

ESSAY | William Safire

Spilling the NID

WASHINGTON

William Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, appears to be getting nervous in the service on the subject of leaks. Having been made the laughingstock of world spookery by his mishandling of the defector Yurchenko, he is now threatening journalists with jail terms for publishing secrets other than those leaked from the top.

He is joined in this always-popular pastime of intimidation by David Durenberger, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, whose heavily publicized midlife crisis makes him seem, in my opinion, eager to show he has not become a blabbermouth.

Let me put forward my own National Estimate of the crackbrained crackdown.

John McMahon, until two months ago the C.I.A.'s Deputy Director, was the product of its intelligence-gathering side, and resisted Director Casey's policy (with which I agree) of putting missiles in the arms of freedom fighters willing to shoot them at oppressors in Afghanistan, Africa and Nicaragua.

He was booted out and replaced by Robert Gates, who came up through the evaluation rather than gathering branch. Mr. Gates is thus more a driver of spies than a spy by trade; he is comfortable with the Casey covert action, and his pride and joy has been the National Intelligence Daily.

This "NID," with its blue cardboard cover and 10 or 12 pages of information, is the evaluated product of the intelligence community. The circulation is limited to about 200 officials whose lowest clearance is "top secret," and who enjoy the thrill of insidership six mornings a week. (On Sundays they have to rely on the newspapers, and can catch up on what is happening.)

Do not confuse the NID with the P.D.B. — the President's Daily Briefing, in the white cover — which goes to only a handful of people, and which I presume contains poop from the human group as well as from satellites and big ears. (I used to confuse the NID with the New International Dictionary, Merriam-Webster's Unabridged, and found it difficult to understand why spooks were concerned that "the NID is leaking.")

That's it. That's the reason Mr. Casey is having fits, losing sight of the freedoms we hired him to protect: the NID is leaking.

Rather than consider if secrets are coming out of C.I.A. or N.S.A. (No Such Agency), where fooling the polygraph is child's play, the blame is being placed on the consumers of intelligence: the 200 NID subscribers, a third of whom are in the Pentagon.

A scapegoat was needed to send a warning to the list, and to justify the lie detector "experiment" within the Pentagon. After a story appeared in the Evans and Novak column about using Zaire as the distributor of missiles to the Savimbi insurgents in Angola — information that may have been in the NID — Michael Pillsbury, a Defense official, was fluttered and bounced.

"Mike the Pill" was expendable; as a Senate aide in the hard-line "Madison Group" during the Carter era, Mr. Pillsbury was a valued Casey-Weinberger ally; but now the Jesse Helms crowd is losing its clout and the firing of Mike the Pill could serve as a warning to others. Moreover, a head on a platter was needed for Zaire.

Then Bill Casey went a bridge too far. To scare the press, he went to The Washington Post to say that if a certain Bob Woodward story was published, he would recommend prosecution under some untested statute. "I'm not threatening, but . . ."

The Justice Department, however, while willing to go after leakers in Gov-

The C.I.A. tries to spook the press

ernment, is unwilling to join Mr. Casey in chilling the leakees in the press.

One reason is that law enforcement officials have long been aware of, and are discreetly curious about, meetings held in Mr. Casey's home, alone, between the Director and reporter Woodward, who is writing a book about the C.I.A.

I would never ask Bob Woodward about that, because a man's sources or non-sources are nobody's business but his own. But a few months back I put the question buzzing around Justice directly to my old friend Casey.

"I haven't seen Woodward for 18 months," was the gruff reply. No basis at all to the obvious F.B.I. wonderment if Mr. Casey was the source of the stories he most complains about. He does readily admit seeing Mr. Woodward (as he did me) long ago.

I do not suggest that the Director of Central Intelligence has ever been the source of a fact the Government does not want known. But to the extent politicians on background seek to use journalists to advance policy, Mr. Casey and even higher officials are "sources." They will find their outlets turn user-unfriendly when their carrots become sticks.

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The real story
Soviet combat brigades

The STUPIDITY of 'Intelligence'

by Stansfield Turner

The most profound disappointment of my presidency," Jimmy Carter said of the failure to secure Senate ratification of the SALT II agreement. He had staked his presidential prestige and, to a significant extent, his political future on the signing and ratification of the treaty. While many factors combined to put Senate ratification in doubt, the White House thought the prospects hopeful even in an election year; hopeful that is, until an intelligence failure concerning the report of a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba caused a political uproar that seriously damaged the chances for passage of SALT II. Here, Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA at the time, gives his account of the mishandling of the report and the unnecessary damage it caused.

Technology has so increased the amount of information we can acquire that a whole new set of problems has resulted. On the one hand, analysts are inundated with data and must find ways to filter, store, and retrieve what is significant. On the other hand, analysts must be concerned with whether they are receiving everything that is collected in their area of interest; with whether the members of the intelligence

community—the CIA's espionage branch, the NSA [National Security Agency], the Defense organizations responsible for overhead reconnaissance, the CIA's electronic surveillance component, the State Department's diplomatic reporting system, the FBI's foreign intelligence branch, the Defense Intelligence Agency's [DIA] attaches, the intelligence organizations of the military services, and the intelligence offices of the departments of Treasury, Energy, and the Drug Enforcement Agency—all share what they collect. An unfortunate example of information not being shared adequately came in the summer of 1979. It led to the most serious intelligence failure of my tenure. The failure to forecast the fall of the Shah earlier that year was of far less significance than our mishandling of the report that a "combat brigade" of Soviet troops was in Cuba. Had we predicted the Shah's fall from power even six or seven months ahead of time, there was little the United States could have done to prevent it. The reporting on the combat brigade, however, did play a direct part in scuttling the SALT II arms control treaty with the Soviet Union.

In June 1979 President Carter had met with President Brezhnev and signed the SALT II treaty. The Senate was preparing to hold its initial hearings on ratification when, on July 18, the *Washington Star* reported, "Sen. Richard Stone,

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WASHINGTON POST
 16 November 1985

Joint Ceremony to Cap Summit

Soviets Resolve 10 of 25 Divided-Family Cases, State Dept. Says

By Lou Cannon and David Hoffman
 Washington Post Staff Writers

President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev have agreed to add a joint appearance Thursday at the end of their meetings in Geneva, where they are likely to sign cultural and air-safety agreements and to review the summit, White House officials said yesterday.

In another development, the State Department said last night that the Soviets had resolved 10 of the 25 U.S.-Soviet cases involving separated spouses, dual nationals and divided families.

Prior to this month, only three separated spouses had received exit visas over the past 1½ years and only one dual national case was resolved within the last year. The gesture was termed by a senior department official as "a signal prior to the summit" of Soviet willingness to resolve the problems.

These developments came as Reagan prepared to depart this morning for Geneva and the first superpower summit since 1979. Sources said that Reagan and Gorbachev are expected to agree to establish a regular process of consultation, including future summit conferences.

A senior White House official said that the Thursday ceremony that has been added to the summit schedule also could include either joint or separate statements by the two leaders on summit accomplishments.

Describing the Thursday ceremony, a senior official said: "As we see it now, the two leaders in some public forum would sign the documents [and] would each make a statement. Ours would probably be on how we saw the summit. Then there would be some more casual conversation between the two, and they'd leave."

The senior official said that Gorbachev is "the head of the Communist Party and a very staunch advocate of his cause" and that Reagan is under no illusions that the meetings will be easy.

"You cannot expect him to be soft, you cannot expect him to be genial, you cannot expect him to be anything except what he is, leader of the Soviet people and a very dynamic person," the official said.

Reagan spent his last day in Washington in an hour-long National Security Council meeting reviewing summit themes. An official said the president's advisers "don't want to overload him" with briefing material and added that Reagan was rereading earlier papers that had been given him.

Reagan also met during the day with Sens. Pete Wilson (R-Calif.), and Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.).

They presented a petition signed by 37 colleagues urging Reagan not to agree to restrictions on his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The senators said they shared Reagan's view "that SDI is too important to be traded for marginal improvements in the status quo."

"The quest for a world free of 'push button' Armageddon must not be abandoned for short-term gains in the superpower thermostat," the senators said. "Ironically, we have let the Soviets make real progress on their campaign against our SDI, while they proceed apace on their own."

Earlier this week, Reagan was briefed on the Soviet Union by three CIA analysts.

Staff writer Don Oberdorfer
 contributed to this report.

Managing 'the Fudge Factory'

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 24 — As Ronald I. Spiers tells it, he was happily at work as Ambassador to Pakistan when he complained offhandedly to Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who was passing through Islamabad, about the way the State Department was managed worldwide.

The next thing he knew, Mr. Shultz was asking him to return to Washington to become Under Secretary of State for Management. Mr. Shultz's first choice as head of management, a corporate expert in the field, had given up in disgust after less than a year of trying to put order into what has affectionately been called "the Fudge Factory."

The problems of the State Department are so long-standing — inadequate resources, cliquish personnel policies and a pervasive feeling that what most officers do has little impact on foreign policy — that being head of management is viewed by many in the department as an invitation to frustration. Mr. Spiers said he took the job because after complaining to Mr. Shultz "I could hardly tell him I preferred to stay where I was."

Mr. Spiers, a veteran of the Foreign Service, has in recent months begun speaking out candidly about his unhappiness with the state of affairs at Foggy Bottom, and he is quick to say that not much has changed yet. He recently gave a speech to the American Foreign Service Association, the trade union for the State Department, and excerpts from that speech appear in the current issues of the Foreign Service Journal and the State Department's own house organ.

In his view, not only does the State Department not receive enough money to do its job well, but it has failed to manage well the resources it has, namely a dedicated corps of diplomats.

In a way Mr. Spiers may have discovered the wheel. It has long been known that a disproportionate number of competent diplomats had little

to do. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk complained in the early 1960's that the department had "too many chiefs and not enough Indians."

Mr. Spiers makes the same point when he says: "We have too many senior officers who cannot be placed in jobs appropriate to their rank" and "currently, 40 senior officers are overcomplement" (doing "make-work" jobs). In part, this is because of politics. Since 1981, he says, 23 ambassadorial or other senior assignments have moved from career to

'At the heart of many problems is a loss of discipline.'

—Ronald I. Spiers

political appointees. Even the most respected category is not immune. Of 40 career ministers, the absolute cream of the foreign service, seven are without meaningful jobs, he says.

Many officers, particularly those without challenging assignments, complain that despite all sorts of objective criteria that are supposed to be used to rank officers and to select the best for promotion, in the end it all depends on whom one knows in a position of power. An officer may have performed superbly in some far-off embassy, but usually has less chance of getting a top position than does a talented aide to a senior official in Washington.

For instance, it is regarded in the State Department as a passport to a prized overseas assignment to spend two or three years as a senior aide to

a high official. In fairness to those officers, they do put in 18-hour days and long weekends, and the toll on their personal lives is often heavy.

Too often, Mr. Spiers says, assignments depend "more on whom you know than whether you are the best for the job or the job is best for you." The system today penalizes officers "who are less visible to the decision-makers in Washington" and fails to insure "equitable sharing of hardship assignments," he says.

"At the heart of many of these problems is a loss of service discipline that, in my view, arises from a sense that the system is not operating equitably," he said. "I see little chance of restoring esprit de corps and a sense of service until we find ways to restore trust in the system and overcome a feeling that nice guys finish last."

Another major complaint of Mr. Spiers is the lack of funds given to the State Department for its basic job. The budget is about \$2 billion annually, which, as Mr. Spiers points out, is less than one percent of the Pentagon's budget.

Moreover, he says, despite the mystique attached to the Central Intelligence Agency and other clandestine operations, 70 percent of the material in the President's supersecret morning report covering crucial overnight international developments comes from Foreign Service reporting. And yet, in the last decade, there has been an 18 percent cut in the number of people "devoted to economic and political reporting and analysis — the heart of the department's responsibilities — as we had to meet increases in consular workloads and provide administrative support for other agencies."

"What we have done, year after year, is thin the soup," Mr. Spiers said.

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18 September 1984

Soviets testing new ICBMs, CIA reports

By Ted Agres
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Soviet Union is developing and deploying three new types of nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, informed administration sources have told The Washington Times.

This represents a major new effort by the Soviets to upgrade their strategic missile network. It also would place them up to 10 to 15 years ahead of the United States in deployment of comparable strategic missile systems, the sources say.

As part of this effort, the Soviet Union has embarked on a crash program to deploy upwards of 460 new SS-25 nuclear ICBMs at two launch sites before the end of 1985.

According to information recently reported in the CIA's top-secret National Intelligence Daily, the Soviets have accelerated SS-25 flight test programs and are deploying the new missiles at Yoshkar Ola and Yurya. Yoshkar Ola

presently houses SS-13 single-warhead ICBMs, and Yurya is an SS-20 missile complex.

The sources said that 60 triple-warheaded SS-25s are being installed in SS-13 silos at Yoshkar Ola to replace those older single missiles. An additional 200 road-mobile SS-25s each are to be deployed at Yoshkar Ola and Yurya as well for a total of 460.

The sources report that the warhead on the SS-25 is about one-third of the missile's total throw-weight, or payload. This not only violates another provision of SALT II; it also indicates the SS-25 will be covertly deployed with three MIRVed warheads.

The strategic significance of this crash program to deploy 460 new missiles is that it will add 1,380 new warheads by 1985.

In addition, U.S. intelligence officers have identified a totally new missile, the SS-X-27, as being under development. Its liquid-fueled

engines are being tested at the Soviet facility at Dnepropetrovsk and the missile's test silos have been detected at the Tyuratam missile/space center, the sources say.

The SS-X-27 had been foreseen by the Pentagon as an outgrowth of the SS-18 ICBM. But based on the observed size of the SS-X-27's silo, it is believed that the new missile will be significantly larger than the SS-18.

First flight tests of the SS-X-27 are expected in 1986 but could occur as early as next year.

The Soviets, in the past, have maintained that their missile developments are simply modifications of existing systems. The SALT II treaty, by which both the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to abide even though it has not been ratified, prohibits deployment of more than one "new type" ICBM. The Soviets have designated the medium-sized SS-24 as this new type and claim that the SS-25 and others are merely modifications of it, and proper.

Two administration reports on Soviet arms control violations have concluded that the SS-25 represents an illegal second "new type" ICBM. The president's report to Congress, released in January, and the still-classified General Advisory Committee's report on arms

control violations both term the SS-25 as a "probable violation" of SALT II.

The sources say that the evidence is now stronger and the "probable" qualification has been strengthened to "certain" in official reports.

The third new missile, the SS-X-26, has been seen at the Plesetsk test range, the sources reported. Until recently, U.S. intelligence believed that the Soviets would hold off testing the SS-X-26 in flight until after SALT II expires at the end of 1985. But now, the sources say, "it is known it will be flight tested by early 1985."

The SS-X-26, which uses a solid propellant, is a successor to the SS-18, which uses a liquid propellant. The sources said that, based on the observed size of the SS-X-26 silos, it will be "significantly larger" than the SS-18, which can be fitted with up to 14 nuclear warheads.

The silos for the SS-X-26 are said to be larger than those of the SS-18, which would constitute a violation of SALT II limits on silo size.

The sources say that Soviet missile complexes for old, deactivated SS-7 ICBMs are likely sites for future deployments of the road-mobile SS-25s. They identified four such sites at Verkhnyaya Salda, Novosibirsk, Omsk and Tyumen.

The deployment of the SS-25, SS-26, and SS-27 missiles would violate several arms control agreements, the sources say.

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ON PAGE A-4WASHINGTON POST
24 May 1984

CBS Asks Dismissal Westmoreland Suit

By Eleanor Randolph
Washington Post Staff Writer

Libel lawyers for CBS argued yesterday that sworn statements from almost 40 military and intelligence analysts from the Vietnam war years prove the network's charge that the U.S. military command in Vietnam lied about enemy troop strength to bolster political support for the war in the late 1960s.

In a motion asking U.S. District Court Judge Pierre Leval to dismiss a \$120 million libel action against CBS by retired Army Gen. William C. Westmoreland, network lawyers said that "few broadcasts have been as thoroughly researched" as a Mike Wallace program called "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," which ran in January, 1982.

Included in the CBS brief are quotations from letters that a former Army analyst sent his wife.

"You should have seen the antics my people and I had to go through with our computer calculations to make the February strength calculations come out the way the general wanted them to," one read. "We started with the answer and plugged in all sorts of figures until we found the combination the machine would digest."

The writer of the letter, James Meacham, now a journalist in London, has said recently that he was merely dissatisfied with his work and did not mean the letters to be construed years later as evidence of a conspiracy.

The CBS brief also quoted Richard Kovar, a 30-year CIA veteran who now writes President Reagan's daily CIA briefing, as saying that the CBS documentary is "a great service to the intelligence process."

The network brief also contended that Kovar said it should be broadcast annually on the anniversary of the Tet offensive "so that no intelligence analyst, soldier or citizen who watches it will ever let anything like this happen again."

Ronald Smith, a 25-year CIA intelligence officer and analyst who is at the Department of Energy, said that for CBS to call efforts to hold down enemy troop estimates a "conspiracy . . . accurately describes the concerted effort undertaken by military officials to distort and suppress critical intelligence information about the enemy we faced in Vietnam."

Drawing from almost 400,000 documents that have made the CBS documentary a detailed chronicle of one of the crucial periods in the war and an important part of the media, CBS used a rare tactic in the early stage of a libel case, saying that the documentary is true and thus is not libelous. Such an assertion normally awaits the findings of the court as a result of the trial.

As a fallback to a more standard legal position in such cases, CBS lawyer David Boies also argued

that First Amendment protections of a free press in this country should warrant dismissal of Westmoreland's "attempt . . . to impose a price on criticism of the way in which our government's highest officials exercise their official powers" by his filing of the libel suit.

Boies acknowledged that the broadcast has flaws, some of which were the subject of a highly critical article in TV Guide last year and a recently released book charging that CBS set out to "smear" Westmoreland.

But Boies argued that "none of those flaws implicates either the truth of what the broadcast says or CBS' belief in it."

Don Kowet, author of a controversial new book about the documentary, "A Matter of Honor," and Sally Bedell, now with The New York Times, wrote the article in TV Guide, "Anatomy of a Smear—How CBS Broke the Rules and 'Got' Westmoreland."

After the story, CBS conducted an internal investigation that criticized the network for re-interviewing some witnesses unfairly, for not identifying former CIA analyst Sam Adams on the air as a paid CBS consultant and for failing to prove that there was a "conspiracy" by the military to "cook" the figures, as such manipulations are sometimes called.

In June, 1983, CBS suspended the show's producer, George Crile, for taping telephone interviews with former secretary of defense Robert S. McNamara and others without their knowledge. The tapes and the internal CBS investigation have become a part of the voluminous record.

Westmoreland's lawyer, Dan M. Burt, said he could not comment in detail on a motion he had not read. He labeled as "ridiculous" a CBS argument that Westmoreland cannot sue for libel.

U.S. Aides Say Iraqis Made Use Of a Nerve Gas

Assert Lab Gear Came From West Germans

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 29 — United States intelligence officials say they have obtained what they believe to be incontrovertible evidence that Iraq has used nerve gas in its war with Iran and is nearing completion of extensive sites for the mass production of the lethal chemical warfare agent.

Pentagon, State Department and intelligence officials said in interviews this week that the evidence included documentation that Iraq has been buying laboratory equipment from a West German company, purchases that are believed to be linked to Iraq's nerve gas production plans.

The intelligence also shows, the officials said, that Iraq has as many as five dispersed sites for the storage, production and assembly of nerve gas weapons. Without intervention, these officials said, Iraq is estimated to be weeks or months away from the ability to mount major chemical attacks against Iran's far more numerous troops.

Deep Underground Bunkers

Each of the sites, the officials said, has been built in deep underground bunkers, heavily fortified by concrete, that are reported to be six stories below the surface. Officials said the Iraqi concern appeared to be protection from an air attack.

Neither the White House nor the State Department would formally comment today on the intelligence information.

If full-scale chemical war develops, one senior American official said, "the genie is out of the bottle." He added: "Arms control is down the drain. And we've got our forces completely at risk." The official warned that because of the nature of chemical weapons, huge doses of which can be transported

in small canisters, it would be virtually impossible to effectively monitor the spread of such weapons to other countries.

In 1969 the United States reaffirmed its renunciation of the first use of chemical warfare, and it later reduced its preparations to defend against a chemical war. The United States has accused Iraq of using chemical weapons in the war with Iran, but Baghdad has denied the charge.

A senior official said this week that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been asked to provide what he termed a "preliminary look" at the feasibility of an American air strike on the fortified sites, but concluded there were not enough American aircraft in appropriate locations.

This official went on to say that there were many in the Government who, recalling the successful Israeli air attack in 1981 on what was determined to be an Iraqi nuclear plant, would like to see the Israeli Air Force attack again. Some sensitive high-level conversations on the issue between the United States and Israel have already taken place, the official added.

This information could not be confirmed, although many American officials, in interviews, volunteered their personal judgment that such an attack would be one welcome solution to the problem.

A senior State Department official described his frustration over the issue. "It's not lack of knowledge at high levels," he said. "It's been in all the high-rollers' briefing books. The Iraqis appear to be ready to do anything. The question is what do we do? Should we cast a major air strike? That's a big move." The official acknowledged hearing "speculation" that the Israelis might be "ready to move," but added that such talk was in his view only talk.

The intelligence, which was provided from sources depicted as being "better than on-site," has been repeatedly and forcefully presented to President Reagan in the last week, the officials said, with the White House not yet providing any policy guidance.

Officials said that on three occasions within the week the Central Intelligence Agency, to dramatize its concern over the intelligence, had emphasized or "red lined" the relevant information on Iraq's chemical war abilities in the President's daily intelligence brief, one of the most highly classified documents in the Government. This information is prepared overnight by the C.I.A. and presented early each morning to the President.

Praise for C.I.A. Director

One official, reflecting the frustration of many in the intelligence field, praised William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, for having "the guts to stand up and fight," adding, "He's given the correct information to the White House and it's up to them."

The State Department said on March 5 that the United States had concluded that the available evidence indicated that lethal chemical weapons were being used by Iraq against Iran, in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which Iraq agreed to adhere to in 1931. At the time of the statement an Administration official said the chemical weapon being used by the Iraqis seemed to be mustard gas, a blistering agent. At that time Iran accused the Iraqis of using nerve gas and nitrogen mustard, but the Administration said there was no evidence Iraq had used nerve gas.

One reason for hesitation over the issue, a White House official acknowledged, is the traditional concern of intelligence officials for the protection of "sources and methods." The specific information about the extent of Iraqi nerve gas development is said to have been derived from unusually sensitive sources.

A major diplomatic complication confronts the Administration officials say. American intelligence agencies have identified Karl Kolb, a scientific and technical supply company in Dreieich, West Germany, as being responsible for the sale and shipping of sophisticated laboratory equipment that, intelligence officials say, has been used — apparently without the company's knowledge — to aid the Iraqi Government in its clandestine ability to develop a nerve gas. Sales of equipment considered by American officials to be essential to the Iraqi effort were said to have taken place over a period of at least two years, with the chemical company obtaining all of the required export licenses from the West German Government before shipment.

Evidence Presented to Bonn

Sometime within the last month, officials said, intelligence officials obtained evidence directly linking the company's shipments to Iraqi development of nerve gas.

The C.I.A. relayed some of its information and its concern directly to the United States Embassy in Bonn, an official said, which in turn made a diplomatic representation to the West German Government. The official Ameri-

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Intelligence: Too Much In Too Little Evaluation

This report was prepared and written by Philip Taubman and Joel Brinkley.

The marines, defending the adequacy of security at their Beirut headquarters on Oct. 23, have said they never received intelligence information warning that they might be the target of a suicidal truck-bomb attack. General Kelley, the Marine Commandant, told Congress last month that the marines "have yet to find a shred of intelligence which would have alerted a reasonable and prudent commander to this new and unique threat."

Intelligence and military officials say General Kelley may be right in the sense that the marines never received a tip that a large truck packed with explosives would come crashing into the Marine compound. But they said intelligence warnings about terrorist threats, particularly car bombs, were never in short supply.

"We got one or two a day," recalled General Mead, who served two tours and five months as Marine commander in Beirut. He said, "I was told by my intel officer, 'Hey boss, we've had another warning.' You got that every day. 'You're gonna get it, you're gonna get it, you're gonna get it.' Initially, after the American Embassy went, we went into a condition-one-type situation. I had my men on alert all the time. But then I began thinking I had to have more specificity, I'm wearing my men down without more specificity of a threat."

Too Much Raw Intelligence

The problem in Beirut was not insufficient intelligence, but insufficient evaluation, according to a variety of current and former military and intelligence officials familiar with the intelligence support provided to the marines.

If anything, commanders up the line agreed, the marines received too much raw intelligence about terrorism and were not trained to analyze it, eventually becoming somewhat complacent about almost daily car-bomb warnings.

Admiral Holcomb, the deputy commander of American Naval Forces in Europe, said the flow of intelligence information was filled with warnings of impending terrorist attacks. General Kelley told Congressional com-

mittees that the marines were given descriptions of at least 100 potential car bombs between June 1 and Oct. 23.

General Mead recalled receiving dozens of warnings about white Mercedes vehicles that might be carrying bombs. "We were told this every day," he said in an interview, "so everybody's looking for this white Mercedes. I used to laugh every day when I'd get on the street with my driver and I'd say, 'Count the white Mercedes!'"

No one in the Marine contingents in Beirut or the chain of command above them appears to have appreciated the influence this might have on security. No one proposed establishing a special intelligence task force composed of terrorism experts to help the marines, according to the intelligence officials.

Intelligence experts said such a unit, which could have been based in Washington, Europe or Beirut, could have sifted through the various kinds of intelligence, including information obtained from informants and electronic surveillance, and helped separate the reliable from the unreliable.

Bits and Pieces of Data

In addition, they said, the specialists could have looked for patterns in the bits and pieces of data that might reveal whether terrorists were receiving support from Iran or Syria, which, in turn, could help pinpoint targets for surveillance.

Analysis of this kind in Washington since the Marine bombing indicates that an Iranian-backed Shiite Moslem faction in Lebanon called the Islamic Amal, located in Baalbek, northeast of Beirut, was involved in both the embassy and Marine bombings.

A senior intelligence official said there are also "some indications" that Syria aided in the attack by providing explosives. He denied reports that the United States has irrefutable evidence linking the attacks to Syrian leaders.

Formation of a group of specialists before the attack could have given a more sophisticated reading of the terrorist threat, intelligence experts said.

"It was a colossal oversight," one former senior intelligence official said. He added, "It's almost criminal to send Marine intelligence officers, men who've dealt only with battlefield intelligence, into Beirut without sending some experts in to help them handle the specialized kind of information they were getting on terrorism."

Senator Warner, who has been investigating intelligence aspects of the Marine mission, said the chain of command "should have required that someone with this training be reassigned temporarily to the Marines."

From the beginning of their mission, the marines seemed to be haunted by American intelligence setbacks. The first, which the marines indirectly abetted in their first tour in August 1982, was the P.L.O. evacuation after the Israeli invasion.

Over the years, while the United States officially refused to deal directly with the P.L.O. because of its terrorist activities and hostility toward Israel, the C.I.A. developed a highly effective intelligence network in the Palestinian community in Lebanon. "The disintegration of the P.L.O. was a serious intelligence loss for the United States," one former intelligence official said.

Then in April almost the entire C.I.A. staff in Beirut was killed by the bomb blast that destroyed the embassy, including several of the agency's leading experts on the Middle East. Intelligence officials said the C.I.A. station was quickly rebuilt and the network of informants in Lebanon was not affected, but acknowledged that the change was disruptive.

Gathering intelligence about terrorism, particularly trying to penetrate terrorist groups, is considered one of the toughest jobs in the intelligence business.

One intelligence official said: "Terrorist cells are small, fanatical and highly paranoid. It's almost impossible to plant an agent in one. You may get lucky and turn someone already inside, but you generally have to rely for information on wiretaps and other communications intercepts."

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FILE ON

A TIME TABLE OF TERROR

BY URIDAN, NILES LATHEN, DEBORAH ORIN
and JEFF WELLS. Written by GUY HAWKIN.

THE U.S. air attack yesterday on the Syrian artillery batteries, which fired on unarmed American reconnaissance planes, was the first strike the U.S. has made directly against the forces of President Hafez Assad.

Yet the Syrians — with strong Soviet backing — have waged a brutal undeclared war against the international peacekeeping force since it arrived in Lebanon.

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This emerges from a major Post investigation into the October 23 "kamikaze" bombings of the U.S. and French military compounds in Beirut which cost the peacekeeping forces almost 300 lives.

Among the disturbing conclusions of the investigation:

- The Syrian regime of President Assad directly controlled the terrorists who carried out the bombings.

- There is strong circumstantial evidence that the Syrians also ordered the April 18 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut — an atrocity which killed 63 embassy personnel.

- The bombings were carried out with Soviet and East Bloc complicity if not explicit approval.

Other findings include:

- The American, French and Israeli intelligence services inexplicably ignored vital evidence of the involvement of fanatical Shiite Moslem "Shahid" suicide squads in Middle East terrorism.

- Even so, many lives would have been saved had the Defense Dept. heeded urgent warnings from the CIA and other intelligence agencies of plans for a "spectacular" strike against the Marines compound.

- Security at the Marine compound was inexplicably lax on the night of the bombing — even by the "relaxed" standards of the Beirut peacekeeping forces.

- Defense Dept. anxiety about alienating Syrian "goodwill" put

many American lives in jeopardy when offers of Israeli medical and rescue assistance were rejected.

- Testimony by top Pentagon brass on Capitol Hill indicates that a "coverup" of intelligence and security shortcomings is under way within the Defense Dept.

This is the story the Defense Dept. does not want to see in print.

The following is the first part of an exclusive day-by-day account of events leading up to the devastating attacks.

It has been pieced together from exhaustive interviews by Post reporters in Lebanon, Israel and Washington.

Monday, April 18, 1983:

The U.S. Embassy, Beirut. Time: Midday. A pickup truck loaded with high explosive detonates in the embassy forecourt, demolishing the entire front of the building and killing 63 embassy personnel.

Among the dead are Bob Ames, the CIA's chief Middle East analyst, and 11 of his most important subordinates. U.S. intelligence sources claim that it is still not known whether or not it was a suicide attack.

CONTINUED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-3WASHINGTON POST
7 November 1983**Personalities***By Chuck Conconi*

One of West Germany's most influential publications, Der Spiegel, has a harsh piece this week on "The World of Ronald Reagan." On the weekly news magazine cover Sunday was Reagan in cowboy hat, along with Mickey Mouse, a sultry blond, covered wagons, an Indian, combat troops leaving a landing-craft and skyscrapers. In describing the president's world, Der Spiegel wrote:

"Ronald Reagan, who in the White House is briefed by the CIA about the foreign situation in 20-minute films, probably considers the world is a movie. Grenada is no accident, but a new film scene in the life of this president—the first takes on location since he took office. It has the old, tested B-movie motives—to the right the cavalry

on the hilltop, left in the bush the enemies of civilization, the Reds. So simple, so old is Ronald Reagan's California cosmology."

U.S. camp in Lebanon shifts entry

From Inquirer Wire Services

BEIRUT, Lebanon — U.S. Marines yesterday shifted the main entrance to their camp to the gate used by the truck-bomb terrorist and set up a heavily fortified 130-yard maze in hope of foiling any more bomb attacks.

Meanwhile, police sources said that Lebanese investigators had been threatened with death if they continued to probe the Oct. 23 bombings that killed at least 230 Marines and sailors at Beirut International Airport and 58 French paratroopers about a mile away.

The sources, who requested anonymity, did not say who had made the threats. But they disclosed that, according to informants, the terrorists first surveyed the bomb targets by posing as peddlers.

As FBI laboratory specialists continued analyzing the 40-foot-wide bomb crater, the Marines shifted the main entrance to their camp from north to south. The new main gate is the same one through which the bomb-laden truck passed before speeding into the four-story Battalion Landing Team headquarters, where it detonated and reduced the structure to rubble.

Now, vehicles entering the gate face Marine sentries and must be driven along a zigzag route.

The New York Times reported yesterday that a warning of a terrorist attack on U.S. forces in Lebanon was circulated among top government officials three days before the Oct. 23 bombing.

The Times said an intelligence report specified that a pro-Iranian Shiite Muslim group known as "Islamic Amal" and "the Party of God" was planning an attack

The CIA said yesterday that it could not confirm the warning was given and a White House spokesman declined to comment on the report.

Within hours of the bombing, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger said he suspected pro-Iranian terrorists were responsible. The head of Islamic Amal has denied the group carried out the bombing.

The Times said the warning did not predict a time, date or place for the attack.

The newspaper said the report was distributed Oct. 20 to top government officials and military leaders in Europe and probably was seen by top Marine officers in Beirut.

The Times quoted Marine Col. James McManaway as saying the warning was not precise enough for Marines in Beirut to take extraordinary precautions around the headquarters building.

"For all we knew, the threat mentioned might have involved an old lady carrying a shopping bag filled with explosives," he said.

In fighting in Lebanon, government troops and Muslim gunmen engulfed Beirut's southern suburb and surrounding hills with artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire yesterday in a serious breach of the Sept. 26 cease-fire agreement.

Lebanese army sources also reported Druse Muslim shelling of the defense ministry in Yarze and the Shouf Mountain village of Souk el Gharb, the key army base eight miles from Beirut that guards the south-east approaches to the capital.

State-run Beirut Radio said the nine leaders of Lebanon's warring factions, who are attending a national reconciliation talks in Geneva, Switzerland, had learned of the fighting. The radio said they called their Christian and Muslim field commanders to try to silence the guns.

Unconfirmed reports on the right-wing Phalange militia radio reported battles and sniping on the Galerie Semaan, Beirut's main east-west roadway and in the Tayoune area that separates Christian east from Muslim west Beirut.

The radio, known as the Voice of Lebanon, also said that snipers fired on motorists in Kharoub, 15 miles south of Beirut, and that several people were wounded.

The artillery and mortar blasts echoed over the U.S. Marine peace-keeping base sandwiched between the combat zones, but a Marine spokesman said no Americans were involved.

"You can hear the fighting, but right now the Marines are not being fired on," said Capt. Wayne Jones 15 minutes after he toured Marine positions adjacent to south Beirut Shiite sectors involved in the clashes.

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ON PAGE A 21

Major Questions Raised On C.I.A.'s Performance

By PHILIP TAUBMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 2—The terrorist bombing of the United States Marine headquarters in Beirut and the unexpectedly large Cuban presence that American forces say they found in Grenada have raised major questions in the Reagan Administration and Congress about the performance of American intelligence agencies.

These questions, like those about the adequacy of security at the building in Beirut, represent some of the most contested issues growing out of the recent events in Lebanon and Grenada.

The intelligence questions, according to Administration officials and members of Congress, revolve around two immediate concerns: whether better intelligence information might have helped prevent the attack on the Marines in Beirut on Oct. 23 and whether the American troops that invaded Grenada two days later were sufficiently informed about the strength of Cuban forces on the island.

The officials said fundamental questions had also been raised about the mission and methods of the nation's intelligence agencies, including the issue of whether the United States had become too dependent on sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment instead of human agents for spying.

Agencies on the Defensive

The questions have put the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence organizations somewhat on the defensive and produced strains between the uniformed military services and civilian intelligence officials. Military officers who commanded the invasion of Grenada, for example, complain about an intelligence vacuum that they say left assault forces unprepared for the stiff resistance they encountered from Cuban troops.

While most said it would be some time before a full review was completed, they said it already seemed clear that serious shortcomings were exposed in Lebanon and Grenada.

In Lebanon, the American intelligence agencies had been trying to monitor the activities of terrorist groups and to anticipate political developments among the volatile Moslem

and Christian communities, Administration officials said.

Because of the difficulty of infiltrating militant groups, however, the officials said, the resulting intelligence tended to lack the specific information that would enable the authorities to block assassination plots or other terrorist activities.

Three days before a terrorist drove a truck filled with tons of explosives into the Marine headquarters at Beirut airport, killing about 230 American servicemen, the C.I.A. reported that a pro-Iranian Moslem splinter group appeared to be planning an attack against the Marines. The report was widely distributed among senior Government officials, including Marine leaders.

Defenders of the C.I.A. cite the report, which appeared in the highly classified National Intelligence Digest on Oct. 20, as evidence that the agency provided at least some warning before the bombing, even if it did not give the time, target or type of attack.

Gen. Paul X. Kelley, the Marine Commandant, disputed that suggestion today, telling members of the House Armed Services Committee that no one had given the Marines the kind of detailed intelligence they needed to prevent a suicide bombing attack.

"I'm not talking about those broad, vague, general statements that they hide behind," General Kelley said in an apparent reference to the Oct. 20 intelligence report. "I'm talking about specificity, about a truck," he said.

Surprises in Grenada

In regard to Grenada, Defense Department officials said they were surprised by both the number of Cuban combat forces and the extent of Soviet and Cuban influence on the island.

Intelligence officials acknowledged that detailed information on both subjects was unavailable, but said that planning for the invasion had moved so rapidly there was little time to prepare the tactical intelligence normally required for a military assault. They also said that the military services, not the C.I.A., were responsible for the collection of tactical intelligence.

The officials said the C.I.A. estimated before the invasion that there were about 700 Cubans in Grenada, a figure that the Defense Department ultimately accepted last week after reporting earlier in the week that the total was more than 1,100.

The intelligence officials said the C.I.A. had provided a periodic flow of information in recent months showing that Cuba and the Soviet Union were expanding their influence in Grenada. But they said they were unaware of the large stockpiles of Russian weapons reportedly found in the invasion.

Administration officials said the C.I.A. also had little information about political developments in Grenada. As a result, they said, Washington was caught by surprise when Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was ousted in a coup last month.

In both Grenada and Lebanon, intelligence officials said, the information that was lacking was of the kind best obtained by human agents rather than satellites, reconnaissance aircraft or other electronic equipment.

While declining to provide details, the officials said the C.I.A. operated a large number of American and foreign agents in Lebanon but had been unable to penetrate terrorist groups.

In Grenada, the officials said, the C.I.A. had no permanent presence and the State Department maintained no permanent diplomatic presence on the island. As a result, the officials said, the United States had few reliable sources of information and found itself relying on other Latin nations.

NEW YORK TIMES
 3 November 1983

Questions by House Panel Anger Marine General

By JOEL BRINKLEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 2 — The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Paul X. Kelley, told the House Armed Services Committee today that it should be asking more questions about the people who bombed the Marine headquarters at Beirut airport rather than about security precautions.

The death toll may rise to 239, he said. Questioned for the second day about why sentries on duty were not carrying loaded rifles when the truck loaded with explosives raced past, General Kelley shouted:

"We're talking about clips in weapons, but we're not talking about the people who did it. I want to find the perpetrators. I want to bring them to justice! You have to allow me this one moment of anger."

General Kelley also responded vehemently to a report that the Central Intelligence Agency said Oct. 20, three days before the bombing, that there might be a possible terrorist attack on American forces in Lebanon.

"I read in The New York Times today," General Kelley said, "that some nameless, faceless intelligence official had an intelligence report that

should have been sufficient that we should have recognized the threat.

"But I would like that nameless and faceless official to come by and tell me he recognized that it would be a five-ton truck carrying 5,000 pounds of ordnance going at 60 miles per hour. And I'll tell you, I'll be damn mad!"

He said the tragedy might have been averted if the Marines had received a specific warning.

"I'm not talking about those broad, vague general statements they hide behind," he said. "I'm talking about specificity, about a truck."

General Kelley completed his third

day of testimony before House and Senate committees today. He said the truck bombing "represents a new and unique terrorist threat, one that could not have been anticipated by any commander."

He defended the field commander's decision to house several hundred marines in one place, saying that the airport headquarters had survived many months of fighting, including shelling during the Israeli occupation.

Representative Dave McCurdy, an Oklahoma Democrat, asked why there were so many people in the building, considering that, "in the Middle East, terrorism is just as much a function of their use of power as our use of the M-1 tank."

Some military officials and experts on terrorism said the same thing in interviews.

An Army official, who declined to be identified, said:

"You put that many people in one place together, and you are creating a situation, especially in that part of the world where terrorism is so common."

Prof. Robert H. Kupperman of Georgetown University, a specialist on terrorism who used to be with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said:

"I just don't understand it. In addition to providing barriers against vehicles, you just don't want to concentrate your people in a situation like that. They seemed more interested in creature comforts than in safety."

On the question of unloaded weapons, General Kelley told the committee that sentries were following orders and

could have loaded their rifles in a second or two. The rifles are carried unloaded to prevent accidents, a Marine spokesman said.

Besides, the general told the committee, "In my professional judgment, it would have been impossible to stop that truck with small arms fire."

Representative Larry Hopkins, a Kentucky Republican, responded: "Maybe the M-16 would not have stopped the truck. We'll never know. But one thing we do know is that an empty M-16 won't stop a truck."

Now, the general said, the Marine sentries are carrying loaded weapons.

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NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100150001-2
2 November 1983

Reagan Aides Say U.S. Agencies Issued Warning of Beirut Attack

By PHILIP TAUBMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 1 — Three days before a bomb blast killed United States marines, soldiers and sailors in Beirut, intelligence agencies warned that American forces in Lebanon would probably be the target of a terrorist attack, Reagan Administration officials said today.

The intelligence report, the officials said, specified that the group that appeared to be planning such an attack was a militant pro-Iranian Shiite Moslem group in Lebanon known as the Islamic Amal and the Party of God.

The head of the Islamic Amal has denied that his group was responsible for the attack Oct. 23 that destroyed the Marine headquarters at the Beirut airport. After the attack, American and French intelligence officials said the Moslem splinter group appeared to have been involved.

In a related development, a spokesman for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lane Bonner, said a team of explosives experts from the bureau's laboratory had been sent to Beirut to help determine who was responsible for the attack.

Mr. Bonner said debris recovered at the blast site would be brought back to Washington for analysis to determine whether the bomb could be linked to improvised explosive devices used in other attacks in Lebanon.

No Exact Predictions

The intelligence warning did not predict the exact time, type or target of an attack, according to the officials, but nevertheless stood out from the flow of vague rumors and imprecise intelligence about terrorist activities in Lebanon. It was published in a classified intelligence bulletin on Oct. 20, the officials said.

"It was a heads-up, a clear, prominent warning," one official who read the report said. He said similar, though less precise, warnings had appeared in intelligence reports earlier in the year.

The officials said the report appeared in the National Intelligence Digest, a summary of intelligence information that is prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and distributed every day to about 200 senior Government officials, including Marine Corps officers and United States military commanders in Europe who have spe-

cific command over the Marine units in Lebanon.

The adequacy of Marine security procedures and the quality of intelligence before the bombing have emerged as major issues in the wake of the bombing.

Commandant Didn't See Report

General Kelley, the Marine Commandant, did not see or know of the Oct. 20 intelligence report, a Marine spokesman said today. The spokesman, Col. James L. McManaway, said General Kelley, who returned to Washington on Oct. 19 after an eight-day trip to Europe and the Middle East, worked at his living quarters in Washington on Oct. 20 and did not see the National Intelligence Digest because rules governing the handling of the highly classified document stipulate that it not be taken out of Marine headquarters in Virginia.

Colonel McManaway said he did not know what the Marines did with the specific intelligence report on Oct. 20, but he said that in general "our commanders in Beirut get exactly the same information we see here." He said the Oct. 20 report did not contain the kind of precise information that could have helped the Marines defend against the bombing. "For all we knew," he said, "the threat mentioned might have involved an old lady carrying a shopping bag filled with explosives."

Colonel McManaway said the Oct. 20 report did not contain the kind of precise information that could have helped the Marines defend against the bombing. "For all we knew," he said, "the threat mentioned might have involved an old lady carrying a shopping bag filled with explosives."

The number of American deaths from the bombing is uncertain. Gen. Paul X. Kelley said the death toll was 239, and spokesmen for the Defense Department and the Marine Corps said 229. A Marine spokesman in Beirut said it was at least 230, and a report from a military hospital in West Germany indicated the number was 231.

A second terrorist bomb attack the same day blew up the headquarters of French forces in Beirut, killing 56 paratroops. The American and the French troops were based in Beirut as part of an international peacekeeping force.

General Kelley and other top military officers in Washington and in Beirut have said the Marines in Lebanon had no intelligence information warn-

ing that they faced the threat of a suicide bomb attack such as the one that destroyed the Marine headquarters.

Senior Administration officials and members of Congress looking into the circumstances surrounding the attack said today that the intelligence warning published on Oct. 20, while not providing details about a possible attack against the Marines, did include enough information so that the Marines should have increased security.

Specifically, they said, in the wake of the suicide terrorist bombing attack against the United States Embassy in Beirut that was carried out in a similar fashion earlier this year, the warning should have alerted the Marines to take special precautions.

The intelligence report, the officials said, pinpointed the Islamic Amal as the group that intelligence sources in Lebanon said was most likely to attack the Marines. It also described the group as a leading suspect in the bombing of the American Embassy. The leader of the splinter group, Hussein Musavi, denied any involvement in either attack last week.

WASHINGTON POST
9 October 1983

George F. Will
**Bush Is
Wearing
Well**

Kaiser Wilhelm's aides prepared for him each morning a newspaper of carefully excerpted items, printed in gold. Vice President George Bush gets less gilded, but better, information.

Tucking into scrambled eggs at his office at 7:30 a.m. last week, Bush looked forward to a day that began with the feeding of a columnist but soon became interesting. It included several meetings with the president and ended with a political fund-raiser, the sting of which was assuaged by the fact that it involved playing tennis. By 8:30 a.m. he was receiving his daily briefing from the CIA—the brutality of facts, not printed in gold. He went from there to another national security briefing with the president.

Most thoughtful people entering government are dismayed by, and their dismay steadily deepens about, the weak information base on which decisions are made. So Bush works to be a super-tanker loaded to the Plimsoll mark with information.

His experience during the last three years is a case study in the natural mortality of the silliness that flourishes during campaigns. References to Ronald Reagan as "a B-movie actor" are dead. So is the science of preppvology. That involved the scrutiny of Bush's wrist-watch bands for signs of terminal Yale influences. Another melody no longer heard is the refrain that his conservative credentials are not in good order. He has now extinguished the suspicions of all conservatives except those who need suspicions the way plants need sunshine.

Bush only became suspect because he was Reagan's opponent. Leave aside those conservatives who themselves wear white collars and whose manual labor extends only to moving the carriage of a typewriter, but who think Bush cannot relate to—as they can—blue-collar America. If Bush would just do something ungentleel—drink the water from the finger bowl, perhaps—he might complete his conquest of conservative holdouts.

It is to the credit of the current president and especially his predecessor—two former governors with no Washington experience—that the vice presidency has become a serious job. Walter Mondale was the first vice president to have an office in the White House West Wing, as does Bush. Hitherto, vice presidents had offices next door, in the Executive Office Building. That building is just a 30-second walk from the Oval Office, but (in the words of a Bush aide) "politically, it's Baltimore."

Bush can attend any meeting the president has, except those which heads of state traditionally have alone. He speaks his mind only in private with the president, for several reasons.

The author of the most memorable phrase of the 1980 campaign—"voodoo economics"—must feel somewhat inhibited about entering the intramural debate between those who still say the tax cuts will be self-financing (because economic growth will close the budget gap) and those who say tax increases are necessary. Furthermore, Bush speaks circumspectly when not alone with the president because he knows it would be a matter of minutes before any real or imagined differences with the president became common gossip.

Bush has had the sort of career common in Britain but rare here. That is, he has passed through a series of significant offices (congressman, chairman of his party, ambassador to the U.N. and to Peking, director of the CIA). He is the most comprehensively experienced person to serve as vice president. This is a political asset because of Reagan's age. That was expected to be an issue in 1980 and was not. It is not expected to be in 1984, but may be. Perhaps it will be less an "issue" than a vague anxiety. If so, Bush and his many credentials will be important again.

Last time, he was important as evidence of Reagan's pragmatism and taste for quality. "Exit polls" taken among voters leaving polling places showed that 9 percent of those who voted for Reagan listed his choice of Bush as the reason. It is hard to know exactly what those polled were saying, but 9 percent is a large number of persons saying it.

Of all mortals in their 60th year, Bush is the least weatherworn, perhaps because he has come to terms with the fact that there is only so much, and not very much, any man can do to control events. His cheerful absence of anxiety about The Question (will Reagan run?) reflects his certitude that Reagan will run, and his general knack for cheerfulness. Happiness often is a byproduct of a mature person's fatalism, and a certain fatalism is essential to the emotional well-being of a long-distance political runner.

Reagan's move called 'preemptive'

By Alfonso Chardy
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Hints that Cuba and the Soviet Union were preparing to expand their military role in Nicaragua led President Reagan to increase the U.S. military presence in Central America, according to Pentagon and National Security Council officials.

"All our indications were that Cuba and the Soviet Union were preparing major military moves in Nicaragua, and so we had to move, too," one security council official said Thursday.

"Our move was a preemptive strike, so to speak," said a Pentagon official, who, along with other sources knowledgeable about the situation, agreed to talk on condition that he remain anonymous.

Administration officials said, however, there was no hard evidence that Cuba was mobilizing troops or warplanes to intervene in Central America.

And congressional critics suggested Thursday that U.S. intelligence analysts might have misread the evidence under pressure to supply proof for Reagan's hard-line stance on the region.

The Reagan administration surprised the U.S. public and angered critics Monday when it announced that it would dispatch 19 U.S. warships, including two aircraft carriers, and 3,000 to 4,000 ground troops to Central America for maneuvers that would last six months.

On Tuesday, Reagan described the deployments as "routine exercises." But privately, senior administration officials said they were meant to show support for U.S. allies in the region, step up U.S. pressures on Nicaragua's Sandinista rulers to moderate their Marxist stance, and prove to U.S. foes that Reagan could act decisively in Central America, despite congressional opposition to his policies.

Pentagon, State Department and security council officials interviewed this week said that although these factors explained what Reagan want-

ed the maneuvers to accomplish, they did not explain his decision to order the exercises.

In fact, they said, Reagan's key reason for deploying the U.S. forces was the U.S. perception that Cuba and the Soviet Union were planning a significant escalation of their military roles in Nicaragua.

State Department sources said U.S. ambassadors in Latin America had been instructed to tell "trusted" leaders in the region that Reagan had fresh intelligence data suggesting such an escalation.

The Cuban moves are to be described as amounting to a direct challenge to vital U.S. interests and national security, said the sources, who saw the cables sent to the American diplomats.

On Thursday, Cuban President Fidel Castro suggested to reporters that he would be willing to pull Cuban military advisers out of Nicaragua and stop sending arms to that country if Washington did the same throughout Central America. On Friday, Reagan indicated he could accept such an agreement.

"If he is really serious about this, I think it's fine," Reagan said in an interview. "I think that I am willing to give him the benefit of the doubt in any negotiations."

Security council and Pentagon officials said hints of Cuban and Soviet buildups in Central America began flowing into U.S. intelligence agencies 10 to 15 weeks ago.

Officials said alarm bells began ringing at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., in May, when photographs snapped by an SR-71, a high-flying spy aircraft, showed about 400 Cuban marines practicing "sophisticated amphibious landings" on beaches near the Cuban port of Mariel, 25 miles west of Havana.

The CIA's chief aerial-photography analyst, John Hughes, concluded that the Cubans were practicing an invasion of a foreign country, not a defense of their own beaches, the officials said.

Administration officials said they believed the Cubans might have been practicing for landings in Nicaragua, and perhaps even Honduras, a staunch U.S. ally.

At about this same time, the officials said, Hughes reported that four Soviet merchant ships had been photographed unloading military equipment at Nicaragua's Pacific port of Corinto.

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journal distributed to senior policy makers — reported on June 1 that Cuban army Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez had been in Nicaragua since early May.

The report said Ochoa had been instrumental in negotiating, organizing and leading the deployment of Cuban troops to Angola in 1976 and to Ethiopia in 1977.

Officials who read the CIA journal said that in July it noted that 1,200 Cuban military advisers had arrived in Nicaragua in recent months, raising the total of Cuban civilian and security advisers there to about 5,500.

Finally, said one security council official, U.S. diplomats around the world noticed in recent weeks that their Cuban counterparts were "probing" to assess how Reagan would react should Havana send troops or Soviet-made MiG warplanes to Managua.

While all this was going on, U.S. intelligence agencies were reporting an ongoing expansion of the Soviet military role in Cuba and Nicaragua.

Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle advised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March that Moscow had shipped 63,000 tons of arms to Cuba in 1981 and 68,000 tons in 1982 — the highest yearly totals since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

Ikle also said that the number of Soviet military advisers in Cuba had increased by 20 percent in 1982, up to 2,500. In addition, he said the Soviets had 6,000 to 8,000 civilian advisers and a 1,700-member combat brigade in Cuba.

By last week, the Pentagon had revised upward the number of Soviet civilian advisers in Cuba to 8,500 to 10,500. The Pentagon also said that in the first six months of 1983, approximately 20,000 metric tons of military equipment was shipped from Moscow to Cuba.

Cuban, Soviet moves said to spur Reagan

Knight-News Service

Washington — A flurry of hints that Cuba and the Soviet Union were preparing to expand their military role in Nicaragua led President Reagan to increase the U.S. military presence in Central America, according to Pentagon and National Security Council officials.

"All our indications were that Cuba and the Soviet Union were preparing major military moves in Nicaragua, and so we had to move, too," one NSC official said yesterday.

"Our move was a preemptive strike, so to speak," said a Pentagon official who, like other sources knowledgeable about the situation, agreed to talk on condition that he remain anonymous.

Administration officials conceded, however, that there has been no hard evidence that Cuba is mobilizing troops or warplanes to intervene in Central America.

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Mr. Reagan described the deployments Tuesday as "routine exercises," but senior administration officials privately said they were meant to show support for U.S. allies in the region; step up U.S. pressures on Nicaragua's Sandinista rulers to moderate their Marxist stance; and prove to U.S. foes that Mr. Reagan can act decisively in Central America, despite congressional opposition to his policies.

Pentagon, State Department and NSC officials interviewed this week said that while these factors explain what Mr. Reagan wants the maneuvers to accomplish, they do not explain his decision to order the exercises.

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The CIA's chief aerial photography analyst, John Hughes, concluded the Cubans were practicing an invasion of a foreign country, not a defense of their own beaches, the officials said.

Administration officials said they first interpreted the Cuban maneuvers as preparation for an invasion of some small Caribbean nation. Now, however, they believe the Cubans may have been practicing for landings in Nicaragua, and perhaps even Honduras, a staunch U.S. ally.

About the same time, the officials said, Mr. Hughes reported that four Soviet merchant ships had been photographed unloading military equipment at Nicaragua's Pacific port of Corinto.

The administration was further "jolted," the officials said, when the *National Intelligence Daily* (NID), a CIA journal distributed to senior policymakers, reported June 1 that Cuban army Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez had been in Nicaragua since

early May.

The NID report said General Ochoa had been instrumental in negotiating, organizing and leading the deployment of Cuban troops to Angola in 1976 and to Ethiopia in 1977, totaling about 42,000 soldiers.

NID's June 1 report said the Soviet-trained General Ochoa apparently was in Nicaragua to compile a report for Fidel Castro on whether it would be feasible to send Cuban troops to Nicaragua.

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WASHINGTON POST

27 June 1983

Casey, Who Can't Remember, Berates Officials Who Can't Read

STAT

Lou Cannon

REAGAN & CO.

Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Casey, whose memory ranges from weak to nonexistent on unauthorized disclosure of President Carter's briefing books to the 1980 Reagan campaign, is worried that fellow Reaganites are a bunch of blabbermouths.

Appearing before the senior White House staff last Tuesday and reading a prepared lecture in a tone described as "an admonishing mumble," Casey fretted about the difficulties of keeping classified information classified.

In the process, he gave several still-classified examples of "unauthorized disclosures" to staff members not normally authorized to receive classified information of any kind.

Fortunately for the security of the republic, Casey's examples included such previously rehashed events as the thwarted Libyan invasion of the Sudan, the world-publicized sending of arms to Afghan guerrillas and the open secret that the United States is assisting anti-government rebels in Nicaragua.

All of this was old hat. But some of the White House staff members were startled to hear Casey's report on care and feeding of the National Intelligence Daily, the com-

paratively low-level CIA analysis provided daily to 150 U.S. government officials. A legend on the cover of this document, known as NID, says it is to be returned the same day and not to be duplicated.

According to Casey, a CIA check showed that more than 100 of the documents were not being turned in and that some of those returned came complete with handy notations instructing secretaries to copy them. One responsive official, asked to return his copy, supposedly gave back 75 photocopies.

As it turns out, there are remedies to deal with such carelessness.

Casey mentioned a few of them, such as dismissal and administering lie-detector tests to employes who engage in "unauthorized disclosures." As far as is known, he would make an exception for briefing material that mysteriously appears on the desk of campaign chairmen just before a crucial debate.

Two days later, when asked to provide details of how the Carter briefing book wound up in the Reagan camp, Casey gave an impressive demonstration of what a CIA director might do if he became a prisoner of war.

Although he provided his name and rank, Casey said he remembered nothing whatever about a briefing book that White House chief of staff James A. Baker III re-

called Casey giving him. Casey's recollection has not improved subsequently.

Most Americans would, of course, be genuinely concerned by disclosure of real national-security secrets by those charged with keeping them. But some in the White House believe that national security in the Reagan administration would be served especially well by appointment of a CIA director who starts with a greater presumption of credibility.

That is not Casey's long suit, as a couple of jokes making the White House rounds last week attest. One, attributable to Alan Abelson in Barron's, said "CIA" really stood for "Casey Investing Again," a reference to the remarkable timeliness of the director's successful stock-market investments.

The other, repeated on background and presumably not classified, was a tongue-in-cheek assurance that Casey could not have been the recipient of the Carter briefing book.

"If Bill had received it," one White House official said, "he would have placed it in a blind trust."

19 June 1983

Cuba's Top Combat General Is Said to Serve in Nicaragua

By LESLIE H. GELB
 Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 18—Cuba's top military combat commander has been working in Nicaragua for about a month and has been "secretly assigned to duty" there, according to an intelligence report disclosed by a Reagan Administration official.

The commander was identified as Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa Sánchez, who as a brigade commander was said to have been instrumental in negotiating, organizing and leading the Cuban military buildup in Angola in 1976 and in Ethiopia in 1977. He is now deputy to Raúl Castro, Minister of the Armed Forces.

The report is based primarily on Central American military sources who, two officials said, have been reliable in their accounts of Cuban activities in Nicaragua.

These sources, according to the report, believe General Ochoa is organizing a "large-scale Cuban move into Nicaragua." One of the sources even said he would be chief of all Nicaraguan and Cuban armed forces.

Administration officials acknowledged that apart from the Central



Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa Sánchez

American sources, they had no independent confirmation that General Ochoa had in fact been "assigned to duty" in Nicaragua.

An Administration official also said that the assignment did not mean General Ochoa was expected to be in Nicaragua full time to the neglect of his duties in Cuba and that it was assumed that he traveled back and forth between the two countries.

Reagan Orders a Review

Although Nicaraguan and Cuban officials have put the number of Cubans in Nicaragua at about 4,000, the C.I.A. report estimated that there were 8,000 there, 2,000 of them military advisers and technicians, 2,000 teachers and the rest in construction brigades and teams specializing in public health, agriculture and civil affairs. There was no suggestion that Cubans had engaged in combat.

Asked about the report, other Administration officials said there was no evidence that Cuban forces would be sent to Nicaragua for combat duty, but they said General Ochoa's presence might well presage a larger Cuban military advisory role and perhaps an increase in the number of Cuban advisers there.

An Administration official said that the report was given to President Reagan about two weeks ago in his daily intelligence briefing book prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and that he immediately ordered a study to review

possible United States responses.

It was said that William P. Clark, the President's national security adviser, felt the report put a new "dark cloud" over the situation in Central America.

There was no suggestion by any of the Administration officials who spoke about the intelligence report that its disclosure was intended to justify any new American military moves. The motive for the disclosure was apparently to underline Cuba's growing role in Nicaragua and to warn Havana that Washington knows what is going on.

The disclosure falls into a pattern of recent events pointing to greater military activity in Central America. Administration officials said recently that the number of American-backed anti-Sandinist guerrillas in Nicaragua had risen by a third in the last two months to about 8,000 and that they could be expected to control large areas of Nicaragua within six months. Honduran officials indicated they would be asking for more American military aid if fighting in Nicaragua spilled over into their territory. More than 100 American Green Berets have been sent to Honduras to train Salvadoran forces.

Wayne S. Smith, formerly the State Department's top expert on Cuba and now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: "I would not expect Cuban expeditionary forces in Nicaragua. But given the external pressures on the Sandinists, I think it would be surprising if there were no response from the Cubans."

The judgment of the C.I.A. analysts who wrote the report was similar. They said President Fidel Castro had decided he had to, "for the sake of his world

revolutionary image and credibility, move decisively to prop up the Sandinista regime."

Ochoa's Previous Roles

The C.I.A. writers of the report contended that General Ochoa's assignment, based on his previous activities, was "a major indicator" of possible Cuban moves.

According to the report, General Ochoa completed a special training course in the Soviet Union in 1976, then went directly to Angola. When he arrived, Cuban forces were said to total fewer than 3,000, but when he left in April 1976, that figure had reached 20,000. The report put the present Cuban force there at 25,000. It defends the Marxist Government in Luanda against rival factions.

Later in 1976, according to the report, the general was one of Cuba's key negotiators in Moscow's agreement to supply arms to Ethiopia for use against Somalia in border clashes. In December 1977, the report said, General Ochoa was transferred to Ethiopia as head of Cuban combat and support forces. These forces rose from 2,000 in April 1978 to the current level of 17,000, according to the report.

General Ochoa is said to be in his mid-40's and to have been in charge of combat readiness and military combat training in Cuba since 1961. He is said to be a close friend of President Castro.

Other Indications in Cuba

The C.I.A. report's writers also said there were indications in Cuba that it might make further military moves in Nicaragua. They said that in the last few months Cuba had considerably increased its military abilities "for both foreign deployments and defensive preparedness at home." Details on these were not made available. The officials also spoke of the "record-setting rate and nature" of military deliveries to Cuba by the Soviet Union over the last 30 months, shifting Havana's "military capabilities from a mere defensive to a now notably offensive footing."

The Administration official who provided the substance of the report also drew attention to the fact that Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko spoke on the Central American situation at length in a speech several days ago to the Supreme Soviet. But he and Administration specialists on Moscow said Mr. Gromyko said nothing new on the subject.

Soviet officials have been extremely careful to maintain that Nicaragua is not a "socialist" nation by Moscow's definition. This is deemed to be important because Moscow generally avoids any military commitment to countries it does not consider "socialist."

The prevailing view in the Administration, apart from that of the writers of the C.I.A. report, seems to be that neither Moscow nor Havana is likely to risk any dramatic new move in Nicaragua.

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ON PAGE 68Harvard University
Summer 1983

Crisis Mangling and the Cuban Brigade

Gloria Duffy

Gloria Duffy is Executive Director of Ploughshares Fund. In addition to the references cited, this article is based on numerous interviews with officials in the Carter Administration.

The furor over a supposed brigade of Soviet combat troops, discovered in the fall of 1979 to be stationed in Cuba, should have been no more than a minor controversy within the U.S. intelligence community. Instead, an intense diplomatic storm ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Revelation of the particular data on Soviet troops in Cuba which surfaced in 1979 would have stirred little public concern at any other time, but the information came to light in the volatile political environment of the Carter Administration's third year in office, as the Administration's management of relations with the Soviet Union came under mounting attack. In this atmosphere, a minor and inconclusive piece of intelligence became a political issue. The crisis which grew from public disclosure of the brigade discovery had disproportionate effects on the debate over ratification of the SALT II treaty, the course of U.S.-Soviet relations, and Soviet perceptions of American will and leadership. As Cyrus Vance recently said of the crisis:

"... I think it clearly hurt the ratification process, without any doubt. There was an erosion of the support for SALT prior to the Cuban brigade issue, but clearly it was a real blow that set us back substantially."¹

Most contemporary historians date the present chill in U.S.-Soviet relations from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. But in many ways, the brigade affair four months earlier was the turning point towards a higher level of hostility between the superpowers.

Those aware of the brigade crisis universally regard the incident as a low point in Carter Administration foreign policy, and perhaps even in the history of U.S.-Soviet relations. Ray Cline, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the Kennedy years, dubbed the incident at the time an exercise in "crisis mangling," rather than crisis management. And the International Institute for Strategic Studies even more contemptuously demoted the episode to a "storm in a teacup" in its annual review of politico-military events. Beyond the impression that a sequence of events took place which was confusing and perhaps badly managed by the United States, however, no one is quite certain exactly what came to pass and why. Earlier incidents involving the issue of Soviet forces in Cuba—the 1962 missile crisis, the 1969-70 controversy over Soviet naval facilities at Cienfuegos, and even a minor debate in 1978 about Soviet MiG-23 aircraft on the island—have been studied and mined for their significance. But the brigade incident remains a question mark for many of the individuals who made American foreign policy at the time, not to mention for the public. What really happened? Was there a combat brigade in Cuba? Why did the United States negotiate at length with the Soviets on the issue? What did the Carter Administration ask the Soviets to do about the brigade, and how did the Russians respond? What were the effects of the event, and what lessons are to be learned?

A closer look at the incident reveals some aspects contrary to the conventional wisdom. Even those most informed about the brigade affair vilify former Idaho Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1979, as the main American alarmist about the brigade,

¹ Interview with Robert Scheer in Scheer's *With Enough Shovels* (New York: Random House, 1982), p. 226.

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WASHINGTON POST

10 MAY 1983

JACK ANDERSON**U.S. Was Warned
Of Bombing at
Beirut Embassy**

U.S. intelligence agencies received warnings a month in advance that Iranian-backed terrorists planned to bomb the American Embassy in Beirut. Yet nothing was done to beef up security at the building where 17 Americans were killed.

This shocking admission is contained in the super-secret National Intelligence Daily, a document circulated to fewer than 100 high-level U.S. officials. An autopsy of the Beirut bombing appeared in the April 20 edition—two days after the tragedy and one day after the Islamic Jihad Organization claimed responsibility for the blast.

Though the report itself is classified above top-secret, it was reviewed by my associate Dale Van Atta. Here's the appalling story:

The National Security Agency's code breakers had intercepted some alarming communications in the Middle East. These gave a clear indication that a pro-Iranian Shiite Moslem group, fanatically loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was planning to bomb the embassy in Beirut.

At the same time, the CIA, which lost seven people in the bombing, had gathered "humint," or human intelligence, which warned that the same group had plans to bomb the embassy.

According to the intelligence report, preparations for the bomb attack were supervised by a high official in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, who also gave final approval. It was assumed that Khomeini also knew of the plan and approved it.

The admission that both the NSA and the CIA had prior warning of the bombing was hedged with suggestions that the intelligence information could not be verified, and in at least one case came from an untested source.

But this alibi has a hollow ring. Not only had the Islamic Jihad shown itself to be a terrorist group that should be taken seriously, but the CIA had been keeping track of the Jihad and other Khomeini-backed groups for a year or more. For example:

- The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a car-bomb explosion—the same kind of attack as that of April 18—that killed 12 people at the French Embassy in Beirut a year ago.

- It also took responsibility for grenade and machine-gun attacks on American and Italian troops of the multinational peace-keeping force in

Beirut last March. The toll: one Italian killed and five Americans wounded. And it claimed to have taken shots at members of the French peace-keeping force a few days before the U.S. Embassy blast.

- The Jihad is an offshoot of the mainstream Shiite paramilitary organization Amal. The original leader, Musa al Sadre, was a Khomeini disciple who disappeared on a 1978 trip to Libya. The Jihad is closely associated with an estimated 1,000 Iranian revolutionary guards who have proclaimed an "Islamic-Khomeinist state" at Baalbek in northeastern Lebanon.

CIA reports over the past year list several cases of Khomeini's attempts to export his revolution beyond Iran's borders:

- An attempt to set up an Islamic state in Turkey through the Iranian consulate in Istanbul.

- A planned coup by 60 Bahrainis, many trained in Iran, to take over that Persian Gulf state.

- A meeting in Cyprus of Saudi Arabian opposition leaders to plot infiltration of the military, incitement of the large Shiite minority and eventual overthrow of the royal family.

- Financing of secret trips by Moslem students to Iran for revolutionary training. The students are then smuggled back to their homelands to await the signal for uprising.

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PARADE MAGAZINE
WASHINGTON POST
13 MARCH 1983

WHY PRESIDENTS STUMBLE

By Jack Anderson

THE U.S.

has eyes and ears all over the globe. Yet our Presidents often act like someone who is blind and deaf. They seldom seem to anticipate world events of momentous importance. They have been caught napping by revolutions, invasions and other developments of awesome consequence.

Why is the President invariably so late to act that he can only react? I can tell you that it's not from lack of sound information. He is served by professionals who spend their lives sifting fact from fantasy, truth from propaganda. They produce stunningly accurate assessments—which are routinely ignored by the White House. Consider a few examples of warnings that have gone unheeded:

- President Richard Nixon could have prevented the ruinous 40-fold jump in oil prices had he heeded the available warnings. The federal government, with all the agencies that watch over the oil industry, had an immense early-alert system.
- President Jimmy Carter could have spared the nation 444 days of humiliation if he had just paid attention to the State Department's Iranian experts. With startling prescience, they warned of the likelihood of an attack on the embassy and the seizure of hostages.
- President Carter could have stopped Fidel Castro from shipping Cuba's criminals and crazies to Florida, where they have aggravated the crime rate. The CIA submitted at least five advance warnings of Castro's intentions.
- President Carter might have dissuaded the Soviets from invading Afghanistan, thus preventing the breakdown of détente, if he had acted on advance information. He seemed to be the only one in high places who was surprised by the invasion.
- President Ronald Reagan might have been able to avert the Falkland Islands mess had he reacted promptly to intelligence reports that the Argentines would invade. Indeed, the Argentine generals had the false impression that the invasion would have his blessing.
- President Reagan could have dealt

ments that an Israeli invasion was "inevitable." Earlier, the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor also was forecast precisely.

In each of these disasters, a President had access to information that would have enabled him to take preventive actions, rather than blunder along. Maybe the correct intelligence never reached the President. Maybe it had been so twisted or toned down that it was easy to ignore. Yet in some cases, I had published the warnings long before events got out of control.

Of course, a President gets bad advice as well as good. Conflicting information comes in from various confidential sources available to him. The real pros among those who provide information have been able to forecast or anticipate events with far more reliability than any President has ever done. The problem is that the politicians around the President either don't know who the reliable experts are or prefer to ignore them.

How does crucial information get cut off at the pass? First, let's examine how a President reaches his decisions.

Though different Presidents have asked for intelligence in different forms, each has received what is known in the intelligence community as the PDB, or President's Daily Brief. The idea is to give a President the most sensitive information U.S. intelligence agencies have available. The document he can read in 15 minutes.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 56THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY
March 1983

WHO'S WHO in the Administration

Recently Lou Cannon of *The Washington Post* reported that in any potential shakeup of the top staff at the White House the big winner would probably be national security adviser William Clark, who Cannon reported could advance to chief of staff if James Baker takes a Cabinet post or goes home to Texas. Sources in a position to know say that this version of possible changes is not entirely unrelated to the fact that "the Judge" (as Clark is called) is Cannon's main source right now. (Given the toughness of Cannon's recent coverage, he may be his only big source left.)

For some additional evidence on why Cannon and Clark are on such good terms, recall that during the 1980 campaign Cannon did Clark a favor. Reagan held a press conference at which he promised to appoint a woman to the Supreme Court, adding that as governor of California he had named only bar association-certified candidates to the state bench. The truth was that Clark, whose qualifications included flunking the bar exam, had not been certified before being appointed by Reagan to the California Supreme Court. Cannon, who covered Clark when he was Reagan's California chief of staff, knew Reagan had not told the truth about Clark but didn't embarrass the Judge by reporting it.

Apparently the administration's two chief economic policy makers are at war. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan and Martin Feldstein, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, are said by insiders to speak to each another only with great effort. Part of it is over policy—Regan is more anxious than Feldstein to take steps to stimulate economic recovery—but much of it is personal. Regan believes Feldstein is a head-in-the-clouds academic who believes the world works the way his Harvard models tell him. Feldstein views Regan as merely a Wall Street businessman whose knowledge of economics is so sketchy that after his easy conversion into a supply-sider he has reverted into a thoroughly muddle-headed policy maker.

Meanwhile, the one member of the administration who has shown some foresight at all about the seriousness of the nation's economic condition, Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, finds that his early, correct warnings to Reagan have not won him any chits. . . .

Our audio-visual president has another aid. Reagan's written briefings from the CIA are reportedly now being supplemented by a videotape that Reagan can tune into. . . .

NEW YORK POST
14 February 1983

GOP PUT HE ON PREZ OVER POPE SLAY PLOT

By NILES LATHEM
PRESIDENT Reagan's decision to pursue the assassination plot against Pope John Paul II was prompted by pressure from Republicans in Congress.

White House and Senate insiders said there has been a growing feeling of discontent on the congressional intelligence committees about the performance of the CIA and its chief, William Casey.

And when Republicans on the committees read recent reports about how the CIA was trying to discourage all investigation into the link between Turkish gunman Mehmet Ali Agca and the Soviet KGB-controlled Bulgarian secret police, they made their anger known.

In one of a series of leadership meetings with the President recently, the Senate and House GOP leaders, led by Majority Leader Howard Baker, bluntly told Reagan about their concerns.

Reagan, described as "shocked" at the outburst, immediately went into action and carpeted CIA chief Casey for failing to pursue the plot to kill the Pope.

★ ★ ★
One big gripe about

CIA chief
Casey
rapped
at stormy
meeting



Casey is over a new method he authorized for delivering to Reagan his daily intelligence briefings.

Insiders said Reagan has been receiving daily briefings from the CIA on videotape instead of verbally or written reports.

Capitol Hill officials who have seen these tapes are appalled.

Not only are the videotapes potential security risks, say officials, but "they are made as if for a dunce," said one official.

★ ★ ★
GOP Chairman Sen. Paul Laxalt last week came out the loser in a major confrontation with the White House staff over President Reagan's reelection campaign.

A few weeks ago, Lax-

alt, in a major power play, proposed that the Republican National Committee take control of Reagan's 1984 campaign.

But Laxalt and his proposal soon ran into a brick wall of furious White House staffers, led by White House Chief of Staff James Baker, who want an independent reelection committee formed.


"The big boys were feuding like crazy," said a prominent Republican.

Laxalt last week backed off and said in a press release he favors the formation of a separate committee. He also said he will be picking the committee's chairman.

But White House aides said California political whiz Stewart Spencer has already been picked as committee chairman, even though Reagan still hasn't decided whether he will run again.

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THE BALTIMORE SUN
1 February 1983



Opinion • Commentary

Reagan and Russia—I

The Beginning of the End

THE lack of a clear and steady view has bedeviled American policy toward Soviet Russia from the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.

For the past 65 years, the way American policymakers, academics and journalists regard the Soviet Union has undergone wild periodic swings: At one moment the Communist regime is on its last legs, at the next it is a worldwide menace. Sometimes both estimates prevail at once.

Because policy is the offspring of perception, it is no small matter to know how the president and his advisers perceive the Soviet Union, especially since foreign policy is a public enterprise in which the national liability may be unlimited.

President Reagan has made his views perfectly plain, to the delight of the Republican

By Stephens Broening

Party's right wing and to the astonishment of many academics whose life's work is the study of the immensely complicated Soviet system.

With Mr. Reagan the complexities tend to disappear; nuance is an alien presence. As his former campaign manager Stuart Spencer said of him on public television the other night, "With Ronald Reagan, what you see is what you get."

The president set the tone in his first press conference. On the threshold of a term of office that was bound to involve some kind of dealings, if not negotiations, with the only power that can destroy us, he had this to say about Soviet leaders, past and present: "... they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat" in order to attain their ends.

This was more than just an indication that Mr. Reagan intended to be rashly skeptical in any transactions with Soviet leaders. It was evidence of a deeply held animus. Just as deep, as Mr. Reagan's subsequent public pronouncements have shown, is his conviction that the Soviet regime is on the verge of collapse.

"The West won't contain communism, it will transcend communism," he told the graduating class at the White House in 1981. "It won't bother to denounce it, it will

dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written."

A month later, he said at a press conference, that "... the things we're seeing, not only in Poland but the reports that are beginning to come out of Russia itself about the younger generation and its resistance to long-time government controls, [are] an indication that communism is an aberration. It's not a normal way of living for human beings, and I think we are seeing the first, beginning cracks, the beginning of the end."

At a meeting with newspaper editors in October, 1981, the president made a connection between the U.S. rearmament program and the Soviet economic weakness he saw, suggesting that if the Soviets were faced with an uncontrolled arms race they would have to accept mutual arms reductions.

"There's one thing sure," he said. "They cannot vastly increase their military productivity because they've already got their people on a starvation diet as far as consumer products are concerned. But they know our potential capacity industrially and they can't match it. So we've got the chip this time, that if we show them the will and determination to go forward with a military buildup in our own defense and the defense of our allies, they then have to weigh: do they want to meet us realistically on a program of disarmament or do they want to face a legitimate arms race in which we're racing? ... we could go forward with an arms race and they can't keep up."

Last May, in a commencement address at Eureka College, the president said "the Soviet empire is faltering." The Soviet "dictatorship," he said, "has forged the largest armed force in the world. It has done so by preempting the human needs of its people and, in the end, this course will undermine the foundations of the Soviet system."

tion of the White House position on the Sovi-

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE

January 1983

By Philip Traubman

S

William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, sat at the end of the mahogany conference table in his office. Outside, the late afternoon sun played across the trees that ring the Central Intelligence Agency's headquarters in northern Virginia, filling the windows with a fresco of autumn colors. A short stack of documents, some stamped SECRET, rested at Mr. Casey's left elbow, and a yellow legal pad on which he had penciled several notes was positioned to his right.

"The reason I am here is because I have a lot of relevant experience and a good track record," Mr. Casey said, alluding to comments that he was unqualified for the job and had been appointed only because he was Ronald Reagan's campaign manager. Mr. Casey, an imperious and proud man, had been fuming over the criticism for months, according to his friends, and now, in his first comprehensive interview since taking office, he wanted to set the record straight.


nd

He flipped through the papers and extracted a yellowing clipping from The New York Times that extolled his record as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1971 to 1973. Next, he provided several pages copied from a book about Allied intelligence operations during World War II; he had underlined a glowing assessment of his contribution to the Office of Strategic Services. The final clipping was a story that appeared in The Washington Star in the summer of 1980, describing Mr. Casey's role as Reagan campaign director. The headline: "Casey, the Take-Charge Boss."

It was an oddly defensive performance for a man who, according to classified budget figures provided by Government officials, is overseeing the biggest peacetime buildup in the American intelligence community since the early 1950's. Because intelligence expenditures are secret, it is not widely known that at a moment when the Reagan Administration is forcing most Government agencies to retrench, the C.I.A. and its fellow intelligence organizations are enjoying boom times. Even the military services, which have been favored with substantial budget increases, lag well behind in terms of percentage growth, although military-run intelligence agencies are growing almost as quickly as the C.I.A. Spending figures for intelligence agencies, including the C.I.A., are hidden within the Defense Department's budget. With a budget increase for the 1983 fiscal year of 25 percent, not allowing for inflation, compared with 18 percent for the Defense Department, the C.I.A. is the Federal Government, according to Administration budget officials.

intentions, integrity
and capabilities.

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
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THE WASHINGTON POST
3 November 1982

CIA Said to Find S. African Rebels Stronger, Weighing New Targets

STAT

By Virginia Hamill
Washington Post Foreign Service



A Washington lobby group that has previously obtained sensitive classified documents says it has been given a U.S. intelligence report warning that the main guerrilla group operating in South Africa is gaining strength and is weighing a more militant strategy involving attacks on white civilian targets.

A second document made available to The Washington Post by Trans-Africa, a black American lobby group on African affairs, suggests that the white-minority government in South Africa is considering suppression of reliable reports of successful guerrilla attacks to protect white morale.

That report is contained in what Trans-Africa describes as a copy of a page from the April 15, 1982, National Intelligence Daily, a highly classified compilation of current intelligence information from the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and other intelligence sources.

It is circulated by the CIA director, as head of U.S. intelligence, to a limited number of senior policy makers in the White House, the Cabinet and elsewhere in Washington and to certain military commanders overseas.

The daily summary said Pretoria was considering new and stricter limitations on publicizing terrorist attacks because "the ANC [African National Conference, the main guerrilla group in South Africa] benefits from press coverage of its attacks." That, in turn, the summary said, "will strengthen the militants in the ANC who want the group to engage in spectacular attacks against whites."

Supporting that assessment is what Trans-Africa Director Randall Robinson said was an extensive CIA report on the outlawed nationalist group. Robinson, who said the report came into his hands in April, refused to make portions of it available for publication. He said they dealt with specific personalities and bases of the ANC.

Separate CIA spokesmen, making what each called the agency's "usual" response to press queries, refused last week to confirm or deny the existence or the reported contents of the excerpt from the intelligence daily as

spokesmen initially asked for details of the documents and responded several hours later.

Yesterday, a man identifying himself as George Schwegmann, from the CIA's Office of Physical Security, telephoned to inquire about the page of the April 15 intelligence summary. He said he had been advised by the agency's Department of Public Affairs of the copy. He was told that it no longer was in the reporter's possession.

Other sources in a position to be aware of the authenticity of the documents declined to challenge them. In May 1981, Trans-Africa leaked to the press classified State Department documents on Africa policy that U.S. officials later acknowledged to be valid.

The forecast in the alleged CIA report is for "more persistent and widespread racial unrest" in South Africa as the ANC moves against whites' "lives, property and security" to force them to face up to the need for change. The authorities are foreseen introducing more repressive measures and mounting further military operations against the group's installations in neighboring states.

The report, a chronicle of the group from its beginnings in the early part of this century through its current and considerable revival after the suppression of the Soweto riots of 1976, echoes widely accepted assessments within academic and business circles here of the ANC's burgeoning strength.

In its review of the ANC's major sabotage operations of the last two years, the report cites "improved efficiency and coordination" of the group's operations between 1980 and 1981, and an increase from 10 to 40 in major attacks against government and economic targets in that period.

"It is clear," the report said, that the ANC "could have inflicted a large number of white casualties if had chosen to do so."

Pointing to changes in the group's operations, the report says that "terrorist teams are now beginning to remain [in South Africa] for longer periods of time, sometimes carrying out several assignments before finally leaving."

It estimates that the ANC has 1,000 to

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ON PAGE 16

Casey's Shadows: A Greater Emphasis On CIA Analysis

In the huge marble entrance hall of the Central Intelligence Agency outside Washington, one wall bears the words, "And Ye Shall Know the Truth and the Truth Shall Make You Free." The wall opposite is inscribed with stars. "In Honor of Those Members of the CIA Who Gave Their Lives in the Service of Their Country." Below the stars, a glass display case holds a book in which each star is followed by the name of the slain CIA member it stands for. Some of the stars have only blank spaces beside them, to mark the names that will never be revealed.

This dual commitment, to secrecy and to knowledge, is the hallmark of a government intelligence agency. Most of our attention to the CIA in the past decade has been concentrated on the secrecy part. But CIA Director William Casey, in a recent interview, wanted mainly to talk about what he was doing about the less glamorous and more important matter of how the agency analyzes and reports information.

He did say that the CIA was now active again in clandestine activities albeit in post-Watergate style. "There's a lot of talk about my being trigger-happy," Mr. Casey defended himself, "but lots of the little countries of the world are under pressure"

Capital Chronicle

by Suzanne Garment

from Soviet-backed forces. "We've gotten out of the business of security assistance, but we're doing lots for them in fields like communications.

"For instance, we helped in the El Salvador election. In Honduras, we put people through school and gave them instruments that can detect how much metal a truck is carrying. Some countries we help just with photographic information, or sensors, or training for anti-terrorist forces. It's all done with local people and just a handful of officers."

But just as important was what was happening to intelligence analysis. The estimates program—the process by which the intelligence community, within the CIA and elsewhere, produces its major pieces of analysis—had been "way down," Mr.

Casey said, when he arrived. Part of the problem was simply money: In the seven or eight years prior to the last year of the Carter administration, the agency had "lost 50% of its people and 40% of its funding."

The problem wasn't just money, though. The program "wasn't timely," said Mr. Casey, "and it wasn't relevant. For instance, I asked for an estimate on the Cubans and their activities. I got it after two months—and it neglected to mention Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union. I sent it back, and it took another while. I asked how long it had been in the works. It turned out that it was begun in June of 1980. It had gone through seven drafts—and the first one was the best."

Moreover, the estimates were too narrow in scope: "They were doing these estimates on a country-by-country basis. They would do one on Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador. But no one was looking at the regional interplay among these countries. And no one was concentrating on the economic component of these situations. In 20 years, we had put only five estimates on the Soviet economy.

"We've got the estimating process streamlined," Mr. Casey said. Instead of the compromising and papering-over of differences that used to go on at the lower levels of the bureaucracy when an estimate was prepared, "we now have the chiefs of all the agencies comprising the intelligence community making the decisions." The issues, as one aide to Mr. Casey put it, are drawn more clearly under the new system. They are made clearer still by Mr. Casey's certainty that "I'm the one responsible for the estimate, and for giving a fair reflection of alternative views."

Mr. Casey has also made some major changes in the way the agency does its short-term analysis. He's taken the people in the analytic sections—who used to be divided up into categories like scientific affairs, societal affairs and strategic affairs—and put them into new sections organized along geographic lines. That way, he said, they have a better chance of producing information that is immediately useful to policymakers. He has also established new analysis centers on two topics of current interest, technology transfer and "insurgency and instability."

Finally, the daily briefing procedure has been changed. Now high officials don't merely get a package of written materials sent over by the agency. Instead they hear a presentation from a briefing officer. He then reports back to headquarters on what types of questions the officials asked and if there might be a need for more of certain kinds of information.

These changes in the way the CIA handles intelligence are all of a piece. They are designed to make disputes in the intelligence community more visible, produce information on the politicians' timetable, reorganize the analysts to make their product conform more closely to decision makers' needs and tighten the day-to-day connection between high government officials and the agency. If they work, they will make the CIA more relevant. They will also make the agency more political, by forcing analysts to attune themselves more closely to the schedules and agendas of the politicians who are their customers.

Mr. Casey's strategy is guaranteed to provoke resistance, but its "political" nature is precisely what makes it promising. After all, it is hard to give a decision maker a good answer unless you are willing to find out what his question is.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-27NEW YORK TIMES
23 APRIL 1982

Is Castro Convertible?

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, April 22 — The C.I.A. has come up with an exciting modern method of briefing President Reagan about foreign leaders: the motion picture. Before a visit to the U.S. by Israel's Menachem Begin, the C.I.A. produced a psychological profile in the form of a film documentary for the President's top-secret viewing that was the pride of the agency's film division.

Mr. Reagan finds going to the secret movies preferable to slogging through turgid written intelligence reports. After the socko success of the Begin film at the Oval Box Office, Cloak and Dagger Productions came up with an even bigger hit.

The 20-minute selected short subject that drew raves last month from elite audiences at the White House and State is a search inside the mind of Fidel Castro, which takes the point of view that he may be going through a political menopause; it suggests that a mid-life crisis of the Cuban leader, now 54, offers us an opportunity to woo him away from the Soviet orbit.

Evidence exists that Secretary Haig has been trying to steal that demarche. Five months ago he met secretly with the Cuban Vice President in Mexico; that de facto recognition led to a follow-up visit to Havana by the silent-mission specialist Vernon Walters. (There was a rumor that Mr. Haig slipped away over a weekend in March for a rendezvous with Cuban officials, but he flatly denies that.)

The Reagan Administration may be deluding itself. In 1978 the Carter Administration became aware of violations of the 1962 agreement with the Soviet Union that prohibited the installation of offensive weapons in Cuba. Instead of demanding the withdrawal of MIG-23's with the capability of bombing Houston, Mr. Carter wrote to Leonid Brezhnev stating only that further shipments would be considered a violation. They stopped. During the Reagan Administration, the shipments began again.

That quiet buildup was soon accompanied by an open warning from Mr. Brezhnev that any attempt by the U.S. to counter new Soviet missiles in Europe would be followed by an escalation of Soviet power near the U.S. — which means missiles in Cuba.

Alarmed by the apparent weakness of the Reagan response, and made suspicious by five cancellations since February of scheduled Haig testimony about Cuban policy, hard-line senators led by the Republican Steve Symms of Idaho introduced a resolution reaffirming the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement.

partment weaseled. "We do not find the Symms restatement resolution helpful to our overall efforts in that region now," a State functionary informed Howard Baker, the majority leader, who then dutifully broke a tie vote and supported the weasel.

Despite all the tough talk by the President this month about a Soviet-Cuban "virus" threatening the Caribbean, when it came to a simple reaffirmation of our 20-year understanding that we will not tolerate offensive weapons in Cuba, the Reagan Administration waffled.

Why? Perhaps a vote for the 1962 agreement would expose the degree to which that agreement is being violated. Perhaps, at the other extreme, an attack on Cuba is being planned that would also violate the agreement. Or perhaps some timorous jerk down the line at State, without checking upstairs, instructed the majority leader of the Senate to make a fool of himself.

The unofficial line at State today supports — even promotes — the timorous-jerk theory. Senators are being told that when the resolution comes up again next month, the Administration will support it. All the waffling last week was a terrible mistake, the Reagan men say, and point to the hasty cutoff of tourist trade with Cuba as proof of toughness on Mr. Castro. Where was our efficient national security adviser in this uncoordinated mess? Out to lunch.

Something is fishy about all that. It could be that some competitive wooing of Mr. Castro was going on, and we turned out to be the rejected suitor. When the Argentines asked their big grain customer, the Soviet Union, to veto the United Nations resolution calling for a pullout from the Falklands, it asked for assurances that the Argentines in return would not join a U.S.-organized move against Cuba. The Argentines had no answer and so Moscow abstained, showing that its priority in Latin America is still its ally, Cuba.

Let us hope that our behind-the-scenes flirtation with Mr. Castro is over. For him there is no role reversal, despite fanciful C.I.A. movies to the contrary.

Men high in Reagan circles murmur about carrots and sticks; now that the carrot has not worked, what is left? Our 1962 agreement is being steadily eroded, and we are on notice from the Kremlin that intermediate-range missiles will soon be near our shores.

Future memoirs in four volumes, will prove that we gave peaceful initiatives every chance. Now is the time to deal with a threat before it becomes

People of the Week®

New Force In Reagan's Foreign Policy

The President's security adviser is concentrating power in the White House and cracking the whip over Weinberger and Haig.

After a year of controversy and confusion, the administration's foreign-policy apparatus is being transformed by one of Ronald Reagan's closest political friends.

William P. Clark, 50, the President's low-profile assistant for national-security affairs, is moving quietly but forcefully to counter widespread criticism of a lack of coherence in Washington's handling of international affairs.

He has put Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger on notice that further public squabbling will not be tolerated.

At the same time, Reagan has been drawn by Clark into a greatly expanded role in managing foreign policy, an area that the President tended to shun during his first year in office. Also, Clark's strengthened National Security Council staff is pursuing critical studies that are designed to provide the basis for a coordinated national-security strategy.

Among the most important: A far-reaching analysis of American military objectives and capabilities around the world through the end of this decade. The study is being directed by former Air Force Secretary Thomas C. Reed, another longtime Reagan friend who is a consultant to Clark. One official says that Reed's report "will become the equivalent of a little red book from which everyone will get his marching orders."

Briefings restored. Reagan himself now routinely spends up to 3 hours a day in Oval Office deliberations on global problems and then heads home at night with a thick stack of reading material to study. The President's daily national-security briefings—discontinued for a time last year—stretch for an hour on many Approved For Release Clark brings in experts from the State Department, the

Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and the NSC staff to background Reagan on international issues.

One of the first steps taken by Clark to give the President a tighter rein on the process was a directive spelling out in detail the authority and responsibilities of the NSC chief and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The presidential order has reduced much of the public competition evident earlier between Haig and Weinberger.

Clark has issued another directive under Reagan's signature that requires White House approval for overseas travel by department heads. One official says that during the past year the President at times was not even aware that the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense was embarking on trips abroad.

The new directive has helped curb the sort of disarray that arose when Weinberger, while in the Middle East in February, raised the possibility of arms shipments to Jordan that were vigorously opposed by Haig.

Meanwhile, all major public statements issued by the Pentagon, the State Department or the CIA must now be cleared in advance by the White House.

In addition, presidential decisions that in the past were conveyed verbally now are formalized into signed or-

ders to ensure that they are implemented without confusion or delay.

Aides say that Reagan realized after a year into his Presidency that he was not fully involved in key military and foreign questions. "Too many decisions were being made at State and Defense instead of in the Oval Office," says a senior adviser.

The remedy was to elevate the status of the NSC adviser to report directly to the President instead of through White House Counselor Edwin Meese, as was the case with Richard V. Allen. The former NSC chief resigned in January.

"Not a Kissinger." A trusted Reagan friend who served as his chief of staff in the California statehouse, the current national-security adviser has the confidence of the President in a way that Allen never did—despite Clark's total lack of experience in foreign affairs before Reagan asked him to come to Washington as deputy secretary of state in 1981.

"Bill is not a Henry Kissinger conceptualizing a world order and then flying off in the dark of night to carry it out," explains a White House adviser, "but he's very effective in making sure that the President maintains control."

Clark, who was nominated to the California Supreme Court by Reagan, is described as assuming the role of an "honest broker" of views to the President. He is "still playing judge from the standpoint of making sure everyone in the courtroom has his views heard," says an aide.

For the most part, Clark is slow to press his personal views, which aides describe as conservative but flexible and pragmatic. Nevertheless, Reagan relies heavily on Clark's judgment on an array of issues, including domestic matters. When advisers are sharply divided in their proposals, the President usually turns to Clark for counsel, sometimes asking him to stay behind after a meeting to talk in private.

Like Reagan, the lanky 6-foot-2 Clark owns a ranch near Santa Barbara. He has a penchant for three-piece suits and cowboy boots and shares the President's love of horseback riding. The two often swap catalogs on horses and ranch equipment.

Careful not to intrude on others' turf, Clark also gets along well with Reagan's Big Three advisers—James Baker, Michael Deaver and Meese.


But his amiable, low-key manner is not taken lightly by administration officials. "Never be fooled by that quiet, gentle smile," warns a White House aide. "Clark is tough and not afraid to

President Reagan looks to William Clark to play key role in managing U.S. global strategy.



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A4

THE WASHINGTON POST
5 January 1982



Continued Hostilities Cost Allen His Job

By Martin Schram
Washington Post Staff Writer

Edwin Meese III offered a cordial greeting to his visitor, Richard V. Allen, and then he let him know where things stood.

The president wanted Allen's resignation, Meese said. There was no other way out of it.

The word came as no surprise to Allen, as he sat yesterday afternoon in that prestigious corner office that had belonged to past White House national security advisers but had never been his. The newspapers had even printed the name of his successor.

But Allen was not yet ready to yield. As he recalled, and Meese later confirmed, Allen said that he

News Analysis

worked for the president and no one else, and if that was what the president desired, then he wanted to hear it directly from him.

It was 2 p.m., time for Allen's scheduled meeting with President Reagan. He left the office of the counselor to the president, walked around the bend in the corridor and was ushered into the Oval Office, where he quietly made his last stand.

"I suggested to the president that I wanted to be reinstated, but I understood he might have other ideas," Allen said.

The president had other ideas. And so, on the day in which he was finally exonerated of any illegality or even impropriety in the scandal that had become linked with his name, Richard Allen left the permanent employ of the man he had worked for years to elect and then serve.

Allen lost his job, in the end, not because of the \$1,000 in cash he received from Japanese journalists; not because of the three watches he received and kept; not because of the contacts with his former business associates; and not because of the errors on his financial disclosure form. The Justice Department ruled weeks ago that he had broken no laws, and the White House counsel's office said yesterday (after an inexplicable delay) that he had violated no codes of conduct.

Allen was replaced as the president's national security adviser mainly because the president and his top advisers concluded they did not like the way things had worked out with him in the job.

Coordination and communication between Allen and Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. had been shattered by the friction and hostility that existed unchecked between the two men from the outset of the administration.

It was not that it was mostly Allen's fault: Haig had managed to involve himself in repeated clashes with Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and a number of other Cabinet colleagues, as he seemed to view every debate over policy and planning and structure as a struggle over the territorial imperative.

But tensions between the two men and their staffs continued to flare, fueled by reports that made their way around the State Department and the White House that Allen was frequently critical of Haig in private meetings with outsiders and at cocktail and dinner parties.

The president's top advisers—chief of staff James A. Baker III, deputy chief of staff Michael K. Deaver and Meese (Allen's staff supervisor)—seemed to spend increasing amounts of time trying to resolve the intramural quarrels before they

got to Reagan. But there were some things that they could not keep from

Like the problem with the morning intelligence briefings. Presidents have traditionally received their daily briefings on international intelligence developments from the national security adviser. But Haig—apparently chafing at what he feared was a daily opportunity for Allen to snipe at him—insisted to the president that he wanted to be present at the morning briefings, too, or at least have another State Department official there.

So Haig or Deputy Secretary of State William P. Clark began attending the daily briefings. But this proved unsettling to Weinberger, who let it be known that Defense wanted to be there, too.

Reagan's ultimate response was to cancel his morning briefings from the national security adviser, saying he would simply read the data from written reports. Some White House officials said privately at the time that the president thought that his morning sessions with Allen had been mainly a waste of time. But one senior presidential adviser offered another view the other day: "The briefings had become unwieldy. It was like having to have a miniature National Security Council meeting each morning."


By this time, as Meese was later to concede, the coordination of the president's national security policy making had degenerated into "confusion."

Haig was communicating with the White House by talking variously with Meese, Baker, Deaver and the president. Often, key guidance and impressions were passed through what proved to be a crucial, informal back-channel: between Deaver and Clark, who had been placed at State mainly because he was an old Reagan ally who could serve as a conduit between Haig and the Reagan men who were hardly

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ON PAGE A16

THE NEW YORK TIMES
24 December 1981



Charles Waller

Reagan Views Films to Get The Diplomatic Edge

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 — The lights go off, the projector rolls and President Reagan settles back in his chair to prepare for his first meeting with a foreign head of state. It is the White House version of "This Is Your Life," and among the film subjects so far have been Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, King Hussein of Jordan and Anwar el-Sadat, the late President of Egypt.

What the President sees is a special film, put together by the Central Intelligence Agency, that includes a mixture of footage from American and foreign television and classified material from Government agencies. The film includes commentary to give the President insights into the life, rhetoric and work of foreign leaders, most of whom are strangers to Mr. Reagan.

The film is used to supplement the voluminous briefing books that

Administration officials prepare for the President before he meets with a foreign head of state. Mr. Reagan, according to White House sources, prefers the film briefing to the heavy reading because he feels it gives him a better feel for foreign leaders and their style.

David R. Gergen, director of White House communications, said the video-briefings are a "normal procedure" that are not new to the Reagan White House and that the films are made up primarily of public footage.

Jimmy Carter, who preferred the printed word and thrived on briefing books, used the film briefing "once or twice" in his Presidency, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mr. Carter's national security adviser. Mr. Reagan, however, with his roots in the celluloid world, is devoted to the screen versions.

Phil Gailey

RADIO TV REPORTS

4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM The Fred Fiske Show

DATE October 12, 1981 8:00 PM

SUBJECT The National Intelligence Daily

FRED FISKE: Almost all newspapers work very hard to increase their circulation. The newspaper with the largest reporting staff in the world and a huge budget has a tiny, select, strictly limited readership. It's the National Intelligence Daily published by the CIA. And Dale Vanatta (?) tells about it in an article in the current issue of Washingtonian magazine, entitled "Okay, Doll, this is Knight. Get me Casey. I've got a scoop." It's the most secret newspaper in the world. The National Intelligence Daily is the subject.

Dale Vanatta is an investigative reporter on the staff of Jack Anderson.

How are you, Dale?

DALE VANATTA: Fine. Good to be back after a year.

FISKE: It hardly seems to me that it could be a year. How about that? He says it's a year ago. I'd have guessed five or six months.

VANATTA: Yeah. And I think that article -- when we were talking about that article, it was about rating Jimmy Carter with peanuts. And we said we'd probably be rating Ronald Reagan with oranges the next year. And indeed we are, yes, with Reagan in power.

FISKE: How's Jack these days?

VANATTA: Fine. Doing very well.

FISKE: The National Intelligence Daily is the brain-

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Reagan's top security adviser a bit insecure

By Steve Neal
Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON — During a recent White House strategy meeting on the AWACS proposal, a senior aide noted the absence of National Security Adviser Richard V. Allen.

Deputy Chief of Staff Michael K. Deaver deadpanned, "He's probably downstairs coloring one of his maps."

The comment is a reflection of Allen's downgraded status as Ronald Reagan's foreign policy advisers. "He's in over his head" says a Cabinet secretary who has worked with Allen.

By most accounts, Allen has been less than effective in his nine-month stewardship of the National Security Council. As head of the administration's AWACS task force, Allen has done nothing to dispel this impression.

In his encounters with Republican senators, Allen is said to be patronizing and arrogant. When Sen. James McClure (R., Idaho), warned him that the Saudi arms package was in trouble, Allen cut him short: "We've got a lot of things in this you aren't even aware of."

"DICK IS a very bright guy but he never learned how to be tactful," says a senior White House official. "He just doesn't know much about politics."

A key midwestern senator is of the theory that the White House "set up" Allen to be the scapegoat if Congress shoots down the AWACS package.

A Senate aide adds: "He had neither the clout nor the brains to pull it off."

Secretary of State Alexander Haig has blamed Allen for the administration's choppy start in presenting the Saudi AWACS deal to Congress. Allen, for his part, suggests that Haig is to blame.

The tall, silver-haired Allen, 45, heatedly denies allegations that he wasn't up to the job. "Under my guidance and coordination," he says, "the group has been prepared since August and earlier to take this case to the Congress."

ALLEN DELAYED making his pitch until Reagan's economic recovery package had been passed and until the President had a chance to discuss the Saudi arms deal with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

Under the administration's plan, the United States would sell \$3.5 billion worth of sophisticated military equipment to Saudi Arabia, including five Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar jets.

"The ultimate meaning of this sale," says Allen, "will be to strengthen regional security for all states in the (Persian Gulf) region against a growing Soviet threat and a threat by proxies of the Soviet Union."

In the face of stiffening congressional opposition to the sale, Allen brought Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan into the Capitol for closed-door meetings with pivotal senators. Allen also suggested sending a group of senators to Saudi Arabia in an effort to gain concessions from Saudi leaders.

WITH 24 HOURS, Haig blocked Allen's plan. Haig, who was furious at the idea of having senators negotiating U.S. foreign policy, demanded that Allen's superiors put a stop to the affair — and they did.

State Department officials say that Haig's infighting with Allen no longer debilitates the secretary of state. Haig has managed to cut Allen out of most weighty issues. The State Department is sending its economic studies for this month's Cancun summit conference in Mexico directly to White House Counsel Edwin Meese's office — not Allen's.

Haig also has wrested control from Allen of arms limitation talks, the middle East, and U.S.-Soviet relations, issues which were often handled by former NSC advisers Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger. "In the old days, (former Secretary of State Cyrus R.) Vance would call to complain about Brezezinski's interfering and Brezezinski would be standing there next to Carter while he talked on the phone with Vance," said one State Department source. "Allen has been cut out of that sort of access to the President."

IN HIS first six months on the job, Allen gave Reagan formal daily briefings on the state of the world. There were complaints, though, that he did little more than "read from CIA material" at those meetings. "He didn't offer much analysis of his own," said a Reagan aide.

Last winter, for example, before the President was scheduled to hold a brief Oval Office conference with Italian foreign minister Emilio Colombo, Allen handed him a State Department briefing book which an aide called "the size of the D.C. Yellow Pages."

Finally, the President decided that he didn't need Allen's briefings. And, since July, the national security adviser has been required to submit his reports in writing. Publicly, Allen has claimed to be "enthusiastic" about the new system.

A longtime Reagan associate said, however, "What they're trying to do is put some distance between Allen and the President."

PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR Edwin Meese has eclipsed Allen as the White House's top foreign-policy spokesman. Allen now reports to Meese instead of the President. And Meese now occupies the corner office which previously belonged to Kissinger and Brzezinski, while Allen works in the White House basement.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 122

WASHINGTONIAN
OCTOBER 1981

Okay, Doll, This Is the Get Me Casey. I've

The CIA Is the Largest News-Gathering and Its National Intelligence Daily Is Very By Dale Van Atta

For more than twenty years Bill dreamed of publishing a little newspaper. He realized his dream in 1974, launching a four-page publication that readers, when they referred to it at all, simply called the *NID*. It came out every day except Sunday, when most of its readers rested.

Bill says his newspaper had the largest reporting staff of any on earth and a budget running to billions of dollars. Unquestionably, the communications technology used to produce the *NID* was the best yet devised. Although there was no advertising to bump any of the paper's many exclusives, its editors often complained of a need for more space. But Bill resisted: Keep it small, he said. Bill made sure that it was kept exclusive as well. The *NID* never had more than sixty customers. One of them was the President of the United States.

Bill will tell you that his reporters and newspaper were the best in the world. Mostly we have to take his word for that, because the paper's readers were required to return it or destroy it. *NID* is short for *National Intelligence Daily*, the newspaper of the Central Intelligence Agency. Bill is short for William Egan Colby, director of the CIA from 1973 to 1976.

Pity the CIA man, for he is a most misunderstood creature.

They—which means everyone not in the know—call him an agent. He huffs at that. Agents are merely spies, and are paid and “handled,” whereas he is a case officer or analyst. They say he is covert, which is true, but that does not mean that he is evil. They draw him in cloak and with dagger, but his true companions are computers, economic matrices, and ~~Robert~~ ~~the~~ ~~security~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~nation~~ ~~rests~~ ~~on~~ ~~his~~ ~~judgment~~; but often, if he is to advance,



The front page of the *Nation Intelligence Daily* for Friday, 29, 1975, and William Egan who founded this most secret newspaper in the world.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1

THE WASHINGTON POST
12 July 1981

Reagan Ends Daily Briefings With National Security

By Martin Schram
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Reagan has decided to end the long-standing presidential practice of receiving formal daily briefings from his national security affairs adviser — further deemphasizing the role of Richard V. Allen, who now holds that job — and to put a new emphasis on a committee of policy-makers.

As part of a continuing effort to bring order to his often-fractious foreign policy high command, the president is receiving his daily national security report from Allen in written form only, according to senior White House sources. The sources also said that the president has decided to set aside time three mornings a week for meetings with his entire top echelon of national security policy: Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Casey, plus Allen and top White House aides Edwin Meese III, James A. Baker III and Michael K. Deaver.

Top presidential advisers said that the president hoped his new format would serve to emphasize the collegial nature and team-player requisites of his Cabinet government.

The moves come amid reverberations from the most recent round of personal infighting and private consternation within Reagan's national security inner circle. The latest problem began with criticism from two of Haig's deputies of the performance of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick — which renewed the concerns of the president and his senior White House officials about Haig's willingness to perform as a player on the Reagan team.

The problem continued through published reports that Allen, in discussions with reporters, was sharply critical of Haig. The reports prompted considerable unhappiness with Allen on the part of Haig, his associates and

Senior presidential aides said the decision on the new policy, put into effect last week, was made by the president after consultation with his top staff advisers, notably Meese, Baker and Deaver.

"A decision has been made to streamline the president's schedule," one of Reagan's senior advisers said. "It is not intended to reflect on Dick Allen or Al Haig or anyone else."

In practice, however, the change does reflect on Allen, because every national security affairs adviser has given daily briefings to the president since the job was formalized in the Kennedy White House with the appointment of McGeorge Bundy. And it reflects upon Haig in that the formalized inclusion on the president's schedule three days a week of the eight-person committee known as the National Security Planning Group amounts to the regular participation of two officials — the defense secretary and the CIA director — who had not previously been part of the president's routine morning policy discussions.

This means that the president will be meeting regularly with virtually his entire national security council. While the entire group will be included on the president's schedule every Monday, Wednesday and Friday, it will not actually meet quite that often, according to one senior White House aide. The meetings will be convened any time any of the members feels there is a matter that ought to be discussed, he said.

"We expect that the group will meet at least a couple of times each week. The reason for the change is that issues have often surfaced in the morning briefings that affected not only State, but Defense, the CIA and others — and they weren't there. Now they will be. It's an extension of cabinet government, really."

Before last week, the president had been receiving oral national security briefings from Allen each morning, and a daily intelligence report sent over by the CIA. Those morning briefings were attended by Deaver and either Haig or Deputy Sec-

ording to a presidential aide.

"I think every president feels that it clarifies a briefer's mind to first put [his thoughts] down on paper," this presidential adviser said. "... Each morning, if Dick Allen wants to see the president, he will be able to do so. Also, every time Al Haig wants to see the president, he will be able to see him."

Allen, who assumed office in January with the understanding that his job would not be as commanding in scope as it was in the era of two of his more famous predecessors, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, was asked in a telephone interview if he considered the new format a reduction of his duties. "Not at all," he said. "I suppose it could seem that way. But not at all. We are trying to make better use of the president's time. I'm altogether enthusiastic about the new schedule."

Now, he said, the president will read his national security briefing, and then Allen will appear in the Oval Office for the first five minutes of the regularly scheduled morning meeting that the president has with Meese, Baker and Deaver — "just to see if there is anything that needs to be clarified."

The private conflicts and all-too-public turf fights that have marred the first 5½ months of the Reagan presidency were triggered by — and continued to revolve around — his secretary of state, Haig.

In a memo to the president delivered on Inauguration Day, Haig sought to structure administration machinery to put him in control of all national security policy-making. One senior State Department official later