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SUBJECT: Jim Covert

Central Intelligence Agency



OCA 87-0417

Washington, D.C. 20505

19 FEB 1987

The Honorable Jim Courter
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Courter:

Thank you for sending the Agency your recent articles on SDI deployment, the contras, drug trafficking, terrorism, and the Iran arms deal. Bill Casey always found your writings of great interest, and I hope you will continue to share them with me.

If the Agency can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

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Washington, D. C. 20505

OCA 87-0417

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Washington, D.C. 20505

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5 Feb '87

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
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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515



January 30, 1987

The Honorable William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear William:

The nation's 100th Congress is underway, and it promises to be a very important one for issues of great mutual interest, including SDI, aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, and the perennial problem of international terrorism.

It remains unclear whether congressional opponents of the contras will be able to use the Iran arms sales affair to break apart the bipartisan coalition which, less than six months ago, agreed to the largest aid package ever. More positive movement is evident on strategic defenses. Prospects for deploying initial phases of defensive technology during the Reagan Administration seemed remote a short time ago; now I believe we are on the verge of an important announcement from the White House. Some of my thoughts on these and other subjects are reflected in the enclosed articles.

The Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran is now beginning to choose its staff and consider the scope of its work. I am proud to be a part of the inquiry, and hope that whatever the course of its proceedings, the President will press forward vigorously with his foreign policy agenda. The continuing weakness of the Democrats' alternative foreign policy program (please see the American Politics article) is an indicator of how important it is to keep the Reagan Revolution alive abroad as well as at home.

I hope these articles are of interest, and I solicit your comments and criticisms.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in cursive that reads "Jim".

JIM COURTER
Member of Congress

JAC/ch
Enclosures



G L O B A L

Rhetoric Vs. Reality

"New" Democratic Foreign Policy is More of the Same.

by Jim Courter

One thing most observers of the presidential election of 1984 agree about is that the outcome turned on some clear differences between Republican and Democratic principles articulated in their respective party platforms.

Running on the most isolationist platform ever drafted by a major political party, Walter Mondale, Geraldine Ferraro and other Democratic candidates were swamped in every state but one in the 1984 Reagan Republican landslide. Perhaps never before has a platform been so completely repudiated by the electorate.

As we approach the next Presidential election, it is not surprising that Democratic leaders are anxiously searching for some new approach to foreign policy in an effort to put the 1984 platform catastrophe behind them and revive the old image of their party's pre-McGovernite internationalism.

Thus, my colleague Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), one of the Democrats' most thoughtful and influential leaders, recently chaired a Democratic Task Force on Foreign Policy and summarized the panel's recommendations in *American Politics*' November issue ["Towards A Democratic Foreign Policy"]. The Task Force was clearly intended to come up with an alternative to the repudiated San Francisco platform.

The "Towards" in the title of Rep. Solarz' article implies that the Democrats are not yet agreed on one foreign policy. In fact, Solarz emphasizes that there is still no consensus in his party on the direction foreign policy should take. But although "no Democrat accepts every position adopted by the majority," he believes a large majority of Democrats support the "principles set forth in our report."

In other words, it is admitted that the report does not provide a central vision or reflect a coherent overview of international affairs. On the contrary, it merely summarizes the different and contradictory views of the radical and moderate wings now warring for control of the Democratic Party.

Congressman Solarz's article consisted of two parts. Part one is a list of eight guidelines offered as a basis for foreign policy decisions. I find it striking that the first two points address the Soviet threat in language Democratic leaders have nearly forgotten

how to speak in the last decade.

Yet in part two of the article, where these principles are supposed to be specifically applied, it is striking that there is not a single example of a practical or concrete proposal to counter the Soviet threat so prominently addressed among the guidelines of part one. On the contrary, whereas the guidelines begin with two pronouncements against Soviet adventurism, the specifics begin by demanding continued adherence to the SALT II and ABM treaties, two highly flawed agreements the Soviets have repeatedly violated.

Rarely has the gap between a party's principles and its practice been so wide and so obvious.

But there is more. One need only reread the 1984 Mondale platform to realize that every one of the seven or eight specific policy applications the Solarz article mentions comes from that very document! Nuclear test bans, ASAT agreements, the anti-Reagan Central America agenda, the "Contadora" process, and so on, the whole agenda describing, in Solarz's words, "where Democratic leadership would take the nation for the rest of this decade and beyond," in fact, is lifted right out of the repudiated platform.

Speaking as a member of the 1984 Republican platform committee, I am proud that there is no contradiction between my party's principles and practices as outlined in our campaign statement. Rather, our platform is notable for its close, tight consistency.

We Republicans recognized that the globalist Soviet ideology in principle threatened freedom and peace everywhere—and we concluded that negotiations with the Soviets cannot be separated from Soviet behavior around the world.

We recognized that the Soviet Union has engaged in a "sustained pattern" of treaty violations, particularly as regards the SALT and ABM agreements—and we deduced that as a matter of policy the U.S. must not compromise its defense deterrent just for the sake of getting *any* arms control treaty with our enemy.

We emphasized that the first principle of liberal democracy is human equality from which our natural rights as human beings are derived. We completely rejected the

posture of moral equivalence and declared that there is a deep moral gulf between democracies and Marxist-Leninist regimes. From this we concluded that America is obligated to assist freedom fighters in Central America, Angola and Afghanistan; we condemned South Africa's apartheid system; and we supported funding for public diplomacy initiatives such as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and USIA.

Republicans recognized that third world poverty is a fertile ground for Communist exploitation—and we concluded that our economic assistance policy should discourage statist and socialist economic systems and foster the creation of democratic capitalism in developing societies everywhere.

One of the most significant principles we Republicans acknowledged was the moral difference between the use of military force for liberation versus force for conquest and expansion. Therefore, we applauded the policy decision to challenge the Brezhnev doctrine and liberate Grenada.

Obeisance to principles of "national ideals" and "national interests" is necessary, but it must be more than rhetorical. It must issue in practical policies that reflect those principles rather than ignoring or even contradicting them. The 1984 Republican platform statement clearly connected policy and principle, and I would argue that the Reagan Administration has compiled an enviable record of basing the operations of its foreign policy squarely on those principles. When majorities in 49 states gave their vote to Ronald Reagan and the Republicans in 1984, they placed their stamp of approval on the Reagan match between policy and principle.

The question Democrats must now answer is: do they or do they not repudiate the platform the Democrats ran on in 1984? Or, to put it another way, can *any* set of grandiloquent principles serve to justify the same isolationist foreign policy outlook which has taken the Democrats down to defeat in three out of the last four Presidential elections? Far more than mere partisanship is at issue here—the future of the United States and the Free World is in question. As long as the Democratic Party, which now controls both houses of Congress, refuses to accept the reality of foreign policy engagement which characterized Democratic administrations from FDR and Truman through John F. Kennedy, their new pro-American rhetoric will not conceal the tendency of their policies to weaken America—and they will never be trusted by the electorate with the Presidency of the United States. ●

Jim Courter, a Republican Congressman from New Jersey, is a member of the House Armed Services Committee.

JIM COURTER

The Washington Times

December 31, 1986


War, peace, and the Congress

In the furor and drama gripping Washington over the Iran "contra" crisis, Congress should not be allowed to escape its share of blame.

I believe there is no excuse for anyone in the Reagan administration or elsewhere to break the law, nor to allow illegalities to go unpunished. But the dilemma which led up to this crisis was at least partly a result of Congress's decade-long attempt to dominate this country's foreign affairs. To the question "isn't anybody in control of foreign policy?" the answer is that Congress has been continuously disputing the executive's authority. There are 536 people at

the wheel, 1,072 hands trying to steer instead of just two. Congressional policy toward Nicaragua has been incoherent, having gone through six reversals in eight years. Laws such as the Boland Amendment forbidding aid to the "contras," the War Powers Act, the Clark Amendment prohibiting aid to UNITA in Angola, and the web of restrictions Congress writes into annual defense and foreign aid appropriations are not only constitutionally suspect but counterproductive for effective foreign policy-making.

The authors of our Constitution would have been disappointed but probably not surprised to hear one senator recently remark, "I bet it's a cold day in Washington, D.C., before



any more money goes to Nicaragua." Congress's tendency to let domestic politics drive foreign-policy objectives was predicted by the men who designed our system of government.

Alexander Hamilton explained why the House of Representatives should not have the power to ratify, let alone make, treaties:

"Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy, and dispatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous." [Emphasis in original]

see COURTER, page 2D

Jim Courter, a Republican member of the House of Representatives from New Jersey, is a member of the Armed Services Committee.

The Case for Early SDI Deployment

By REP. JIM COURTER (R.-N.J.)

President Reagan's heroism at Reykjavik rescued the SDI vision, but those of us who want to see the program become a reality must not be too sanguine about its prospects just yet.

Not only has strategic defense—once considered inappropriate for arms control talks—now become as negotiable as offensive weapons, but the fact is, the SDI program still faces an increasingly uncertain future in the Congress. Under present circumstances, it remains likely that by 1996, the United States will have no SDI program or, at best, a primitive system that contributes little to the defense of our people.

Not so for the Soviet Union. If history is any guide, Soviet SDI capabilities in 1996 will be significantly greater than they are presently, in spite of any agreements that Gorbachev may sign.

The existing Soviet system of ABM interceptors, strategic air defenses, and sophisticated radars will probably be upgraded and augmented by deployment of initial directed and kinetic energy SDI systems. This SDI "shield" will be the barrier behind which remaining illegal Soviet ballistic missiles will continue to threaten the U.S. and her allies.

Against this threat the President has insisted upon retaining the SDI program as an "insurance policy." It is only with such "insurance" against Soviet cheating and unfriendly emerging nuclear weapons states that the drastic reduction or elimination of U.S. ballistic missiles could ever be considered.

But such "insurance" must truly afford protection against the disastrous and the unexpected. An SDI program limited to research, development and testing provides no protection whatsoever in the near term and is highly unlikely to guard the U.S. and her allies at the end of 10 years.

Nevertheless, the President and his senior advisers seem convinced that no worthwhile SDI system could even enter initial deployment within 10 years. Accordingly, they see little harm in waiting 10 years. They hold this view in spite of credible evidence to the contrary which is in their possession.

They also maintain these views in the face of a recent pro-SDI letter to the President, drafted by Dr. Edward Teller, Rep. Jack Kemp and myself, and signed by Senators Wallop, Hollings, Quayle and Wilson; distinguished scientists Robert Jastrow, Lowell Wood and Greg Canavan; and former high-level policymakers, Alexander Haig, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Zbigniew Brzezinski. The message of the letter is direct and powerful: *defenses against Soviet ballistic missiles can and should be deployed as soon as possible.*

The detailed technical and scientific evidence the Administration is holding confirms the points made in the letter: there are SDI systems available for initial deployment within three to five years, some of them compliant with the ABM treaty, all

of them providing some level of protection for population areas.

These systems would be significant by themselves, and they would also constitute the foundation upon which more sophisticated, effective systems could be built. They would, quite simply, provide some protection against Soviet ballistic missiles where none currently exists.

One such system, completely compliant with the



DR. EDWARD TELLER

ABM treaty, would include 100 interceptors based at the dormant Grand Forks, N.D., ABM site. Unlike their crude, nuclear-armed predecessors, these non-nuclear ERIS interceptors would be capable of streaking into space to destroy Soviet ballistic missile warheads in midcourse, as they start their unguided descent to their targets. The warheads may be programmed to attack missile silos or population centers, but the ERIS interceptor would prevent them from reaching their targets.

The 100 ERIS interceptors and the associated computers and radars could be fully deployed at the Grand Forks site by 1993. The projected cost would be approximately \$3 billion, or less than the Congress authorized for the SDI program in 1987 alone.

Another such early deployment proposal involves more exotic space-based SDI satellites deployed in polar orbits around the globe. Each satellite would be capable of firing a large number of guided interceptor rockets, or "kinetic kill vehicles," at Soviet ballistic missiles as they emerge from the atmosphere during the "boost phase" of their flight.

Destroying ballistic missiles in the boost phase, while a great technical challenge, represents one of the most important SDI capabilities. Ballistic missiles are relatively slow and fragile (their

"skin" is but a fraction of an inch thick) and they present large, glowing targets for attack. They are particularly attractive targets because they may each carry as many as 10 or more warheads. Thus, each relatively inexpensive "kinetic kill vehicle" might be capable of destroying several very costly, destructive Soviet missile warheads with a single shot.

Unlike the ERIS proposal, deployment of space-based kinetic energy weapons would violate the ABM treaty. Plans for such systems are not as mature as the blueprints for ERIS deployments. Placement of "battle stations" in orbit may require a great deal of space lift capability, perhaps even precious Space Shuttle flights. Even so, the technology for such systems is so readily available that the "stations" themselves could enter development and eventually deployment within three years.

There are many different proposals for near-term SDI deployment, but they all have one important deterrent factor in common. Properly deployed and fully integrated into our evolving strategic defense doctrine, such systems will introduce uncertainty into Soviet war plans. The geo-strategic leverage exerted by Soviet strategic land-based missile forces will be considerably reduced.

This fact has long ago dawned on the Soviets, and on their General Staff in particular. Marshall S. F. Akhromeyev, the chief of the General Staff, has been one of the most vocal Soviet critics of the SDI program. The commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Y. P. Maksimov, an Akhromeyev subordinate, must have weighed in with dark predictions about the negative effect of imperialistic strategic defense deployments on the "correlation of forces."

The West should not expect that the Soviet High Command will acquiesce in, let alone welcome, a U.S. decision to deploy strategic defenses. But then that should not be a prerequisite for such deployments. The prerequisite should be a determination that Western security demands protection against growing Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces, utopian arms control agreements notwithstanding. Studies making this point abound within the Administration, and more are reportedly in preparation.

In addition to stark national security determinations, there are important internal political forces arguing for near-term SDI deployment. Survey after survey has revealed that the American people want to be defended against Soviet ballistic missiles. They do not demand a leakproof, "Astrodome" defense. They merely seek the best that Western technology can provide in the shortest period of time for the least amount of money.

But Americans also believe President Reagan when he tells them that no strategic defenses can be deployed for 10 years. What they then may not understand is why their representatives in Congress should continue to vote large sums of money for an SDI "science project" which will protect no one in

Rep. Courter is a member of the House Armed Services Committee.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

SDI: Shultz Backs Off

George Shultz's decision to dodge face-to-face discussion with influential defense-oriented Republicans on early deployment of defense against missile attack suggests the secretary of state is backing away from internal conflict.

Just before that decision, he ducked another bureaucratic struggle that was his to resolve. To the anguish of newly installed national security adviser Frank Carlucci, Shultz refused to clamp down on Deputy Secretary John Whitehead's decision to visit Bulgaria. Simultaneously, Shultz faces a more difficult life now that his ally, Sen. Richard Lugar, has been replaced by the prickly right-wing leader, Sen. Jesse Helms, as the Senate's top Republican foreign policy voice.

But his seeming reluctance to exert personal influence on major policy decisions—as reflected by his remoteness from the Iranian arms affair—may cloud a future that three months ago seemed unusually secure. Instead of showing a zest for exercising his power, Shultz is pulling back into his shell amid anonymous White House charges

that he has been insufficiently loyal in the Iran-arms aftermath. That raises speculation that he might retreat right out of the administration.

Such thoughts stem from his unwillingness to discuss the hottest defense issue of Reagan's final two years today with the pro-defense GOP "Gang of Five"—Sen. Pete Wilson, Sen. Dan Quayle, Sen. Malcolm Wallop, Rep. Jim Courter and Rep. Jack Kemp. Instead, he dispatched his arms-control adviser, Paul Nitze.

The five Republicans want the president to commit his administration to early deployment of the first stages of SDI. For Shultz to appear at the appointed hour with a full explanation of diplomatic pros and cons of early deployment, one of the five told us, would have helped his credibility—even if, as expected, he opposed deployment.

His refusal was viewed as an admission that Shultz really will not know how he feels on the deployment issue until the president has made up his own mind, and does not want to be made accountable now.

It is conceivable Shultz merely want-

ed to avoid a contentious session on SDI, an issue where he received his first full-fledged briefing only last Saturday. But that in itself increases the doubts about Shultz's bureaucratic prowess raised by the Iranian arms revelations.

The invitation to Shultz was signed by Courter two weeks ago. It asked whether the secretary and Nitze are opposed to early deployment of SDI. If so, did the reasons have "more to do with U.S.-Soviet relations than with the vulnerability of the U.S. and her allies to ballistic missile attack?" A subject closer to the real world of the secretary of state would be hard to find.

Just before turning down the "Gang of Five," Shultz sidestepped a clash with his strong-willed deputy secretary over Whitehead's personal decision to visit Bulgaria on his forthcoming tour of Eastern Europe. The Sofia regime never has been cleared of complicity in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II.

When an angry Carlucci learned that Whitehead would visit Sofia, he picked up the phone for the first time to question a Shultz decision. Shultz's

startling explanation: he fully agreed Whitehead should not go to Bulgaria but since his deputy had made up his mind, Shultz chose not to intervene.

Carlucci let the matter drop, but it left a bad taste. Bulgaria fails both of the State Department's tests: no high-level visit to communist states unless they are showing new independence from the Soviet Union or unless they have made a human rights breakthrough.

The Bulgarian question is another piece of ammunition for Jesse Helms, who has been Shultz's hair shirt for four years. The secretary's aides warn him that Helms, with his new status, may be far rougher—and possibly more successful—in opposing Shultz on a range of issues from choice of ambassadors to U.S.-Soviet relations.

With that backdrop, the Republican "Gang of Five" was upset and mystified by Shultz's no-show. While it might have been a tactical withdrawal to avoid debate, it looked to the conservatives as though one of Washington's master bureaucrats of the past 15 years was running away.

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WASHINGTON POST 1/28/87

Sunday Star-Ledger



Vol. 73, No. 296 35 Cents

The Newspaper for New Jersey, Sunday, December 21, 1984

2 Jerseyans in spotlight in Iran arms probe

By J. SCOTT ORR
and ROBERT COHEN
Star-Ledger Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — When the House select committee convenes next month to begin its probe of the Iran-contra arms scandal, two New Jersey congressmen of contrasting backgrounds and nearly opposite ideologies will find themselves in the national spotlight.

Rep. Peter Rodino (D-10th Dist.), one of the New Jersey delegation's most liberal members, and Rep. Jim Courter (R-22nd Dist.), one of the state's most conservative congressmen, were named last week by the leaders of their respective parties to the 15 member House investigative panel.

The investigations by the House committee and a similar Watergate-style Senate panel are set to begin shortly after Congress returns next month and are being touted as the definitive congressional look at the worst crisis of the Reagan presidency.

Rodino, 77, nearing the end of his congressional career, and Courter, 45, a rising star in the Republican Party, are the sixth and seventh members of the



Photo by Tim Van Hecke

'We will have to look at the President's actions and what he knew, and if he didn't know what was going on, where is our government going?'

Rep. Peter W. Rodino

Star-Ledger Graphic

New Jersey delegation to join in congressional probes. These investigations to date have focused on the sale of arms to Iran and the secret diversion of the proceeds to aid the contra rebels in their fight to overthrow the government of Nicaragua.

Rodino gained national fame when he presided over the 1974 House Judiciary Committee impeachment proceedings against President Richard Nixon. While he declined to draw direct parallels between the current scandal and Watergate, he said the present situation, like the one a decade ago, has "affected the presidency."

And the New Jersey Democrat emphasized that the House select committee will have a responsibility to take a close look at Reagan's role in the entire affair.

"We will have to look at the President's actions and what he knew," Rodino said. "And if he didn't know what was going on, where is our government going?"

The nation is shaken a crisis upon us," Rodino said. "It has raised questions about the ability of the President to govern and questions of who



Photo by Steve Krieger

'My allegiance is to my oath and my constituents. Not a party or this President or a philosophy'

Rep. James Courter

Star-Ledger Graphic

was governing and running the state. Courter, facing his first major test before a national audience, is a strong ally of President Reagan. But Courter said he is not going into the investigation with a preconceived plan to defend the White House.

The New Jersey Republican said he will be "objective" and "dispassionate" in pursuing the truth. He said he wants to "uncover the facts and find out what happened."

Asked whether his loyalty to the President and the Republican Party might color his views, Courter replied: "My allegiance is to my oath and my constituents, not to a party or this president or a philosophy."

"The American people don't want partisanship," he added.

Courter said he is aware that the committee assignment will put him in the "eye of a hurricane" and that the entire panel and its individual members will be under close scrutiny.

Reflecting on the 1974 hearings into the Watergate scandal, Courter

Please Turn to Page 24

COMMENTARY

Sending Belgrade a signal

JIM COURTER

Americans must have been ill-prepared for Belgrade's arrest of several U.S. citizens for anti-Yugoslav political activity, especially when the politicking occurred in America.

Two generations of Western university professors, politicians, and diplomats have intrigued us so with Yugoslavia's break with Stalin and worker management of Yugoslav industries that most Americans view that country as a model of humane Communism, gentle at home and non-aligned abroad. Billions of dollars worth of Western aid and credits have created an unspoken need to preserve the image.

But sometimes it takes the unwarranted arrest of one of us abroad — one such as Peter Ivezaj of Michigan — to make us see a government through the eyes of its subjects.

As a rule, Belgrade uses the fullness of its police powers, including punishment in psychiatric hospitals, against dissidents. By official admission, hundreds have been sentenced to jail in recent years for political activities.

Such persecution has never stopped at the Yugoslav borders, and the arrest of an American for joining a demonstration in Washington, D.C., six years ago should be less surprising than it was.

The control the ruling League of Communists holds over the country's centrifugal ethnic and political forces constantly requires reassertion. Denunciation of political opponents as "fascists" and "irredentists" has become commonplace.

Emigres who are politically active have become an obsession of the regime, and it appears that the SDS, or Yugoslav secret police, has been deeply involved in killings and intimidation abroad.

In the United States, there is evidence of extortion, provocation within emigre circles, and even murder. There is still more evidence of violence in Western Europe. Five anti-Communist activists were murdered in Munich during the first half of 1969. A Croatian exile, Professor Cizek, was abducted to Yugoslavia a few years ago. Three exiled Serbians — with World War II records as guerrilla partisans, but not Titoists — were killed in Sydney, Chicago, and Vienna within a space of a few days this February.

One might imagine that much of this was coincidental, or the product of the usual tensions that run like fracture lines through many of the world's emigre groups.

But a number of European intelligence services have been objecting for many years to Belgrade about the foreign operations of the SDS.

Second, anger toward Yugoslav exiles is often vented in the government press.

Third, the *Foreign Report of The Economist* points to a meeting early in the year in Belgrade at which an interior ministry called for "action" against anti-government exiles allegedly "dealing in terrorism and propaganda." His generous estimate of their number at 30,000 is an indication of just how deep the obsession runs.

In foreign policy, reality is much at odds with the myth of Yugoslavia as "Communism with a difference." Belgrade may be a leader in the Movement of the Non-Aligned, but it also holds observer status in Comecon, the Soviets' international economic union, and participates in 23 of its 33 specialized commissions. It was part of Comecon meetings in Havana and Cienfuegos this April, and used the opportunity to strike a

five-year plan to double bilateral trade with Cuba to \$300 million.

And although Belgrade is indebted to the West for some \$20 billion, it nonetheless found some \$40 million to give the Sandinistas in the years after 1979. Another \$106 million worth of food assistance was delivered in November of 1984.

Yugoslavia allows port calls to U.S. warships from time to time, and accepts just enough military aid each year (\$130,000 is the public figure) to keep open the communication lines to the U.S. armed forces. But it is the U.S.S.R., not the U.S.A., which has access to Yugoslav airspace.

For example, during two weeks in the October 1973 Middle East war as many as 1,000 Soviet fighters and transports made use of Yugoslav air corridors to aid the war effort against Israel.

Arrangements for such endeavors are made in top-level meetings between the Yugoslav armed forces and those of the Warsaw Pact. Items in the Eastern European press indicate, for example, that the assistant federal secretary for national defense was in Prague in May to "advance cooperation" between the Yugoslav and Czech armies, while the chief of staff of the Hungarian army led a delegation to Yugoslavia. Then in June the chief of the general staff of the Yugoslav army took a delegation to the U.S.S.R.

The Yugoslav secretary for national defense, Adm. Branko Mamula, was in Romania in June to "further improvement of relations

Jim Courter, Republican representative from New Jersey, is a fourth-term member of the House Armed Services Committee.

The Times

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THE TIMES, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1986 A21

Drug traffic, terrorism clearly linked

Courts in cities as disparate as Miami, Rome and West Berlin are generating disturbing evidence of the relationships radical governments keep with drug traffickers and political terrorists.

Not all the facts allow for generalization, but there is a recurrent theme in these legal proceedings in three languages: Narcotics trafficking and terrorism are closely interlinked, and certain governments are involved with both — for the money and for the political fruits of terror and destabilization.

MIAMI. On November 18, a federal court unsealed an indictment of several Colombians said to be responsible for producing and exporting to the United States some 58 tons of cocaine between 1981 and 1985.

Within the 50-page document are charges that Federico Vaughn, a former assistant to Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge, used his office and Sandinista army personnel to help the cartel fly drugs to the U.S. Prosecutors have photographs of the loading process in Nicaragua. A defector from the Nicaraguan counterintelligence service has said that the purpose of the Nicaraguan involvement was earning foreign currency to finance espionage operations.

This recalls hard evidence of recent years linking some of Colombia's biggest drug producers to the M-19s, FARC, and the National Liberation Army — communist insurgents who have provided heavily armed guards at jungle laboratories and adjoining airstrips.

And Cuba, whose interests in Colombia are much like the traffickers and terrorists — money and political destabilization — has also been involved in getting Latin American drugs to US markets. CIA Director William Casey has said that both Cuba and Nicaragua have been "caught red-handed" in such trafficking.

ROME. Judge Severino Santiapichi has just released a 1,200-page report wrapping up procedures on the plot to kill Pope John Paul II. Our State Department is still translating the

REP. JIM COURTER

document, of which the chief focus will undoubtedly be the Turkish gunman, Mehmet Ali Agca, and the relations he kept with Western European and Turkish gunrunners and drug dealers, many of whom operated from Bulgaria with the assistance of that government.

According to earlier court records and testimony before Congress, Bulgaria's state export firm Kintex provided these criminals with safe houses, communications, banking, storage and even naval escorts or secure flights with Balkan Air.

The narcotics traded and sold in this way came mostly from the Middle East, but Bulgarian laboratories also make heroin for export, and Kintex could supply traffickers with Colombian cocaine made available to it by Cuba, with which Bulgaria has close ties. The weapons came from Soviet-bloc factories, and went to terrorists who paid for them with drugs or cash.

Beneficiaries of the networks included Abu Nidal, the largest two Armenian terrorist groups, the Palestinian PFLP, pro-Syrian extremists in Lebanon, and many Marxist groups. The Pizza Connection, a restaurant chain which distributed billions of dollars worth of heroin in the U.S. until 1984, had a Kintex/Bulgaria connection named Geatano Batalamenti.

WEST BERLIN. A Palestinian on trial for the bombing of a German-Arab Friendship Society says that in Damascus he raised the subject of heroin smuggling with the high-ranking Syrian military officer instructing him in the use of a suitcase bomb. Farouk Salameh asked the officer for heroin to sell in West Berlin. The request was evaded or denied with the words: "Everything in its time."

While no drugs were exchanged on that occasion, the Syrians were seemingly in a position to provide. Having taken control of Lebanon's Bekaa

Valley when the Lebanese state collapsed, the Syrian army also inherited the drug-producing regions used by the PLO when that organization was expelled in 1982.

The PLO had trafficked in hashish, and there is evidence — mostly circumstantial — that the Syrian military command now does so too. There is much money to be made; the Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that drugs are the basis of half the Lebanese economy.

Expansive fields of opium poppies, marijuana and coca plants are harvested in Syrian-supervised areas. Terrorists from Ireland, Corsica, Italy, and the Middle East buy the products for sale to Europe.

One account points to the use of Syrian diplomatic pouches for smuggling heroin into Europe. Another places Syrian intelligence operatives among personnel from Bulgaria, the USSR and East Germany at an October, 1983 meeting with Middle Eastern terrorists in Varna, a Bulgarian Black Sea port.

The drugs-for-guns trade has had enormous military consequences, being an effective and hard-to-trace method of moving weapons between Soviet-bloc producers and guerrilla and terrorist customers. It has had ugly social effects, contributing to the addiction of customers in Europe and America.

But it is a means by which radical governments make large profits. Enterprising diplomats — like the North Koreans who have been caught in half a dozen capitals selling marijuana and Syrian hashish — may sell drugs to expand limited budgets for their foreign operations. Terrorists earn the money that pays their deadly way.

It is a problem whose dimensions we have only recently grasped, and with which our diplomatic, drug enforcement, intelligence, and military personnel will be wrestling for a long time to come.

Jim Courter (R-12th District) of Hackettstown is a fifth-term member of the House Armed Services Committee.

SYMPOSIUM
BY JIM COURTER

Initiative Needed for SDI's Success

SUMMARY: Some of the systems making up the Strategic Defense Initiative could successfully be deployed in the near future with the proper political support. Progress made so far bears this out, says Courter, a New Jersey Republican who is a member of the House Armed Services Committee.

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When discussing the possible near-term deployment of strategic defense systems, an old cliché applies: The devil is in the details. So little properly focused, adequately funded work has been done on specific near-term Strategic Defense Initiative systems that the information necessary for a substantive discussion is difficult to uncover. Nevertheless, enough information does exist in the public domain to provide an assessment of near-term capabilities that is considerably more detailed and encouraging than the SDI naysayers are willing to admit.

When we speak of SDI systems available for initial operational capability in the near term, we speak of systems whose technological maturity would permit their deployment before 1996. This assumes the necessary commitment of manpower, resources and political support — big assumptions, to be sure, but our purpose here is merely to review the available data on system configurations, capabilities, costs and deployment schedules.

All SDI systems would be composed of three basic elements: weapons, sensors and controls. The weapons are the actual kill mechanisms (interceptors, lasers, etc.) that destroy the ballistic missiles and their warheads. The sensors are the "eyes in the sky" that detect and track the targets for the weapons to attack. The controls incorporate data from the sensors and assign the weapons to their targets. The Pentagon's Strategic Defense Initiative Organization and other SDI experts have stated repeatedly that the most daunting technological challenge for the program is the control,

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Terrorism: How the West Can Win

Edited by Benjamin Netanyahu; Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York; 254 pp.; \$18.95 (1986)

"Rome burns while they fiddle, but they have two excuses: they don't know Rome is burning, and they don't know they are fiddling . . ." Rep. Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.) starts his contribution to *Terrorism: How the West Can Win* with this quote from the late political philosopher Leo Strauss for the same reason that the book is among the best half dozen ever written about terrorism: at the center of Strauss's work and present in nearly all the book's essays is an overriding concern for the moral element in political events and ideas.

Some analysts of terrorism feel that the moral dimensions of this grisly modern phenomenon are too "value laden," too emotionally charged, to benefit from anyone who becomes "judgmental" about the subject of his work. They have therefore preferred a detached and purely descriptive point of view by detailing terrorists' crimes without getting at their moral disease. Or worse still, they describe this disease as if it were merely another kind of political life.

This volume brings together the many papers of the 1984 international conference of Tel Aviv's Jonathan Institute, founded to study terrorism and named for Lt. Col. Jonathan Netanyahu, the leader of the Entebbe raid.

The heart of the book is introduced by editor Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli ambassador to the United Nations and brother of the fallen hero of Entebbe, and sustained by an impressive array of scholars, journalists and public figures from Europe, Israel and the United States. At the core of the book are the notions that terrorism is definable and distinguishable from civil warfare and other conventional military struggles; and it is a most dangerous evil that can and must be resisted by clear thinking and courageous action.

The book's operative definition of terrorism reiterates the one produced by

the first conference in 1979. It remains the best we have. "Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends." That conclusion sufficiently answers some of the best-known conundrums in public discussion of terrorism.

"Who are we to condemn any political act, since one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter?" But freedom is an end, while terrorism is a reprehensible means to political ends that often has more to do with tyrannical power and destruction than with freedom. Over centuries, free men have attempted to contain warfare to the battlefield and hold damage to civilians to a minimum. Indeed, such efforts were thought to distinguish civilized human beings from barbarians.

Terrorists, however, make war on the whole society, and so the Olympic athlete, the school bus, the children's dormitory, the airline passenger in a sport shirt and the wheelchair-bound tourist become the "enemy forces" against which the new gunmen gird for battle.

If terrorism is in its essence reactionary—conducive to the restoration of barbarism—then the prognosis for justice and freedom in a "revolution" begun by terrorists is poor. And it is no accident that dictators and totalitarians, rather than freedom-loving people from democratic societies, are underwriting international terrorism.

The rulers of Cuba, Libya, the USSR, Bulgaria and Iran no more want freedom for the killers they arm abroad than they do for their own subjects. The archetype for these movements, Netanyahu says, is the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria, which after having expelled French colonial power went on to become merely another despotism and exporter of international terrorism, while France remained a free state.

"But who are Americans, a revolutionary people with avowedly revolutionary ideals, to deny the new insurgents their day of struggle and their hope for success?" Netanyahu retorts that terrorists' descriptions of them-

selves as insurgents or "guerrillas" is unacceptable. Guerrillas are "irregular soldiers who wage war on regular military forces, not civilians. . . . While they pit themselves against far superior *combatants*, terrorists chose to attack weak and defenseless civilians."

Amb. Jeane Kirkpatrick similarly asserts that "a soldier uses violence where a state of belligerence is recognized to exist, and against armed enemies; a terrorist engages in violence against people who do not understand themselves to be at war and, in fact, are not at war."

Thus, freedom fighters must be distinguished from terrorists. Several of the authors point out that French resistance fighters contested Adolf Hitler's odious regime without lowering themselves to the level of child killers. The Polish emigré philosopher Leszak Kolakowski adds that Solidarity never employed violence, though it certainly had the practical means to do so.

It is not freedom fighting, then, but totalitarian ideals and tactics that the essayists identify with terrorism. Terror prepared the way for the founding of every totalitarian state, and totalitarian states are perpetuated only by continual terror.

Both, as Daniel P. Moynihan explains, deny the superiority of law, and both are the products of self-appointed violent elites despising democratic process. Both so politicize society that there remains no distinction between state and society, between public and private. For example, the totalitarian can have you whipped if your poetry is not ideologically correct; the terrorist will bomb you for shopping at Harrods in London and furthering the bourgeois stupefaction of the people.

Concluding the chapter on "Terrorism and Totalitarianism," Kirkpatrick notes that both the Soviets and other U.N. members routinely describe favorite terrorist movements as "national liberation struggles." Kirkpatrick says simply: "Unable to distinguish between force used to liberate and force used to enslave, a majority of nations in the U.N. regard

Continued on page 62



Congress's Rising Stars

For the most part, those who succeed in Congress today pay obeisance to party leaders and senior committee members. In short, they've learned to work the system.

BY RICHARD E. COHEN
AND BURT SOLOMON

When Sam Rayburn and Lyndon B. Johnson charted Congress's course during the 1950s, junior Members understood that they were to keep their mouths closed. The new guys would just have to wait their 20 years to get their say.

Twenty years passed and it was their turn, but something happened: Just as they were primed to take over, a new breed of young Members trashed the seniority system and came quickly to the fore. What did they care if the House and Senate sometimes broke down under the strain?

In the 1980s, things have changed again. Today's junior Members, unable to move into committee chairmanships because of the blanket of 1970s veterans above them, have found their own path to influence: respect for their elders. For the most part, those who succeed in Congress pay obeisance and respect the perquisites of party leaders and senior committee members. Different times, different norms.

Each congressional generation, like any organization stuffed with egos, produces its ne'er-do-wells and its rising stars. The former may be more boisterous, but the latter are more useful to know. Thirteen rising stars, picked after conversations with dozens of congressional insiders, are profiled in the following pages. They're all on their way from obscurity to influence, and all for the same reason: They've learned to work the system. "You have to respect seniority," counseled fledgling Sen. Thomas A. Daschle, D-S.D., who just finished eight years in the House to begin what many observers think will be a promising Senate career. "You use it to your advantage by working with the top people. More-senior Members are more willing to work



with the junior Members than in the 1970s, when that chemistry was lacking."

That's not all that these up-and-comers have in common. They're all intense, either obviously or *in camera*. They're bright; they're workaholics; they're good on substance; they're politically astute. They have safe seats at home. They spark Congress with their ideas and their enthusiasm. They've gained colleagues' respect—sometimes grudgingly—and those in the know increasingly pay them attention. They've generally served for 4-10 years and have begun to carve a niche for themselves, usually by joining prominent committees and working on high-profile issues. They've shown some stuff.

They all display what Christopher J. Matthews, former top aide to retired Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., D-Mass., listed as the three keys for congressional success: "the right style so that a Member can get attention when it matters, the right issues and the ability to get things done internally."

What's perhaps more interesting is how they're different. This baker's dozen ranges in age from Rep. Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y., who's just 36 and looks a decade older, to bouncy 56-year-old Sen. Warren Rudman, R-N.H. Some,

such as Reps. Dennis E. Eckart, D-Ohio, and Barbara B. Kennelly, D-Conn., have tied themselves to mentors; others have shown streaks of independence. In ideology, they run the gamut from Rep. Steve Bartlett, R-Texas, who has driven Democrats nuts with his conservative floor amendments, to Rep. Pat Williams, D-Mont., a liberal in the old mold. Some are better legislators than politicians. Some, like Schumer, can play the legislative games but don't hesitate to state their case to reporters, while others, like Rep. Ed Jenkins, D-Ga., sit back and wait for the right moment.

Not all are beloved by their colleagues. Rep. Mike Synar, D-Okla.—young and brash—sometimes annoys his colleagues but has kept their respect and made a mark on a variety of matters. Others, more compliant, already have made it onto the lower rungs of leadership. Sixth-termer Rep. David E. Bonior, D-Mich., tied with Jenkins as senior in service among the 13, was a surprise pick by Speaker Jim Wright of Texas last month to be chief deputy whip. Williams and Eckart are among eight deputy whips. Rep. Vic Fazio, D-Calif., lost his bid for a leadership post but will keep gaining influence because he knows how to deal with his colleagues.

Just two are Senators: Rudman, who will soon be known for more than following a hyphen, and Daschle, who wowed Congress watchers by immediately wrangling a seat on two heavyweight committees. The Senate's smaller size and brighter spotlight means that most stars there have already risen.

Among the House's 11 rising stars, only 3 are Republicans, probably because it's hard for the minority to make a mark in a body so dominated by Democrats. Two are quite conservative: Bartlett and Jim Courter, R-N.J., who's gained influence by marshaling expertise on the

Armed Services Committee. In contrast, Rep. Thomas J. Tauke, R-Iowa—more moderate—is often the first one Democrats approach in search of bipartisan accommodation.

These rising stars are spread across committees. Jenkins and Kennelly belong to last year's star panel—Ways and Means. Eckart, Synar and Tauke serve on Energy and Commerce, which claims jurisdiction over anything that moves, burns or is sold. Bonior is becoming a power on the Rules Committee. Fazio, Jenkins, Schumer and Williams are on the Budget Committee, which Democratic leaders consider a testing ground for up-and-comers.

Some categories of Members weren't included on this list. Several relatively junior Members have already made it to legislative stardom, among them Sens. Bill Bradley, D-N.J., and Phil Gramm, R-Texas, and Reps. Tony Coelho, D-Calif.—the new Majority Whip—and Dick Cheney, R-Wyo., who chairs the House Republican Policy Committee. Freshman House Members were considered too unknowable. Also excluded were

young Members notable mostly for the not inconsiderable achievement of having won a seat on a powerful committee such as Ways and Means.

This is no comprehensive listing of rising stars. Many Members came close to being included. The sheer brilliance of Massachusetts Democrat Barney Frank's mind and tongue have made him a force to be reckoned with. Sen. Albert Gore Jr., D-Tenn., and Rep. Edward J. Markey, D-Mass., have overcome earlier reputations as dilettantes to become serious, maturing legislators. Rep. John M. Spratt Jr., D-S.C., a former Rhodes scholar, is aggressive and effective in legislating on textiles. Rep. Douglas K. Bereuter, R-Neb., understands the connection between agricultural policy and international trade. Rep. Joe L. Barton, R-Texas, a boyish second-termer, showed energy and savvy during his first term by getting every Texas and Oklahoma Member to pen a letter to counteract a California delegation's letter favoring an offshore oil drilling moratorium in the Pacific.

Reps. Nancy L. Johnson, R-Conn., and Ron Wyden, D-Ore., are promising legis-

lators who are well positioned to advance their careers, possibly with a bid for statewide office. Rep. Steny H. Hoyer, D-Md., is expected to move up the political ladder. A Republican lobbyist would rather go to Sen. Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., to solve a New Mexico problem than to the state's noted senior Senator, Republican Pete V. Domenici. Four capable young Texas Democrats—Michael A. Andrews, Ronald D. Coleman, Martin Frost and Mickey Leland—won't be hurt by having a Texan as the new Speaker. Sen. Dan Quayle, R-Ind., a lion on Washington's social circuit, has also impressed many observers with his skills in defense and labor policy. In a body where Members tend to become jaded, Sen. David Pryor, D-Ark., has retained a compassion for people that impresses even hard-bitten lobbyists.

The list that follows—a bit of a civics lesson, a bit of a legislative Baedeker—is of the 13 who, during their modest tenures, have most impressed their peers, their employees and those who woo them on bended knee. In all cases, for good reason.

Courter: Conservative Voice

Rep. Jim Courter, R-N.J., is enjoying himself so much in the House that he has all but ruled out a 1988 challenge against Democratic Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg. That may disappoint many Republican leaders who have been hoping that he will run. It would also represent a major change in attitude for the fifth-termer who came close to running for the Senate in 1982.

"It's an exciting job, and I enjoy it," Courter said. "People make a mistake when they say that House Members cannot grow and that they should be in the Senate. If they have new ideas and know how to market them, some House Members make a bigger impact than Senators."

Courter's focus is largely on national security policy, although he has also been an enthusiast of the proposals for tax cuts, monetary reform and other economic policy changes advanced by his close friend and likely presidential candidate, Rep. Jack F. Kemp, R-N.Y., whose intensity he seems to share. Courter has been a leader among conservatives urging early deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a step recently endorsed by Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger but not by President Reagan. As an increasingly senior member of the Armed Services Committee, he has supported greater military procurement cost controls but has worked to put the brakes on more active reformers.

And, as a member of the special House select committee appointed to investigate the Iran-contra arms affair, he has pledged to insist that the committee "see the forest, not just the trees" by going beyond the "who, what and why" and examining such broader issues as the relationship between Congress and the President on covert assistance and the proper congressional role in foreign policy.

"Jim has become an articulate spokesman for Northeast conservatives," said a former official in the Reagan White House. A leading House Republican strategist said Courter has "mastered the art of being conceptually radical while reassuring the establishment."

One feature that makes Courter, 45,

especially interesting is his eagerness to shape the public debate, largely on national security policy. He is a frequent contributor to op-ed pages on such subjects as aid to the Nicaraguan contras, domestic problems in the Soviet Union and Democrats' foreign policy views. He recently authored a book, *Defending Democracy* (American Studies Center),



Richard A. Bloom

Rep. Jim Courter keeps his affiliation with the military reform caucus, but is often a strong supporter of Pentagon programs. He reflects a strong streak of independent thought that defies easy categorization.

The Reformer With a Difference

BY BRIAN GREEN
AFA DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH

REP. Jim Courter (R-N. J.) believes the nation's defense is on the wrong track. The reason: In spite of the prominence of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in current defense debates, the nation is "not moving in real terms toward a strategic defense."

Representative Courter's views as an influential member of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) reflect a strong streak of independent thought that often defies simple categorization. While his support of SDI is based on a long-term desire to eliminate the nuclear threat, he also firmly favors strategic offensive modernization. He strongly supports the Peacekeeper (MX) program and a larger, more capable—and cheaper—Small ICBM. He also backs both the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) as part of the two-bomber program and a halt to the B-1B at 100 planes.

Representative Courter is one of the seminal military reformers in Congress, with clear ideas on how to improve the way the Pentagon does business. But he betrays some suspicion of the motives of fellow military reformers, and he wants to *reduce* the oversight that many

believe keeps the Pentagon in line.

And even while he is one of the staunchest supporters of a strong defense, he refuses to accept the priorities of the services if he is convinced different programs can fulfill military needs more cheaply. Thus he opposes the C-17 airlifter—a top priority of the Air Force and the Army—because he believes a combination of C-5s, C-141s, and C-130s can provide the same capabilities at lower cost.

SDI Seen as the Key

The key to Representative Courter's strategic view is the development and deployment of viable strategic defenses. He strongly favors early deployment of workable defenses, not only for defense of the US strategic arsenal but for population defense as well. He points to the early successes of HEDI (High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor) and ERIS (Exoatmospheric Reentry-Vehicle Intercept Subsystem) and the potentially large "footprints" (or areas of the US that could be protected by a single defense site) of the systems that might result from these technological developments as evidence

that the continental US could be defended against Soviet attack.

Development and deployment of antitactical ballistic missile defenses also appeal to Representative Courter as a way of dealing with the theater nuclear threat, convincing US allies that their populations will be defended also, and getting US allies and trading partners to contribute their own substantial technical expertise to the task of developing defenses.

Even though SDI was initiated by President Reagan, Representative Courter is critical of how the Administration has handled the program thus far. One criticism is timing—he is concerned that the US may never deploy any defense while waiting for a perfect one. He notes also that SDI opponents have shifted tactics with some success. The opponents, he says, "were losing the ideological, doctrinal, and moral argument—and the American people." By instead challenging funding levels and technical feasibility, they have for the time being succeeded in slowing the growth rate of the program.

To sustain a long-term consensus, Representative Courter believes a

strong rallying call is required. Comparing President Reagan's treatment of SDI and an earlier successful technology program, he suggests, "If Kennedy got on the tube after Sputnik and said, 'We're going to do a basic research program that the next President will look at to see if it's achievable and affordable to go to the moon,' that's just milque-toast. No one would get behind that program."

Representative Courter believes that the recent rumors of an arms-control compromise in Geneva involving restrictions on the SDI program have unwittingly blurred the vision behind the program, and he fears that SDI might become hostage to lengthy negotiations with the Soviets.

Arms Control

That is not to say that Representative Courter opposes arms control with the Soviets. But arms control in the absence of strategic defenses is "the cart before the horse," according to the Congressman. Rendering offensive weapons less potent by dint of effective defenses will make arms-control agreements easier to reach, he believes.

"Certainly the prospect of reducing nuclear weapons to . . . mere handfuls on both sides is a pipe dream, unless you have defensive capabilities. . . . I can see where we could have enough confidence in verification, enough confidence in the reliability of deployed defenses that the United States could enter an agreement where no ICBMs and SLBMs . . . would be permitted on either side. But we would never do so unless we had robust defenses as a hedge against cheating," he says.

Without those capabilities, significant arms reductions can only be achieved if future agreements have built into them much higher-confidence verification measures and provisions permitting corrective action should treaty violations be verified. That, according to Representative Courter, would involve on-site monitors, on-site inspection, and on-demand inspection of suspicious events. National technical means, used to verify past agreements, have been inadequate, he believes. Further, "We should make it totally clear in the document itself that if there is a violation, the other

side is exempt from all or any part of the agreement they want to be exempt from," he says.

His hardheaded view is reflected in his opinions on current arms-control agreements. The US Representative Courter believes, should pursue military measures that will rectify the military imbalances resulting from Soviet violations of SALT II. He does not share the concern of Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), HASC Chairman, that the Soviets will build large numbers of new offensive nuclear weapons in response to US breaches of the unratified, expired treaty. In Representative Courter's view, such a Soviet expansion would be militarily unimportant and very expensive.

Further, while he would support ratification of the never-approved 1974 Threshold Test-Ban Treaty—which limits underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons—if adequate verification could be assured, he is absolutely opposed to the House-approved ban on tests over one kiloton. The one-kiloton limit, he believes, is inherently unverifiable, and overriding US military interests dictate that testing at higher yields continue.

Strategic Modernization A High Priority

In the absence of viable arms-control agreements and US strategic defenses—and given the intense effort the Soviets devote to deploying their own strategic defenses—the Congressman sees strategic offensive modernization as the best means of assuring US security for the time being. While he would like, in the long term, to reduce reliance on retaliatory threats to deter nuclear attack, he does not see deployment of defenses as a political certainty, and "we don't want to give up strategic modernization in the hope of getting something we may not get." He favors the ATB, which he sees as a fundamentally new plane that will maximally complicate the task facing Soviet defenses, and sees no benefit in buying more than 100 B-1Bs. He also strongly favors the 100 MX ICBMs recommended by the Scowcroft Commission, though he sees little chance—given the current political climate in the House—that the second fifty be-

yond those already authorized by Congress will be approved.

He disagrees with his House colleagues in his support for the Small ICBM as well. While he believes that mobility, in addition to active defense, is an important means of assuring the survivability of strategic forces, he also believes that the additional weight of extra warheads and penetration aids would not impair the small missile's mobility. According to information the Congressman has received from a senior defense official, it appears that a 52,000-pound, two-warhead missile with pen aids would be as mobile, and thus as survivable, as the congressionally mandated one-warhead, 37,000-pound missile.

"It all comes down to a matter of dollars and cents," says Representative Courter, who believes a multi-warhead missile could deliver the same military capability for \$10 billion to \$30 billion less than its single-warhead cousin.

Defense Economy and Reform

This emphasis on economy is not at all alien to Representative Courter, who has built a large part of his reputation on efforts to improve the efficiency of the Pentagon. He believes that DoD is run better now than it was several years ago, thanks to key reforms, a fact that may explain his surprisingly sanguine view of the deep cuts being inflicted on the Administration defense request this year. While he would prefer a higher defense total, he avers that "there is a lot of money [in the defense budget], and, properly spent, it can do a heck of a lot."

The common theme that runs through Representative Courter's thoughts on military reform is a balance between oversight and accountability. In the past, he says, "we have erred on the side of treating everyone as children." What is needed, he believes, is more "freedom of action, freedom to make mistakes," with rewards for success and penalties for failure. He thus takes a dim view of many efforts to increase oversight of the Defense Department.

He introduced legislation to abolish the Defense Contract Auditing Agency and supports efforts to reduce congressional micromanagement. He generally favors a reduc-

tion of the role of defense agencies—he wants to abolish the Defense Logistics Agency and looks askance at a House measure to create a National Special Operations Agency—preferring to vest authority in the service Secretaries, “who are capable of being yelled at, screamed at, hired, and fired.”

Increased competition in defense procurement as one of the sound practices that have led to improved efficiency. He was one of the early, strong proponents of competition, though he now couches his advocacy in caution. He suggests that the bounds of desirable competition may have been exceeded in some



Representative Courter's views on defense are driven by distrust of the Soviet Union and a desire for an efficient and economically run defense establishment. He is a strong supporter of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Representative Courter recognizes the difficulty of steering the reform movement in the direction he wants, however. Congress, for example, spends too little time tackling big issues of strategy and doctrine and far too much time on detailed specifics of pieces of equipment and budget line items, he believes. And while he successfully sponsored an amendment to reduce the number of DoD reports required by Congress and favors a two-year defense budget cycle, he believes it will be virtually impossible to reduce the number of congressional committees that claim and exercise oversight responsibility of the Pentagon.

“I just can’t believe that John Dingell [D-Mich., who is Chairman of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee] is going to agree to stop talking about stealth and getting all those secret reports,” Representative Courter says.

The imbalance between oversight and accountability has led to a loss of “the dynamism that is natural in a market economy,” and he counts in-

areas, that it could improve in others, and that imposing further requirements for competition must be done carefully.

No Rubber Stamp

While he is a member of the Military Reform Caucus, which is a bipartisan group of congressmen dedicated to “fixing” the Defense Department, and the ranking minority member on the HASC Acquisition and Procurement Policy Panel, Representative Courter is not cut from the same cloth as other reformers, many of whom are much less disposed than he to support Pentagon programs. When questioned, he refuses to criticize others directly. But his suspicion of their motives is made clear when he states that some are “well-intentioned individuals [who] I think don’t recognize some of the real-world repercussions of their actions, votes, and amendments. . . . I would imagine there are some people around here who love military reform because they can beat up on the Pentagon. . . . There were bad bills that were purposely done very badly, but very few.”

Representative Courter himself, however, is no rubber stamp for defense requests. His opposition to the C-17 is a case in point, illustrating his dedication to saving money when he believes it possible without compromising military capability.

The Air Force and the Army want the C-17 not only to boost inter-theater airlift but also for its unique capabilities on austere runways and its ability to deliver outsize cargo directly to the forward edge of the battle area. The Congressman remains convinced that, in the present budget climate, the plane is unaffordable and that a combination of C-5, C-141, and C-130 airlifters can achieve identical capabilities for less money. He also remains unconvinced that the Air Force would be willing to send an expensive C-17 into high-risk areas. Gen. Duane Cassidy, Commander in Chief of the Military Airlift Command, has argued that he would prefer not to risk the twenty or more C-130 crewmen required to deliver the same quantity of materiel as the C-17 when the three crewmen of a C-17 could do the same job.

The Russians and Congress

At the core of Representative Courter’s view of the need for military strength is his profound distrust of the Soviet Union. The relentless Soviet military buildup provides credibility to their political threat, and at the same time, their hostile ideology makes the military buildup much more threatening. “I don’t think [the Soviets] are going to behave unless there’s a revolution over there,” he says.

But this is a view that Representative Courter suspects is not shared by many of his colleagues in the House, some of whom he believes pay lip service to the Soviet threat while voting against needed military programs: “They seem to be saying that the real threat is a bad economy or inflation. Those things are debilitating, but not life-threatening. The Soviet threat can be.”

But while he may not walk in lockstep with his fellows in Congress, he wields considerable influence through his independence and articulate defense of his ideas. His accomplishments already assure that his influence will continue to be felt for years to come. ■

that was largely a collection of his recent speeches and articles. Occasionally, he moves toward the political center with actions such as criticism of the South African government and opposition to proposed government controls on pornography.

Courter acknowledged that his recent call for SDI deployment, which he issued with Kemp and Sen. Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo., following their four-day tour of domestic research facilities, would probably precipitate Democratic-initiated legislative bans on such activity.

"We don't have the votes to stop [the critics]," he said. "But it will be a lot easier to debate this issue if the vote is 'to deploy or not to deploy' instead of the current debate on how much to spend for research. . . . This absolutely will be a 1988 campaign issue."

Some defense experts have attacked his proposal, saying it would be a clear violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union. "He and

the others pushing for early deployment want to break the treaty while they can," an observer said.

Courter countered that the treaty has not achieved its goal of an assured retaliatory capability because its drafters did not foresee technological progress and the growth of offensive weapons. "We reject the notion that there is more stability today," he said. "There is less, because of increased vulnerability. What's dangerous is the offensive weapons. We should look at [cutting back] the bullet, not the bullet-proof vest."

Courter's activities on defense procurement policy, which stem from his co-chairmanship in 1983-84 of the congressional Military Reform Caucus, forced a showdown last year when he offered a floor amendment to limit further procurement reforms. (*For a report on the caucus, see NJ, 6/28/86, p. 1596.*) Although his alternative lost, 164-245, he won on several issues in the House-Senate conference and was praised by military contrac-

tors and other business groups for making the fight.

"Not many Members are willing to make the case on behalf of the defense industry," said Ellen Brown, a lobbyist who works on government contract issues for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. "He is probably the most sensible Member of Congress on these issues."

As for his friend Kemp, Courter dismissed the latest Washington wisdom that the candidacy is floundering. "After the natural weeding out process, the conservatives will gravitate back to Jack," he said. "He has a compelling, future-oriented message, which needs the attention of the public. The way to do that is for him to do better than the expectations in the early primaries and then—unlike Gary Hart in 1984—have something to say when he has the window of opportunity."

If that strategy succeeds, Courter will have a friend in the White House.

Books

from page 60

legitimacy as a function of the will and power . . ." (see JODD, November 1984, "Speaking Out"). Here is the link between the Nietzschean anarchism of pre-1917 Russia, "The First European Terrorists" as described in Alain Besancon's paper and the crude Leninism, Maoism or Trotskyism of contemporary European bands of political thugs: *will* is the spark that can make the city burn and the revolution begin.

After discussing terrorism and the Islamic world, the international terror network, the legal foundations of the war against terrorism and domestic battles, the essayists repeatedly return to the moral problem. In exploring terrorism and the media, for example, eminent journalists such as Charles Krauthammer, Arnaud de Borchgrave and the London *Times's* John O'Sullivan criticize the press for near partnership in the crimes they cover so lavishly.

For example, Krauthammer maintains that excessive attention exacerbated the hostage crisis in the U.S. Embassy in Iran. "In physics," he writes, "the Heisenberg principle implies that reality is changed when observed. In politics, the media's effect on terrorism is beyond Heisenberg: observation can actually create the event."

Netanyahu advises reporters to use discretion in their coverage of terrorism. Report the facts coldly and factually, deprived of their excitement and glamour, says Britain's Lord Chalfont. Being a journalist, Chalfont argues, does not absolve a person from moral and civic responsibilities. There remains "the need to decide that this lot is good, or bad."

CBS and CNN senior correspondent Daniel Schorr counters that "some of us still believe that journalists are people committed to the idea that the world must know," but O'Sullivan is unyielding and unforgiving of that genre of argument:

To begin with, we invariably know what [terrorists] think long before they appear on television to tell us. Is anyone unaware of the aims and beliefs of the PLO, or of the IRA, or of the Red Brigades? Secondly, what they say on television is not necessarily what they think (which . . . is more accurately conveyed by what they do). It is sugared propaganda. Finally, even if we needed to know what the terrorist thought and could rely on his honesty,

a straightforward report and analysis by the journalist himself would be a more efficient and reliable method of conveying such information without the side effect of conferring respectability upon murderers.

The estimable contributors to the present volume show more understanding of the psychology and tactics of terrorism than most. But having understood, they condemn. "Depravity," "evil" and other words that make only rare appearances in contemporary political science literature are used here without undue self-consciousness. For historian Paul Johnson and his fellow panelists, there are not any good and bad terrorists any more than there were good and bad slave traders. Because that is true, the condemnation of terrorism goes well beyond its anti-Israeli and anti-American variants.

Finally, the contributors condemn the apologists of terrorism, including "the doubters and accommodationists." They are right to condemn, for the only thing as damaging to civilization as the deliberate murder of the innocent is the misuse of reason to justify or celebrate such murder.

This book's particular recommendations for legislation and action are useful, but the authors know that these require moral and political grounding in public opinion. They thus strive to be instructive, daring and democratic. The reader is asked to see terrorism in its naked essence—the abuse of the defenseless with the intent of paralyzing a citizenry with fear and altering its government's policies.

Having recognized the evil, man must then oppose it. If terrorists win and civilization loses, writes Midge Dector, executive director of the Committee for the Free World, historians will say people were "too morally lazy to do whatever was necessary to keep their blessings alive for the rest of us."

"Courage" is an old-fashioned word that appears in many places in this book. It is to that virtue that Benjamin Netanyahu repairs in concluding the last of his own contributions:

"Courage, said the Romans, is not the only virtue, but it is the single virtue without which all the others are meaningless. . . .

"Confusion and vacillation facilitated the rise of terrorism. Clarity and courage will ensure its defeat."

—Rep. Jim Courter (R-N.J.)

or battle management, function.

The most technologically mature "family" of near-term SDI systems are the ground-based interceptors. The present-day interceptors are descendants of the Sprint and Spartan nuclear-tipped interceptors that were briefly deployed at Grand Forks, N.D., and the nuclear-armed ABM interceptors that protect the Soviet capital. However, there is one important advance that has been made: The newest U.S. interceptor designs do not use explosives to kill the incoming Soviet warheads. The sheer force, or kinetic energy, of the collision at many thousands of feet per second disintegrates the attacking weapon.

The best-known and most promising ground-based interceptor system is ERIS, the Exoatmospheric Reentry-vehicle Intercept Subsystem. The ERIS system could be deployed in several configurations, but a representative scheme would include 100 ERIS interceptors deployed at the Grand Forks ABM site, along with the necessary radars to permit the rockets to track, acquire and destroy their targets.

In a ballistic missile attack, ERIS interceptors would fly at 16,000 feet per second to an altitude of more than 100 miles. Once outside the atmosphere, each interceptor would attack one ballistic missile warhead before the warhead's target was known.

Because each ERIS interceptor could destroy only one warhead, such an initial system would only be effective against partial attacks, accidental launches or launches by emerging nuclear weapons states with crude ballistic missile capabilities. However, even such a modest capability is not to be taken lightly. We presently have no ABM capability at all, and the ERIS system, like other near-term systems, could be expanded, upgraded and complemented by other, more sophisticated systems.

The total cost of an initial ERIS system would be in the realm of \$10 billion to \$12 billion, which includes the cost of the expensive radars and battle management computers. Once again assuming the necessary support for such a deployment, the technology would permit initial operational capability for ERIS within three or four years and full operational capability within five years.

From the ground-based interceptors we move to the more exotic space-based kinetic-kill systems. Such systems involve orbiting "battle stations," each containing up to 150 nonexplosive "kill vehicles." The kill vehicles, weighing approximately 40 pounds each and resembling large tomato juice cans, would use their sophisticated heat sensors to home in on ballistic missiles or warheads as they flew through the cold vacuum of space. Traveling at speeds of approximately 10 kilometers per second over 1,000-kilometer distances, the kill vehicles, like the ERIS interceptors, would destroy their targets through the sheer force of impact.

The number of battle stations required for a near-term deployment would depend upon many factors, most notably the confidence level being sought for the system. A representative near-term deployment of space-based kinetic-kill vehicles might include 40 battle stations along with the necessary boost and space surveillance systems to provide target detection and tracking capability. The total cost of such a system could approach \$60 billion.

The availability of the expendable launch vehicles is also a major factor in determining the time frame for an initial space-



The free-electron laser program, directed by Dodge Warren, is integral to SDI's success.

based kinetic-kill vehicle deployment. Assuming optimum availability as well as the necessary funding and manpower support, the technology could come on line within five years and reach full operational capability within seven or eight years. This system could be deployed alone or, preferably, in conjunction with an ERIS midcourse interceptor. Like ERIS, the space-based kinetic-kill vehicle system would accommodate additional battle stations as well as technology upgrades.

Even more exotic than the space-based kinetic-kill vehicle, but still within the realm of possibility for deployment within 10 years, is the X-ray laser, also referred to as the Excalibur System. The X-ray laser is powered by a nuclear device. In the billionths of a second before the explosion destroys the laser, the powerful X-ray emissions from the nuclear weapon are channeled through up to 50 lasing rods aimed at incoming ballistic missiles and warheads. There are no known countermeasures to protect the missiles and warheads against X rays traveling through space at the speed of light, 186,000 miles per second.

There are several options for deployment of X-ray laser devices. For instance, as many as 20 Excalibur laser devices could be deployed in the nose cone of an MX land-based ballistic missile or a Trident sea-launched ballistic missile. The missiles could then "pop up" the laser devices into space in the event of a ballistic missile attack. The lasers could be deployed in similar fashion atop ABM interceptors at the Grand Forks site and launched into space at the appropriate moment.

The relatively small size and weight of the Excalibur laser devices, as well as the technological maturity of the program, could permit a representative deployment of 1,000 lasers on 50 ballistic missile boosters at a cost of approximately \$50 billion. If each laser device has lasing rods sufficient to destroy 50 attacking missiles or warheads, then such a representative system could conceivably handle a Soviet attack as large as 50,000 warheads. Based on the current state of the Excalibur technology, initial operational capability for deployment on land- or sea-based ballistic missiles could be achieved within 10 years.

Given the roller coaster funding profile of ABM/SDI programs and the uncertain political climate, it is a small miracle that the technological prognosis for near-term deployment is as positive as it is. A great deal of work would be required to achieve the actual deployment of any of the systems that we have discussed.

Still, the work that has been done so far demonstrates that the notion of near-term deployment does not violate any of the immutable laws of physics. We are largely confronted with engineering problems that, while daunting, can be overcome with the proper financial and political support.

The message, then, from the technical community to the president and the Congress is simply this: The ball is in your court.

The Syrian program... and ours

by Representative
Jim Courter

Months ago in April, when it was Libya that most people were watching, an authoritative European publication reported that the quick-drying plastic explosive which had just blown a hole in the side of a TWA jet approaching Athens may have been planted by Syrian Air Force intelligence.

Then on June 26th, a man tried to have a bomb smuggled aboard an El Al jetliner at Madrid. He was a Spanish Palestinian, Nasser Hassan el-Ali, said to have been briefed for the role in Damascus and supplied with a Syrian passport.

Nawaf Mansour Hazi, now on trial in a German court for a discoteque bombing in West Berlin in which two died and 230 were burned and wounded, has allowed that he was trained in Syria, and has said he received explosives and logistical support from Syrian embassy personnel in East Berlin.

It would therefore be less than astonishing if it were true, as a jury in a London court has declared, that this last suspect's brother, Nezar Hindawi, had Syrian Air Force and diplomatic help in plotting the destruction of an El Al jet by sending an unwitting girl aboard with a bomb. It would not be astonishing, but only gruesomely regular, part of a pattern of Syrian behavior.

From the Syrian intelligence Captain Nassif and his superiors who directed the assassination of Lebanese President elect Bashir Gemayel in 1982, through the Syrian role in the U.S. marines bar-

racks bombing of the next year, to the Turkish allegations of late last month that the Syrian-based Abu Nidal band is to be blamed for the butchery at the Istanbul synagogue, the Assad regime has proven itself the equal of terrorism's other chief exporters, Colonel Qaddafi and the Ayatollah Khomeini, with whom he is closely allied.

Syria is home not only to Abu Nidal but to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, to the old-line Syrian-controlled PLO wing Saiqa, and to Turkish terrorists, whom it trains and sends north and west. By its control of northern areas of the shattered state of Lebanon, Syria has direct influence over the many hundreds of Iranians and Arabs who train in the Bekaa Valley for terrorist attacks against civilian and military targets.

No serious person can study official Syrian behavior during the TWA 847 Beirut hijacking case, or in the captures and

receipt of French and American weapons.

What options do we have?

To begin with the simplest: The glare of publicity can be of some use against dictators, who are fearful of public criticism and vulnerable where access to information is free. The Assad who worked so conspicuously for U.S. favor during the TWA 847 case and after the Rome and Vienna airport attacks of last December is the same Assad who would feel the heat of international opprobrium. Government announcements, and the publicity engendered by the boycotts of private and commercial international organizations like the airline pilots, are both useful.

Assad's shaky political homefront could be tested by U.S. aid to the opposition, such as the National Alliance for the Liberation of Syria, a coalition which staged a rally October 18th (and prompted a massive round of arrests) in Damascus. The knowledge that increments of aid to his

enemies will be the inevitable result of each Syrian-sponsored attack might cool Assad's ardor for foreign operations. Egypt, which gives haven to some Syrian dissidents, might help guide U.S. assistance into the most capable, most democratic opposition hands.

Economic sanctions will not have all the force they did in the Libyan case, unless our allies joined in resolutely, a regrettably distant possibility. Syria's hard Soviet bloc connections also mitigate against embargoes, just as they pre-empt special problems to U.S. contingency planners considering armed reprisals. Yet Israel has faced and defeated Soviet/Syrian air defenses, and perhaps the United States should be prepared to do the same.

The U.S. was right to reduce the diplomatic staff at Assad's Washington D.C. embassy.* Britain deserves our support just now as surely as the dictator of Damascus deserves (continued on page 36)

* The U.S. State Department has discussed such a reduction, and at the time this article was submitted a spokesman insisted it was still likely. However, there has as yet been no reduction. Various other sanctions are in force.

Congressman Courter on Syria

(continued from page 35)

to the peace process than any other government in the region. The reprise won by the bombing of Libyan centers of terrorism was long-awaited and much deserved. But that reprise is over now. Firm and unified action—and if possible nonmilitary action—is still needed against the group of terrorism-sponsoring states in the Middle East. Such action will remain necessary as long as governments continue to choose the dramatic kidnapping, murder, and menacing of the innocent as a means to a political end.

Jim Courter has been elected for a fifth term as New Jersey's 12th district representative in Congress.

in the sphere of the military-economic complex." Last year he journeyed to East Germany and also to Libya; talks with both governments concerned the "promotion of relations and cooperation between the Armed Forces."

The Libya-Yugoslavia alliance is something no one in Washington ever talks about. But it lies just below the surface of much of the news. Not many nations sent their foreign ministers to Tripoli after the U.S. air raid of April 14 to denounce the Americans' "unprovoked aggression." But Yugoslavia did.

Subsequently, only two countries' officers were quietly asked in by Col. Muammar Qaddafi to do the post-mortem on Libya's military response to the raid: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Libya has purchased Yugoslav arms, including aircraft and naval vessels. According to a new issue of *Der Spiegel*, Libyan pilots are receiving fighter training in MiG-21s in Yugoslavia as part of an arrangement to pay off the latter's oil debts. That report recalls another of last Dec. 22, when "PLO Radio in Baghdad" broadcast the obituary of a Palestine Liberation Organization MiG-21 pilot said to have been trained in Libya, Yugoslavia, and Nicaragua.

Yugoslavia's support for Palestinians and other international terrorists had gone virtually unnoticed until Abu Abbas, the Yasser Arafat loyalist who commanded the *Achille Lauro* ship hijacking operation, fled from Italy to the PLO Embassy in Belgrade.

Greek police have been reported to believe that Omar Ali Marzouki, the leader of the pro-Libyan Abu Nidal team which hijacked an Egyptian air liner to Malta in November, entered the country from Belgrade. And *Foreign Report's* sources say Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, thought responsible for the horrendous series of bombings in Paris, is one of a half-dozen Lebanese Marxists who have been active in Europe since receiving guerilla training in Ljubljana, Yugoslavia, in 1980.

Little wonder that the journalist and Yugoslavia expert Nora Beloff describes Belgrade's foreign policy in a new book as "non-aligned against the West." And yet, for all the available evidence, she is one of very few to take notice.

For detailed corroboration, one must look as far back as 1980 to Dr. Harold Rood's *Kingdoms of the Blind*, a survey of geopolitics which gives an account of mutual Yugoslav/Warsaw Pact/Libyan enterprises in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Before Mr. Rood there was Lawrence Silbermann, the U.S. ambassador to Belgrade who ran-

kled the State Department in 1977 with the unconventional observation that "non-aligned" Yugoslavia "had consistently sided with America's enemies in the world."

It continues to do so, voting with the United States on issues before the United Nations less than 12 percent of the time, according to a tally of 1985 roll calls. The Soviet record is as good as that.

America's long-standing policy of perpetuating friendly relations is by no means incomprehensible: Yugoslavia lives in the shadow of the world's most dangerous and acquisitive power. But the insistence upon the rosy conventional view of Belgrade's policies has led us to ignore much of the evidence, and therefore to misunderstand the regime.

Perhaps that is finally changing. When Belgrade arrested its third American, it found a congressional resolution introduced, almost out of thin air, urging suspension of Yugoslavia's most-favored-nation trade status. That was but half of Belgrade's new problem: fully one-third of the House of Representatives was eager to sign it.

The swift release of Mr. Ivezić and Mr. Radizojević, and the subsequent release of Gradimir Hadžić of Los Angeles, was an indication of just how much the Yugoslav League of Communists appreciates our usual disinterest in what it does day by day in the rest of the world.

Perhaps it's time to take a good hard look.



2 Jersey congressmen aid probe of arms sale

Continued from Page One

said some members of the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Watergate Committee distinguished themselves while others did not.

Rodino, who was widely credited with conducting the 1974 impeachment inquiry in a fair and impartial manner, said Watergate resulted from "a president who sought personal advantage, covered up information and betrayed the trust of the people and the institutions."

"He lied to the people. That is why everything broke down," he said.

Rodino said Reagan at first refused to admit he made mistakes, but has subsequently said errors were made. Rodino said Reagan can avoid the pitfalls encountered by Nixon if he is as forthright as possible and helps Congress get all of the answers.

In the years since the Rodino committee voted articles of impeachment against Nixon, the legislator said he "hoped and prayed" he would not witness another presidential crisis during his public career.

Besides Reagan, the congressman said he is concerned about the conflicting roles played by Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d as a top adviser to the President, a member of the National Security Council and an investigator of the affair.

The Judiciary Committee has asked Meese to supply information about what he learned from White House officials and what advice he gave the President and other members of the Administration concerning the Iran-contra situation.

Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-9th Dist.), who has been investigating the scandal as a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the House select committee will have a difficult task. He also cautioned that there may be pitfalls awaiting members of the panel.

"If the Republican members were selected with the intention of defending an undefendable policy, they are making a huge mistake. They should remember the fate of those who made the last stand in defending Nixon during the Watergate hearings," he said.

In addition to Rodino, two New Jersey Republicans—the late Charles Sandman and Joseph Maraziti—were members of the Judiciary Committee during the impeachment proceedings. The two defended Nixon to the end and were defeated at the polls shortly after Nixon's resignation.

Rodino said he expects the committee's investigation to center on two

basic questions: Was there illegality on the part of the Administration in selling arms to Iran and diverting the money to the contras? And why was Congress kept in the dark about it?

He said he is concerned that the White House may have "undermined" the separation-of-powers doctrine by leaving Congress out of the information circuit. He added that a "critical issue is whether the White House and the President followed the nation's basic constitutional principles in carrying out the Iran and Nicaraguan policies."

During Watergate, Rodino said, he often pointed out that "The real security and strength of this nation lies in the integrity of its institutions and the trust and informed confidence of its people."

"That's the strength. That's the cornerstone. The integrity of our institutions and a guarantee that the president operate on the basis of his constitutional authority in coordination with Congress."

Courter said the committee must look at the roles of all those involved, but should not focus on possible illegalities by Administration officials. That job, he said, should be left to special prosecutor Lawrence E. Walsh, who was appointed by a special three-judge panel Friday.

"We're involved in oversight and determining what went on," said Courter. "If there was illegal conduct, the independent counsel will have to deal with it. We are not judges or juries. We are the Congress."

"I'm sure the select committee will conduct a complete airing of the facts. If anything calls for a legislative

remedy, we will recommend legislation regarding reporting requirements to Congress or the functioning of the National Security Council," he said.

Courter said he does not believe it was good policy to sell arms to Iran, although he said the concept of trying to re-establish links with moderates there was a "laudable goal." He said he also hopes that any finding of illegal payments to the contras will not cause a reversal of the policy of support for the rebels.

On the paramount question of "who knew what when," Courter demurred, saying, "I can't comment on what happened or why, or who was involved."

Meanwhile, Rodino said he cannot believe that the entire affair was engineered and carried out with only former national security adviser Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter and his former aide, Marine Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, knowing about it.

Rodino said he is keeping an open mind, but asserted that it "defies imagination that two individuals schooled in acting only on orders would act alone. At this time, they are the only ones who the finger has been pointed at. This is an incredible situation. Having been in other investigations, this doesn't seem to be believable."

Of the seven New Jersey congressmen that have been involved in congressional probes of the affair, only Rep. Christopher Smith (R-4th Dist.), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said he believes North and Poindexter acted alone.

"From everything I've heard and

read, it seems entirely plausible to me that Oliver North, working with the tacit approval of Adm. Poindexter, could have engineered this entire operation," Smith said.

"The President could have been out of the loop, and I think that he was. Poindexter probably knew. The Secretary of State was apparently out of the loop, as were many others in the Administration," he added.

After weeks of hearings in separate investigations of the affair, two House committees and one Senate panel are preparing to slow their efforts in deference to the newly created House and Senate select committees.

Rodino and Courter join five New Jersey legislators already involved in the investigations: Sen. Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee; Torricelli and Smith, both members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; and Reps. Robert Roe (D-8th Dist.) and Bernard Dwyer (D-6th Dist.), both members of the House Intelligence Committee.

The Capitol Hill hearings have included appearances by all the major players in the scandal. Members of the investigating committees say a clearer picture is emerging of the events surrounding the sale of arms to Iran and the diversion of some of those funds to the contras.

They are quick to add, however, that the committees are still missing crucial information about the affair. They cite the lack of testimony by Poindexter, who resigned, and North, who was fired. Both men cited their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in refusing to answer questions during hearings before all three investigating panels.

"There still are gaps in the record, but I think I have a much clearer picture than I had one week ago," Bradley said last week following Senate Intelligence Committee hearings with White House chief of staff Donald Regan and Meese.

Bradley, who has described the affair as a "colossal blunder" on the part of the Administration, said that despite the gaps, the intelligence panel has developed a thorough record of the events that led to the scandal.

"I can't say at this point who said what to whom, but I can say that it is a lot clearer now. We are developing a very detailed record. It's coming in in bits and pieces, certainly a lot more than has been disclosed to the public," Bradley said. "We are developing a lot of insight through context and from reference. We can see how one thing fits in with another."

Casey on road to recovery

WASHINGTON (AP)—CIA Director William J. Casey is recovering satisfactorily after brain surgery, doctors say, but they are giving no indication when he might be able to return to work or even leave the hospital.

President Reagan says he has no plans to replace the 73-year-old spy chief.

Officials at Georgetown University Hospital clamped a weekend lid on public statements on Casey, saying his condition was stable and they wouldn't have any updates unless the situation changed.

"There's been no change," spokeswoman Robin Payes said yesterday. "At this moment it's still the same."

Experts on brain surgery who are not associated with the case said Casey

probably will be hospitalized for at least another week, and then might face extensive radiation treatment or other anti-cancer therapy.

His physicians reported earlier that during Thursday's 5½-hour surgery to remove a tumor from Casey's brain they found "a lymphoma which appears treatable."

They never mentioned the words "cancer" or "malignant." But outside experts assumed the growth was cancerous.

At the White House, spokesman Larry Speakes said, "The President has made no plans to replace the director of central intelligence."

He said Reagan would telephone Casey "when it is appropriate."



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OLIVER TAMBO CAN'T HELP

Remarks by Rep. Jim Courter (R,N.J.) for the House Floor

Mr. Speaker, I rise to voice my opposition to the meeting the Secretary of State is holding with the ANC's Oliver Tambo today. Tambo represents everything we should not be working for in South Africa.

Two years ago, on December 4, 1984, I was among those Republican Members who wrote to the South African Ambassador to inform him that unless his government began to show "a demonstrated sense of urgency about ending apartheid", we would become supporters of sanctions. Now I've voted for sanctions, and I'm glad sanctions are in place.

But the American Administration, having seen constructive engagement with the white government fail, seems now to believe that it will work with the most violent, least democratic South African alternative. The ANC is in large part a communist organization. And Oliver Tambo is an unhesitant, outspoken advocate of terrorism, that is, of the deliberate use of violence against civilians, most of whom thus far have been black.

Mr. Speaker, this is not what we stand for. I would insist -- the State Department must insist -- that there is nothing in our well-known opposition to racial dictatorship which implies advocacy of, or indifference to, any other form of dictatorship. It would defy logic, and speak ill of the common sense of the moderate majority of South Africans, black and white, to suggest that if we would not have Mr. Botha we must have Oliver Tambo.

Equality and democracy are what we have always tried to promote, and equality and democracy are what we should be working for now. Oliver Tambo stands for neither and fights against both. We shouldn't be talking to him.

We would do far better, as a number of us suggested to President Reagan in a letter of August 15, to do what we can to turn discussion here and in South Africa to wide-ranging constitutional reform. There have already been a number of suggestions, some very elaborate, all constructive, from powerful and responsible black South African groups like the Inkatha of Zulu chief Buthelezi. The need is to deal with these, and proposals like them, which represent the path of reason. We can and must shun the advocates of class war.

THIS WEEK'S NEWS FROM



Inside Washington

the foreseeable future and which may be traded away in future arms control negotiations.

Our experiences in the wake of the ABM treaty of 1972 demonstrated that there is little support for interminable research programs to hedge against Soviet strategic defenses. All signs point toward a similar fate for a 10-year SDI research program under the potential stewardship of two unknown Reagan successors. This cannot be what the President has in mind for his proudest legacy to the American people and the free world.

In the wake of the Iceland summit, the President has an historic "window of opportunity" to influence Western security long after he has left the White House.

We have within our grasp a major "insurance policy"—SDI deployment—which will make it

safe for the United States to accept significant strategic and intermediate-range arms reduction agreements, even in the face of Soviet cheating and emerging nuclear weapons states. Our negotiators need this "insurance" as leverage to produce Soviet agreement to the sweeping proposals that the General Secretary left on the table at Reykjavik.

Within the Reagan Administration, SDI supporters have already prepared numerous detailed proposals for SDI deployment. The President need only request briefings on these proposals, establish some general guidelines and direct the formation of SDI deployment offices within the Defense Department to implement the guidelines. Initial funding for near-term deployment systems, as well as focused research funding for intermediate and long-term deployment possibilities, must be included in the Fiscal Year 1988 defense budget request.

All of these actions must be accompanied by clear, comprehensive Administration policy statements that explain the new national security strategy and the timetable for its complete implementation. The raw material for these statements has existed since before the President's March 1983 SDI announcement and only awaits the President's order to be rendered into a coherent, convincing explanation for our allies and adversaries alike.

The national security bureaucracy in Washington, most notably the State Department, has steadfastly resisted and stonewalled the SDI program virtually since its inception. The bureaucratic wailing and hand-wringing that will greet a presidential SDI deployment decision will be unprecedented. That reaction alone should be sufficient to confirm for the President the innate necessity of such a revolutionary change in national security strategy.

COURTIER

From page 11D

The first House contained only 65 members. Today's 100-person, directly elected Senate also falls under Mr. Hamilton's objections, as Republican Sen. Dave Durenberger's remark suggests.

From the beginning, foreign affairs were thought to belong to the executive. In 1800, soon-to-be Chief Justice John Marshall, speaking as a House member, said that the president: "holds and directs the force of the nation. . . . The Executive . . . is entrusted with the whole foreign intercourse of the nation, with the negotiation of all its treaties. . . . [It is] the department whose duty it is to understand precisely the state of the political intercourse and connexion between the United States and foreign nations, to understand the manner in which the particular stipulation is explained and performed by foreign nations, and to understand completely the state of the Union."

It would be a mistake to think that interbranch rivalry in foreign affairs always pits a liberal legislature against a conservative executive. The political spectrum has often been reversed, yet the problem remains.

In the 1890's, as today, a European power intervened in the Western Hemisphere to crush a democratic revolution, then in Cuba. Spain was the 1890's imperial aggressor, just as the Soviets are today. Cuban rebels were yesterday's "contras." But then it was war hawks in Congress who forced military action on an anti-war president.

When President Grover Cleveland, a Democrat, proclaimed neu-

trality in 1896, Congress overwhelmingly passed a resolution recognizing rebel rights as well as Spain's. Mr. Cleveland is supposed to have said that even if Congress declared war he would not, as commander in chief, mobilize the army. The press replied by calling Mr. Cleveland an "ally of Spain."

After the battleship Maine was blown up in Havana harbor, Congress voted unanimously for \$50 million in defense spending. Anti-war President William McKinley, supported by businessmen who preferred peace and trade, attempted a Contadora-style diplomatic solution via the pope, which had nearly succeeded. But the state of opinion may be gauged by a *New York Journal* cartoon showing Mr. McKinley with a broom trying to push back a tidal wave labeled "Congress." The Republican congressional majority, fearing that belliose Democrats would defeat them in November, clamored for war and even threatened to declare it without a presidential request. Mr. McKinley had little choice but to bow to the legislative will. The Spanish-American War was a result of congressional, not presidential, direction.

In the 1930's, right-wing isolationists in Congress frustrated President Franklin D. Roosevelt's efforts to resist fascist dictators until the only solution was military. True to Congress's tendency to see foreign relations through a domestic prism, Senate investigations in 1934 tried to prove that munitions makers were responsible for the Great War. What might be termed "World War I syndrome" led Congress to pass four Neutrality Acts to stop U.S. involvement in foreign wars.

In 1940 Winston Churchill pleaded with FDR for naval vessels to help England during the months before her own ships would come off the line. Without stopgap support, the prime minister believed his island would be open to Nazi invasion. But the Neutrality Acts blocked U.S. assistance to the bastion of democracy.

Mr. Churchill offered the United States 99-year leases on British New World bases in return for 50 old destroyers. The two leaders took great pains in their communications to develop contrary explanations to their respective constituencies. Mr. Roosevelt surely violated the spirit, and possible the letter, of the Neutrality Acts: to skirt a breach of law, he described the transfer as a trade. But Mr. Churchill, to prevent an uproar over the imbalance of values, claimed there was no trade at all — just mutual gifts between the two democracies!


Moreover, Mr. Churchill gave the president secret assurances that if England fell, the fleet would never be surrendered to Hitler. Mr. Churchill later called the ship transfer "a decidedly unneutral act," and wrote that "It would, according to all the standards of history, have justified the German government in declaring war" on the United States.

Congress's attempt to avoid war at any price may have actually encouraged war. Without legislative isolationism, President Roosevelt might well have been able to persuade Italian dictator Benito Mussolini not to join the Axis, and we would not have fought Italy.

Only the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor completely broke the isolationist grip on congressional foreign policy.

The Supreme Court, too, has recognized the need for executive control over foreign policy. In words which speak to the circumstances underlying the Iran/"contra" situation, the court stated in *U.S. vs. Curtiss-Wright*:

"It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment — perhaps serious embarrassment — is to be avoided and success for our aims



achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the president a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular, and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results."

No absolute constitutional separation of foreign-policy function exists. The Founders knew that legislative budget authority "deals Congress in" respecting foreign policy. Indeed Congress should make it foreign-policy views known to the president in extraordinary circumstances when it believes the executive has gone beyond the mandate the voters accorded him in the last election. Normally however, legislators must permit the executive branch flexibility and leeway to carry out policy.

Yet, despite three presidential elections since 1976, find it disturbing that Congress steadfastly refuses to accord the president the prerogative he requires for a successful pro-democratic, anti-Communist foreign policy.

For his part the president's unique obligation under the Constitution is to preserve, protect, and defend the nation to the best of his ability. But when his actions might be interpreted to abrogate the law, the president must make his case public, explaining the pressing need demanding controversial action.

Despite parallels among previous cases, the great difference is that the Reagan administration chose to keep the facts secret until it was forced to tell the public. The need of the "contras" for emergency assistance to survive Sandinista Communist attacks until the aid then being approved in Congress became available should have been explained. An administration so successful in communicating with the people should never have refused to take the people into its confidence when it was so necessary to do so.

Rarely has the executive branch given Congress a better excuse to continue micromanaging foreign affairs.

Don't punish contras for executive branch mistakes

By Rep. Jim Courter


IN recent weeks hundreds of Sandinista troops have been fighting in neighboring Honduras where forces of the Nicaraguan resistance are encamped. But here in Washington, ironically, a leading topic of discussion is whether Congress should withhold aid it openly appropriated for the Nicaraguan resistance just a few months ago.

At the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), which keeps an office on Connecticut Avenue, a political leadership that is already in debt because of the military purchases it made while the Boland amendment was in effect now finds itself with new troubles. UNO can fight the Sandinistas. Our Congress the group can only persuade. And Congress is in a touchy mood.

But Congress has little right to retract contra aid just now. After a half-dozen contradictory Nicaragua policies since 1977, Capitol Hill finally seemed to settle upon an appropriation for the resistance. But no sooner is Congress confronted with the possibility that Iranian money went to the contras via US contacts than some members wonder anew about delivering the promised aid package.

Why? There is still no evidence that the contras received anything like the amounts generated by the arms sales to Iran. More to the point, the justice of the cause of the Nicaraguan resistance is not at issue now, nor should it be. The issue is one of possible malfeasance by our executive branch. That must not become an excuse for Congress to change course again and withhold aid already granted.

The Nicaraguan resistance is as deserving as any group battling for freedom from tyranny in the world today. Allegations about ties to Somoza become emptier year by year. Many resistance fighters were in late childhood during the final Somoza years. Some are Sandinistas who



Sandinista soldier stops a driver

defected as the revolution slid toward unalloyed dictatorship. Many others have religious, political, business, or labor interests which are intolerable to a regime that takes its guidance more from Castro than Sandino.

The contras' political leaders, Adolfo Calero, Alfonso Robelo, and Arturo Cruz, are respected men. Their UNO organization leads some 20,000 fighters. Of 153 senior officers in its largest contingent, the FDN, only 41 are former guardsmen. Nor does the tar of the "Somocista" brush adhere well to other resistance forces outside UNO. The Southern Opposition Bloc commanders are former Sandinista officials, now disillusioned.

The Nicaraguan resistance is now at war with what is easily the largest army in Central America, guided and supplied in the field by Cuban and Soviet experts, and enjoying that absolute political support which only the organizational tools of totalitarianism can supply. No one believes that the war has been clean, or that every contra field unit is free of blame for human rights abuses. But what must not be forgotten is that the resistance is a

loose-knit, diverse force opposing the Sandinistas' institutionalized human rights abuse. The excesses and crimes of the resistance are not in accord with UNO policy, but against it. Those who commit them are the very same who have fled a polity they find worse than the battlefield. No state in the hemisphere, according to Ismael Reyes, past president of the Nicaraguan Red Cross, is more "barbaric and sanguinary," or "violates human rights in a manner more constant and permanent than the Sandinista regime."

What is it that the resistance wants? Nothing more or less than what the US government, in concert with the other members of the Organization of American States, demanded of Somoza in 1979:

1. Immediate and definitive replacement of the regime in Nicaragua.
2. Installation in Nicaraguan territory of a truly democratic government guaranteeing peace, freedom, and justice. Its composition should include the principal representative groups that oppose the regime and reflect the free will of the people of Nicaragua.
3. Ensuring respect for the rights of all

Nicaraguans without exception.

4. The holding of free elections as soon as possible.

The OAS required these of Anastasio Somoza; it should require them now of the Sandinista dictators. Somoza, at least, did not promise democracy to the Nicaraguans; the Sandinistas did.

What is required is some trace of the resolution the anti-communist Nicaraguan forces are showing on the battlefields, and that beleaguered opposition political, union, and religious leaders occasionally dare to reveal in Managua's meeting halls.

The tide may well yet turn in this struggle. The Sandinista regime's reputation has diminished steadily since 1979. Last year, Ecuador broke relations with the government because of its refusal to hold true elections. Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras have expressed their belief that their peace and freedom are not safe as long as the Sandinistas refuse to share power. And our ambassador to the Organization of American States, Richard McCormack, has just returned from the General Assembly session, where he found "a widespread belief that if there were a pluralistic party system in Nicaragua that really worked, we would not have a Central American crisis."

Not only have we cause for hope, we have a duty to act. In Public Law 99-63 in 1985, Congress recognized the role we had, with the OAS, in delegitimizing Somoza and seeing in the current government. That role gives us "a special responsibility regarding the implementation of the commitments made by that [Sandinista] government in 1979."

The contras did not cause the current crisis; the aid we wisely promised them should be delivered.

Jim Courter (R) of New Jersey is a fifth-term member of the House Armed Services Committee and a member of the House Select Committee on the Iranian Arms Controversy.