

OCA FILE OGA
REPORT # Record

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY




Director of Congressional Affairs

OCA#86-2499

16 July 1986

NOTE FOR: Ron Sable
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director, Legislative
Affairs, NSC

FROM: Dave Gries 

SUBJECT: Angola

At Monday's meeting you asked for a list of who CIA had briefed. You also asked for a collection of classified and unclassified publications. Having none of the latter, I enclose the briefing list and a collection of classified publications.

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - D/OCA
① OCA Registry

~~SECRET~~

<u>TIME</u> <u>PLACE</u>		<u>EVENT</u>	<u>CIA PARTICIPANTS</u>
13 Jan 1400 3F29, Hqs	25X1	Brf Sen Byrd's (D., WV) stfr D'Amato on Angola	
16 Jan 1400 S-406 Capitol		Brf HFAC, SFRC & SSCI stf on Angola	
28 Jan 1530 H-405 Capitol		Brf Rep Michel, (R., IL), House Minority Leader, and Rep Dick Cheney (R., WY) re Angola and Nicaragua	
30 Jan 1000 S-116 Capitol		Bfg SFRC on Angola	
30 Jan 1600 219 SHOB		Brf SSCI on Nicaragua, Cambodia and Yemen (plus Angola) (also Gerner, DO/EPS attended)	
31 Jan 1000 120 SROB		Brf Sen Mitch McConnell (R., KY) and SSCI stfr Cleveland on Angola	
31 Jan 1100 219 SHOB		Brf SFRC stfrs on Angola	
13 Feb 1500 7E48, Hqs		Brf Sen Glenn's (D., OH) stfrs Eckert	

SECRET

25X1
05 Mar
1300
119 SDOB
Staff Briefing on Angola PF for Shekmar
of SAC Def Subcmte

12 Mar
1400
H-405 Capitol
Testimony on Angola for HPSCI
(w/Sec State)

14 Mar
1030
Member Briefing on Angola for SSCI mbr
Sen Boren (D., OK) (POSTPONED)


20 Mar
1400
219 SHOB
Staff Briefing on Angola for SSCI Stfr
McMahon

21 Mar
1100
219 SHOB
Member Briefing on Angola for
Sen DeConcini (D., AZ) of SAC

04 Apr
1000
6D01 Hqs
Staff Briefing on Afghanistan and
Angola for Finn and Levine, SSCI stfrs

04 Apr
1330
3F29 Hqs
Staff Briefing on Angola and Mozambique
for Philip Christenson of SFRC stf

15 Apr
1430
137 CHOB
Member Briefing on Angola for Rep
Siljander (R., MI) of HFAC



SECRET

25X1

28 Apr
0800
DCI D.R.

Breakfast bfg on Nicaragua, Angola and
Soviet activities abroad for Sens.
Wallop (R., WY) and Quayle (R., IN)
(Agency, Seal Medallion to Wallop)

05 May
1045
219 SHOB

Member Briefing on Angola & Afghanistan
for Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D., AZ) of
SAC

09 May
1300
517 SHOB

Member Briefing on Mozambique &
Angola for Senator Tribble (R., VA)

16 May
1530
211 SHOB

Pre-trip staff briefing on Angola for
Holliday, Cleveland, Kettlewell &
Ockenden of SSCI

22 May
1500
3F45 Hqs

Staff Briefing on Ethiopia & Angola for
Peckham, Pitchford, Loney, HFAC stfrs

18 Jun
1600
7B02 HQS

Staff Briefing on Angola for O'Neil
and Giza of HPSCI

~~Secret~~

25X1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

14 July 1986

Options and Scenarios for South African Actions Against Its Neighbors

South Africa's economic and military dominance of the region provides it with a broad range of options for actions against its neighbors, many of which it has exercised repeatedly. Pretoria's regional policy under State President P. W. Botha, who came to power in 1978 after 13 years as Defense Minister, has been especially prone to coercive measures, ranging from "economic pinpricks" such as recently restricted supplies of lubricants for Zimbabwean diesels to full-fledged support for Angolan insurgents. This memorandum:

- Provides a menu of South African economic and military options for each of Pretoria's neighbors, with actions listed in order of severity, including the probable impact on the country, the country's probable response, and an estimate, where possible, of the costs to the United States and the West of compensating a country for damage.
- Formulates several scenarios, starting with a baseline assessment, that project Pretoria's probable regional reaction to alternative US and Western initiatives toward South Africa, indicates the options and targets the South Africans are likely to choose, and assesses the impact on US and Western interests.
- Outlines briefly our understanding of the general priorities and factors that affect Pretoria's policies toward its neighbors.

We begin by examining the forces that affect Pretoria's calculus, reflecting our judgment that the evolving crisis inside the country has caused Pretoria to take an increasingly demanding and coercive stance in the region

25X1

Section I

The View From Pretoria

We doubt that South Africa proceeds within the region from any "grand strategy" but rather believe that leaders in Pretoria react to events and seize opportunities as they present themselves. Nevertheless, the Botha government's decisions on dealing with individual black states appear to fall within a framework of general objectives and priorities. We believe, however, that several key factors, many of them reflecting domestic political conditions, critically affect how Pretoria implements its regional policy

25X1

Attacking Anti-South African Insurgents. Pretoria's hostility toward a neighbor is directly influenced by the extent to which it supports—or is perceived to support—the African National Congress (ANC), the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and the Pan-Africanist

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

5 June 1986

Angola: Surge in Soviet Arms Deliveries

25X1

Summary

Soviet ships and heavy-lift transport aircraft have delivered large amounts of military cargo to Angola over the past six months. We believe Moscow's increasing effort this year almost certainly is intended to replenish Luanda's supply of weapons and materiel before the government steps up the tempo of military operations against UNITA. The recent increase in deliveries adds to Moscow's already high level of military assistance for Angola over the last three years, when nearly \$2 billion in arms were provided. We believe the equipment received since November 1985 will significantly augment Angola's ability to prosecute the war this year, and additional improved weapons systems are likely to arrive in 1986

25X1

25X11

25X1

~~SECRET~~



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

25 March 1986

25X1

ANGOLA: UNITA Leader Savimbi Today--His Goals and Prospects



25X1

Summary

The visit by Jonas Savimbi to Washington last January gave US officials a closer look at the longtime Angolan guerrilla leader and helped place him in current perspective. The UNITA leader's comments were largely consistent with his earlier statements and confirmed our view of him as a pragmatic African nationalist.

25X1

Savimbi's goal is to force the Angolan Government to the bargaining table by waging a protracted war that convinces the MPLA regime that it cannot win and must negotiate. Confident of his staying power and South African backing, Savimbi believes UNITA can blunt this year's major offensive by the Angolan government, which managed to regain the military initiative in 1985 for the first time in several years. Savimbi calculates, by his own private admission, that several years of standoff will be necessary before negotiations with the MPLA are feasible.

In the near term--the next 12 to 18 months, we believe the fighting probably will be the most intense of the civil war, with tactical gains and losses on both sides, but that neither side will deliver a knockout punch. However, there is a



ALA M 86-20015



25X1



25X1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

8 July 1986

Angola-Zaire: An Uneasy Peace



25X1

Summary

The traditionally uneasy relationship between Angola and Zaire has worsened noticeably in recent months as suspicions on both sides have mounted about each other's willingness to increase aid to dissident groups. The summit scheduled for 10 July in Luanda between Angolan President dos Santos and Zairian President Mobutu is unlikely to relax growing tensions, even though we expect both leaders to give lip service to improving diplomatic relations. Our reading of a large quantity of special intelligence leads us to conclude that Angola has already proceeded with a number of low-risk diplomatic and psychological measures in hope of inhibiting Zairian support to Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Although we doubt that Kinshasa will reduce its involvement with UNITA, President Mobutu is working hard to reduce Zaire's regional isolation, project a more nonaligned foreign policy, and improve relations with Moscow in the unrealistic hope that such cosmetic moves will paper over growing difficulties with Angola.

25X1

Should tensions continue to mount in the wake of the summit, we believe Angola will take limited military moves against Kinshasa, probably including increased hot pursuit operations against UNITA forces using Zaire as a sanctuary or limited cross-border raids by regular Angolan Army troops. We



ALA M 86-20033C



25X1



25X1



Directorate of
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~



25X1

Angola: UNITA's Prospects in 1986



25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

~~Top Secret~~

ALA 86-10007CX

February 1986

25X1

Copy



Directorate of
Intelligence

~~Secret~~



25X1

Angola: Vulnerability of the Oilfields



An Intelligence Assessment

25X1

~~Secret~~

ALA 86-10005
January 1986

Copy 187

[redacted]
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

29 November 1985

Angola: Dos Santos Up Beat Before Party Congress [redacted]

25X1

Summary

A Party Congress--only the third since the MPLA seized control in 1975 with Soviet and Cuban backing--is slated for 6-10 December. President dos Santos's position within the Party appears more secure than at any time since he came to power in 1979. On the eve of the Congress, the MPLA leadership, undoubtedly encouraged by its recent military successes against UNITA, appears even more determined to pursue a military solution to the insurgency. Although dos Santos is likely to gain increased personal power at the Congress, we believe his policy options are narrowed because of the regime's growing military dependence on the Soviets and Cubans. The Congress is likely to adopt some reforms to improve party discipline and to revive the economy, but we expect these measures will do little to broaden the regime's narrow base of support or to arrest the economic decline. [redacted]

25X1

The MPLA's current air of confidence could well be short-lived in our view. The regime still faces the difficult task of building on the momentum of the past year, as the government's improved performance against the insurgents in

ALA M 85-10119

[redacted]
25X1



25X1

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

15 November 1985

THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA

This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. The Assessment was coordinated at the working level within the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State. Also participating were the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Headquarters, Marine Corps. Information available as of 8 November 1985 was used in the preparation of this Assessment.




25X1



NI IIA 85-10009

25X1
25X1



25X1

25X1



SNIE 71/11-85

**SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT
TO ANGOLA: INTENTIONS
AND PROSPECTS**

Information available as of 24 October 1985 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.



25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied