
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY







Director, Office of Legislative Liaison

19 December 1984

NOTE TO: EX DIR

DDCI

REF:

Office of Technology Assessment Request

- I think you both ought to weigh in on this issue.
- I have discovered sevéral recent examples of the absence of institutional memory here, occasioned by reorganization and rapid turnover of personnel, being the cause of distrust between the Agency and the Congress.
- In fact, and I have concluded that the root cause of almost all of our current difficulties is distrust: us of them in a security context; them of us in a information denial context.
- I'm asking, with regard to the attached exchange with OTA whether this is the smartest way to go.

Charles A. Briggs

DDI CC:

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Central Intelligence Agency

OLL 84-4571/1



Washington, D. C. 20505

Mr. Peter Sharfman
Program Manager
International Security and Commerce Program
Office of Technology Assessment
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Sharfman:

I am writing in response to your letter of 28 November 1984 requesting additional support from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in connection with your study on Soviet ballistic missile defense.

As you know, the CIA has provided OTA with a great deal of assistance on this study. Since August 1984 some 17 Agency intelligence officers, including—at your specific request—the National Intelligence Officers for Strategic Programs and for the Soviet Union, have participated in three separate briefings for you and your colleagues. The most recent of these briefings occurred on 10 December, involved seven Agency officers, and lasted three hours.

In your letter of 28 November you also requested access to six classified Agency reports, including two National Intelligence Estimates and a typescript manuscript whose dissemination was limited to its requester. Senior managers of the Agency have carefully considered your request for access to these documents. It has been determined, however, that your request must be denied because of the particularly sensitive intelligence sources and methods used in preparing the documents. As you know, the Director of Central Intelligence is required by statute to protect intelligence sources and methods, and this responsibility requires us to withhold the documents in question. We note, however, that the documents -- with the exception of the limited distribution typescript which is an internal document--are available to the Congressional Committees (Senate Foreign Relations and House Armed Services) that commissioned your OTA study should they need to review them.

In your letter you cited your experience in 1980 when you and other OTA staffers were given special compartmented clearances in connection with your study on the MX missile. You have been able to retain these special clearances, but retention of such clearances does not ensure your access to reports bearing that classification. Indeed, access to reports is governed on a strict need to know basis and by the Director's statutory mandate to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

We hope that you and your associates have found your briefings from CIA officers helpful to you in your study. We regret that we cannot provide you additional assistance at this time.

Sincerely,

Charles A. Briggs
Director, Office of Legislative Liaison