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
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EXDIS

NEW DELHI PASS CODEL NUNN

DEPT PASS ELECTRICALLY TO SECDEF WASHDC, JCS WASHDC,
 USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI,
 USCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MARR, PK, US, OVIP
 SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF
 - STAFF COMMITTEE NOVEMBER 27, 1984

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 WINTEL/NOFORN

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

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 2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: CODEL NUNN (COMPOSED OF
 SENATORS NUNN, JOHNSTON, GLENN AND SASSER AND STAFFERS
 PUNARO, SULLIVAN, JONES AND WEISS) ACCOMPANIED BY
 AMBASSADOR HINTON, POLCOUNS WOLF, AND PDL/MILOFF
 LEMMON, CALLED ON CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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PAGE 002
TOR: 020603Z DEC 84

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COMMITTEE GEN. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN NOVEMBER 27. FOLLOWING A BRIEF COURTESY CALL, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE (ISI) LTG AKHTAR ABDUL REHMAN KHAN PROVIDED A THREAT BRIEFING WHICH COVERED: (1) SOVIET STRATEGY TOWARD THE REGION; (2) THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN; (3) THE INDIAN MILITARY BUILD-UP; (4) THE SOVIET-INDIAN "INDIRECT OFFENSIVE" AGAINST PAKISTAN; AND (5) POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN. AN EXTENSIVE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD FOLLOWED THE ISI BRIEFING. ALSO IN ATTENDANCE ON THE PAKISTAN SIDE WERE: DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE JOINT STAFF, LTG SYED RAFAQAT; DIR GEN PLANS, MG NISHAT AHMED; DIR GEN LOGISTICS, AVM ABDUL MASOOD KHAN; DIR GEN TRAINING, RADM I.A. SIROHRY AND MFA DIRECTOR FOR THE AMERICAS, SAEED KHALID.

3. IN BRIEF, AKHTAR SAID PAKISTAN VIEWED THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AS A DELIBERATE MILITARY MOVE AS PART OF ITS GLOBAL EXPANSIONIST POLICY AND HISTORICAL DRIVE SOUTHWARD TO THE ARABIAN SEA/PERSIAN GULF. WE WERE, THEREFORE, IN FOR A LONG-TERM POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUGGLE IN AFGHANISTAN. AT THE SAME TIME, THE USSR SOUGHT TO INFLUENCE OVERTLY AND COVERTLY LEFTIST FORCES IN SOUTH ASIA TO SUPPORT SOVIET OBJECTIVES. THE SOVIETS ALSO SUPPORTED THE INDIAN DRIVE FOR REGIONAL PREDOMINANCE AS IT WAS IN THE OVERALL SOVIET INTEREST TO SUBORDINATE THE OTHER STATES IN THE REGION TO INDIA. SINCE INDIA WOULD BE INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR SPARE PARTS AND REPLACEMENTS FOR ITS LARGELY SOVIET-EQUIPPED MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, THE GOI WOULD BE FORCED TO DO THE SOVIET'S BIDDING IN SOUTH ASIA. THIS REQUIRED, HOWEVER, DENYING PAKISTAN US POLITICAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO REMOVE PAKISTAN AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET CONTROL IN AFGHANISTAN AND INDIAN HEGEMONY IN SOUTH ASIA. THEREFORE, THE SOVIET UNION AND INDIA WERE COLLUDING IN A STRATEGY OF MILITARY PRESSURE AND INTERNAL SUBVERSION AGAINST PAKISTAN, EACH FOR ITS OWN ENDS. PAKISTAN'S STRATEGY WAS TO DEVELOP A MINIMUM DETERRENCE CAPABILITY TO DISSUADE ANY POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR AND A CREDIBLE DEFENSEIVE CAPABILITY TO HOLD OFF AN ATTACKER UNTIL THE US AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD COME TO PAKISTAN'S AID AND STOP THE FIGHTING. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

4. ISI BRIEFING - SOVIET STRATEGY TOWARDS SOUTH/

SOUTH WEST ASIA:

AKHTAR NOTED THAT THE EVENTS OF 1979 HAD BEEN A WATERSHED FOR THE GEO-POLITICAL AND GEO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE REGION. THE FALL OF THE SHAH OF IRAN, THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE NORTH ARABIAN SEA HAD FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR THE

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SECRET

84 5845861

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PAGE 003

NC 5845861

TOR: 020603Z DEC 84

FREE WORLD AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE SOVIET MOVE INTO AFGHANISTAN WAS A SIGNIFICANT FURTHER STEP IN SOVIET HISTORICAL DESIGNS ON THE REGION TO ESTABLISH A LAND ROUTE TO THE ARABIAN SEA/PERSIAN GULF AND OUTFLANK CHINA. THEREFORE, THE SOVIETS FOUND IT EXPEDIENT TO CULTIVATE INDIA FOR PROMOTION OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL OBJECTIVES.

5. THE SOVIETS CONFRONTED A MILITARY STALEMATE IN AFGHANISTAN AND, SINCE CHERNENKO REPLACED ANDROPOV, THERE HAD BEEN A DISCERNIBLE HARDENING OF THE SOVIET POSITION. ANOTHER SOVIET DIVISION HAD BEEN SENT INTO AFGHANISTAN IN EARLY 1984 BEFORE THE PANJSHIR VII OFFENSIVE AND THE SOVIETS HAD BECOME MORE HEAVILY ENGAGED IN DIRECT COMBAT WITH THE MUJAHIDEEN. PAKISTAN IS THE MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET CONTROL OVER AFGHANISTAN. THEREFORE, THE USSR HAD MOVED TO NEUTRALIZE PAKISTAN THROUGH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND INTERNAL SUBVERSION THROUGH COLLABORATION WITH INDIA IN THE TRAINING OF TERRORISTS.

6. AFGHANISTAN SITREP - CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION:

THE SOVIET ARMY IN AFGHANISTAN TOTALLED ROUGHLY 115,000 MEN ORGANIZED INTO THE EQUIVALENT OF 10 DIVISIONS UNDER THE 40TH ALL-ARMS ARMY IN KABUL, WHICH WAS UNDER THE SOVIET ARMY'S SOUTHERN COMMAND HEADQUARTERED AT TASHKENT. AN INDEPENDENT REGIMENT IN THE WAKHAN CORRIDOR WAS UNDER THE CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARY DISTRICT. IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST YEAR, CONSIDERABLE UPGRADING OF SOVIET ARMS AND EQUIPMENT HAD TAKEN PLACE (E.G., INTRODUCTION OF 152MM SELF-PROPELLED GUNS AND 240MM MORTARS). FOUR BATTALIONS OF SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES (SPETSNAZ), WHICH WERE SPECIALLY TRAINED FOR COMMANDO AND CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS, WERE NOW STATIONED AT BAGRAM, JALOLABAD, GHAZNI AND KANDAHAR. THE SOVIET AIR FORCE STRENGTH TOTALED 150 COMBAT AIRCRAFT (INCLUDING 45 MIG-23S, 21 SU-25S, 84 SU-17/22S) 260 HELICOPTERS (60 MI-24S, 140 MI-8S, 60 MI-6S), AND 39 SAM BATTERIES. THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE TOTALED 195 AIRCRAFT (50 MIG-21S, 76 MIG-17S, 30 SU-17/22S, 24 SU-7S, 15 IL-28S), AND 150 HELICOPTERS (30 MI-24 GUNSHIPS AND 120 MI-8 ARMED TRANSPORTS). THE COMPOSITION AND LOCATION OF THE SOVIET AIR FORCE AND ITS AIRFIELDS WAS INDICATIVE OF SOVIET PREPAREDNESS TO OPERATE BEYOND AFGHANISTAN.

7. THE AFGHAN ARMY CURRENTLY TOTALED 35-40,000 MEN AND WAS INEFFECTIVE AS A FIGHTING FORCE. IT WAS NO THREAT AT PRESENT TO PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY AND WOULD REMAIN SO UNLESS/UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION ESTABLISHED ORDER IN AFGHANISTAN AND SUCCEEDED IN RE-STRUCTURING THE AFGHAN ARMY ALONG RED ARMY LINES. SINCE JANUARY 1980, THE AFGHAN ARMY HAD SUFFERED 33,294 DESERTIONS AND 2,431 ARRESTS FOR TOTAL NON-COMBAT LOSSES OF 35,725. IN ADDITION, 57,727 OFFICERS AND MEN HAD BEEN KILLED, WOUNDED OR CAPTURED. THE SOVIETS/DRA HAVE TRIED A VARIETY OF TACTICS SINCE 1980, RANGING FROM CORPS-SIZED SWEEP OPERATIONS TO COMMANDO OPERATIONS AND SCORCHED-EARTH TACTICS. ALL HAD FAILED TO CRUSH THE MUJAHIDEEN AND SOVIET/DRA TROOPS HAD WITHDRAWN FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE INTO GARRISONS, LEAVING EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY TO THE RESISTANCE. IN FEBRUARY 1984, HOWEVER, SOVIET OPERATIONAL STRATEGY CHANGED FUNDAMENTALLY. SOVIET TROOPS WERE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN COMBAT MORE FREQUENTLY, ENGAGING IN EXTENSIVE SWEEP OPERATIONS THROUGH THE PANJSHIR

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TOR: 020603Z DEC 84

VALLEY AND KUNAR, KANDAHAR, LOWGAR, NINGAHAR AND

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SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF

HERAT PROVINCES. HEAVY USE OF AIR POWER, INCLUDING CARPET BOMBING, WAS A PROMINENT FEATURE OF THESE OPERATIONS.

8. MUJAHIDEEN PERFORMANCE.

THE AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS HAD AVOIDED PITCHED BATTLES WITH SOVIET/DRA TROOPS AND USED MODIFIED HIT-AND-RUN TACTICS TO TIE DOWN THOSE FORCES IN SUCH AREAS AS THE PANJSHIR WHILE CONTINUING TO HARASS/CUT PRIMARY ROAD NETWORK AND BESIEGE ISOLATED GARRISONS. MORE RECENTLY THE MUJAHIDEEN HAD FOCUSED ON URBAN CENTERS, ATTACKING SOVIET/DRA INSTALLATIONS IN KABUL, CUTTING ROADS BETWEEN CITIES AND TOWNS AND FORCING THE SOVIETS/DRA TO DEPEND ON AIR TRANSPORT TO MOVE AROUND THE COUNTRY. THERE HAD BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN SOVIET CASUALTIES OVER THE PAST YEAR, REACHING A TOTAL AT PRESENT OF 15,042 KILLED/WOUNDED SINCE JANUARY 1980 AND 63 CAPTURED (OFFICERS 1,622 KILLED/WOUNDED AND 24 CAPTURED; SOLDIERS 13,420 KILLED/WOUNDED AND 39 CAPTURED). SOVIET/DRA EQUIPMENT LOSSES TOTALED: 385 TANKS, 611 APCs, 3,539 VEHICLES, 640 AIRCRAFT/HELICOPTERS AND 451 HEAVY GUNS/MORTARS. MUJAHIDEEN CASUALTIES AT MINIMUM WERE 37,284 KILLED/WOUNDED AND 11,333 CAPTURED FOR TOTAL LOSSES OF 48,617.

9. SOVIET STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

THE SOVIETS SHOWED NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING AND WERE WORKING HARD TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENT HOLD OVER AFGHANISTAN. THEY HAD ADOPTED AN UNCOMPROMISING, HARD-LINE ATTITUDE, ESPECIALLY SINCE CHERNENKO HAD COME TO POWER. THEIR STRATEGY WAS TO HOLD THE URBAN AREAS AND PRINCIPAL COMMUNICATIONS CENTERS, CONDUCT A RUTHLESS PURGE OF THE COUNTRYSIDE, SOVIETIZE AFGHAN SOCIETY AND ECONOMY, AND CONDUCT AN "INDIRECT OFFENSIVE" AGAINST PAKISTAN IN ORDER TO "NEUTRALIZE" IT AND REMOVE IT AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET CONTROL OVER AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS SOUGHT TO SUBDUCE THE MUJAHIDEEN THROUGH A COMBINATION OF MILITARY FORCE AND SUBVERSION TO BREAK THEIR WILL TO FIGHT. FINALLY, THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING TO GET THE DRA ACCEPTED AND AFGHANISTAN RECOGNIZED AS BEING IN THEIR SPHERE OF INFLUENCE/SECURITY. TOWARDS THESE ENDS, THE SOVIETS WERE TRYING: TO CAPTURE THE NEXT GENERATION OF AFGHANS BY EDUCATING URBAN YOUTH IN THE SOVIET UNION (4,000 BOYS AGES 6-12 WERE SENT TO THE USSR EACH YEAR); TO SPLINTER TRIBAL/ETHNIC GROUPS IN ORDER TO DISINTEGRATE TRADITIONAL AFGHAN SOCIETY; TO MAKE AFGHANISTAN TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY; AND TO WIN THE AGREEMENT OF OTHER REGIONAL COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY

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PAGE 005

NC 5845861

TOR: 020603Z DEC 84

INDIA, TO ACCEPT THE DRA AND CONTINUED SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. IN RETURN FOR INDIAN POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT IN THIS EFFORT, THE SOVIETS WERE SUPPORTING INDIA'S EXTENSIVE MILITARY BUILDUP.

10. INDIAN MILITARY BUILD-UP

THE PRC-INDIAN CLASHES IN THE EARLY 1960'S HAD OPENED THE WAY FOR THE INDO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIP TO FLOURISH. THE 1971 TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION PROVIDED THE FORMAL BASIS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP. THAT IN TURN LED TO MUTUAL COLLUSION AGAINST THOSE REGIONAL STATES WHICH STOOD IN THE

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WAY OF EITHER'S AMBITIONS (AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA). INDIA WANTED REGIONAL PREDOMINANCE AND THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THIS AMBITION FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. AKHTAR QUOTED MRS. GANDHI AS HAVING TOLD SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER USTINOV DURING HIS MARCH 1984 VISIT TO INDIA THAT THE US WAS MOVING BACK INTO SOUTH ASIA AND INDIA WAS THE USSR'S ONLY ALLY IN THE REGION. THE US BUILDUP WAS DIRECTED AGAINST BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND INDIA. PAKISTAN WAS THE PRINCIPAL RECIPIENT OF US MILITARY AID AND WAS A THREAT TO BOTH. THEREFORE, IT WAS IN BOTH INDIA'S AND THE USSR'S INTEREST TO NEUTRALIZE AND DISMEMBER PAKISTAN. BUT THEY MUST MOVE FAST TO DESTABILIZE PAKISTAN BEFORE THE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE BECAME EFFECTIVE. (EMBASSY COMMENT - THE ABOVE IS VERY SENSITIVE AND SHOULD BE HELD CLOSELY. END COMMENT)

11. AKHTAR DECLINED TO REVEAL HIS SOURCE FOR THIS INFORMATION BEFORE THE SENATORS' VISIT TO INDIA, BUT SAID HE WOULD MAKE IT KNOWN AFTERWARDS. HE FURTHER ARGUED THAT INDIA WANTED TO ESTABLISH A VETO RIGHT OVER HER NEIGHBORS' RELATIONS WITH ALL OUTSIDE POWERS AND SOUGHT US ACCEPTANCE OF THIS RIGHT. IN INDIA'S EYES, IT IS THE US-PAKISTAN-PRC CONNECTION WHICH THREATENED HER INTERESTS, NOT THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

12. INDO-SOVIET DEFENSE COOPERATION

AKHTAR DESCRIBED THE RECENT INDO-SOVIET ARMS DEAL AS TOTALLING 5 BILLION RUBLES AT 2 PERCENT INTEREST AT PRICES 1/3 TO 1/4 THE WESTERN EQUIVALENT RESULTING IN REAL PURCHASES OF \$17 BILLION WORTH OF ADVANCED ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. THIS INCLUDED FOR THE ARMY SOME 750 T-72 TANKS, 675 BMP-1 INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES, 110 BRDM-11 APCs, 18 130MM GUNS, 250 122MM D-130 GUNS, 60 122MM 40 BARRELLED RNDs, 18 SAM 6, 36 SAM 7 AND 24 SAM 8 BATTERIES, 60 ZSU-23-4M AD GUNS, 100 ZSU-23-2 AD GUNS, 600 KRAZ-255-B-1 GUN TOWING VEHICLES. THE NAVY HAD ACQUIRED 8 SUBMARINES, 5 KASHIN CLASS MISSILE

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PAGE 006

NC 5845861

TOR: 020603Z DEC 84

DESTROYERS, 5 MISSILE BOATS, 4 ASW VESSELS, 5 IL-38 ASW AIRCRAFT, 12 ASW HELICOPTERS AND 6 COASTAL MINESWEEPERS. THE AIR FORCE RECEIVED 155 MIG-23S, 8 MIG-25S, 95 AN-32S, 130 AS-7 AIR-SURFACE MISSILES, 10 MI-8 HELICOPTERS, 15 P-18/19 RADARS, AND 12 SQUADRONS OF SAM 3S. IN ADDITION, SOVIET ASSISTANCE WITH DEFENSE PRODUCTION WOULD GIVE INDIA A CAPABILITY TO BUILD 200 T-72 TANKS/YEAR, 500 BMP-I/II ICVS/YR, 40 MIG-27/YR, 3 MISSILE DESTROYERS/YR, 4 ASW CORVETTES/YR, AND 15 MISSILE CRAFT/YR. THE GOI HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH USTINOV IN MARCH 1984 ON THE 1985-90 INDIAN DEFENSE PLAN AND HAD ASKED FOR EVEN LARGER NUMBERS OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY (SEPTEL).

13. SINCE 1971, INDIAN MILITARY FORCES HAD UNDERGONE A COMPLETE MODERNIZATION AND SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION. THE INDIAN ARMY HAD ADDED A NEW COMMAND HEADQUARTERS, 3 CORPS HEADQUARTERS, 1 ARMORED DIVISION, 1 MECHANIZED DIVISION, 5 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 3 INDEPENDENT ARMORED BRIGADES, 12 INDEPENDENT INFANTRY BRIGADES, AND 19 BORDER SECURITY FORCE BATTALIONS. THE INDIAN ARMY NOW TOTALLED 1.1 MILLION MEN ORGANIZED IN 5 COMMAND HQ, 8 CORPS HQ, 2 ARMORED DIV, 1 MECHANIZED DIV, 21 INFANTRY DIV, 9 MOUNTAIN DIV, 6 INDEPENDENT ARMORED BDE, 16 INDEPENDENT INFANTRY BDE, 119 BORDER SECURITY FORCE BATTALIONS. THE AIR FORCE HAD ADDED SEVEN NEW FIGHTER SQUADRONS AND ESTABLISHED AH

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AIR COMMAND AT TRIVANDRUM TO COVER THE INDIAN OCEAN. THERE WERE NOW 44 SQUADRONS (INCLUDING 21 MIG-21, 6 MIG-23, 3 SU-7, 3 JAGUAR, 4 AJEET, 3 HUNTER, 1 MIG-25, AND 3 CANBERRA) WITH 32 DEPLOYED UNDER THE WESTERN AIR COMMAND AND 12 DIVIDED AMONG THE EASTERN, CENTRAL, NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN COMMANDS. INDIA HAD BUILT 5 NEW AIR BASES ALONG ITS WESTERN BORDER AND NOW HAD THE INFRASTRUCTURE TO ACCOMMODATE ALL 44 SQUADRONS IN AN ATTACK AGAINST PAKISTAN. THE INDIAN NAVY HAD BEEN GREATLY EXPANDED AND WAS NOW THE MOST POWERFUL IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. IT WAS COMPOSED OF 72 SHIPS: 1 AIRCRAFT CARRIER, 8 SUBMARINES, 1 CRUISER, 6 MISSILE DESTROYERS/FRIGATES, 19 CONVENTIONAL FRIGATES, 3 NANUCHKAS MISSILE CORVETTES, 13 MISSILE BOATS, 6 LANDING SHIP TANKS, 6 NATYAS MINESWEEPERS, 5 CHARIOTS AND 4 SUAVEY SHIPS. MOST OF THOSE SHIPS (48) WERE IN THE WESTERN NAVAL COMMAND AVAILABLE FOR USE AGAINST PAKISTAN. IN ADDITION, AN ALL-SERVICES RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE HAD BEEN CREATED AND PERIODICALLY EXERCISED IN THE ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS.

14. MOREOVER, THE HIGH PERCENTAGE OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT IN THE INDIAN MILITARY INVENTORY (BETWEEN 60 AND 100 PERCENT OF KEY WEAPONS SYSTEMS) MADE INDIA VERY VULNERABLE TO A POSSIBLE SOVIET CUT-OFF OF SPARE PARTS AND REPLACEMENTS. THEREFORE, INDIA HAD REFUSED TO CONDEMN THE SOVIETS OVER AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA AS SHE FELT SHE NEEDED CONTINUED SOVIET

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PAGE 007

NC 5845861

TOR: 020603Z DEC 84

MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. NOTWITHSTANDING US WILLINGNESS TO SELL MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO INDIA WHICH WAS SUPERIOR TO THE SOVIETS, INDIA WOULD STAY WITH THE USSR BECAUSE OF A COINCIDENCE OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND ATTRACTIVE SOVIET TERMS FOR CONTINUED MILITARY SUPPLIES.

15. INDO-SOVIET INDIRECT OFFENSIVE

INDIVIDUALLY AND IN CONCERT, THE SOVIET UNION AND INDIA HAVE TRIED TO NEUTRALIZE PAKISTAN GEO-POLITICALLY THROUGH SUBVERSION IN ORDER TO CREATE DOMESTIC STRIFE WHICH COULD LEAD TO MILITARY INTERVENTION BY EITHER. THEY WERE COLLUDING WITH DOMESTIC POLITICAL OPPOSITION, HARBORING AL-ZULFIQAR TERRORISTS IN KABUL, TRAINING ADDITIONAL TERRORISTS IN TEN TRAINING CAMPS IN INDIA AND INFILTRATING KHAD/KGB AGENTS ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES INTO PAKISTAN DISGUISED AS AFGHAN REFUGEES. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS CONTINUED THEIR CROSS BORDER ATTACKS AND INDIA HAD INCREASED ITS MILITARY PRESSURE BY OCCUPYING THE SIACHIN GLACIER AND CREATING INCIDENTS ALONG THE LINE OF CONTROL. INDIA HAD USED THE SIKH DISTURBANCES IN THE PUNJAB TO MASSIVELY REINFORCE THE BORDER WITH PAKISTAN. THE INDIANS HAD UNDERTAKEN A MASSIVE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST PAKISTAN AND WAS ENGAGED IN DISINFORMATION ABOUT PAKISTAN'S ALLEGED ROLE IN FOMENTING/AIDING THE SIKHS. THEREFORE, PAKISTAN HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE THREAT ON BOTH ITS WESTERN AND EASTERN BORDERS COUPLED WITH SUBVERSION FROM WITHIN AND IT WAS THIS INDO-SOVIET COLLUSION THAT WAS PAKISTAN'S FOREMOST SECURITY CONCERN.

16. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

SENATOR NUNN ASKED ABOUT PAKISTAN'S STRATEGY TO COPE WITH TWO OVERWHELMING THREATS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND INDIA AND WHAT LEVEL OF DETERRENCE PAKISTAN HOPED

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TO ACHIEVE. GENERAL RAHIM UDDIN KHAN SAID THAT ZIA HAD UNDERTAKEN A PEACE OFFENSIVE WITH INDIA IN AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE PEACE ON ITS EASTERN BORDER. AT THE SAME TIME, PAKISTAN SOUGHT TO MODERNIZE ITS MILITARY IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT ON THE WESTERN BORDER. PAKISTAN'S FRUSTRATION WAS THAT INDIA WAS NOT LOOKING AT THE LONG-TERM THREAT TO IT FROM THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF PAKISTAN AS A BUFFER STATE. THE NEXT SOVIET MOVE TO THE WARM WATERS OF THE ARABIAN SEA/PERSIAN GULF WOULD BE EITHER THROUGH IRAN OR PAKISTAN. GROMYKO HAD TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB THAT PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE TO FACE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDEEN AS IT WAS NOW ENGAGED IN AN UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THE DANGER TO PAKISTAN HAD INCREASED SINCE CHERNENKO

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PAGE 008

NC 5845861

TOR: 020603Z DEC 84

REPLACED ANDROPOV AND CROSS-BORDER STRIKES HAD INCREASED IN NUMBER AND INTENSITY. THIS IN TURN HURT THE GOP'S CREDIBILITY WITH THE PEOPLE AS IT WAS SEEN AS UNABLE TO PROTECT THE COUNTRY. THEREFORE, PAKISTAN NEEDED AIR SURVEILLANCE AND AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. THAT IN TURN LEADS THE INDIANS TO PROTEST THAT PAKISTAN INTENDS TO ATTACK THEM. PAKISTAN HAD NEITHER THE CAPABILITY NOR THE INTENTION OF GOING TO WAR WITH INDIA AS IT WAS TOO LARGE AND PAKISTAN NEEDED A STABLE INDIA FOR ITS OWN SECURITY. INDIA WAS VERY VULNERABLE TO COMMUNIST PENETRATION GIVEN THE HINDU CASTE SYSTEM WHICH MADE THOSE ON THE BOTTOM VULNERABLE TO ITS RHETORIC. THE INDIAN MILITARY BUILDUP TOOK PLACE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PEOPLE'S POVERTY. PAKISTAN, THEREFORE, WANTED AN IMPROVED DETERRENT CAPABILITY AS WELL AS A DEFENSE CAPABILITY. IT WANTED ONLY TO BE LEFT ALONE TO DEAL WITH ITS OWN DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS. PAKISTAN WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE POSITION OF A SATELLITE. INDIA AS THE MORE POWERFUL COUNTRY WOULD HAVE TO PLAY THE GREATER PART IN IMPROVING RELATIONS ON THE SUB-CONTINENT. THE GANDHI ASSASSINATION AND THE RISE OF NEW LEADERSHIP PROVIDED SOME HOPE FOR CHANGE, BUT GIVEN INDIA'S DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE GOI WOULD CHANGE ITS POLICIES VERY MUCH. THEREFORE, PAKISTAN MUST GROW MUCH STRONGER IF REGIONAL STABILITY IS TO BE ENSURED GIVEN THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. PAKISTAN MUST BE AS STRONG IN SOUTH ASIA AS ISRAEL IS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OTHERWISE, IT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PLAY THE ROLE ENVISAGED FOR IT TO STAND UP TO THE SOVIETS UNTIL HELP ARRIVES FROM ITS FRIENDS. PAKISTAN HAD NO DESIRE FOR WAR WITH INDIA AND HOPED THAT IT WOULD FINALLY SEE THAT THE REAL THREAT TO BOTH COUNTRIES IS AS IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN -- FROM THE WEST BY THE SOVIETS MOVING THROUGH AFGHANISTAN INTO PAKISTAN AND THEN INDIA.

17. SENATOR JOHNSTON QUERIED AS TO WHAT WAS INDIA'S GOAL VIS-A-VIS PAKISTAN. GENERAL RAHIM UDDIN KHAN REPLIED THAT INDIA WANTED TO PLAY THE ROLE OF DOMINANT POWER IN THE REGION, "CUT PAKISTAN DOWN TO SIZE" AS IT HAD DONE IN 1971, AND MAKE IT PLAY A SATELLITE ROLE. PAKISTAN, HOWEVER, WOULD NEVER ACCEPT SUCH A ROLE AND SOONER OR LATER INDIA WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT FACT. SENATOR JOHNSTON ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT INDIA WAS PREPARING TO ATTACK OR SIMPLY TO INTIMIDATE PAKISTAN. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN SAID THE GOP WAS VERY CONCERNED WITH THE MOVE OF SUBSTANTIAL INDIAN MILITARY FORCE INTO THE PUNJAB TO HANDLE THE SIKH CRISIS. THIS WAS GREATER THAN WAS REQUIRED FOR RESTORING ORDER IN THE PUNJAB. SENATOR JOHNSTON ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE A DIRECT THREAT TO PAKISTAN AS LONG AS THEY WERE TIED DOWN

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NEW DELHI PASS CODEL NUNN

DEPT PASS ELECTRICALLY TO SECDEF WASHDC, JCS WASHDC, USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, USCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, PK, US, OVIP

SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF

FIGHTING THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN SAID THE SOVIETS WERE A THREAT NOW BUT THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THEY WOULD START A WAR WITH PAKISTAN

SECRET

SECRET

84 5845861

SSP

PAGE 009

NC 5845861

TDR: 020603Z DEC 84

UNTIL THEY HAD CONSOLIDATED THEIR CONTROL IN AFGHANISTAN HE NOTED THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS NOT VIET NAM AS THE SOVIETS COULD APPLY THEIR AIRPOWER WHEREVER AND WHENEVER AGAINST THE MUJAHIDEEN; AND AFGHANISTAN BORDERED DIRECTLY ON THE SOVIET UNION WHILE THE US HAD BEEN 3,000 MILES AWAY FROM SE ASIA. THE SITUATIONS WERE GEO-STRATEGICALLY DIFFERENT. THE SOVIETS COULD BOMB AFGHANISTAN WITH AIRCRAFT BASED IN CENTRAL ASIA AND HAD 30 DIVISIONS IN PLACE WHICH COULD BE QUICKLY MOVED INTO AFGHANISTAN. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN THEM LOGISTICALLY AS THEY REQUIRED CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRYSIDE. HOW THE WORLD HELPED WOULD BE A FACTOR IN HOW LONG THE MUJAHIDEEN COULD GO ON. THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS AS AFGHANISTAN WAS NOT A WESTERN COUNTRY AND THE EUROPEANS IN PARTICULAR WANTED TO PRESERVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW -- THE GERMANS FOR EXAMPLE WERE MORE INTERESTED IN THEIR GAS DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS THAN THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

18. SENATOR NUNN ASKED WHETHER PAKISTAN COULDN'T DO MORE WITH OTHER ISLAMIC COUNTRIES AND THE NON-ALIGNED TO INCREASE POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON MOSCOW. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN SAID PAKISTAN WAS TRYING TO DO WHAT IT COULD, BUT MANY COUNTRIES DID NOT WANT TO ANTAGONIZE THE SOVIETS OR SIMPLY WEREN'T WILLING TO CRITICIZE MOSCOW.

19. SENATOR GLENN ASKED ABOUT GEN. AKHTAR'S SOURCE FOR HIS RECITATION OF MRS. GANDHI'S CONVERSATION WITH USTINOV. AKHTAR SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE THE ANSWER "IN DUE COURSE" FOLLOWING THE CODEL'S VISIT TO INDIA. SENATOR GLENN QUERIED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO GET CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN INDIA THE WAY THEY HAD TRIED IN EGYPT. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN SAID THAT INDIA WAS A LARGE COUNTRY AND IT WAS HARD TO GET THAT KIND OF INFLUENCE. INDIA'S VULNERABILITY CAME FROM ITS DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLY/SPARE PARTS. SENATOR GLENN ASKED WHETHER INDIAN POLICY MIGHT CHANGE UNDER RAJIV GANDHI. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN RESPONDED THAT INDIAN DEPENDENCE WAS SO DEEP THAT, EVEN IF RAJIV WANTED TO CHANGE, IT WOULD TAKE MANY YEARS TO DIVERSIFY INDIA'S SOURCES OF SUPPLY. THEREFORE, HE WAS LIKELY TO KEEP THE INDO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP GOING AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND REFRAIN FROM CRITICIZING OR PRESSURING THE SOVIET UNION. SENATOR GLENN QUERIED AS TO HOW LONG IT HAD TAKEN FOR THE RUSSIANS/SOVIETS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR CONTROL OVER CENTRAL ASIA. AKHTAR SAID THE RUSSIANS TOOK MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR CONTROL AND THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT FIGHTING STILL OCCURRED AS LATE AS THE 1930'S. AKHTAR SAID THE RUSSIANS MOVED FORWARD WHENEVER POSSIBLE, AND TURNED BACK WHEN CHALLENGED. PAKISTAN WANTED AMERICAN PROTECTION FROM THE SOVIETS, THOUGH THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE WOULD NEVER ACCEPT DOMINATION BY EITHER THE SOVIET UNION OR INDIA. SENATOR GLENN OBSERVED THAT CENTRAL ASIANS WERE MUSLIM BY HERITAGE AND WONDERED WHETHER AFGHANISTAN WAS CAUSING ANY PROBLEMS AND WHETHER THIS COULD BE EXPLOITED. AKHTAR SAID IT WAS CONCEIVABLE, BUT THAT MOST OF THE POPULATION KNEW LITTLE OR NOTHING ABOUT ISLAM. ANY EXPLOITATION WOULD HAVE TO BE THROUGH THE JOINT EFFORTS OF MANY, NOT JUST PAKISTAN. AKHTAR QUOTED A SENIOR CHINESE OFFICIAL AS SAYING THAT ONLY

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SECRET

SECRET

84 5845861 SSP

PAGE 010

NC 5845861

TOR: 020603Z DEC 84

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, PK, US, OVIP

SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF

THE COMBINATION OF FIVE POWERS COULD DEFEAT THE SOVIET
UNION: CHINA, US, JAPAN, WESTERN EUROPE (FRG AND FRANCE)
AND THE THIRD WORLD.

20. SENATOR NUNN NOTED THAT AKHTAR HAD NOT MENTIONED
IRAN AND ASKED WHAT ADVICE HE WOULD GIVE THE US AS TO
WHAT WE SHOULD AND SHOULDN'T DO. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN
ADVISED THAT THE US SHOULD AVOID CONDEMNATION AND
ADOPT A POSTURE OF FORGIVING AND FORGETTING. PAKISTAN
WAS PLAYING ITS PART BY NOT LETTING IRAN FEEL TOTALLY
ISOLATED AND OSTRACIZED. SENATOR NUNN ASKED WHETHER
IRAN SHARED PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT.
AKHTAR SAID IRAN WAS VERY ISOLATED WITH LITTLE WESTERN
INFLUENCE REMAINING. IT WAS AWARE OF THE SOVIET
THREAT, BUT IT DIDN'T SAY IT LOUDLY BECAUSE OF ITS
ISOLATION FROM THE WEST. IRAN WAS ABSORBED WITH ITS
WAR WITH IRAQ, BUT IT WOULD NEVER ACCEPT SOVIET
DOMINATION. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WAS IN NO ONE'S
INTEREST EXCEPT THE SOVIETS WHO HOPED TO PICK UP THE
PIECES.

21. SENATOR JOHNSTON ASKED HOW PAKISTAN ASSESSED THE
IMPACT ON IRAN OF THE US'S RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. AKHTAR DEFERRED TO AMBASSADOR
HINTON WHO NOTED THAT THE US UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE
OF IRAN AND WANTED TO RE-ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS.
HOWEVER, IRAN WAS STILL RUNNING TERRORIST OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE US AND WE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT MOVE
TOWARDS THEM AS LONG AS THAT CONTINUED. SENATOR NUNN
UNDERScoreD THAT AS THE AMERICAN PUBLIC BECAME
INCREASINGLY AWARE OF IRANIAN TERRORIST OPERATIONS,
STRONG PUBLIC PRESSURE WOULD BUILD TO STRIKE AGAINST
IRAN. THIS WAS NOT IN OUR LONG-TERM INTEREST BUT IT
WAS A FACT OF POLITICAL LIFE. HE HOPED THAT
PAKISTAN WOULD PASS THIS ON TO IRAN.

22. SENATOR GLENN RECOUNTED US EFFORTS TO PREVENT
THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO MORE AND MORE
COUNTRIES. WE UNDERSTOOD PAKISTAN'S SITUATION AND
HAVE MONITORED DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM. HE WANTED TO UNDERScore THAT THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION AND THAT THIS WAS ONE ISSUE THAT
COULD UPSET THE WHOLE US-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP.
RAHIM UDDIN KHAN STRESSED THAT PAKISTAN DIDN'T DREAM
OF A CONVENTIONAL, MUCH LESS A NUCLEAR WAR. IT HAD
PROPOSED TO INDIA THAT BOTH COUNTRIES OPEN THEIR
NUCLEAR FACILITIES TO INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION.
PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS VERY MODEST AND THEY
HAD NEITHER THE INTENT, THE DESIRE NOR THE ABILITY
TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PAKISTAN WANTED TO AVOID
ANY SITUATION WHERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE USED.
BUT IT BADLY NEEDED MORE ENERGY AND OIL WAS TOO
EXPENSIVE. SENATOR GLENN NOTED THAT PAKISTAN HAD
ENGAGED IN SOME ACTIVITY WHICH IN THE PAST HAD
INDICATED A COUNTRY WAS MOVING TOWARDS ACQUIRING
A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN SAID
THAT SENATOR GLENN WOULD BE SEEING PAKISTAN ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMISSION HEAD MUNIR KHAN AND THAT HE WOULD

SECRET

SECRET

84 5845861

SSP

PAGE 011

NC 5845861

TOR: 020603Z DEC 84

BE ABLE TO ADDRESS THIS QUESTION BETTER.

23. SENATOR SASSER NOTED THAT US PRESS REPORTS HAD ASSERTED THAT PAKISTAN HAD PULLED BACK ITS FORCES FROM THE AFGHAN BORDER IN ORDER TO AVOID PROVOKING THE SOVIETS AND ASKED AT WHAT POINT PAKISTAN DREW THE LINE AT CROSS-BORDER INCURSIONS. GEN RAFAQAT SAID PA FORCES HAD NOT BEEN MOVED BACK. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN REITERATED THAT PAKISTAN NEEDED A MODERN, SOPHISTICATED EARLY WARNING SYSTEM TO DETECT INTRUDERS AND AN AIR

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DEFENSE CAPABILITY TO BRING THEM DOWN. IN THIS REGARD, PAKISTAN HAD ASKED FOR STINGER POST, AIM9L AND E2CS. IT HAD ALSO REQUESTED THAT DELIVERIES OF SOME OTHER WEAPONS SYSTEMS BE SPEEDED UP.

24. SENATOR SASSER ASKED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE SIKH CRISIS ON THE INDIAN ARMY. AKHTAR SAID THE HANDLING OF THE GOLDEN TEMPLE EPISODE HAD BEEN A "POLITICAL MESS UP". USING THE ARMY TO ASSAULT THE GOLDEN TEMPLE HAD SET SIKHS AGAINST NON-SIKHS IN THE ARMY. COMMAND OF SIKH UNITS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HINDUS AND SIKH OFFICERS HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM KEY POSITIONS. THE SIKHS MAY YET TAKE THE REVENGE PATH AS THEY HAVE STILL NOT FORGIVEN THE HINDUS FOR THE ASSAULT ON THE GOLDEN TEMPLE.

25. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
HINTON

END OF MESSAGE

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