

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
ARE ATTACHED:
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ER 86-5507 4/1

ER 86-5510 4/1-6

ACIS 090/87-C

ER 87-1307X

SUBJECT: Gates' Speech
25 Nov 86

"The Soviets and
SDI"

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP**

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Remarks

Executive Secretary
2 Apr '87

Date

STAT

JIM COURTER
NEW JERSEY

COMMITTEES:
ARMED SERVICES
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON AGING

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

87-1307x

March 27, 1987

Honorable Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Bob:

I thought you would like to see the enclosed essay from The Boston Herald, in the last paragraph of which I cite your recent speech on the Soviet SDI program.

I still think that your speech to the Northern California World Affairs Council was one of the most valuable contributions to the cause of strategic defenses ever made by a U.S. government official. It is my considered opinion that we must continue to call attention to Soviet activities in the strategic defense area. The recent edition of Soviet Military Power was somewhat disappointing in this regard, as it contained little new information on the Soviet SDI program. I understand the constraints under which you operate in this area, but it would be very helpful if you could do your utmost to release additional examples of Soviet SDI activity.


Once again, I hope you enjoy the essay. Please let me know when we could get together and discuss the many issues in which we both have an interest. I will look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,



JIM COURTER
Member of Congress

JC/jr
Enclosure


L-231-15

The Boston Herald, Thursday, March 26, 1987

Here comes Soviet 'Star Wars'

REP. JIM COURTER

HERE are three "Trivial Pursuit" questions for inquisitive Bostonians: Which country, the United States or the Soviet Union, had the first "Star Wars," or Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program? Which country has spent \$150 billion on strategic defense in the last ten years? Which country has the only deployed strategic defense system? The answer to all three questions: The Soviet Union.

If you answered "The United States," you are to be excused. Once President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative program almost exactly four years ago, the program's critics have promoted an erroneous impression that only the United States was pursuing defenses against ballistic missiles. For its part, the Reagan Administration has not been enough to expose the Soviet strategic defense program to public scrutiny.

The fact is that the Soviet Union has had its own "Star Wars" program since the early 1950s, predating even the introduction of U.S. ballistic missiles capable of striking the Soviet Union.

After more than 30 years of effort, the Soviet Union now has the world's only operational strategic defense system, deployed around the Soviet capital city of Moscow.

In addition to the Moscow ABM system, there are thousands of very fast interceptor missiles deployed elsewhere around the Soviet Union, which

reportedly have some capability to intercept U.S. ballistic missile warheads. The Defense Department estimates that there are also 10,000 Soviet scientists and technicians working on high-technology strategic defense systems involving lasers, particle beams and microwaves.

After a careful evaluation of these activities, the Reagan Administration reported to the Congress on March 10, 1987, "that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory," in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

But is the Soviet SDI system a perfect, impenetrable leak-proof "astrodome" against U.S. ballistic missiles? No, it is not. There have never been, nor will there ever be, any "perfect" offensive or defensive weapons systems.

The Soviets know this, yet according to the Defense Department, over the past ten years they have spent an estimated \$150 billion on their SDI program, or more than ten times the amount the United States spent on similar technologies. Why?

Soviet war plans envision the use of a strategic "sword" and "shield" to achieve military objectives. The "sword" is the 1400 land-based ballistic missiles and the "shield" is the Soviet SDI system. It is estimated that a Soviet missile attack on the U.S. missile force could destroy 90% of our 1000 land-based missiles. The U.S. would naturally retaliate against such an attack with all our remaining weapons, but this dramatically smaller, uncoordinated retaliatory attack could be effectively

‘There are 10,000 Soviet scientists working on strategic defense systems.’

blunted by the partially effective Soviet SDI system. Thus the Soviet leadership could rationally threaten, without actually carrying out, a nuclear missile attack on the United States.

The total absence of strategic defenses also leaves us vulnerable to accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attack. Consider this scenario: The Pave Paws radar at Otis Air Force Base on the Cape detects a submarine-launched ballistic missile heading for Boston. Its estimated flight time is just a few minutes. We assume that the missile was launched by a Soviet submarine, but we also know that the Chinese have ballistic missile submarines. The President has no alternative to letting the missile detonate over Boston and then contemplating retaliation against the Soviet Union with our missiles. Millions of innocent Americans and Russians would die as a result.

But even if we all agree that some initial strategic defenses for the U.S. would be a good idea, wouldn't it take at least until the mid-1990s to deploy some SDI systems? Not necessarily. If the right decisions were made and funding provid-

ed in 1987, the U.S. could begin deployment of a partial strategic defense system in 1993. As the technology advances, more effective strategic defense systems could be added to the initial system.

This is known as "pre-planned product improvement," and it is the same approach we use for many other weapons systems. It is, by the way, the same approach that the Soviet Union has used in its strategic defense program.

But in spite of the vigorous Soviet strategic defense program, Soviet spokesmen continue to attack our SDI program in the harshest possible language. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev recently denounced the SDI program as a "voracious monster" derived from a "fundamentally inhumane" concept. But what could be more humane than President Reagan's goal of saving lives with SDI rather than avenging them with nuclear weapons?

Soviet opposition to the U.S. SDI program was best explained by Deputy CIA Director Robert Gates in a recent speech. "There is one person in the world who believes nearly as strongly as Ronald Reagan that SDI will work and that America can build it if it decides to do so," Gates said. "And that person is Mikhail Gorbachev." Isn't this reason enough to start defending America against nuclear missile attack, the sooner the better?

U.S. Rep. Jim Courter, R-N.J., is a member of the House Armed Services Committee and a leading expert on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

John Counter M.C.

Honorable Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Reductions

ACIS - 090/87-c
20 February 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Steve Steiner
NSC Staff
Chairman, Arms Control & SDI Public Diplomacy IG

FROM:
Chairman, Strategic Arms Monitoring Working Group

SUBJECT: DDCI Gates' Speech of 25 November 1986

STAT

1. This memorandum responds to your request to clear the revised version of the speech by DDCI R. M. Gates, on 25 November, for release now as a Department of State Special Report.

2. As I understand it from Hal Davidson, as part of the SDI Public Diplomacy effort, the IG wants to publish this subject speech with changes suggested by the Department of State and DIA. Except for the change that the DDCI agreed to earlier (i.e., change "create" to "research" on page 1), I do not believe it is wise or useful to accept the proposed revisions. Hence, I do not concur on making any of the changes.

3. The reasons are clear. It is almost three months since the speech was delivered. Most of the suggestions add little, if anything, to the context of the speech--in my opinion, and the dollar figures cited by the ADCI are national vice departmental figures. Moreover, the speech was reported in the papers and has already been published by DoD. To make changes at this point would hopelessly muddy the waters and open the way for the obvious complaints about changing the historical record.

4. I have discussed this issue with the NIO/SP, and he feels strongly as well that no revisions be made other than the earlier one-word change.

5. If you still desire to put it out as a Department of State Special Report, I recommend publishing it as it is agreed.

6. If there is more I may do to help you, please call. (U)

STAT

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

B-802-12

ER 86-5510/6

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

5 December 1986

NOTE FOR ANDY MARSHALL

Per your request, enclosed are
copies of the two speeches given
by Bob Gates in San Francisco
recently.

[Redacted]

O/DDCI

Enclosures

STAT



B-802-15

The Soviets and SDI

An Address to the World Affairs Council of Northern California
(Bay Area International Forum)
by Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
November 25, 1986

One of the most significant developments in the nuclear age was the President's call to the nation in March 1983 to build a strategic defense system to protect the United States and its allies. This visionary concept and the President's determination to bring it to reality initially was greeted with widespread skepticism and a good deal of head shaking over his presumed naivete. And yet, as the nation's scientists and engineers have been mobilized, the technologies examined, and successful tests carried out a growing number of scientific and political leaders have come not only to accept the validity of the concept but the wisdom of implementing it. While skeptics and critics continue to voice their doubts, there is one person in the world who believes nearly as strongly as Ronald Reagan that SDI will work and that America can build it if it decides to do so -- and that person is Mikhail Gorbachev.

It seemed appropriate to me to speak today in this center of high technology development not of our own SDI with which some of you are more familiar than I am but rather the Soviet approach to strategic defense and their own pursuit of SDI type

War By Another Name

An Address to the Commonwealth Club of California
by Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
November 25, 1986

The most divisive and controversial part of American foreign policy for nearly four decades has been our effort in the Third World to preserve and defend pro-Western governments, to resist Communist aggression and subversion, and to promote economic development and democracy.

Our continuing difficulty in formulating a coherent and sustainable bipartisan strategy for the Third World over two generations contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union's relentless effort there to eliminate Western influence, establish strategically located client Communist states, and to gain access to strategic resources.

But while we may debate strategy and how to respond, the facts of Soviet involvement in major Third World conflicts are undeniable. Consider two very painful memories:

- It is clear that the Soviet Union, and Stalin personally, played a central role in prompting North Korea's invasion of the South in 1950, the cause of our

ER Copy

5510/5

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

2 December 1986

Mr. James Hackett
Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

Dear Jim:

Enclosed are copies of the two speeches that I gave in San Francisco last week. You may find them of interest.

It was good to see you today even if only for a moment. When things calm down a bit, I owe you lunch.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

STAT


Enclosures



B-802-1R

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505



26 November 1986

Dr. Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Room 4E830
The Pentagon

Fred -

Enclosed are the two speeches I gave in California this week that I thought you might find of passing interest.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosures

STAT



The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

5510/2

26 November 1986

The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
Room 4E808
The Pentagon

Rich -

Enclosed are two speeches that I gave in California last week in which you might have a passing interest.

I am trying to get you out here for lunch-- there is much to talk about.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosures

STAT

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

5510/3

26 November 1986

R. E. Tyrrell, Jr.
Editor-in-Chief
The American Spectator
1101 N. Highland
P. O. Box 10448
Arlington, VA 22210

RMG -

There is always risk in an amateur sharing his work with a professional, but enclosed are the two speeches I spoke to you about the other evening. I hope you find them of some passing interest.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosures

STAT

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

5510/4

26 November 1986


Mr. Anthony Dolan
Speechwriter
Executive Office of the President
The White House

Tony -

There is always great risk in an amateur sharing his work with a professional, but I thought you might find these two speeches I gave earlier this week in California of passing interest.

We need to get together again in the near future.

Regards.



Robert M. Gates

Enclosures

STAT

5-5510

War By Another Name

An Address to the Commonwealth Club of California
by Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
November 25, 1986

The most divisive and controversial part of American foreign policy for nearly four decades has been our effort in the Third World to preserve and defend pro-Western governments, to resist Communist aggression and subversion, and to promote economic development and democracy.

Our continuing difficulty in formulating a coherent and sustainable bipartisan strategy for the Third World over two generations contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union's relentless effort there to eliminate Western influence, establish strategically located client Communist states, and to gain access to strategic resources.

But while we may debate strategy and how to respond, the facts of Soviet involvement in major Third World conflicts are undeniable. Consider two very painful memories:

- It is clear that the Soviet Union, and Stalin personally, played a central role in prompting North Korea's invasion of the South in 1950, the cause of our



B-802-17

first great post-war strategic debate over strategy in the Third World.

- Although the strategic consequences of a victory by North Vietnam were hotly debated in the US, we now see the Soviet Navy well entrenched in the great naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, and Vietnam's economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union; we recall the Soviet military supplyline that made Hanoi's victory possible, and remember Soviet help in the conquest of Laos and Cambodia. The resulting human suffering in Southeast Asia was even more horrifying than predicted.

Somehow many Americans thought their first loss of a major foreign war -- Vietnam -- would have no important consequences, especially inasmuch as it was accompanied by so-called "detente" with the Soviet Union and the opening to China. Yet, it was in fact a major watershed in post World War II history, especially as it coincided with the collapse of Portugal's colonial empire in Africa; revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia and Nicaragua; and Congressional actions in the mid-1970s cutting off all US assistance to the non-Communist forces in Angola, thus signaling the withdrawal of American support for opponents of Marxist-Leninist forces in the Third World.

The effects of American defeat in Vietnam, the revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, and the coming to power of bitterly

antagonistic and aggressively destabilizing governments in all three countries undermined the confidence of US friends and allies in the Third World (not to mention in Europe and Japan) and ensured that an opportunistic Soviet Union would see in the Third World its principal foreign policy opportunities for years to come.

And they moved aggressively to create or exploit such opportunities. Throughout the Third World, the Soviet Union and its clients for the past ten years have incited violence and disorder and sponsored subversion of neutral or pro-Western governments in El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, various Caribbean States, Chad, Sudan, Suriname, North Yemen, Oman, Pakistan, New Caledonia, South Korea, Grenada, and many others. The Soviet Union has affixed itself as a parasite to legitimate nationalist, anticolonial movements or to those who have overthrown repressive or incompetent regimes and tried wherever possible to convert or consolidate them into Marxist-Leninist dictatorships as in Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. And now these same regimes in the process of consolidating power are fighting their own people. Open warfare by invading Communist armies is being waged in Cambodia and Afghanistan. And in most instances of state support for terrorism, the government involved is tied in some way to the USSR.

These contemporary challenges to international order and stability -- and to democratic values -- certainly grow primarily out of localized and specific circumstances. To be sure, there are local economic, social, racial, human rights and other injustices. And many -- too many -- governments have demonstrated their capacity to inflict hardship and violence on their own people. But, that said, we cannot close our eyes to a common theme across the entire Third World and that is the pervasively destructive role of the Soviet Union and its clients.

In 1919, Trotsky said that, "The road to London and Paris lies through Calcutta." This conviction that the West could more easily and effectively be weakened and made vulnerable through the Third World than by direct confrontation remains central to Soviet foreign policy. And if you question how critical this is for Moscow, remember that the Soviets allowed detente with the US, which was highly advantageous to them, to founder substantially with successive Presidents in the 1970s because the USSR refused to moderate its aggressive pursuit of Third World opportunities -- in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Afghanistan.

Subversion, Violence and Repression

In the mid-1970s, new Soviet tactics in the Third World, combined with historic events and opportunities, emerged to challenge Western presence, progress toward democracy and sound economic development in the Third World. The new tactics were designed to minimize the chance of a repetition of disastrous setbacks such as their expulsion from Egypt in 1972 and the ouster of a Marxist regime in Chile in 1973. The strategy had five parts:

- First, the cornerstone of the new Soviet approach was the use of Cuban forces to establish and sustain the power of "revolutionary governments". They first helped consolidate radical power in Angola. This was followed by the dispatch of thousands of Cuban troops to Ethiopia where that regime also became dependent on their support.

This tactic of using Third World Communist or radical states as surrogates in the Third World subsequently involved assisting Vietnam's conquest of the remainder of Indochina, Libya's designs in Chad and plotting against Sudan, South Yemen's aggression against Oman and North Yemen, and Cuba's support for regimes in Nicaragua, Grenada and Suriname as well as the insurgency in El Salvador.

- Second, when radical governments came to power without the aid of foreign troops, as in Nicaragua, Soviets directly or through their surrogates such as East Germany helped in the establishment of an internal security structure to ensure that any possible challenge from within would be stamped out.

- Third, the Soviets continued to supplement these tactics with more traditional offerings such as technical and political training in the USSR, the rapid supply of weapons, and the use of a wide range of covert actions to support friends and to help defeat or destabilize unfriendly challengers or governments.

- Fourth, the USSR proved in Afghanistan that it would still be willing to launch its own forces at targets on its periphery -- and perhaps elsewhere -- when and if circumstances are right.

- Fifth, and finally, the Soviets advised new radical regimes to mute their revolutionary rhetoric and to try to keep their links to Western commercial resources, foreign assistance and international financial institutions. Soviet ambitions did not cloud their recognition that they could not afford more economic dependents such as Cuba and Vietnam.

Soviet support for the radical regimes that it has helped established has been sustained. The Soviets and their East European allies have provided military and economic assistance to Nicaragua over the past five years approaching \$2.5 billion dollars. Compare this with the highly controversial \$100 million American program to assist the resistance in that country. The Soviets have provided a full range of military weapons and support and also have become Nicaragua's major source of economic aid. They are attempting to shore up a Nicaraguan economy rapidly deteriorating because of slumping industrial and agricultural production, falling export earnings and cutbacks in Western funding. The Soviet Union has replaced Mexico as Nicaragua's primary supplier of oil.

In Angola, total Communist military and economic assistance now stands at almost \$3.5 billion, most of it since 1984. Almost all of that assistance is military. The Soviets are not particularly generous, however, and because Angola in the past has had the ability to pay, the Soviets and Cubans have required payment for material and technicians in hard currency, thus adding to the country's economic problems.

It is in Afghanistan, however, that the full measure of Soviet ambitions in the Third World can be taken most clearly. More than 100,000 Soviet troops are in Afghanistan, with more than a million troops having served. The cost to Afghanistan

has been high. Some four million people, more than a quarter of the population, have had to flee their country. Thousands of children are being sent to the Soviet Union for education and ideological training. Yet, after seven years, the Soviets are still unable to create a regime that can gain public support -- and, in fact, just last week dumped Babrak Karmal, who they brought in from exile in Moscow after the KGB assassinated his predecessor. Afghanis drafted into government military service use the first opportunity to desert or defect, often to the Mujahedin freedom fighters. Despite horrendous losses and incredible suffering, the Mujahedin have fought the Soviets to a standoff over seven years and are daily increasing their military capability and the cost of the war to the Soviets.

Indeed, a new phenomenon that Soviets have faced in recent years is that they find themselves on the defensive, supporting high cost, long term efforts to maintain in power repressive regimes they have installed or coopted in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Mozambique, South Yemen and Nicaragua. Taken together, nearly half a million resistance fighters have taken up arms against some 400,000 Soviet, Vietnamese and Cuban troops occupying these countries.

The Soviets' aggressive strategy in the Third World has, in my view, four ultimate targets -- first, the oil fields of the Middle East which are the life line of the West and Japan;

second, the Isthmus and Canal of Panama between North and South America; and, third, the mineral wealth of Southern Africa. Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and Mozambique and Angola in Southern Africa bring Soviet power much closer to the sources of oil and minerals on which the industrial nations depend and put Soviet naval and air power astride the sea lanes which carry those resources to America, Europe and Japan. The fourth target is the West itself -- to use conflict in the Third World to exploit divisions in the Alliance and to try to recreate the internal divisions caused by Vietnam in order to weaken the Western response and provoke disagreement over larger national security and defense policies.

Terrorism

Let me now turn to terrorism. Terrorism, including state supported terrorism, is not a new phenomenon. Unhappily, it is a familiar fact of life in the internal affairs of too many countries -- as well as in nearly all wars. Even so, terrorist murder in peacetime of innocent bystanders -- men, women and children -- is very rare in the West and it is especially frightening when perpetrated by states and causes remote from us. And when it becomes the primary means of waging war for smaller states, it becomes a real danger. Growing out of the Lebanese Civil War and the overthrow of the Shah, support for terrorism by Syria, Libya and Iran has become a significant and lethal component of international terrorism and has become an

established instrument of foreign policy of those and other countries.

At the same time, looming in the background of Middle Eastern terrorism -- and terrorism elsewhere as well -- are the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe. Let there be no mistake or ambiguity about it: the Soviet Union supports terrorism. It has directly and indirectly trained, funded, armed and even operationally assisted terrorist organizations such as Fatah, Abu Nidal and others. Nearly every terrorist group in the Middle East has links to the USSR or one of its clients. Just by way of example:

- In 1982 Israel found in the PLO camps in Lebanon nearly three dozen Soviet tanks, Soviet anti-aircraft guns, armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, 1200 anti-tank weapons, and more than 28,000 small caliber weapons.
- In the 1970s, Turkish officials uncovered in the hands of Turkish terrorists thousands of Czech CZ-75 pistols, Polish submachine guns, Hungarian pistols -- and in 1981 they found Soviet bazookas, AK-47 rifles and F-1 hand grenades.
- Elsewhere, the M-19 terrorists who attacked the Palace of Justice in Bogota, Colombia a year ago were armed

with US M-16 rifles which we left in Vietnam. Cuba was the source of the large quantities of weapons recently found cached for terrorists in Northern Chile. Again, weapons we abandoned in Vietnam. And I could go on.

It is this umbrella of Soviet support, and the associated role of Soviet clients such as Syria, Libya, Vietnam and Nicaragua that allows large scale terrorist operations to continue. And, finally, in addition to their support of these groups, the Soviets refuse to play any role in international efforts to curtail terrorism.

It has not been lost on the Soviets that the practitioners of terrorism who make spectacular strikes against the West by bending or redefining the rules -- as in Lebanon -- are finding ways past the West's defenses, both physical and psychological. This has allure -- and is a good line of attack -- for Moscow in a world when nuclear and conventional military balances change slowly and where Soviet economic, political and ideological power is stunted. Such an attitude toward terrorism is not surprising given the fundamental role that terrorism played in the establishment of Soviet power and the conduct of its policy. One of those who led the revolution, Trotsky, said that the revolution "kills individuals and intimidates thousands" -- it is necessary to kill some in order shatter the will of the rest. No one in the intervening 65 years has found a better statement of the purpose of terror at home or abroad.

Conclusions: What is to be Done

As we reflect on the last forty years of war, subversion, instability and terrorism in the Third World, it is clear that the Soviet Union and its surrogates have played and are continuing to play a major role. Their involvement is a common feature as is their ability relentlessly to sustain their participation over many years. It is imperative that, at long last, Americans recognize the strategic significance of this Soviet offensive -- that it is in reality, a war, a war waged between nations and against Western influence and presence, against economic development and against the growth of democratic values. It is war without declaration, without mobilization, without massive armies. It is, in fact, that long twilight war described nearly a quarter century ago by President Kennedy.

What then are we to do? From Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan, our Presidents have recognized the importance of this struggle in the Third World -- some sooner than others. But public and Congressional understanding and support have waxed and waned. What we need is a vigorous strategy we can sustain in a struggle Secretary Shultz has said is "the prime challenge we will face, at least through the remainder of this century." I would like to suggest several steps, none of them new, and many of them in train now, that should be integrated into a

strategy to meet the long term Soviet challenge and promote democracy and freedom in the Third World.

1. First, Congress and the Executive Branch, Republicans and Democrats, must collaborate more closely in the setting of strategy. There seems to be more agreement on the nature of the threat than on what to do about it. Cooperation and support in recent years has been good in some areas; not so good in others. There have been close calls and too often prolonged delays in getting help to our friends. Too often in the past, opportunities to counter the Soviets have been lost by clashes between the two Branches, or by partisan politics. If common understanding of the Soviet challenge in the Third World cannot be translated into a program of action that can be counted on for more than a year at a time, if that, we will have little success. At the same time, those who would lay claim to a constructive role in protecting our interests and advancing stability and freedom in the Third World cannot oppose overt military action and covert action and at the same time also reject security assistance and economic assistance for key countries. The United States must have some means to help our friends in the Third World defend themselves and grow economically, and support for those means must be bipartisan and stable.

2. Second, more must be done to educate the public, the Congress, and Third World governments about Soviet strategy in

the Third World. A continuing information program to inform and tie together developments in areas widely distant is needed and must be pursued over a long term.

3. We must, as a country, give priority to learning more about developments in the Third World and to providing early warning of economic, social, and political problems that foreshadow instability and opportunities for exploitation by the USSR or its clients. We should serve as a clearing house of information useful to threatened countries, for example, seeing to it that lessons learned in successful counterinsurgencies or economic development programs are shared.

4. The US must establish priorities in terms of major commitments. If our early help fails to prevent serious trouble, for which countries are we prepared to put our chips on the table? Also, I believe we should at least try to make such choices in consultation with key members of Congress so that their support at crucial moments is more likely. Great losing battles in Congress for foreign military sales or economic assistance for important Third World friends, played out on the world stage and at critical times, represent devastating setbacks for the US with ramifications going far beyond the affected country.

5. We must be -- and are -- prepared to demand firmly, but tactfully and privately, that our friends observe certain

standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights. It is required by our own principles and essential to political support in the US. Moreover, we have to be -- and are -- willing to talk straight to those we would help about issues they must address to block Soviet and other foreign exploitation of their problems -- issues such as land reform and corruption. We have a right and a responsibility to condition our support -- but must do so in ways that make it possible politically for the recipient to comply.

6. We need to change our approach to foreign military sales so that the US can provide arms more quickly to our friends in need -- provide them the tools to do the job -- and to do so without hanging out all their dirty linen for the world to see. It does not serve any rational purpose to humiliate those whom we would help.

7. Covert action can be used, as in the past, to create problems for hostile governments, and to provide discreet help to friendly organizations and governments. Indeed, at times it may be the only means we have to help them.

8. We must be prepared to use overt military forces where circumstances are appropriate, as in Grenada and Libya.

9. We must find a way to mobilize and use our greatest asset in the Third World -- private business. No one in the

Third World wants to adopt the Soviet economic system. Neither we nor the Soviets can offer unlimited or even large-scale economic assistance to the Third World. Investment is the key to economic success or at least survival in the Third World and we, our NATO allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy to promote investment in the Third World. The Soviets are helpless to compete with private capital in these countries.

10. Finally, we need to have a strategy supported with consistency through more than one Presidency. This Administration and Congress in recent years have gone further than any of their predecessors in developing and sustaining a coherent strategy. But more must be done, and it must endure. After all, we now face a Soviet leader who could be in power well into the 21st century.

We are engaged in a historic struggle with the Soviet Union, a struggle between age-old tyranny -- to use an old fashioned word -- and the concept that the highest goal of the State is to protect and foster the creative capabilities and liberties of the individual. The battle lines are most sharply drawn in the Third World. We have enormous assets and advantages in this struggle. We offer an economic model based on private enterprise for long term development, independence, stability, and prosperity. We offer a model of freedom and democratic ideals; we offer religious tolerance and spiritual values; and we have democratic allies willing to help. As the

President has said, we welcome the democratic revolution in the Third World and are committed to promoting national independence and popular rule. In contrast, the Soviet Union offers only a model police state, a new form of colonial subservience, the morality of the gun, and the austerity of totalitarian socialism.

Our experience over the last forty years makes clear that Soviet aggression and subversion in the Third World cannot be stopped by negotiation alone (if at all); it must be resisted -- politically, economically and militarily.

As a country, we must develop realistic policies, public support for those policies and make the long term investment essential to a constructive role in helping to bring peace, stability, prosperity and freedom to the Third World. The East-West struggle to influence the future of the Third World is a classic confrontation of the Soviet capacity to destroy arrayed against the democratic nations' capacity to build. Americans cannot and must not be indifferent to the outcome.


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

3 December 1986

NOTE FOR: Alton Frye

Per your office's request,
enclosed is a copy of the speech
entitled, "The Soviets and SDI,"
given by Mr. Gates in San Francisco
recently.


O/DDCI

Enclosure

STAT

The Soviets and SDI

An Address to the World Affairs Council of Northern California
(Bay Area International Forum)
by Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
November 25, 1986

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
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Executive Sec.
DC 5507/1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

28 November 1986

General James Williams



STAT

General Williams:

The attached is forwarded
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O/DDCI

Executive Registry

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Until March 1983, the United States developed its strategic military programs within the strategic reality that the existence of huge nuclear arsenals and the vulnerability of both sides to those weapons would lead each side to calculate that a nuclear attack would be suicidal -- that even if one side preempted, the other side would have enough weapons remaining to destroy the still-vulnerable initiator of the conflict. This is the concept we have known as mutual assured destruction. Even though this has not been our official policy, it has been the reality.

There are two problems with this concept. First, the Soviets never accepted it. The Soviets believe that nuclear war could occur and, in light of that fact, they have designed their military programs to try to enable the Soviet Union to survive and to prevail. This includes the development over many years, and continuing until today, of a massive national

strategic air defense against bombers and cruise missiles, a ballistic missile defense of Moscow and a vigorous R&D program, as well as large scale measures for leadership protection, civil defense, and protection of vital elements of the national economy. It speaks volumes that in a relationship in which for twenty or more years strategic stability presumably has been based on mutual vulnerability, the Soviet Union has been working to eliminate its own vulnerability and consolidate a unilateral strategic advantage.

Second, the offensive balance has not been maintained. To take just one example, the Soviets have continued to improve their heavy ICBM force in order to be able to take out all of the US ICBM force, other nuclear force installations, and the few hardened leadership facilities we have. Their heavy ICBM force is designed in order for the Soviets to strike first, and effectively, despite their propoganda claim that they would not use nuclear weapons first. The Soviet concept, an initial strike by their heavy ICBMs, is the essential lead element of their strategic defenses, for it reduces the nuclear threat with which the rest of their defenses have to contend.

It is the Soviet program for strategic defense that I want to address today. Only by understanding the scope of this Soviet effort, our own vulnerability, and the destabilizing effect of this imbalance -- recognized for years by our own military as a serious flaw -- can one fully understand the significance of the President's initiative.

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And what have they bought for their money? They have the world's only operational ballistic missile defense system, installed around Moscow. Six years ago they began to upgrade and expand that system -- actually, to replace it with a completely new system -- to the limits allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty. When completed the modernized Moscow ABM system will be a two-layer defense composed of silo-based long-range modified Galosh interceptors; silo-based, high-acceleration Gazelle interceptors designed to engage targets within the atmosphere; associated engagement and guidance radars; and a new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM engagements. The silo-based launchers may be reloadable. The new system will have the 100 ABM launchers permitted by the Treaty and could be fully operational in 1988. The Soviet system for detection and tracking of ballistic missile attacks

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technology is blurring the distinction between air defense and ABM systems. This problem will be further complicated as newer, more complex air defense missile systems are developed.

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Although the United States dismantled most of its defenses against Soviet bombers in the 1960s, the Soviet Union has continued to invest enormous resources in a wide array of strategic air defense weapon systems. Currently the Soviets

have nearly 12,000 surface to air missile launchers at over 1200 sites; 10,000 air defense radars and more than 1200 interceptor aircraft dedicated to strategic defense. An additional 2800 interceptors assigned to Soviet air forces could also be employed in strategic defense missions. The newest Soviet air defense interceptor aircraft, the MIG-31/FOXHOUND, has a lookdown, shootdown and multiple target engagement capability. More than 85 FOXHOUNDS are now operationally deployed. In contrast, the US has approximately 300 interceptor aircraft based in the US, dedicated to strategic defense, 118 strategic air defense warning radars and no operational strategic surface to air missile launchers. And this in the face of the modernization of the Soviet heavy bomber force and development of a new Soviet strategic bomber, the Blackjack. Similar in design to the B-1 but larger and faster.

Finally, the Soviets also have a wide range of passive defenses to ensure wartime survivability and continuity of Soviet nuclear forces, leadership, military command and control units, war-related industrial production and services, the essential work force, and as much of the population as possible.

The USSR has hardened its ICBM silos, launch facilities and key command and control centers to an unprecedented degree. Much of today's US retaliatory force would be ineffective against those hardened targets. Soviet leaders and managers at

all levels of the government and Party are provided hardened alternate command posts located well away from the urban centers, in addition to many deep bunkers and blast shelters in Soviet cities. This comprehensive and redundant system provides hardened alternate facilities for more than 175,000 key Party and government personnel. Elaborate plans also have been made for the full mobilization of the national economy in support of a war effort. Reserves of vital materials are maintained, many in hardened underground structures. Redundant industrial facilities are in active production. Industrial and other economic facilities have been equipped with blast shelters for the work force and detailed procedures have been developed for the relocation of selected plants and equipment.

As if all these developments were not worrisome enough, since the late 1960s the Soviet Union also has been pursuing advanced technologies for strategic defense -- technologies which the US is intending to explore in its strategic defense initiative program. The Soviets expect that military applications of directed energy technologies hold promise of overcoming weaknesses in their conventional air and missile defenses. The Soviets have been working as long as the United States in laser, particle beam, kinetic energy and microwave technologies applicable to strategic weapons. Let me briefly discuss their activities in each of these.

The Soviet laser weapons program began in the 1960s. Many Soviet organizations both civilian and military are involved. The Soviet laser weapon effort is guided and supported by some of the best scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union. Yevgeniy Velikhov, the rising vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, made his early mark in directed energy related weapons research. (He is, by the way, the same Velikhov who was one of 200 Soviet signatories of a full page ad in the New York Times which stated that SDI would not work. He, and some of the others, made their mark by demonstrating the value of these technologies.)

The level of effort that the Soviets have applied to their laser weapons program is great. While it is difficult for us to measure the size of this program precisely, we estimate roughly \$1 billion per year for the laser effort. It is clear, based on the observed scale and scope of the Soviet effort, that their program is considerably larger than that of the United States. For example, the Soviets have built over a half a dozen major R&D facilities and test ranges and have an estimated 10,000 scientists and engineers associated with the development of lasers for weapons.

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The USSR has now progressed, in some cases, beyond technology research. It already has ground-based lasers that could be used to interfere with US satellites and could have prototype space-based anti-satellite laser weapons by the early 1990s. We expect the Soviets to test the feasibility of ground-based lasers for defense against ballistic missiles by the late 1980s and could begin testing components for a large scale deployment system in the 1990s.

The remaining difficulties in fielding an operational system will require still more development time. An operational ground-based laser for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be deployed until after the year 2000. If technology developments prove successful, the Soviets may deploy operational space-based anti-satellite lasers in the 1990s and might be able to deploy space-based laser systems for defense against ballistic missiles after the year 2000.

Soviet research and development of those technologies that could support a particle beam weapon also have been impressive. We estimate that they may be able to test a prototype particle beam weapon intended to disrupt the electronics of satellites in the 1990s. A weapon designed to destroy satellites could follow later. A weapon capable of physically destroying missile boosters or warheads probably would require additional years of research and development.

The USSR also has conducted research in the use of strong radiofrequency signals that have the potential to interfere with or destroy critical electronic components of ballistic missile warheads. The Soviets could test a ground-based radiofrequency weapon capable of damaging satellites in the 1990s. Soviet capabilities to develop micro-wave weapons or radiofrequency weapons are on a par if not superior to those of the US.

The Soviets also have a variety of research programs underway in the area of kinetic energy weapons using the high speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism. Long range, space-based kinetic energy systems for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be developed until the mid-1990s or even later. The USSR could, however, could deploy in the near term a short-range space-based system useful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle to Soviet success in these advanced defenses against ballistic missiles are remote sensor and computer technologies -- currently more highly developed in the West than in the USSR. The Soviets are devoting considerable resources to improving their abilities and expertise in these technologies. An important part of that effort involves increasing exploitation of open and clandestine access to Western technology. For example, the Soviets have long been engaged in well funded effort to purchase US high technology computers, test and calibration equipment, and sensors illegally through third parties.

The Soviets have had a near monopoly on strategic defenses for many years. Their primary motivation for engaging initially in the strategic arms limitation talks with the United States in 1969 was to kill the US anti-ballistic missile program. Indeed, for many months in the early stages of SALT,

the Soviets refused even to discuss limits on offensive strategic systems.

The Soviet effort we see today to kill SDI is of a piece with the effort nearly twenty years ago to kill ABM. The Soviets simply do not want the United States to be able to defend itself against strategic nuclear weapons. Limited though the current Soviet anti-ballistic missile system is, the Soviets are laying the foundation that will give them the option of a relatively rapidly deployable nationwide ABM system -- a system that despite deficiencies would give the Soviets a significant unilateral advantage both politically and in time of war. Through an intensive worldwide propaganda campaign, the USSR hopes that it can dissuade the United States from pursuing the SDI research program and thereby preserve the Soviet monopoly in defense against ballistic missiles. Indeed, the same Soviet covert action structure that was used against the enhanced radiation weapon in the late 1970s and the deployment of intermediate nuclear forces to Europe in the early 80s is now being used against SDI.

The Soviets wish that the President's March 23rd announcement had never been made and that they could pursue their own solitary development of an anti-ballistic missile defense and research on advanced strategic defense without competition from the United States. The advent of SDI, however, faces the Soviets with the mobilization of an American

effort to build a strategic missile defense in the United States and they are moving heaven and earth to convince or pressure the United States to drop it. They believe we can develop a highly effective strategic defense, in part because they are doing large elements of such a program themselves.

In the Soviet view, a US decision at this point to give up on defense and to rely solely on offensive weapons for deterrence not only would preserve their monopoly in strategic defense, but would be a key indicator of a loss of US will to compete militarily. Moreover, failure to proceed with an American strategic defense would hand the Soviets a unilateral military advantage of historic consequence -- with awesomely negative implications for strategic stability and peace.

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technologies. I think you will be surprised by the breadth and depth of the Soviet program and the long term commitment they have made to strategic defense, including advanced technologies. It is ironic that the US effort to achieve strategic defense is the focus of world attention, as if the Soviet program had never existed. Indeed, I hope that when I conclude the principal question remaining in your mind will be why we have waited so long to create a defense for our country -- to prevent nuclear weapons from reaching their targets.

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laser, and the chemical laser. Soviet achievements are impressive. The Soviets have not only followed suit with the US in their work on these three kinds of lasers, they have continued to work on certain types of lasers which the US abandoned. The Soviets have been working on other types of lasers that the US has not seriously considered for weapons application until very recently. They also are investigating excimer, free electron and x-ray lasers and have been developing argon ion lasers for over a decade. The Soviets appear generally capable of supplying the prime power, energy storage and auxiliary components needed for most laser and other directed energy weapons. They have developed a rocket-driven generator which produces over 15 megawatts of electrical power -- a device that has no counterpart in the West. The Soviets may also have the capability to develop the optical systems necessary for laser weapons to track and attack their target.

The USSR has now progressed, in some cases, beyond technology research. It already has ground-based lasers that could be used to interfere with US satellites and could have prototype space-based anti-satellite laser weapons by the early 1990s. We expect the Soviets to test the feasibility of ground-based lasers for defense against ballistic missiles by the late 1980s and could begin testing components for a large scale deployment system in the 1990s.

The remaining difficulties in fielding an operational system will require still more development time. An operational ground-based laser for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be deployed until after the year 2000. If technology developments prove successful, the Soviets may deploy operational space-based anti-satellite lasers in the 1990s and might be able to deploy space-based laser systems for defense against ballistic missiles after the year 2000.

Soviet research and development of those technologies that could support a particle beam weapon also have been impressive. We estimate that they may be able to test a prototype particle beam weapon intended to disrupt the electronics of satellites in the 1990s. A weapon designed to destroy satellites could follow later. A weapon capable of physically destroying missile boosters or warheads probably would require additional years of research and development.

The USSR also has conducted research in the use of strong radiofrequency signals that have the potential to interfere with or destroy critical electronic components of ballistic missile warheads. The Soviets could test a ground-based radiofrequency weapon capable of damaging satellites in the 1990s. Soviet capabilities to develop micro-wave weapons or radiofrequency weapons are on a par if not superior to those of the US.

The Soviets also have a variety of research programs underway in the area of kinetic energy weapons using the high speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism. Long range, space-based kinetic energy systems for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be developed until the mid-1990s or even later. The USSR could, however, could deploy in the near term a short-range space-based system useful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle to Soviet success in these advanced defenses against ballistic missiles are remote sensor and computer technologies -- currently more highly developed in the West than in the USSR. The Soviets are devoting considerable resources to improving their abilities and expertise in these technologies. An important part of that effort involves increasing exploitation of open and clandestine access to Western technology. For example, the Soviets have long been engaged in well funded effort to purchase US high technology computers, test and calibration equipment, and sensors illegally through third parties.

The Soviets have had a near monopoly on strategic defenses for many years. Their primary motivation for engaging initially in the strategic arms limitation talks with the United States in 1969 was to kill the US anti-ballistic missile program. Indeed, for many months in the early stages of SALT,

the Soviets refused even to discuss limits on offensive strategic systems.

The Soviet effort we see today to kill SDI is of a piece with the effort nearly twenty years ago to kill ABM. The Soviets simply do not want the United States to be able to defend itself against strategic nuclear weapons. Limited though the current Soviet anti-ballistic missile system is, the Soviets are laying the foundation that will give them the option of a relatively rapidly deployable nationwide ABM system -- a system that despite deficiencies would give the Soviets a significant unilateral advantage both politically and in time of war. Through an intensive worldwide propaganda campaign, the USSR hopes that it can dissuade the United States from pursuing the SDI research program and thereby preserve the Soviet monopoly in defense against ballistic missiles. Indeed, the same Soviet covert action structure that was used against the enhanced radiation weapon in the late 1970s and the deployment of intermediate nuclear forces to Europe in the early 80s is now being used against SDI.

The Soviets wish that the President's March 23rd announcement had never been made and that they could pursue their own solitary development of an anti-ballistic missile defense and research on advanced strategic defense without competition from the United States. The advent of SDI, however, faces the Soviets with the mobilization of an American

effort to build a strategic missile defense in the United States and they are moving heaven and earth to convince or pressure the United States to drop it. They believe we can develop a highly effective strategic defense, in part because they are doing large elements of such a program themselves.

In the Soviet view, a US decision at this point to give up on defense and to rely solely on offensive weapons for deterrence not only would preserve their monopoly in strategic defense, but would be a key indicator of a loss of US will to compete militarily. Moreover, failure to proceed with an American strategic defense would hand the Soviets a unilateral military advantage of historic consequence -- with awesomely negative implications for strategic stability and peace.