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Remarks

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Executive Secretary

25 May '88

Date

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
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
May 23, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: United States Policy Towards Indochina (S)


Attached are the approved terms of reference for a review of
United States Policy Towards Indochina. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Colin L. Powell

Attachment



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THE WHITE HOUSE

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May 23, 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY
DIRECTIVE NO. 1-88UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS INDOCHINA (S)Introduction

This National Security Study Directive (NSSD) establishes the terms of reference for an interagency review of United States policy towards Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). A review is warranted in light of recent developments that could potentially affect United States interests in the region. (S)

Scope

The review should cover all three Indochinese states, with particular focus on the Cambodian conflict. (S)

The review should discuss existing policies towards Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos, examine the implications of recent developments for our policy objectives, and, if necessary, recommend policy adjustments. (S)

The Cambodian Conflict

Assess the situation on the ground in Cambodia, including Vietnamese military options and the relative strength and prospects of the various Cambodian factions. (S)

Assess recent diplomatic developments, e.g., Prince Sihanouk's activities, including his meetings with Phnom Penh Prime Minister Hun Sen, and the efforts of Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas to organize a Jakarta "cocktail party." (S)

Review the positions of the governments with significant influence and interests in the Cambodian conflict, including:

- Vietnam: Vietnamese objectives and intentions in Cambodia. Possibility of diplomatic flexibility and prospect of entering serious negotiations. Prospects for withdrawal by 1990.

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- China: Prospects for PRC willingness/ability to control Khmer Rouge as part of settlement. Chinese strategic objectives in event of settlement (and in its absence). Likelihood of Chinese support for settlement leading to diminished role for Khmer Rouge and leadership by Prince Sihanouk.
- Thailand/ASEAN: Prospects for continued unified ASEAN support for opposition to Vietnamese occupation. Implications for ASEAN cohesion of a) continued Vietnamese intransigence or b) rapid movement toward settlement. Thailand's likely stance towards the Khmer Rouge in a settlement. Implications of ASEAN trade with Vietnam for U.S./ASEAN strategy (and possible United States isolation on this issue).
- The Soviet Union: Possibility of its playing constructive role in urging Hanoi to negotiate/withdraw, and in guaranteeing a settlement. Utility of Afghan agreement as a model for Cambodia. (S)

Current United States policy towards the Cambodian conflict emphasizes: support for ASEAN and Prince Sihanouk, support for the diplomatic/economic isolation of Vietnam, support for the Cambodian non-communist resistance, and opposition to the return of the Khmer Rouge. Examine whether/how our policy focus should change in order to hasten an acceptable outcome, including whether we should, for example:

- Attempt to further strengthen coordination with ASEAN, e.g., to increase economic and diplomatic pressure on Hanoi (and put the burden more clearly on Vietnam for lack of movement toward settlement).
- Review with ASEAN governments whether we should also seek to develop positive incentives to encourage Vietnamese flexibility.
- Increase our public support for and coordination with Prince Sihanouk.
- Increase the levels or change the mix of our aid to the non-communist resistance to prepare it for competition with the Khmer Rouge and/or counter the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea/Peoples Army of Vietnam (PRK/PAVN).
- Examine the need for better defined United States position on what (if any) Khmer Rouge involvement in the negotiations and post-settlement period is acceptable.

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- Explore the utility of developing with ASEAN and China a framework to control the Khmer Rouge and consider how such a framework could be used to increase the pressure on Vietnam to negotiate.
- Examine the possibility and utility of more active/detailed dialogue with Soviets on Cambodia. Consider how to limit gains that might accrue to Soviets from their more active involvement.
- Explore whether/how to raise Cambodia directly with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Can our willingness to normalize in the context of a settlement be used to encourage the Vietnamese to compromise? Are there other inducements, short of normalization, we could employ to encourage further movement? Would any dialogue with Hanoi on these issues vitiate our overall strategy/leverage? What would the effect be on Soviet attitudes towards Hanoi?
- Consider whether increased U.S./Lao cooperation would affect the Cambodian equation. (S)

Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos: Humanitarian Issues

Review the current status of our efforts to achieve POW/MIA accounting and other humanitarian objectives (political prisoners, Amerasians, Orderly Departure Program (ODP)), and address, inter alia:

- Vietnam: What additional incentives or cooperative arrangements can be developed to maximize Vietnamese responses on humanitarian issues without undermining our Cambodian policy?
- Laos: How can we improve Lao cooperation on humanitarian issues and what measures can be used to decrease their involvement in the narcotics trade?
- Cambodia: How can we bring pressure to bear on Cambodia to return through international/humanitarian channels the remains of Americans that they claim to hold? (S)

The study shall be conducted on a strict need-to-know basis by an interagency group chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. It should be completed by June 13, 1988. (C)

Ronald Reagan

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