


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
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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, UR, CB, VN, CH, ASEAN, XC
 SUBJECT: SOVIET OFFICIAL ON KAMPUCHEA AND SEA

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: A HALF HOUR AFTER THE ANDROPOV DEATH ANNOUNCEMENT, POLCOUNS MET AS SCHEDULED WITH SOVIET MFA SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEPARTMENT CHIEF ZAYTSEV, WHO OFFERED A LARGELY ORTHODOX PRESENTATION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON THE KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM. ZAYTSEV REPEATEDLY STRESSED CHINA'S ALLEGED "EXPANSIONIST" AMBITIONS AS THE ROOT CAUSE OF SEA INSTABILITY AND TENSION. HE INDICATED SOVIET INTEREST IN VARIOUS EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT, BUT SAID HANOI COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY ROLE FOR POL POT. ZAYTSEV, AN EX-AIDE OF GROMYKO, CAME ACROSS SOMEWHAT WARMER THAN MOST SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS ON FIRST MEETINGS WITH AMERICAN EMBOFFS. HE APPEARS TO HAVE CLOSE TIES TO SOVIET MFA DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPITSA. END SUMMARY.

DIPLOMACY AS USUAL AFTER ANDROPOV'S DEATH

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3. POLCOUNS MET FEBRUARY 10 WITH SOVIET MFA SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEPARTMENT CHIEF ANATOLIY SAFRONOVICH ZAYTSEV FOR A DISCUSSION WHICH CENTERED ON KAMPUCHEA. EMBOFF AND SOVIET MFA COUNSELOR FOR THAI AND KAMPUCHEAN AFFAIRS MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH BELIY TOOK NOTES. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE ONE HALF HOUR AFTER THE ANDROPOV DEATH ANNOUNCEMENT. ZAYTSEV ACCEPTED OUR PROFFERED CONDOLENCE AND THEN WENT SMOOTHLY INTO DISCUSSION. AT ONE POINT TO ILLUSTRATE HIS POINT THAT THE US AND USSR HAD A COMMON INTEREST IN KEEPING TENSIONS DOWN IN ASIA, ZAYTSEV CITED ANDROPOV'S AUGUST 18 DISCUSSION WITH CODEL PELL.

SOVIET POSITION ON KAMPUCHEA

4. THROUGHOUT HIS DISCUSSION OF THE KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE, ZAYTSEV HEWED CLOSELY TO THE SOVIET OFFICIAL LINE. HE STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTS STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA BECAUSE THE AREA LIES ON THE SEA LANES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN AND ASIAN PARTS OF THE USSR. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE "GUARANTEES" AS A NON-REGIONAL GREAT POWER IF A REGIONAL SOLUTION TO THE KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM COULD BE FOUND. HE STATED THAT ASEAN AND OTHERS SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT VIETNAM MAY BECOME MORE WILLING TO WITHDRAW IN TIME, CITING SOVIET AND OTHER "ALLIED" AID AS IMPORTANT SOURCES OF VIETNAMESE SUSTENANCE. WITHOUT SAYING IN SO MANY WORDS THAT "TIME IS ON VIETNAM'S SIDE," AS HAVE OTHER SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS, ZAYTSEV ASSERTED THAT HENG SAMRIN'S REGIME CONTINUES STEADILY TO CONSOLIDATE POWER IN KAMPUCHEA. HE CONFIRMED THAT KAPITSA HAD JUST COMPLETED A FOUR-DAY VISIT TO PHNOM PENH AS PART OF A TWO WEEK SWING THROUGH SOUTHEAST ASIA.

THE CHINA FACTOR

5. ZAYTSEV PORTRAYED VIETNAM AS A BULWARK AGAINST CHINESE "IMPERIALIST PRETENSIONS" IN SEA. HE POINTED TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOME ASEAN STATES AND CHINA OVER THE ROLE OF POL POT AND HIS SUPPORTERS IN A KAMPUCHEAN SETTLEMENT TO BUTTRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT CHINA'S GOALS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH REGIONAL HARMONY. ZAYTSEV SAID IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO HIM WHAT CONCRETELY HAD COME OUT OF PREMIER ZHAO'S WASHINGTON TALKS ON KAMPUCHEA. POLCOUNS SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS KAMPUCHEA DURING THE UPCOMING MARCH ROUND OF SINO-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS.

COMPROMISE FORMULAE

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6. ZAYTSEV COMMENTED ON SEVERAL COMPROMISE FORMULAE. HE INDICATED THAT THE 1983 UNGA RESOLUTION ON KAMPUCHEA WAS SOMEWHAT MORE BALANCED THAN THE 1981 UNGA INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA RESOLUTION. ZAYTSEV PRAISED ELEMENTS OF COMPROMISE REPORTEDLY ADVANCED BY FORMER SENATOR CLARK, WHICH ZAYTSEV CHARACTERIZED AS CALLING FOR GUARANTEES TO VIETNAM (END OF "CHINESE THREAT" AND END OF AID TO POL POT) TO ALLOW IT TO WITH-

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DRAW FROM VIETNAM. WITHOUT ELABORATION, ZAYTSEV CRITICIZED WHAT HE TERMED THE "INDONESIAN PLAN," SAYING IT DID NOT REALISTICALLY ADDRESS THE POL POT QUESTION.

7. ZAYTSEV FAVORABLY MENTIONED THE 1983 NEW DELHI NAM CONFERENCE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM SEA. ZAYTSEV SAID FORCES TO BE WITHDRAWN WOULD INCLUDE CHINESE TROOPS ON THE PARACELS AND US REGIONAL FORCES. QUESTIONED ABOUT CHINESE "FOREIGN" FORCES ON THE PARACELS, ZAYTSEV SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN SINCE THEIR PRESENCE VIOLATED VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE PARACELS. LATER IN THE DISCUSSION, ZAYTSEV REFERRED TO THE SEPTEMBER 1983 ASEAN APPEAL ON KAMPUCHEA, SUGGESTING THAT ASEAN WAS HAVING PROBLEMS DEFINING ELEMENTS OF THE APPEAL, PARTICULARLY HOW TO ASSURE THAT POL POT FORCES WOULD NOT SWEEP BACK IF A POWER VACUUM WERE CREATED.

8. TOWARDS THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, AFTER EXHAUSTING HIS APPARENT PREPARED BRIEF, ZAYTSEV RETURNED TO THE GENERAL THEME OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE STRESSED SOVIET INTEREST IN MOVING THE PROBLEM TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AWAY FROM THE ANNUAL CYCLE OF UN RESOLUTIONS AND DRY SEASON MILITARY OFFENSIVES. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE WILLING TO EXPLORE VARIOUS FORUMS -- PREFERABLY REGIONAL -- FOR ESTABLISHING A DIALOGUE AMONG THE PARTIES, BUT THE ONE THING VIETNAM WOULD NOT ACCEPT WAS PARTICIPATION BY POL POT, WHOSE FACTION CONTROLLED THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORCE SEEN AS THREATENING BY HANOI. ANY POLITICAL SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO PRECLUDE A RETURN TO POWER BY POL POT, AND VIETNAM WOULD HAVE TO BE ASSURED ON THIS POINT IF NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO SUCCEED. ZAYTSEV DID NOT CHARACTERIZE THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DK COALITION.

DRY SEASON SITUATION

9. ZAYTSEV NOTED THAT BELGIUM AND AUSTRALIA HAVE APPEALED TO VIETNAM TO REFRAIN FROM ATTACKING COALITION FORCES IN THE THAI BORDER REGION DURING THE DRY SEASON. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT SOME ASEAN COUNTRIES HAVE ASKED THE SOVIET UNION TO "PRESSURE" VIETNAM TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. ZAYTSEV, APPARENTLY HOPING TO PREEMPT A US APPEAL, SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION WAS RELATIVELY QUIET SO FAR THIS YEAR. HE POINTEDLY COMPLAINED THAT COUNTRIES MAKING THESE APPEALS ARE NOT ABLE TO GUARANTEE OR OTHERWISE INFLUENCE THE COALITION FORCES TOWARD SIMILAR RESTRAINT. IN FACT, HE SAID, THE COALITION AND ITS SUPPORTERS ONCE AGAIN THIS YEAR HAVE EMBARKED ON A CYCLE OF PROPAGANDA AND DIPLOMACY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THEIR DRY SEASON OPERATIONS.

SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

10. EMBOFF ASKED ZAYTSEV TO EXPLAIN WHAT THE VIETNAMESE MEANT BY THE "UNITY OF STRATEGIC INTERESTS" UNDERLYING SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS (83 MOSCOW 12372). ZAYTSEV DECLINED TO COMMENT ON WHAT THE VIETNAMESE MEANT, BUT

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DENIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ANY KIND OF "STRATEGIC" OR "SECRET" RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM, MAINTAINING THAT

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SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS ARE CLEARLY SPELLED OUT IN PUBLIC AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS. HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD BEEN TO HANOI WITH ALIYEV LAST FALL, AND THAT SPECULATION ABOUT ALLEGED SRV UNHAPPINESS OVER SINO-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT WAS UNFOUNDED.

BIOGRAPHICS

11. IN RESPONSE TO POLCOUNS' INQUIRY, ZAYTSEV GAVE A SHORT AUTOBIOGRAPHIC SKETCH. AFTER SERVICE IN VIETNAM AND IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEPARTMENT IN THE 1960'S, WHEN HE WORKED UNDER KAPITSA, ZAYTSEV COMPLETED A DISSERTATION FOR A PH.D. (KANDIDAT) IN ECONOMICS. HE RETURNED TO THE SOVIET MFA IN 1971, SERVING IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT. LATER HE WORKED (1972-77) AS A COUNSELOR AT THE SOVIET MISSION TO UN ORGANIZATIONS IN GENEVA. HE RETURNED TO MOSCOW IN 1977 TO WORK ON AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND IN THE SECOND EUROPEAN DIVISION. FROM 1979 UNTIL HIS APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN DIVISION IN MARCH 1983, ZAYTSEV WAS AN ASSISTANT TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN THE MFA SECRETARIAT. HE TRAVELLED WITH GROMYKO, INCLUDING ONE UN TRIP WHEN GROMYKO MET SECRETARY HAIG.
HARTMAN

END OF MESSAGE

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