

October 10, 1986

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

Pubs S 15903

prehensive Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union; and that the President immediately undertake a program that would replace the jobs that are lost from the nuclear weapons industry as a consequence of a test ban policy. This body also calls upon our members of congress to support legislation that would enact a moratorium on nuclear testing, to be continued as long as the Soviets do not test. Copies of this resolution shall be forwarded to the President of the United States and to the Senators and Representatives from our congressional delegation.

REAUTHORIZE MARINE FISHERY PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

● Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I strongly support the committee amendment to S. 991, which, among other things reauthorizes important marine fishery programs administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA]. The amendment includes three separate bills of which I was an original cosponsor—S. 991, which passed the Senate as a general fishery authorization bill last year; S. 2583, to provide for an Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, an Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere and a Chief Scientist position at NOAA; and S. 958, reauthorization of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act [MFCMA].

The committee bill is divided into four titles: Title I includes amendments to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation Act [MFCMA]. Title II sets up a new seafood promotion program that is intended to increase domestic and foreign trade of fishery and seafood products. Title III revises the Commercial Fisheries Research and Development Act. Title IV contains miscellaneous provisions such as the establishment of a Chief Scientist position at NOAA.

I would like to focus on two aspects of S. 991. First, I am pleased that we were able to work out amendments to the Magnuson Act. The changes to the act strengthen its management and enforcement provisions of the act. The MFCMA is the single most important law pertaining to the management of the fisheries resources located within our 200-mile fishery conservation zone. This law would be reauthorized through fiscal year 1989.

Second, the bill provides waivers from restrictions on vessel documentation for two vessels located in the Pacific Northwest—the *Kodiak Queen* and the *Northwind*. The *Kodiak Queen* is a vessel that was built in California in 1941 for the Department of the Navy. It was placed under Liberian registry in 1962 when it was purchased by foreign interests. In 1967, the vessel was acquired by a company in Alaska, and placed under U.S. flag and registry. The vessel has since remained in the ownership of U.S. citizens. The *Kodiak Queen* is documented for use in the fisheries. It has been

engaged in the crab fishery in Kodiak, AK. Its present owners would like to expand the use of the vessel in coastwise trade for other fishery purposes such as tendering salmon, herring or freight.

The *Northwind* is a motor yacht built in Wisconsin in 1930. In 1938, the vessel was transferred from United States to British ownership, to be used in the service of the British Government and Royal Navy. The *Northwind* is now located in Seattle, WA. The vessel has undergone substantial renovation. The present owners wish to engage in the coastwise trade as a pleasure charter in and around Puget Sound.

Mr. President, S. 991 as amended by the committee amendment is the result of a lot of hard work. I thank the chairman as well as the Commerce Committee staff for their efforts in getting this bill before the Senate. I urge my colleagues to adopt this legislation expeditiously.●

A FORCE FOR GOOD

● Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, the recent death of Rabbi Jacob B. Agus, scholar, teacher, leader, theologian, writer and leader in the efforts to expand the Jewish-Christian dialog, is a loss not only to Beth El Congregation and Baltimore, but to all who have been involved in building bridges among the various faiths.

During all his extraordinary career, Rabbi Agus was proud of his role as "a community pastor, to have helped preserve a Jewish mentality, to have helped people with some serenity through these cataclysmic times, to be an interpreter of Jewish values." This is, as Rabbi Agus said, "the greatest challenge one could wish."

Rabbi Agus met that challenge every day of his life. I ask that an article from the Baltimore Evening Sun outlining some of Rabbi Agus' accomplishments be included in the RECORD.

The article follows:

[From the Baltimore Sun Oct. 7, 1986]

A FORCE FOR GOOD

(By Albert E. Denny)

The death of Jacob B. Agus, rabbi emeritus of Beth El Congregation, removes an intellectual giant from the American rabbinate and represents a stunning loss to Baltimore's Jewish community.

An internationally recognized scholar, teacher, philosopher and theologian, Agus' penetrating insights into religion and his enlightened views of contemporary Jewish life made him a leading force in the Conservative movement. He was the author of nine scholarly books, some of them used as texts in religious courses on the university level, and dozens of articles that appeared in a wide range of Jewish and secular publications.

He lectured at Johns Hopkins University and other colleges in the United States and abroad, and for 12 years was editorial consultant to the Encyclopedia Britannica on articles of Jewish content. He served as Visiting professor of modern Jewish philosophy at Temple University, Dropsie College,

the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College and St. Mary's Seminary.

Perhaps the most durable achievement in the life of Jacob Agus was his long-time, assiduous involvement in building bridges of understanding between the various faiths. Beginning in the early 1950s and extending to his death, the rabbi worked unrelentingly at promoting interfaith harmony, representing Judaism at various ecumenical conferences in the United States, South America and England.

He was a member of a dialogue composed of Jewish, Christian and Muslim leaders sponsored by the Kennedy Institute on Ethics at Georgetown University in Washington. As professor of classical Hebrew studies at the Ecumenical Institute of Theology of St. Mary's Seminary and University, he taught a course entitled "Matthew—The Jewish Gospel," which analyzed Matthew in the light of Jewish literature that was contemporary with the Gospels.

"When the Gospels are placed within a Jewish context and interpreted accordingly," the rabbi explained, "there will result a much deeper appreciation on the part of Jews with Christianity and Christians with Judaism."

Even this year, despite his failing health, the 75-year-old rabbi took an active role in discussions of the ninth national workshop on Christian-Jewish relations held in Baltimore. The conference presented an award to him "for his pioneering efforts in Jewish-Christian dialogue."

Born in Poland on Nov. 8, 1911, the future rabbi lived for a time in what was then Palestine, and was brought to the United States in 1927. After his ordination as an Orthodox rabbi in 1935, he held a pulpit in Cambridge, Mass., later earned a doctorate from Harvard in the history and philosophy of religion and served Orthodox synagogues in Norfolk and Chicago.

Chafing under the constraints imposed by the rigid Orthodox beliefs that clashed with his emerging liberal views, Agus made the leap to a Conservative pulpit in Dayton, Ohio in 1942. He was invited to Baltimore in 1950 to take the spiritual reins of the newly formed Beth El Congregation.

The innovative ideas that he brought to Baltimore meshed perfectly with the desire of Beth El's founders to introduce a liberal brand of Conservatism to the community. In the ensuing three decades, the congregation built its membership to 1,400 families, and Beth El and its dynamic rabbi were catapulted to national prominence.

Agus might have achieved greatness as a full-time university professor, but he never regretted his decision to enter the rabbinate. He once said, "As a community pastor, to have helped preserve a Jewish mentality, to have helped people with some serenity through these cataclysmic times, to be an interpreter and pastor of Jewish values—that is the greatest challenge one could wish."●

LEV NAVROZOV ON MORE CIA INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

● Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the CIA has repeatedly failed to predict accurately the Soviet military threat, or to understand in any adequate way Soviet global intentions. It appears that the CIA has a methodology for estimating Soviet military expenditures which produces gross underestimates. By the CIA's own evaluation, its current estimates of Soviet strategic forces 5 years into the future will

S 15904

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

October 10, 1986

not come even close to being accurate 5 years hence.

Mr. President, I believe that the American people are not getting their money's worth from the CIA. For the many billions of tax dollars spent by CIA, we seem mostly to be getting only underestimates of the Soviet military threat, bungled covert operations, bungled defections of Soviets, bungled counter-intelligence operations against CIA defectors, and even bungled planning and programming of technical collection resources.

Mr. President, Mr. Lev Navrozov, who emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1972 at the height of "detente", has become one of the most articulate and knowledgeable critics of the CIA. Lev Navrozov has made a very careful study of over 77,000 pages of declassified materials from CIA. He bases his critiques on these declassified CIA estimates as compared to his own profoundly deep knowledge of Russia. I point out that Candidate Ronald Reagan in 1978 and 1979 quoted extensively from Lev Navrozov's critiques of CIA during his campaign, thereby bestowing considerable credibility upon Mr. Navrozov.

Mr. President, I ask that the following articles from the *New York City Tribune* be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks:

First. "Soviet Anti-Missile Defense Which Was Not", by Lev Navrozov, January 1, 1986;

Second. "The 'World's Most Important Statistic' and the CIA", by Lev Navrozov, January 22, 1986;

Third. "The Soviets' Greatest Spy—Western Free Enterprise?" by Lev Navrozov, January 29, 1986;

Fourth. "1961—The Year of CIA/MI-6's Bittersweet Triumph", by Lev Navrozov, February 19, 1986;

Fifth. "On 30th Anniversary of 'Khrushchev's Secret Speech'" by Lev Navrozov, February 26, 1986;

Sixth. "The CIA and Soviet Defection-Redefection Mysteries", by Lev Navrozov, March 12, 1986;

Seventh. "Arms Agreements? Compliance Unverifiable by CIA", by Lev Navrozov, March 26, 1986;

Eighth. "Illusions on Which CIA Was Founded 40 Years Ago", by Lev Navrozov, April 2, 1986;

Ninth. "How the CIA Bores the US Congress Stiff", by Lev Navrozov, April 16, 1986;

Tenth. "Kim Philby: Espionage Romance and Drab Reality", by Lev Navrozov, April 30, 1986;

Eleventh. "How the CIA Flunked Abysmally on Chernobyl Affair", by Lev Navrozov, May 7, 1986;

Twelfth. "What the CIA Reveals About Itself in Its Pamphlet", by Lev Navrozov, May 21, 1986;

Thirteenth. "Has US Intelligence Improved With Casey at Bat?", by Lev Navrozov, May 28, 1986;

Fourteenth. "What the Ronald Pelton Spy Case Demonstrates", by Lev Navrozov, June 4, 1986;

Fifteenth. "How Former CIA Official Responded to Past Error", by Lev Navrozov, July 2, 1986;

Sixteenth. "Ineptness, Not Immorality, Is Main Flaw of CIA", by Lev Navrozov, July 30, 1986;

Seventeenth. "CIA and the 'Mystery' of Where Does Soviet Steel Go", by Lev Navrozov, September 3, 1986;

Eighteenth. "Classic Barter, Soviet-Style: A Spy for a Journalist", by Lev Navrozov, September 10, 1986;

Nineteenth. "What the KGB's Daniloff-Zakharov Move Signifies", by Lev Navrozov, September 17, 1986;

Twentieth. "UN Is Moscow's Best Espionage Base Worldwide", by Lev Navrozov, October 1, 1986;

Twenty-first. "Sen. Helms Ushers In New Intelligence Era for West", by Lev Navrozov, October 8, 1986.

The articles follow:

[From the N.Y. City Tribune, January 1, 1986]

SOVIET ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE WHICH WAS NOT

(By Lev Navrozov)

Today, I begin my weekly Wednesday column on intelligence work in the sense of espionage, not in the sense of Sovietological meditations about UPI news.

Those who imagine Western intelligence work since 1917 as a series of Western espionage exploits in the Kremlin and want to hear of more such will be bitterly disappointed reading my column. Not only are they unlikely to find any more of such exploits in my column, but they will see that most "true spy stories" they know are myths, spread by Western intelligence agencies about themselves with the help of the media and hosts of intelligence/espionage writers who copy their true spy stories from each other like Victorian authors of "true ghost stories" copied them under the assumption that the more minute the details copied, the truer the ghost story was—or at least seemed.

I proceed from the assumption that the West needs espionage in totalitarian societies, not ghost stories—I beg your pardon, I mean—not spy stories. Hence the West needs a critical analysis of intelligence/espionage as is.

Mine is based on (1) primary sources, such as the CIA's testimony before Congress, (2) common sense, such as the belief that Allen Dulles could not be on May 21-27, 1956, at his post of Director of Central Intelligence in Washington DC, if incontrovertible evidence shows that his corporeal self (and not just his ghost) was in Canada at the time; and (3) the existential experiences of those who spent a lifetime in a totalitarian society, such as yours truly.

Between 1965 and 1971, we lived near the international Vnukovo airport, 16 miles from Moscow, Russia.

Whenever a taxi cab sped us from Vnukovo to Moscow, a strange spectacle on the right side of the highway would open to our view: a futuristic composition out of high-voltage insulators, transformers and other such paraphernalia.

"What's that?" I would ask the taxi driver.

"Anti-missile defense," he would answer conspiratorially on the understanding that the information so confidential could only be shared with especially good customers.

Don't tell me how secretive the Soviet regime is. And here every foreigner going from the Vnukovo airport to Moscow could photograph from his car a Soviet anti-mis-

sile defense site even without telescopic lenses, for the site began just 10 yards from the highway.

Work on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system in the United States naturally began in the early 1960s, as soon as intercontinental missiles had come into their own. The Soviet military was in despair. ABM defense required more sophisticated computers than did missiles, and that was just the field in which the Soviet war-oriented economy still lagged far behind, too late had the Soviet planners realized how important computers would be for warfare.

The U.S. ABM defense would reverse the global strategic situation. Without it, Soviet missiles could destroy the United States. Even if the United States could retaliate in kind, the very possibility of mutual destruction enhanced Soviet strategic prestige. Thus the possibility of mutual destruction of a terrorist and his important hostages enhances his prestige by equalizing his and their survival chances. The Soviet rulers could always say: "If the worst comes to the worst, remember that we will all blowup."

The U.S. ABM defense would cancel this mutual destruction possibility and introduce, instead, the development of ABM warfare, in which the Soviet armed forces would be notoriously behind. From the glory of the world's first Soviet space satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles in the late 1950s, the Soviet regime would go back to the status of a second-rate military power in the early 50s.

How could they make the United States stop further development of its ABM defense system?

I doubt that any Western-born expert on the Soviet Union inside or outside the Western intelligence communities had ever heard, until a few years ago, about the Main Directorate of Strategic Camouflage, which had been founded in the Soviet General Staff in 1964 under the leadership of the then General and later Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov (The same person who coped easily with a battery of Western journalists at a news conference after the Soviets shot down a South Korean airliner with 269 people aboard in 1983).

It is known or understood even less that the Directorate's aim is not only to conceal real Soviet weapons systems, but also to create dummy weapon systems to mislead the Western intelligence communities.

The shrewd Ogarkov's solution was simple:

Let us create our dummy ABM defense for the benefit of the CIA. The all-seeing CIA will detect and report it to the U.S. government, Congress and hence the public. The Americans will think that we are even ahead of them in ABM defense. So they will conclude that the best solution is to sign with us an ABM treaty, to halt all further development of ABM defense in both countries, that is, in the United States.

First there began to appear in Soviet open military publications, which many Western experts in and out of the Western intelligence communities love to study, frequent references to Soviet achievements in anti-missile defense.

Shown on the Red Square parade in 1964 was a missile codenamed "Galosh" by NATO because it was always inside a ribbed container. It was decided that Galosh was an anti-missile missile, though as of today, no-one in the West has ever seen it without its galosh-like container and cannot vouch that it is not just a length of pipe.

I have the impression that Ogarkov put those galoshes on those lengths of pipe to make them easily identifiable on space photographs. In sunny weather, the ribs, each

October 10, 1986

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 15905

of which is at least a foot long, by my measurements, cast sharp clearcut shadows on the sunny part of a galosh and stood out, brightly illuminated by the sun, on its shady side. The CIA immediately identified 64 Galoshes around Moscow, four sites of 16 Galoshes each.

In Soviet documentaries, a Soviet missile shot down another, except that the narrator did not explain that this was no feat if both Soviet missiles were launched by ordered trajectories to hit each other.

Ogarkov's finishing master stroke, however, was the building of dummy ABM bases, like the one near Vnukovo airport, so that they could be observed by foreigners in the Soviet Union.

The CIA could not miss the Vnukovo base. Going from the airport to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow were those of its staffers who were on the CIA's or the Defense Intelligence Agency's payrolls. What an opportunity for honest-to-goodness espionage Ogarkov had offered them!

The Soviet-American ABM treaty was signed in 1972 and thus the development of ABM defenses in the United States was halted for 13 years, up to 1983, when that wicked President Reagan revived it in his Strategic Defense Initiative, to the disgust of the Concerned Scientists and the Soviet Politburo.

Naturally, the Soviet military based those 13 years to advance Soviet ABM defense as much as possible.

Today, the Main Directorate of Strategic Camouflage seems to be pondering a new tack: to rig up and show dummy missiles that allegedly will reduce U.S. anti-missile defenses to a "pile of junk." At least, the first "Soviet military papers," explaining just that, already have appeared, and one of them has been reported in *The New York Times* in dead earnest.

THE "WORLD'S MOST IMPORTANT STATISTIC"
AND THE CIA

(By Leo Naurozov)

A couple of years ago *The Washington Post* spoke of the "world's most important statistic." What is it?

According to the *Post*, it is the percentage of military output in the Soviet Gross National Product. That is to say, "What portion of Russia's goods and services is intended for military purposes?"

For the United States, the answer would be simple. You'd buy the latest *World Almanac* or some other such book for five bucks, look up the defense budget estimate for, say, 1983—\$245 billion—and come up with 7%.

For Russia you buy an official statistical book for 3 rubles and learn that 12.8 billion rubles was spent on defense in 1965, for example.

Yes, but what rubles? The rulers of Russia set all the prices, and those for military goods and services are unknown. Therefore, the rubles with which the Soviet Ministry of Defense procures guns may have little to do with the rubles with which a Soviet inhabitant buys butter.

It is equally futile to convert these rubles into dollars according to the official exchange rate, as is usually done by the Western media.

Let us try, therefore, to glean from indirect clues some notion of the proportion of Soviet goods and services intended for military purposes in the last quarter of a century.

In his tapes Nikita Khrushchev recalls: "[The Soviet physicist Peter Kapitza] invited me to his laboratory." The purpose was, of course, to persuade Khrushchev to allocate money for Kapitza's research project.

The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* gives Kapitza an impressive four-paragraph entry: in 1929, at the age of 35, while living in Britain, he was "elected to the Royal Society [of London], the first foreigner in 200 years to become a member."

Khrushchev says on tape: "We didn't give him the money at that time either. . ."

But why? Khrushchev had made inquiries about the subject of Kapitza's research, and was told that it was not very military. Khrushchev reminisces on tape:

In a while Kapitza requested me to receive him again. And I did. Then I asked him bluntly: "Why don't you, Comrade Kapitza, take up a defense subject?"

So, Khrushchev, that founding father of détente, could not bear to see even one outstanding scientist without demanding that he take up a military line of research rather than the line the great scientist was inclined to pursue.

In the post-Khrushchev era, at a closed lecture to editors in Leningrad in 1965, Abel Aganbegyan, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and director of the Novosibirsk Institute of Economic and Industrial Organization, said:

"Of approximately 100 million people in the U.S.S.R. who work, about 30-40 million are employed in the defense industry."

High-level economist though he was, Aganbegyan had no access to the Soviet secret statistics on those "employed in the defense industry." His figure was only an educated guess according to the data at his disposal.

But the West has not known any more reliable figure than his guess of 20 years ago.

How did it reach the West? Someone who was present at Aganbegyan's closed lecture managed to record it and gave the text to a samizdat (underground) typewritten magazine. After it had ceased publication, several back issues reached the West, and Aganbegyan's guess became known here.

What about those who are not "employed in the defense industry?" This is not secret sometimes. In 1983, in an edition of 50,000 copies, the Soviet publishing house "Music" printed a book for kindergartens entitled *In the Army We Will Serve: Songs, Plays and Poems for Children of Junior Age* (from three to six) With Piano (Accordion) Accompaniment.

Listen:

"We don't yet go to school/

But like soldiers on we march!

Chorus: In the army we will serve. . .

An officer I want to be/To rush ahead in all attacks!

Chorus: In the army we will serve. . ."

How do you like this little cute poem for tots:

The sun trumpets its golden horn,

"Glory to the hero-warrior!"

The enemy is routed, smashed and destroyed,

"Glory to the hero-warrior!"

The plays for tots are a subject apart. They reduce to drumming, marching, drumming again and are actually a sort of drill exercises to instill military subordination and leadership from infancy. The goal of the whole project is to make a tot enjoy the prospect of being a cog in the global war-machine.

Yet all such writers, composers, teachers, educators, editors, book designers, printers, pianists or accordion players are not "employed in the defense industry." Nor is their activity secret—possibly because children of three are not thought to be sufficiently responsible to sign "obligation of non-divulgence of closed data."

But obviously, all the adults involved in this "aesthetic education of junior-age chil-

dren" are also engaged in the maximization of the country's global power.

The question is, who is not. After all, those "employed in the defense industry" or even those 3-year-olds who sing about how "in the army we will serve" have to eat, for example, and those who work to provide them with what may be defined as "poor irregular war food rations in peacetime" are also involved in the same all-out military effort.

Now, how has the CIA evaluated the military share in the Soviet goods and services—the "world's most important statistic"?

The CIA kept repeating its absurd figure every year—up to 1975 inclusive.

Before 1976 the CIA's figure was from 6 to 8 percent, roughly the same as for the United States. But since the total output of Soviet goods and services was far smaller than its U.S. counterpart, the Soviet military output must have been far smaller too, the CIA reasoned.

In 1976 the CIA finally notices that inexplicably, Soviet weapons had first overtaken American weapons and then began to surpass them. Then the CIA declared that it had been mistaken between 1957 and 1976 and doubled its figure for the proportion of Soviet military output in the Soviet Gross National Product, where this figure roughly stays in 1986. Well, before 1976 the CIA's "most important statistic" was laughable, while now it is only 50 percent so.

"Can't we make a mistake?" is the CIA's plea. Yes, but what kind of mistake? To say, about a society where even children of three "march like real soldiers," that it spends less for military purposes than the United States does, means just to know nothing about that society.

THE SOVIETS' GREATEST SPY—WESTERN FREE
ENTERPRISE?

(By Lev Naurozov)

We have heard that we live in one of the open societies, called "the West" for short, in which Soviet espionage can easily operate by definition.

This is an understatement. In the West, information which would be considered top secret military espionage data in the Soviet Union is pushed on everyone for free with aggressive high-pressure, salesmanship, or as the expression goes, with the hard sell. Hereby I announce a contest (no cash prizes) for the best term for such societies. The hard-sell-of-military-data societies?

MILITARY MARKET

Here in front of me is the Jan. 18 issue of the British *Jane's Defense Weekly* which the mailman has just brought and thus inspired me to write this column.

Jane's is one of the numberless Western magazines treating military Research & Development, the production, of weapons, etc. as a "military market"—just like any other market.

All this splendid military merchandise beautifully displayed on the pages of *Jane's* has to be sold in a fierce competition, right?

Now, to sell it you must advertise your product as smartly as possible. The customers must know that your scientists and engineers have just conceived of a submarine which will be better than any other submarine on the market. Orders can already be filed. Negotiations are on. Our customers are always right, our salesmen are always bright.

"Yes, sir, only our company in the West will be able to produce that submarine. The Soviet military, sir, will perhaps be able to produce it too—as they have learned about our concept from *Jane's Defense Weekly*, but you won't buy weapons from the Soviet

S 15906

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

October 10, 1986

military, will you? Yes, sir, the Soviet military will perhaps be able to sink our submarine—since they have learned about our concept. But you are not going to fight them. I hope not, sir. You intend, I take it, to fight Tararabumbia or is it South Trali-Vali, sir? If you place and order ahead of Trali-Vali... The right decision, sir. We'll formalize it before lunch, sir. Now I don't envy Trali-Vali, ha-ha-ha! unless it's Tararabumbia, of course."

MIL BIZ IS LIKE ANY BIZ

My subscription to *Jane's* seems to have expired, but I receive it anyway. Of course. Perhaps I'll place an early order for a dozen of those new submarines, after all, or at least will renew my subscription.

Yeah, mil biz is like any biz. From advertisements in *Jane's*, for example, you can learn what weapons every Western company produces, how they look, why they are better than any other on the market—and what the company's location and telephone numbers are. How else? Suppose you want to place an order for those new submarines. What company can afford losing potential customers by withholding its name, address and phone numbers?

There are grandiose military trade fairs, and since mil biz must know what to research, develop, produce and sell and the customers what to order, buy and deploy, magazines like *Jane's* give a wealth of background military information. Supply and demand. Who researches, develops, produces, sells, plans, intends, orders, buys and deploys what in the military field.

Poor KGB and GRU. They feel like the wives of Soviet Embassy officials at Bloomingdale's. Their eyes run away with them. What to buy? Which Western weapons to copy—and improve? What military information to use? I can imagine a Soviet submarine builder, rushing to his design office with a copy of *Jane's* in his hand: "Brothers! A new concept in submarines!"

A TORRENT VS. RARE TINY DROPS

If military information from the West comes to the Soviet military in a torrent, from the Soviet Union to the Western military, it comes in a trickle, nay, rare tiny drops.

Jane's has a special section called "Soviet Intelligence." Usually it is a photograph of, say, a Soviet fighter-bomber in a test flight, and though the fighter-bomber looks on the photo more like a blurred mangled frog than a fighter-bomber (it is, obviously, a blow-up of a satellite photograph) and is a reprint from *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, I imagine the editor rubbing his hands in glee and composing a text to conjecture the performance characteristics as well as the size and configuration of the mangled frog—I mean the Soviet fighter-bomber.

But in the current issue there is an even greater piece of "Soviet Intelligence": two full pages devoted to Vladimir Chernavin, the new commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy.

Well *Jane's* even carries his photographs, somewhat blurred, too, but possibly because the *Pravda* photocamera was poor (almost everything is poor in the Soviet Union except weapons), not because the picture had to be taken by the CIA from space.

Strangely enough, while, say, the Soviet designers of submarines or missiles are total unknowns (even their names are secret until they die), the names and faces of Soviet top military men are at least allowed to be recognized by the West. But what else?

The first subhead of the *Jane's* article about Chernavin is "Patriotic Loyalty." How did *Jane's* or the CIA discover that? From his speeches in the Soviet newspapers.

You see, were not Vladimir a loyal patriot he would say as much in *Pravda*. Imagine a banner headline: "Fleet Admiral Chernavin: Am I a Loyal Patriot? Not By a Long (Naval) Shot!" But he didn't. So he must be a loyal patriot.

Similarly, *Jane's* makes other Soviet intelligence revelations. At the end, the magazine discovers (from an article in *Izvestia*, July 27, 1985) that "Chernavin introduced a new definition" of naval power. It is the "extent to which a particular state is able to make the most effective use of the oceans of the world." Terrific! But I think the "new definition" could be found in *Izvestia* 10 or 15 years ago too—or in 16th century British naval papers.

THE WAY OUT

In short, while the Western military market or mil biz cascades its splendors on all and sundry like Bloomingdale's and Macy's do theirs, the West receives the blurred photograph of a Soviet admiral and Soviet newspaper clichés, referred to as "Soviet intelligence" revelations.

What's the way-out? To try to eliminate or reduce free enterprise in the military field in favor of secretive bureaucracy is insane.

Free enterprise is creative. It does forge ahead in many areas ahead of the Soviet military despite everything. Now, free enterprise cannot function without a free open market and its free open advertisement and exchange of information.

Hence Western military information cascades freely and openly on all and sundry, including the Soviet military, while Soviet military information is contained inside the totalitarian reservoir which Western intelligence/espionage cannot penetrate.

The solution seems to lie in the penetration of the totalitarian reservoir by Western intelligence/espionage rather than the attempt to impose secrecy on the Western free and open military market. But more about it on future Wednesdays.

1961—THE YEAR OF CIA/MIA-6'S BITTERSWEET TRIUMPH

(By Lev Navrozov)

A quarter of a century ago a Soviet high-ranking official named Oleg Penkovsky and a British businessman in Moscow named Greville Winne walked through Moscow's whirling snow "on which even the KGB could not hang a microphone."

The joke is not mine, but Winne's, and hence in quotes. But whether or not the KGB can hang microphones on whirling snow, Penkovsky asked Winne to pass to Britain a package in which he suggested that he would be an espionage agent for the British Intelligence Service, MI-6.

And so he was, for about half a year, practically the only espionage agent the West ever had in post-1917 Russia—that is, in almost 70 years.

There have been many defectors from among those Soviet nationals stationed in the West—but stationed in the West, they have had no access to centers of strategic information in Russia.

Penkovsky had that access. The English-language version of his calling card said: Deputy Division Chief, Foreign Relations Department, State Committee for Coordination of Scientific (read: Military) Research.

IN WEST, MORE MAY BE LESS

The more strategically important the information a Soviet official handles, the higher his socio-economic status in the "Soviet State." The West cannot induce him to become an espionage agent with only the prospect of a post and salary in the West. His relative socio-economic status in the

West will always be lower than it was in Russia—that is, in the West he will never be so much more important and wealthy than the rest of society as he was in Russia.

In his book *CIA's Secret Operations*, Harry Rositzke, who worked in the CIA for 25 years and with whom I almost came to blows on a TV program about intelligence/espionage, described an alleged successful inducement in the form of rubles. This is ridiculous. Rubles buy little wealth in Russia, since real wealth is actually distributed according to official rank—via "closed stores," for example.

Therefore, one of the strong motives for a Soviet high-ranking official to become an espionage agent for the West has to be ethical or spiritual (as it was in the case of Penkovsky), that is, connected with a strong realization that the West is right and the "Soviet State" is wrong.

But here comes a new difficulty. Those with strong ethical-spiritual motives of this kind do not usually join even the Communist Party, let alone the KGB, just as decent women do not usually go to work at a brothel. Hence, those with strong ethical-spiritual motives have as a rule no access to strategic data of national importance.

Those like Penkovsky are rare, marginal or mixed cases.

Let us suppose that a Soviet national who has access to strategic data and yet is not devoid of strong ethical-spiritual motives has realized that the West is right and the "Soviet State" is wrong.

But it's a long way from having this ethical-spiritual realization to becoming an intelligence agent for the West, something infinitely more dangerous in Russia than any other "crime."

NATHAN HALE NO PARIAH

My apartment house is called "Nathan Hale Gardens." Some day I will take a poll to see how many tenants know that Hale was America's espionage agent.

I wonder, though, if anything in the West has been named after Oleg Penkovsky. To the new American culture, grown by universities in the last 20 years, the military are the country's pariahs, while espionage agents are pariahs of pariahs.

Quite a few CIA officials themselves have been explaining at great length that the CIA is a kind of university, consisting of scholars, thinkers, analysts, philosophers—not some, God forbid, spies—and that the word "intelligence" and the name "CIA" mean just information, or analysis of information. These CIA authors have been avoiding the very word "espionage" as if it referred to something shameful, almost indecent and certainly having nothing to do with the CIA.

If this has been the West's attitude toward espionage on behalf of the free world, why should a Soviet official or officer translate his ethical-spiritual endorsement of the West into infinitely dangerous espionage on behalf of the free world? To be regarded by the West as a pariah of pariahs?

However, a Soviet official who may contemplate conducting intelligence information for the West does not live in the West. He has been living in a Soviet environment where it was drilled into his mind since infancy that no creature on earth is more heinous than a spy for the West—a loathsome traitor and an unspeakable scoundrel.

If he is uncovered, his wife, his children and his friends may think of him in just such terms, while all Soviet media without a single dissenting voice will depict on millions of screens and printed pages how monstrous he is.

October 10, 1986

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 15907

Yes, Penkovsky was a miracle. A rare statistic. A godsend for the West. Yes, 1961 was the year of triumph for MI-6 and for the CIA, which had joined MI-6 on the Penkovsky case. A real espionage agent worked for the West in Russia.

Those billions of dollars taxpayers had put into the CIA seemed to be now justified to some degree. It was now only necessary to preserve Penkovsky for at least 10 years and then retrieve him.

All was well for about half a year, as long as Penkovsky met only Winne (a contact authorized by his Soviet chiefs) and went abroad (a privilege of the chosen few that he also enjoyed) to pass on his espionage data on behalf of the free world.

Now in the fall of 1961, MI-6 and the CIA decided to use their expertise. In the spirit of an old sloppy spy thriller, they instructed Penkovsky to approach the wife of a British embassy official (she was an MI-6 agent) seated in a park in Moscow with her children and present one child with a box of candy that actually did not contain candy (Oh, the diabolical joint cunning of MI-6 and the CIA!) but Penkovsky's espionage data.

Since all members of the British Embassy in Moscow and their families have always been watched all round the clock, Penkovsky was destroyed then and there, though the KGB did not "nab" him on the spot, of course, but continued to watch him for about a year, a standard KGB time for "investigation."

I always wondered what MI-6 and the CIA meant to tell the KGB by this grandmotherly spy thriller of theirs—that high-ranking Soviet officials are in the charitable habit of walking about in Moscow's parks and giving boxes of candy to the families of members of the British Embassy?

ON 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF "KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET SPEECH"

(By Lev Navrozov)

Yesterday it was 30 years since the delegates to the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party listened all night to Nikita Khrushchev's report, according to which Josef Stalin was not by far the greatest man in history, nay, an omniscient, kind and beloved deity, but as a neighbor of ours put it, "our Hitler, only worse."

No Western intelligence agency is impudent enough to claim it knew anything about the report when it was delivered.

Even today, 30 years later, it would have been known to Western intelligence no more than is, say, the secret "Letter Concerning L.P. Beria," the chief of Stalin's secret police, had not Khrushchev decided to pass copies of his report via Tito to the West and to Poland, where they became freely available.

WHAT THE CIA DID NOT KNOW

The CIA did not know that:

Khrushchev's report was motivated by his struggle for power only: in 1955 he still meant to succeed Stalin as Stalin's "closest associate." (Allen Dulles, then CIA director, thought Khrushchev had to deliver his report under the pressure of anti-Stalinist public opinion, led by the intelligentsia!)

Khrushchev managed to deliver the report only due to a trick of his own, taking advantage of the fact that the Presidium of the Central Committee was to be formed after the Congress, not at the congress.

The delegates listened to the report in a dead silence. (Dulles thought they argued with Khrushchev!)

The report was a scholarly bureaucratic treatise, with long quotations (the CIA wondered whether the written text of the "speech" existed).

The report was printed in a closed edition of about a half million copies and read to practically the entire able-bodied adult population of Russia at "closed" (secret) meetings.

NATIONAL CONSPIRACY

This last point is especially staggering. Suppose the entire able-bodied adult population of Russia is gathered for secret meetings to listen to a decision to the effect that a surprise nuclear-missile attack will be launched on the retaliatory potential of the West.

Comrades, we are telling you this so that you could be prepared for nuclear defense since the enemy may try some counter-measures in case his retaliatory potential has not been completely destroyed. But the enemy should not know this."

If Western intelligence agencies don't have a single agent even among the ordinary population, as it had none in 1956, the West would not know the content of such a decision, known to the entire able-bodied population of Russia. Therefore, Western intelligence wouldn't know even the fact that such secret meetings took place all over the country, as it didn't know in 1956.

A countrywide conspiracy against the West is possible, to which practically all the adult population of Russia would be privy, while Western intelligence agencies would read *Pravda* with an air of great importance and brag that "space satellites can see even a hare scampering in a field" (which, incidentally, is not true either).

But what about more narrow higher-level Soviet conspiracies to which only privileged strata of the Soviet population are privy? If the CIA knows nothing even at the Soviet grass-roots level, how can it presume to know anything at the highest level which is infinitely more secret, hidden within thousands of walls, screens and barriers of all kinds and accessible only to the most privileged few?

NO ANSWER FROM CIA

In my last column (Feb. 5, 1986) I wrote about my Appeal to the CIA's Information Review Committee to give the CIA a fair chance to dissociate itself, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of "Khrushchev's Secret Speech," from the insane canard that the CIA had allegedly almost purloined the text of the speech right after the 20th Congress if not at the 20th Congress or before it.

True, the head of German intelligence, Reinhard Gehlen, also bragged that his agency and no other secured the complete text of the "speech," and certainly had done so before the CIA or anyone else secured any text at all.

Similarly, it has been claimed that the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, and no other, secured the "speech."

The canard that a Western intelligence agency purloined Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" took wind in 1962 with the help of Dulles himself and has been flying about since then frantically in all directions.

To begin with, members of each of the three agencies—the CIA, Reinhard Gehlen's "ORG" of West Germany and the Mossad of Israel—have been claiming that *their* agency, and no other, acquired the report. The absurd impression they have been creating is that Khrushchev's report existed in one copy, and the only problem is to decide which intelligence purloined that unique copy and thus immortalized itself.

It is forgotten that the Soviet bloc countries have even "closed" newspapers for their ruling elites, not to mention texts like Khrushchev's report.

Current and former members of each agency "leaked" to their favorite journalists

imaginary colorful details about how their agency accomplished that "espionage coup of the century."

Intelligence/espionage authors and whoever is not too lazy to write on this subject have been copying these imaginary details from each other, embellishing them, adding what their own imagination suggests and passing off the resulting concoctions as the latest inside info, straight from top secret sources.

Nothing is missing in these yarns: the CIA's spies in the Kremlin and millions of dollars in Swiss banks, Gehlen's writing of Stalin's would-be assassin, Dostoyevskian love-hate friendship between the head of the CIA's counterintelligence, James Angleton, and the head of the Italian Communist Party, Palmiro Togliatti, and whatever a spythriller author can imagine given unlimited leisure.

Those who have been spinning these yarns have never noticed that their yarn not only contradicts all the other yarns, but is also self-contradictory as such unless it is all absurd. Reputable book publishers and publications like the *New York Times* have been publishing these yarns as serious scholarly studies, often complete with source notes.

Since I am an American citizen, I thought it behooved me to request the CIA to dissociate itself from these insane boasts on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of Khrushchev's nocturnal delivery of his report. Let other Western agencies make fools of themselves by bragging of their imaginary feat.

Alas, the CIA's Information Review Committee has answered that it wouldn't be able to consider my appeal in such a short time.

The fact that the CIA was unable to acquire Khrushchev's report until and unless Khrushchev sent copies to the West via Tito and to Poland does not discredit the CIA—such an operation exceeds by many orders of magnitude the ability of Western intelligence agencies as they are today.

Something else is deplorable: the event demonstrated that Western intelligence knew nothing about what was going on in Russia behind the exterior visible to tourists or depicted in the Soviet "open" media, that is, the media available to all, in contrast to the Soviet multitiered "closed press" available to Soviet officials according to their rank.

THE CIA AND SOVIET DEFECTION-REDEFECTION MYSTERIES

(By Lev Navrozov)

When Oleg Penkovsky proposed in 1960 to become a Western intelligence agent without any remuneration, but just out of sympathy for the West, the CIA rejected him as an obvious Soviet plant—he was "too good to be true," in the CIA's opinion.

If British MI-6 had shared this bias—and fortunately, it did not—the West would have lost practically the only intelligence agent it ever had inside the strategic centers of Russia.

This shows that the bias of viewing any present or former inhabitant of Russia willing to help the West as "too good to be true" may lead to disastrous losses of vital information.

On the other hand, here was Oleg Tu-manov, a defector working for Radio Liberty for about 20 years. Recently he disappeared—presumably redeffected. Was he, the man in charge of broadcasting for Russia, a Soviet agent all along?

And what was Vitaly Yurchenko, who went back to Russia last November? A KGB agent who tricked the CIA all along for some obscure reason? Or a naive minor

S 15908

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

October 10, 1986

KGB office who first defected, then changed his mind, and redefected to be shot as a traitor?

To the CIA and the media he was a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, to repeat once again a phrase from Churchill's broadcast on Oct. 1, 1939.

Still earlier another Oleg, Oleg Bitov, a journalist and a brother of Andrei Bitov—a gifted "semidissident" writer whom I knew, respected and translated into English—defected, and then redefected so strangely that he was said to have been kidnapped by the KGB.

How to distinguish between an authentic defector and a KGB phony?

In Stalin's era, as I recall it, the failure to spot in one's circle of friends a secret police informer almost inevitably led to being denounced by him and perishing in Stalin's camps. Yet my friends and I survived. I had my trusted friends. They are all alive and well. None of them turned out to be a secret police informer. We were able to spot secret police phonies and avoid them.

How did we do it?

In a circle of intimate friends—devoted to things intellectual or spiritual, for example—there is always some "key" as in music. Whatever is off key is out of tune, and hence a false note.

An intruder trying to be "in" imitates their "music," but he immediately alerts them as soon as he opens his mouth, for his very first "note" is false, and what follows is cacophonous to the intimate circle's ear. They freeze and wait for him to slink away.

Now let us assume that I was to determine in Russia whether a certain American was an authentic communist sympathizer or a CIA agent pretending to be such.

I would not have been able to determine that for two reasons. First since I have never been a communist, it would have been difficult for me to sense what was authentic. Everything "communist" would have seemed to me phony.

Second, though my knowledge of English was admittedly second to none among the Russian-born, all Americans seemed to me more alike than they really were and the English they spoke seemed to me more uniform than it really was.

All that I could tell about an American correspondent I knew was that he was an American and spoke that kind of English which they speak in the United States.

Recently, 14 years after my sojourn in the United States, he called me. I nearly fainted. He sounded so entirely different. Now I heard not just impersonal "American English," but the language of a particular individual, shaped by his birthplace, childhood, family life, career, psyche, larynx, mouth and vocabulary.

Also, I heard not only the meaning of his words, but also what was behind or under them: his hesitations, motives emotions, intentions and limitations. I heard how and why he chose his words, but them together and articulated them.

That is the CIA's problem. No matter how good its American-born experts of Russia and Russian are, all Russians inevitably seem to them more alike than they really are, and their Russian more uniform than it really is. Neither the CIA nor the media "understood" Oleg Penkovsky, Oleg Bitov, Vitaly Yurchenko or Oleg Tumanov: they perceived them each time just as a "Russian" speaking "that kind of language which they speak in Russia."

The difference between a defector, defecting out of sympathy for the West., and a KGB phony crudely imitating that sympathy, was a nuance for beyond their perception. They heard an alleged defector's words, not what was behind or below them.

After it was all over with Penkovsky, the CIA published *The Penkovsky Papers*, consisting of authentic documents (except one suspicious photograph) and a fake one purporting to be Penkovsky's notes.

To a native Russian, the phoniness of the fake Penkovsky notes is comical; to him everything in the document is plainly ridiculous: it is out of character, out of style, off key all the time. A native Russian can only laugh reading the "notes." But to the CIA, the fake document seemed no doubt very clever.

The question is: how can the CIA distinguish a phony KGB defector from a real one if the CIA considers a laughable fake so cleverly made that it needs to publish it?

Naturally, few Western-born experts even noticed that the "diary" was a fake, and hardly anyone saw its comical crudeness.

Besides, for many in the CIA and the media it is as difficult to sense a true defector's sympathy for the West "as for the sated to understand the hungry."

In the West, freedom is as abundantly obtainable as food. That someone somewhere may lack basic freedom and crave for it is as irreal in the West as that someone somewhere may lack and crave for the food that American supermarkets throw out because it is stale or damaged when shipped.

Therefore, to many in the CIA and media, a defector's sympathy for the West as such seems somehow phony: "Why should a prosperous, high-status Russian give up everything out of sympathy for some Fourth of July abstractions that few recall here even on the Fourth of July?"

When an alleged KGB defector conveys these abstractions in his own language, American-born experts can only grasp the meaning of his words, but not their infinite psychological overtones; and if he conveys them in his rudimentary English, it depersonalizes him completely.

Hence, a true defector becomes indistinguishable from a KGB phony, and his behavior a conundrum that is useless even to begin to solve.

[From the New York City Tribune, Mar. 26, 1986]

ARMS AGREEMENTS? COMPLIANCE UNVERIFIABLE BY CIA (By Lev Navrozov)

There is a never-answered question that has been asked at least since 1968 when the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) went ahead, resulting in the SALT-I agreement in 1972:

"Can the compliance of the closed Soviet regime with such agreements be verified by the CIA-led intelligence community?"

The CIA has been vacillating between its desire to impress the public with its imaginary ability of verification and its fear of being found out the hard way (perhaps even in the extreme form of a surprise Soviet attack on the strategic retaliatory potential of the West).

May of those inside and outside the U.S. government in favor of arms negotiations and agreements have been saying that, yes, the CIA has been able to verify SALT I and SALT II, and only secrecy has been preventing them or the CIA from ever saying anything on the subject beyond this bold profession of their faith.

$X + Y = ?$

But does their faith prove anything? In his memoirs published in 1985, Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of Central Intelligence from 1977 to 1980—that is, when SALT II was to be ratified—writes:

"The only means I had for calculating whether the Soviets could cheat was to

figure out the different ways they might attempt it. I had a team of experts pretend they were malicious, scheming Soviets and think up techniques for cheating. One idea they came up with to hide the construction of new ICBM silos was to build them inside large buildings and plan to fire the missiles through the roofs."

To suppose that a missile like an ICBM can be hidden inside a large building does not require "team of experts" pretending they are "malicious, scheming Soviets"; a child of six could come up with such an idea. Turner continues:

"I was prepared to say [to the Congress] that I had X percent confidence that they could not secretly build more than 100 missile silos inside buildings without our detecting what was going on, and that our confidence would be $X + Y$ percent by the time they got to 200."

So, even in 1985 Turner does not say what "percent confidence" he had in 1978 or what it was in 1968, when SALT-I began. In 1985 the public was to believe this was still a secret that could only be denoted by X and $X + Y$.

It is statistically true that anyone who hides a thing runs a certain risk of that thing being discovered. That risk for 100 hidden items may be designated by X, and that for 200 by $X + Y$. So, put in such neat symbols of school algebra, Turner's verification percentages look impeccable.

But if the Soviet military can hide an ICBM inside a large building, then, even though the probability of discovery for 100, 200, 2,000 (and so on) ICBMs does increase theoretically, neither the CIA nor anyone else can calculate this X, $X + Y$, $X + Y + Z$ (and so on). They can exist only as algebraic symbols, not as calculated specific figures. Turner takes advantage of secrecy to conceal the fact that no one can calculate them.

The U.S. government machinery of strategic arms negotiations and agreements has been rumbling on in the 1980s on the basis of nothing except a vague national myth about the CIA's ability at verification, which the American media have created for the CIA.

SALT-II was never ratified, since the CIA has refused to say unequivocally that yes, SALT-II is verifiable, but has confined itself to safe assurances that the CIA's probability of discovery of 100 Soviet hidden ICBMs is X and keeps increasing with the number of hidden Soviet ICBMs.

MOBILE UNKNOWNNS

In 1985 Turner spoke only about stationary ICBMs, hidden inside buildings, with an empty algebraic promise that if very many ICBMs are hidden in this way, there is an X chance that the CIA will detect "what was going on."

But there has been something still worse in store for the West: mobile missile.

The CIA might have detected this danger in 1969 if it had listened to ex-Soviet leader Mikita Khrushchev's tapes, as I did. The following is Khrushchev on tape:

"I think Stalin was still alive then [that is, it was in 1953, take or leave a year or two]. When we had created mobile missile systems, we discussed this question, and gave up the building of stationary [missiles] and went over to mobile ones, which were a better solution. . . . They could be dispersed and it was more difficult for intelligence to establish where these missiles were."

Do you see the meaning of it all? Somewhere between 1952 and no later than 1964, when Khrushchev was thrown out of power, the Soviet military gave up the building of stationary missiles and went over to mobile ones for obvious reasons.

October 10, 1986

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 15909

But Adm. Turner narrates in 1985 that he explained to the Congress in 1977 to 1980 how the CIA could detect Soviet stationary (pre-1964?) missiles with a probability equal to X, etc. What about mobile missiles? The CIA didn't know that the Soviet military had switched to them at least 13, if not 28 years earlier?

On Dec. 31, 1985, SALT-II formally expired. But the Reagan administration has declared its intention to abide by it at least up to the spring of 1986, and it is widely believed that secret commitments were made by President Reagan at the summit late in 1985 to that effect. The liberal media have been egging on the administration: negotiate, negotiate, negotiate.

But if stationary missiles are unknowns—they could be hidden in large buildings—mobile missiles are mobile unknowns, which the CIA does not even presume to detect with a probability equal to X.

Only espionage agents inside the Kremlin could have yielded such information, but the CIA has, practically, never had any, and has been relying on space surveillance in the hope of photo-graphing Soviet stationary missiles hidden behind walls—which has been futile anyway since at least 1964, when the Soviet building of mobile missiles began.

[From the New York City Tribune, Apr. 2, 1986]

ILLUSIONS ON WHICH CIA WAS FOUNDED 40 YEARS AGO

(By Lev Navrozov)

The birth of the CIA 40 years ago was based on several American illusions.

Since it is no problem to buy any commodity on sale in the United States if you have enough money, there originated a delusion that intelligence/espionage will also be available if Congress pays enough money for it.

Since American corporations like General Motors are fairly efficient, there originated a delusion that a government non-profit bureaucracy will be also fairly efficient if organized along the lines of General Motors to produce intelligence/espionage data.

Since many gifted Americans are paid salaries, there originated a delusion that every American was gifted in intelligence/espionage if he was paid a salary.

Since Soviet spies penetrated during World War II and thereafter even the U.S. top secret atomic laboratory, which was completely isolated in a remote practically desert area, there originated a delusion that an American who is paid a salary for intelligence/espionage would similarly be able to penetrate the innermost recesses of Stalin's Russia.

FROM OMAHA TO THE KREMLIN

We know how the CIA was born due to someone who joined it at its birth worked in it for 25 years, and then wrote memoirs. His name is Harry Rositzke.

I would read his and other such books as comical writing except that their meaning is tragic. Anyway, Rositzke wrote his memoirs in dead earnest. He takes himself for the CIA's master spy who has given the taxpayers more than the value of his salary they paid him for 25 years. So let us begin with Rositzke himself.

Who the hell would imagine that a Rositzke, who was born in Brooklyn, studied German at Harvard and taught English in Omaha, could penetrate, say, a Soviet military laboratory in Kungur?

Did Rositzke know a word of Russian or any other of the more than 130 languages of Russia? Or was it assumed that English or German was spoken in Kungur, and so Rositzke would speak with the local populace in his Brooklyn-Omaha English or his Har-

vard German? Was Kungur thought to be like Brooklyn, Omaha or Harvard?

What does the teaching of English in Omaha have to do with espionage in Russia? What did Rositzke know about the subject? Why on earth was he thought to be more gifted in the field than in heart surgery, weight lifting or the composition of a concerto for violin and orchestra?

FUTURE SPIES IN THE KREMLIN

Rositzke did us a great service by listing also the occupations of those of his new colleagues whom he came to know best. These were:

Two journalists. Excellent! They would send their messages from a secret laboratory in Kungur as newspaper reports, with by-line and all.

A state trooper from the Midwest. Fantastic! He would be a sports coach at a local school.

Several sons of missionaries. Splendid! They would convert some atheists at the Kungur laboratory in the process of espionage.

A lawyer. Magnificent! He would talk in Kungur. Lawyers know how to do it.

A postal clerk. My God! He could get a job at the local post office and read all letters.

Several high-school and college teachers (like Rositzke). They would find no more difficulty than Rositzke himself in passing themselves off in Kungur for itinerant circus acrobats, for example. Surely the nascent CIA could teach them somersaults or whatever.

True, there was one defect in them all. None of these future spies in Kungur of the Kremlin knew a word of any of Russia's 130 languages. A way-out seemed to be for all of them to pretend that they were deafmutes.

REHASHED WISDOM

Once on his job, Rositzke decided to learn something about Russia—to train himself on the job, as they say. How? By reading Soviet books and magazines.

In 1973, that is, about 25 years later, Rositzke published a book of his own, entitled *The USSR Today*. Needless to say, I've tracked it down to see what he produced after 25 years of his salaried sojourn in the CIA. I hardly need to say that the CIA's espionage did not move an inch during those 25 years. But here was at least Rositzke's book.

Thousands of Americans write books about Russia by rehashing other books about Russia, written by rehashing still other books about Russia. So after 25 years of his salaried sojourn in Washington Rositzke churned out in the same way his book about Russia: it is thin, and hence subsequent experts on Russia will have little to rehash.

Otherwise here are three of Rositzke's rehashed "truths about Russia":

The "average Soviet factory worker is better off than the 20 million Americans at the bottom of the income ladder";

"Marxism-Leninism appeals to countless men"; and

The "Soviet record in public health is outstanding."

It is not clear why Rositzke should have struck it out for 25 years in the CIA to pen this rehash one could learn straight from any Soviet propaganda pamphlet in English on sale in Washington for 50 cents a copy. Had Rositzke seen a single Soviet factory worker in the flesh in a town like Kungur? How did Rositzke know that Marxism-Leninism appealed even to Brezhnev? What did Rositzke know about Soviet public health except what was written about it in Soviet propaganda?

TOP SECRET

But it took Rositzke 25 years in the CIA to obtain these gems of rehashed wisdom, while at the birth of the intelligence agency, Rositzke was yet to *begin* reading in absolute top secrecy what—*Pravda*? No, of course, not. In those days *Pravda* was not published in English. But fortunately, several Soviet glossy propaganda magazines were. These Rositzke would read in absolute top secrecy until he knew Russia enough to penetrate the Kremlin or at least Kungur.

In absolute top secrecy did Rositzke arrange for subscriptions to several such periodicals. His job was so secret that even his wife was not supposed to know that her husband was the Chief of Special Projects Division/Soviet, Strategic Services Unit. Indeed, Harry Rositzke didn't exist any more. He used cover names from now on, say, Dick Appel and when Dick Appel was asked where he worked, he had to say: "At the State Department" or name some other innocuous place. Of course, the Soviet magazines were to arrive at some innocent Post Office Box.

Finally, the first of them did, postmarked Moscow. Inside his absolutely top secret Division within an absolutely top secret Unit, Dick Appel picked up the package from his in-basket and read the Moscow label on the brown wrapper.

Harry Rositzke
Chief, Special Projects
Division/Soviet
Strategic Services Unit
2430 E Street
Washington, DC.

[From the New York City Tribune, Apr. 16, 1986]

HOW THE CIA BORES THE U.S. CONGRESS STIFF

(By Lev Navrozov)

The CIA has been testifying before various congressional committees, and whatever sanitized version is released for the press, I collect it, so that now I have a huge stack of the CIA's testimonies dating back as early as 1959.

As a random sample, I pull out from the stack a typewritten release for the press: the CIA's testimony before the Joint Economic Committee on Sept. 14, 1983, entitled *USSR: Economic Trends and Policy Development*.

In the 1980s a member of the U.S. Congress would not mind hearing from the CIA how the Politburo harnesses all available economic sources to maximize its global might, and when the later will be sufficient in the Politburo's estimation to put an end to the United States by striking at its retaliatory nuclear missile potential.

But there is something more important for the CIA to testify about. Hark ye, U.S. senators and representatives: "Production [in 1982] of fruits and vegetables reached record levels . . ."

This is what the CIA learned from Soviet "open" (that is, freely available) reference books, though as usual the CIA give no source note. The Congress is to suppose that the CIA has received this strategic information via intelligence/espionage, and so no sources could be given.

Imagine a dark, rainy night, when all KGB counterintelligence agents stay at home (at least in American spy thrillers), and the CIA's ace agent passes his case officer on Gorky Street (favored in such spy thrillers, too) and whispers as he passes:

"Production of fruits and vegetables reached record levels . . ."

So why should the U.S. Congress hear from the CIA that in Russia in 1982 there

S 15910

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

October 10, 1986

was a good harvest of "fruits and vegetables?" Why should a secret intelligence/espionage agency, leading the secret "intelligence community" of 200,000 secret employees, report this to the U.S. Congress? Can a professor of Soviet economics not register this news from the Soviet open press in his article if it is of interest to anyone?

The testimony takes several hours to read. It is a frightfully boring and irrelevant rehash of the Soviet open press.

Less than 6 percent of the testimony is occupied by two sections called "Defense." It is interesting that even in terms of time and space in the CIA's testimony, the CIA gives Soviet "defense" a modest fraction of its testimony—6 percent—and this fraction figures under the conventional reassuring Soviet propaganda name: "defense." Every country must defend itself, must it not? So the "U.S.S.R." (the CIA uses all the propaganda names) has its "defense," too.

The CIA informs the Congress: "Andropov's position on the share of resources that should go to military is unclear."

Unclear? But what about intelligence/espionage that has penetrated the Kremlin, as we have been told so many times? The CIA explains: "In his November 1982 speech, he [Andropov] stated only that defense requirements as usual have been sufficiently taken into account."

You see? Andropov was vague. If he had expressed himself clearly in *Pravda*, the CIA would have copied the article from *Pravda* and read it to the Congress. That's what intelligence/espionage is all for! But Andropov was vague. So what on earth could Congress expect from the CIA? No wonder the CIA was vague too!

New information indicates that the Soviets did not field weapons as rapidly after 1976 as before. Practically all major categories of Soviet weapons were affected—missiles, aircraft, and ships.

What does the first sentence of this verbiage mean? That in 1982 U.S. space satellites saw a smaller number of missiles fielded than in 1975? But what if the missiles of 1982 had far more warheads, and these were far more accurate? What about camouflaged stationary and mobile land missiles that U.S. space satellites did not see?

READING THE TEA LEAVES

Congress then hears:

The growth in total [Soviet military] expenditures still appears to be considerably below the long-term average, and [military] procurement spending remains roughly unchanged, although at a high level, when measured in constant 1970 prices.

What follows is the CIA's favorite pastime: guesswork that the CIA calls "analysis." Having invented a "trend"—in this particular case, the slowdown in the growth in total Soviet military expenditures and military procurement—the CIA proceeds to invent the imaginary causes of its invention:

The slowdown in the growth of military procurement cannot be explained by any single factor. Initially, at least, the absence of growth in military procurement might have been attributed to natural lulls in production as older weapon programs were phased out before new ones began. The extended nature of the slowdown, however, goes far beyond normal dips in procurement cycles.

The continued slow growth since the late 1970s seems related to a combination of complex factors including technological problems, industrial bottlenecks, and policy decisions. Some funds budgeted for procurement may have been directed instead to research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) during this period because of the increasing complexity of weapon systems being researched.

The process of the CIA's production of this verbiage for the benefit of the U.S. Congress, government and all concerned can be outlined as follows: Having invented the "slowdown in the growth of [Soviet] military procurement," the "CIA analysts" begin to "analyze," or as the old English expression goes, to read the tea leaves.

Procurement cycles? No good! According to the CIA's imagination, the slowdown is extended. Then the "analysts" begin to enumerate everything that comes to their heads as capable of slowing down the growth of Soviet military procurement, but pass off a string of their ad hoc inventions as facts, established presumably via intelligence/espionage.

Indeed, what possibly can slow down the growth of Soviet military procurement? Technological problems. An excellent safe common place!

What else? Industrial bottlenecks. A marvelous fib—and very much in the spirit of the Soviet scene! Policy decisions. A splendid fantasy—and totally noncommittal: surely those Soviets always make some policy decisions! Funds may have been diverted to RDT&F. A brilliant figment of imagination—surely Soviet RDT&E can do with more funds!

The invention of imaginary causes of an imaginary event may be an interesting game. But it is not clear why everything that was noted above cannot be "testified" to before the Congress by any American able to speak grammatical English, and it is even less clear why Congress should hear this "testimony."

At best, it is a waste of time, filling the legislator's heads with nonsensical trivia at a time the West is gravely threatened.

[From the New York City Tribune, Apr. 30, 1986]

KIM PHILBY: ESPIONAGE ROMANCE AND DRAE REALITY

(By Lev NAVTOZOV)

The trouble with many Western intelligence/espionage writers is that they "tone up" everything and everyone in their book to make them "exciting."

I first noticed this when I read the books and articles about Harold "Kim" Philby, an Englishman who was a Soviet agent for 30 years (1933-63). At the peak of his career Philby functioned in Britain and the United States as director of the counter-Soviet section of the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI 6, and liaison officer between MI 6 and the CIA.

In one book about Philby, three journalists of the London *Sunday Times*, who were aided by a 13-person research team, refer to the "great sexuality" of Litzl Friedman, his first wife, who "had never wanted for admirers" before Philby met her. She was in short a ravishing Austrian girl, beset by admirers, a middle-European sex goddess from a \$40-million movie, fit to be the consort of the British superspy.

Then I saw her photograph: a chunky, short-legged peasant girl (you can find such in a Soviet Ukrainian village) with retreating forehead, idiotic hairdo, heavy jaw, big mouth and hooked but by no means well-chiseled nose.

She might have been a good, nice, intelligent girl or a village slut, for village sluts are not always for choosy customers. But what do the *Sunday Times* authors' great sexual fantasies have in common with her?

SOPHISTICATED SOPHISTICATION

That's the working principle of many intelligence/espionage authors. Litzl Friedman did exist and Philby did marry her, but the rest is the *Sunday Times* journalists'

imagination—and just as their imagination transforms Litzl, it transforms whatever they describe.

If everything written about Philby, including by Philby himself, is collected, it can be summarized in these four paragraphs:

Functioning in Britain has been the famous MI 6, the British Secret Intelligence Service. Words fail to describe its sophistication, which has been maturing for 3 or 4 centuries.

Working as director of the counter-Soviet section of MI 6 was Harold Philby. While MI 5, the British counterintelligence service, just tracks Soviet spies on English territory, the counter-Soviet section conducts espionage inside the KGB in order to learn who the Soviet spies are, in particular MI 6. Not bad, eh?

But that's not all. Philby, head of the very section of MI 6 aimed at penetrating the KGB to learn who the KGB agents are in MI 6, was . . . a KGB agent. What a wilderness of mirrors! What sophisticated espionage! So that Philby was a man of double genius in espionage: his genius of British espionage combined with that of Soviet espionage.

Finally, imagine the sophistication of the KGB, which planted its agent at the top of the sophisticated MI 6, nay, its even more sophisticated counter-Soviet section! Exposed by defectors, the double genius of espionage Philby disappeared from Beirut and surfaced in Moscow in 1963.

PROSAIC REALITY

Since Philby's father was a British official, he gave his son education "in the humanities." Millions of young people in the West who have no ability for anything receive education in the humanities because their parents can afford it.

Philby could write and speak the English of the upper middle class. That's all he learned to do in his lifetime. Before his escape to the Soviet Union in 1963 he knew nothing about the Soviet Union except what any newspaper-reading Englishman knows. He was never interested in anything except booze (or however you say booze in his upper-middle-class English) and he never said or wrote anything but a platitude.

But how could such a nonentity become the head of the counter-Soviet section of MI 6?

Because MI 6 has been merely pretending since 1918 that it conducts espionage in the Soviet Union. All those books and TV programs about how the ace spy Sidney Reilly nearly toppled Lenin's regime are perhaps exciting, yet they are untrue (see my column of Jan. 15, "How Superspy Reilly Tried to Topple the Soviets").

Characteristically, even the myth is almost 70 years old, and MI 6 has never dared to circulate any fresher myth. Philby had no more ability to conduct espionage in the Soviet Union than to design a nuclear bomb or build a space rocket. But to pretend? Why not?

He describes his greatest espionage operation, Operation Spyglass, as follows:

The main item was, of course, the camera. Having no technical knowledge of photography [and technical knowledge of what did he have?], I could not specify the make: I simply described what I wanted it to do and left the rest to headquarters.

Having the camera designed and built, Philby went to north Turkey, from where Soviet territory is visible, and his aide "swung the camera."

With an ordinary camera one could take only separate snapshots, but as his aide swung this camera, specially designed and

October 10, 1986

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 15911

built for Operation Spyglass, he took several photographs one after another automatically.

That is how Philby penetrated the Soviet Union, if not the KGB.

Of course, aerial photo-reconnaissance had existed in World War I, not to mention World War II. An ordinary World War II reconnaissance plane could have flown along the border and done within an hour far more than could Operation Spyglass do in a month, since the plane can carry heavier and more sophisticated cameras, fly far higher than Philby's aide could swing the camera, and hence take a view far deeper into Soviet territory.

But why should Philby have known anything about aerial photo-reconnaissance? Why should he have thought about it? They were supposed to spend taxpayers' money. They did. On Operation Spyglass, for example.

No more difficult was Philby's work as a Soviet agent; contacts are never a problem in a society where anyone can travel all over the world. But what espionage data did Philby pass if MI 6 was all pretense?

Well, the KGB wanted to make sure that it remained all pretense—to keep an eye on MI 6 lest it was up to some mischief.

Thus, in August 1945, Konstantin Volkov, vice-consul at the Soviet Consulate-General in Istanbul, Turkey, wanted to defect with fantastically important intelligence data. The British consulate-general began pondering, and Philby came to the scene as an expert.

But first he informed the NKVD, as the KGB was called then, which dispatched Volkov to Moscow by air either as a corpse already or still alive for further investigation at the Moscow KGB headquarters.

All the KGB did in the Philby case was to receive this kind of information from Philby. The KGB was not interested in his motives. In addition to his MI 6 salary, he received a KGB officer's pay. He enabled the KGB to destroy Volkov—he earned well his KGB salary. That's all.

His escape was no less prosaic. MI 6 did not hold him, but on the contrary wanted him to disappear into the silence of the Soviet Union, to bury the scandal.

MI 6 made a mistake: the KGB began to glorify its former spies instead of denying their existence as before, so the scandal was all the worse.

[From the New York City Tribune, May 7, 1986]

HOW THE CIA FLUNKED ABYSMALLY ON CHERNOBYL AFFAIR (By Lev Navrozov)

Whatever happened at Chernobyl on Friday, April 25 (Thursday the 24th, Saturday the 26th?), the West, and in particular the American 200,000-member intelligence community led by the CIA, had known nothing about it except what had been publicly known without them—from, say, a French communications space satellite.

In other words, Chernobyl has demonstrated once again that Western intelligence/espionage inside totalitarian societies does not exist, for space satellite observation is not a form of intelligence-gathering or espionage.

Intelligence/espionage is the clandestine acquisition of information denied to our side by a target country. There is nothing clandestine about space satellites, unless the Western intelligence/espionage agencies want to pretend their satellites are clandestine by calling them spies-in-the-sky and other such spy-thriller names.

Nor has any space observation ever been prevented by the Soviet side: on the con-

trary, for more than 20 years any space satellites have been mutually permitted to fly over any territory and make any photographs or register any waves and particles.

NOT A SINGLE AGENT

If just one Western intelligence/espionage agency had had one agent in Kiev—no, not within any infrastructure, but just as a "man in the street," an ordinary Kievan—he could have informed his agency when Kiev's hospitals began to fill up with radiation victims from Chernobyl. It's only some 50 miles away from Kiev, and he could have ascertained whether these victims were being shipped out of the area to be hospitalized (or buried) in areas where foreigners are not allowed.

Kiev, the third largest city in the Soviet empire, is full of physics laboratories. The level of radiation was known to many scientists and could be readily learned privately from them by any Kievan.

It could thus be calculated how many people were not hospitalized, yet had received a lethal or dangerous dose of radiation, for example in Pripyat, a town with a population of 25,000 about 10 miles from Chernobyl.

Any Kievan could also obtain privately from these scientists information on the size of the area of nuclear contamination.

How much, for example, is Kiev's water contaminated? How much is the entire chain of reservoirs down to the Black Sea contaminated? To know this it would have been sufficient to have an agent in Dnepropetrovsk Zaporzhye or even Odessa or Niko-

lev.

But to maintain one agent inside a totalitarian society even as an ordinary, lowest-level member of this society—who has ever heard of that?

Ten years ago, when Mao died, hundreds of millions of people in China were on the verge of starvation, dozens of millions were starving, and millions dying of hunger. Here is an exchange in Congress on the subject in 1976.

PERCY QUESTIONS BUSH

Sen. Charles Percy asks George Bush, now U.S. vice president and then CIA director, whether it is true that there is a "great deal of malnutrition" in China.

Mr. Bush replies: What you have said, sir, comes as a surprise to me. Maybe some of our experts can confirm it. Is anyone prepared to do that?

[No response.]

Mr. Bush. I didn't travel to some of the autonomous regions, but I did travel a lot in China. We were free to move around, although you never get far off the beaten track. But certainly their own theses [are] that there is a basic level of nutrition for the entire population.

Can anyone here help the Senator with that, as to whether there is malnutrition in places in China?

Mr. Field [CIA expert]: No; I have no information on it.

Of course not. How can you see hunger via a space satellite? But you won't imagine, will you, that there was as of 1976 one CIA agent among 900 million Chinese who would report to Bush that they were starving. The conclusion of this particular piece of testimony, boldly entitled "Absence of Hunger in China," is worth reading:

Senator Percy: In other words, so far as we know, the claim that they have made that they are meeting the food problems of the country, and our own observations along that line, were accurate?

Mr. Bush: Yes.

Senator Percy: and I think they have been absolutely remarkable.

If half of Russia's population had received a lethal dose of Chernobyl's radiation or

eaten lethally contaminated food, the director of Central Intelligence and his experts would say that they have no information on the subject.

Thus, on May 1, The New York Times related that in the CIA's reports "there was no solid information to prove or disprove the Soviet assertion that two people had been killed and . . . 197 had been hospitalized."

CHERNOBYL AFIRE

The Chernobyl plant began to emit light (that a space satellite could photograph) as well as nuclear radiation and nuclear particles (that a space satellite or an outsider interceptor could register) on April 24, 25 or 26.

On Monday, April 28, a nuclear cloud from Chernobyl reached Sweden, 800 miles away, and the Swedish government spent a full day demanding an explanation. So foreign correspondents in Moscow received from Tass a piece of paper on which were four sentences typed in English to the effect that "an accident" did occur at Chernobyl, "measures to eliminate" its "consequences" were being taken, aid was being given to "those affected," and a "government commission" had been set up.

The Western intelligence/espionage community learned of the "accident" only from these four sentences as they were reported in the West by correspondents in Moscow, and until the next Tass handout knew nothing except these four sentences.

So, the by-no-means clandestine space satellite observation did not work.

The U.S. intelligence community has one (yes, one) space satellite up over Russia. Now, to obtain maximum space satellite resolution—that is, to distinguish, say, a window in a house as at least a dot—it had to span in one photograph no more than a fraction of one-millionth of Soviet territory.

Well, Chernobyl was not inside that fraction. As for the National Security Agency's interceptors along the border of Russia, the interceptions were filed to be studied "later."

Hence, the U.S. intelligence community knew absolutely nothing until Tass told the world Monday, April 28, whatever it deemed necessary to tell.

To cap the irony of it all, the United States' only space satellite over Russia is to be replaced within a year. Yet it may go out of commission any day, and there is no stand-by space satellite to replace it.

[From the New York City Tribune, May 21, 1986]

WHAT THE CIA REVEALS ABOUT ITSELF IN ITS PAMPHLET

(By Lev Navrozov)

The CIA has sent me (free) its glossy 28-page pamphlet about itself. The booklet is entitled *Intelligence: The Acme of Skill*—a title taken from Sun Tzu, a philosopher of China Circa 400 B.C., who said, "To find security without fighting is the acme of skill."

In general, the philosophical side of espionage has been increasingly dazzling in the CIA. More and more Ph.D.'s work on the CIA—often because the alternative is to work as typists or advertising agents. Naturally, doctors of philosophy philosophize—in this particular case about espionage.

Obviously, they philosophize secretly. Thus, under three pieces of their philosophy cited at the beginning of the pamphlet, their names are withdrawn and only their posts are given. So top secret.

True, above their pieces are their photographs. I thought one's photograph was a better means of identification for the KGB and GRU than one's name—which may be

assumed—but this is what the CIA's secrecy often is.

One of the three secret philosophers says they strive for "that high-quality knowledge that decision makers need to arrive at safe, effective decisions."

Yes, but surely the same can be said by practically any institution from General Motors to the Society for Encouragement of Sunday Family Outings.

The second secret philosopher is no less philosophical: the goal, you see, is "the gathering of as much information as is available on events abroad and the intellectual job of integrating that information."

But surely this is precisely what the State Dept., the relevant university departments and the foreign desks and bureaus of the media do.

ENRICHMENT OF UNDERSTANDING

The third and the last secret philosopher says that "intelligence . . . must be an enrichment of the understanding of the problems that face a decision maker."

One will think this comes from a university department of cognitive psychology, and by intelligence is meant here the mental faculty of reasoning and understanding. Here must be a philosophical society concerned with cognitive intelligence—the Cognitive Intelligence Association, or CIA for short.

While philosophy is obviously advanced at the CIA, painting and sculpture are not lagging behind either. One photograph shows the interior of CIA headquarters: this is the first floor, looking like a modern-art museum. Says the pamphlet: "Works of art grace the building's entire first floor."

As befits doctors of cognitive intelligence, all works of art visible in the photograph are abstract, with a kind of huge broken matchbox in the forefront.

If the second floor of the building is given over as wholly to modernistic music, the third to avant-grade poetry, and the fourth to the theater of the absurd, all worry about the CIA's cultural advancement disappears.

INVENTION OF PHOTOGRAPHY

In the middle of the pamphlet, our eyes are greeted by a magnificent centerfold photograph of the kind that can be seen in Look magazine: an aerial photograph in which one can distinguish the hubs of a truck's wheels.

Several months ago I was studying aerial and space photographs in the Map Division of the New York Public Library. Finally they brought me a state-of-the-art miracle, a desk-size album—the best album I could find in the Map Division. Not without distaste, however, I found the album was Soviet.

Surprising? Not at all. Apart from East Germany working for the Soviet empire (and German photography has always been second to none), the Soviet military can always buy the best photographic equipment for their aerial and space photography in Europe, Japan and the United States.

So what does the CIA want to say by that centerfold photograph? That the CIA has invented photography?

One may here observe:

Aerial photography is the job of the Air Force, not the CIA.

It was practiced by air forces of all countries as early as World War I.

It cannot possibly be practiced over Soviet territory, since reconnaissance aircraft will be shot at immediately.

The CIA has not invented photography and to buy and use photographic equipment takes no "acme of skill," but only commercial and technological routines.

ONLY TWO PARAGRAPHS

So, is there anything in the pamphlet about intelligence/espionage? I found two paragraphs, one of which says: "Where once the human agent was the basic collector of data, a technological revolution in the past 2 decades has generated technical systems capable of producing prodigious quantities of information."

So, 2 decades ago—that is, from 1947 and throughout the 1950s—it was the human agent that was the basic collector of intelligence data. Oh, yes?

If the CIA ever had had a single agent inside a Soviet institution of strategic importance inside Russia and retrieved him successfully, surely he would have written his memoirs in a sensational best-seller under a title like "A Spy in the Kremlin." What an hour of glory that would have been for the CIA.

But next year it will be 40 years since the CIA's establishment. Where are that human agent and his bestseller?

Opposite the text is a page-size photograph from a pre-1953 Soviet illustrated magazine: a festival march carrying a huge portrait of Stalin. The inscription: "In its early years [not now?], the Central Intelligence Agency's primary concern was with Soviet military activities and political intentions."

The photograph is appropriate. It is from Soviet propaganda magazines that the CIA has been deriving its espionage data.

HUMAN AGENT ACKNOWLEDGED

The second paragraph relating to intelligence/espionage says: "And yet the human agent remains vital. If the photographs and signals that technical means gather speak of what people have built or what they are saying, only the human agent can deliver what they are thinking."

But if there was not a single CIA agent inside the strategic infrastructure of Russia in those days when he was supposed to be the "basic collector of data," why should he appear now? Or is he expected to emerge from the CIA's exercises in philosophy, painting and sculpture, as well as music and theater?

[From the New York City Tribune, May 28, 1986]

HAS U.S. INTELLIGENCE IMPROVED WITH CASEY AT BAT?

(By Lev Navrozov)

Among some conservatives there abides a soothing illusion that there has been a dramatic improvement in U.S. intelligence/espionage under Ronald Reagan, since he appointed William J. Casey director of the CIA.

Let me repeat that I regard as espionage/intelligence our clandestine penetration of areas, spaces and institutions "denied" by a prospective totalitarian enemy.

One of the proofs of successful espionage/intelligence in that sense is successfully retrieved agents—such as Arkady Shevchenko—who stay in the West, write public memoirs about their experiences and thus establish their bona fides beyond doubt before the public.

During Reagan's term we have heard of only one such case, that of Shevchenko. But even this sole case belongs to the pre-Reagan era: Shevchenko terminated his espionage for the United States in 1978. But let's imagine that the case continued into the 1980s.

Shevchenko is a hero, and as a true hero he wrote an authentic, excellent and moving book—published in 1985—about how he had been afraid (it's cowards who write books about how fearless they are). I am prepared

to write pages in praise of Shevchenko and his book.

LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE

But let us evaluate the case from the point of view of intelligence/espionage:

Shevchenko lived in New York and could move freely about it; so, the CIA's part in this espionage exploit was reduced to renting an apartment in New York to meet with him (and even this job the CIA could not do too well, according to Shevchenko).

The former United Nations official was stationed in the West and hence would not have access to the innermost strategic recesses inside Russia, for those who have such access are not allowed to go abroad in the first place.

Shevchenko was a "Soviet diplomat," and diplomacy in a totalitarian society is a form of propaganda; diplomats in such a society are often the last to learn about what the military are doing.

Since Shevchenko lived in New York, his "successful retrieval" could have been grandly executed without the CIA by taking a cab and asking the driver to go to 26 Federal Plaza—FBI headquarters in New York.

Shevchenko was asked on television last year what secrets he could disclose, and he said that in the late 1970s he knew from rumors at the diplomatic top and could tell the CIA that former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was having the flu—since otherwise the West would not know even that. He is right, and least of all I want to deny the importance of the West of having known Soviet top diplomatic rumors about Brezhnev's flu.

But what a distance between Brezhnev's flu and the vast Soviet unknown where military preparations are afoot. What a pathetic case from every point of view in terms of intelligence/espionage.

What was simpler for Shevchenko's "successful retrieval" than getting into a cab? But no! "I took an overnight bag from the living-room closet and jammed a few shirts and some socks and underwear into it," he recalls in his book.

So, in the United States in general and in the CIA in particular there was a shortage of shirts, socks and underwear. He had to take them along. What else? An electric iron, two pillows, a leg of ham, I hope the socks had no holes.

Then he discovered that the service elevators he wanted to use did not run after midnight. "I had not worked this part with Bob and Carl [of the CIA]," he explains. With the overnight bag (who could leave behind those socks and everything else?) he began climbing down the fire stairs (20 flights), stumbling, his calf muscles "trembling from the unusual strain," and stopping to shift the bag from hand to hand after each five or six flights.

Then, lugging the bag along, he ran down 64th Street and across Third Avenue to the CIA's car.

The building was tenanted by Soviet officials, including KGB agents. What if he had been watched or seen accidentally by a KGB agent? Out of breath, the undersecretary general of the U.N. was running with an overnight bag in the middle of the night toward a strange car.

Now, this is the CIA's most brilliant successful espionage operation in how many—20? 30? 40 years?

Let us recall that actually, Shevchenko's espionage had ended before the Reagan term. So, in the Reagan era, there has not even been such a case of successful espionage and retrieval. If there had been, the public would have learned about it, as it has about Shevchenko.

October 10, 1986

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 15913

CRITICS AND REAGAN

Before Reagan took office he was interested in conservative critics of the CIA, including myself. After he took office, those critics were forgotten by the administration. Instead, we learned that the director of Central Intelligence was now William Casey, Reagan's old friend.

Tremble, Soviet war-empire: Ronald Reagan's old friend would now conduct intelligence-espionage within your innermost strategic depths, and not just on Third Avenue, New York.

When the newly elected president's old friend gets an appointment, there must be some peg to hang it on. For example, if it's ambassadorship to Moscow, the peg may be the appointee's wife's ability to cook Russian Pirozhky (pies), which makes the family well-equipped to get on with the Politburo.

In the case of Casey, the peg was his intelligence work against Nazi Germany during World War II. It was like expecting that Reagan's old friend who worked in a hospital 40-odd years ago would be able to pioneer new fields of heart surgery because he is, after all, an old friend of Ronald Reagan.

But it is not all gloom. Reagan brushed aside all critics and criticisms of the CIA for his old friend was now at its helm. Yet they have not disappeared. They have been thriving and developing outside the official intelligence community.

I will mention just three of such critics: David Sullivan, who left the CIA and is now assistant to several senators; Angelo Codevilla, now a fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, and Mark Schneider, now with the Department of Defense.

Conservative criticism of the CIA is often linked with that of Reagan's defense policies as a whole. For example, this month's issue of *Commentary* carries Codevilla's article, "How SDI Is Being Undone From Within." This is a devastating piece of criticism, showing how much needed strategic defense is, yet how little is being done in practice—indeed, the Strategic Defense Initiative is being undone.

Perhaps criticism of Reagan's defense policy in general and the CIA during his term of office in particular, will reach its full vigor by the time a new presidential candidate comes to the scene—for, frankly speaking, the U.S. needs now not just Reagan, but a super-Reagan.

[From the New York City Tribune, June 4, 1986]

WHAT THE RONALD PELTON SPY CASE DEMONSTRATES

(By Lev Navrozov)

There is nothing new or peculiar about either Ronald W. Pelton himself or his case, which is to go to jury deliberations this week.

Indeed, about a month before the case opened on May 27 I described a typical espionage case (April 23, "When an American Spies . . .") that subsumed the case of Pelton.

Pelton made \$24,500 in 1979, his last year of employment at the National Security Agency. Nothing unusual. Most of the 3.5 million Americans who have access to classified data draw comparable salaries.

In the Soviet empire, Pelton's equivalent would be automatically far better off than, say, an ordinary physician or a plumber. In the United States a physician or even a plumber makes several times as much money as did Pelton.

If we assume that all the 4.3 million Americans who had access to secret data in 1979 (today the figure has been reduced to 3.5 million) made on the average \$24,500,

the total sum of their pay amounted to more than \$105 billion.

But even if the salaries of those with access to classified data were tripled, money for many Americans is a kind of lifeblood, of which they must have always more than they do or they will die of anemia.

Pelton "needed money desperately." What is more common in the United States in almost all brackets?

On the evening of Jan. 14, 1980, Pelton called the Soviet Embassy. That was his gross blunder. He could have walked into the embassy without a telephone call. But he had that American habit of making an appointment over the phone.

Of course, the FBI taped the telephone call. This is routine, since all telephones of the embassy can be switched permanently to recording equipment.

I read about that in a back issue of a Russian magazine published before World War I, when a telephone conversation could be recorded only on a gramophone disk or a phonograph roll. According to the magazine, the British Intelligence Service recorded all telephone conversation from and to the German Embassy.

Small wonder that in our age of \$20 tape recorders at every store, the FBI does along these lines what could be done before World War I.

But Pelton's blunder did not lead to his arrest. The FBI was unable to find the caller by his voice among the 4.3 million Americans who had access to classified data.

The Soviet Embassy official who named himself Vladimir Sorokin at first suggested a morning for Pelton's visit, which shows again how inept the KGB/GRU is (and yet it is doing so well in the West). But at least Pelton had enough gray matter in his head to choose an evening—"tomorrow evening"—so his face wouldn't be seen well: "It will be dark when I come in."

Yes, but today there is excellent night vision photography.

The tape left no doubt as to the purpose of the caller's visit: "I come from . . . I . . . I . . . I'm in . . . with the United States Government," the caller said. "Uh, I have something to discuss with you, I think, that would be very interesting to you." He said everything short of: "I want to be a spy. Can I come to discuss it?"

Having made his appointment for the next evening, Pelton decided to confirm it—"to firm it up"—next day at 2:32 p.m., and appeared at the Soviet Embassy several minutes later—in broad daylight! Apparently, he did not have the patience to wait for darkness as he had intended.

This gave the FBI almost 22 hours—from 4:53 p.m. Jan. 14 to 2:32 p.m. Jan. 15—to organize constant tight surveillance of the Soviet embassy. But the FBI didn't listen to the tape until days later. It was shelved by the FBI for several days!

What about, then, the FBI's routine surveillance of the Soviet Embassy? Well, that didn't help either: while in the embassy Pelton had his beard shaved off and was directed to go out through a service exit, not the exit for official visitors.

These two Soviet espionage tricks at the Stone Age level confused the FBI! Neither was Pelton photographed as he entered nor as he left the embassy. He was not arrested at the time nor at any time after that.

Only when alleged KGB defector Vitaly Yurchenko gave him away late in 1985—almost 6 years later—was Pelton finally arrested.

Yurchenko's information concerning Pelton was cited as proof that he was a bona fide defector who just changed his mind and redefected. But it is no proof.

The KGB/GRU may have decided they did not need Pelton anymore: he no longer worked at the National Security Agency, he had told them all he could recall, and he failed to answer their telephone call in the summer of 1985.

He failed to do so because he was drunk at the time and his car, which his girlfriend drove for him, didn't have enough gas. But the KGB/GRU may have thought he was not interested any more.

What is relevant here is that the exposure of Pelton was purely accidental and had nothing to do with the FBI, CIA, or NSA.

Let us now draw some dire conclusions:

While the West does not even know where the Soviets' "NSA"—the main code-making, code-breaking and radio-intercepting institution—is located, the Soviet KGB/GRU has had a string of spies in NSA, even if only *known* spies are taken into consideration—such as Sgt. Jack E. Dunlap, who became conspicuously rich from selling NSA secrets to Soviet agents in the early 1960s without anyone paying the slightest attention.

No other case has better demonstrated that the FBI's ability to apprehend spying Americans equals zero even when these Americans make gross blunders, like "making an appointment" by telephone with the Soviet Embassy, and when their method is no more sophisticated than walking into the embassy in broad daylight and without disguise to sell classified data.

Under such condition, the ineptness of the KGB/GRU does not prevent Soviet espionage from flourishing—for it is sufficient for the KGB/GRU just to wait for Peltons to come to any Soviet institution abroad, such as the embassy in Washington, and then evaluate their classified data and pay them accordingly.

If the Soviet military knows everything about NSA owing to such "Americans in desperate need of cash," while the West doesn't know even where the Soviet NSA is located, then U.S. codes, for example, will be worse than useless: they will be traps, since the Soviet military will read them, owing to the Dunlaps and Peltons, and will know from them American crucial strategic secrets.

On the other hand, since the Soviet highest-level codes are one-time systems, they are unbreakable without espionage able to secure the code keys, and hence the West will be as much in the dark about the Soviet highest-level codes as it has always been.

[From the New York City Tribune, July 2, 1986]

HOW FORMER CIA OFFICIAL RESPONDED TO PAST ERROR

(By Lev Navrozov)

When David Sullivan, an aide to three pro-defense Senators and Washington's most powerful critic of the CIA, presented his critique of the agency at a seminar in 1980, his opponent was Ray Cline, CIA deputy director for Intelligence from 1962 to 1966.

One of Sullivan's case histories was the CIA's assurance on Sept. 19, 1962, that Soviet ballistic missiles targeted on the United States would not be installed in Cuba, while actually, oh yes, they were being installed there, as ordinary aerophotography (the business of the Air Force) revealed later very clearly.

The story is simple, obvious, and has been told and retold many times, since the CIA's so-called Special National Intelligence Estimate of Sept. 19, 1962 has been declassified, and so everyone can see retroactively the CIA's gross error.

The error occurred because intelligence/espionage data usually have played no essential role in the CIA's estimates since 1947. To conduct espionage in Cuba in 1962 was still incomparably easier than in Russia after 1921. Cuba was still porous, and exuded a constant flow of practically uncontrolled emigration.

But even in such a case, when intelligence/espionage data could readily be obtained, CIA analysts like Ray Cline derived their conclusions out from intelligence/espionage data, but from "logic," as the CIA once put it.

"Logically," Khrushchev should not install those missiles in Cuba (the CIA analysts philosophized), and so they would not be installed there, for how could Khrushchev go against the CIA's "logic"?

The CIA's former deputy director's rebuttal of Sullivan's description of the CIA's gross error is one of the most instructive documents for all those to whom the destiny of the free West is not a matter of utter indifference.

First of all, Cline explains very movingly that ever since 1942 he has been "worried about how to accumulate the information that our country needs, that or national leaders need."

Also, he has been "very anxious to see groups like this resume the discussion of serious issues concerning the functions and organization of the intelligence community."

Finally, Cline says: "I want to make some comments on the substance of Mr. Sullivan's paper. They are not intended to destroy the validity of his remarks."

They are not? So Cline agrees with Sullivan's remark that the CIA's estimate of Sept. 19, 1962 was a gross error. Now, you expect Cline's explanation of how and why such a gross error was made.

Little do you know the CIA. Cline declares that "intelligence is always [!] wrong." Good Heavens! "Certainly my experience in intelligence estimates is that intelligence estimators are always [!] wrong, and there are always [!] plenty [!] of people around to tell them so."

It's like such a person accused of a bank robbery saying that everyone is always engaged in bank robbery, for any human activity is a kind of bank robbery. The estimate of Sept. 19, 1962 is a gross error because intelligence is always a gross error—it consists of nothing but gross errors!

But listen again to Cline: "I think Mr. Sullivan does a disservice to most of our intelligence analysts by simplifying the conclusions which they reached, and pretty much dismissing them as gross error."

You see, "intelligence estimators are always wrong." But "Mr. Sullivan does a disservice to most of our intelligence analysts" when he states that they were wrong on Sept. 19, 1962. This is Cline's logic.

Whereupon Cline explains philosophically how objective and accurate knowledge is obtained and how they at the CIA were obtaining it on Sept. 19, 1962:

"We were trying to perform what I call an analytical task, that is, an evidence-based description of the real world around us, with as much objectivity and accuracy as possible."

On one hand, Cline says that "intelligence is always wrong," and on the other he defines intelligence/espionage as though it were a rigorous exact science: "an evidence-based description of the real world around us."

Unfortunately, the Soviet empire and its satellite Cuba were not around Cline's desk in Washington, D.C.

Cline's rebuttal lasted for no less than half an hour. I am sorry I cannot quote it in

full, but have to choose just a few tidbits. Try this delicious morsel, for example:

"And in the last analysis, a formal estimate is just a racetrack bettor's book on what he thinks is going to happen: 'It's six-to-five this way.' If it is six-to-five this way—and that is pretty much what the estimates said—remember it is five-to-six the other way. So it is not always an egregious error not to be able to predict which side of a close bet is going to pay off."

So, when the CIA "estimated" that the Soviet missiles would not be installed in Cuba, "remember it is five-to-six the other way"—that is, "the other way" the Soviet missiles were being installed in Cuba.

Intelligence work is racetrack betting, in which the CIA is just one of the bettors; the president and Congress can always bet "the other way." The CIA bets that the Soviet missiles will not be installed in Cuba. Let the president and Congress bet that they are already there. So what's the problem?

"I have great sympathy with Sherman Kent [in charge of the estimation of Sept. 19, 1962]," Cline declares. Why? You see, Sherman Kent "often said" that . . .

"... his estimate of what was reasonable for the Soviet Union to do was a lot better than Khrushchev's and therefore he was correct in analyzing the situation as it should have been seen by the Soviet Union. What he did not have was any concrete evidence that Khrushchev was seeing it another way."

Well put! With his super-Hegelian mind Kent assumed that he knew what was good for Khrushchev better than Khrushchev did. As Hegel said when he was told that what he said contradicted facts, "So much the worse for facts."

And so it goes on and on. And what's the moral?

Even 14 years later, retired from the CIA, its deputy director from 1962 to 1966 would not honestly admit that smug, high-handed and idiotic mistake that the CIA perpetrated in 1962 and which is now known to the public because the relevant estimates have been declassified.

Instead of admitting that plain and gross, error, Cline goes into comical, impudent and primitive quibbling for more than half an hour.

[From the New York City Tribune, July 30, 1986]

INEPTNESS, NOT IMMORALITY, IS MAIN FLAW OF CIA

(By Lev Navrozov)

In the 1970s the major (liberal-Democrat) media charged the CIA with criminality and immorality. The campaign was so deafening that few noticed the rise of an entirely different kind of criticism of the CIA, that of the CIA's ineptness.

The liberal-Democrat critics of the CIA were not worried about the danger to the West of the absence of intelligence/espionage data on totalitarian military power. But that is precisely what worried the critics of ineptness of the CIA—all of them staunchly pro-defense.

In a sense, it can be said that criticism of the CIA's ineptness was pioneered by Albert Wohlstetter, a mathematical logician, when he published in 1974 two articles entitled *Legends of the Strategic Arms Race*.

The criticism reached its high plateau in 1978 to 1980 when the critics were befriended by Ronald Reagan, who at the time deplored the miserably inept performance of the CIA under President Jimmy Carter.

As Reagan became president, he appointed the so-called CIA Transition Team, the deliberations and report of which are still secret.

Some critics, including myself, were not on the team because we had no security clearances. But when I submitted a memo at the request of Reagan's former National Security Adviser, Richard Allen, he told me that my proposal coincided with that of Bill Middendorf, head of the Transition Team:

Let the CIA be replaced by several competing intelligence units that would sell secret data to the government as competing corporations sell weapons.

One of those CIA bureaucrats, who want to believe that the CIA has always been the best intelligence agency of which human imagination can conceive, called three team members—Angelo Codevilla, Mark Schneider and Kenneth de Graffenreid—"the three hooligans form the Hill."

No wonder. When another hide-bound functionary from the CIA was asked what Codevilla's proposals amounted to, the upset bureaucrat answered that they amounted to firing every official of the CIA above GS-14 (which included him).

In that sense, our criticism threatens the CIA's inept bureaucrats more than liberal-Democrat criticism ever did. When the New York Times or *Washington Post* attacked the criminality and immorality of the CIA, they never called for the firing of every CIA official above GS-14—but if the CIA is inept, that is what it amounts to.

If a certain official of the CIA is not gifted (and in particular, not intelligent) enough to conduct intelligence/espionage in the sense of the clandestine acquisition of strategically vital data denied by totalitarian societies, no laws enacted by Congress and no rules established by the CIA will make him more gifted or intelligent than he is. He has to be fired and seek employment fitting his ability and intellect.

Thus, our criticism threatens not just a few culprits; but all inept personnel of it as a whole, except the GSI levels of typists or security guards.

Still unknown to the public, as far as I know, the following list of the CIA's failures was presented by the Transition Team:

Chronic failure to predict the actual size of the Soviet military effort and of the military portion of the Soviet GNP.

Constant gross misstatement of Soviet global objectives.

Failure to predict the fall of the Shah in Iran.

Massive failure to interpret and predict the nature of "wars of national liberation" in Africa and Central and South America.

Constant miscalculation of the effect of massive technology transfer from the West to the Soviet bloc.

Utter failure to predict the massive Soviet buildup of ICBMs and SLBMs.

Massive failure to understand the characteristics of Soviet missiles under development prior to SALT I.

Failure to predict (combined with predictions to the contrary) the major improvements in accuracy of Soviet ICBMs in the late 1970s.

General failure to explain the characteristics of Soviet conventional weapon systems and vessels—for example, the Soviet T-64 and T-72 tanks and new guided missile cruisers.

Massive failure to understand or counteract Soviet disinformation and propaganda.

Failure to detect the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

The list did not make clear where the CIA had not failed.

However, William Casey all of a sudden terminated the Transition Team (before there was any resolution), put its "hooliganism" into secret mothballs, and has ignored it ever since.

October 10, 1986

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 15915

The public knew nothing about the storm that had been raging in the Transition Team. The list of the CIA's failures stayed secret. Within the administration, the criticism of the CIA's ineptness froze for 6 years and will probably remain frozen until the end of Reagan's second term.

The CIA's public image of its ability has been as glorious since 1980 as ever before.

Though Casey is supposed to be a conservative Republican, the CIA is as one with the liberal-Democrat media, which support the CIA in their joint fight against the Department of Defense, its Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Reagan administration itself.

The "three hooligans from the Hill" have not slid into obscurity, however. On the contrary, one of them—de Graffenreid—is in the White House, another—Schneider—in the Department of Defense, and the third—Codevilla—is more visible than in 1980.

The fourth "hooligan," David Sullivan, is quite high on the Hill, and those of us who are not from the Hill do not desist either.

"Are the Soviet silos which the CIA sees via space satellites empty, while the Soviet mobile missiles are hidden?" asked Sam Cohen, the inventor of the neutron bomb, and Joe Douglass, a Washington defense analyst, in their Wall Street Journal article of July 18.

"To enhance the success of such deception, the Soviets would want to conduct missile flight tests and reloading exercises from their silo fields, which the U.S. monitors with great precision. This they have done, enhancing their confidence in their missile-launching capabilities and enhancing the U.S.'s ill-advised confidence in outside monitoring."

Such questions will multiply as the Soviet "great unknown" becomes more and more dangerous and more and more unknown.

Casey terminated the Transition Team's criticism of the CIA 6 years ago.

But he cannot terminate the growth of the Soviet "great unknown"—nor the growing doubts of the American public that the CIA is as successful in penetrating this "great unknown" as its officials have always been saying it is, before and after 1980.

[From the New York City Tribune, Sept. 3, 1986]

CIA AND THE 'MYSTERY' OF WHERE DOES SOVIET STEEL GO

(By Lev Navrozov)

While the Soviet regime successfully conceals from the CIA many of its weapons, it has not been concealing the output of something of which they are made—steel. The output of steel was hailed by Stalin well back in the early 1930s as a symbol of "peaceful industrialization" of the once industrially backward Russia, and this image has stuck in the West.

It was believed in the West that Stalin wanted his populace to have as many cars and other "iron and steel products" as the Americans have already in the 1930s, and hence the Soviet output of steel had to match its American counterpart.

In 1975, the Soviet output of steel reached 141 million tons—that is, it surpassed the U.S. steel output by 32 million tons. So Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wisc., brought up the matter with a couple of CIA experts when they testified before his Joint Economic Committee on the Soviet economy in 1975:

"One of the first questions I asked, I wondered what in the dickens that they are doing with all that steel. A lot of it is there, but even there it seems to me they do not have automobiles like we do. They do not have the highway system we have. They do not have the housing construction or anything of that kind.

"If they are producing more steel, how can they use it?"

Proxmire's insight was brilliant. Before citing the CIA experts' answer, let's see how the mystery of Soviet steel has grown ever since.

In 1983, the Soviets' raw steel output surpassed 168 millions tons while they imported a net of 5 million tons, i.e., they used a total of 173 million tons. Meanwhile, America's "total shipments" of steel amounted to 68 million tons.

We know how the U.S. steel is distributed. In 1983, about 17 million tons or 25 percent went to the "distributors," that is, was stocked into warehouses from which the distributors could meet demand whenever it originated, for each steel consumer wants his steel immediately or he will apply to another distributor.

The biggest consumer of steel is the automotive industry: 12 million tons or 18 percent of output. Then follows construction: 10 million tons or 15 percent. Then (don't laugh!) production of cans and other containers: 5 million tons or 7 percent. Finally, production of kitchen appliances, etc.: 3 million tons or 5 percent.

Add the above to the distributors' allotment and we find that 70 percent of U.S. steel is spent on basically civilian uses—which make up only a fraction of the Soviets' use of steel.

In the communist Soviet Union, there is no need to send one-quarter of steel to distributors the way it is done in the United States. There is a hierarchy of military projects, under which lie civilian projects. The military will get all the steel they need according to the hierarchy (the top will get it first). If no steel is left for civilian projects, those will have to wait.

A total of 1,487,000 cars were produced in the Soviet Union in 1983, according to Soviet statistics, as against 6,781,184 in the United States. And Soviet cars are small (except for those few intended for the ruling few), their average weight about 1 ton. Hence the total Soviet steel output for cars does not have to exceed 1,487,000 tons, or less than 1 percent of the steel used by the Soviets.

Construction? American builders begin the construction of even ordinary five-story apartment houses and highways with steelwork. Soviet builders use it only in industrial structures that will carry heavy loads; otherwise they build out of anything but steel.

An American highway is in fact a horizontally level steel-and-concrete bridge over terrain. A Soviet "road with a hard surface" (as Soviet statistics call it) is a layer of asphalt laid over a layer of gravel and sand, which undulates with terrain—it's a "washboard road," as an American reporter put it a week ago.

Cans and other containers? Contrary to Soviet statistics, recent emigrés from the Soviet Union report there was no canned orange juice even in major cities when they left the country. The problem of containers is solved at the customers' expense: they have to bring their own, into which vegetable oil or whatever is poured.

Kitchen gadgets? In 1983, 4,201,000 microwave ovens—of which few in the Soviet Union have even heard—were produced in the United States. Soviet statistics contend that 401,000 "one-fifth cubic meter" two- and three-chamber refrigerators and freezers were produced in 1983. The size of such a refrigerator is one-fourth that of our standard General Electric fridge.

Since 5,255,000 refrigerators were produced in the United States in 1983, the Soviet-U.S. ratio of steel in refrigerators—with allowance for size—is 1 to 52.

In short, it is not clear what in the dickens the Soviet economy can do even with 68 million tons of steel. But the Soviet use is 173 million! Let's now see what the CIA experts answered Sen. Proxmire in 1975:

Mr. Burton. They are also inefficient users of steel. Their machines are very, very heavy compared to ours.

Sen. Proxmire. The military weapons systems are usually heavy, too.

Mr. Burton. Yes.

Mr. Proctor. One remembers Khrushchev's cursing of the manufacturers as metal-eaters. He had a campaign to reduce the waste of steel, especially in the manufacture of both military and civilian hardware.

Soviet steel can be wasted in two ways. Between an ingot of steel and a finished product some steel has to be lost as shavings, scrap, etc., owing to machining, etc. As of 1967, the Soviet loss of this kind constituted 18 percent for the Soviet economy as a whole.

Even if it is assumed that not an ounce of steel is lost this way in the United States, 18 percent doesn't solve the mystery of Soviet steel.

The other loss is a "constructive" one. Here we had in 1976 the Soviet T-72 tank. Its U.S. equivalent in performance, the XM-1 tank, appeared in 1979. But suppose the T-72 was poorly constructed and hence weighed more for the same performance. This could be called a "constructive loss" of steel.

The only trouble is that the T-72 weighed less than its U.S. equivalent: 36 tons vs. 53 tons for the MX-1.

So the explanation of the mystery of Soviet steel is that a hidden Soviet military-industrial expansion has been going on—on a scale the CIA did not want even to conjecture upon in 1975, when the mystery so puzzled Proxmire, and the CIA refuses to face up to the reality 11 years later.

[From the New York City Tribune, Sept. 10, 1986]

CLASSIC BARTER, SOVIET-STYLE: A SPY FOR A JOURNALIST

(By Lev Navrozov)

When I heard about the Aug. 24 arrest of Soviet U.N. official Gennadi Zakharov on charges of espionage, I told my wife that an irrelevant American would now be framed as a spy and arrested in Moscow so that later he could be swapped for Zakharov.

A week later, on Aug. 31, my wife, who scans newspapers for me, said as she folded a clipping and pressed it secretly to her chest: "Guess what happened yesterday?"

I said: "Easy. An American was framed-up in Moscow as a spy to exchange him for Zakharov." "Right!" she said. "Nicholas Daniloff, the Moscow correspondent of the U.S. News & World Report."

How could it be otherwise? In Moscow in the early 1970s we met foreign correspondents and passed to them all kinds of "emigration materials," such as letters written by those who couldn't get exit visas, and appealed to all kinds of individuals and institutions or to the world at large.

Now suppose a KGB agent-provocateur posed as one of us hundreds of thousands of aspiring emigrés.

It would be enough for him to pass to a correspondent an envelope looking like one of our letters, but actually containing classified military data. Whereupon the KGB would burst in, search him, find the envelope in his pocket, open it—and here you are, a spy caught in the act! The whole scene could be videotaped as future legal evidence.

IMPECCABLE TRIAL STAGED

An impeccable trial could be staged if necessary. Indeed, the American defendant could even be allowed to have an American lawyer to come to Moscow to defend him.

The KGB agent-provocateur would testify that the American recruited him and requested he bring him those classified data in an envelope. How would the American lawyer be able to prove that this miserable-looking Soviet codefendant whom the American had allegedly recruited was a KGB agent-provocateur and that the American had no idea of the classified military content of the envelope?

And so, faced with the prospect of death for "espionage," the American will most likely "confess" to his imaginary "espionage," (and later be swapped for a real spy caught in the United States) and his lawyer will have to tearfully say in court that his defendant's guilt is fully proved but he is asking the judges for leniency.

As a result, the KGB and GRU have hundreds and thousands of legitimate Soviet spies in the United States to carry out espionage operations openly, legitimately and with total impunity.

To begin with, many of them have diplomatic immunity. So the worst that the U.S. government can do to them is to send them back home to the Soviet Union, from where they will go to spy to another country.

Since there are more than 100 countries, each Soviet spy has to be declared persona non grata at least 100 times before the KGB gives him a job inside the Soviet Union, and such jobs are never lacking, for the entire population has to be watched by that same KGB!

But even if the FBI dares to catch a Soviet spy without diplomatic immunity—like Zakharov—the KGB will frame as a spy any American in the Soviet Union: all Americans there are thus hostages, each of whom can be arrested and exchanged for Soviet spies in the United States who have no diplomatic immunity.

This situation originated no later than 1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt "recognized" Stalin's totalitarian regime—53 years was not enough for the State Department, the FBI and other U.S. government institutions to understand the nature of the totalitarian regime and consequences of this "recognition."

When Zakharov was arrested, it was reported that more arrests of such Soviet nationals were expected; that the Soviet U.N. mission totals 275 officials—the world's largest by far—about half of whom are KGB and GRU spies, and that all other Soviet institutions in the United States have always been spy nests.

Now, when an American correspondent was arrested in Moscow on Saturday, Aug. 30, the State Department 4 days later still "rejected any attempt by Moscow to link the release" of the framed-up Daniloff to the release of Soviet spy Zakharov.

A deal? A linkage? Never ever! "U.S. Aides Reject Deal For Newsman" and "U.S. Aides Reject Linkage Between Spy Cases" were the heroic headlines of the New York Times' front page Sept. 3.

But in the article under those heroic headlines we could already read: "A senior Administration official with President Reagan in Santa Barbara, Calif., said Monday that no course of action to win Mr. Daniloff's release, including a possible prisoner exchange, had been ruled out."

What about the State Department? Its officials said it was "possible that the Federal Court in New York might allow Mr. Zakharov to be released to the custody of the Soviet Ambassador, Yuri V. Dubinin. If that

happens, the Soviet side might allow Mr. Daniloff out of prison, but that would not be an arranged deal."

Certainly not an arranged deal! A linkage? Never ever! A pure coincidence. Zakharov will be released, and then—who would think of it?—Daniloff will be released, too. The FBI catches a Soviet spy, after which the KGB catches any American in the Soviet Union. Then the Soviet spy is released, after which the American is released too. What deal? What linkage? Never ever!

What FDR "recognized" Stalin's totalitarian regime, he thereby legitimized Soviet espionage in the United States—while American espionage in the Soviet Union has essentially consisted in the presence of American military attachés at Soviet parades where the Soviet military either show them dummies of non-existent weapons, or show them real Soviet weapons, or do not show them either dummies or real Soviet weapons, depending on the current scheme of deception.

On one occasion the same new Soviet Bison jet bombers circled out of sight and flew over again. Khrushchev had switched the Soviet aircraft-building plants into missile-production sites, and he wanted to mislead the United States government into the belief that he had more new jet bombers than the United States did.

He succeeded only too well: there was a panic in the U.S. intelligence community, including the CIA.

In other words, while FDR's recognition of the totalitarian regime gave the latter immense opportunities for legitimate—that is, unpunishable—espionage with and without diplomatic immunity, FDR's recognition gave the United States nothing but immense opportunities for self-deception via the American military attachés presence at Soviet deceptive military parades.

[From the New York City Tribune, Sept. 17, 1986]

WHAT THE KGB'S DANILOFF-ZAKHAROV MOVE SIGNIFIES

(By Lev Navrozov)

Soviet espionage in the classical sense—through Soviet or East-bloc nationals disguised as Westerns—has failed everywhere except in West Germany. Only there can numerous Soviet-bloc nationals—East Germans—engage in espionage in the guise of the local inhabitants—West Germans.

The reason is simple. East Germany's espionage agencies have a reservoir of millions of German-speaking natives who can be sent to pose as West Germans.

There is no such reservoir available for use in the United States. Stalin wanted to rectify that situation by organizing educational institutions to create "artificial Anglo-Saxons," so to speak, from among whom the KGB and GRU could select suitable candidates for further training as spies.

This hasn't worked so far, and prior to the General Zakharov case the system of Soviet espionage was organized as follows:

Soviet nationals without diplomatic immunity acted to "spot" Americans who could be recruited for espionage. This carries no liability under American laws. Even if a "spotter" and an American have reached an understanding about espionage, their understanding does not yet constitute a crime, so the Soviet agent is safe.

At this point a Soviet national who does have diplomatic immunity takes over—receives classified information—does what qualifies as espionage under American laws.

But since he has diplomatic immunity he can only be expelled, after which he can go to another country and do the same thing.

THERE MUST BE A BETTER WAY

The system had an essential defect: the number of Soviet nationals in the United States who have diplomatic immunity is only a fraction of the total number in the United States.

Even in New York with its United Nations, probably no more than 200 Soviets have diplomatic immunity, while the total number of Soviet nationals in New York—including Secretariat employees, such as Zakharov—may exceed 1,000. This number can easily swell if one counts Soviet tourists, traders, scientists who are part of exchange programs, etc.

If all Soviet nationals could be made immune to U.S. charges of espionage, Soviet espionage would expand enormously.

The recipe for their immunity is simple. Let the United States know that every arrest of a Soviet spy in the United States will be subject to reciprocity by the KGB's frameup of an American national in Russia so the latter can be exchanged for the Soviet spy.

Thus, no American arrest of a Soviet spy will lead to anything except much ado for the United States and the spy's eventual release.

Of course, the Politburo calculated the winning chances before making its move and decided that the United States, its government and Ronald Reagan were weak enough to surrender the game and make all Soviet nationals henceforth immune to U.S. charges of espionage.

Since the missile crisis of 1963 the United States has been sinking to the position of a second-rate military power able only to "negotiate" with the Soviet rulers, never stand up to them. Moscow apparently believes the time has come to assert its right to perform acts of espionage in the United States.

On Sept. 8, the official Soviet daily *Izvestia* presented the "case" against Daniloff. Reading it, I felt I was facing that boundless Soviet insolence every reader of the Soviet press knows. Now this insolence is directed toward the United States and Ronald Reagan personally.

Says *Izvestia*: "On familiarizing himself with the indictment, Nicholas Daniloff reluctantly put his signature, and his status changed from that of suspect to that of defendant."

Everyone indicted in Russia has to sign that he has read the indictment. The line says: "I have read the indictment. Signed." The indictment may charge that Daniloff is an elephant, but he is not to sign that he is an elephant. He is to sign that he has read that he has been charged with being an elephant.

Thus, *Izvestia* turns a purely formal Soviet procedure into almost a piece of "smoking-gun" evidence, demonstrating that Daniloff is a spy. Why, he signed—if only reluctantly—the indictment saying that he is a spy!

The *Izvestia* article was translated by Tass, handed out to Western correspondents, and in its usual humorless way the *New York Times* published it (on Sept. 19) under the headline, "The KGB's Evidence in Developing a Case of Espionage Against Daniloff."

What other evidence did the KGB develop?

Izvestia tell us how Daniloff (himself!) related that the "photographs, diagrams and maps" in the envelopes that "Misha" has thrust on him "were an unexpected and unpleasant revelation to me."

October 10, 1986

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 15917

A TWISTING OF EVIDENCE

Well, this is evidence—for Daniloff and against the KGB. But, insolently, *Izvestia* continues:

Was it so "unexpected," Mr. Daniloff?

The name of Nicholas Daniloff has long been known among members of the foreign journalists' corps accredited in Moscow.

At the mention of Daniloff's name, many of his colleagues in Moscow frowned in displeasure, saying: "Ah, that one?" and often made it clear that they had nothing in common with him.

Even more inane is the "evidence" that came from the KGB's agent-provocateur Misha.

One could think that Misha would be passed off as a Soviet whom Daniloff has recruited. Not so! He is being presented as an honest Soviet who set about in 1982 to enlighten Daniloff, whom he thought was an honest American journalist, but discovered that Daniloff "was not the person he was professing to be."

Says Misha: "I gathered the impression that Daniloff was interested in nothing but restricted [that is, classified] information." So it's an honest innocent Soviet Misha whom the American spy tried to deceive, but Misha saw through him.

The KGB-Tass-*Izvestia* concoction ends thus: "Is more proof needed? It exists."

The above, you see, was proof so abundant that really no more proof is needed. Yet more proof of the same kind exists.

Thus, the KGB has not even tried to concoct something plausible. Meanwhile, Daniloff and Zakharov have been released to the custody of U.S. and Soviet ambassadors, part one of the exchange the KGB envisions.

For all its inane crudeness, will the KGB's ruse succeed? If it does, the road for unpunishable Soviet espionage in the United States will be open.

[From the New York City Tribune, Oct. 1, 1986]

U.N. IS MOSCOW'S BEST ESPIONAGE BASE WORLDWIDE

(By Lev Navrozov)

What did Franklin D. Roosevelt mean to achieve by his recognition of Stalin's regime in 1933? FDR's view of the post-1917 regime of Russia was so naive, parochial, fragmentary and self-serving that trying to analyze his motives would be a waste of time. On the other hand, what Stalin meant to achieve was simple: to establish an espionage base in the United States under the facade of an embassy.

However, that base had at least three drawbacks:

(1) The number of Soviet Embassy staffers was limited, and the number of those who had diplomatic immunity even more so;

(2) In retaliation for Soviet travel restrictions imposed on U.S. Embassy personnel in Moscow, the U.S. government imposed similar restrictions on Soviet Embassy personnel in Washington; and

(3) Soviet Embassy officials had to introduce themselves as *Soviet* embassy officials.

However, following World War II, FDR presented Stalin with a new espionage base, compared with which FDR's previous gift was a trifle: the United Nations! Can one even compare this Soviet espionage base with the Soviet Embassy? No! As a Soviet espionage base, the U.N. is free from the drawbacks of the Soviet Embassy:

More than 200 Soviet members of the U.N. Secretariat have diplomatic immunity, while the total number of Soviet-bloc nationals in the United Nations exceeds 1,000; and

They can travel without restrictions, for there is no equivalent United Nations in

Moscow to impose restrictions on the corresponding 1,000 American nationals in Moscow;

They can appear everywhere as U.N. personnel because U.N. identification doesn't disclose its bearer's nationality.

PROFITMAKING ESPIONAGE

While free from the drawbacks of the Soviet Embassy, the United Nations has many merits of its own as a peerless espionage base.

KGB fronts like the World Peace Council freely participate in U.N. activities, since such fronts have been declared by the rulers of Russia to be nongovernment organizations or NGOs;

Soviet nationals at the United Nations can use the U.N. computerized Data Bank Service to tap into American data banks and the U.N. Dag Hammarskjöld Library to acquire scientific technical information on behalf of the United Nations and intended for the Soviet military buildup;

90 percent of the salaries for Soviet personnel in the U.N. Secretariat is paid by other countries, and, besides, the Soviet regime nets every year no less than \$20 million by taking a hefty percentage of all Soviet U.N. salaries, so that for the first time in history, espionage doesn't cost anything, but on the contrary generates currency.

NOT SO INTRIGUING

The question as to how many Soviet nationals in the United Nations are KGB or GRU agents intrigues the West. The Western estimates vary from one quarter to three-quarters. However, is the percentage so important?

In the United States, there is a fundamental difference between a CIA officer currently in service and an ordinary U.S. citizen. The latter can tell the CIA to go to hell if the CIA approaches him or criticize the CIA publicly for any real or imaginary fault.

A Soviet citizen has a slave status. This has been unfashionable to mention in the last 20 or so years, yet this is true. The "defection" of a Soviet citizen is always like a slave's escape from his master, trying to retrieve his human property.

Suppose a Soviet national who is not a KGB or GRU officer is requested, before his trip to the United States, to do something for the KGB or GRU. He can refuse under some specious pretext. If the KGB or GRU assignment requires a certain kind of good memory, he can say he has always suffered from the absence of that kind of memory (he cannot remember faces, or location, or telephone numbers, or whatever).

Then he may learn that his trip to the United States has been canceled. Who was behind the decision? Why? He'll never know. He can only guess. Nor will he know why he has been demoted or dismissed.

This is, incidentally, why I never held any post or even any salaried job in Russia and never went aboard even for a day. One's temptation to make a brilliant Soviet career and travel abroad opens one to easy KGB pressure.

Besides, many Soviet members of the U.N. are members of the State Committee for Science and Technology or SCST, which is not a department of the KGB or GRU, but which acquires by all means possible Western scientific and technological data of strategic importance to the Soviet war-empire. In other words, the SCST is a kind of scientific & technological intelligence agency in its own right, and members abroad are its agents.

Finally, as far as I know, every Soviet member of the U.N. Secretariat (if not of all agencies) is a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In case an espionage mission is sufficiently important, the KGB or GRU can apply to the party, and if its member disobeys its order, he "will part with his membership card", as the expression is, that is, will reduce his entire career to zero.

Therefore, the Western interest as to the percentage of KGB or GRU agents in the Soviet U.N. personnel stems rather from Western projections on a society where everyone allowed to travel abroad can be forced into espionage—or lose his privilege of traveling abroad.

It takes the KGB much time, energy and ingenuity to place over 1,000 Soviet-bloc nationals into the United Nations. Some U.N. agencies are quite obscure. Who has heard of WIPO, for example? Yet WIPO is the World Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva, and the KGB has placed there six Soviet nationals to take care of world intellectual property.

The news yesterday that Gennadi Zakharov, the Soviet U.N. official who has been indicted on charges of espionage, was swapped for the innocent U.S. journalist Nicholas Daniloff, indicated that the KGB and GRU have succeeded in their two-fold task:

(1) To preserve their priceless espionage base called the United Nations; and

(2) To enable the 1,000 Zakharovs from this base to spy with impunity. From now on, whenever a Zakharov is apprehended by the FBI, there will be an American arrested and framed up in Russia, so that both can be duly exchanged. Certainly, there are enough Daniloffs in Russia to be used as hostages, ensuring the impunity of Soviet espionage even by those Soviet nationals who have no diplomatic immunity.

[From the New York City Tribune, Oct. 8, 1986]

SENATOR HELMS USHERS IN NEW INTELLIGENCE ERA FOR WEST

(By Lev Navrozov)

What occurred on Sept. 25 on the floor of the U.S. Congress may well turn out to be the most important event in the post-1917 history of Western intelligence services and hence in the post-1917 history of the West.

To say that the major media ignored the event would be wrong. The New York Times from-paged it under a rather enigmatic headline: "Vote in Senate Supports Helms on C.I.A. Curb."

Curb? Apparently the Times missed the point. In reality, Sen. Jesse Helms, R-NC., is out to remove the curb which those in charge of the CIA imposed on the creative minds within the CIA. As has been usual in post-1917 history, the Times couldn't or wouldn't expound the historic purport of the event reported.

I have written this column to put the Helms legislation in its historical perspective on the basis of all-declassified information I gathered on the subject.

The word "declassified" turns off The Washington Post or New York Times. They are not interested unless they get some classified information illegally leaked and publicized. In this way they feel they are privy to top government secrets (which is exciting), do something safe yet forbidden or even criminal (which is even more exciting) and spite the conservatives, cold-warriors and warmongers (and what is more exciting than that?).

I've been trying to interest my readers not in illegal leaks, but in the story in the making as of this hour.

Owing to the U.S. system covering CIA congressional testimony, the declassifying of once-top secret documents, the Freedom of Information Act and other democratic as-

pects of Americal society. I have gathered since 1974 well over 300,000 pages of primary data on the subject of intelligence-espionage. They don't contain an atom of classified information, but this doesn't make them any less interesting or important.

The same applies to my data on Helms and his innovative legislation.

HISTORY IN THE MAKING

It is a truism that the survival of the West depends on vital intelligence data on the closed totalitarian society of post-1917 Russia and its vassals and allies, both actual and potential.

That the CIA (just as other Western intelligence agencies) is tragically inadequate in this respect was a paradox in the 1950s, a growing opinion in the '60s, a respectable consensus in the '70s and a plain truth, obvious to anyone willing to look at it on his own, in the '80s.

At the same time, the Soviet-American strategic power ratio has been defined by a Congressional aide at a hearing as follows: "U.S. monopoly in the 1940's, heavy U.S. superiority in the 1950s, light U.S.-Soviet parity in the 1970s, and Soviet superiority in the 1980s."

However, the liberal-Democrat media have refused to face the lethal "intelligence gap" since this would end all those arms-limitation or -reduction agreements, which are based on the CIA's imaginary ability to verify them.

As we know, the liberal-Democrat establishment has been trying since 1963 to replace Western defenses with such self-deceptive agreements, and while the liberal-Democrat media have never stinted on space for what they regard as the CIA's immorality and criminality, the CIA intelligence gap has been one of their most sacred taboos.

What about conservative-Republican president?

RICHARD NIXON'S COMPLAINT

When no longer president, Richard Nixon complained in a TV interview in Paris that the CIA had been grossly misleading the country for 11 years by ignoring the Soviets' stupendous military growth between 1964 and 1975. But where had he been during those 11 years, and why hadn't he done anything to enable outsiders to evaluate the CIA?

Ronald Reagan did accept the plain truth that the CIA is tragically inadequate. He did it between 1978 (when his newsletter praised my article on the subject in *Commentary* magazine) and 1980 (when he abruptly terminated his own Transition Team's study that confirmed the CIA's utter inability to cope with the task it was created for).

But after 1980 he put the plain truth in mothballs. No one has seen the Transition Team's study (except those in charge of the CIA and perhaps John Ranelagh, who claims that he received a copy of it from the CIA for his 847-page eulogy of the CIA entitled *The Agency* and published this year).

With all major media being liberal-Democrat, President Reagan could ill afford luxuries like evaluating, criticizing and reforming the CIA. His stay in office itself has been possible as long as he can compromise with the liberal-Democrat establishment.

To reform the CIA? What an outcry in the media would have ensued! No, Reagan didn't dare. That's why William Casey, his newly appointed director of central intelligence, appeared at a Transition Team session and just cut it off in the middle of a sentence, with all its materials shoved into the CIA's safest vault, to rest there—forever if possible.

Until Sept. 26 the deadlock seemed unbreakable. To be sure, the plain truth about the CIA was there—but how to bring it to the public? Anxious to suppress it are, above all, those who rule the roost in the CIA and value its corporate and their own personal prestige and prosperity above the survival of the West.

Anxious to suppress, too, is the liberal-Democrat establishment, including the major media and the bulk of the academy. And anxious to suppress it, if only reluctantly, is Ronald Reagan and those Republicans who believe they should not above all "rock the boat," "make waves," anger the liberal-Democrat media.

A WEST-SAVING BOLT FROM BLUE

The two protagonists of the extraordinary effort to stop the suicidal concealment of the plain truth from the public are Sen. Jesse Helms and his legislative assistant for defense and intelligence, David Sullivan.

To say that Sullivan left the CIA about 8 years ago because he dissented from its estimates will probably be proven inaccurate a decade from now. It will then, perhaps, be more apt to say that the CIA left Sullivan. The heart and soul of U.S. intelligence work has shifted from a huge corporation, having thousands of employees and officially designated as the "CIA," to a "one-man CIA," as I called David Sullivan in my review last year of the book he coauthored with Quentin Crommelin: *Soviet Military Supremacy*.

But Sullivan's superhuman effort, as well as the work of all us critics of the CIA, could smoulder on quietly for a long time in specialized or conservative publications, reaching no decision-making elites, were not Sullivan linked with prominent pro-defense legislators—and above all Jesse Helms, that astute and courageous ranking majority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The West-saving bolt came from the blue for Congress.

What did Helms do? With his characteristic legislative skill, he added historic amendments to an annual bill authorizing the activities of the U.S. intelligence agencies.

First of all, he introduced a "requirement for intensified competitive analysis" in intelligence work, and invoked in this connection an example that the hidebound segment of the CIA dreads—"A-team-B-team exercise"—in which a dozen outsiders (Team B) are given the same intelligence data as CIA insiders (Team A) and prove that the CIA's Team A has drawn false conclusions from its own intelligence data.

Helms also evoked an even more dreadful ghost as he referred on the floor of the Congress to the "availability[!]" of the report of the president's 1980 Transition Team study of intelligence—yes, that same milestone study that the administration has been hiding for 6 years even from all members of Congress.

The struggle for intensified competitive analysis will no doubt be uphill. Outsiders were allowed by the CIA to participate in the "A-team-B-team exercise in 1976"—but will those in charge of the CIA ever repeat this self-exposure of its incompetence? They have never done it so far. The critics of the CIA in the Transition Team's study were outsiders—but Ronald Reagan, not the CIA, appointed them.

The day after Helms introduced his amendments, *The New York Times* noted they provide for a "team of 15 experts from outside the government to spend a year reviewing some of the basic intelligence findings of the CIA. Their report would be delivered to the President and Congress."

COMPETITION BETWEEN WHOM?

But a week later—on Oct. 2, 1986—the *Times* reported:

"Mr. Helms said in his speech that he intended for the agency to bring in a team of outside experts who would re-examine the agency's conclusions on key issues. Senate aides disagreed, arguing that the intelligence agency could satisfy the requirement for competitive analysis by using its own employees or by using analysis from other government agencies."

Competition between government agencies is better than no competition at all. In particular, Helms emphasizes in his amendments the importance of competition between the CIA and the DIA: the latter must compete with the former, not subordinate its findings to the CIA.

But to say that the CIA can effectively compete "by using its own employees" is the same as to say General Motors can effectively compete with General Motors, and so no outside competitors are needed.

Even if the CIA is compelled by Congress to admit outsiders for evaluation, review and other competitive events, yet allowed to choose its competitors, analysis of the CIA's behavior indicates that it will choose the weakest, the least effective, the most innocuous and hence the best for CIA's corporate interests as those now in charge understand them.

Yet while the path toward truly competitive analysis goes uphill, the trail has been blazed. We'll see why presently.

SELECTED INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS

However the notion of competition may be understood by the CIA or the liberal-Democrat media, Helms read on the floor of the Congress a list of 32 "intelligence problems" to be "studied under appropriate competitive analysis procedures." Here's my selection of 20, most of which I abbreviate:

Soviet geopolitical and strategic intentions.

Soviet investigation of the feasibility of detecting submerged submarines through the analysis of data on the surface of the ocean.

The role of surprise and deception as principles of Soviet military doctrine.

The accuracy of Soviet missiles.

The existence of hidden Soviet missiles for reload, refire and covert soft launch in strategic reserves.

The reasons for the CIA's continuing underestimation of Soviet strategic forces.

Better methodologies for estimating Soviet defense spending.

The effects of Soviet negotiating and operational deception in arms control.

Means of overcoming a deterring and hardening against Soviet data denial through Soviet radio-electronic warfare.

The extent of the Soviet lead over the United States in deploying a nationwide, land-based ABM defense and in developing a space-based ABM defense, including identification of U.S. intelligence gaps on the Soviet SDI program.

Soviet knowledge of U.S. National Technical Means of intelligence collection and deceptive actions that Moscow may have taken on the basis of that knowledge.

The Soviet Biological and Chemical Warfare threat and potential U.S. counter-measures.

Implications for U.S. national security of Soviet military supremacy.

Better methodologies for estimating yields of Soviet underground nuclear weapons tests by utilizing all the evidence available.

Possible limitations in U.S. area search and spot search reconnaissance capability.

The ability of U.S. National Technical Means of intelligence collection to monitor Soviet compliance with the 1987 Outer

October 10, 1986

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 15919

Space Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in space, and with an Anti-Satellite Treaty.

The history of Soviet violations of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions and whether the CIA blocked the creation of an Interagency Group to study these violations when they were first detected in 1976 and 1977.

The military implications of Soviet SALT and other arms-control violations and the reasons why the CIA resisted evidence and analysis showing Soviet SALT violations for 12 years.

The reasons for reported CIA long-term underestimation of Soviet submarine capabilities.

REQUESTS HAVE FORCE OF LAW

Under congressional rules and owing to Helms' impeccable legislative strategy, these questions "stand as Senate requests" to the intelligence agencies—and such requests have the force of law!

Read the list carefully. Every item confronts the CIA squarely. The CIA has been avoiding the issues by, say, picking from Soviet propaganda myriads of trifles like an "increase of sale of fruit in the U.S.S.R." and discoursing upon them ad infinitum.

Now the CIA has to face the issues by law! The extent of its ignorance, evasion and obfuscation will be revealed, and that will lead to true competition—the CIA against the best, the strongest competitors—no matter how fiercely William Casey resists it now, or did in 1980.

There has never been any other way to achieve excellence in any field except through competition. Even in the Soviet system the best weapons are produced only when all the best designers freely compete (despite the fact that there is no competition in the fields about which the Soviet rulers don't care).

Secrecy is a must in intelligence work and should be observed. All competitors must be checked—and not just by formal signs, such as the assumption that all fourth-generation Americans with impeccably Anglo-Saxon names are loyal to the West while all émigrés are security risks.

Let's recall that in the list of Soviet spies in the United States as exposed in the last decade, there are many Anglo-Saxon-sounding names—Walker, Howard, Whitworth, etc. On the other hand, thousands of émigrés from Russia have secret clearances and hundreds of them top-secret clearances—but not one of them so far has been convicted of spying.

NO HIDING BEHIND SECRECY

Yes, secrecy is a must. But it should not be a tool for an entrenched bureaucracy to avoid all true competition, ignore all effective criticism, conceal its ineptness and ignorance and praise itself to the skies. Certainly not if that bureaucracy is an institution on which the survival of the West so critically depends.

No wonder many anti-defense liberal-Democrat members of the Congress and their aides are full of forebodings. Listen to the New York Times of Oct. 2:

"They said that once the reports were delivered to Congress, Sen. Helms would return next year with broader efforts to rewrite the intelligence legislation on the floor."

Yes, aided by David Sullivan, Helms is doing "on the floor" what Ronald Reagan meant but failed to do. They are doing what the Republican Party ought to have done once the Democratic Party abdicated its defense mission in 1963. To put in bluntly, they are saving the West—and none too soon!

CIA PROBE OF SOVIET SPACE SHUTTLE SABOTAGE

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article entitled "CIA May Sniff for Space Spies," of October 4, 1986; an article entitled "Senate OK's Challenger Spy Probe" of October 7, 1986; and an article entitled "Sabotage? CIA May Probe Shuttle Disaster"; all by Todd Halvorson published in Florida Today, be printed in the RECORD. I finally ask unanimous consent that an article in the News and Observer of Raleigh, NC, October 8, 1986, entitled "Helms seeks investigation of possibility of Soviet role in Challenger explosion," be printed in the RECORD.

The articles follow:

[From Florida Today, Oct. 4, 1986]

CIA MAY SNIFF FOR SPACE SPIES

(By Todd Halvorson)

An unprecedented string of disasters dating back to August 1985 is fueling calls for a CIA investigation into the possibility that the Soviet Union has been sabotaging western space launches.

Legislation that would direct the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies to investigate "the possibility of Soviet bloc sabotage" in the Jan. 28 Challenger explosion will be brought before the Senate Monday.

If passed, the secret appropriations bill also would direct the U.S. intelligence community to examine the possibility of Soviet sabotage in a string of other recent American and European launch failures.

The legislation passed the House by voice vote on Thursday and must be approved by the Senate before it becomes law.

The presidential commission that investigated the Challenger disaster found no evidence of sabotage in its four-month probe of the catastrophe.

The chairman of the Challenger commission—former Secretary of State William Rogers—declined comment on the pending legislation.

A congressional source who asked not to be identified said the investigation will focus on "circumstantial evidence" brought to light by Retired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and past deputy director of the CIA.

Graham now heads High Frontier, a privately funded organization whose purpose is to propose policies relating to space utilization. He also is the man credited with selling President Reagan on the idea of the Strategic Defense Initiative, more commonly known as the "Star Wars" program.

In a telephone interview from his Washington, D.C., office, Graham said the string of launch failures warrants close scrutiny by the intelligence community.

Two unmanned Titan rockets, a Space Shuttle, an expendable Delta rocket, and a European Space Agency Ariane rocket are among the western space launch vehicles lost to failures since August 1985.

"The odds are astronomical against that all being coincidental," Graham said. "The thing that raises the greatest suspicion is all these things happening in a series."

"If you don't buy coincidence, if you don't buy a sudden rash of incompetence among everybody in the Western world involved in launching space boosters, you say 'Well, there's foul play involved here somewhere,'" he said.

"It doesn't make the case that foul play was involved," he said. "But it does make the case that you certainly ought to investigate it."

Among items that would be investigated, Graham said, are:

The possibility that U.S. Air Force Capt. William Hughes, who trained range safety officers to destroy malfunctioning rockets, defected to the Soviet Union or was abducted by the KGB, the Russian equivalent of the CIA.

Hughes, 34, "simply disappeared" in July 1983 while he was traveling to the Netherlands, Graham said. Hughes was declared a deserter by the Air Force in December 1983 and has not been seen since his disappearance. He had been stationed at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico.

"Nobody has seen him nor hair from him since," Graham said.

The possibility that Soviet intelligence trawlers off the coast of Cape Canaveral on Jan. 28 were notified that a disaster was impending.

"About four hours before the Challenger launched, (the Soviet trawlers) were noted at flank speed leaving the area," Graham said.

The trawlers, Graham said, usually stay about 12 miles off shore to monitor launches.

"The implications is that the Soviets decided they didn't want any of their ships at the scene of the crime—that they knew it was going to happen and they wanted to be gone, out of the area," Graham said.

The possibility that the Soviet Union placed a spy within NASA.

The Soviets, Graham contended, have a strong motive for wanting the American space fleet grounded.

"The motive is clear—SDI (the Strategic Defense Initiative)," Graham said. "The Soviets are really pulling out every stop to prevent (deployment) of SDI."

Officials at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., could not be reached for comment.

A spokeswoman for the CIA would neither confirm nor deny that an investigation might take place. She did say, though, that the agency "responds to all congressional queries."

[From Florida Today, Oct. 7, 1986]

SENATE OKS CHALLENGER SPY PROBE

(By Todd Halvorson)

The Senate on Monday sent President Reagan a bill that directs the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies to investigate "the possibility of Soviet-bloc sabotage" in the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster.

But a former CIA deputy director says the agency may be one step ahead. Retired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham believes the CIA already may have launched an investigation.

The annual appropriations bill for the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, passed by the Senate on a voice vote Monday, directs the U.S. intelligence community to examine the possibility of Soviet sabotage in the Jan. 28 catastrophe as well as an unprecedented string of other Western launch failures.

The House approved the bill Thursday.

An amendment to the bill, proposed by U.S. Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., requires the CIA to send Congress a series of reports on various subjects.

One of those topics, according to a Helms aide who asked not to be named, concerns "the possibility of Soviet-bloc sabotage" of Challenger and other launches.

The request for the probe, the aide said, was prompted by "circumstantial evidence" brought to light by Graham, also former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

S 15920

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

October 10, 1986

Graham now heads High Frontier, a Washington, D.C.-based organization whose purpose is to propose policies relating to the use of space.

"I don't know if the amendment by Mr. Helms is necessary," Graham said recently. "I'm beginning to get some indications around town . . . that, in fact, something has been put together (by the CIA) to investigate."

Graham said the recent rash of launch failures warrants close examination.

Two unmanned Titan rockets carrying sophisticated spy satellites, a Space Shuttle, an expendable Delta rocket and a European Space Agency Ariane rocket are among the Western vehicles lost to failures since the fall of 1985.

"The odds are astronomical against that all being coincidental," Graham said. High frontier statisticians calculated the chances of the string occurring as 1 in 250 million, he added.

Graham asked the House and Senate select committees on intelligence to investigate:

The possibility that U.S. Air Force Capt. William Hughes, who trained range safety officers to destroy malfunctioning rockets, defected to the Soviet Union or was abducted by the KGB, the Russian equivalent of the CIA.

Hughes "simply disappeared" in July 1983 while he was traveling to the Netherlands, Graham said. Then 34, Hughes was declared a deserter by the Air Force in December 1983.

The possibility that the KGB "electronically interfered" with U.S. space launches.

The possibility that Soviet intelligence trawlers off Cape Canaveral on Jan. 28 were notified that a disaster was pending.

"About four hours before the Challenger launched, (the Soviet trawlers) were noted at flank speed leaving the area," Graham said. The trawlers, he said, usually stay about 12 miles off shore.

The possibility that the Soviets placed a spy in NASA.

[From Florida Today, Sept. 28, 1986]

SABOTAGE?—CIA MAY PROBE SHUTTLE DISASTER

(By Todd Halvorson)

The CIA is one legislative step away from launching an investigation into "the possibility of Soviet bloc sabotage" in the Jan. 28 Space Shuttle Challenger explosion, a Senate aide said.

The investigation also would probe the possibility of Soviet sabotage in a string of other recent U.S. launch failures, he said.

The presidential commission that investigated the Challenger disaster found no evidence of sabotage in its four-month probe of the catastrophe, which claimed the lives of seven crew members.

However, an amendment to a Senate bill passed Wednesday directs the CIA and other intelligence agencies to explore "the possibility of Soviet bloc sabotage being among the human errors causing the Space Shuttle Challenger and other recent U.S. strategic space mission explosions."

The amendment was tagged onto an annual spending appropriations bill for the CIA and other intelligence agencies. The bill was passed on the Senate floor on a voice vote and then sent to a conference committee with the House.

The House would have to agree with the Senate text before the amendment could become law.

The amendment was proposed by Sen. Jesse Helms, the conservative North Carolina Republican. A Helms aide said the measure is expected to be approved by the con-

ference committee and an investigation would ensue.

"It's safe to say (the CIA) will be investigating," said the aide, who asked not to be identified. "And it won't be just the CIA, it will be a team of outside experts and a counterintelligence team of the whole intelligence community."

CIA spokeswoman Sharon Foster would neither confirm nor deny that an investigation might take place.

"We don't discuss what we do for Congress," Foster said. "We respond to congressional queries but we don't discuss them at all," she said.

Specifically, the Helms amendment directs the intelligence community to use competing teams to evaluate a list of 32 topics, most of which deal with the Soviet Union.

Other than the sabotage inquiry, the list calls for intelligence agencies to examine Soviet strategic intentions, the accuracy of Soviet missiles, the existence of hidden Soviet missiles and reasons for the alleged underestimation by the CIA of Soviet strategic forces and submarine capacity.

[From the News and Observer, Raleigh, NC., Oct. 8, 1986]

HELMS SEEKS INVESTIGATION OF POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET ROLE IN CHALLENGER EXPLOSION

WASHINGTON.—Sen. Jesse A. Helms, R-N.C., wants the U.S. intelligence community to investigate whether Soviet sabotage played a role in the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger in January.

Helms included the request in an amendment he attached two weeks ago to a bill to finance the nation's intelligence operations.

He declined to elaborate on his request. "I cannot discuss it, because I would be getting into classified information," he said. But a Helms aide, James Lucier, suggested that the U.S. intelligence community already had begun its own investigation of possible Soviet complicity in the Challenger explosion.

The Helms amendment called for a probe into the "possibility of Soviet Bloc sabotage being among the human errors causing the space shuttle Challenger and other recent U.S. strategic space mission explosions," according to the Congressional Record of Sept. 25.

That was five days before the White House announced that President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev would meet Oct. 11-12 in Iceland.

The Challenger probe was one of 32 problems that Helms' amendment said should be examined by "competitive analysis." That is a method using separate or competing studies of a topic to arrive at intelligence estimates.

Lucier said Helms included the request after discussion with several people, including retired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, former chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency and now director of High Frontier, Inc., which is promoting the Strategic Defense Initiative, a space-based missile defense system popularly known as "Star Wars."

"He has compiled a list of 22 incidents or facts relating to the lift-off," Lucier said, "which he considers suspicious in the context of the whole thing that happened, plus the whole string of missile failures . . . that, in terms of mathematical probability, was not consistent with past experience in the missile programs . . ."

"We're not asserting this as fact, but as an hypothesis which is worthy of investigation. It's not just some strange idea . . . There's probable cause to investigate."

However, one informed Senate source said he never had heard "any serious sugges-

tion" in the intelligence community of sabotage of the Challenger.

BERNIE FOWLER

● Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, the Senate should soon be considering the Clean Water Act conference report, a very important legislative item not only to my own State of Maryland, but to the entire Nation as well. I have been a strong supporter of this legislation, which plays an important part in the cleanup of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries.

For more than 15 years in public office, Bernard Fowler, now Maryland State senator from southern Maryland, has helped lead the fight for cleaning up the Patuxent River, a major tributary of the bay, which provides drainage for many of Washington DC's suburbs. Bernie Fowler saw the threat to the Patuxent, and the bay, and fought effectively and successfully, for stricter controls on upstream pollution. Bernie has made a major contribution to the health of our waterways.

In an article in last Sunday's Baltimore Sun, Tom Horton, himself a widely respected environmental expert, chronicled some of Bernie Fowler's contribution to clean water for southern Maryland. I ask that his article be reprinted in the RECORD.

The article follows:

ENOUGH OF CHESAPEAKE BAY FACTS: LET'S GET TO THE MORE SIGNIFICANT STUFF: MYTHS

DAMERON, MD.—For 10 years I've been attacking the problems of the environment with artfully crafted facts—facts perfectly balanced, honed to a fine point and driven home with all the force of truth. Might as well have been plinking spitballs at a brick wall, I sometimes think.

Now, I've seen the light, after a visit here in St. Mary's County with my good friend Tom Wisner, the Chesapeake Bay folksinger, poet and storyteller. Wisner told me there's bigger and better ammunition than fact. It's called myth.

Myth is a concept we reporters, steeped in questing for the factual, the verifiable, tend to equate with lies. You will find no such pejorative definition in the dictionary or the thesaurus; rather myths, or folk tales, legends—call them what you will—are the way we embody and transmit down the generations our most deeply held values and beliefs.

Facts, and their sibling, logic, are useful. Without them we would not get to places like the moon. But myths are powerful. Without our myths, we would not long to go to the moon in the first place.

Tom told me last week that it is a misconception that myths are all from the hoary past, the province only of ancient Greeks or Norsemen. He has found a fledgling myth almost at his doorstep in Southern Maryland, he said, and he thinks it is worth nurturing as a step toward helping out the bay.

For a long time, he said, he has been dissatisfied with what he considers the dominant mythology underlying our ethic toward the Chesapeake region's environment.

"When Captain John Smith drafted his piece about 'heaven and earth never having conspired more agreeably to frame a habitat for man,' he composed the principal catch