly expand the utility and usage of COINS?

What is the impact of current security policy on the operation and utilization of Community-wide access systems such as COINS? What would be the effect of a policy change to permit multi-level secure systems? Are current trends toward greater restriction and control of secondary dissemination of intelligence reports a threat to further expansion of Community-wide access systems?

### Intercommunity Systems

Routine, active involvement of Intelligence Community assets in non-traditional operations support, such as counterterrorism and interdiction of narcotics trafficking, is still relatively new. The use in such support of automated information handling networks in which both Community foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement elements participate encounters a number of significant problems in the areas of protection of intelligence sources and methods, operational use of intelligence data and conformity with statutes dealing with legal discovery, privacy and freedom of information. Experience, thus far, would appear to indicate that these problems are manageable, from the technical and procedural standpoint, provided that their accommodation is planned for in the course of system design.

[The Justice Department briefer is requested to address the foregoing, including insights gained from the experience of agencies seeking to meet statutory requirements, e.g. the 4C system.]

However, there exist a number of basic operational questions of great importance to the ultimate effectiveness of the intercommunity support

SECRET

SECRET

relationship. These have to do with the "cultural" differences between the communities, in terms of the operational utility of intelligence support, protection of sources and methods, etc. For an information handling relationship to be effective, all parties to it must perceive its purpose and modus operandi in the same way and operate accordingly. To the extent that does not occur, automated information handling operations will be dysfunctional or, at best, inefficient.

[NIO briefers in the narcotics interdiction and counterterrorism fields are asked to review operational experience to date in intercommunity intelligence activities, as well as plans and requirements. DESIST and SOIS briefers are requested to focus, inter alia, on the functional requirements and operating environments influencing their design and implementation (and subsequent modification, if appropriate).]

The FBI has the most experience in intelligence support to law enforcement on the national level. Given the Bureau's central functional responsibility and its considerable efforts automated information handling, it is desirable that NFIP-sponsored intercommunity information handling initiatives be coordinated (and, where appropriate, integrated) with those of the Bureau.

[The FBI briefer is asked to describe the Bureau's ongoing and planned automated intelligence support services, in particular those relevant to the counterterrorism and narcotics interdiction efforts. Information on mechanisms for interagency planning and development of information handling capabilities within the law enforcement community is also requested.]

The basic Conference objective in addressing intercommunity systems is to share experience and lessons learned that might be of general use. The apparent success of FLASHBOARD, for example, offers a useful insight (previously demonstrated by NOIWON among others) into the utility of convenient, informal and secure communication as an effective means for bridging the perceptual gaps created by differing missions, organizational structures, and operating constraints. The Joint Maritime Information Element (JMIE) initiative, to be briefed at the Conference, illustrates a variant approach to intercommunity, multi-mission intelligence support. Development of a national-level, all-source narcotics interdiction intelligence center represents yet another basic approach.

[The Drug Enforcement Policy Board briefer is asked to address, inter alia, the operational and organizational requirements and objectives supporting establishment of an all-source intelligence center.]

### Computer Security

The requirements of an effective Intelligence Community computer security program are difficult and expensive and, unless carefully implemented, can seriously disrupt ability to meet operational information handling commitments. For these reasons, and because the technology required is, in many cases, not yet available, partial and interim measures must be adopted to

SECRET



SECRET

gain as much added protection as possible, as soon as possible. Unfortunately, the amalgam of near term, long term, procedural, and technical initiatives has created a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding, amplified by the large number of organizations involved. Perception of this circumstance by the Congress has resulted in reduced funding for computer security at a critical juncture.

Among the measures needed to cope with the foregoing is establishment of an operating framework to provide a common perspective for the organizations engaged in computer security development activities, both within the Intelligence Community and in the broader spectrum of organizations encompassed by the NTISSC. Envisioned as an understanding rather than as a specific bureaucratic entity, the purpose of the framework would be, inter alia, to provide a basis for coordinating development objectives and timetables, rationalizing guidance to Community operating elements, and avoiding unnecessary redundancy of effort in technical research and development. At the same time, the understanding should provide individual participating agencies a buffer against unrealistic impact on their internal information handling operations and development programs.

The parties key to formulation of such an understanding are the DCI, the ASD(C<sup>3</sup>I) and the National Computer Security Evaluation Center (NCSEC). A working group of their staff representatives has been meeting toward that end, and the Conference will provide an informal forum for considering its preliminary recommendations and providing guidance to ongoing efforts.

[The NCSEC briefer is asked to describe, inter alia, the Center's current goals, operating strategy, and perception of its mission. An outline of specific programs addressing Community computer security concerns is also requested. The ASD(C<sup>3</sup>I) briefer is asked to outline working group findings, thus far, concerning development of agreed guidance to supplement the DCI SAFEGUARDS and DoD Orange Book.]

DCID 1/16 is a major component of DCI policy guidance in the computer security area. As such, it will be a major influence on formulation of the operating framework envisioned above. However, the directive requires review and update to bring it in line with contemporary technical, operational and organizational conditions. The DCI Security Committee and the IHC will jointly sponsor such an effort, to be initiated at the Conference with consideration of strawman proposals for revision. The basic Conference objective is to gain insight into the positions held by Community agencies on current policy and prospective changes thereto as the basis for determining how best to go about updating the DCID.

#### Open Source Initiative

The DDCI has approved a major, long term initiative designed to improve the availability to Community analysts of timely data from unclassified sources such as periodicals, books, broadcasts, and electronic data bases. The program envisioned is extensive and multi-faceted, and is described in a

SECRET

SECRET

separate document accompanying this guide. The IHC has been assigned the lead responsibility for planning and coordinating those segments of the program relating to the exchange of open source information and services and requiring the use of improved automated information handling techniques.

It will be evident that the initiatives, for both budgetary and technical reasons, cannot be all implemented at once. Given the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation, it is likely that the next several fiscal years (at least) will yield particularly limited funding support. It is important, therefore, that the Community develop an implementation strategy that makes most effective and creative use of available resources, both funds and existing support capabilities. Among strategic objectives to be considered, for example, are:

- early activation of a meaningful improvement in open source support as a demonstration of the potential of the larger program; and
- incremental Community supplementation of ongoing agency programs to maximize and advance the yield of resources already committed through the latter.

[The FBIS briefer is asked to describe his organization's modernization program as concerns prospective facilities and services for provision of open source information, implementation strategies, and timetables related thereto.]

The Conference should also consider how best to organize and coordinate the planning and subsequent implementation efforts for the open source program, given the diverse organizational involvement and many technical program components. Responsibilities should be appropriately delegated to participating organizations to the maximum feasible extent. However, the overall program must be coherently structured and coordinated if it is to compete successfully for NFIP resources.

SECRET

**Page Denied**

~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
HUMINT Committee  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

HC 86-055  
11 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Director, Intelligence Community Staff  
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff *gll*

25X1 FROM:   
Chairman, HUMINT Committee

25X1 SUBJECT: Open Source Exploitation Program

1. On behalf of the Executive Steering Group for the Exploitation of Overt Information on Science and Technology, I take pleasure in submitting the highlights of a comprehensive report which will soon be published separately as a basic source of program guidance and reference for the Intelligence Community's components charged with responsibilities in this field.

2. As you will recall, the need to address this issue was flagged in a 1983 report prepared by a joint Working Group of the HUMINT Committee and the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee. At that time I was commissioned to lead an Executive Steering Group to examine how the HC/STIC report could be implemented. Our conclusions were presented to the DCI's Offsite Conference in September 1984, and the Executive Steering Group was charged with managerial implementation with respect not only to S&T information but political, economic, and sociological information. For eight months during 1985 an intensive series of meetings were held under the chairmanship of  which brought together for the first time all the Program Managers of the various open source centers within the Intelligence Community. The attached report distills the essence of this work and of the Executive Steering Group's conclusions and recommendations.

3. The following salient features of the report warrant brief mention:

- o This report marks the first time in 25 years that the Program Managers of the Intelligence Community have undertaken a comprehensive examination of this issue.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~25X1 SUBJECT: Open Source Exploitation Program 

- o Recent advances in information handling systems, as well as technical developments on the immediate horizon, have made it possible to provide major enhancements to the speed and effectiveness of the processing tools which Community analysts will have at their disposal.
- o The discussions within the Executive Steering Group and the Action Group Committees on information technology, translation services, and collection have already served the purposes of senior Community management in that they have set in train a series of significant management initiatives and enhancements by the key segments of the Open Source Service Community.
- o Strengthening links between providers and analysts and modernizing the information technology available to analysts can best take place by implementing the concept of "distributed services" for the exchange of open source information. This will, we believe, provide an effective management framework within which many short-term improvements are possible at relatively low cost.
- o Implementing these recommendations will go far to meet national needs for more economic as well as scientific and technical information, a point stressed by the DDI during the recently concluded Offsite Conference.

3. The Executive Steering Group seeks your endorsement in principle for the recommendations summarized in our report so that the processing enhancements begun or envisioned may go forward within existing budgetary restraints and in close coordination with the Community as a whole. The Information Handling Committee, augmented in its membership as appropriate, will assume the lead role within the Intelligence Community Staff, while the Executive Steering Group would have a continuing responsibility for policy oversight.

25X1



25X1 Attachment: Highlights on Processing  
Overt S&T Information

~~SECRET~~

S E C R E T

25X1

SUBJECT: Open Source Exploitation Program

APPROVED:

\* *in concept*

25X1

17 MAR 1986

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED:

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

S E C R E T

ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

## HIGHLIGHTS ON PROCESSING OVERT S&amp;T INFORMATION

KEY FINDINGS

- o The primary organizations within the US Government that process and use open-source information (herein referred to collectively as the Open Source Service Community [OSSC]) are currently a loosely-knit collection of autonomous or semi-autonomous units.
- o Open Source information is processed in essentially two ways: either by services of common concern, that support a variety of recipients both inside and outside the Intelligence Community, or by dedicated services that primarily support local users. The three principal organizations which process information as services of common concern are:
  - the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) of CIA, which is responsible for monitoring foreign media and maintaining the Automated Consolidated Translation Survey (ACTS) data base of translations completed and in process within the government;
  - the Foreign Technology Division (FTD), executive agent for the CIRC data base of references to S&T documents and to selected translations; and
  - the State/INR/Publications Program (INR/P), [redacted] which coordinates publications ordering and acquisition.
- o Major users of open-source information within the US government include intelligence analysts, laboratories, and contractors working for intelligence or other agencies. The private sector also has a continuing and specialized knowledge of foreign activities which make it both a potentially lucrative source and consumer of open-source information.
- o Total funding for open-source services is not presently known or easily obtainable, but it is generally recognized as being small in comparison to other activities funded within the NFIP. However, a substantial portion of the infrastructure upon which the processing of open-source material is dependent lies outside the NFIP.

25X1  
25X1~~SECRET~~



SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS ON PROCESSING OVERT S&T INFORMATION


KEY JUDGMENTS

- o Basic weaknesses of the current Open Source Service Community vary from agency to agency but generally can be described as:
  - inadequate and unequal access to open-source processing services across the spectrum of users;
  - inadequate knowledge or awareness of available acquisitions/ collection and processing services;
  - inadequate relationship between funding of open-source processing services and needs;
  - inadequate use of organizations in the private sector that collect and process open-source material of interest to the OSSC;
  - inadequate coordination and/or management mechanisms for modernization of open-source processing services; and
  - inadequate training within career development paths for both processors and analysts of open-source information within the US Government.
- o While these weaknesses are recognized as applying to the overall OSSC, they are not necessarily characteristic of services provided by particular segments of that Community.
- o Any actions to correct these deficiencies in processing scientific and technical information should be applicable to all open-source information without regard to subject matter. They should be executed within the assigned mission responsibilities of Community members. Practical successes demonstrate the validity of emphasizing better processing and use not only of S&T information, but also economic, political, military, and sociology-related information.

SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS ON PROCESSING OVERT S&T INFORMATION

NEAR-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

- o The Intelligence Community should sustain the momentum that has been achieved during the past year in the exploitation of open-source information. It should begin now to plan the future long-term program as a framework for near-term improvements. It should coordinate and implement the program efforts of Community members as integral parts of a single concept, built upon stronger relationships between open-source service providers and analysts. This effort should lead in modernizing the information technology available to analysts by taking full advantage of available and emerging new technology in the government and private sector.
- o In the area of information technology and communications, it is recommended that:
  - Managers of user organizations share technology applications already in being or under development in their organizations.
  - Program managers for the Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Program and the Productivity Enhancement Initiatives Program encourage software applications by soliciting proposals for them as part of the analytical projects under these programs.
  - CIA/ORD serve as a focal point through symposia, monitoring the work of other governmental agencies and of the private sector, and sharing its R&D efforts in a special interest group involving user agencies.
- o In the area of translation technology and expertise, it is recommended that:



25X1

SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS ON PROCESSING OVERT S&T INFORMATION

- FTD provide interim support for an index to translations while the long-term ACTS upgrade is under way;
  - FBIS initiate quarterly meetings of senior professional translators and managers to discuss the full scope of translation issues peculiar to the OSSC; and
  - FTD, FBIS, and other OSSC agencies with significant translation responsibilities share translation technologies and identify specific resources in future budgets for career enhancement, training, and the exchange of foreign language personnel.
- o In the area of processing collection acquisition and deliveries more effectively, it is recommended that:
- A Steering Group be established within the existing Interagency Maps and Publications Acquisitions Committee to develop and implement managerial and practical improvements in processing in the earliest stages of acquisition of maps and publications; to integrate and coordinate economic and other governmental open-source collection programs for better exploitation; to improve field functions; and to monitor progress in making commercial electronic data bases more suitable for Intelligence Community needs.
  - Intelligence Community production committees play a more active role in representing open-source users by expressing their needs on topics of current interest through both formal and informal mechanisms;
- o In remaining areas, it is recommended that:
- Training and accompanying training materials be improved in the specialty areas supporting open-source services and their utilization. Key areas include: information management, information technology tools and methods, and automated data base management and usage; and
  - Rapid response mechanisms be established through which analysts can acquire current high priority open-source information resident in the private sector. The Intelligence Community, in partnership with the Department of Commerce, should identify ways to improve such collection through the private sector.

SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS ON PROCESSING OVERT S&T INFORMATION

LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

- o The Community should establish as a long-term goal the creation of a Community-wide Open-Source Exploitation Program. Such a program would exploit automation and communications technologies currently available in the government and the private sector to: a) improve cooperation and cohesiveness among providers of open-source materials, and b) allow the individual analyst more direct and convenient access to open-source products as well as the capability to integrate open-source with classified information. Wherever possible, this program would be implemented via evolutionary improvements that draw upon existing computer and communications systems. Functionally, the improvements would:
  - service all members of the Intelligence Community, especially its S&T centers, with a timely flow of open-source material;
  - provide analysts with on-line access to each other;
  - deliver materials in a way that is convenient for analysts at their desks;
  - produce enhanced output from data bases by providing better access for analysts, eliminating duplication among data bases before making information available to analysts, and allowing the analysts to manipulate the results of the searches;
  - contain an on-line accessible, coordinated data base of publications on order;
  - contain an accessible distributed data base of materials translated and in process of translation with due dates;
  - contain specialized catalogs of open-source holdings;
  - provide on-line ordering of materials through appropriate information service points which can access any acquisition channel;
  - maintain comprehensive data bases of categories of open-source materials as reference information that is properly indexed, scannable in various ways, retrievable, and electrically deliverable;

SECRET

SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS ON PROCESSING OVERT S&T INFORMATION

- provide delivery of full-text information, including delivery in hard-copy form in a timely manner; and
- provide these services through networked computers that facilitate access by multiple users in associated agencies.
- o A phased implementation plan with a specific date for an initial operational capability for the program improvements should be developed by the Information Handling Committee through involvement of major providers and users. Of the major providers, FTD and FBIS will play a central role, with  participating where appropriate.
- o The Executive Steering Group that was established to focus attention on open-source exploitation will have a continuing responsibility for overseeing all Open Source Service Community policy matters relating to both the long- and near-term recommendations identified above.

25X1

**Page Denied**

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Intelligence Information Handling Committee  
WASHINGTON, DC 20505

IHC/MM 86-09  
10 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

25X1 FROM:

Chairman, Intelligence Information  
Handling Committee

SUBJECT: Intelligence Information Handling  
Committee (IHC) 1986 Off-Site Conference

1. The Intelligence Community has developed, in COINS, a major automated information resource with worldwide reach which is now entering an era of major expansion and modernization. The Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS), which will greatly expand the availability of COINS services to military commands around the world, has begun to come online; and, in the spring of this year, the initial operating capability of the Community Information Retrieval System (CIRS) will provide, via COINS and DODIIS, rapid access to in-depth data bases of Community intelligence product. In 1986, the Community will also begin design and planning attendant to implementation of the DCI's initiative directed toward substantially improving the availability to Community analysts of open source information.

2. These programs are clearly interrelated and, along with others unmentioned, represent an immense resource for support of Community operations. Their proper employment requires a level of integrative planning capable of cutting across individual program lines and looking at support requirements and the potential for meeting them in broader perspective. This need extends to the burgeoning intelligence support relationship between the intelligence and law enforcement communities, most notably in the narcotics interdiction and counter-terrorism areas. The extension of Intelligence Community information handling services into the law enforcement operating environment has generated a range of new functional, legal, and security issues that must be factored into Community system development and operating strategies.

3. Overall, there is the challenge of computer security and the management judgments that need to be made regarding acceptable level of risk relative to operating restrictions that would have to be imposed in order to minimize system security vulnerability. Trade-off issues of this nature are particularly relevant to systems of the kind mentioned above, which involve broadly based organizational networks, a large number of dispersed system access points, and diverse data bases. In the current absence of effective

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

technical means for totally eliminating system vulnerability to penetration, continuing implementation of such systems requires recognition of the risks involved and the adoption of interim technical and procedural measures to contain them. These, in turn, need to be supported by realistic and useful policy and resource guidance.

25X1 4. Within the context outlined above, I propose to devote the 1986 IHC Off-Site Conference [redacted] 20-22 April, to a goal-oriented consideration of the course of Community automated information handling strategy. Our objectives will be: (1) to seek a consensual formulation of Community goals regarding development of information handling capabilities and support services in the next three years; (2) to review the status of relevant information handling programs and planned additional development; and (3) to explore, on a cross-program basis, strategies for achieving the indicated capability and service goals, including recommendations concerning DCI policy and fiscal guidance and potential joint initiatives with the Secretary of Defense.

5. You are cordially invited to attend the conference, which will commence with a reception and dinner on the evening of 20 April, followed by an overview session on conference issues. The next day and a half will be devoted to briefings and discussions focusing on the subjects and objectives outlined above. A specific agenda and details concerning travel and administrative arrangements will be provided later.

25X1 6. Please advise [redacted] of your attendance plans by 21 March  
25X1 1986. He can be reached at [redacted] and can  
25X1 answer any questions you might have. The IHC staff and I look forward to seeing you at the conference.



CONFIDENTIAL



**Page Denied**