Approved For Release 2009/01/30: CIA-RDP90B01370R000300390021-4 TS Aug 84 CIACIS STAT 05WR/584 SVASTAT GERSHWIN NIOLSP! BUILDING ROOM NO. REMARKS: We need to organize a briefing(s) for OTA per the attached request. Could you talk among vourselves STAT (Gershwin reasonable and least disruptive way of assisting OTA and call us with your ideas. FROM: OLL ROOM NO. BUILDING STAT 7B02 Hqs. **開始 241**

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JOHN H GIBBONS

August 10, 1984

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Central Inteligence Agency Office of Legislative Liaison Room 7B02 Washington, D.C. 20505

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Thank you again for arranging the informative meeting earlier this week on anti-satellite weapons issues between some of our staff and some of your analysts. As you know, the ASAT Technical Memorandum we are working on is part of a larger study of "New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies," a study requested of OTA by the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In carrying out this study, it would be of great help to us to be able to explore the following points with relevant CIA analytic staff:

- 1) Description of current Soviet BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) research, development and testing.
- 2) Likely Soviet policies toward BMD and the ABM Treaty in the absence of any U.S. intitiatives in these areas.
- 3) Strategic implications of U.S. SDI development and deployment, including / political and arms control implications -- specifically for ABM treaty.
- 4) Plausible Soviet countermeasures to SDI deployment including changes in offensive forces (ballistic missiles, bombers, cruise missiles).
- 5) Plausible Soviet analogous responses to SDI, such as directed energy system development, conventional Soviet ABM systems.
- 6) The Soviet record to date on compliance with the ABM Treaty.
- 7) U.S. capabilities (current and future) for verifying current and possible future arms control agreements on ballistic missile defenses (including national technical means and cooperative arrangements.

I realize that this is a rather full menu of issues, so, if necessary, we are prepared to make more than one visit to cover it. We would appreciate having the first meeting as soon as possible after Labor Day, September 3, 1984. I should add that our ability to keep that appointment is contingent upon final approval of SCI clearances for two of our staff whose applications are

still pending. The members			clearances who wou	ıld
Dr. Peter Sharfman, Program Dr. Thomas Karas, Project I Dr. Robert Rochlin, Senior Control and Disarmament Age	Manager, Inter Director, New Ba Analyst (his SC	national Security llistic Missile E I clearances are	Defense Technologi through the Arms	25x
In addition, we would hope have received their SCI cle				7
Dr. Alan Shaw, Senior Analyst	78t			/25x
Should the new clearances a postponement of the meeting				25x
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Thank you again for your he Sincerely,	erb.	V. C 14 1	200	~ > 1/
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