

OLL 84-296#5

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SUSPENSE 27 Aug 1984  
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OLL 84-2965/1  
7 September 1984

**OTA**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing for Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) Staffers

1. On 7 September 1984, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) staffers Peter Sharman, Tom Karas, and Alan Shaw were briefed on the topics listed in their letter (attached) of 10 August 1984. CIA briefers were Larry Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer/Strategic Programs (NIO/SP); Doug [redacted] ANIO/SP; [redacted] Office of Scientific and Weapons Research; and [redacted] [redacted] of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff. The briefing was conducted at the TS/Codeword level. [redacted]

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2. Mr. Gershwin led off the briefing with an overview of Soviet strategic defense systems. Using vu-graphs, he discussed the rationale and doctrine underlying Moscow's strategic defense program, its protection priorities, its R&D efforts, the Moscow ABM system, and the prospect for ABM deployment nationwide. [redacted]

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3. This presentation was followed by a briefing on directed energy by [redacted]. He discussed the relevant technology in the USSR and the history of its development. Included in the briefing was discussion of intelligence gaps and problems in analyzing how far along the Soviets might be in developing a space-based laser weapon. [redacted]

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4. Due to lack of time, the arms control aspect of Soviet compliance with existing treaties was not covered. This may be handled at a later date. The OTA staffers expressed appreciation for the two-hour briefing given today.

[redacted]

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LEGISLATIVE LIAISON  
 84-2965

August 10, 1984

STAT

[Redacted]  
 Central Intelligence Agency  
 Office of Legislative Liaison  
 Room 7B02  
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear [Redacted]

STAT

Thank you again for arranging the informative meeting earlier this week on anti-satellite weapons issues between some of our staff and some of your analysts. As you know, the ASAT Technical Memorandum we are working on is part of a larger study of "New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies," a study requested of OTA by the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In carrying out this study, it would be of great help to us to be able to explore the following points with relevant CIA analytic staff:

- 1) Description of current Soviet BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) research, development and testing.
- 2) Likely Soviet policies toward BMD and the ABM Treaty in the absence of any U.S. initiatives in these areas.
- 3) Strategic implications of U.S. SDI development and deployment, including political and arms control implications -- specifically for ABM treaty.
- 4) Plausible Soviet countermeasures to SDI deployment including changes in offensive forces (ballistic missiles, bombers, cruise missiles).
- 5) Plausible Soviet analogous responses to SDI, such as directed energy system development, conventional Soviet ABM systems.
- 6) The Soviet record to date on compliance with the ABM Treaty.
- 7) U.S. capabilities (current and future) for verifying current and possible future arms control agreements on ballistic missile defenses (including national technical means and cooperative arrangements).

I realize that this is a rather full menu of issues, so, if necessary, we are prepared to make more than one visit to cover it. We would appreciate having the first meeting as soon as possible after Labor Day, September 3, 1984. I should add that our ability to keep that appointment is contingent upon final approval of SCI clearances for two of our staff whose applications are

still pending. The members of our staff with current SCI clearances who would probably attend these meetings are as follows:

Dr. Peter Sharfman, Program Manager, International Security and Commerce  
Dr. Thomas Karas, Project Director, New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies  
Dr. Robert Rochlin, Senior Analyst (his SCI clearances are through the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from which we have him on detail)

In addition, we would hope that by September the following two people would have received their SCI clearances and would also be able to attend:

Dr. Alan Shaw, Senior Analyst  
Dr. Gerald Epstein, Analyst.

Should the new clearances not yet have been granted, we would hope that postponement of the meeting to a mutually convenient time could be arranged.

If there are any documents that it would be useful for us to read beforehand, we would appreciate access to them. (I believe that our security officer, Tom McGurn, will be contacting you about arranging for CIA approval of OTA secure storage facilities for non-SCI classified materials.)

Thank you again for your help.

Sincerely,



Thomas H. Karas