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SUBJECT: (Optional)

Presentation by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

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PRESENTATION BY

DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

TO THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

24 SEPTEMBER 1987

Bob, Director, ladies and gentlemen, let me first of all say how very genuinely pleased I am to be here. I am pleased for three basic reasons. First of all, and I say this not to gain a sympathetic audience, but because I genuinely feel so, I consider the Agency and the people who work in it, not only essential to the U.S. national security, but really to represent what American Government has the best to offer. I have known the Agency over the years, for many years in fact. In the early stages of my academic career I developed a variety of contacts with the Agency and I have always been enormously impressed by the ability, the dedication, the intelligence of the people working in this Agency. There was a time when people working here were getting the credit they deserved from the nation at large and that was rewarding and gratifying. There was a time when this was not the case, and it was frustrating and unjust. I think we are back to the days when the country at large, in the main, understands not only the centrality of what is being done here and by your colleagues abroad, but understands also that the people who serve here do so out of commitment, out of patriotism, and are making a very vital contribution. In my own personal experience in Government, I never had better people

working for me than people from the Agency. So, it really is for me a source of deep satisfaction to be able to stand on this podium and to speak to you.

Secondly, it is a pleasure to be in an institution headed by Judge Webster, whom I have known over the years and with whom I collaborated when I was serving in the White House and whose leadership and integrity qualities are not only well established but generally hailed. I think it is really a felicitous coincidence of events that he can now head this important Agency. And added to his many attributes is the fact that he, unfortunately, is a better tennis player than I am.

And the last, but not least, it is really a very special opportunity to stand here having been introduced by my former associate, Bob Gates. Bob Gates worked with me in the White House and throughout his service I was impressed by his insights, indeed his wisdom. One of the first things he said to me when I assumed office was, "You and the DCI should be natural allies. You should work together." Well, I tried, and I thought his wisdom was well taken. In any case, I am delighted to see him here and I know that he has contributed enormously to the analytical and overall organizational high standards that this Agency has been setting over the years.

This is by way of introduction, I want to say, because I really feel this way. Let me begin by telling you what it is I intend to talk to you about, as the basis for some exchange of views, and then let me do what I intend to do. I intend to focus my remarks on the American Soviet relationship, since clearly that is still the

central geostrategic relationship in the world, though I do not slight the importance of other problems. Nonetheless, for quite a few years to come it is this relationship that will be the central preoccupation insofar as our national security is concerned, and hence I will focus on it. In doing so, I will first focus on the broad geopolitical trends as I see them. Secondly, I will raise some questions that I consider to be of major importance for the future. And then thirdly, in the light of the foregoing, I would like to share with you some thoughts regarding the basic intelligence needs of the top policymakers as I see them in the light of my own perception of the situation, and, indeed, also my own experience. So that is the agenda that I propose to cover.

Broad geopolitical trends. The point of departure for any discussion of broad geopolitical trends in the American-Soviet relationship is to identify the foci side of the American-Soviet contest, and in my judgment, that contest manifests itself primarily in three areas which can be identified and which I have tried to identify in some of my writings as the three central strategic fronts of the American-Soviet rivalry. And these, to put it very neatly, and somewhat obviously, are the Western front, the Eastern front, and the Southwestern front--all of them involved in the continent of Eurasia. But to this day and since 1945, the American-Soviet contest is ultimately centered on the question as to who will or will not control the Eurasian continent, and it thus pits a very major transoceanic power against a very major land mass power. That land mass power normally would dominate the Eurasian continent. It seizes on historical destiny, as so predisposed

and certainly after World War II with the destruction both in Western Europe and in the Far East, the Soviet Union was in a position to assert preponderance over all of Eurasia. It was the entrance into the picture of the transoceanic power which established bridgeheads on the fringes of this enormous Eurasian continent that altered the emerging power situation and, indeed, provided then for the ongoing rivalry that has lasted to this day. For just as the main land mass power, the Soviet Union, sees its sway over this entire continent as a logical outcome of its geopolitical position, so too the transoceanic power across the seas, the United States, with the two oceans on its sides, sees these oceans as an extension of its influence, and, therefore, those entities on the peripheries of Eurasia that are culturally related to it as normal extensions of its own power. And thus it is not an historical accident nor an aberration that the Western European peninsula, which, in fact, is a small extension of the Eurasian continent, became allied with the United States, and that the United States established an entrenched bridgehead on the Far East, in Japan and South Korea.

And that represents the first two fronts and in the last 15 years a third front was emerged, the Southwest Asian front, involving that area that includes Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the height which is the Persian Gulf. For many years this was not the area of American-Soviet contestation. American allies were politically preponderant but the area was not a focal point of contest. In the last 15 years it has become that--in the wake of the collapse of Iran and the Soviet aggression into Afghanistan.

Till then the Persian Gulf region was sheltered by a strategic line which could be drawn across the northern frontiers of Turkey, Iran, northwest Pakistan, with Afghanistan as a neutral buffer. The neutral buffer is gone. Iran has defected, so to speak, from the American camp and is subject to internecine warfare and potential instability. Pakistan is threatened. And, thus, this has emerged as a major contestation zone in the American-Soviet rivalry.

Of these three fronts, looking ahead, I think one is justified in saying that the most stable, politically and militarily, is the Far East area. It is unlikely that in the foreseeable future, by which one means five to ten years ahead, fundamental changes will take place. To be sure there could be some spark igniting a new conflict - let's say North versus South Korea - but, by and large, the geopolitical strategic lines have been firmly drawn and are based on the reality of a growing capacity of Japan, on the reality of a firm statehood existing in China, and the prospects for increased Chinese modernization, on the fact that there aren't too many possibilities for significant military or political breakthroughs.

The most dangerous front, clearly, is the third front. It is the front in which there is the possibility simultaneously for political upheaval, ideological revolution, and military confrontation, and it is unlikely the situation will alter. Indeed, it may become worse in the course of the next five to ten years. And thus, this is the area where there is the highest potential for some direct American-Soviet collision, if not at least indirect collision, of the type that has already been taking place in

Afghanistan and through shadow-boxing even currently in the Persian Gulf.

The first front, the Far Western front, which involves Europe, in my judgment, is not susceptible to change militarily, but it is susceptible to political change, perhaps. Because on both sides of the dividing line a more fluid political situation is developing, and while it is unlikely that political change would produce fundamentally different consequences from what exists today, nonetheless, it could induce qualitatively important changes. In the West, there is no doubt that there is some propensity towards neutralism. There is some anxiety about relationship with the United States. There is, of course, in the case of the Germans, a magnetic attraction towards the East, partially motivated by national, partially motivated by economic impulses. And in Eastern Europe, of course, you have the process underway increasing the physical, which can best be described by the words organic rejection of a doctrine and a system imposed on the region on the basis of a totally alien historical experience. And this process is gaining momentum. It is gaining momentum.

And thus, in Europe, on the first central strategic front, there is the potential for political change but probably, in my judgment, with the highest probability without a military confrontation. In the Far East, on the second central strategic front, I see continued political, economic, ideological competition, but with the lines relatively stable and firmly drawn, and no basic alteration for the balance. And in the third front, there is the potential for collision, upheaval and uncertainty. And this is the

way I perceive, therefore, the true political structure of the American-Soviet rivalry.

In that context, two further points should be made. The Soviet Union, in being a rival to the United States, remains and will remain for a long time to come a unique historical rival. Unique historically. Unique in that it is unlike any previous rival for regional or global preponderance. Global rivalry between an established number one power and a rising anti-status quo power is not new. That has been the central reality of international affairs for centuries--whether one thinks of Britain and Spain, or the struggle for continental supremacy between England and France, or between clusters of continental powers, or even more recently the two world wars. That is normal reality. But what has been characteristic of that reality was that the number one was always challenged by number two on a comprehensive basis. The power that preponderated was a preponderant military power, cultural power, financial power, economic power and the challenger tended to offer challenge in all of these dimensions. Napoleonic France was as much a potential military power, though more of a land power than naval power, than Britain. It offered a cultural challenge as well. A powerful cultural challenge. It had the wherewithal for establishment of financial economic preponderance with the European system, had it emerged supreme. The same thing can be said in different ways, even of Germany, in the two world wars, and the democratic powers.

What is unique about the Soviet challenge is that it is entirely one dimensional. It is only in the military area. There

was a time, until recently, that the Soviet Union offered some additional challenges. It offered for awhile an ideological challenge. More so in the 20's than in the 30's. Somewhat more again in the late 40's because of the prestige of its victory in World War II, continuing into the 50's, but then increasingly declining. Today the Soviet Union is not an ideological rival. Today the Soviet Union is quite literally an ideological embarrassment even to the International Communist movement. There isn't a single Communist party around the world that will state in its program, which is designed to gain adherents for it, that if it wins power it will build a system in the country it will dominate, emulating the Soviet experience. It still would have said that 20 years ago. Today every Communist party goes out of its way to tell you that, if it comes to power, it will avoid the mistakes of the Soviet experience. That is its main thrust--in some cases very explicitly so, such as the Italian Communist Party. You know the case obliquely. An International Communist movement is in desperate search of a model. There really isn't very many models for it anymore because all models look pretty bad. But the Soviet Union ideologically is not a rival. It really has no longer any ideological cultural appeal - none. And what's more, the Soviet leaders now, at least some of them, recognize this.

The Soviet Union at least for awhile, was an economic rival to the United States. Khrushchev, as recently as of 25 years ago, predicted explicitly and had the prediction enshrined in the party program, that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States economically by 1970 and in per capita terms in 1980. That

prediction has been shamefacedly depleted from the last Soviet party program adopted within the last two years because it is an embarrassing reminder of what has happened in the last 25 years. Not only the relative, but the absolute gap between the United States and the Soviet Union has widened. I do not speak here even of the qualitative gap. Today the United States has 45 times as many computers per head as the Soviet Union to take but just one example, and there are many others in different areas of high science and ultratech. The fact is the Soviet Union is not an economic rival. It is not an ideological rival. Financially it has nothing to offer the world community were it to emerge as a governing power. It is clinging desperately to the status of parity on the basis of military power and it is trying to use its military power to enhance the scope of its influence and to place the United States on the defensive, particularly in the unguarded historical contestation for Eurasia. And it is using that military power skillfully and well, and we should not underestimate its importance. We should also bear in mind that it is a one dimensional rival, which if checkmated militarily effectively, really ceases to be a very major rival and Soviet leaders know that. But our own capacity to respond depends then on our understanding of the problem and our national preoccupations, and that leads me to the further point on this discussion of basic geopolitical trends, namely our own future and our own capacity to sustain the rivalry.

Here the big question mark I have is whether we do have the national will, the national perspective, the national determination,

to carry on that rivalry in a manner permitting us eventually to prevail by winning successively in the different phases of the competition. We have won ideologically. We have won economically. We must prevail militarily in some fashion depending on how one wishes to define that. And here the question marks are real. They are not speculative. First of all, I think there is a real danger that if the situation in Central America gets out of hand, if we mismanage that issue, as I think the prospects are reasonably high that we will, the problem will get worse. And as the problem gets worse in Central America, it will probably begin to merge with a wider series of difficulties in the Caribbean and particularly in Mexico. The situation in Haiti is getting bad from day to day. The situation in Mexico is ambivalent and ambiguous at best, but the underlying trends certainly give you pause and give you grounds for concern. Were these issues in a cluster to begin to explode, I think there is real, real danger that our preoccupation with security problems will divert it Southward. That is all we will think about. Our capacity to sustain our global engagement will be weakened and in that context we may find it difficult to sustain the kind of commitments we have assumed.

Necessarily connected with it is the question mark about our economic prospects. It is probable that in the course of the next administration we will have a recession. We haven't had one. The cyclical thrust indicates that we should expect one some time in the course of the next five or six years and that will certainly effect also our capacity to operate. Accumulatively this will impose major strains on our defense budget, force us into some major

reallocations, and could affect adversely our capacity to exploit the advantages that historically have accrued to us in the course of our competition with the Soviets, and make it more difficult for us to push forward with the strategy designed to alter the nature of the American-Soviet relationship in a fashion that would permit us retroactively then to conclude that, in fact, we have prevailed.

All of that, of course, is premised on a series of more specific questions regarding the future, and let me turn to these because, perhaps, these may also be matters we will wish to discuss jointly, and I would like simply to register some of the questions marks and make some preliminary comments about some of these larger issues that we need to ponder.

Clearly, the central question of American-Soviet relationship is the internal future of the Soviet Union. What can we expect in the course of the next decade? What more specifically in the context of the framework that I have outlined can we anticipate for Gorbachev and for the Soviet Union? There is a tendency, I think, in our public analysis to oscillate between optimism about the scale of change and pessimism based on historical analogies drawn particularly from Khrushchev's experience. My own inclination is to be skeptical about both. The limits to internal reform in the Soviet Union, in my judgment, are very sharply drawn, but it doesn't follow from it that the Khrushchevian experience needs to be replicated.

The major stumbling block to Soviet reform, in my judgment, in addition to the obvious institutional impediments, is something much more fundamental. And that is the central fact that political

economic reform is being explored and its scope is being defined in a preliminary sense in a multi-national empire. That to me is the central question and the central dimension of political change in the Soviet Union.

For years I have argued that in our assessment of the Soviet Union we have not given sufficient importance to the fact that we are dealing with a multi-national empire, and that we have permitted our own public consciousness, our own vision of the Soviet Union, to produce an identity between it and the word Russia. Whereas, in fact, the Soviet Union is not Russia. The Soviet Union is a Russian empire which exists in the age of nationalism. And any reform in the Soviet Union is bound to confront that reality, as it already has started even more rapidly than I had expected - having for years argued that this is the Achilles heel and potentially the central issue for the remaining decades of the century for the Soviet Union. But what has happened in Kazakhstan or Vilnyus or Riga are preliminaries to what is likely to happen subsequently in Kiev, and Lvov, and Tbilisi, and Yerevan, and elsewhere. And that is going to pose a very sharp challenge to the Soviet reformers. Because, in effect, it will force them to confront a problem that you cannot have far reaching economic reform without political consequences. And political consequences are related to political culture and political self-identity.

To put it differently, you can reform China by decentralizing it economically, and it still remains China politically. Can you reform the Soviet Union economically and still remain the Soviet Union politically? That is the question in the age of nationalism

and it is not an easy one to answer given the inbuilt intolerance, the inbuilt suppression, the inbuilt bitter memories of the past, and the subterranean reality of national life in the Soviet Union.

There was a wonderful article in Literaturnaya Gazeta that some of you may have read - those of you who follow Soviet affairs - on Sufism, and it was based entirely on Western sources. What was so striking to me was there was an admission by the Soviets that this underground political religious life exists and it wouldn't have been printed if it wasn't an acknowledgment of something that was far reaching.

Similarly we need to think in this context of the nature of political change in Eastern Europe. I have already spoken about the turmoil and change in Eastern Europe. I have suggested Eastern Europe is politically subject to change. But the deeper question to which an answer needs to be sought is what kind of political change will produce what kind of new political elites? The East European political elite is changing at the highest level quite obviously because of the imminence of the problems of succession. But a deeper change is taking place within it in terms of ideological evolution, in terms of professional change, in terms of cultural identity and what kind of a political elite is likely to dominate these European countries. I have recently been to Hungary and to Poland and I was struck, particularly in Hungary, by the changes in the character of the political elite. That is to say, there is a qualitative transformation in their mental set, in their cultural mold, in their view of the world, irrespective of their ideological self-identification and institution loyalty. It really is less

important what subjectively they think they are and more important to ask what objectively have they become. And the same set of questions, I think, pertains to Eastern Europe because it is pregnant with political consequences.

We need also to think hard about changes in the strategic realm in connection with the foregoing. We know, of course, that geostrategic change is driven both by budgets and by technology. And here I think we may well be on the brink of some fundamental changes as well which will impose new intellectual tasks on us. For one thing, we may well be coming to the end of the era in which offensive military systems have dominated over defensive systems. The initiation of that era in military warfare can be precisely timed in 1917, not because of the Bolshevik revolution, but because of introduction of the aircraft and the tank into the last phases of World War I. And that produced, in its wake, a very basic change of the concepts of warfare. Till then, somewhere from the mid-nineteenth century, roughly from the American Civil War, defensive fire power, particularly built around the machine gun and artillery, preponderated and inflicted high casualties on rather static military forces. The introduction of the tank and the plane introduced mobility. It produced a number of theorists ranging from Mitchell here to Tukhachevskiy in the Soviet Union to Douhet in Italy to Guderian in Germany, who thought through the notion of rapidity of maneuver, rapid breakthrough exploitation and produced, in effect, the era dominated by offensive warfare. And the high point of that, of course, was reached with the introduction of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles which put a

premium on offensive warfare to a point that we have both adopted offensive strategies of a suicidal type.

The fact is that this has not only become expensive but, perhaps, increasingly redundant. Modern technology is producing the possibility now of favorable trade-offs for defensive systems, both on the strategic and non-strategic levels and the question that arises for the future is how the two will be assimilated and in what fashion and with what strategic consequences. And that, of course, imposes the prospects of very basic strategic changes in our respective postures. Particularly it is symbiotic defense-offensive strategy gradually adopted as I think it will be by both sides. And it will impose, of course, enormous obligations for much heightened verification capacities, particularly on the part of the United States, because both systems are likely to be relatively mobile. And hence the main tendency of the balance between offense and defense in your own strategy will be as important as also the maintenance of the balance in our relationship with our opponent.

Related to all of this, of course, will be subordinate questions such as how do we maintain a defensiveness of our alliances, what kind of technological innovation will have to be assimilated by them with what kind of political consequences. These are all large strategic questions which loom on the horizon and which are likely to be confronted by our political leadership in the not too distant future.

And that brings me to the third and concluding part of my comments to you, my sharing of some informal thoughts with you - namely what are the needs of top policymakers in so far as

intelligence is concerned. Now here, of course, I will speak to some extent objectively, but, hopefully, generalizing somewhat beyond some of my own personal experiences, interests and proclivities. I would put it this way, the top political decisionmakers need intelligence of three types - they need political intelligence, they need geopolitical intelligence, and they need strategic intelligence.

By political intelligence, I mean something quite simple and yet terribly important. A top policymaker truly needs to know, to the extent that it is possible to know, what is the strategizing of our adversary. How is our enemy formulating this strategy, what is the nature of our enemy's strategy and tactics? The more specifically one knows that the better, because that is absolutely central to the process of decision making oneself. The more one knows about that, the better one is off in one's own decision making, the less one operates in the darkroom with the windows drawn and the lights shut off, which is often the case, figuratively speaking, when one sits in the situation room at the White House. What we can know about our enemy's intentions and plans is absolutely central. And that, of course, involves very high reliance on human penetration of other governments and, particularly, the most hostile governments. It involves, of course, intercepts, decoding, and long range plans in the other side's officialdom.

I know, for example, that in the efforts to deter the Soviet Union from invading Poland in December of 1980, information provided from this building, and obtained from a courageous Polish colonel,

who for reasons of patriotism, decided to volunteer such information to the United States, and who himself was integrally related to not only the Polish high command but to the Warsaw high command, was of absolutely central importance in the kinds of consultations, debates, and decisions that we made in the White House. It was literally directly related. The fact that we had that information, the fact that we knew what the timing was, the fact that we knew what the military dispositions were, the fact that we knew what some of the political considerations involved were, enabled us very deliberately to do what we did, and to draw certain lessons from past experiences where we didn't do what we needed to do, in part because we knew less. Particularly in mind is the experience of 1968, where both our decision making and our substantive information was less than adequate. And that was absolutely essential. And this is the kind of political intelligence which informs decisionmakers in a manner which is absolutely essential to that grand chess game - it is as if one knew what your opponent was planning to make for his next three or four moves. And I consider that kind of political intelligence to be absolutely essential.

Second is geopolitical intelligence which is also very important. By geopolitical intelligence and, again I am looking at it from a vantage point of the decisionmaker, you may have different categories for describing the same things and you may structure the argument differently, but I am trying to give you a sense of how it looks to us. By geopolitical intelligence, I mean essentially some refined understanding of politically significant trends. That is to say, some definition of the larger thrust of historical change.

What can one anticipate as the broad secular dynamics within the Soviet Union more specifically. What can one project forward as the limits or scope of Sino-Soviet accommodation and how far is it likely to go. With what kind of policy implications for each of the two major powers? With what kind of political changes in theirleadership? What is the likely scope and outer limits of the national questions of the Soviet Union? What kind of developments one can reasonably anticipated, with what kind of tradeoffs and consequences for other policies, such as economic decentralization, Glasnost, the organization of political power in relations to outside countries. This kind of geopolitical intelligence provides the framework for the political intelligence within which then our top policymakers have to make their decisions. This is not easy to do, but it is very important.

And the third strategic intelligence, by which I mean what do our opponents have; what kind of assets and leverage can they weld; what are the tangible and intangible dimensions of their power which they can apply against us in the pursuit of their strategy and in keeping with historical trends as intelligence items defined? But more importantly than what they have is even the question, what can they do with it? For in my judgment the truly part of any net assessment is not an identification of what the other side has, but an intelligence discussion of what it can do with it. What is the importance of certain margins of advantage or the unimportance of these margins of advantage? What can they actually and practically do either with their military assets or with their political opportunities or with whatever else has been identified as providing

the capacity for the other side to act?

Now, in the light of my own experience but also beyond it in the sense that I have been involved in a variety ways with this administration on some sensitive national security matters and I was previously involved, also marginally, in some other administrations, but particularly based on my own experience, I would say categorically that you perform brilliantly and effectively with regards to the third. That is to say, in terms of strategic intelligence, I think what the U.S. decisionmakers obtain from you is absolutely first-rate and, in my judgment, better than any other leadership in the world obtains from its intelligence services. It is extremely well done, well structured and especially in the first half of the third requirement. That is to say, what do our opponents have in so far as strategic intelligence is concerned. In terms of what they can do with it, I think there is room for improvement. For that requires more refined judgments, perhaps some speculative judgments, but it is the area of assessment which, of course, is of critical importance to the decisionmaker.

When it comes to the second category, geopolitical intelligence, I would say the record is so-so. On the record is so-so largely because of the culture imperatives of our own society of which we are all products and the culture imperatives of our own society make us uncongenial to the acquisition of a feel for other societies. Largely because we neither teach history nor geography. Largely because, in the absence of history and geography, we really cannot successfully, intellectually empathize with what makes other societies tick. And unless we do so we do not understand really

well how other societies evolve and change. I think this is a very basic intellectual failure of our society which one senses, not only here, but which one senses very much, for example in the journalistic community. Where journalism is equally uninformed when it comes to trends and, therefore, finds refuge in a preoccupation with events or hard disparate facts. I often say that Americans have more access to more information about the world than any people in the world and probably understand it less than many people in the world. Largely because facts by themselves are not sufficient. Facts are only, or should be, only links in a large chain. But that link is established is established by an understanding of history and geography and the interrelationship between the two, by which I subsume also literature, religion, outlook, cultural behavior of different people in different circumstances. And that is critically essential to an understanding of what might be called geopolitical trends.

We are weakest still, despite improvements made over the last number of years, in the area of political intelligence. Here to this day, on many crucial issues top policymakers operate in the semi-dark, if not in total darkness. The fact of the matter is that we have not developed over the last several decades a tradition, a pattern of behavior, which enables us to develop long range assets. What is commonly called moles in sufficient numbers in governments that are hostile to us. The situation has become somewhat better in recent years and I am very cognizant of that, in spite of some losses, but by and large we are deficient in this respect , in my judgment, in comparison to several intelligence services in the

world. But not only of an adversary type - some, perhaps, of a semiadversary type. But the fact is that we simply do not have the kind of assets that we should have and certainly after 40 years of sustained efforts we should have by now developed. And these seeds take a long time to mature and to blossom and they have to be planted early and they have to be cultivated and one has to develop again a whole tradition of operations which enables one to do so on a scale that is sufficient. But this is where in my judgment, the deficiency still to this day is the most acute.

Let me finally conclude by a brief word which is related to the question of what the top policymakers need and that is the process. How to translate for the decisionmakers information that is helpful to them.

If the top decisionmakers know what they need, they will ask for it. That is, of course, simple. It makes it easy for the DCI, makes it easy for the Agency. The problem is that more often than not the top decisionmakers don't know what they need. And there are periods when top decisionmakers are more ignorant than at other times and there have been such times. And the more ignorant a top decisionmaker is about the world the less likely he is to ask the right questions and to know what he wants. And one has to face the fact that there are times in our political history when the President or the National Security Advisor or the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense or all of them are to a large extent ignorant. In which case it

puts even a higher premium on the DCI and the Agency to provide what is needed. As I said, there are times when they know what to ask. There are times when some of them know more than others and there are times when none of them know. And this is essential, therefore, to make sure that the President and his chief advisors have an awareness of the larger strategic and trend dimensions of international affairs and are not merely informed about facts. Not just facts which are, of course, interesting in themselves, but above all else infusion into their mindset of the notion of strategic change and of historical trends. And that to me is a central educational role that the Agency and the Director can play in regards to intelligence, and in regards particularly to the intelligence that the top policymakers need. That means, in turn, that the Agency itself, in feeding material to top policymakers, has to stress these dimensions of strategic change and historical trends and package its information in that context so that that message comes through loud and clear and begins to inform the mind of the recipient.

Secondly, I think it is terribly important to use the President's Daily Brief to that end and to use regular access to the President for that purpose. For the access to the President, either through the Daily Brief or through regularly scheduled briefing sessions, should not be used to convey information as from time to time in the past primarily it had been, but it should be used to infuse the President's mind with strategic intelligence, to shape his sense of the world, to

inform him in a dynamic sense of what is happening on the world scene. Transferral of facts in the Presidential briefing, in my mind, is not a useful employment of that time, as it was the problem occasionally over the years past. It is an opportunity to structure the President's vision and it is a very special opportunity. If one can structure the President's vision of the world one is determining his understanding of the world and one is really then shaping policy. The Agency is not to shape policy, of course, but the Agency is not irrelevant to policy and if one's vision of the world gets shaped by informed frameworks, one is really influencing policy in the most decisive of ways and that is a very special opportunity for an Agency that is supposed to produce intelligence. Intelligence meaning a broad strategic vision.

Thirdly, I think it is essential that the DCI and the top officials participate regularly and frequently in formal top strategizing sessions. That is to say, sessions which really define longer range policy thrusts. And that, in turn, means that equally important is their participation in informal sessions of that type, for a great deal of policy is made informally either through ad hoc meetings engaging the President and his top advisors, or quite often informal meetings just of two or three of the President's top decisionmakers. The breakfast or lunch between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Advisor, can be a terribly important mechanism for shaping, on an ad hoc basis, and incrementally what becomes national strategy. And hence

direct involvement in that is critical. It is not easy to achieve. There are bureaucratic obstacles to it. In the past there have even been personal obstacles to it in the sense that some people were deliberately excluded. But it is very important to overcome that if the process that emanates from here is to infuse the decision making with that critical dimension of strategizing which is intelligence as the point of departure for strategically organized process making.

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