


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TAGS: PREL, XD, AF, PK, UR US
SUBJECT: CODEL TOWER'S FEBRUARY 17-20 VISIT TO PAKISTAN

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DURING FEBRUARY 17-20 VISIT OF SENATOR TOWER AND CONGRESSMAN JOHN MCCAIN TO PAKISTAN, PRESIDENT ZIA, FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN AND DEFENSE MINISTER TALPUR REVIEWED THE POSITIVE STATE OF CURRENT U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS, EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S MILITARY SALES AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGE, AND PROVIDED AN IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. THE DISCUSSIONS TOUCHED ON PAKISTAN-SOVIET RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE SOVIET FAILURE TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT ZIA PRIVATELY IN MOSCOW. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE BRIEFING REVIEWED THE CHALLENGES CREATED BY THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, ITS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN THE REGION, AND INDIA'S ASPIRATIONS FOR REGIONAL DOMINANCE. NOTWITHSTANDING INDIA'S WAR RHETORIC, THE GOP REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED TO CONDUCTING A "PEACE OFFENSIVE" FOR THE NORMALIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS. PRESIDENT ZIA IS DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE PROSPECT OF LEBANON'S DISINTEGRATION AND A SYRIAN-ISRAELI WAR IF A SHORT-TERM TACTICAL SOLUTION CANNOT BE FOUND. HE IS MOST PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND DISTURBED BY THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN IRANIAN VICTORY FOR REGIONAL STABILIT

AT THE END OF THE MOD BRIEFING ON PAKISTAN'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, SECRETARY GENERAL RAHIM KHAN AND LT. GEN. ARIF ASKED SENATOR TOWER'S ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING

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FAVORABLE NDPC RECONSIDERATION FOR RELEASE OF THE AIM-9L STINGER POST AND COPPERHEAD. PRESIDENT ZIA AT DINNER ESSENTIALLY FOLLOWED THE SAME LINE, INCLUDING EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN AIM-9L, ETC. END SUMMARY.

3. THE HIGHLIGHTS OF CODEL TOWER'S FEBRUARY 17-20 VISIT TO PAKISTAN WERE THE MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT ZIA AND FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN, AND AN IN-DEPTH SECURITY BRIEFING CHAIRED BY MOD SECRETARY GENERAL RAHIM KHAN AND CHIEF OF STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL K.M. ARIF. CODEL TOWER ALSO MET NWFP GOVERNOR FAZLE HAQ IN PESHAWAR AND TRAVELED TO MICHNI POINT OVERLOOKING THE PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER AT TORKHAM. THE PLANNED VISIT TO AN AFGHAN REFUGEE CAMP HAD TO BE DROPPED AS BAD WEATHER CANCELLED USE OF A PAF HELICOPTER EXTENDING THE TRAVEL TIME BETWEEN ISLAMABAD AND THE NWFP.

PAKISTAN'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:

4. ISI DEPUTY DIRECTOR NIAZI'S BRIEFING ON PAKISTAN'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT EMPHASIZED THE LONG-TERM PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE CONTINUING SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA'S DRIVE FOR A DOMINANT POSITION IN SOUTH ASIA. THE 1979 INVASION WAS A DELIBERATE STRATEGIC MOVE TO ESTABLISH A SOVIET REGIONAL PRESENCE ON A PERMANENT BASIS. THE GOP VIEWS SOVIET LONG-TERM STRATEGY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN AS THE WHITTLING DOWN OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE BY FORCE AND SUBVERSION, NEUTRALIZATION OF PAKISTAN, GRADUAL INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN AS PART OF THE SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, AND THE SOVIETIZATION OF THAT COUNTRY. THE GOP VIEWS INDIA AS A WILLING PARTNER IN SOVIET EFFORTS TO WIN THE SUPPORT OF REGIONAL COUNTRIES FOR THIS LONG-TERM STRATEGY. PAKISTAN ALSO VIEWS IRAN'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE AS ANOTHER SOURCE OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY, AND BELIEVES THAT BOTH INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE INCREASING THEIR EFFORTS TO GAIN A FOOTHOLD IN IRAN THROUGH OFFERS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. PAKISTAN REMAINS COMMITTED TO RESISTING THESE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL THREATS TO ITS SECURITY AND TO DOING ITS SHARE TO PREVENT A DEFINITIVE SOVIET CONSOLIDATION IN AFGHANISTAN.

AFGHANISTAN:

5. IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR TOWER'S QUERY ABOUT SOVIET PROSPECTS, NIAZI INDICATED THAT PAKISTAN VIEWS THE SOVIET TIME-FRAME FOR DOMINATION OF AFGHANISTAN AS EXTENDING TO A GENERATION AND A HALF. THEY PROBABLY HAVE WRITTEN OFF THE OLDER GENERATION AND ARE CONCENTRATING ON INDOCTRINATION AND EDUCATION OF A NEW GENERATION. THEY HOPE OVER 20-25 YEARS TO ABSORB AFGHANISTAN AS A SOVIET

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SATELLITE. IN THE SHORT TERM, IN THE GOP VIEW, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL INCREASE THEIR TROOP PRESENCE AS THIS PROBABLY WOULD LEAD TO STRONG REACTIONS BY THE U.S. AND CHINA AS WELL AS ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SOVIET POSTURE IN OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. DURING 1983 THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WAS OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE IN BOTH THE NORTH (NEAR THE SOVIET BORDER) AND IN PAKTIA AN PAKTIKA PROVINCES IN THE SOUTH. AS LT. GEN. FAZLE HAQ PUT IT, IN THE SHORT RUN THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO PACIFY AFGHANISTAN ONLY AT A VERY HEAVY COST. AT THE

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SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS RETAIN A HOT-PURSUIT OPTION WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO FACE PAKISTAN WITH A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO DEFEND ITS BORDERS AND NATIONAL INTEGRITY.

INDIA:

6. AT THE MOD BRIEFING, SENATOR TOWER WAS TOLD THAT PAKISTAN VIEWS INDIA'S CONNECTION WITH THE USSR AS ITS "PRINCIPAL WORRY". THE USSR AND INDIA HAVE COMMON INTERESTS IN TRYING TO SUBDUCE AND WEAKEN PAKISTAN, AND TO ALTER THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO PAKISTAN'S DISADVANTAGE. INDIA'S CLOSE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CONNECTIONS WITH THE USSR PRECLUDE IT FROM SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGING ITS PRESENT POLICIES. GENERAL ARIF SAID THAT MRS. GANDHI DELIBERATELY PLAYS EAST AGAINST WEST IN ORDER TO EXTRACT MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE FOR INDIA. FOR EXAMPLE, SHE USES LIMITED ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE WEST TO GET MORE FROM THE SOVIETS WHILE CONVERSELY CITING THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN TO EXTRACT MORE CONCESSIONS FROM THE WEST. SIMILARLY, INDIA DOES NOT WANT TO FINALLY RESOLVE ITS BORDER PROBLEMS WITH CHINA AS THIS ALSO WOULD DIMINISH ITS LEVERAGE WITH BOTH THE USSR AND THE WEST.

PAKISTAN'S POSTURE TOWARD REGIONAL STATES:

7. NOTWITHSTANDING THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND RHETORIC FROM INDIA ABOUT THE THREAT OF WAR, FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN STRESSED PAKISTAN'S COMMITMENT TO WAGING "A PEACE OFFENSIVE" TOWARD INDIA. HE AND FOREIGN SECRETARY NAIK REITERATED PAKISTAN'S DESIRE TO HAVE POSITIVE RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND THEIR HOPE THAT THE PRESENT DOWNTURN IN RELATIONS WILL ONLY BE TEMPORARY. IN PRIVATE MEETING WITH SENATOR TOWER, CONGRESSMAN MCCAIN, AND AMBASSADOR, FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN TALKED OF INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN. HE LAMENTED INDIAN ACTIONS AND TALK OF WAR, BUT SAID PAKISTAN WOULD PERSEVERE WITH ITS POLICY OF NOT ALLOWING ITSELF TO BE PROVOKED AND OF WAGING A PEACE OFFENSIVE. ON AFGHANISTAN, HE SEEMED A BIT MORE PESSIMISTIC IN HIS ASSESSMENT THAN SOMETIMES. HOWEVER, HE CONCLUDED THAT FACED WITH CONTINUING WAR AND SOVIET THREATS, PAKISTAN'S POLICY COULD BE SUMMED UP AS "DEFIANCE, COURAGE, AND FORTITUDE."

PAKISTAN AND THE USSR:

8. FOREIGN SECRETARY NIAZ NIAK, IN DOWNPLAYING SOVIET FAILURE TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT ZIA PRIVATELY, EXPLAINED THAT THIS REFLECTS CURRENT SOVIET FOCUS ON THE WEST AND DISARMAMENT WHEREAS AT THE BREZHNEV FUNERAL THE SOVIETS CONCENTRATED ON SOUTH ASIAN PROBLEMS. COMMENT: THE PAKISTANIS WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT PRESIDENT ZIA WAS NOT RECEIVED AND THIS IS A FACE SAVING EXPLANATION. YAQUB'S LINE (HARDER THAN HIS PRE-FUNERAL TONE) "IN FACE OF THREATS, DEFIANCE" SUGGESTS THE SOVIETS DID NOT SCORE BY SPURNING PRESIDENT ZIA.

U.S. PAKISTAN RELATIONS:

9. AT PRESIDENT ZIA'S DINNER FOR CODEL TOWER, THE PRESIDENT SAID RELATIONS WERE EXCELLENT. HE HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH U.S. OTHER THAN DELAYS, MENTIONED ALMOST AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT BUT MENTIONED DELIBERATELY, IN PROCUREMENT OF THE THREE ITEMS HE UNDERSTOOD HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS (AIM 9L, STINGER POST AND COPPERHEAD). AT SENATOR TOWER'S REQUEST HE DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH THE MIDDLE EAST OUTLOOK (SE

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PARAS 11-12 BELOW). AS PRESIDENT ZIA WAS PAINTING THE SITUATION IN BLEAK TERMS, SENATOR TOWER INQUIRED NOT SO

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INNOCENTLY IF IT WOULD NOT BE A GOOD IDEA FOR DEFENSE OFFICIALS OF BOTH SIDES TO MEET TOGETHER FROM TIME TO TIME TO TRADE IDEAS. ZIA AGREED AND SAID HE HAD TOLD SECRETARY WEINBERGER THIS COULD BE DONE. HE LOOKED UP WITH A MORE OR LESS PUZZLED AIR AS IF TO ASK WHAT GOES. FOREIGN SECRETARY NIAZ NAIK SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED EXPLAIN THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD DRAFTED A REPLY AND IT WAS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, ETC. ZIA THEN OBSERVED THAT AS A NEW COMER TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT PAKISTAN IS SOMETIMES "MORE CATHOLIC THAN THE POPE." COMMENT: WHETHER THIS EXCHANGE WILL BREAK THE LOG JAM ON THE MILITARY PLANNING GROUP REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT THE MESSAGE HAS AGAIN BEEN DELIVERED.

10. DURING THE MOD BRIEFING, SECRETARY GENERAL RAHIM KHAN AND GENERAL ARIF RENEWED THE GOP REQUESTS FOR NDCP RECONSIDERATION OF THESE THREE OUTSTANDING MILITARY ITEM GENERAL ARIF NOTED THAT DURING PRESIDENT ZIA-SECDEF WEINBERGER'S MEETING IN WASHINGTON IN DECEMBER 1982, PAK ISTAN HAD REQUESTED FAVORABLE ACTION ON FIVE ITEMS. TWO OF THESE--THE ALR-69 AND HARPOON MISSILE--HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED. THE OUTSTANDING ITEMS PENDING NDCP APPROVAL ARE THE AIM-9L MISSILE, STINGER POST AND COPPERHEAD. IN ASKING SENATOR TOWER TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF FAVORABLE ACTION, GENERAL ARIF MADE THREE POINTS: (A) PRESIDENT ZIA TOLD SECRETARY WEINBERG IN ISLAMABAD IN OCTOBER 1983 THAT HE HAS GIVEN FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PAF TO SHOOT DOWN THE NEXT SOVIET AIRPLANE INVADING PAKISTANI AIRSPACE PROVIDED IT CAN BE BROUGHT DOWN ON PAKISTANI TERRITORY. PROVISION OF THE AIM-9L MISSILE WILL HELP TO MAKE THIS POSSIBLE. THE GOP IS CONCERNED THAT CONTINUED SOVIET AIR VIOLATIONS WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE PAF RESPONSE WILL REINFORCE PUBLIC CONCERNS THAT THE BORDER CANNOT BE PROTECTED. THIS IN TURN WILL AFFECT THE GOVERNMENT'S CREDIBILITY IN ASSURING THE PUBLIC THAT IT CAN DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION. (B) THE GOP AS A POOR COUNTRY CAN ONLY INDUCT EQUIPMENT WITH A 20 YEA TIME FRAME. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS PRECLUDE PURCHASING THE STINGER BASIC, ONLY TO REPLACE IT WITH STINGER POST IN FIVE YEARS. THIS IN GENERAL IS THE REASON WHY PAKISTAN HAS REQUESTED THE BEST AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY FROM THE USG; AND (C) FULFILLMENT OF GOP REQUESTS FOR HIGH-TECHNOLOGY ITEMS WILL ENABLE PAKISTAN TO ASSURE OTHE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES THAT THE U.S. IS READY TO HELP ITS FRIENDS. INDIRECTLY THIS WILL ASSIST IN BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. POSITION IN THE THIRD WORLD. SENATOR TOWER SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PAKISTAN'S REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD EXPLORE THE STATUS OF THESE OUTSTANDING REQUEST UPON HIS RETURN TO THE U.S.

THE MIDDLE EAST:

11. ON LEBANON PRESIDENT ZIA SEEMED TO FAVOR MASSIVE U.S. INTERVENTION, BUT ALSO RECOGNIZED IT MUCH LESS LIKELY IN AN ELECTION YEAR. HE FORESEES BREAKUP OF LEBANON INTO FIVE CANTONS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER SYRIAN-ISRAELI WAR IF LEBANESE UNITY AND INDEPENDENCE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED. FOREIGN MINISTERYAQUB KHAN'S ASSESSMENT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF FINDING A SHORT TERM TACTICAL SOLUTION TO PREVENT A FURTHER DETERIORATIO

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THE UNDERLYING STRATEGIC REALITY, HE SAID, IS THAT A POWER VACUUM LOOMS AHEAD IN LEBANON. SYRIA'S GOAL APPEARS TO BE THE EXPANSION OF ITS INFLUENCE IN LEBANON IN COOPERATION WITH THE MILITANT WING OF THE PLO. THIS WILL PUT PRESSURE ON JORDAN AND THE OTHER ARAB MODERATE STATES. IF ISRAEL DOES NOT ACCEPT THIS, AS IT PROBABLY WILL NOT, A CONFLICT BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL COULD BECOME "STRATEGICALLY INEVITABLE." THE MODERATES DO NOT FAVOR SYRIAN EXPANSION BUT THEY ARE INSISTING, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO, THAT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY FROM LEBANON. THE EGYPTIANS SAY THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IS AN ARAB PROBLEM WHICH THE ARABS THEMSELVES MUST RESOLVE. THEY THEREFORE SUPPORT ABROGATION OF THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT AS THE FIRST STEP TO WORKING OUT A NEW MODUS VIVENDI. YAQUB BELIEVES THAT THE SOVIETS WILL STAY DIPLOMATICALLY ACTIVE BUT WILL BE RELUCTANT TO BE DRAWN MILITARILY INTO AN ISRAELI-SYRIAN CONFLICT. THIS IN EFFECT WOULD BE DRAGGING THEM INTO A GLOBAL CONFLICT AT A TIME AND PLACE NOT OF THEIR CHOOSING.

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IRAN-IRAQ WAR:

12. ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR PRESIDENT ZIA ELABORATED HIS CONCERN THAT IRAN BECAUSE OF SUPERIOR MANPOWER AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH WILL EVENTUALLY PREVAIL WITH DIRE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SHIA-SUNNI BALANCE OF POWER WITHIN THE ISLAMIC WORLD. HE FORESEES A DEFEATED IRAQ WITH ITS HEAVILY SHI POPULATION ALLIED WITH IRAN, SYRIA, AND SHIAS IN LEBANON EXERTING ENORMOUS AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE PRESSURE ON THE GULF STATES. PRESIDENT ZIA USED WORDS SUCH AS "TERRIBLE" AND "MADNESS" TO DESCRIBE THE SITUATION. THE WORST OF IT FOR HIM SEEMED TO BE THAT IT WAS A SENSELESS WAR DIVIDING ISLAM ALONG ARAB AND NON-ARAB LINES. HE THOUGHT THAT THE BEST THAT COULD BE HOPED FOR NOW WAS A CONTINUING STALEMATE. ONLY IF KHOMEINI OR SADDAM HUSSAIN WERE OUT OF THE PICTURE DID HE THINK A CEASE FIRE COULD BE NEGOTIATED.

13. THIS MESSAGE WAS PREPARED FOLLOWING SENATOR TOWER'S DEPARTURE AND WAS NOT CLEARED WITH HIM.

14. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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END OF MESSAGE

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