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BOOKS BY THEODORE C. SORENSEN

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SNOW, C. P.—*Continued*

blooded novelist; and the hardsell technique of a successful businessman . . . he is a jolly personality who takes a schoolboyish delight in his plans for presenting a new politico-scientific humdinger which is going to rattle the Establishment more than somewhat."

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SNOW, SIR CHARLES PERCY *See* Snow, C. P.

SORENSEN, THEODORE (CHAIKIN)
May 8, 1928- United States government official; lawyer

Address: b. The White House Office, Washington, D.C.; h. 3000 Spout Run Parkway, Arlington, Va.

Few officials in the new administration are more concerned with the policies and programs of John F. Kennedy than Theodore Sorensen, the Special Counsel to the President of the United States. The youngest official in the Kennedy administration, he is the President's chief writer of speeches, braintruster, political confidant, and, along with Lawrence F. O'Brien, one of his chief legislative aides. Although he bears a modest title, Sorensen, who has been called "chief of staff for ideas," is one of the most important and influential men in Washington.

Theodore Chaikin Sorensen was born on May 8, 1928 in Lincoln, Nebraska to Christian Abraham and Annis (Chaikin) Sorensen. He has three brothers: Thomas, Robert, and Philip Sorensen, and a sister, Mrs. Ruth Singer. Born of Danish parents in a prairie sod house, his father rose to become state attorney general of Nebraska and a Republican in the tradition of Senator George Norris' liberalism. He went to Europe on Henry Ford's peace ship, served as counsel to the women's suffrage movement in Nebraska, and wrote the law that enabled public bodies to acquire private utility companies. His mother, of Russian-Jewish background, was an ardent feminist and pacifist who gave her maiden name as a middle name to all the five Sorensen children.

Christian Sorensen often took his son Ted to meetings on public utilities, and he sometimes had the child address the audience with a "few words" from the platform. Cluttered with liberal magazines and books, the Sorensen household was a congregating place for progressive friends who debated current issues, particularly those of the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration. Another influence upon the boy was the family's Unitarianism.

In 1945 Ted Sorensen graduated from Lincoln High School, where he had been active in drama and debate, in the band, and in the YMCA. That fall he entered the University of Nebraska on a Regents scholarship, studying the arts and sciences in a prelaw curriculum. In 1949 he was granted a B.S.L. degree with election to Phi Beta Kappa. As an undergraduate, Sorensen had served as chairman of the campus constitutional convention and of the mock United Nations convention. He had also been president of the university YMCA and a member of the debating team, the drama club, and the band.

With the help of a Donald Miller scholarship, Sorensen entered the College of Law at the University of Nebraska in 1949. He became editor in chief of the *Nebraska Law Review* and was awarded the Order of Coif. In his spare time he served as a chief lobbyist in the state legislature for the groups that favored a Fair Employment Practices Committee law. In 1951 Ted Sorensen stood first in his graduating class when he received his LL.B. degree. His father wanted him to practise law in Lincoln, but feeling that his home town was too restrictive, Sorensen headed for Washington, D.C., where he would be relatively unknown.

In 1951 Sorensen became an attorney for the Federal Security Agency, later the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Through a lawyer whom he had met at a convention of Americans for Democratic Action, Sorensen became a staff researcher for the joint Congressional subcommittee on railroad retirement, which had been set up to study revision of the Railway Retirement System. When the subcommittee finished its work, Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois was so impressed with Sorensen's performance that he recommended him for a job as administrative assistant to the newly elected Senator from Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy.

Reportedly, John F. Kennedy gave Sorensen two five-minute interviews a day or two apart before he hired him. In the first session Kennedy interviewed Sorensen; in the second session Sorensen questioned Kennedy. "Drawn together by their mutual love of books and politics, the two men worked together efficiently and harmoniously. With his remarkable analytical ability, Sorensen soon showed a special knack for studying bills, drafting "quick study" memoranda, and conducting research for speeches and magazine articles. That first year, in 1953, Sorensen was mainly concerned with the problems of New England. In 1954 he became secretary to the New England Senators' Conference and held the post through 1959.

While John F. Kennedy was recovering from a back injury in 1955, Sorensen did the research for Kennedy's *Profiles in Courage* (Harper, 1956), a collection of biographical sketches about American legislators who exercised independent judgement in the face of pressures from their constituents. At first Drew Pearson attributed the Pulitzer Prize-winning book to Sorensen as its ghost-writer, but the documentary evidence of Sorensen's research notes, Kennedy's drafts in his own handwriting, and

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the help of Clark Clifford, a Washington lawyer, later led Pearson to retract the charges.

A friend has said that from the beginning of the two men's association, Sorensen had set himself one goal—to get John F. Kennedy elected President. In 1956 he urged Kennedy to try for the Vice-Presidential nomination at the Democratic Convention in Chicago. In the same year he prepared the widely circulated memorandum, based on analyses of national election returns, that argued that political considerations should not keep a Roman Catholic from a Democratic national ticket for reasons of religion, and that the Democratic ticket needed Kennedy to bring back defecting Roman Catholics to the Democratic camp. Kennedy almost got the nomination.

On January 2, 1960 John F. Kennedy announced that he was a candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination. What followed has been described as one of the most successful political campaigns ever waged in the United States. Sorensen and Kennedy traveled through every state, courting politicians, making estimates of the real sources of power, and lining up delegates for the 1960 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles. Sorensen built up a card file of about 30,000 names of people active in Democratic politics, one of the most extensive in the hands of any man.

Just before the primaries, Sorensen relinquished his organizational duties to the Senator's brother, Robert F. Kennedy. But throughout the primaries, the whistle stops, and the television debates, Sorensen remained as John F. Kennedy's chief strategist and policy maker. While the Senator was giving one speech, Sorensen would be writing another. Journalists covering the strenuous campaign reported that Sorensen seemed to thrive on the pressure. Among others, he prepared those speeches that defended Kennedy's Roman Catholicism from onslaughts by Protestant fundamentalists. Kennedy said: "I want to keep Ted with me wherever I go in this campaign. You need somebody whom you can trust implicitly."

Now that John F. Kennedy is in office, a major preoccupation of Theodore Sorensen is to make him remembered as one of the greatest Presidents. When Kennedy was President-elect, he helped to draft the inaugural address. Since becoming Special Counsel to the President of the United States, he has spent much of his time in drafting and writing Presidential messages and speeches. He was Kennedy's major force in writing his first State of the Union message, and he helped in the preparation of Kennedy's speech to the nation on the Berlin crisis on July 25, 1961. Perhaps no one has so closely approximated the speech rhythms of John F. Kennedy as Theodore Sorensen.

Sorensen now stands in the White House tradition of Colonel House, Harry Hopkins, and Sherman Adams. He handles situations that cut across government departments. Reportedly, he will be given more responsibilities in the field of foreign relations; previously, he concentrated on domestic affairs. Like other advisors of this tradition, he has already become embroiled in controversy.

Wide World

THEODORE SORENSEN

In the autumn of 1961 Senator Barry Goldwater, the conservative Republican Senator from Arizona, read into the *Congressional Record* a story by Walter Trohan, chief of the Washington bureau of the Chicago *Tribune*. Trohan asserted that "the man behind President Kennedy's rocking chair in a world with war tensions, escaped military service as a conscientious objector and Korean War service as a father."

According to Sorensen's draft board in Lincoln, Nebraska, at the end of 1948 Sorensen was classified 1-AO. He had, in other words, agreed to serve in the armed forces as a noncombatant (as in the medical department). Reclassified to 3-A in August 1950 because he had married, Sorenson was reclassified to 1-AO in January 1952 because he had no children. After an operation for a tumor behind the ear, he was classified 4-F. In April 1954 he was reclassified 3-A, since he had become a father.

Theodore Sorensen married Camilla Palmer on September 8, 1949, just before he entered law school. They live in Arlington, Virginia with their three boys: Eric Kristen, Stephen Edgar, and Philip Jon. Sorensen once won a silver dollar from his parents for having reached maturity without having smoked or taken a drink. Although he indulges in an occasional sherry before dinner or in a daiquiri (to which he was introduced by John F. Kennedy), he still avoids tobacco and never drinks coffee.

Sorensen's frugality, abstemiousness, and Puritanism result from his rearing, not from financial necessity. This asceticism extends to his appearance. He is a sparely built man, six feet and one-half inch in height and 175 pounds in weight, with brown hair and brown eyes and a square and determined face that usually wears a sober expression. Strangers

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SORENSEN, THEODORE—*Continued*

often mistake his glacial reserve for coldness instead of recognizing the underlying shyness that may be its cause. When not under pressure, he can be charming. To relax, he plays softball with his sons. He is a member of the Nebraska Bar Association and a Unitarian.

Max Freedman, the Washington correspondent of the Manchester *Guardian*, has written that "Mr. Sorensen, in John Morley's phrase, has the glory of words. But he is much more than a literary craftsman; he is also a master of political philosophy and political strategy. It is not the language of eulogy but a demonstrable truth to say that he combines the political sagacity of James Farley with the literary graces of Judge Samuel Rosenman."

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SPORBORG, MRS. WILLIAM DICK July 11, 1879-Jan. 2, 1961 Civic leader and clubwoman; headed New York City and State Federations of Women's Clubs, National Council of Jewish Women, and Women's Voluntary Participation Defense Council; consultant with United States delegation to the United Nations at San Francisco in 1945. *See Current Biography* (November) 1947.

Obituary

N Y Times p29 Ja 3 '61

STACE, W(ALTER) T(ERENCE) Nov. 17, 1886- Philosopher; author

Address: 986 East Ave., Mantoloking, N.J.

One of the leading philosophers of the English-speaking world is W. T. Stace, a naturalist who nevertheless admits the validity of religious experience. A British subject, Stace served in the British colonial ranks in Ceylon for twenty-two years, some of them as mayor of Colombo and as chairman of the Colombo municipal council. In 1932 Stace accepted a teaching position at Princeton University, where he taught until his retirement in 1955.

Stace has written ten books on philosophical questions. His *Destiny of Western Man*, an attempt to defend the "rightness" of democracy against totalitarian systems, won the Reynal & Hitchcock Prize in 1941 as the best nonfiction book for the general reader written by a member of an American college or university staff. In 1959 he was one of ten scholars who received $10,000 prizes for distinguished scholarship in the humanities from the American Council of Learned Societies.

Walter Terence Stace was born on November 17, 1886 in London, England to Edward Vincent Stace and Amy Mary (Watson) Stace. He is the great-grandson of General William Stace, who fought at the Battle of Waterloo. His father was a lieutenant colonel in the British Army; and one of his brothers, Ralph Edward Stace, is a retired lieutenant colonel of the Royal Engineers. It is this family background of Army and civil service that later inducted Stace to enter the British colonial administrative ranks in Ceylon. Stace's other brother, Henry Watson, is deceased. He also has a sister, Hilda (Mrs. Maurice Swabey).

Stace was educated at Bath College and Fettes College in Edinburgh around the turn of the century. He then attended Trinity College at Dublin University, where he majored in philosophy and from which he received his B.A. degree in 1908. Two years later, in 1910, he joined the British Civil Service in Ceylon. He remained there for twenty-two years, serving at various times as district judge, private secretary to the Governor, land settlement officer, member of the legislative council of Ceylon, member of the governor's executive council, and, finally, as mayor of Colombo and chairman of the Colombo municipal council. In 1915, while Stace was serving as police magistrate of Kandy, serious riots took place between the Buddhists and Mohammedans in Ceylon. On one occasion, Stace, who was responsible for suppressing the disturbances, refused to let the police fire into an unarmed crowd, an action unusual enough to cause much controversy at the time.

In 1932, as a result of government changes in Ceylon, many civil servants were offered retirement, and Stace decided to leave the country. He sent a résumé of his published writings to several British and American universities and accepted the best offer—a three-year lectureship at Princeton University. He was Stuart Professor of Philosophy from 1935 until his retirement in 1955.

Stace had never done any formal graduate work, but in 1929 he received a Litt.D. degree from Dublin University in recognition of the scholarly contribution he made in his book *The Philosophy of Hegel* (Macmillan, 1924; Dover, 1955). "The primary object of this book," Stace noted in his preface, "is to place in the hands of the philosophical student a complete exposition of the system of Hegel in a single volume. No book with a similar purpose, so far as I know, exists in our language.... The difficulty of Hegel's writings is notorious.... Therefore, I have aimed especially at lucidity. The student . . . will find here, I hope, all Hegel's essential thoughts stated as easily and simply as is possible." This effort to convey philosophical essentials in understandable terms marks the bulk of Stace's work.

Since the publication of his first book, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy* (Macmillan, 1920), Stace has written on several major areas of philosophical thought. In *The Meaning of Beauty* (Richards & Toulmin, 1929), he advances a theory of aesthetics. *The Nature of the World* (Oxford, 1940) is an essay in phenomenalist metaphysics (philosophical phenomenalism holds that phenomena are the only objects of knowledge). *The Theory of Knowledge and Existence* (Oxford, 1933) was praised by *New Statesman and Nation* reviewers for showing "clear exposition

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SOREL, EDWARD, artist; b. N.Y.C., Mar. 26, 1929; s. Morris and Rebecca (Kleinberg) Schwartz; diploma Cooper Union, 1951; m. Nancy Caldwell, May 29, 1965; children—Jenny, Katherine; children by previous marriage—Madeline, Leo. Co-founder Pushpin Studio, 1953; free lance artist, 1956—; syndicated Sorel's News Service, 1969-70, King Features; exhibited in Pushpin Studio retrospective at the Louvre, 1970; other European galleries, 1970-71; exhibited one-man show Graham Galleries, N.Y.C., 1973. Recipient awards Soc. Illustrators, also Art Dirs. Club N.Y.; Augustus St. Gauden's medal Cooper Union. Mem. Am. Inst. Graphic Arts, Alliance Graphique International. Author, illustrator: Moon Missing, Making The World Safe for Hypocrisy, 1972. Illustrator: Pablo Paints a Picture, 1961; Gwendolyn the Miracle Hen (N.Y. Herald Tribune Book award for illustration, 1962), 1963; What's Good for a Five-Year-Old, 1969; The Duck in the Gun, 1969; Word People, 1970; Magical Storybook, 1972. Contbr. to nat. magazines. Home: RD 2 Route 301 Carmel NY 10512

SORENSEN, CLARENCE WOODROW, ret. coll. pres.; b. Loup City, Neb., Apr. 6, 1907; s. James C. and Anna (Madsen) S.; Ph.D., U. Chgo., 1951; L.H.D., Wittenberg U., 1963, Marycrest Coll., 1970; m. Edna L. Schaus, Aug. 13, 1938. Dir. Pakistan edn. project, 1951-52; asst. prof. Ill. State U., 1949-52, asso. prof., 1952-56, prof. geography, 1956-59, dean Grad. Sch., 1959-62; pres. Augustana Coll., Rock Island, Ill., 1962-75. Dir. Found. Inter Confessional Research, France. Mem. Am. Assn. Geographers, Nat. Council Social Edn. (editorial bd. 1952-55). Clubs: Union League (Chgo.), University (N.Y.C.). Author: A World View, 1950; Ways of Our Land, 1954; (with H. H. Barrows, E.P. Parker) Our Big World, 1945; Old World Lands, 1948; The American Continents, 1947; co-author vols. published in Urdu: Neighbors in Asia, Europe and North America, The Southern Continents, Pakistan and the World, Regions and Resources, Economic Geography, Physical Geography and Geology, 1952-54; also numerous articles, filmstrips in field. Home: 3426 7th Av Rock Island IL 61201

SORENSEN, GLADYS ELAINE, coll. dean; b. Rockville, Neb., Oct. 17, 1922; d. Victor and Christine (Heide) Sorensen; B.S. in Nursing, U. Neb., 1945; M.S. in Nursing, U. Colo., 1951; Ed.D., Columbia, 1964. Head nurse U. Neb. Hosp., 1945-48, evening supr., asst. nursing arts instr. Good Samaritan Hosp., Phoenix, 1949-50; nursing supr. Luth. Hosp., Grand Island, Neb., 1950; asst. prof. nursing, coordinator med.-surg. nursing U. Colo. Sch. Nursing, 1951-57, acting asst. prof. nursing, grad. student on leave U. Wash. Sch. Nursing, 1955-56; asso. prof. nursing U. Colo. Sch. Nursing, 1957-58; prof. nursing U. Ariz. Coll. Nursing, 1958-67, dean coll., 1967—; cons. in field, 1945—. Mem. Def. Adv. Com. on Women in Services. Bd. dirs. Tucson Vis. Nurse Assn. Mem. Nat., Ariz. (v.p. 1958-60) leagues nursing, Am., Ariz. nurses assns. Contbr. profl. jours. Address: 7811 E Lee St Tucson AZ 85715

SORENSEN, LEIF BOGE, physician, educator; b. Odense, Denmark, Mar. 25, 1928; s. Henry V. and Mary (Nielsen) S.; B.S., Odense Katedralskole, 1946; M.D., U. Copenhagen (Denmark), 1953, Ph.D. in Biochemistry, 1960; m. Kari Heggtveit, July 12, 1968; 1 dau., Heidi. Came to U.S., 1955, naturalized, 1963. Intern, Copenhagen County Hosp., Hellerup, Denmark, 1954; resident Copenhagen Municipal Hosp., 1955, U. Chgo. Hosp., 1957-60, practice medicine specializing in metabolic (genetic) disease and rheumatology U. Chgo. Clinics; mem. faculty U. Chgo. and Franklin McLean Meml. Research Inst., 1956—, prof. medicine, 1970—; scientist, 1956—; attending physician, dept. medicine Fritzker Sch. Medicine, U. Chgo.; cons. FDA, 1972—. Served with M.C., Danish Army, 1951. Fulbright scholar, 1955; Ill. Arthritis Found. grantee, 1970-72. Mem. A.A.A.S., Am. Rheumatism Soc., Am. Soc. Clin. Investigation, Central Soc. Clin. Research, N.Y. Acad. Scis., Danish Med. Assn., Ill. Acad. Gen. Practice. Mem. editorial bd. Jour. Lab. and Clin. Medicine, 1964-70, Arthritis and Rheumatism, 1965-72. Contbr. articles to profl. jours. Home: 4800 Chicago Beach Dr Chicago IL 60615

SORENSEN, PARRY DANIEL, educator; b. Manti, Utah, June 23, 1916; s. E. D. and Ann (Parry) S.; B.S., U. Utah, 1936; postgrad. U. London, 1937; M.S., Northwestern U., 1940; m. Margaret Christensen, July 12, 1941; children—Richard P., Daniel P., Holly Ruth, Michael H., William F. Reporter, Deseret News, Salt Lake City, 1938-39; reporter Washington Post, 1940-41; spl. agt. FBI, 1942-45; reporter Los Angeles Examiner, 1945-46; dir. univ. relations U. Utah, Salt Lake City, 1946-64, exec. asst. to pres., 1964—, asst. prof. journalism, 1946-52, asso. prof., 1952-64, prof., 1964—, acting chmn. dept. journalism, 1961-62; cons. Assn. Governing Bds. of Colls. and Univs., 1968. Pres. Western Motor Lodge, 1958-67; dir. Deseret Book Co., 1969—. Mem. gen. bd. Young Mens Mut. Improvement Assn., Latter-day Saints Ch., 1964-71. Recipient Outstanding Young Man award Utah Jr. C. of C., 1947; Silver Anvil award Pub. Relations Soc. Am., 1964. Mem. Pub. Relations Soc. Am. (past pres. Intermountain chpt.), Am. Coll. Pub. Relations Assn. (pres. 1969-70), Nat. Assn. State Univs. and Land Grant Colls. (past com. chmn.), Sigma Nu, Phi Kappa Phi, Sigma Delta Chi, Kappa Tau Alpha. Mem. Ch. of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (mission...

...dep. city atty., Pasadena, 1941-43, 46-47; city atty. Santa Monica, Cal., 1947-52; partner firm Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Los Angeles, 1952—; cons., spl. atty. municipalities. Mem. Santa Monica City Council, 1965-69. Served with USNR, 1943-45. Mem. State Bar Cal., Am., Los Angeles County bar assns., League Cal. Cities (dir. 1965-67). Club: Cal. Yacht. Home: 1102 San Vicente Blvd Santa Monica CA 90402 Office: Suite 3300 707 Wilshire Blvd Los Angeles CA 90017

SORENSEN, SVEND OLUF, banker; b. Grenaa, Denmark, Feb. 24, 1914; s. P. and Anna (Jensen) S.; diploma banking Copenhagen Sch. Econs. and Bus. Adminstrn., 1941; m. Karen Vontillius, Nov. 12, 1949; children—Aase Hellemann, Birgit Vontillius. With Den Danske Landmandsbank, Copenhagen, 1930—, mng. dir., 1962—; gov. Adela Investment Co. S.A. Adviser banking Govt. Pakistan, 1952-53; pres. bd. Danish Bankers Assn.; pres. bd. Banking Fedn. EEC; chmn. bd. Ship Credit Fund Denmark; mem. bd. Danish Agrl. Real Property Loan Fund; mem. Danish Capital Market Council; mem. Institut International d'Etudes Bancaires, Internat. Monetary Conf.; internat. counsellor Conf. Bd.; fgn. corr. Danish-Am. Trade Council. Mem. Danish nat. com. Internat. C. of C.; mem. com. Finance Inst. Danish Industry and Handicrafts, Ltd., Danish Soc. Preservation Bldgs. and Landscapes; mem. Danish nat. com. Bicentennial Commemoration U.S.A., 1976. Decorated comdr. Order Dannebrog (Denmark), knight 1st class Order St. Olav (Norway). Mem. Danish Acad. for Tech. Scis., Danish Econ. Council, Danish Atlantic Assn. (mem. council). Rotarian. Clubs: American (Copenhagen), Overseas Bankers (London, Eng.); Rungsted Golf. Home: 11 A Hambros Alle 2900 Hellerup Denmark also 47 Kystvejen 3100 Hornbaek Denmark Office: 12 Holmens Kanal 1092 Copenhagen K Denmark

SORENSEN, THEODORE CHAIKIN, lawyer, former spl. counsel to Pres. of U.S.; b. Lincoln, Neb., May 8, 1928; s. Christian Abraham and Annis (Chaikin) S.; B.S. in Law, U. Neb., 1949, LL.B., 1951; LL.D., 1969; LL.D., U. Canterbury, 1966, Alfred U., 1969, Temple U., 1969, Fairfield U., 1969; m. Gillian Martin, June 28, 1969; 1 dau., Juliet Suzanne; children from previous marriage—Eric Kristen, Stephen Edgar, Philip Jon. Admitted to Neb. bar, 1951, N.Y. bar, 1966, D.C. bar, 1971, also U.S. Supreme Court bar; atty. Fed. Security Agy., 1951-52; mem. staff joint com. railroad retirement U.S. Senate, 1952; asst. to Sen. John F. Kennedy, 1953-61; sec. New Eng. Senators' Conf., 1953-59; spl. counsel to Pres. of U.S., 1961-64; mem. firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, N.Y.C., 1966—; commentator nat. affairs Metromedia Channel 5, 1971-73. Democratic candidate for N.Y. Senate, 1970. Named by Jr. C. of C. as one of ten Outstanding Young Men of Year, 1961. Mem. D.C., Neb. bar assns., Phi Beta Kappa, Order of Coif. Editor Neb. Law Rev., 1950-51. Author: Decision Making in the White House, 1963; Kennedy, 1965; The Kennedy Legacy, 1969. Office: 345 Park Av New York City NY 10022

SORENSEN, THOMAS CHAIKIN, financial exec.; b. Lincoln, Neb., Mar. 31, 1926; s. Christian and Annis (Chaikin) S.; B.A., U. Neb., 1947; m. Mary Barstler, July 5, 1947; children—Ann Christine, Alan Thomas, Jens Christian. Radio announcer, 1943-44; newspaper reporter, 1945-46; asst. night editor Neb. State Jour., 1946-49; dir. news and pub. affairs radio sta. KLMS, Lincoln, 1949-51; instr. U. Neb. Sch. Journalism, 1948-50; information officer, press attache Am. embassy, Beirut, Lebanon, 1952-56, Baghdad Pact, Iraq, 1956, Cairo, Egypt, 1957-59; program and policy officer for Near East, USIA, Washington, 1959-61, dep. dir. for policy, 1961-65; v.p. Internat. Tech. Assistance & Devel. Co., 1965-66; v.p. U. Cal., 1966-68; campaign coordinator Robert Kennedy for Pres., 1968, Alan Cranston for U.S. Senator, 1968; sr. fellow Adlai Stevenson Inst., 1968-69; v.p. Leasco Corp., 1969-70; partner Sartorius & Co., N.Y.C., 1971-74; partner Advest Co., 1974—; pres. Advest Internat., 1974—; dir. Pa. Mut. Fund, N.Y.C., Hyde Park Bank and Trust Co., Public Media Inc., Chgo. Recipient Arthur S. Flemming award, 1961. Mem. Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Delta Chi, Delta Sigma Rho. Author: The Word War, 1968. Home: 250 Beverly Rd Scarsdale NY 10583

SORENSEN, VIRGINIA (MRS. ALEC WAUGH), author; b. Provo, Utah, Feb. 17, 1912; d. Claud E. and Helen El Deva (Blackett) Eggertson; A.B., Brigham Young U., 1934; m. Frederick C. Sorensen, Aug. 16, 1933; children—Elizabeth (Mrs. Christian Anderson), Frederick W.; m. 2d, Alec Waugh, 1969. Guggenheim fellow, 1946-47, 54-55. Author: (novels) A Little Lower Than the Angels, 1942; On This Star, 1946; The Neighbors, 1947; The Evening and the Morning, 1949; The Proper Gods, 1951; Many Heavens, 1954; Kingdom Come, 1960; The Man With The Key, 1974; (children's books) Curious Missie, 1953; The House Next Door, 1954; Plain Girl (recipient award Child Study Assn. Am. 1955), 1955; Miracles on Maple Hill (recipient Newberry award A.L.A. 1956), 1956; Where Nothing is Long Ago, 1963; Lotte's Locket, 1964; Around the Corner, 1970. Mem. Authors Guild, P.E.N. Home: 97 Blvd de Paris Tangier Morocco Office: care Harcourt Brace & Johanovich Dir Pub Relations 757 3d Av New York City NY 10017

SORENSON, ALLAN RICHARD, chem. engr., univ. regent; b. Manistee, Mich., Dec. 12, 1919; s. Albert Reinhold and ... Europa (Vlach) S.; B.S. in Engring., U. Mich. ... Harris, Feb. 3, 1950; children ...

...motivation and guidance, 1942; Psychology for Living ... edit., 1970. Home: 12405 N 28th St Tampa FL 33612

SORENSON, RALPH ZELLER, II, coll. pres.; b. ... Sept. 20, 1933; s. Ralph Zeller and Verna Mary ...; ... magna cum laude, Amherst Coll., 1955; M.B.A. ... Harvard, 1959, D.B.A., 1967; m. Charlotte Bacon ... 1960; children—Kristin Elizabeth, Katrina Ann ... Research asst. IMEDE Mgmt. Devel. Inst., Lausanne ... 1959-61; exec. Nestle Alimentana S.A., Vevey, Switzerland ... prof. Harvard Bus. Sch., 1964-74; pres. Babson Coll. ... Mass., 1974—. Dir. Foxboro Co., Amtel Inc., ... Gen. Housewares Corp. Served to lt. USAF, 1955-... fellow, recipient spl. award appreciation Asian Inst. ... Philippines. Mem. Amherst Coll. Alumni Soc. ... Wellesley Country, Wellesley, Commercial ... Wellesley Hills MA 02181

SORG, HERBERT PETER, U.S. judge; b. St. Marys, Pa., ... 1911; s. Jacob P. and Margaret M. (Wehler) S.; ... Coll., 1927-31; LL.B., Duquesne U., 1935; m. June Mary ... 31, 1940; children—Suzanne (Mrs. Gregory ...), ... Richard I. Thomas), June (Mrs. Daniel Lloyd ...) ... Peter, Vivian (Mrs. Daniel L. Dernyer). Admitted to Pa. bar ... practiced in St. Mary's, Pa., 1935-55; judge U.S. Dist. ... Pitts., 1955—. Mem. Pa. Ho. of Reps., 1940-... 1945-47, majority leader, 1947, speaker, 1947-... Assn., Am. Judicature Soc. K.C. Home: 110 Creston ... PA 15228 Office: Room 803 US Courthouse Pittsburgh PA ...

SORIA, DARIO, opera dir.; b. Rome, Italy, May ...; s. Raffaello and Amelia (Padoa) S.; B.A., U. Rome, 19...; ... U. Ferrara (Italy), 1937-39; m. Dorle Jarmel, July 26, ... U.S., 1939, naturalized, 1945. Jr. partner Raffaello Soria ... Rome, 1930-39; treas., dir. Buitoni Foods Corp. N.Y.C. ... announcer Italian programs, dir. Italian and French ... N.Y.C., 1942-43, asst. dir., then dir. network programs ... 1943-48; dir. radio programs D'Arcy Advt. Agy. ... Hollywood, 1948-50; pres., gen. mgr. Cetra-Soria ... 1950-53; pres. EMI Inc. (Angel Records), N.Y.C. ... administrv. dir. Festival of Two Worlds, Spoleto ... producer Soria Series for RCA Victor, N.Y.C., 1958-... charge internat. operations and fgn. subsidiaries ... N.Y.C., 1961-70; mng. dir. Met. Opera Guild, Inc. N.Y.C. ... producer, narrator weekly radio program Festival of ... radio, N.Y.C., 1951-56. Served to lt. Italian Alpine ... 35-36. Decorated Cross of Merit. Club: Metropolitan ... 24 W 55th St New York City NY 10019 Office: 1865 ... York City NY 10023

SORIANO, RALPHAEL SIMON, architect, educator; b. ... Greece, Aug. 1, 1907; s. Simeon and Bohora ...; ... Rhodes Coll., St. Jean, 1919-22; B. Arch., U. So. Cal. ... U.S., 1924, naturalized, 1930. Work with Richard Neutra ... planning, 1932-35; engaged spl. projects Los Angeles ... Regional Planning Commn., 1935-36; pvt. practice ... 1936—; pioneer steel house, industrialization of ... prodn.; prin. works include Hallawell Seed Co., San ... Francisco, 1940, Ciro of Bond Street Stores, Beverly ... Francisco, 1947, Beverly Green Apt. House, Los ... Adolph's Office Bldg. and Lab., Burbank, 195...; ... Community Hosp., 1960; aluminum houses prefabricated ... to Maui, Hawaii, Watanabe Housing Project 1963 ... 1956, U. Ariz., McGill U., 1959, Yale, 1959-60, ... Wash. U., 1962-63; lectr. U.S. and abroad; ... Expn., 1937, Pan Am. Congress, Havana, 1951, Mus. ... Modern Art, 1952, Internat. Exhbn., Sao Paulo ... Exhbn. Munich, Germany, 1955, Toledo Mus. 1956 ... U.S.A. Exhibit, Moscow, USSR, 1958, speaker ... Tokyo, Japan, 1960. Recipient VII Pan Am. ... Progressive Architecture award, 1947. Archtl. Forum ... Fellow A.I.A. (nat. award 1951, 56, 58, 60, 62 ... 57); mem. Am. Assn. U. Profs. Scarab. Author ... Home: PO Box 128 Belvedere Tiburon CA 94920 Office: ... Belvedere Tiburon CA 94920

SORKIN, CYLVIA AARON, business cons.; b. ... 1914; d. Leo and Laura (Messenberg) Aaron; B.S. ... 1935, M.S., 1936, Ph.D., 1941; m. Dr. Harry M... 9, 1936 (dec. 1959); children—Harlan ...; ... Schatzman, June 20, 1963. Asst. to prof. Washington ... instr. Sch. of Bus., 1941-43, asst. prof. ... 1943-50, bus. cons., lectr., 1950—; own TV ... affiliate, 1958—; with radio sta. KMOX, St. Louis ... appearances on KTVI-TV, ABC, St. Louis, ... A.M. Chgo., Larry Angell Show, St. Louis, Mo., ... Francisco, Regis Philbin Show, St. Louis, ... Angeles, others. Mem. def. adv. com. women in ... com. on adminstrv. personnel U.S. Civil Service ... Louis Civil Liberties Com.; mem. bd. ...

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Nixon or to Humphrey ... [illegible] made that the Wallace presence introduced rightward vectors into the national Republican strategy. At Miami, Nixon knew that he would have to carry the border states: therefore, the nomination of Spiro Agnew, instead of, say, Hatfield or Percy. The themes of the Nixon campaign were designed in the knowledge that the race had to be run not only against Humphrey but also against Wallace; and there can be little doubt that the behavior of the Administration while in office—its Supreme Court nominations, its school integration stance, its attitude toward law enforcement—has been influenced by the knowledge that, whatever the Democrats come up with, Nixon may also be running against Wallace in 1972. If Wallace is defeated and thus sunk on May 5, Nixon will be much freer to prospect leftward for liberal votes. To say this, moreover, is not cynical: Votes are the *sine qua non* of democratic politics, and almost any politician, his right flank secured, will try to occupy the ground to the left. As far as Wallace is now concerned, therefore, the political conclusion is complicated. Wallace's effect on the political process is both dangerous and desirable—but the latter only so long as he can be contained at his 1968 electoral strength.

Wishes Aren't Horses, Dammit!

Great and general rejoicing among the champagne merchants of Vienna! The Americans and Russians are coming—for Round Two of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which will almost certainly result in an amiable and lengthy exchange of sweet nothings and promises to meet again, sometime, somewhere, unless (which God forbid; see page 360) our side abandons its insistence on close on-site inspection. Elsewhere, preparations for the talks have been grimmer. In the Soviet Union, Marshal Grechko (the assassin of Czechoslovakia) has engaged in public saber-rattling; development of an armed satellite that can search out and destroy our spy satellites has been announced; construction of the missile submarine fleet that will outstrip our own by 1974 has proceeded apace, as has the building of ICBM sites (including dummy ones to confuse us); and—grand finale—missile tests in the Pacific have begun, to include the triple-warhead SS-9, said to be capable of knocking out our Minuteman ICBMs in their silos.

And in the United States? Well, President Nixon revealed plans to add a third ABM site to the two authorized last year, and to do preliminary work on four more; and the Air Force announced that we will deploy a dozen or so MIRVs come June. Whereupon, all hell broke loose. Mike Mansfield screamed bloody murder about the ABM, charging that we were trying to defend ourselves against a "hypothetical" Red Chinese threat (we should wait until it's actual?). Bill Proxmire condemned our ABM (not the Soviet Union's). Edward Brooke called for a U.S.-Soviet "moratorium" on MIRV [illegible]. And so on, and on; the *Leitmotiv* being always that ABM and MIRV will "sabotage the SALT talks." Come *on*, gentlemen.

Profile in Courage: Ted Sorensen's Finest Hour

On the evening of February 9, William Rusher and Theodore C. Sorensen Jr. appeared together as guests on the Barry Farber radio talk-show. Sorensen was widely known to be about to announce his intention of running in the New York Democratic primary for the senatorial nomination, thus adding his name to the 604 others trying for the opportunity of running against Charles Goodell. As the colloquy began, Mr. Rusher read aloud from an article about Sorensen published in the *New York Times Magazine* in March 1967, in which Mr. Sorensen explained why he could not possibly be a viable candidate for the Senate from New York. This understandably annoyed Mr. Sorensen, who began referring to Rusher, apparently in a spirit of contempt, as "Mr. Busher." Finally, as Rusher continued to read from Sorensen's own 1967 description of his various disabilities as a senatorial candidate, Sorensen blew his mind, and had his finest hour since helping to write Teddy's TV statement on Chappaquiddick.

S. Mr. Busher, you're frustrated, you're bitter, because you represent a point of view that has never succeeded in getting the people of this state behind it. George Wallace represented it, fine. The local Nazi Party represented it, fine. But you have never been able to get either the Democratic Party or the Republican Party to accept the kind of racism and militarism that is preached by your publication. And I fully understand why you are bitter and frustrated and angry and resentful at any moderate politician who may come along. So go right ahead and vent your spleen on me. I understand completely.

R. (*to Farber, who is groaning*) Let me have this, if I may. Just stand back for a moment.

F. Will somebody first explain the "Busher" reference? I don't know who "Busher" is. I know who Hitler is.

R. I take it that Mr. Sorensen is making this mistake intentionally. (*To Sorensen*) Is that right?

S. No, I'm sorry; I'm sorry. "Bill Rusher." I thought it was "Rill Busher."

F. Well, who is "Busher"? Why should I be the only illiterate in the house?

S. "Rusher"; I've got it, okay.

R. Well, now that we've got that cleared up, where in my publication, Mr. Sorensen, NATIONAL REVIEW, is racism advocated?

S. I will be glad to get that out for you and send it to you after I've had my librarian check it.

R. You'll be glad to get it out for me and send it to me?

S. I will indeed.

R. Well I'll make a little date with you, Mr. Sorensen—and

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Barry knows I keep these things—we'll come back on this program and hear where and when NATIONAL REVIEW advocated racism, and perhaps you can show it to me; and if you can't, at that point I'll call you a liar. Now, Mr. Sorensen, we're going to proceed with another point or two. I don't blame you for being annoyed because I have quoted your own words on your own incapacities and your own unsuitedness for the United States Senate.

S. Not in the slightest. I'm only amazed at your inability to understand the point I've been trying to make.

R. I think I understand all the points you've been trying to make, and I expect the audience understands. I don't know that you're qualifying yourself terribly well as the new United States Senator from here. I'll say this. I was on this program—I've forgotten how long ago, it was only a few months ago—with Senator Goodell, and he and I disagreed on everything we could disagree on, including the palatability of the coffee that Barry was serving that evening. But in the entire time, I will say he was a gentleman. He never went in for absurd mispronunciations of my name. He never made wild accusations of racism. And I'll say this, Mr. Sorensen: You may think you've been in New York long enough to be a viable candidate for the United States Senate, but on the basis of your hysterical showing this evening you wouldn't make a viable candidate for dog catcher of New York City.

S. Now it seems to me, Mr. Rusher, *you're* being rather hysterical.

R. Yeah, but I'm not running for the Senate.

S. I don't understand why you're losing your cool. You stood there and made all kinds of charges and all kinds of objections and all kinds of complaints—

R. I've done nothing tonight but quote you.

S. —and when I exercise my right of free speech to defend myself you say it's hysterical.

R. I want to know—I want to know, and we will find out—where and when NATIONAL REVIEW advocated racism. You do want to stick to the charge? You wouldn't want just to withdraw it, would you, by any chance? Because you're going to be required to, if you stick to it. (*Long pause*) Take your time and make up your mind.

S. About what?

R. Do you want to charge that NATIONAL REVIEW has advocated racism?

S. I think the policies supported by NATIONAL REVIEW, and the candidates supported by NATIONAL REVIEW, have not advanced race relations in this country.

R. But that's not quite the same thing. Are we advocating racism, or have we?

S. I just stated my statement.

R. Well, you don't want to restate your previous charge that we advocated racism, and when you go back to your files you're going to prove it?

S. (*Long pause*) I am telling you the position I'm taking.

R. Tell us again, now, what is it? Do we advocate racism or don't we?

S. Well, let me ask you: Do you support the Kerner Commission report?

R. No, I think it's wrong.

S. Well the Kerner Commission report, I think, pointed out very clearly what white racism is in America.

R. Yes, I know perfectly well that it blamed the troubles of America in the race area on white racism, and I think it [illegible] emphasis at that time. But you have made a specific charge, Mr. Sorensen, and you might as well inaugurate your campaign by either backing it up or withdrawing it. Does NATIONAL REVIEW advocate racism or not?

S. NATIONAL REVIEW, in the sense of the Kerner Commission report, has contributed to this result. That's exactly right.

R. In what sense is that? (*Pause*) What kind of a weaselly statement is that?

S. That's not a weaselly statement. As you've just pointed out, you don't agree with the Kerner Commission report.

R. And therefore I'm a racist? Anybody who disagrees with it is a racist?

S. No, of course not.

R. Well then, what?

S. (*Pause*) What what?

R. Well then, what is the point of bringing it up?

S. What is the point of your bringing up all the articles—

R. Because you have charged NATIONAL REVIEW with racism, and I want to know if you've got anything to back it up.

S. And I have told you as soon as I consult with my librarian I'll send you the documentation.

R. And the answer is that at the moment you don't have any documentation?

S. No, of course I do.

R. Oh, you do now?

S. I am going to send you the documentation, Mr. Rusher.

R. But you don't have it with you tonight?

S. No, of course. I don't have it with me tonight.

R. And you can't recall what it is?

S. Oh, I have a very clear impression of NATIONAL REVIEW and what it stands for.

R. And what is that?

S. I have already spoken that.

R. Racism?

S. It has contributed to the atmosphere of racism that has unfortunately set back race relations in this country.

R. And it has done this in what way?

S. In its articles.

R. Which articles?

S. And in the candidates it has espoused.

R. Which candidates?

S. And in the policies that it has backed.

R. Which candidates?

S. And I intend to send you the documentation.

R. You're aware that we opposed Wallace, are you not? Maybe you're not. It occurs to me that you probably aren't.

S. Well, you opposed Wallace because you had Mr. Nixon, who was equally close to your point of view.

R. And you think that supporting Richard Nixon makes us racists, indirectly or directly?

S. No.

R. Well then, what does?

S. Why don't you wait for the documentation?

R. All right, that's what we'll do.

The "documentation" never showed up, of course. Instead, Sorensen sent the following apology and retraction to Barry Farber. (It's a good thing for Sorensen that he did not seek the legal advice of Gargan and Markham.)

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February 20, 1970

Dear Barry:

I very much regret having used the words "racist" and "American Nazi Party" in connection with the NATIONAL REVIEW during your radio show of February 9. My apologies to you and Mr. William Rusher for this unfortunate error.

Sincerely,
Theodore C. Sorensen

Erle Stanley Gardner, RIP

It is hard to think of anyone in our time who has given more people more simple, unadulterated pleasure than Erle Stanley Gardner. When he died at the age of 80, something like 170 million copies of his books had been sold in America alone. The readers of these books, his multitudinous readers abroad, and those who have watched the Perry Mason television series, have found continuing solace in Gardner's intricate plots and clear, absorbing narrative. And absorbing entertainment aside, there has been in these troubled times something more—a simple unapologetic vindication of American values in Gardner's portrayal of the triumph of the innocent, the resourcefulness of their defenders, the flexibility and probity of our American system of law and justice.—FSM



I devote the section (greatly expanded) to a letter from a young man, recently returned from the Army, who adequately, indeed excellently, describes himself, his brief history and his grievances with NATIONAL REVIEW. I found him, and his criticisms, so engaging, that I asked the editorial board, and Mr. Rusher, to comment on his criticisms. They did so in memorandums addressed to me. The result is edifying, and entertaining. I shall devote a future section to reactions (brief, please) from readers. My thanks to you, in advance; and, especially, to Mr. McSloy. —WFB

Dear Mr. Buckley:

You probably don't remember me, but we had some dealings when I edited the Northwestern University Conservative Club's magazine, the *Optimate*, and we have met on several occasions—during the Goldwater campaign and most recently in early 1968 when you gave a speech here in San Antonio.

All this should serve to indicate that I am an inveterate *NR* fan, even to the point of saving past issues of the magazine for rainy afternoons, à la Mrs. Ferrari.

But sometimes you people at *NR* just burn me up! I recall your rather snotty comments about that girl who was expelled from Columbia simply because she chose to live with a man who was not her husband. With an administration like that to contend with, I'm not surprised Mark Rudd and the boys got a bit rowdy.

I remember being thought quite radical in my days at Northwestern because I advocated integrated off-campus housing, Bob Dylan music and an end to curfews for girls over twenty-one. We didn't ask the University to take a position on Dylan, but you can't imagine how the officials there grumbled and procrastinated over the issues we brought them. I didn't even last long enough at NU (only four-and-a-half years) to see the abolition of the curfew.

Although I've been in the military for the past three years, thus missing a good deal of campus excitement, I get the impression that some administrations have brought a lot of trouble on themselves.

Had they been more responsive to legitimate student reforms, had they been willing to deal with those students who wanted to work within the system, much of the radicals' strength would have been defused. (For example, I remember how hard we had to work just to get two students in as "observers" during meetings of a certain high administrative body.)

The cretins of the New Left would never have been able to do (or undo) all they have if a large number of students had not been latently hostile to the university administrations, believing (correctly, in most cases) that their administrations would obstinately refuse all compromise until the students made life sufficiently intolerable to force certain policy modifications.

NR does not seem to have given "equal time" to both sides of the student revolt question. While justly criticizing Hayden, Davis, et al., you often throw in nasty, off-the-cuff comments that place you pretty far into the Pig Camp.

I'm thinking now of Neil McCaffrey's tasteless, entirely uncalled-for reference to the "Rolling Scum" in the July 15, 1969 issue—which is the proximate cause of this letter. You don't have to be a Stones fan (though I am) to know that *NR* is no place for such malicious remarks.

How would you like it if in my magazine I referred to "Pope Pig VI" or quoted "President Richard Outhouse Nixon"? I certainly don't mean to equate the Stones with the Pope or RMN—but I use the analogy because if something like the above were printed in, say, the *New York Times*, or in Murray Kempton's column, the very next issue of *NR* would surely contain a sonorous passage or two, slapping the offender's wrist for violation of unwritten rules of fair play, and all that.

There are a lot of *NR* subscribers under thirty and we're not freaks, either, or radicals or hippies. But I am damned tired of those little innuendos about the things young people like, and of the fact that every pomposity uttered by some SDS moron is duly punctured, while

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MOST-FAVORED-NATION AND LESS FAVORITE NATIONS

By Theodore C. Sorensen

THE Amendment submitted by Senator Henry Jackson to the Administration's pending Trade Reform bill, along with its counterpart in the House of Representatives, is a curious blend of foreign policy idealism and domestic politics. The exaggerated claims of both proponents and opponents in the long and often emotional debate over the Amendment cannot obscure the underlying issue, which is as old as the nation-state—whether and when should one nation apply pressure to alter those policies or practices of another which, if not exclusively "internal" in impact, are at least not clearly within the traditional foreign policy realm. Although any amendment enjoying the formal sponsorship of nearly four-fifths of the members of the Senate and nearly two-thirds of the members of the House appears almost certain to be passed in one form or another, both the Congress and the Administration must now think through more carefully the implications and consequences of enacting the Amendment in its present form.

II

The Jackson Amendment would deny to any "nonmarket economy country" eligibility for most-favored-nation tariff treatment (MFN) and participation in the Federal government's export credit, credit guarantee and investment guarantee programs during any period in which that country denies to its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate, specifically by imposing more than a nominal tax or other charge. The primary objective of the Amendment is the elimination of Soviet "education" or exit taxes and other restrictions on the emigration to Israel of Soviet Jews.

That is a worthy objective, consistent with basic principles of human rights, with which few can in good conscience disagree. (I personally have supported free Jewish emigration in addresses in the Soviet Union as well as the United States.) As a means of achieving this objective, however—even as a somewhat awkward vehicle for conveying congressional support for it—the Amendment, to say nothing of the debate thereon, has been

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less clearly focused. For in fact it attempts too much to be effective and too little to be meaningful.

Inconsistencies abound among both its critics and proponents. Congressional "doves" who proclaimed that no amount of American might could alter the determination of tiny North Vietnam are now convinced that the minimal economic blow contained in the Jackson Amendment will move a superpower. The Administration which formulated the "linkage" theory of Soviet-American relations now rejects any attempt to link trade and human rights—an even-less-relevant-than-usual linkage proposed by those who previously scoffed at the theory. Businessmen argue that our economy needs Moscow's trade when in fact exports financed extensively by credits can only aggravate our short-range balance-of-payments problem.

The Secretary of State pleads that most-favored-nation status and credits were specifically pledged by the Administration in a solemn commitment to Moscow in 1972—a commitment that we dare not breach, he says, for fear of "provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions." But Moscow surely knows from bitter experience during the Johnson Presidency, and perhaps knows better than an Administration frequently forgetful of Congress' role in foreign affairs, that solemn commitments of this kind on matters of trade and finance can under our Constitution be made only with the ultimate consent of the Congress.

The Amendment backers have talked about overall Soviet treatment of Jews, but the Amendment itself is confined to emigration. Soviet Jews seeking religious freedom and political equality may well wonder why so many eminent American legislators are interested in them only if they are willing to leave their country, and how passage of the Jackson Amendment will ease their lot if they are not. Similarly, while the plight of Soviet author Alexander Solzhenitsyn and academician Andrei Sakharov has been cited with some frequency in the speeches of Senator Jackson and his cohorts, there is no evidence that either of those brave men wishes to leave the Soviet Union or that their safety would be any more assured by a relaxation of emigration restrictions. If trade with the United States were truly a prize for which a desperate Moscow would make unprecedented concessions—the unproven premise of the Jackson Amendment—the obvious question is why we should not condition it upon a

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whole range of human rights and disarmament proposals as well as emigration.

A nation's emigration policies are hardly the most crucial test of its merit as a trading partner or in any other role. Most nations, including Israel, restrict or tax emigration or foreign travel to some degree. Underdeveloped nations, for example, understandably fear that their ablest citizens, if allowed to leave, will not return from studies or visits in countries where higher incomes are available. The United States itself arbitrarily imposed bans, until they were held invalid, on travel to Cuba, North Vietnam and elsewhere, and before that the total denial of passports was a common practice until it too was held unconstitutional.

Methods for controlling emigration may vary, and the use of substantial exit taxes, spotlighted by the Jackson Amendment, is only one of many techniques. Repeal of the Kremlin's tax would make difficult any finding, under the wording of the Amendment, that a denial of emigration remained. But if the experience of other countries is any indication, the manipulation of passport requirements, national security restrictions, political sanctions, bureaucratic delays and other methods are equally effective, and more difficult to identify.

Then too, the widely varying patterns of government intervention in the economy among underdeveloped and developed nations alike make difficult any unanimity among economists as to which nations have "nonmarket" rather than "market" economics. Nor is there any reliable relationship between a nation's economic system and its restrictions on travel or other freedoms. The United States currently extends credits and MFN status to a wide variety of non-Communist governments which restrict emigration, intimidate intellectuals and trample on human rights.

If the denial of our trade credits and most-favored-nation treatment could truly end a nation's internal repression, or if a nation guilty of the latter should as a matter of conscience be denied the former, then one wonders why this approach is not applied by our country or by this Amendment to all countries. If, on the other hand, the backers of the Amendment prefer to concentrate now on the rights of Soviet Jewry, it is unfortunate that debate over the Amendment has also delayed extension of most-favored-nation treatment to Romania, China and others.

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III

But even if emigration is the right subject and Communist countries are the right target, the question remains whether trade in general and most-favored-nation status in particular constitute the right lever. In the past we have occasionally withheld our foreign aid, our military supplies or even our diplomatic representation from various nations as a sign of disapproval or means of pressure, but at the same time we have usually been willing to do business with these countries.

Part of the problem arises from confusion over the term "most-favored-nation." Congressional debate has frequently labeled the extension of this status a "concession," a "subsidy," a "favor," a "preference," or a "privilege." In fact it is none of these. On the contrary, it is a recognition of normal, equal status, in effect a determination that *no* nation or nations will be favored. It simply assures the recipient that its goods will enter the United States at the same low tariff rates applicable to comparable goods of our other trading partners who make available equal status to us. It is a common worldwide approach—indeed Israel at last report still granted most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union despite their bitter disagreements on other matters. As George Kennan has written:

> It involves no one-sided transfer of funds or goods; no loans, no gifts . . . [no] act of benevolence. . . . There is no more reason why normal trade relations between this country and the U.S.S.R. should be regarded as an exceptional favor bestowed by us on them than there would be for regarding such relations as an exceptional favor bestowed by them on us.

That equal status was enjoyed by the U.S.S.R. for 16 years, starting in 1935, until Congress cut off normal trade relations with all Communist countries early in the cold war. Today, as the conflicts between Washington and Moscow subside, Senator Jackson and other backers of this Amendment assert their support for expanded East-West trade in nonstrategic goods on a nondiscriminatory basis.[1] But if trade is truly a "trade" in which both sides, over the appropriate period of accounting, benefit equally—and neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would accept it on any other basis—then any U.S. barrier to Soviet imports, such as denial of MFN status, not only curbs

[1] My own support for this position is of long standing, expressed in "Why We Should Trade with the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1968.

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expansion but also imposes an equal handicap on both economies. Thus a meaningful trade relationship with the Soviet Union will be difficult to achieve and sustain over the long run if its goods are denied equal access to our markets, limiting its opportunities to earn the dollars with which to purchase our goods. MFN is a symbol that Moscow seeks, and its denial is a stigma that Moscow resents.

Yet it is ironic that nearly all the attention in the debate over the Jackson Amendment has been paid to MFN instead of to long-term credits and credit guarantees, which are much more important. (Moreover, the Amendment makes no mention whatever of rules governing the transfer of U.S. technology, which may be even more crucial to Moscow.) Such credits and guarantees are also extended by the United States as a matter of equality to all kinds of governments engaged in all kinds of restrictive practices. But such credits are different from MFN in one important respect. Backed by the federal government at bargain rates, they truly are a valued form of unilateral help, particularly in the short run. At a time when the Soviet trade deficit with this country could approach a billion dollars a year, credits are essential to Soviet buyers as well as American exporters; and Moscow is understandably more concerned about continuing to participate in U.S. Export-Import Bank and other export and credit guarantee programs than it is about receiving most-favored-nation status.

Granting, then, that MFN and credits have some symbolic and economic importance, how significant are they as a lever on Soviet behavior? Here one can only speculate. To this author it does not seem likely that either the various claims advanced by the Amendment's sponsors in Congress or the fears expressed by its detractors in the Administration would be borne out by the practical effects.

On the one hand, it is doubtful that a substantial expansion of trade with the United States is either so promising or so desperately needed by the Soviet Union, or so seriously affected by our withholding of MFN or even export credits, that the Kremlin would determine its policy in any area—emigration, other internal controls, détente or even trade itself—on the basis of this Amendment's success or failure. The steady growth of the Soviet economy during the cold-war years, despite a barrage of Battle Act, Trading with the Enemy Act and other U.S. restrictions,

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reflects both its traditional refusal to become too dependent upon American imports and its ability to find adequate markets and sources of supply in Europe, Japan and elsewhere. Soviet officials resent the repeated American assertion that they have little to sell which this country might want to buy—an ironic assertion in the light of those U.S. legislative and administrative rulings which have denied them any opportunity even to market certain goods here, ranging from small furs to giant turbines. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the near-term prospects for a much larger volume and variety of quality Soviet exports to the United States, particularly in the manufactured goods most affected by MFN, are slim whether or not most-favored-nation status is extended.

The Soviets know, moreover, that the mere availability of credits and MFN does not in itself assure the trade deals they seek, and that the absence of such terms does not inevitably cancel or prevent the deals otherwise available and now being made. The largest potential Soviet export to excite speculation in this country is natural gas. But that commodity, like most of the Soviet minerals and raw materials now constituting the bulk of its imports here, faces little or no U.S. import duty with or without MFN. Similarly, if the gas project's viability can be assured, private American financing will undoubtedly be forthcoming in the context of the energy crisis even without Export-Import Bank participation. Indeed substantial private credits will also be available in all likelihood to finance a considerable expansion of American exports to the U.S.S.R.[2]

Thus the Jackson Amendment's impact upon the Soviet economy is likely to be too minimal either to achieve the objectives of its supporters or to fulfill the fears of its opponents. The net result of our cutting off credits and holding back MFN would not be so unmanageable from the point of view of Soviet leaders as to enable the United States to dictate the terms upon which trade is to be expanded. More likely, the ultimate Kremlin concern for the economic consequences of the Amendment will be too small, and its resentment at being publicly pressured will be too great, to produce any important change in its emigration

[2] To the extent that they are not, the gap created by our barriers to the Soviets earning dollars in this country can continue to be offset in part by their requiring American exporters to accept payment in Soviet goods for resale or "switch" transactions, and also by their utilizing credit balances and currencies in third countries (for example, by stipulating the American exporter's components in goods which they purchase from those countries).

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policies in particular or its treatment of Jews and intellectuals in general. It would be contrary to our knowledge of the whole philosophy and experience of the U.S.S.R. to expect it to yield on this political issue as the result of our economic sanctions. The same would be true of any great power, including the United States. Were we to be threatened by another nation with a loss of trade equality unless we freed our "political" prisoners, for example, or broke up alleged monopolies, we might well react by reversing whatever consideration we were giving to moving as commanded and instead stiffen our resistance. While brave Soviet Jews and intellectuals have been quoted on both sides of this question in the current congressional debate, their firing-line perspective is not necessarily the best or only measure the American Congress should use in determining the risks and benefits to them and others as a result of the passage or defeat of this legislation. Certainly no one, including the Amendment's backers, expects the Soviets ever wholly to reverse a basic ideological tenet and remove *all* emigration restrictions.

Even if the Soviets were to make some positive concession or offer to do so, once passage of the Jackson Amendment occurs, in order to test the atmosphere, our government would have difficulty applying the precise wording of the Amendment in a realistic way or even measuring its success. This is not only because formal declarations by the Soviet Union have approximately the same practical effects as its recent ratification of the U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights. It is also because the emigration rate of Soviet Jews has already increased 3000 percent since 1970, continuing even during the latest Middle East hostilities. In the past 15 months the exit tax has been announced, then waived for some, then formally promulgated, then suspended for others, then reaffirmed, and then paid for others by foreign friends, and during it all the overall rate of expansion in the continuing wave of emigration to Israel seemed to vary hardly at all. If these moves toward relaxation of the tax were merely a ploy to deter adoption of the Jackson Amendment, then that could indicate a Soviet willingness to make concessions on this subject—or it could foretell a retightening of controls if the deterrent fails to stop passage of the Amendment. But if this generally expanding wave is instead a reflection of Kremlin acknowledgment that confinement of this many highly visible dissatisfied citizens is unwise or unfeasible, then neither passage

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nor defeat of the Jackson Amendment is likely to affect the size of that wave very much.

On the other hand, the Administration now warns that passage of Senator Jackson's Amendment could risk an end to détente and jeopardize the current talks on arms limitations and reduction of forces. Senator Jackson, with equal hyperbole, insists that there is and can be no genuine détente without free emigration, and that failure of his Amendment will enable the Kremlin to adopt a hard line internally and then externally. Avoiding the semantics of exactly when a détente is a détente, few can question that the avoidance of global incineration through stable superpower relationships overshadows the Soviet government's treatment of its citizens. But surely, if the Amendment is unlikely to have a significant effect on either the Soviet Union's economy or its emigration, it is unlikely to cause its leaders to reopen the cold war as Secretary Kissinger has warned.

The current Soviet-American détente, as recent experience in the Middle East demonstrates, is a fragile phenomenon based not on intangible personal relations but on national interests far more durable than symbolic issues like MFN. Predictions of an economically interdependent America and Russia bound to a peaceful relationship have been overstressed. To be sure, American trade and credits are regarded by the Soviets as an important benefit of détente; and the total refusal of those benefits could lead to a rise in influence within the Kremlin by anti-American militants. But Moscow's interest in the present improved relationship is also based on a desire for quiet on the Western front, on a desire for alleviation of U.S.-U.S.S.R. armaments-race burdens and risks, and on a desire for links with the United States sufficient to prevent a Sino-American conspiracy. The Soviets are thus unlikely to either retain or renounce détente merely because the Jackson Amendment is voted up or down.

IV

In this perspective the dividing line between internal and external policy is not as clear as Administration spokesmen imply when they oppose the Jackson Amendment as intervention in the Soviet Union's internal affairs. This is the key philosophical issue underlying the whole debate—not only whether this is interference with another nation's internal policy but when, if ever, such interference can be justified.

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Examining these questions in a broader context than that of Soviet Jewry suggests no simple or single answer. Internal policies frequently affect or reflect external policies. There is nothing new about foreign antagonisms being aroused by a nation's approach to emigration or immigration: witness the reactions to the former U.S. exclusion of Chinese, or the barriers erected by several countries to nonwhites, or the forced expulsion of East Asians from Uganda. In addition, the very reliability of a government's foreign policy is certain to be judged in part by the extent to which its domestic policies are cruel or honorable, immoral or self-restrained, arbitrary or open to correction, and indifferent or responsive to such universal standards as rational debate and human life itself. A lack of decency at home neither inspires nor earns trust abroad. The world would have learned much about both Stalin's and Hitler's intentions abroad by paying more attention to their activities at home. Were the pogroms of November 1938 to be ignored because they were an internal matter?

Consumers in this country often refuse to buy goods from a manufacturer or shopkeeper who mistreats his help. This is not always a moral or even a political judgment but a shrewd assessment of what kind of man they want to do business with. In similar fashion, residents of a close-knit community feel entitled to be concerned with the terror waged by a neighbor within his own house against his own family. They do not feel they are meddling in his internal affairs but meeting their responsibilities as human beings, upholding standards of decency in the neighborhood which ultimately affect them all, and acting out of the fear that a man who is violent to his wife and children may someday turn on them.

On the other hand, too much analogizing and moralizing on this subject clearly leads down a dangerous path, a path most Americans claimed to have disavowed after the long, disastrous slide into Vietnam. A solemn resolve not to concern ourselves with the political systems or internal conflicts of other nations has been repeatedly expressed by the leaders of all parties and factions. True to this resolve, we have not in recent years used any of our military or economic power, and very little of our diplomatic influence, to force a change on several governments charged with excessive force against their own citizens. Surely, one would conclude, we would never use that power with respect

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to governments charged not with bloodshed but with the curtailment of citizens' rights. If our goal is to make the world safe for diversity, as President Kennedy stated, then the governments we are obligated to leave alone are bound to include some whose treatment of their own inhabitants we find objectionable. We have no right, no obligation and insufficient power to intervene on behalf of the hundreds of millions of human beings around the world who are subjected by their rulers to curbs on their liberty.

It is also absurd to say that we will trust only those governments in the world community which have the support of their own citizens. Hitler had massive support; and democracies, whose policies tend to fluctuate with public opinion and to change with governments, are not always more stable, effective or reliable negotiating partners than one-party or one-man governments.

Thus principles divide. Any attempt to construct a coherent and consistent philosophy on the eternal question of intervening in another nation's internal affairs sooner or later runs headlong into real-life cases with which one's emotions or fortunes are involved. Many Americans, while deploring the very necessity of a Central Intelligence Agency and its participation in other people's politics, simultaneously complain that our government has not brought pressure to bear on the Greek junta. Others, who endorsed noble inter-American resolutions on the cardinal sin of intervention and called for hands off Allende, now want restraints imposed on his successors. Still others favored intervention to save Guatemala from domestic communism but have no interest in saving democracy in the Philippines or South Korea. Still others choose to ignore denials of human rights in our own country, or those practiced by our allies such as Portugal or client-states such as South Vietnam, but vigorously protest such practices in North Vietnam or Cuba. Even those Americans who have supported the U.N.'s gradual development of international legal standards, including specific and enforceable convenants under which the dividing line between external and internal behavior fades away, would resist stoutly any other nation's attempt to condition our trade or security pacts upon improved guarantees for our own minorities.

Such inconsistencies are inevitable, because few principles pertaining to intervention in another's domestic affairs, covert or

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overt, are universally applicable. The Alliance for Progress, for example, exerted economic pressure on Latin American countries to adopt internal political, social and economic reforms. It was denounced by Cuba as blatant internal intervention, welcomed (if not implemented) by most recipients as a friendly and humanitarian effort, and justified in Washington as a national security move on grounds that the United States could not risk becoming the only democracy south of the Canadian border. All three descriptions had merit. Similarly, we denounce as "blackmail" the embargoes placed by Arab governments on their export of oil to the United States, which they term justifiable to prevent the strengthening of their enemy's primary supplier. Again both may be right.

In truth, all nations, including the United States, while consistently mouthing the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs, continue to intervene in one form or another whenever the available means are in proportion to the primary motivation or provocation. Direct military action, for example, cannot be justified unless the other nation's activities pose a clear and present danger to the intervening nation's security, whereas a severance of diplomatic relations, which obviously is almost totally without effect, is often taken merely to display displeasure with less extreme activities.

In a democracy such as the United States, the motivation must generally be implanted in the public mind if the intervention is to endure; and public opinion on questions of intervention in "internal" affairs is rarely consistent. In some countries we seem to take totalitarianism, repression or domestic slaughter for granted. Apparently we assume that the indigenous population prefers or deserves it, or else we cannot readily identify with little-known faraway peoples, or else we simply cannot comprehend mass destruction as distinguished from the mistreatment of a few well-publicized individuals (which can often move us to action).

To be sure, politics plays a role in our inconsistencies, along with a certain amount of liberal faddism. Inhumanity in Bangladesh or Biafra has aroused a passionate response, not matched proportionately by the reaction to less-publicized conditions in Ruanda and Burundi. Americans of Irish, Polish and Jewish descent have over the years petitioned the Congress to intervene against repression in the lands of their forefathers, while

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those of Paraguayan or Tibetan ancestry were too few to form a caucus. Black Americans are now urging our intervention in South Africa and denouncing it in Uganda.

But it is more than ethnic politics that underlies U.S. government actions in response to other nation's political practices. For better or worse, Americans are a moralistic people in foreign affairs, brought up to believe that this country has stood for human rights around the world since the days of Jefferson and Paine. They are unwilling to accept the notion that intervention in another nation's political affairs is justified to protect our military bases or business interests, but not to alleviate human suffering or oppression. Arguments that such intervention itself might be immoral, to say nothing of irrelevant to our national interests, or that the citizens of another country cannot be dependent upon our intervention for their security, or that our actions on their behalf might only increase their suffering, are accepted in the abstract—particularly after the trauma of Vietnam—but not when they are confronted with particular cases. Even so hard-nosed a realist as the late Dean Acheson, while delivering a scathing rejection of reliance on morality in foreign policy, acknowledged that "our governmental goal for many years has been to preserve and foster an environment in which free societies may exist and flourish." There are no free societies without free human beings.

It was thus inevitable that both sides of the Jackson Amendment debate would be guilty of inconsistency with past positions on the intervention question. Businessmen denouncing the Amendment as unwarranted meddling in Soviet internal policies were strongly in favor of our applying economic sanctions against any Latin American government nationalizing industrial or mining properties. Legislators indifferent to South African curbs on the movement of Bantus within as well as outside that country insist that they support the Jackson Amendment because it expresses a universal principle. Liberals who said we had no business interfering with the domestic politics of the Dominican Republic line up to vote for the use of our economic power to change Soviet emigration policy, joined by conservatives who opposed as a matter of principle any economic sanctions against Rhodesia's suppression of its black majority. And an Administration willing to juggle governments and ministerial portfolios in each of the Indochina states needs a better explana-

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tion of its opposition to the Jackson Amendment than a self-righteous protest against ever interfering in another nation's internal politics.

V

Most members of Congress today appear ready to reject Senator Fulbright's protest against the Jackson Amendment's "meddling, even idealistic meddling" in Soviet affairs. They are not out to "transform the domestic structure" of the Soviet Union, as alleged in one Kissinger exaggeration. Neither do they accept Senator Jackson's exaggeration that Moscow's decision is whether or not "to become a member of the community of civilized nations." They are instead unwilling, in the absence of changes in Soviet emigration policy, to endorse a Soviet-American trade relationship that could strengthen the Soviet economy. For rightly or wrongly they believe that such strengthening merely postpones Soviet reforms, or reinforces Soviet repression, or appears to reward recent Soviet curbs on intellectual freedom and human rights. That is not intervention in another nation's internal affairs, in their opinion, but if it is they are willing to make the most of it.

Thus, without any serious attempt to justify the logic of its concentration on emigration instead of human rights, on nonmarket economies instead of all repressive regimes, and on MFN instead of more effective means, the Jackson Amendment appears certain to be enacted. Once the issue was publicly raised and widely discussed as a Trade Bill Amendment, few Senators and Congressmen have been willing to expose themselves to the charge of "putting dollars ahead of freedom." Few want to appear silent or indifferent on an issue of human rights. MFN and credits may have been an illogical lever with which to alter Soviet restrictions on Jewish emigration, but it has been the only leverage offered them.

And beyond those for whom the Amendment is an act of conscientious protest, others support it because of long-held anti-Soviet or anti-détente sentiments; still others as another barrier against foreign imports from any country; and still others for reasons of presidential, party or local politics. That is a formidable coalition, and has been from the start. While passage of the Amendment will unfortunately strengthen the Arab myth that, despite its tiny proportion of the electorate, the "Jewish vote"

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controls the Congress, it will surely destroy any lingering myth in the Soviet Union that Wall Street is in control of Washington. For American business has been virtually the only voice outside the government to oppose the Amendment.

In retrospect it can be seen that the Administration, which had ample warning, misled the Soviets as well as itself into believing that MFN would be forthcoming, that credits would be retained, and that the Jackson forces would be rebuffed. But instead of ignoring the question of emigration and human rights in its draft legislation on trade reform, the Administration should from the start have recognized the issue's inevitability and preëmpted it, by seeking to bring all parties together on a reworded amendment or even a separate bill.

That effort might have worked. The Jackson Amendment takes an all-or-nothing approach, discouraging even a meaningful concession by the Soviet Union. It would require all the affected countries to end not only all exit or education taxes but all infringements on emigration if they are to qualify for MFN and credits. A more flexible approach might well have obtained a more favorable response from the Soviet Union, whose leaders are sophisticated enough when consulted in advance to recognize the political necessities in this country. Such an approach could have included other countries, other denials of freedom and other levers in addition to or even in place of MFN and credits. If this country is to compete in world markets over the long run with the Japanese and others, it must soon forge a whole new pattern of flexible foreign trade and investment controls and incentives which can be turned off and on as our foreign policy and other interests require; and this issue presented a logical place to begin.

Unfortunately it may now be too late to recast the wording of the Jackson Amendment and the terms of the debate. Flexibility in legislation generally requires a delegation of discretion to the President; and this Congress at this time with this President is reluctant to offer that. Legislative lines, moreover, harden as time passes, as language becomes familiar and as election day draws closer. But those who prefer practical results to symbols and slogans, and who seek both an end to discrimination against Soviet Jews and an end to discrimination against Soviet trade, may still have time to work out a more sensible legislative approach that pursues both goals realistically.

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IMPROPER PAYMENTS ABROAD: PERSPECTIVES AND PROPOSALS

By Theodore C. Sorensen

LIKE motherhood and apple pie (zero population growth? food additives?), corporate bribery abroad is not the simple, safe issue it seems at first blush. Sharp division and delay have characterized its consideration by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Department of Justice and Internal Revenue Service, and by several Committees of the U.S. Congress, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the International Chamber of Commerce. In the United States, a Presidential Cabinet-level Task Force—and in the United Nations, the Committee on Transnational Corporations—have been asked to untangle the problem; but no solution is yet agreed upon.

The practice of exporters and investors offering special inducements to host country officials is at least as old as Marco Polo. But in the United States a post-Watergate climate of pitiless exposure for all suspect practices connected with government has intensified both the investigations of these payments and the oversimplified publicity given to them. Indeed the seeds of the present furor were sown in Watergate. When the Special Prosecutor traced some of the "cover-up" financing to unreported corporate campaign contributions, often transmitted through foreign "slush funds," the SEC initiated a major check on all undisclosed payments to governments and politicians, both domestic and foreign, by the publicly owned companies subject to its jurisdiction.

As a result, U.S. corporate officials have engaged in the most painful rush to public "voluntary" confession since China's Cultural Revolution. Scores of U.S.-based companies have been investigated by one or more arms of the U.S. executive branch, legislative branch, and news media—or by their own directors. Many foreign officials of varying prominence have been forced to resign, deny, or both. The going rate for bribery has reportedly fallen in some countries as fear of disclosure increases, and risen in others as officials discover the full potential of their position. Debates between businessmen asserting

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Theodore C. Sorensen, a lawyer, was Special Counsel to the President, 1961–64, and is the author of *Kennedy; Decision-Making in the White House; Watchmen in the Night: Presidential Accountability After Watergate* and other works.

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that only they live in the "real world" ("Of course, I'm against bribery, but....") and bureaucrats asserting that only they are without sin ("No payment of any kind or size for any reason should escape ....") have thus far produced more heat than light.

It is to be hoped that a calmer, more long-range perspective can soon prevail. Otherwise, genuinely legitimate business practices will be inhibited by an atmosphere of fear and suspicion, generated by sweeping and hasty reactions, while those truly intent on corruption will merely wait for the emotional storm to pass.

II

Clearly, our understanding of the problem is not enhanced by the tendency in some quarters to place all the blame on those few U.S. corporations which have received the most publicity. Those engaged in the sale of arms, aircraft, oil and pharmaceuticals—all highly government-oriented businesses—may have been in the forefront; but nearly all other kinds of business have been engaging in these practices as well: privately held corporations as well as publicly owned; small as well as large; strong as well as weak; producers of civilian goods as well as of military hardware; those who buy or invest as well as those who sell; and, most importantly, companies which are based abroad as well as companies based here in the United States.

Moreover, our country has no monopoly on the resulting stain. Contrary to common assertion, nor does the Third World. Bribe recipients have served in every kind of government on virtually every continent: anti-U.S. administrations and political parties as well as pro-U.S.; democracies as well as dictatorships; communist as well as non-communist governments; and rich industrialized nations as well as poor and underdeveloped nations. Nor is the blame confined to governments and business—members of the accounting and legal professions have played a role as well.

The picture has been further distorted by an outpouring of self-serving, self-righteous hypocrisy on both sides. Among the biggest hypocrites have been the following:

—those foreign governments which since time immemorial have closed their eyes and held out their hands, but which now denounce the United States for introducing corruption to their shores;

—those U.S. politicians who professed ignorance of the illegality of the corporate campaign contributions they received (or knew others received) in cash in sealed envelopes behind a barn or men's room door, but who now insist that various company ex-

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ecutives be prosecuted because they should have known of their subordinates' improper activities abroad;

—those agencies of the U.S. government which long knew of and even approved of barely concealed payoffs by companies engaged in favored overseas sales and investments, but which now wring their hands at the unbelievable shame of it all; and

—those U.S. and foreign newspaper commentators who long winked at free junkets and passes for newsmen, even a little extra income doing public relations for the organizations they were covering, but who now condemn the ethical standards of the business community.

Nor have those issuing sweeping condemnations always noted certain valid distinctions. Not every payment to a foreign government employee is a bribe. Nor is every corporate political contribution abroad improper. Not every foreign consultant or sales agent is corrupt or retained to perform some improper function.

Political contributions paid in cash or in secret to foreign candidates or parties are rightfully suspect. But properly recorded corporate political contributions, with no quid pro quo, are legal in many if not most of the states of the United States; and the new Campaign Finance Reform Law, passed in the very wake of Watergate, permitted corporate-sponsored political activity in our federal elections. It is thus unfair and illogical to attack any and all participation by U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries in the political campaigns of other countries which also permit it by law.

Similarly, payments to a foreign consultant, agent, lawyer or marketer, if made in cash or not fully reported or if wholly out of proportion to his services, most likely deserve condemnation. But properly recorded payments, of an amount appropriate under the circumstances, to a qualified and responsible professional for his performance of legitimate and necessary services, may well be perfectly justifiable. To be sure, such individuals may be making the most of their personal, political, business or family ties with key government officials—a phenomenon not unfamiliar in our own country. But they also know the local language, procedures, personnel, regulations, press and sources of supplies and information. They can provide the visiting businesssman with a local headquarters, communications and a means of scheduling and coordinating appointments, as well as valuable advice on strategy and presentation. Local government officials, for perfectly legitimate reasons including their sense

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of uneasiness in dealing with foreigners, may prefer or insist upon working with a compatriot they know. The payment of a large commission to an agent is no more clear evidence of illegality than is payment of a large commission to an American real estate agent on the sale of an expensive home.

Not even all payments made to foreign government officials should be judged alike. Although U.S. statutes and judicial interpretations vary, the legal essence of *bribery* is a payment voluntarily offered for the purpose of inducing a public official to do or omit to do something in violation of his lawful duty, or to exercise his official discretion in favor of the payor's request for a contract, concession or privilege on some basis other than the merits. Many forms of payment now under attack do not constitute "bribery" under this definition.

For example, a certain amount of scoffing, much of it undoubtedly justified, has greeted the claims by some business executives that their payments to foreign officials were the result of extortion on the part of those officials, not bribery. But the courts do recognize the distinction between those payments which are voluntarily offered by someone who seeks an unlawful advantage and those which are extracted under genuine duress and coercion from an innocent victim seeking only the treatment to which he is lawfully entitled. A company which can demonstrate that it was truly confronted with an unmistakable choice between paying a corrupt foreign official, or seeing its entire investment in that country expropriated, is not paying a "bribe." (A recent U.S. Federal Court of Appeals decision reached a similar conclusion with respect to a hapless accountant indicted for having made payments to a group of threatening IRS agents.)

Nor does the above definition of bribery cover those payments, usually smaller, made by businessmen in a country where they are not prohibited, to facilitate, expedite or express appreciation for the normal, lawful performance of ministerial or procedural duties by a low-ranking government employee. "Grease" payments which help persuade the bureaucrat or functionary to do his job and continue the lawful flow of paper or goods should not be commended; but neither should they be confused with bribing that individual *not* to do his job.

Finally, there is a distinction not always easily determined, between a bribe and a relatively small sum of cash or other gift or service offered to an official by way of common courtesy or social amenity, a present put forward and accepted on the basis of amicable personal relations unconnected with the performance of his duty. Some of these payments are ethically questionable and of doubtful motivation as well; but there is a legal difference, however subtle, between the $20

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bill you hand your local policeman on Christmas Eve and the $20 bill you hand him when he stops you for speeding (a difference recognized by a recent New Jersey Supreme Court decision involving a Christmas gift of cash from a builder to a municipal building inspector).

It is not easy, of course, to determine which foreign corporate political contributions, agents' fees, gifts, "grease" payments, and alleged extortion are in reality nothing more than indirect or camouflaged bribes or kickbacks. U.S. federal and state statutes frequently and justifiably prohibit or penalize these other forms of payment to public officials as well as bribes; and gray areas of interpretation will always remain. The size, form and timing of the payment, the adequacy of its disclosure, and other facts must bear on the conclusion in a doubtful case. Even then there will be countless situations in which a fair-minded investigator or judge will be hard-put to determine whether a particular payment or practice is a legitimate and permissible business activity or a means of improper influence:

Example 1. The best lawyer in a foreign town is the London-educated son of the Minister of Commerce. Should he be prevented from accepting clients who need permits from the Ministry? Should a U.S. corporation be prevented from retaining him? Would it make any difference if he were a consultant or agent instead of a lawyer? The opportunities for abuse here are undeniable but not inevitable.

Example 2. A U.S. corporation is asked by the Provincial Governor to contribute to the local Health and Welfare Fund, his favorite charity. Is this the obligation of a public-spirited company or an opportunity for covert graft?

Example 3. A U.S. corporation, already doing substantial business in a foreign country, wishes to invest as well in one of its local suppliers. The Prime Minister is the latter's principal stockholder. Would it make any difference if it were another U.S. company in which they would be investors together?

Example 4. A U.S. corporation's valuable inventory abroad is stored in a remote warehouse. The nearest police are willing to act as after-hours guards if they are paid by the corporation for their overtime services. Must a less effective and more expensive alternative be found?

Example 5. A U.S. corporation wishes to form a joint venture with a local firm owned by a member of the ruling family (not unusual or considered unethical in small countries with small elites). But see Example 1.

Example 6. A U.S. corporation, seeking to locate its plant in an impoverished land, invites the impoverished Minister of Environ-

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mental Affairs to fly to the United States at its expense for a tour of its domestic installations, reportedly to demonstrate that its proposed plant will not pollute the local air and water. At what point does its hospitality become excessive; and should this expensive trip be more permissible than contributing the cash equivalent thereof?

Example 7. A U.S. corporation is informed that the government permit for which it was bidding has already been issued to a local corporation of unknown ownership which is willing to sell it to the U.S. bidder at the bid price. If no extra payment is thus involved, does the additional step render the transaction improper?

Reasonable men and even angels will differ on the answers to these and similar questions. At the very least such distinctions should make us less sweeping in our judgments and less confident of our solutions.

III

None of this, however, alters the basic parameters of the real problem:

It is illegal for a U.S. corporation to deduct as an ordinary business expense on its U.S. income tax return any bribes, payoffs, kickbacks or other improper payments to foreign government officials, whatever the label or justification, or any political contributions, whether lawful or not; for any corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Securities Acts to fail to include and to describe accurately all such payments (assuming they are material to the company's finances or materially indicative of its management's integrity[1]) in its various statements and periodic reports to the SEC and shareholders required by those Acts; and for any such corporation to finance these payments through secret slush funds or phony offshore corporate entities outside the normal system of financial accountability prescribed by those Acts. Neither bribery of a foreign official outside the United States nor violation of a foreign law, however, appears to violate any U.S. law.

It is unethical for a corporation to pay bribes or kickbacks to foreign officials to induce them to violate their duty—a practice subversive of sound government, sound business and sound relations between the two, no matter how deeply entrenched it may have become in the host country; a costly, wasteful interference with the free competitive market system; and a cynical, shabby technique of getting business which usually rewards the richest, most reckless and ruthless while passing on the cost to those who can afford it least.

[1] The appropriate limits of "materiality," if any, under the Securities Acts in general and in cases of improper foreign payments in particular are being hotly debated as this goes to press and are beyond the scope of the article.

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It is unbusinesslike for a corporation to pay bribes and kickbacks, regardless of how routine a practice it may appear to be in the host country and regardless of competitive pressures. This conclusion, it should be acknowledged, is far from unanimous in the business community. (The legend persists that the Harvard Business School student who questioned the ethics of this practice was directed by his professor to enroll in the Harvard Divinity School.) Nevertheless, a large number of U.S. corporations successfully operating overseas have constantly faced and consistently resisted the pressures and temptations to make payments. Those not resisting appear in many cases to have been those too lazy to compete in honest salesmanship or too inefficient to compete on price, quality and service.

Some corporate executives have undoubtedly achieved substantial gains in the short run by these methods; some have obtained only marginal business; and some will never know if their payments were necessary or helpful or even reached the intended official's pocket. But all who paid thereby established their companies as easy marks for more demands and blackmail. All were immediately courting trouble if they reported these payments and more trouble if they did not. All were exposing their corporations and themselves to the possibility of stockholder suits, legal action by the U.S. government, the possible disclosure of proprietary information of value to their competitors as a consequence, and retaliation by the host country ranging from the cancellation of orders to the nationalization of assets. Moreover, just as a handful of dishonest door-to-door peddlers can turn an entire town against home solicitation, so the conduct of these corporations—at a time when the business community in general and multinational corporations in particular have been seeking to ward off unreasonable restrictions and suspicions—may have done a grave disservice to all who trade abroad. Surely, of all the hypocrites heard on this issue mentioned earlier, the greatest of all are those business executives who made such payments, whose corporations are now as a result in deep difficulty, but who insist they did it "for the good of the company."

This is not to deny the fact that, in far too many countries for far too many years, illicit inducements have been an accepted and customary way of doing business with the government, usually through agents whom virtually every visiting businessman is expected to retain. In still other countries, such payments, if not essential, are widely tolerated and expected.

But what is customary is not thereby ethical or even inevitable. In more than one American city widespread corruption in the police

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department, long thought too deeply entrenched to be uprooted, has been effectively exposed and curbed. The fact that many U.S. companies have successfully avoided these activities in the very countries where it was most customary, and that others have given up business opportunities in those countries and moved elsewhere as a matter of sound business judgment, undermines the payor's usual justification that he had no alternative, that "everyone does it," and that if he didn't do it someone else would (the same excuse offered by heroin pushers). Moreover, the fact that the typical local official who takes a bribe wants it kept secret, fearing punishment in his own country if his corruption becomes known, casts doubt upon any payor's defense that he was merely playing according to "the rules of the game."

IV

All this is by way of background for a consideration of U.S. national interests in the current situation. Without a clear understanding of the scope and nature of the problem and its implications for American business, neither the desirability nor the feasibility of a workable solution can be accurately assessed.

This is particularly true in light of the presently ambivalent attitude of the federal government. While the SEC, Department of Justice and Congress rail against improper payments abroad, more mixed signals have emanated from elsewhere in the executive branch.

American Embassies around the world have long known of these practices but voiced no protests to host governments and offered no protection to honest American businessmen. Those U.S. exporters who thought they were serving their country's foreign policy interests by making under-the-table payments to friendly foreign officials and political parties were never told otherwise. Occasionally State Department officials have even offered guidance on the names and standard fees of those agents with the best connections.

The complicity of the Department of Defense in these practices appears even greater. In quadrupling over the last decade the sale of U.S. arms abroad, the Department approved contracts financed in whole or in part by military assistance funds without too close an examination of agents' fees and other contract terms, and it undertook to "educate" contractors on the necessity and implications of such fees. These sales helped maintain production capacity in this country which the Pentagon regarded as vital, helped achieve economies of scale for its own purchases from the same companies, and helped build closer technological and political ties with the military and governmental leaders of the recipient countries.

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Now, with some present orders canceled as the result of current investigations and still others in doubt, the Pentagon is fearful of losing those advantages. Other agencies are similarly fearful that unilateral U.S. government restrictions on foreign bribery will make it more difficult for American corporations to compete for orders with any less scrupulous companies from Germany, Japan, France, Great Britain, and elsewhere, with adverse effects on U.S. exports, balance of payments and employment.

The State Department is, in addition, upset by the effect of the present investigations on several friendly governments. In Italy, Japan and elsewhere, governments in an already precarious position have been shaken by these revelations of corruption. Communist and other anti-U.S. forces have exploited this evidence of immorality in capitalism and pro-Western governments. Hostility to American interests has increased. More than one foreign official friendly to the United States is fearful of ouster and is resentful of America's role in exposing these traditional practices. More than one friendly foreign newspaper has chastised the United States for broadcasting its national self-flagellation to the detriment of the Western alliance.

But those who are angry at the revelation of bribes instead of at their payment (like those angry at Woodward and Bernstein instead of at Nixon) confuse the weatherman with the weather. Even before they were uncovered, these bribes—merely by being offered and accepted—had damaged American foreign policy and made it more vulnerable to its adversaries. By engaging in such debilitating practices, U.S. businessmen, who in most countries are more visible representatives of the American way of life than our diplomats, tarnished our country's image; subverted the lawful basis of friendly governments; aggravated the economic inequities and instability that inevitably accompany this subsidization and corruption of a power elite; and rendered both the host government and our own government more susceptible to an ultimate backlash.

I doubt that the messenger will in the end be condemned for bringing the bad news. Many foreigners, without ever fully understanding Watergate, came to admire the courage and independence of the American press, courts, prosecutors and legislative branch for exposing and cleaning up that mess. I believe the same will happen here. Certainly the Communists in Italy will now have difficulty maintaining that the multinational corporations and Wall Street dominate Washington, and equal difficulty denying that it was Washington's efforts instead of their own that helped expose this corruption in Italian politics.

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To be sure, notwithstanding the virtues of disclosing and thus discouraging these practices, special care should be taken by both our executive and legislative branches not to publish the names of foreign officials accused only by unsubstantiated testimony, hearsay or rumor, and not to prejudice criminal proceedings in either our country or others by the premature publication or transmittal of such names. That is a legitimate concern of the President and the Department of State that must be respected. But even greater damage to America's reputation for justice and honor than has already been caused by the current revelations could result from any appearance of a cover-up—any suspicion on the part of the legislative branches or citizenries of other countries that the U.S. government is conspiring with their governments to delay indefinitely any disclosure affecting their incumbent officials or political parties.

Imagine the reaction of the American people had the Japanese government possessed vital information on Watergate and refused to transmit it to the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment proceeding, announcing instead that such information should go exclusively to our executive branch! Yet a similarly paternalistic decision has been made by our Department of State; and it is small wonder that this approach has caused the darkest suspicions in Japan about the possibilities of CIA and other U.S. government involvement in these overseas slush funds and bribes.

So let the information flow, with due respect for the rights of the accused. Little attention need be paid to complaints about damaged reputations from those foreign officials who have for years accepted bribes; or from those foreign governments that have long tolerated their receipt by their own officials or their payment by their own exporters; or from those foreign governments which are not now seriously investigating the clear evidence of such practices in their midst; or from those which are making a great show of cracking down on them with the full intention of permitting their resumption once the heat is off. Any pro-U.S. political party whose success has depended upon this kind of secret subsidy and corruption could not have been a very strong reed upon which our country could have leaned in any event.

The other principal concern of the Pentagon and other executive branch agencies is well-founded. Any unilateral U.S. restriction on foreign bribery by U.S. exporters undoubtedly will cause our arms merchants and others to lose substantial sales opportunities to their less-principled competitors, at least in the short run, particularly in some of our weaker industries. That unfortunate fact should be

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acknowledged. A crackdown by the United States will not be cost free.

But surely these highly vulnerable and immoral arrangements between atypical U.S. businessmen and corrupt foreign officials provide a wholly untenable and shaky basis for building our military alliances. U.S. security and stature are not increased when foreign officials are improperly induced to ignore their countries' internal needs or to distort their defense priorities by spending their limited funds (or our limited military assistance grants) on what are frequently marginal weapons systems or a kind they do not need, cannot afford to maintain or will not be able to operate.

Moreover, there was no gain to our country's balance of payments or economy when U.S. companies paid bribes to win a contract that would otherwise have gone to another U.S. company. On the contrary, the added cost of these improper contracts to the host country further weakened the market for other U.S. exporters. The fact that some American companies have succeeded in these countries without the payment of bribes is an indication that U.S. exports will not suffer all that severely from an end to such payments. Those governments desirous of obtaining U.S. technology and quality will unquestionably learn to buy our goods without any special inducement.

In short, it is on balance in the long-run interest of the United States to halt these wasteful, corrosive and indefensible payments to foreign officials by U.S.-based corporations and their subsidiaries. Such action would enable this country once again to offer moral leadership to the world, demonstrating our concern not only for the defense of society but also for the kind of society we are defending, and practicing what we preach about the free market system. It would also provide a sounder basis for our alliances, increase respect for our values, enhance our standing with more progressive elements desirous of reform, and make those governments purchasing from us less vulnerable to future political attack.

Such action would not be, as often charged, an attempt by the United States to impose its puritanical standards on the rest of the world, disregarding the sovereignty of others and policing everyone else's ethics in a hopeless attempt to reform mankind. Not at all. It would instead simply require corporations based in our own country to adhere, wherever they operated, to a standard that served U.S. national interests. Our antitrust, Trading with the Enemy, and other statutes have long been held to have similar extraterritorial application. Setting a good example does not require any other government to follow it.

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V

Of course, it would be preferable if every commercially important government in the world not only enacted but enforced tough and comprehensive laws against the payment and receipt of bribes. That would avoid any adverse competitive consequences of unilateral U.S. action. But awaiting development of an international code by the OECD, GATT, IMF or the United Nations is largely an excuse for delay and inaction. Most of the members of these organizations are not in agreement on what should be done, and many are not enthusiastic about doing anything. Such codes, if they were to be truly meaningful and enforced, would have to sink to the level of the lowest common denominator. Mild admonitions from the OECD and generalized resolutions from the United Nations are the best they are likely to produce.

The United States will be in a stronger position to call for action from other countries, and to embarrass or otherwise pressure any U.S. companies' competitors who are still paying bribes, after we have taken effective action against our own unethical corporations in this regard. Inasmuch as Congress is already past the halfway mark in an election-year session, enactment of new legislation may as well await a fuller determination this year of the entire range of the problem—lest American business be confronted with an incomplete statute constantly undergoing amendment. Nevertheless it should be already clear to our Congress that our present laws are not adequate, and that action should be taken next year before public interest in the problem flags.

Apart from the illegality of deducting such payments on U.S. tax returns, the principal statutory tool by which U.S. companies can currently be called to account is the variety of disclosure requirements in the Securities Acts. In addition, Congress has recently called for further disclosures with respect to military sales under the latest foreign aid legislation; and a similar emphasis on disclosure is contained in most of the other legislative proposals on overseas bribery.

This emphasis is well placed. Sunlight, in the memorable phrase of Justice Brandeis, is still the best disinfectant. A company legally required to expose its bribes—and thus face whatever stockholder suits, public embarrassment and government penalties may follow—is less likely to make these payments in the first place and their collaborators are less likely to demand them.

But our present disclosure laws must be strengthened: to impose more severe and certain criminal as well as civil penalties for those who fail to disclose to the appropriate U.S. government authorities

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any payments abroad, including legitimate political contributions and agents' fees, of a significant amount; to cover privately owned companies as well as those subject to SEC jurisdiction (indeed the SEC may not be the appropriate enforcement agency); to cover exporters of civilian as well as military goods; to cover requests received (as is true of current U.S. Commerce Department regulations concerning the Arab boycott) as well as payments made; and to prohibit more precisely the many techniques used to conceal these practices from corporate and governmental accountability systems.

Disclosure, however, cannot carry the whole burden of law enforcement. It would be illogical to punish more severely than at present the nondisclosure of an activity not now illegal under U.S. law. Moreover, when the general or stockholding public proves to be indifferent to a company's disclosures of wrongdoing, as is often the case, no penalty and no reform may follow.

The more direct and traditional approach to law enforcement is simply to outlaw the payment of bribes and kickbacks to foreign officials by all U.S. corporations and their subsidiaries. Many corporate officials would actually be relieved by such legislation; for it would better enable them to resist all temptations and pressures and to hold both their subordinates and at least their U.S. competitors to a higher standard. It would also provide a stronger legal basis for independent auditors, directors and lawyers—as well as federal authorities—to insist in suspicious cases upon a closer look at the books. It would communicate to every company and government the clearest possible statement of our national integrity.

Such a law would have to be drawn and enforced with great care and precision, carefully setting forth the distinctions between bribery and the other forms of payments described above, and not undertaking to enforce what it cannot reach without placing numerous police agents in every U.S. Embassy. Unenforced and unenforceable laws only engender disrespect.

Nor should compliance with a host country's laws be available as a defense under this new statute. Too many of those laws are ambiguous, incomprehensible or unenforced, and the United States cannot undertake to enforce them. Nor, in some countries, is compliance with the law much proof of propriety.

No matter how carefully the new statute is drafted and implemented, however, some improper practices will escape and some new ones will be invented to circumvent it. A foreign agent who acts as an independent contractor for several companies will be able, on his own initiative and with his own funds, without the knowledge or reim-

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bursement of a principal, to make improper payments on that principal's behalf that no outside law can reach. U.S. corporations wishing to avoid the law by selling to truly independent local distributors who in turn resell to the local government, complete with kickbacks, will no doubt be able to do so, at least diminishing the impact of their conduct on the United States. Extremely difficult problems of definition, fact-finding and interpretation, such as the seven examples earlier cited, will be frequent.

But the courts and Congress are not unaccustomed to drawing fine lines of distinction. Many another law now on the books is frequently violated but nevertheless desirable as a national standard, even if some violations go undetected. With a strengthened disclosure statute, whatever federal agency is enforcing the law will not be without tools to judge the legality of a suspect payment.

The new law could also regulate the use of agents. To prohibit their use would be outlandish, curbing many legitimate practices and merely causing those intent on paying bribes to conceal them elsewhere. To impose a maximum commission rate would only penalize "small-ticket" sales. But U.S.-based corporations could be required (1) to disclose to the U.S. enforcement agency not only every sizable fee or commission paid overseas but also the services for which it is paid and the recipient's qualifications therefor; (2) to instruct the agent by contract to make no payments to or for government officials and no political contributions on its behalf or with its funds; and (3) to obtain the explicit approval of the host government for that contract and for the agent's rate of compensation. Honest and qualified agents will, on the whole, accept such conditions; those intent on dishonesty will not.

Still other new legislative or executive measures could empower the executive branch to take supplementary action. Violators should be warned that the U.S. government would terminate their eligibility for government contracts and impose no obstacle to their extradition to any country possessing actual proof of their wrongdoing. Any U.S. business executive receiving from a foreign official a request or a demand for improper payments should be required to report it promptly to the U.S. Embassy, which should be required to protest vigorously to the host government. Foreign countries and companies persisting in such practices to the detriment of U.S. economic interests should be warned of the possibility of economic retaliation, ranging from termination of economic and military assistance to denial of access to our domestic markets or stock exchange listings.

Even though a strong international code is not in the offing, the

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Department of State should undertake to obtain in advance the approval of all affected governments for each of the legislative measures proposed above. Whatever their real feelings, they would find it difficult to object; and such a step would both dampen the cries that such legislation was imposing our standards upon the rest of the world and improve the prospects for its general effectiveness.

It is to be hoped that such laws will also be accompanied by an increased demonstration of corporate self-regulation. In light of recent revelations, this will never be an acceptable substitute for government measures. But it will still be the most effective form of regulation, if enforced, because management can establish a system of clearances for "unusual" or "potentially embarrassing" payments out in the field that no law can adequately reach. Any new legislation and its administration should thus recognize and encourage company initiatives of this kind.

That will require, however, something more than the recent public relations announcements of companies rushing to "reemphasize longstanding policy" by the issuance of new corporate practice guidelines which are either too vague to be meaningful ("do nothing unlawful or improper"); carefully designed not to interfere with their particular practices ("do not violate local law, local custom or U.S. law; make no payments to the foreign government officials responsible for our industry"); or otherwise ineffective, by design or inadvertence.

Companies no more than governments should attempt to enforce what they cannot realistically reach. But a strict, comprehensive company code should be implemented by prompt disciplinary action, including dismissal at any level for violations; by annual sworn certifications of compliance by all responsible members of management; and by a system of full disclosure to counsel and auditors as well as superiors. Such measures, if accompanied by a reduction in pressure in the field to obtain contracts by whatever means necessary, would be far more effective than the recent proposal authorizing the government to remove the chief executive of an offending company.

In evaluating government as well as private regulation in this area, Americans should bear in mind a wise conclusion of John J. McCloy and his associates in their landmark investigation of the Gulf Oil Corporation's payments at home and abroad. "[I]t is not in the institution of rules and procedures," said that report, that the answer to this problem lies, "as much as it . . . is in the tone and purpose given to the Company by its top management."

The same is true of our country.

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H-8, 1550 N. Lake Shore
Chicago, Ill. 60610

by THEODORE C. SORENSEN

Alla the guide was good, the Hermitage was great, but an invitation to become a monk was declined

Report from Moscow

ILLUSTRATION BY STAN MACK

Last August's outrage in Czechoslovakia once again drastically lowered the temperature of the Cold War and increased the American man-in-the-street's uneasiness over Moscow's intentions. As a result, even last summer's inauguration of New York-to-Moscow air service is unlikely to encourage very many more Americans to travel to the U.S.S.R. However, an old-fashioned sight-seeing trip to the Soviet Union is not only a pleasure for those taking the trip, but the travelers can also make an important contribution to United States-Soviet cultural and political relations.

I recently visited the Soviet Union for two and a half weeks with my three teen-aged sons. All four of us found the trip fun as well as fascinating, and relaxing as well as stimulating. We caught fish in the Volga, laughed at an ingenious puppet show satirizing Hollywood, marveled at a spectacular circus, cheered a championship soccer game and bicycle race, admired the mosaics in the Moscow subway and the pandas in the Moscow Zoo, and saw all the famous sights from Lenin's embalmed corpse to the vast assemblage of masterpieces in the Hermitage Art Museum.

The Russians did not seem fully prepared for large numbers of Westerners traveling for pleasure through their country. American tourists, and particularly American children, usually expect better service, more comfortable and attractive hotels and a wider variety of more familiar foods than we encountered in our visit. But it was not a hardship trip. Intourist is highly organized, its English-speaking guides are pleasant and efficient, and they obtain for their clients the preferential treatment of a privileged class, particularly when the clients are confronted with long queues.

At Yalta, for example, after purchasing tickets for a hydrofoil boatride along the Black Sea coast, we were immediately seated in the boat despite a long line of Soviet ticket-holders who had been waiting in the hot sun for hours. Those protesting refused to believe our guide's explanation that we were Americans. One woman insisted that my youngest son was obviously Russian, and several climbed into our boat for a sit-in. Fortunately, order was restored before the Winter Palace was stormed (although, as the boat pulled out, we mischievously summoned up our limited linguistics to shout good-bye in Russian). It was also obvious, as we viewed the unbroken string of beaches—some as densely congested as Coney Island, others the "private property" of a few official families—that foreign tourists were not the only privileged class in this Communist society.

American families would enjoy the Black Sea resort areas, even though they are overcrowded at the water's edge and the beaches are rock instead of sand. The sight of middle-aged and frequently heavyset Russian women changing into and out of their bathing suit on the beach—and attempting to do so within th bounds of traditional modesty—provides an intriguin exhibition in contortionist gymnastics. The movi shown at our resort hotel—about an heroic Russia boy in World War II—was dubbed in English (actuall rather mediocre Americanese) for the benefit of th guests. Travel by car along seacoast and mountai roads was delightful, provided one was prepared fo aggressive Russian drivers on frequently inadequat roads, and did not run out of gas somewhere in be tween the few filling stations. Those rare billboard that did spoil the scenery displayed governmen sponsored slogans like "Long live the friendship be tween the Communist Party and the people."

The country is full of this kind of propagand Yet, strangely enough, it does not offend or oppre the visitor too deeply. Statues of Red heroes, adorne with posters, are much in evidence. Elegant mon ments and elaborate exhibitions, boasting of past an present accomplishments to Soviet citizens, sharpl contrasted with the drab and sparsely appointed hous in which many Russians still live. Although newsre of American race riots and Vietnamese villages bur ing did not need to be faked, the newspapers an radio were more virulently anti-American than th official government line. And yet, after more th twenty years of hearing and reading this kind anti-Americanism, the Russian people remain as pr American as ever. They seek out visitors from t United States. We often heard Russians express t desire to visit the United States. Kennedy half-dolla which we handed out as souvenir gifts, were in mediately recognized and treasured. Those who spo a little English (including those cautiously suggestin black-market transactions in American goods or cu rency) wanted to practice the language on us and

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DORE C. SORENSEN

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a monk was declined

Report from Moscow

ILLUSTRATION BY STAN WA...

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...personalities and feelings; and even those who spoke no English seemed able to communicate with my children ... the universal language of children.

We were seldom given the opportunity to talk to everyday Soviet citizens. Even officials, guides and press representatives made guarded references to "they" and gave dogmatic, automatic answers to some of my questions. But at times these discussions were spirited, frank and quite emotional. One old man spoke of World War II with tears in his eyes. Our guide in Kiev was reluctant to say why Khrushchev Stadium had been renamed Central Dynamo Stadium, referring finally to the former chairman's "many errors" and the "cult of personality" dangers in naming edifices for living people. But Khrushchev and Stalin were nevertheless talked about openly, with no attempt to pretend that they never existed, although I was discouraged from trying to visit Mr. Khrushchev. I did not feel, for the most part, that these conversations were either preplanned or postreported, and, aside from some limited restrictions on the use of cameras, my sons did not have the sense of restrictiveness that they had anticipated. More than one Russian said that he had heard of our visit on the Voice of America.

Conversation was aided, not impeded, by the presence of my three sons. They learned a dozen or more key Russian words with far more facility than their father. Eric and Steve attended for three days a Pioneer (Young Communist) camp, neither attempting nor receiving any kind of political indoctrination but enjoying themselves thoroughly, despite the language barrier, with soccer, Ping-Pong and swimming, and making friends easily among the 5,000 Russian and East European youngsters of both sexes who inhabited what was literally a youth village. In addition, my boys exchanged demonstrations of the twist with a local official, politely declined an invitation to enroll as student monks at a Russian Orthodox seminary, and even found themselves enjoying the host of museums that Moscow displays to her visitors.

A lot of their enjoyment and the success of our trip was due in part to our vivacious, efficient Intourist guide, a twenty-four-year-old college graduate who spoke excellent English with a New York accent. Alla's knowledge of American mores and music was about as great as her thirst for more; and our conversations about both countries, their people and their politics, were always free-ranging. Her outgoing sense of humor and stylish appearance were contrary to our stereotyped image of a Russian woman.

Alla, to be sure, was not wholly typical. In a nation with well over a hundred different nationalities—Russians, in fact, just constitute a majority of all Soviet citizens—it is hard to say that anyone is "typical." But the ... that makes many of them heavy by middle age—are an impressive lot. They work as translators and medical doctors, they run street-cars and pneumatic drills, they ride in side-cars on their husbands' motorcycles in a country lacking sufficient automobiles for private citizens. Their strong, handsome features remain even on the short, stooped *babushkas* (grandmothers), most of them nearly toothless old widows who have survived the czars, the Revolution, Stalin and the Nazi invasion and now take care of their grandchildren. It is rumored that a surprisingly high number of Russian infants belong to the Russian Orthodox Church without the approval of either the parents or the government simply because strong-willed grandmothers have them baptized to save their souls while their parents are off at work.

The Cathedral in Zagorsk was always full of these older women. But young people rarely came, we learned, and Party workers almost never. To many Russians, the Church deserved to be preserved under the "protection" of the state only as a relic of the past—like the catacombs beneath the ancient monastery in Kiev whose dark subterranean dungeons and coffins have a morbid appeal to all ages.

The casual visitor cannot measure in a brief visit whether this decline in Christian fervor has been matched by a decline in anti-Jewish prejudice. My mother's parents were Jews who were born, raised and married in the Ukraine and then fled to the United States nearly a century ago. "Ah," our various hosts would say with delight when told that we wished to travel to my grandparents' home in Chernigov, "you are Ukrainian!" "Ukrainian Jew," I would say. "Yes, Ukrainian," they would repeat, leaving me to wonder whether my grandparents' faith was being deliberately ignored, and, if so, whether it was because no distinction was made among citizens of different religions or because no recognition was given to Jews.

Our visit to Chernigov—far off the beaten track in Ukrainian farm country that was little changed since my grandparents' time except for the devastation of World War II—was a high point of our trip. We were warmly received by the town mayor and other officials, with many gifts—including a beautiful ornamented box containing Chernigov earth for my mother—and with many toasts—toasts to my mother, toasts to my children, toasts to my grandparents, to better relations between our two countries, to my next visit, to Chernigov, and to countless other subjects I cannot for good reason remember.

But one toast is remembered by my three sons, who drank fruit punch and who were special objects of affection of the Chernigov leaders: "May these boys and all children have as much happiness as the drops in the Atlantic Ocean and as much unhappiness as the drops which will remain in this glass . . . Bottoms up!"

THE END

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REPORT FROM RUMANIA

The Eastern bloc is splintering. When will U.S. policy reflect this change?

By THEODORE C. SORENSEN

BUCHAREST.

CONTINUED references by American statutes and State Department spokesmen to an "international Communism" movement or a Soviet "bloc"—often used to justify our course in Vietnam and our cold war tendencies elsewhere—fly in the face of fact here in the very heart of Eastern Europe. Once the bloc consisted, in addition to the Soviet Union, of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Yugoslavia, China, and the Communist portion of three divided countries: East Germany, North Korea, and North Vietnam. The very size of such a monolith under a hostile banner and a Stalinist bent constituted a threat to our interests and to the security of our allies. Today, upon reflection, those who still speak of the bloc will acknowledge that China and Albania have pursued their own courses, that Yugoslavia has left the fold, that North Vietnam and North Korea are not mere puppets of Moscow, and that Poland's westward yearnings entitle it to separate aid and trade regulations. The addition of Rumania to this list—particularly in view of Rumanian-like stirrings elsewhere in Eastern Europe—reduces the whole notion of an Eastern bloc virtually to shambles.

Without a revolution, without even a spectacular confrontation, this nation—more than any of its neighbors—has gradually substituted autonomy in foreign affairs for Soviet domination. "Rumania," the Acting Foreign Minister said to me, quoting an earlier national declaration, "is 'friendly to all, beholden to none.'" Within this framework, moved more by nationalism and economic needs than ideological ties, the Bucharest government seeks to antagonize, oppose, indict, or threaten no one while seeking to do business with everyone. Having carved out a policy of independence from Moscow in order to trade, it now seeks more trade to reinforce its independence.

Its leaders have refused to join in the isolation of Peking or the indictment of Israel. They have recognized West Germany, to the dismay of East Germany's Walter Ulbricht, and have cast more than one independent vote in the United Nations, to the dismay of the Kremlin. They favor no war (except internal "wars of liberation" in non-Communist countries), no interference by one nation in the affairs of another (listing the U.S. presence in Vietnam as well as any Soviet interference in Rumania), and no question about any nation's right to exist. They have no hesitancy about doing business with Franco in Spain, with the junta in Greece, and, above all, with every variety of capitalist and captain of commerce in the West.

Theodore C. Sorensen, former Special Counsel to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, is an *SR* editor-at-large.

AMERICANS, with their penchant for familiar categories, are tempted to describe Rumanian party leader (and new President) Nicolae Ceausescu as "another Tito." That would not be accurate. Tito—who broke sharply, not gradually, with the Kremlin—is, unlike the Rumanians, hated by the Chinese, more liberal in his domestic political and economic policies, and more concerned with the formation of a Third World bloc. Rumania, while remaining as a somewhat rebellious and sometimes absent member of East Europe's counterparts to NATO and the Common Market, has no taste for any blocs, aligned or nonaligned. Its preference is for a network of bilateral relationships as the true road to peace. Its diplomats took the lead in creating at the United Nations a group of nine small European nations of all stripes and varieties in order to demonstrate by means of a generalized assembly resolution that European affairs could be discussed under the U.N. roof. But now that it is formed, and informally meets for exchanges of views in New York, its members—Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Finland, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, and Belgium—are not certain what to do with it or what even to call it for fear that it will become another bloc. "The only 'Communist bloc,'" a Rumanian told me, "is the one the Americans are creating by their escalation in Vietnam."

If Ceausescu is not another Tito, some will say, he is the Kremlin's de Gaulle. Although the General is greatly admired here, this analogy fails as well. Unlike de Gaulle's obsessive malevolence against the largest member of *his* alliance, his insistence on an independent nuclear force, and his contempt for the United Nations—if not most of mankind—Ceausescu and his colleagues pursue a softer, gentler course, complaining of Soviet economic pressures but denouncing no one, especially by name, and strongly supporting the United Nations. (Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu is the first diplomat from Eastern Europe to serve as President of the General Assembly.) In private as well as in public, Rumanian diplomats mix caution with their candor, frequently preferring statements of general principles to specific references, and realistically recognizing that their long border with the Soviet Union requires a prudent evolution toward total independence if its success is to be assured.

"We wish there were no superpowers," I was told, "but their existence is a fact of life with which we must all live." There is no wish here to repeat Hungary's experience of 1956 and no illusion in Bucharest now, as existed in Budapest then, that the Americans would save them from a Russian intervention.

The evolution of Rumanian internal policy, in the view of most analysts (but not the Rumanians with whom I talked), has failed to keep pace with its progress in foreign affairs. The continued expansion of its economy at a surprisingly high rate of growth has not necessitated the extensive economic reforms found elsewhere in Eastern Europe; and Rumania's Communist leaders have not failed to observe the headaches with nationality groups and ethnic minorities which Tito incurred when he loosened the political strings.

Nevertheless, quiet and undramatic steps forward occur here consistently. (This was written before even more sweeping steps were announced on December 6 at the Party Conference.) The decentralization of economic decisions, and their relationship to profitability, are receiving new stress. "We do not use the word 'reform,'" I was told. "That would be pretentious. But we are moving in that direction." The Government's effort to consult closely with every element of the populace is obviously far greater than in the days when Soviet "advisers," backed by Soviet forces, were in control—the days, as one official put it, "when we were not masters in our own house."

To the Western visitor expecting another dreary city in which party slogans and soldiers are everywhere in evidence, the sprightly shops and streets of old Bucharest are a welcome sight. Western literature and the Voice of America are

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eagerly received. Rigid uniformity is not required in artistic or cinematic expression, and self-criticism is no longer unthinkable. No country is easier to enter. Although no American newsman is here this week, an eminent New York journalist, when he referred brusquely to "the Iron Curtain" in his talk not long ago with a Foreign Ministry official, was interrupted with the reminder that he was literally the ninety-ninth Western newsman to visit that very official. In addition to the foreign trade problems that brought me to Bucharest, my own talks with Rumanian officials and intellectuals, including a two-hour session with Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer, were free-ranging and frank on both sides, with no hostility on points of disagreement and no claims to omniscience in either country.

ONE should not make too much of Rumania's example. It remains a one-party Communist state with objectives conflicting with our own. A small country, with no border on Germany, with a desperate need to trade, and safely surrounded by nations of a similar social system, is obviously freer to take objective foreign policy initiatives than some of its neighbors. Nor should it be expected to work miracles as the result of those efforts. (Prime Minister Maurer was amused by the wild speculation in international capitals that followed his travels from Washington to Peking to Hanoi.)

But it would be equally a mistake to dismiss its potential role, as one high-ranking Western diplomat did, as nothing more than international meddling by a nation of natural brokers that has historically played both sides. (Rumanians attribute it more to a long history of suffering from the aggressions of others.) John Kennedy, whose name here as elsewhere is revered by the great and the small alike (when I mentioned his American University speech, one official interrupted: "Ah, yes, the tenth of June, 1963"), told the Irish Parliament that the little nations of the world had their own roles to play and responsibilities to meet in building a peaceful world. Ireland, he said, had unique advantages as a West European nation that had once been a West European colony.

Rumania is also unique—as an East European nation that has regained its independence while maintaining good relations with the Chinese as well as the Russians, the North Vietnamese as well as the Americans, the Israelis as well as the Arabs, the West Germans as well as the East Germans, and the members of NATO as well as the members of the Warsaw Pact. Proud of its role in the United Nations—the best forum for small nations—and believing in Kennedy's goal of "a world made safe for diversity," its

Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu—"Rumania... has no taste for any blocs. ... [It prefers] bilateral relationships."

—Photos from Pictorial Parade.

President Nicolae Ceausescu—"The United States is excluding itself [from Europe]."

potential contribution to a resolution of current conflicts and a reconciliation of Europe is not to be underestimated.

Unfortunately, the United States has not proceeded to build the kind of close relations with Rumania that could both strengthen and make the most of this potential role. Rumanian leaders note—with understanding but nevertheless with regret—that we concentrate even proportionately far more attention on our relations with Moscow than with Bucharest. What is less understandable to them is our unwillingness to build U.S.-Rumanian trade relations—to relax import and credit restrictions on the nonstrategic goods and technology they wish to buy from us and to extend the equality of "most-favored-nation-clause" tariff treatment to the goods they wish to sell to us. President Johnson's East-West Trade Bill, which would authorize the latter step, was never seriously considered by the last Congress and not even presented to this one. Instead, the Congress seems bent on making matters worse by preventing the Export-Import Bank from financing sales or investments in any country engaged in the shipment of supplies to Ho Chi Minh. Rumania's principle of impartiality does not extend to the Vietnamese war and the American bombing, even though its level of aid and trade to Hanoi is very low; and there is not the slightest prospect that any of the Communist nations will abandon their North Vietnam ally under crude economic pressure from our Congress. Instead, they will simply buy from West European businessmen, and the only losers will be the Americans.

Our loss may be more than jobs, contracts, and goods. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact members can still exercise tremendous leverage on Rumania's course by virtue of its still considerable dependence upon their trade. U.S. trade with Rumania is pitifully small today, as it is with all of Eastern Europe. As a network of trade ties, joint ventures, and other transactions criss-cross East and West Europe, the United States is excluding itself more effectively from that continent than either de Gaulle or Kosygin could succeed in doing. In Rumania's case in particular, we are placing serious limits on the struggle for independence in which it is quietly and courageously engaged.

In the Rumanian view, American policy toward Eastern Europe is ten years behind—still talking in terms of an "Iron Curtain," a monolithic bloc, an East-West cold war, an emphasis upon ideological conflicts, and a concern concentrated upon the Kremlin. In the view of top officials here, economic progress and the elevation of living standards are more important than ideology. Trading goods, they believe, will bring us much closer together much less dangerously than trading diplomatic notes.

Yet theirs is not a wholly mercenary, materialistic view. "We have a great love for the United States," an old professor of international law told me. "You are Europeans who crossed into a new world and made good, who have shown what a free and creative people can do. But we also have great *expectations* of the United States. We expect you to be true to your destiny, to your revolutionary, visionary past, and, above all, to the principles of the United Nations Charter, which was founded on your own war dead as well as ours. We hope you will live up to those expectations."

I hope we will.

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WHY WE SHOULD TRADE WITH THE SOVIETS

By Theodore C. Sorensen

TRADE between the United States and the Soviet Union is unlikely ever to reach mammoth proportions, regardless of political considerations or even economic systems. It is equally unlikely that either nation would ever consider such trade economically indispensable or even significantly beneficial. Nevertheless, the tendency in some quarters in the United States to [illegible]ss both the prospects and the political importance of such trade should be less readily accepted.

It is inconceivable, in fact, that the United States could not, if both parties were willing, gradually achieve a substantial exchange of goods with a massive, modern nation, now largely urbanized and industrialized but needing far more equipment and technology to fulfill its potential; a market of some 250 million people with much the same needs as Western Europe but insufficient productive capacity to meet all of those needs; a nation with eight cities of over a million population, with an increasing level of education and living standards that now finds television and other appliances in millions of homes, and with increasingly restive consumers (whose comparatively low wages are somewhat offset by free or subsidized medical care, housing, education and other services); a potential trading partner which has demonstrated its economic and technological maturity in space, medicine, aviation, biology, electric power and nearly every basic industry.

The Soviet attempt last year to bid on six giant new turbines for the Grand Coulee Dam—a bid prevented largely for political reasons by a startled U.S. Government—is but one demonstration of the folly of our continually asserting that trade between us will always be miniscule because the U.S.S.R. produces nothing worthwhile for us to buy. On other occasions the Soviets have talked of building in this country metallurgical plants with equipment superior to our own, of licensing new medical inventions, of selling us new kinds of industrial tools.

Soviet-American trade today is miniscule. Except for the special sales of American wheat authorized by President Kennedy in 1963 and implemented under President Johnson in 1964, it

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has been miniscule since the early days of the cold war. Indeed, it has never been large; but the barriers have always been—and remain today—more political than economic. No doubt some American businessmen will always refuse to trade with a communist country on grounds it is immoral. No doubt some critics of communism will always be convinced that, without our trade, the Soviet economic system will ultimately and inevitably collapse. No doubt there remain in Moscow disciples of Marx and Lenin who fear that such trade will only postpone the demise of American capitalism and pollute the purity of Soviet communism. But these are minority voices at best. The largest single obstacle to the growth of U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade to a level of hundreds of millions of dollars is the obsolete, arbitrary network of discriminatory tariff, credit and export restrictions imposed by the U.S. Government. These restrictions were imposed largely when the cold war was both hotter and more pervasive than it is today, then elaborated in the days when Stalinism and a more unified communist bloc in Europe appeared to make aggression a clear and present danger; they are justified today on the grounds that the Soviet Union is a supplier and supporter of our enemies in Viet Nam.

We refuse most-favored-nation tariff treatment to Soviet goods, thus forcing American importers to pay the excessive Hawley-Smoot tariffs of 1930 and inviting like retaliation on American goods. (This gap between what the Soviets must pay and what their West European competitors must pay to bring goods into the United States will grow even larger as the new Kennedy Round agreement is carried out.)

We ban seven kinds of Soviet fur in favor of U. S. domestic interests which ask protection in the name of anti-communism.

We ban the export to the Soviet Union of not only military and genuinely strategic goods but also goods which are now freely available for purchase in both Eastern and Western Europe.

We prohibit the Export-Import Bank from financing any sales to the Soviets other than agricultural goods.

We prohibit the sale on credit of surplus agricultural commodities under Public Law 480.

We will not permit, under the Johnson Act, private banks and businessmen to extend long-term credits similar to those granted by our West European competitors.

We impose costly restrictions and delays on Soviet vessels seeking clearance to enter our ports.

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Some of these barriers could not be eliminated entirely and some relate to long-standing questions involving Tsarist World War I debts and Lend-Lease World War II debts. But all would be susceptible to early reduction if the necessary will prevailed on both sides.

Other obstacles to Soviet-American trade must not be underestimated, including those inherent in doing business with a communist state. Trading with a state is not easy for private businessmen in any case, and Soviet bureaucracy can be even slower and more disorganized or over-organized than our own. The problems of delivery, distribution, servicing, procurement of spare parts and foreign exchange are all immense. Differences in currency, in concepts of competition, in measurements, standards, traditions, trademark and patent protection, in the use of arbitration for disputes, and even in language cannot be swiftly swept aside. Until the Soviets earn more dollars by sales to us, they may often require American exporters to take payment either in Soviet goods for resale by professional "switch dealers" or in credit balances which the Soviets have in a third country (or they may simply stipulate American components in goods which they purchase from countries whose currencies they hold). Some American businessmen may be deterred by the inconveniences of Moscow hotel service, by the need for unusual advance planning for each business trip, by the inefficiencies of the Soviet postal and telephone systems, by the lack of easy access to buyers or sellers and to plant managers or technicians, and by the need to be patient and precise on every possible point in negotiations.

Nor are the political objections confined to one side. Communist doctrine makes a virtue of economic self-sufficiency. In the midst of a business negotiation, the Soviet representatives have been known to stiffen their attitudes and their terms very quickly when the cold war suddenly turned for the worse. The war in Viet Nam has at least dampened the Soviet desire to trade. Clearly, the Kremlin has its own share of "hawks," who ask whether the Soviet Union should be trading with the United States while it is bombing their North Vietnamese allies; who regard their current sale to us of strategic metals as "trading with the enemy;" who believe President Johnson's "bridge-building" is a devious method, to quote one Soviet official, of American "ideological penetration;" and who want no Soviet resources or currency reserves diverted to Western imports, and especially to Western consumer goods,

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when they could be used instead for a greater Soviet military build-up.

Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. has not been deterred by the Vietnamese war from selling to this country items which we tell our allies have too great a military potential to be exported to the Soviets—items such as the extremely rare, light, durable metal known as titanium, which we use, as the Soviets well know, almost exclusively for our outer space vehicles and for the supersonic aircraft we fly in Viet Nam. In the course of a long talk last year with Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev and other Soviet officials I became convinced that the Soviets today desire, despite Viet Nam, to buy American goods as well as to sell their goods to us. This desire springs not from any pressing economic need—for they can obtain all the goods and markets they really need elsewhere—but from their belief that trade can help keep doors open and normalize relations.

President Johnson and his Administration, recognizing the value of such exchanges from the American point of view, moved some time ago to remove several hundred items from the export control list and to increase Export-Import Bank financing of sales to Eastern Europe; and the President condemned extremist-sponsored consumer boycotts against East European goods. His proposed East-West Trade Bill of 1966 would have authorized a wholesale liberalization along the lines recommended by a blue-ribbon advisory committee of businessmen. That bill, however, was bottled up in the Congress without even serious consideration and was not resubmitted by the President last year.

Also in 1967 the Senate amended the Export-Import Bank Extension Bill to prohibit loans and guarantees by the Bank to any nation furnishing supplies to Hanoi and to prohibit in particular loans to the Italian credit agency financing the new Fiat automobile plant in the Ukraine. Debate on the amendment related primarily to its effect on the war in Viet Nam and showed that the war is in fact the major obstacle to a liberalization of policy. It is easy to talk about expanding trade with Russia after the war or about trading now with the East European countries in order to lessen their dependence on Moscow. But the really tough question is whether the United States Government should encourage increased two-way trade (in nonstrategic goods) with the Soviet Union so long as that nation is shipping weapons and other supplies to our enemies in Viet Nam.

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That is a question fraught with emotion and uncertainties. Former Secretary of Agriculture Benson has compared such trade to financing Hitler, and suggests that by allegedly promoting communism by such trade the President may be open to impeachment. One Democratic Senator calls it trafficking with the enemy and another describes it as giving aid and comfort to those killing our boys overseas. A Republican Senator compares it to Northern speculators purchasing Southern cotton during the Civil War; and a Republican Congressman says such trade places dollars ahead of lives.

Nevertheless, the question must be faced up to, and my answer is that this trade is desirable for three reasons:

First, such trade can actually advance our national interest in Viet Nam as well as in the world at large. The war in Viet Nam is a time-bomb ticking away in a nuclear world. In this period of tension, the United States and the Soviet Union must deal with each other outside the channels of cold-war manœuvring and hot-war threats and deterrents. We should make every effort to increase understanding and minimize misunderstandings and demonstrate that there is hope for peaceful coexistence. We must show that the United States is not out to eradicate communism from the face of the earth and that methods other than aggression can make progress. Any other counsel tends to escalate the risks and prolong the length of the Vietnamese war. No one advocates that we put dollars ahead of lives; and existing Commerce Department controls on the export of strategic goods will prevent any businessman who wished to from doing so. But neither in a nuclear world can we put all our hope in armaments.

This is not "trading with the enemy." The Soviet Union, for all its contrary interests and adverse actions, is not a declared enemy in Viet Nam nor do we want it to become one. Trade can neither solve nor prevent the conflicts of interest and ideology that divide us there and elsewhere; but by increasing contacts and providing experience in working together, it can help create a climate in which peace may perhaps be more readily achieved.

Bilateral trade strengthens the economies of both countries and any Soviet diversion of foreign exchange to the purchase of nonstrategic goods from us can only be to our advantage. On the other hand, restrictions on East-West trade only draw the communists closer together in increased mutual dependence.

Second, restrictions on Soviet-American trade in nonstrategic

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materials cannot affect the flow of Soviet arms to Viet Nam. Obviously our trade is not of sufficient importance to the Soviets to affect their determination to supply North Viet Nam; equally obvious is the fact that they can buy all the goods they want from our friends in Western Europe and from Japan.

Although East-West trade is still small, it has grown in recent years even more rapidly than Western trade as a whole. American participation in this growth has not equalled that of even some of the smallest European countries. In fact, the latest figures available indicate that, despite some increase, we are trading with the Soviet Union less than we did a generation ago; our sales of hides and skins, foods and fibers, and a variety of other items comprise considerably less than 1 percent of our total exports, while we are buying even less—mostly high-grade chromite, platinum-group metals, furs, aluminum scrap, diamonds and window glass. Meanwhile, our friends and allies—especially Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Finland and Japan—compensating for recent sluggishness in their domestic economies, have been expanding their sales to the Soviet Union by means of long-term credits for machinery, equipment, rubber, transportation items and fabrics, purchasing in return even larger amounts of Soviet fuels, tools and raw materials for their industry, as well as some items for their consumers.

In short, our restrictions on nonstrategic trade do not deny anything to the Soviets. They do deny our businessmen an equal chance to sell in that vast market, to make the most of our technological applications and to reap the rewards in jobs, profits and an improvement in our balance of payments. They deny American farmers and producers who are disappointed with the results of the Kennedy Round in terms of West European markets a fair opportunity to develop markets in Eastern Europe. And they deny American consumers an equal chance to buy low-cost Soviet watches or bicycles or other goods now produced in the Soviet Union more efficiently than by other suppliers. It takes time for our businessmen to develop a new market, particularly one where we have no well-established trade pattern. But we have virtually abandoned the Russian and East European market to the West Europeans and the Japanese; and the longer we stay out the more established Soviet acceptance of other patterns and standards will become. In the name of anti-communism we are not hurting the communist nations but ourselves.

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Trade is not aid. If we sell the Soviets more than we buy, our balance of payments benefits. Even if we grant them long-term credits, sooner or later they will have to come up with the gold or the dollars. As stated by the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce: "Trade by definition does not take place unless benefits accrue to both parties. If one nation refuses to participate, in so far as the second party can find another trading partner, the loss is entirely sustained by the country refusing to do business."

An example of this kind of shortsightedness was the Senate's 1967 amendment to the Export-Import Bank Bill prohibiting the Bank's participation in the sale of American equipment to the Italian Fiat Motor Company for use in its new Soviet plant. Credit was to be granted not to the Soviet Union but to the quasi-official Italian credit agency. Some $50 million worth of American machine tools would have gone into that plant and opened the door for still more American exports. The Departments of Defense, Commerce and State, supported by General Wheeler of the Joint Chiefs, all declared that this loan and plant, as well as the resulting increased Soviet appetite for cars, could not help but result in a diversion of Soviet resources into consumer goods instead of military. The U.S.S.R. is to expend several hundred million dollars of its own on this project and between twenty and forty thousand workers will be employed. There is no possibility, in view of our export control checks, that the smaller, lighter cars this plant will produce in the 1970s could be sensibly used in Viet Nam or any other battle; and it is very clear that both Eastern and Western Europe can supply any of this equipment that we fail to supply.

Nevertheless, in what Secretary Trowbridge called "a fruitless exercise in self-denial without corresponding advantages to the United States," the Senate adopted an amendment which could only antagonize the Soviets, irritate the Italians, deny profits and jobs to our own industry and lose what little influence that sale might have brought us in Moscow—all without interfering in the slightest with the building of the plant in question, with the flow of Soviet supplies to Viet Nam, with the progress of the Soviet economy or with the length of the Vietnamese war. The House having already this year adopted an even broader amendment barring all Export-Import Bank transactions relating to any communist country, it is apparent that Western Europe will supply

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these nonstrategic items to the Soviets and its businessmen and labor will reap the gains, while our balance of payments—as well as our reputation for common sense—will suffer. Perhaps the Senators who voted for the amendment intended it as a symbolic slap at the Soviet Union and felt better as a result. Perhaps the torrent of emotions which compared the proposed transaction to our building "a munitions plant in Moscow" or creating an "RFC for communist countries" had too strong a demagogic appeal to be resisted. But every Senator should have known that the amendment was futile and foolish.

A third reason for trade with the Soviet Union in nonstrategic goods has to do with our long-term interest in moderating the conflict with the Russians. It is often charged that the Soviets use trade as an instrument of policy in the struggle between our two systems. They do and we should. World peace, as President Kennedy said, does not require that we love our neighbors; and world trade likewise does not require that we love our trading partners. While both the ideological differences and the national conflicts of interest between the United States and the U.S.S.R. are too real to be ignored, present U.S. restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union are a handicap in the ideological struggle and run contrary to our foreign policy interests.

The United States should not emerge from the struggle in Viet Nam to find itself wholly out of favor in Europe and wholly out of touch with Moscow. The gradual reconciliation of Eastern and Western Europe seems destined to proceed, whether we like it or not—and most of us do. Eastern and Western Europe are developing a great network of economic relations, trade routes, pipelines, power grids, shared technology and coöperative production agreements. We are already somewhat isolated from this process by the Viet Nam war and an appearance of uncompromising cold-war militancy. We should not add to our isolation by inflexibility on East-West trade.

It is in our interest to see the Soviets invest more of their resources in consumer goods and less in their traditional sectors of heavy industry, space and defense. Already Soviet leaders show an increased if cautious recognition of consumer demand, of the complaints about shortages, the desire for cars and better homes and clothes. The economic reforms launched by the Kremlin more than two years ago do not go as far as those in several other East European states in experimenting, decentralizing and pay-

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ing more attention to market factors. But more responsibility and initiative are now permitted at lower levels; bonuses, profit incentives and other forms of capitalism are beginning to appear; and the balances between production and demand and between prices and costs are becoming more realistic.

Centralized planning is still responsible for unnecessary rigidities and delays. But once their State Planning Committee has decided that the nation's long-range priorities and hard-currency reserves permit the importation of certain goods, their Foreign Trade Ministry and its operating subsidiaries will seek the lowest possible price in the most arduously negotiated contract.

If our businessmen are to make the most of the vast Soviet market, if we are to influence the evolution of Soviet external political attitudes and internal economic reforms and are to resist the ambition common to Kosygin and de Gaulle to exclude our influence from a reunited Europe, then the Congress should remove our outmoded, discriminatory barriers against nonstrategic trade with the Soviet Union; authorize most-favored-nation status for all of Eastern Europe; and remove these latest restrictions imposed upon the Export-Import Bank. The Administration should remove from export controls those commodities which no longer are strategic in the sense that they are unavailable elsewhere; and the Export-Import Bank should grant short-term commercial credits for industrial exports to the Soviet Union without requiring of the Kremlin anything more than is required of other nations to prove their credit-worthiness.

The traffic on bridges to the East, as Senator Dirksen has said, should move both ways. The credits and concessions should be reciprocal and the expansion should be bilateral. Chinese opposition as well as the Vietnamese war may inhibit Russia from accepting our offers for the moment. But our efforts should outlast the Vietnamese war and outgrow the cold war. Trade is a force for friendship, understanding and peace. We should use it, not thwart it.

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Magsaysay, and offering true amnesty and amity to the Vietcong and true reconciliation to the North Vietnamese, might have at least been able to increase the rate of Communist defectors to a level exceeding South Vietnamese defections. That has not happened, nor will it. But the strength, the morale, and the legitimacy of the present government in Saigon are at least sufficient now to permit our own country to pursue a different course.

I WROTE in my book *Kennedy* that that Administration's objective in Vietnam was to gain time—time for the South Vietnamese, with our help and protection, to achieve a society sufficiently cohesive both politically and militarily to negotiate a balanced settlement. There is no reason now for us to refrain from concluding that such time is finally near at hand. The South Vietnamese have expressed through their elections a longing for peace and the beginning of constitutional rule. The Communists have reason to know that they cannot win a total military victory. The Red Chinese, beset by internal wide and external setbacks, may be less able to interfere with negotiations. The Soviets prefer peace to a widening war. The National Liberation Front has dropped its resistance to the inclusion of other South Vietnamese in a postwar government; and the North Vietnamese, at least in the view of one, may again be indicating a genuine willingness to talk peace.

Their willingness, to be sure, has been conditioned upon our suspending indefinitely and unconditionally the bombing of the North. If that bombing had been clearly curtailing Communist infiltration and operations within the South, one could more readily accept our refusal on the ground that such attacks were a more effective way of saving American lives than attempting to interdict North Vietnamese lines in the South. But in fact, despite our constant expansion of targets to include all those of genuine military importance, Secretary of Defense McNamara has acknowledged that the infiltration of North Vietnamese forces has continued to grow—infiltrating over countless routes, by boat and truck and bicycle and foot, under cover of jungle or darkness. In the South they live off the land whenever their supply trains are delayed. In the North, they obtain replacements overland through China whenever their supply depots are destroyed. On balance, the continued bombing, by increasing an embittered militancy in the North and thus prolonging the war, appears to be costing more American lives in the long run than it actually saves.

Heavy bombing has never been wholly decisive in any war. No one promised that it would be in this one. But let us set aside the various inconsistencies in the various statements explaining our original reasons for bombing. The overwhelming weight of the evidence still fails to indicate that pounding that largely primitive, peasant economy with more bombs than we unloaded on all of Europe in World War II has brought us a single day closer to the hour of peaceful settlement. The overwhelming weight of the evidence still fails to indicate that the North Vietnamese resolve to resist has been weakened instead of hardened by these massive attacks on their homeland. The overwhelming weight of the evidence still fails to indicate that any feasible amount of bombing can ever prevent the North Vietnamese from infiltrating into the South all the men, arms, and food needed to sustain a low-level guerrilla war indefinitely.

To be sure, the bombing is not without effect. It not only boosts the morale of the Saigon government—a somewhat dubious justification—but punishes and pressures and pains the North Vietnamese. It makes their maintenance of roads and supply lines, and particularly their transportation of large caches and heavy artillery pieces, more difficult and more costly. It makes life harder and poorer for their citizens and their soldiers. But their life has always been hard and poor. They have never depended on cities or industries. They have known very little but war against the Japanese, the French, and the Americans during most of their lives. A still lower standard of living now, an inconvenient mobilization of manpower to repair bridges and railroads, an increase in shortages and terrors and casualties, do not add up to grounds for surrender, now that they have endured this much this long and have so little to lose but their lives.

There seems little to be gained, then, by our insisting upon a continuance of the bombing in the North. Suspending it will not produce a Communist military victory in the South, nor will it bring the collapse of any Saigon government worthy of our attention. But suspending it will, possibly with the aid of the new electronic "fence," confine the war to the South, where it must be won anyway. It will end the strain on U.S. aircraft crews badly needed for air support in the South, while reducing the costly loss of our aircraft and the humiliation of our captured pilots. It will limit the area our dollars must surely rebuild when the war is over. It will end the toll of North Vietnamese civilian casualties which embarrassingly but unavoidably grows as the list of our targets is expanded. And it will eliminate the single largest barrier to world support for our position and the single largest barrier to negotiations with Hanoi.

BOMBING, we have now learned, cannot force negotiations but it may well be preventing them. There is no possibility of the North Vietnamese engaging in talks while their homeland is being bombed. Inasmuch as the bombing can no longer be regarded as an indispensable means of securing our forces and objectives in the South, the time has come for us to suspend indefinitely and unconditionally our bombing of the North in order to test Hanoi's sincerity and see how it will reciprocate.

Accompanying such a suspension with conditions and deadlines will not work. The North Vietnamese will not respond to

". . . the strength, the morale, and the legitimacy of the present government in Saigon are at least sufficient now to permit our own country to pursue a different course."

an ultimatum. Nor will they respond to our demand or even "expectation" that in exchange they stop sending men and supplies to South Vietnam—in effect stop fighting the war altogether—while we continue to fight. Naturally, no American is going to like it if and when the North's flow of troops and supplies to the South increases during such a suspension. We did not like it when fighting continued in Korea during the truce talks; but had we refused to talk, the loss of American lives there would surely have been higher. Today we must face the facts that prolonging the bombing cannot end the war or even the infiltration and that this impasse is costing us more lives than the bombing saves. Let us also face the fact that someday we will stop it—and the longer we put it off, the more difficult it will be for both sides to negotiate a reasonable settlement.

Indeed, there is already a danger that we have passed the point of no return beyond which neither the Hanoi regime nor the Administration in Washington could reach an accommodation with the other without the risk of being turned out of office. Bitterness and distrust are rapidly rising in both camps. Militants and military chieftains are gaining influence in both capitals. Each side is fearful that a cease-fire will cause a loss of momentum and morale, that negotiations will be only a cover for reinforcements. Each side believes that the other should pay the price of aggression, accept the blame, and make the first concession. Each side would prefer to post-

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pone negotiations until he is clearly winning (at which time, of course, the other side would not negotiate).

Perhaps even now the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front are not interested in serious negotiations. Their recent public statements about peace talks have been largely bellicose, rude, and inconsistent. They appear convinced of their ability to outlast us, meanwhile bleeding us white. They do not wish to offend their largest neighbor, protector, and potential supplier, Red China, which would obviously prefer to see us hopelessly bogged down in Vietnam without risking one Chinese casualty, and which might well threaten the North Vietnamese with a disastrous interruption of supplies if they even talk with the Americans. The pro-Chinese faction in the Hanoi government is already said by some to be on the ascendency.

But even if Hanoi is not now ready to negotiate, we can—instead of continuing the present treadmill into ever more dangerous, divisive, and self-destructive escalation—prudently de-escalate our war effort without harming our interests and with some hope that Hanoi will de-escalate also. Limiting our military commitments, objectives, investment, and assaults, meanwhile consolidating our position in the most populous areas of the South, would cost us fewer lives, less money, no territory, and no "face," while better enabling us to wait until outside events—such as divisions in the Communist camp—make negotiations more possible. Certainly our present course is not dividing the Vietcong from Hanoi or Hanoi from Peking, and indeed may end up helping to unite China for Mao or even Peking with Moscow.

But in fact we do not know with any certainty whether Hanoi and the Vietcong—together or separately—are now ready to negotiate. We have not stopped the bombing indefinitely to find out. We have not since one thirty-seven-day pause nearly two years ago accompanied our talk of negotiations with real deeds of de-escalation demonstrating our earnest good faith. We have not given to the pursuit of peace the same effort, ingenuity, and relentless consistency we have given to prosecuting the war. We have not prevented the Saigon regime from torpedoing the rise of civilian neutralist forces in the South capable of negotiating with the North and the National Liberation Front. We have not left those voices in Hanoi who might once have been concerned about their economy with much reason now to justify a cease-fire. We have not, to the best of my knowledge, adopted a concrete, mutually acceptable plan for negotiations—as distinguished from admirable but vague statements of principle—and communicated that plan to the North. Publicly, at least, we have not offered any of the concessions and compromises required by the military and practical situation for a realistic settlement, frequently implying instead only that we stand ready to negotiate the surrender of the Vietcong.

Most serious of all, we have not been sufficiently forthright or forthcoming in response to what may have been actual opportunities to start or explore negotiations. Perhaps we were looking for a different kind of "signal" and missed the one they sent. Perhaps we were plagued by poor translations, poor communications, or poor coordination on both sides. But whatever the reasons and whoever is to blame—and assessing it now will not help—we must in the future take more care not to spurn or ignore potential opportunities for negotiation, much less deny their existence or escalate in response to them.

Such a posture would involve no weakening of our resolve or responsibility. President Johnson has called "the path of peaceful settlement . . . the only path for reasonable men." President Kennedy obtained withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba by giving attention to the olive branch as well as the arrows—by adopting a carefully measured combination of defense, diplomacy, and dialogue. Perhaps his ploy in that crisis of interpreting a Communist demand in his own terms, his response thus necessitating their reply, could be used now to initiate negotiations with Hanoi. Perhaps the good offices of U Thant, a resolution by the U.N. General Assembly, or a reconvening of the Geneva Conference could initiate talks without either side worrying about protocol or precedent. Perhaps we could invite the other side to the President's next summit meeting with our Asian allies. It would be more realistic, in my view, to seek a secret conference, with no mediator, arbitrator, or press releases, thus alleviating potential Chinese and other pressures. But the essential step is to bring together the combatants—and that necessarily means all the combatants, including the Vietcong.

SUCH talks are not doomed to end in disagreement and disappointment. After all, *both* sides are pledged to work:

First, for a return to the Geneva Agreement of 1954;

Second, for an end to hostilities and the withdrawal of all foreign troops and bases;

Third, for a neutral, peaceful, independent South Vietnam, free to determine in new elections its own political, economic, and social system, and its relationship or reunification with the North;

Fourth, for a government—if necessary (though neither Saigon nor the NLF has squarely faced this), a coalition government composed of all parties, as in the Laotian settlement of 1962—acting on behalf of all South Vietnamese citizens in accordance with the principles of universal suffrage, free speech, free worship, and meaningful land redistribution.

"A new opportunity may now be approaching in the holiday season. . . . If we plan and work for it now, we can be prepared this Christmas to have the firing cease forever."

Agreement on the interpretation and implementation of these principles will not be reached quickly or easily. Such words as "freedom," "independence," and "neutrality" mean very different things to the two sides. Some form of international guarantees and supervision will be essential at least at the outset. But agreement should not be impossible.

Such an ending, while restoring South Vietnamese self-determination and preventing its conquest, would not leave the United States and its allies with any better position militarily than they had before the war began—but neither did the ending of the Cuban crisis or the Berlin crisis or even the Korean war. Such a settlement would also involve grave risks. It would endure only if both sides felt as a matter of practical self-interest that this kind of peace was preferable to war. Even then there would be no way of assuring the American people of the elimination of terrorists from the South, of the early departure of all American troops from Asia, or of the nonparticipation in the South Vietnamese government of one variety or another of Communists. Indeed, there is *no* negotiated solution possible that would not lend itself to bitter attacks in the Congress and pose continuing dangers for the future.

Thus, whatever quantities of national courage, understanding, and unity are required on our part today to fight and accept the war in Vietnam, they will be needed in twice those amounts to find and accept the peace. But find it we must. While we cannot overlook any dangers, neither can we overlook any opportunities. A new opportunity may now be approaching in the holiday season. We have been able to arrange in recent years a Christmas cease-fire in Vietnam. If we plan and work for it now, we can be prepared this Christmas to have the firing cease forever.

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THEODORE C. SORENSEN

A Time Bomb Near the Heart of the Nation

The Electoral College, asserts James A. Michener, is not only an outmoded but a dangerous method for choosing a President.

HAD NELLIE FORBUSH decided in the last few pages of James A. Michener's unforgettable *Tales of the South Pacific*, to reject the hand of her French planter in exchange for his lifelong friendship, most readers would have felt with understandable annoyance that the author had been building up to something more than that. Many will feel the same way upon finishing *Presidential Lottery* (Random House, 240 pp., $3.95), Mr. Michener's devastating attack on this nation's anachronistic Electoral College system of choosing its President and Vice President.

"Anachronistic" is the least of the disparaging adjectives applied to the system by the author in his opening pages. It is also "inane," "immoral," "incredible," "ridiculous," "outmoded" and "dangerous," a "reckless lottery," "a shambles," "an idiotic mess," and "a time bomb lodged near the heart of the nation," calculated to produce "chicanery, fraud and uncertainty."

Among the major evils he points out are: 1) the real possibility of a man being chosen President even though he is defeated by the voters at the polls; 2) the disproportionate influence accorded some states and blocs by the distribution of electoral votes; 3) the folly of continuing a system based on assumptions of 1787 that are no longer remotely valid; 4) the danger of relying upon a system (and someday a result) not clearly understood by the general public; and 5) the injustice of permitting a state to discourage large numbers of its citizens from exercising the franchise and still receive credit for them in the allocation of electoral votes. (For example, Mississippi and Connecticut each had eight electoral votes in 1960, yet Connecticut's eight votes represented four times as many actual voters on Election Day.)

However, after parading this chamber of horrors and suggesting some important changes, Mr. Michener basically recommends that we keep the electoral-vote system, continue the five evils cited above, and thus retain what he has aptly called a "Presidential lottery." Then he adds: ". . . the fact remains that the system has worked. Pragmatically speaking, it has been a great success, having outlasted several hundred other governmental systems that have been tried in other nations in the period since 1789."

This is by no means a fair summary of the book, as I will make clear in a moment, but it does reflect my dismay at the gap between Mr. Michener's conclusions and his opportunity. *Presidential Lottery* could have been a most important and valuable work at a particularly crucial moment. The time for electoral reform, for bold recommendation is now, with the confusion and near-catastrophe of the 1968 experience still fresh in the minds of the Congress and public.

President Nixon has endorsed a plan that will inject more distortions

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and dangers into the present system than it removes -the while professing his true affection for the one reform that ends all distortions, the direct popular vote. Even though they would be preferable, he is not supporting direct elections, said the President, because that approach does not have sufficient backing to be enacted into the Constitution. This is Presidential leadership?

Hoping for a trumpet blast that would destroy the walls of pusillanimity on this issue, imagine my disappointment in finding that Mr. Michener (who, incidentally, campaigned ably against Richard Nixon in 1960 as well as 1968) vitiates the powerful indignation he has leveled against the present plan by mildly proposing that we retain some of its worst features, study all the alternative plans, encourage the Congress to adopt one of them, and "if it becomes apparent that the plan we prefer is not attainable, then we must quickly throw our support to the one that is, unless it is totally objectionable. When it is decided what Constitutional amendment will be offered the people, we must work diligently to see that it is adopted . . . if I cannot get the plan I want, I will want the one I can get." Not quite the trumpet call the times require. Should Mr. Nixon's plan be offered the people, I intend to work diligently to see that it is not adopted.

If my bias toward the direct election of Presidents is showing, it is only because I feel that my obligation to advocate the best for our democracy takes precedence over my obligation to render a detached and dispassionate review of a well-motivated book by a gifted author. Mr. Michener does indicate finally and somewhat reluctantly that the direct popular vote alternative is his second choice. But he precedes this conclusion by quoting a long, rambling lecture he received as a naval "elections officer" on a Pacific island in 1944 from a civilian supervisor whose experience in Democratic Party matters in Boston had taught him that politics should be left to the politicians. This practical politician believed in making it difficult for people to vote, in abolishing absentee ballots, and in confining participatory democracy to the small nucleus of party regulars "who really care." Michener was impressed and still is with this philosophy. "I am not in favor of a direct popular vote for President," he writes.

> I fear that such a vote would be vulnerable to demagoguery, to wild fluctuations of public reaction, to hysteria generated by television, and to the tearing down of the old safeguards which have protected the various regions of our nation . . . I have never believed in a raw democracy of merely adding up total votes.

I do not wish to imply that Mr. Michener has written a book of no value or interest. On the contrary, by stimulating discussion, by setting forth the defects and dangers in our present system, by examining each of the alternatives confronting the Congress and country, he has produced a work certain to be read, quoted, and helpful in maintaining public concern. Although at times *Presidential Lottery* seems a strange combination of personal experience, historical exploration, statistical analysis and political theory, it avoids the heavy, dry tone of a political science tome that would never be read by those average citizens whose concern about this subject must be aroused and sustained.

THE Founding Fathers envisioned a system whereby an élite handful, chosen by their respective state legislatures for their selfless patriotism and vast knowledge, would meet in their respective states every four years and decide on the wisest man in the country to be President. Instead, as Michener points out from his own experience as an elector in 1968, party contributors and reliable hacks are casually telephoned by some political leader: "Hey, Joe! You wanna be an elector?" "Sure, why not?" In Pennsylvania on the appointed day a snowstorm and other obstacles prevented a large number of Michener's fellow Democratic electors from attending their only meeting, and convenient substitutes were hastily rounded up. Because electors were free to vote for anyone they wished, they were urged by a newly founded Commission on Election Reform, sponsored by Roderick D. Dimoff, to cast their Vice Presidential ballots for a man who could negotiate with Brezhnev and de Gaulle in their own languages—Roderick D. Dimoff, whose only campaign promise was to lose sixty pounds in order not to look so fat at government functions.

As absurd and chaotic as this sounds, it was no more so than the results produced by the Electoral College system in 1824, 1876, and 1888, when the voters defeated the man who thereafter became President. Even more absurd and chaotic consequences might have occurred in 1968 had fewer than 78,000 voters in Missouri and Illinois voted for Humphrey instead of Nixon. No candidate would then have received an electoral-vote majority as required by the Constitution, and the President would have been selected by bargaining among the "Hey, Joe's" and other faceless electors, especially those won by George C. Wallace's threat to run down demonstrators with his automobile. Wallace's whole campaign was aimed at carrying enough states to have the Presidency decided by the Electoral College, thereby requiring one of the major candidates to make what he called "a solemn covenant" (spelled d-e-a-l). If the electors failed to find a majority for one candidate, the election would have been thrown into the House of Representatives under a system by which each state, regardless of population, has one vote. Thus Alaska, Nevada, Wyoming, and Vermont, with a combined population of less than 1.5 million, would have been able to outvote California, New York, and Pennsylvania, with a combined population of nearly fifty million.



Michener writes that he was prepared, if neither Nixon nor Humphrey reached an electoral-vote majority on Election Day, to propose to his fellow Democratic electors that they strike a decent bargain with the Republican electors before the Wallace-ites proposed an indecent one and before a decision in the House became necessary. To his surprise, he learned that other more partisan Democrats had been prepared to make the same move. He also notes that on the night of the election while the narrow vote tallies were being announced he had distinctly mixed feelings. As a Humphrey supporter, he hoped the Democratic nominee would win enough electoral votes to deny Nixon a majority and throw the election into a Democratic House of Representatives.

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As a citizen who had studied the potential disaster implicit in such a deadlock, he thought it best for Nixon to win clearly at the polls since he would probably win anyway in the end. Many of us will recall similarly mixed feelings on that long night of last November.

The nation came close to the same kind of Constitutional crisis in 1900, 1912, 1916, and in four of the last eight Presidential elections—those in 1940, 1944, 1948 and 1960. The disturbing bitterness and violence in the 1968 Presidential election erupted in some measure because many citizens do not understand the fairness or relevance of much of our political system—including the nominating process, registration requirements, campaign financing, use of television, even the structure of the parties. Of all our political institutions, surely the electoral-vote system is the least understandable, the most irrelevant and unfair. Should it ever again produce a President who has been rejected by the rank-and-file voters, the potential for bitterness and violence will be truly tragic.

Why continue to take this risk? The Presidential electoral system was devised long before levels of education, communication, and political sophistication enabled the average voter to choose knowledgeably among candidates from states other than his own. Although favored by underpopulated states as a boon to their influence, the electoral system has actually benefited the large states. Southern states liked it when their black populations lacked the franchise they now increasingly exercise. The Founding Fathers assumed that, contrary to present practice, independent, non-partisan electors selected by state legislatures would be solemnly meeting in each state unaware of how other electors were voting. They did not contemplate rapid population changes between the decennial Congressional reapportionments, nor did they anticipate Presidential conventions and campaigns.

Mr. Michener cites Senator John F. Kennedy's support in 1956 of the electoral system. I should point out that Mr. Kennedy, in his role of Senator from a populous state, was defending the big-state preference inherent in the present system. To be completely consistent and effective in his opposition to the "proportional" and "district" plans—which had a real prospect of passage that year whereas the popular-vote proposal had none—he felt obligated to fight all changes. The balanced "solar system" of advantages and disadvantages in American politics, in which the urban advantage in the Electoral College was needed to offset the rural advantage in the House of Representatives had not yet been upset by the Supreme Court's one state-one vote decision. Mr. Kennedy, moreover, spoke before the 1960 and 1968 elections produced not only examples of faithless and unpledged electors but electoral-vote results so close as to bring us to the brink of Constitutional crisis.

This is why Mr. Michener is right in stating that abolition of the independent Electoral College and abolition of the one state-one vote rule in the House of Representatives would be extremely important steps forward, but wrong in saying that we should not go all the way and substitute a direct popular vote for outmoded electoral votes. His plan would automatically credit the electoral votes of each state to the popular-vote winner in that state, making electors unnecessary, and a run-off election between the top two contenders would be held if no candidate received an electoral-vote majority. While this plan is at least a step in the right direction, a direct popular vote is the only system under which we can be certain that

- no man could be elected President with fewer popular votes than his opponent;
- no citizen's vote would be discounted or have more weight than any other;
- election results could not be distorted by out-of-date census figures; and
- Presidential campaigns and Presidential-Vice Presidential tickets would be devised for their appeal to all voters in all states equally. In Omaha, Nebraska, for example, 250,000 people would have the same influence and importance as 250,000 people in Oakland, California.

To be sure, the possibilities of corruption, delay, and uncertainty will exist under any system, but they are best confronted in one that is fundamentally democratic, easily understood, and applicable to every other election in the country. Mr. Michener notes the argument that alternative plans will reduce the temptation to fraud and corruption by quarantining their effect within a particular state or district. But ballot-stuffers deciding to fix the Presidential election in, say, California, by faking 35,000 ballots could thereby change all of California's electoral votes under the present system, and this would give them roughly one-fifth of the electoral votes their candidate would need to be President, whereas under a popular vote it would afford them less than one-tenth of 1 per cent.

Mr. Michener successfully destroys the historical defense of the present system and lists all the frightening results it could someday produce. Yet he refuses to support direct elections, invoking Calhoun's principle of states' rights and opposing "any proposal which would submerge the fifty individual states into a conglomerate mass." In truth, the electoral-vote system has done nothing to prevent the gradual concentration of power in Washington. It is the United States Senate, with equal weight given to each state, that maintains the principle of federalism with the aid of energetic and progressive governors and state legislatures.

The electoral-vote system offers the President an incentive to pay more attention to some states at the expense of others—and that is surely not helping the cause of states' rights. Under modern federalism, the national government should consist of a popularly elected President representing all the people, a Senate representing each state equally regardless of size, and a House representing each of the 435 approximately equal local districts.

In addition to direct elections and Mr. Michener's "automatic electoral vote" alternative (which is desirable if the former is truly out of the question), two other plans consistently advanced by conservatives are ably analyzed in this book. Either would have resulted in Richard Nixon's election over John Kennedy in 1960 and both, not surprisingly, are apparently favored by President Nixon today.

-- The "district plan" would award equal electoral votes to every Congressional district (or special districts created for this purpose by state legislatures), while retaining two at-large electoral votes for each state regardless of size. Merely transferring the "winner-take-all" and other objectionable features of the present system from the state to the district level is not much of a step forward; and encouraging state legislatures to gerrymander such districts only invites distor-

No Sit-ins at Electoral

Even though I was determined to work for the abolition of the Electoral College. I felt that since I was an elected member I should treat the tradition with respect, but society conspired against me. Newspapers in the area conducted man-on-the-street interviews regarding the College, and the replies were comical.

One man said, "Every boy and girl should go to college and if they can't afford Yale or Harvard, why, Electoral is just as good, if you work."

A woman in Philadelphia said, "I've heard some very nice things said about Electoral. It's here in the neighborhood somewhere. I think it's that bunch of red-brick buildings about three blocks farther down." And she pointed toward Independence Hall.

A sporting type said, "The guys at the bar poor-mouth Electoral somethin' awful. Wasn't they mixed up in a basketball scandal or somethin'?"

—From "Presidential Lottery."

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tions in the national electoral result.

The "proportional plan" would divide each state's electoral vote according to the popular vote in that state for each candidate, calculated to the third decimal place. Thinly populated one-party states would thus have more influence on the result than heavily populated two-party states; and the present malapportionment of the electoral vote would be further compounded. Both systems would encourage a mass of splinter parties to seek an electoral vote or two here and there, with the result that every election might be thrown into the Congress or a runoff. And both would greatly reduce the present pressure on the major parties by urban and minority groups, who surely need all the influence that they have achieved.

Thus, in the name of reform, the President has suggested that we step backward; and Mr. Michener, although on balance rejecting the district and proportional plans, appears too eager to accept any change. Recognizing the difficulty of obtaining a Constitutional amendment in this area, he notes that many sparsely populated states assume that *they* are the beneficiaries of the present system, inasmuch as five of them, for example, have fifteen electoral votes between them for two million people, while one (Colorado) has six electoral votes for nearly two million people. Similarly, many populous states assume that *they* are the beneficiaries of the current situation because the winner-take-all system gives them increased leverage and attention. Hence both are reluctant to support a direct popular election plan that would remove these inequities. That is why a trumpet blast is needed, not a cautious whistle.

In providing for the direct election of Senators under the Seventeenth Amendment, the people of this nation forgot about small counties versus large counties, rural citizens versus urban citizens, liberal voters versus conservative voters. They chose instead the fairest, simplest, most democratic method. As a proud native son of Nebraska and a proud resident today of New York, I would gladly forego the supposed electoral advantages of either in order to achieve the only true democratic standard, a direct popular poll in which each citizen of every state, regardless of population, has an equal voice and vote.

Mr. Michener, who opposes the direct vote, quotes Elbridge Gerry: "The people are uninformed and would be misled by a few designing men." I prefer to cite the words of Lincoln's First Inaugural: "This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. . . . Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"

Book Forum

Letters from Readers

Ever Heard of Lidice?

CONCERNING PAUL E. ZINNER'S article, "A Nation Violated" [*SR*, Mar. 29], what would have been a more heroic stance for the Czech nation in 1938 and again in 1948? Armed resistance? How victorious would it have been? Which one of the Western nations would have assisted? Suicidal annihilation! Has Mr. Zinner ever heard of a town named Lidice?

Perhaps a hero is one who must die for his belief, but to me that is a martyr. Survival may be a more accurate term, and what takes more fortitude?

C. JEZEK,
Cincinnati, O.

Strings to Jennie's Bow

IN HER REVIEW OF MY BOOK, *Jennie: The Life of Lady Randolph Churchill* [*SR*, Mar. 8] Glendy Culligan refers to Jennie's life as "a bad life." What nonsense!

She not only shaped her son into what he was, but she converted a social nothing of a husband into a man who almost became Prime Minister. Even besides that, she was the author of books, saw her plays produced in London, edited and published an international literary magazine, was a pianist of almost concert quality and introduced Paderewski to England, and she was a woman of many men—whose lovers were among the most important men in Europe. A Prime Minister's wife once said of Jennie, "She could have governed the world." And, in a sense, she almost did. Bad life, indeed!

One other statement I must answer. Miss Culligan has charged me with "uncritical scholarship" and "imprecise documentation." I spent five years in researching and writing this book. Much of my research came from primary sources—hundreds of letters, diaries, documents, interviews, all over England, the United States and various parts of Europe. All of this is carefully documented in my book, in sixty pages of Notes and References and Critical Bibliography. Your readers have a right to know this.

RALPH G. MARTIN,
East Norwich, N.Y.

Omayyads, Abbasids, Fatimids . . .

MR. KURT ROSENWALD, whose letter appeared in *SR* Feb. 22, should use a non-Zionist history of Palestine. His statement "the fact is that the Arabs never ruled Palestine" is the most bold of several in Mr. Rosenwald's brief effort to rewrite history.

If the Arabs never ruled Palestine, who were the Omayyads, the Abbasids, the Fatimids, and the Ayyubids, who seem, from most reliable historical accounts, to have governed Palestine from 638 A.D. until 1250 A.D., when the Mamelukes arrived on the scene? True, the Crusaders briefly interrupted this more than 600-year reign when they defeated the Fatimids in 1099 and managed to stave off the Arab armies until Saladin restored Arab power in most of Palestine in 1187. His troops were Syrian Muslim Arabs from Syria, and his family, the Ayyubids, ruled from the field, whenever their commander was in battle, as well as from Egypt. The Crusaders failed to unseat the Ayyubids by force and had to rely upon the guile of a questionable ally, Frederick II, to negotiate a ten-year treaty with the Arabs in 1229 to temporarily bring Jerusalem, Nazareth and Bethlehem under Christian rule until the Ayyubid sultanate's control was restored in 1244.

The major point at issue is why the Jews insist upon referring to Palestine as their "homeland" when the Israelites only ruled that land from 1020 B.C. until 721 B.C., only half the time which the Arabs reigned supreme in that land, and less than one-fourth the time which Palestine was under the Muslims.

DAVID D. SHOM[illegible],
Manhasset, N.Y.

Brown-skinned Aryans

GERALD PEARCE RIGHTLY POINTS OUT [Book Forum, Mar. 15] that the old population of Palestine included, not only Jews but also Canaanites, Philistines, etc.

The Canaanites were, as experts point out, Hamites from southwestern Arabia and racial kin to the Akkadians, who invaded and settled in Upper Mesopotamia. Both divisions moved from Arabia about 3500 B.C. Canaan was, of course, named after the Hamitic (Aryan) Canaanites. One of their subsequent tribes is known to history as the Phoenicians. A division that expanded northward was later known as the Amorites. All were brown-skinned Aryans from Arabia.

Their far-off ancestors, known as the Mediterraneans (a sub-race of the Aryan race) migrated from Iran to Mediterranean Basin about 25,000 years ago. They reached the general area of eastern Mediterranean Basin about 10-12,000 years ago. Various of their walled cities, built in the Neolithic age, have been excavated by geologists.

Palestine, then, was occupied by branches and groups of brown Aryans (Canaanites, Phoenicians, Amorites, etc.) from about 4000 B.C. This was roughly 2,000 years before the ancient Hebrews, under the leadership of Terah, father of Abram (later Abraham) appeared on the Babylonian Plain (*circa* 1815 B.C.) and settled near Ur of the Chaldees—the Chaldeans being brown Aryans from Arabia.

In sum, Palestine had been occupied for at least 2,000 years by brown Aryans (peoples who today would be recognized as of Arab stock) before the Khibiru, or ancient Hebrews, crossed the Tigris westward and hundreds of years later, became a nation.

MICHAEL SHEA[illegible],
Cambridge, Mass.

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

THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS OF RICHARD M. NIXON

By THEODORE C. SORENSEN

"I NEVER made a mistake," Will Rogers once said of his wholly ceremonial role as the honorary "Mayor" of Beverly Hills, "partly because I never made a decision." It would be unfair to characterize President Nixon's first months in office with such sweeping irreverence. But it is true that he has not made either the number of mistakes his most fervent detractors expected or the number of decisions his most fervent admirers desired. The most visible hallmark of his first one hundred days in office has been caution.

Ever since Franklin Roosevelt utilized his first one hundred days in the White House to unleash a host of Executive orders dealing with the Depression and to jam accompanying legislation through the Congress, a comparable period at the start of each new administration has been interpreted by the press as the first measuring-stick of a new President's response to that office. Every recent President has been subjected to that test; every recent President has resented it. For FDR, elected in a landslide vote, had acted at a time of deep national crisis, when the national will was nearly paralyzed, when urgent presidential action was demanded with virtual unanimity by the public, and was accepted with relative docility by the Congress. The transition period of preparation between election and Inauguration, in those days before the Twentieth Amendment, stretched into March. No subsequent President has had a comparable opportunity under comparable circumstances. John Kennedy deliberately inserted into his Inaugural Address the phrase "All this will not be finished in the first one hundred days" in order to reduce expectations for that period. Neither he nor his predecessors or successors felt any test was truly valid prior to the mid-term congressional elections and the following presidential election itself.

President Kennedy's concept of the Presidency, however, did require him to fulfill his pledge to "set forth the national agenda" early in his first term, to use that period—while the Legislative branch was getting organized and the nation was eying him both eagerly and anxiously—to outline his major legislative goals, to take the initiative with a divided Congress and country. As the result of intensive work on his part with his aides, new appointees, and transition task forces, he was able to send to Capitol Hill during his first hundred-day period some sixteen comprehensive messages and some 277 separate requests for legislative action. By the end of June, he had signed into law all seven of the economic recovery measures he had proposed in his first message.

President Nixon has taken a wholly different course. To the surprise of those observers who had assumed that his experience in Washington would enable him to seek early implementation of his more specific campaign pledges, he has deliberately chosen a slow and measured pace. Despite fretting from Republican legislators that a Democratic Congress was filling the publicity vacuum if not the power vacuum left by the unprecedented paucity of Administration messages, the President has preferred to exude an attitude of steady, low-key calm, compromise, and continuity. He has made very few new proposals, has postponed most controversial decisions, and has sought to create an atmosphere of quiet prudence instead of bold action.

He has concentrated in part on reshaping the apparatus of government to fit his own needs, on a reorganization of the decision-making process rather than the decisions themselves. He has effected new machinery for urban and foreign affairs, commissioned new studies and committees, and developed improved coordination procedures. Real presidential control of the Executive branch is an important first step for any President given time to achieve it, although this emphasis on Mr. Nixon's part seems inconsistent with the slow pace of presidential appointments below the Cabinet level. In this area he has shown neither the sense of partisan housecleaning (with respect to Democratic holdovers) nor the sense of urgency (with respect, for example, to such a crucial ambassadorial post as Bonn) that some of his advisers might have felt desirable.

THE President has also concentrated, as befits a man elected with the smallest proportion of the popular vote in half a century, on his own public relations and standing. His televised news conferences have been unqualified successes; his role during the Eisenhower funeral was smoothly carried out; his public appearances have added to the sense of relaxation and order he has sought thus far to inspire. While many of this country's best friends in NATO winced at his fulsome salute to General de Gaulle, the one man most responsible for blocking progress toward political integration in Western Europe, Mr. Nixon's highly publicized tour of European capitals undoubtedly did much to dispel some of the clouds—if not the conflicts—surrounding the Western Alliance, and atmospherics can be important to the smooth functioning of any alliance.

One of his most surprising acts of restraint, in view of his assumed pre-

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clivity toward a strong Presidency—was his decision not to deliver a State of the Union Address to the Congress, confining himself instead to a brief and highly generalized written message. Ever since Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt revived the practice of delivering this Constitutionally mandated message in person, the annual State of the Union Address has been regarded as an important tool of presidential leadership. Presidents in their first year usually welcome this opportunity to be compared with their predecessors; the advent of television has helped dramatize the presidential face-to-face initiative this occasion represents. Moreover, as Wilson wrote to a friend, "A President is likely to read his own message rather better than a clerk would."

Nevertheless, President Nixon chose not to take this opportunity; the Congress, embarrassed by its own inactivity following a pay raise but too poorly organized and staffed to proceed very far on its own, grew understandably restless as the weeks went by. Belated and sometimes vague messages as distinguished from draft legislation on tax reform, welfare reform, crime, urban affairs, revenue sharing, Selective Service, mass transit, and hunger were not enough to start the idle legislative wheels turning. Congressional Democrats refrained from criticizing the President's pace, however—partly because his mild middle-of-the-road approach had thus far contained none of the partisan attacks or anti-Communist scare words that had previously characterized his campaigns, and partly because they realized that a public weary of political controversy was unwilling to see the new President judged before he had ample time to perform.

The Gallup Poll indicated that both President and Congress read the public correctly. Mr. Nixon's standing rose steadily among voters of both parties in all sections of the country. Conservatives disappointed in his moderate approach still hoped he would prove to be one of theirs. Liberals expecting immediate disaster confessed with pleasure that it had not happened. The working press longed for more exciting headlines, but gave generally high marks to his new image of quiet circumspection.

CLEARLY a majority of the American public, after a traumatic year of assassinations, riots, crises, crime, and protests, wanted a respite from political acrimony and divisiveness. The new President thus sought deliberately to make no waves, to lower his voice, to "cool it." The Congress, having cleared up most of its enactable backlog during the previous eight years, did not pressure him for more. The 1968 election results, producing a popular-vote majority against the winner and the slenderest of electoral vote margins for him, was not a mandate for bold, new initiatives.

There were other practical reasons for Richard Nixon's slow tempo at the start. The enormous complexity of modern life produces no quick and ready-made answers to the problems of urban blight, inflation, and foreign entanglement. The budget inherited from President Johnson proved to have far less domestic fat available for cutting than campaign oratory had admitted. Progress at home cannot be cheaply bought. But being unwilling to raise taxes in the face of a possible "taxpayers' revolt," the President felt obligated to achieve a larger net reduction in federal expenditures in order to combat inflation with a larger budget surplus. That severely restricted his interest in new federal programs to meet domestic needs.

Much of his time, moreover, has been devoted to world affairs. Unlike JFK, who faced major crises in the Congo, Laos, Vietnam, Cuba, and elsewhere during his first hundred days, Mr. Nixon faced no new major international threats or incidents (other than the downing of our spy plane by the North Koreans), hence facilitating a slow and steady approach in the foreign affairs area as well. But the problems he inherited in Vietnam, the Middle East, and elsewhere did not lend themselves to early solutions. His conciliatory approaches toward Peru and Cambodia may well bear useful fruit in the long run. Both the present and the proposed disarmament talks hold hope for the future. But these gains are only speculative; his initiation of Four Power talks on the Middle East against Israel's wishes may well prove to be sadly mistaken as well as futile, if such talks increase Arab intransigency in the hopes of obtaining support from an obviously biased U.N. Security Council.

The real test of the Nixon hundred days, however, and very likely the most important test of the Nixon Administration, is Vietnam; throughout the hundred days a weary public, both hopeful and skeptical after the last four years, waited for some more solid signs of progress than the claim that secret negotiations were making headway on undefined subjects. The President's reliance upon Ambassadors Lodge and Bunker, seemingly tied to old policies and the recalcitrant Saigon regime, the reassertion through Secretary Laird of the Pentagon's belief in American status on the battlefield, and the continued refusal of the Thieu-Ky regime to pay more than lip service to the concept of an open political system were all ominous portents of little movement in American policy. But the President knows as well as any man that an early end to the war is an absolute prerequisite to his healing the divisions in this country, halting inflation, and obtaining the fiscal resources necessary to attack domestic social problems. He has therefore not escalated the war and has made clear through background press statements that terminating it is his No. 1 priority.

All this is not to say that no [illegible]



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...and domestic decisions of any kind ... disturbed the new Washington atmosphere of tranquility. The President's tax package stirred some criticism, including his small but nevertheless courageous beginning on tax reform. His course of professing to believe in direct presidential elections, while endorsing an unwise Electoral College reform as more likely to pass, cannot be termed equally courageous. Nor can his apparent retention of the old hostile China policy. But the President has not tried to please everyone or to postpone all hard decisions. Civil libertarians were displeased with his Administration's support of wire-tapping, bugging, and preventive detention, as well as his nomination of Otto Otepka to the Subversive Activities Control Board. Patronage-hungry Republicans were displeased with his reorganization of the Post Office Department. Labor leaders were disturbed that his anti-inflation efforts could reduce job expansion, and that his budget changes cut back a proposed Social Security increase.

In fact, the federal budget—that thick, dreary compilation of dry and dusty figures—offered Mr. Nixon both his most difficult and crucial decisions thus far, and his greatest opportunity to signal change. Had he cut back sharply on the Joint Chiefs of Staff requests for massive new weapons systems and other arms, and then allocated at least part of those savings to alleviate hunger and poverty in this country, that move alone would have done more than any other (except ending the war in Vietnam) to win over his critics and reconcile the country. Instead, he committed himself to do battle for the ABM—which, even in its reduced version, has become the national symbol of the growing struggle between the Pentagon and the public welfare for budget supremacy—barely scratched the huge defense budget, and cut back on those urban and other domestic programs that were already under-financed, including anti-poverty programs, Model Cities, education, mental health, Medicaid, and others. These were not large reductions, and some meritorious programs were slightly increased, but the opportunity missed was much larger.

John F. Kennedy's hundred days of [illegible] were ruined when he yielded to the cold warriors urging the Bay of Pigs invasion. The ABM-defense budget decision, urged upon President Nixon by much the same kind of military men, may prove over a much longer run to have been his Bay of Pigs. If, as a result, the Soviet-American arms race is heated up again, carrying the buildup on both sides past the point where effective limitations on strategic and defensive missiles can be negotiated, Mr. Nixon's flexibility, in both foreign and domestic affairs, as well as his hopes for serious accomplishment in either, will be drastically curtailed.

"They went up the hill to fetch a pail of water —How should I know if it was fluoridated?"

The President deserves time. He deserves our patience. He cannot be expected to solve every problem either soon or singlehandedly. "Every President," wrote John Kennedy, "must endure a gap between what he would like and what is possible." No doubt Mr. Nixon would like to do more. While he may come to be criticized for his caution, his moderation, his delays, and his efforts to unite the country around his personal image, so too were Franklin Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln, as well as Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson. So was John Kennedy, whose most important innovations did not come until his third year in office.

But if, as some suggest, Mr. Nixon hopes to stretch his honeymoon period of non-controversial good will throughout his full four-year term, the domestic controversies he hopes to avoid can simply not wait that long. He seeks—and he needs—to reconcile the nation, to bring those most alienated and distrustful back into rapport with our society. He is right not to arouse hopes in these breasts that he cannot fulfill, but he is wrong if he believes that the forces of frustration and fury in those same breasts are not slowly regathering steam.

Having made no effort to win black voters during the presidential campaign, he has thus far only confirmed their suspicions by his ill-timed announcement of Clifford Alexander's replacement as chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and by ambiguities in his position on the desegregation of Southern schools and textile mills. Having gained few supporters among the very young and the very poor, his cutbacks in the Job Corps and other poverty programs have not eased their sense of unrest.

It will take far more than a grant of $200 million in post-riot reconstruction money to reverse the decline of our cities. It will take far more than a Rusk-like belief in mere survival to surmount the crises that face us abroad. The President must lead as well as survive, generate new vistas as well as rebuild old ones, reallocate our resources and reassess our positions as well as stay attuned to public opinion (after the fashion of William McKinley, who, in the words of Speaker Joe Cannon, "kept his ear so close to the ground he got it full of grasshoppers"). As has been rightly said:

> The days of a passive Presidency belong to a simpler past. . . . [The] President must take an activist view of his office. He must articulate the nation's values, define its goals, and marshal its will.

The words sound like John Kennedy's in the 1960 campaign. They were spoken by Richard Nixon in the 1968 campaign. Time—far more time than a hundred days—will tell whether President Nixon is able to live up to this commendable standard.

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BETWEEN THE LINES

Do handsome politicians (like Romney) fare better with female voters than plain-lookers (like Johnson or Nixon)? Would Rockefeller's or Reagan's divorce be a drag? Theodore C. Sorensen (*below, left*) discusses what is known about the woman voter, including the myths and clichés, in a fascinating article beginning on page 61. A Phi Beta Kappa at the University of Nebraska, Mr. Sorensen went on to serve as Special Counsel to both President Kennedy and President Johnson from January, 1961, to February, 1964. He wrote *Kennedy*, a best-seller that has been published, in well over a million copies, in some two dozen countries. Today at 39 he is a partner in a New York law firm, visiting lecturer on public affairs at Princeton University, chairman of the Advisory Committee of the New York State Democratic Party and editor-at-large of *Saturday Review*.

People who own a beautiful doodad, say a Ming vase, have been known to arrange an entire house or apartment around it. That's a "fun" way to do it. But in our new series "First Home," beginning in this issue, we're going in cold without even a carpet remnant to influence us. We start from scratch with the brand-new and very empty house shown below and built by Arbor Homes, Inc., of Waterbury, Connecticut. Our Home Furnishings staff is taking it from there to show young couples what they are up against when they make the big move into their first digs and what, for a beginning, to do about it. We're going to lead you through the whole business. You'll be told when it's advisable to stretch the budget for that special thing and when to clutch your pocketbook for dear life. The idea is to be financially solvent enough when you finish to be able to swing a "bash-in" for your friends. But we're getting ahead of the story; the victory celebration is in the future. Start at the beginning—on page 87.

Richard Lockridge (*below, right*) is the author of this month's novel, "Murder in False Face." A former newspaperman, he wrote more than 50 mysteries in collaboration with his wife Frances until her death in 1963. Since then there have been no more Pam and Jerry North stories, the characters they created, but our novel will be Mr. Lockridge's fifth book on his own. It will be published in May by Lippincott and will be a Mystery Guild selection in June. Mr. Lockridge lives in South Salem, New York, with his second wife, Hildegard Dolson, also an author and a contributor to REDBOOK.

In the annual Martha Foley selection of 20 best American short stories, recently published by Houghton Mifflin, are ten stories from REDBOOK listed as "distinctive," more than from any other large-circulation monthly magazine. — W.B.H.



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"AMERICAN WOMEN -- PARTICULARLY YOUNG, EDUCATED MOTHERS -- TOO OFTEN FAIL TO EXPRESS THEIR OPINIONS AT THE POLLS. THE PRICE PAID FOR THIS FAILURE MUST BE MADE CLEAR . . ."

A SPECIAL REPORT ON THE WOMAN VOTER BY THEODORE C. SORENSEN

No one talks more and knows less about American women in politics than American men in politics.

In 1920 they predicted that giving women the right to vote would either ruin the electorate -- or reform it. Some said women would inject a new wave of enlightened idealism into American politics. Others said they would introduce a female bloc vote, cast on a more emotional and less informed basis than the male vote.

Neither prediction has proved correct.

In 1960 political experts (male) predicted that women voters — oohing, cooing, jumping and screaming — would provide John Kennedy with the margin he needed to defeat Richard Nixon.

That prediction too proved incorrect. In fact, had it been up to the women, Kennedy would have gone down to defeat -- by a narrow margin, to be sure, but not as narrow as the margin by which he won, thanks to a majority among men.

Now, in 1968, professional politicians and pundits, still mostly men, are busy making another series of predictions about the female voter:

¶ that she will be less influenced in this year's Presidential election by such "masculine" matters as the war in Vietnam than by fear of crime in the streets;

¶ that she will be more inclined toward a good-looking Romney or Reagan than a less-handsome Johnson or Nixon; (Continued on page 113)

WOMEN ARE NOT LIKELY TO REALIZE "THAT POLITICS IS IMPORTANT, THAT AS PRIVATE CITIZENS THEY CAN AFFECT THE DIRECTION OF PUBLIC POLICIES . . ."

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Continued from page 61

¶ that she will be less favorably disposed toward the aspirations of Senator Robert Kennedy, should he become a factor, than she was toward his late older brother, whom she regarded as a smoother, softer man.

On these points have the men once again misjudged the ladies?

I agreed to undertake for REDBOOK an article on the women's vote in America before I realized what a perilous undertaking it would be. The surveys are incomplete. The statistics are inconsistent. The studies are inadequate. The subject herself, moreover, is likely to conclude—correctly—that she knows far more about her own voting behavior than any mere male.

Nevertheless, in the hope of shedding light on an area of American politics that has long baffled (if not silenced) male political leaders, and with the help of the John Kraft opinion-survey organization, I have gathered a collection of available polls and other research data analyzing and comparing the political attitudes of American women.

The conclusions that follow are drawn from that material as I interpret it. While they are subject to all the doubts and limitations mentioned, it can be hoped that they at least provide a better guide to understanding and predicting female voting patterns in the 1968 election than the myths and clichés we have employed too often in the past.

Beyond the conclusions lies a troubling concern. American women—particularly young, educated mothers—too often fail to express their opinions at the polls. The price paid for this failure—paid by the women themselves, their husbands and children and the nation as a whole—must be made clear. This becomes particularly important in the election year of 1968. Of all the subjects that concern American women, none touches them more deeply than that of war and peace—and on this issue, where opinion polls reveal consistently that women have a different viewpoint from that of men, their convictions will come to nothing if they are not translated into ballots.

Any article about the women's vote in America should begin with the fact that there is no such thing. Those who exhort our female citizens to vote as a bloc and thus make the most of their majority status (there are actually more women than men among this country's potential voters) are wasting their time. So are politicians searching for some gimmick that will "win over the women of America." There never was and never will be a campaign manager or candidate in this country capable of inducing nearly all our women voters to cast their ballots for the same ticket.

A Negro woman on welfare in Watts, for instance, a unionized telephone operator in New York and an elderly society leader in Atlanta may be of the same sex, and they may be mothers and wives, but they have too little in common to cause them to vote alike. Different groups of [illegible] most certain to take different stands on national issues. In a 1967 poll, for example, in which some women were not enthusiastic about re-electing President Johnson, female union members across the country favored him strongly. In another poll the women in a Midwestern state responded much more adversely to questions about our gradual escalation of the war in Vietnam than the women in a Southern state.

In short, political appeals to female voters as women have about as much chance of success as political appeals to male voters as men. The notion of a solid and consistent nationwide female vote is a myth.

Women, like men, vote as individuals, and their political attitudes are shaped by essentially the same forces that shape men's attitudes, including age, race, religion, geography, economic status, traditional party affiliations. This is one of the reasons husbands and wives often vote the same way. It is not, as some would argue, because of male domination. It is because these couples have similar interests and values and are subject to similar age, religious, economic and regional influences.

Parallel voting by some husbands and wives does not mean, however, that women voters in general can be counted on to react and vote the same way as men. On certain issues and candidates women voters—while responding differently from one another depending on their economic, ethnic, regional and other groupings—also will respond differently from men voters [illegible] the men are classified in the same groups. In one state recently, for example, men were more concerned than women about high federal taxes, but in another state that was polled at the same time the reverse was true. In a recent Missouri poll the men preferred Johnson to Reagan, but the women did not; in a Pennsylvania poll the women favored Johnson over Reagan and every other G.O.P. Presidential hopeful—but, unlike the men, they gave Nelson Rockefeller about an even split.

The woman who knows her own mind and is willing to express her convictions to an opinion-poll questioner is matched, unfortunately, by the woman who either does not have an independent opinion or will not express it. Surveys show that large numbers of women, particularly the less-educated and less-affluent, still regard politics as a man's world in which they apparently feel they do not belong. More women than men tell poll interviewers that they are "not sure," "don't know" or have "no opinions." And many wives unashamedly refer interviewers to their husbands for answers.

Even as children, girls reflect this lack of interest and involvement in politics. According to research studies, girls show much less concern with political matters than do boys. As adults, women are less likely to be drawn by business, professional or union activities into direct contact with politics; less likely to have free time to invest in it; less likely to feel involved; and—I find this disturbing—less likely to realize that politics is important, that as private citizens *they can affect the direction of public policies.*

As a result too many women—including the very young and the very old, and to a somewhat greater extent those in rural and Southern homes where the female role has changed least in the past 50 years—think of politics as a game or contest outside the home, and primarily the concern of men. These women let their husbands do all the political thinking and sometimes all the voting.

This strong masculine influence is confirmed by other studies, which indicate that when children become adults they usually identify with the political party their father favored. Daughters, as well as sons, trace their party preference to their fathers: often, in fact, they are uncertain about their mothers' political views. (A wife is rarely in doubt about her husband's party loyalty.)

If women as individuals generally follow the political lead of their fathers or husbands, does this mean that they are less partisan and party-conscious than men? Feminist leaders often claim that women are more likely than men to vote for the candidate, not the party; to take the role of an "independent." But surveys indicate that women feel a strong affiliation with one of the two major parties in virtually the same proportions as do men. In some instances, moreover, women prove more consistent in their loyalties than men; for example, within labor unions, which are traditional supporters of the Democratic party, the women members are far more likely than the

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Page 83: Striped shirtdress and daisy embroidery are from McCall's pattern 9252.

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men to consider themselves Democrats, rather than Republicans or independents.

It is often suggested, however, that when given a female candidate to support, women will abandon their party more readily to cross party lines and vote for her. But if this is so, it is hard to explain why the United States lags behind so many other nations in the number of women elected to the national legislative body; American women, turning out in force for one of their own sex, could swing virtually any election.

Not only do women fail to show any particular preference for female candidates; there appears to be some evidence that they often oppose women for public office. Opinion polls in Boston last year and in Alabama in 1966 showed that mayoralty candidate Louise Day Hicks and gubernatorial candidate—now Governor Lurleen Wallace were getting more support from men than from women. There was no lack of reasons to be against either of these formidable Democratic ladies, but all such reasons would seem as discernible to men as to women. Could it be that women have more bias than men against a woman running for high executive office? Many women politicians are convinced that this is the case.

From the standpoint of practical politics, what effect does a man's marriage have on his chances of being elected? If his wife has a strong personality and makes a marked impression on the public in ways that may not be unanimously approved, will she be a campaign liability?

Eleanor Roosevelt was the target of considerable criticism during her husband's years in office, but there is no evidence that she cost him any appreciable loss of votes. On the contrary, she may well have helped win him votes.

John Kennedy was told during the 1960 campaign that Jacqueline should forgo all fancy French clothes, fox hunts and other highly individual preferences that housewives, it was said, would resent. But neither the candidate nor his wife was willing to accept such advice, and she proved to be a great asset to him—particularly in the White House—simply by being herself.

This year speculation centers on the fact that two prominent Republican contenders—Rockefeller and Reagan—have been divorced and remarried. Many politicians feel that this issue will hurt their chances, especially with older women, small-town women and Protestant as well as Catholic women. This would be particularly true, these politicians believe, should Rockefeller and Reagan be nominated for a Presidential–Vice Presidential ticket. In support of this contention, they cite actual conversations or polls in which women voters specifically mentioned Rockefeller's divorce as a reason to oppose him in 1964, just as they gave Adlai Stevenson's divorce as a reason for opposition in 1952 and 1956.

Other politicians, however, are convinced that a divorce—or any similar marital issue—is only used as an excuse by voters who would be opposed to that candidate's election for some other reason anyway. (I have had some personal experience with the politics of this question. When a news article suggested that my divorced status would prevent my running for office, I received a letter dismissing this as a barrier and predicting that "by receiving not only the votes of everyone in this state who is divorced but also the votes of everyone who would *like* to be divorced, you will win in a landslide!")

There is very little hard evidence to prove—or disprove—either view. Rockefeller and Reagan were handily elected to their present gubernatorial posts in 1966 without massive signs that their divorces had hurt. The defeat of Stevenson in 1952 and 1956 by Dwight D. Eisenhower could hardly be attributed to the divorce issue. Eisenhower offered hope of peace in Korea, a factor that, as I hope to show, holds a powerful appeal for women and that, in my judgment, not only helped him capture a healthy proportion of the women's vote in 1952 but also enabled him to increase that proportion in 1956. (His majorities among men were somewhat smaller and did not increase in 1956, thus indicating that women did have some special affection for Eisenhower—or disaffection for Stevenson.) And as of this writing, polls show Rockefeller running consistently better with women voters against Johnson in 1968 Presidential pairings than any other Republican candidate.

Just as divorce, despite the lack of evidence, is considered by some to be a political liability where women voters are concerned, a candidate's physical attractiveness, despite a similar lack of evidence, is supposed to be a necessary asset in winning the women's vote. (Both sexes are said to be more responsive to young

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and more handsome candidates, and dis- [illegible] vision viewers in general and younger voters in particular. But merchandising of a handsome, videogenic candidate is surely not aimed primarily at men.)

The comparative importance to women of a candidate's appearance was in a sense tested by the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon campaign. Whatever Richard Nixon's other qualities may be, he was not generally regarded in 1960 as being handsomer and more appealing on television than John Kennedy. And no one who participated in that Kennedy campaign will ever forget the women, young and old, who lined the streets where his motorcade would pass, crowded the airports where his plane would land, darted out between motorcycles to grasp his hand, screamed and jumped at the sight of his wave and pledged their undying devotion to his election.

The registration of young women voters, on whom Kennedy could count, was unusually high, and in the election he did receive far more female votes than Adlai Stevenson had in 1952 and 1956. (Without this increase, Kennedy could not have won.) But surprising as it may seem to some, he did not receive a majority of the votes cast by women.

Surveys indicate that too many of the women who were for Kennedy in 1960 simply did not vote on election day. The surveys also indicate that the women who did vote for him were outnumbered by the older women (traditionally more conservative and more likely to be Republican) who voted for Nixon as Eisenhower's heir; and that women in general were more inclined than men to stick with the Republican ticket they had supported before and were more influenced than men (in the case of some Protestants) to heed anti-Catholic bias they heard in church.

The number of older women who listed themselves with opinion-poll questioners in 1960 as faithful Democrats but who nevertheless voted for Nixon is judged to have been, at least in part, a sign of lingering religious prejudice as well as lingering Eisenhower influence. In any event, it is further proof that good looks alone were not enough to capture the "women's vote" then—and no doubt are not enough to capture it now. Nixon today, still stressing assets other than his appearance, is running stronger among female voters than handsomer candidates Romney and Reagan.

During the course of John Kennedy's Presidency, as the religious issue waned and his leadership qualities became even more apparent, he gained the support of more and more women voters. Today, with a larger proportion of young women in the electorate and a sharper fear of an expanded war, women voters are a chief source of support in the opinion polls for John Kennedy's brother Robert. He is, in fact, one of those rare candidates whose strength among women voters, when tested against any opponent, proves substantially greater than among male voters.

As of this writing it seems almost certain that Robert Kennedy will not be a candidate for President in 1968 and that Lyndon Johnson will be. The year-end Gallup Poll showed Mr. Johnson's gen-

eral standing [illegible] among both men and women vot[illegible] But in spite of an appealing wife and a[n] unprecedented effort to appoint wome[n] to high federal office, the President['s] course with female members of the ele[c]torate has not run smooth.

In 1964 women voters supported M[r.] Johnson overwhelmingly, far more tha[n] they had Jack Kennedy, far more eve[n] than the male voters of 1964. Lynd[on] Johnson was in fact the first Democrati[c] candidate for President—at least sin[ce] Roosevelt—both to win a clear majori[ty] of women's votes and to do better wi[th] women than with men. But surveys ind[i]cate that this may have been not so muc[h] a deep attachment to Mr. Johnson as [a] reaction against Senator Barry Goldwat[er] and a fear of the latter's Vietnam polic[y]. In this context it would seem significa[nt] that President Johnson has run consisten[t]ly weaker among women voters tha[n] among men in recent years.

It must be kept in mind that, in ge[n]eral, women voters have been tending [to] vote Republican in slightly greater num[]bers than men. It is said that this [is] partly because they are naturally mo[re] conservative (both here and in other cou[n]tries), with a greater attachment to th[e] security, traditions and institutions of th[e] *status quo;* and partly (and more pro[b]ably) because women in some Democrat[ic] circles (Negroes, low-income, the Sout[h,] less-educated) are less likely to vote [on] election day than women in Republic[an] circles. Moreover, our female populatio[n] with its longer life expectancy, on th[e] whole is older than our male populatio[n] and older people are more likely to [be] Republican.

But conservatism is not extremis[m] and so in 1964 American women in lar[ge] numbers voted against Senator Goldwat[er.] Younger women in particular, who h[ad] previously considered themselves Repub[li]can but who had been wooed by John K[en]nedy, decided to become Democrats a[s a] result of the Arizona senator's nominati[on.]

Now many of these women give si[gns] of moving away from the Democrats agai[n.] But if Ronald Reagan—or Richard Nix[on] —becomes tagged as the rightful heir [to] the Goldwater mantle, any polls presen[tly] showing them as more popular amo[ng] women than men are likely to be revers[ed.]

In the past it has been thought th[at] women react more strongly than men o[nly] to certain "women's issues"—not to f[or]eign affairs but to domestic problems [in]volving the family, the home and t[he] schools. Polls indicate that there may [be] a grain of truth in this; women do sh[ow] more interest than do men in opinion-p[oll] questions regarding education—and t[he] average female-voter turnout invariably [in]creases whenever a state or local questi[on] on alcohol consumption is on the ball[ot.] Moreover, they are less interested in i[. . .]

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involving agriculture, highways, government spending, space programs and labor relations (except for teachers' strikes).

But contrary to popular belief, there is no consistent pattern to prove that men are any less concerned than women about housing, health, juvenile delinquency, crime in the streets or the high cost of groceries. Nor is there any evidence that women are less concerned than men about such issues as taxes, public welfare or civil rights. (It might be noted that on matters of race, women tend to be slightly more liberal than men in both the North and the South—possibly because of greater church influence or less job competition, but in any case this is true, particularly among younger women.)

None of these domestic issues, however, evokes a response today among women voters even closely comparable to that of war and peace, in Vietnam and the world. Whatever their party, whatever section of the country they come from, however they are grouped for research purposes, women voters for more than a year have consistently reacted more adversely than men to opinion-poll questions on escalating the war in Vietnam.

War in general, and the Vietnam war in particular, presents another of those rare instances in which the pattern of female attitudes is predictably different from that of men. Not drastically different—I am not suggesting that all or nearly all women oppose our course in Vietnam. But in poll after poll, in state after state, however the question is asked and whether national sentiment regarding the war is temporarily running high or low, inevitably a larger proportion of women than men expresses criticism of our present course, opposition to further escalation and support for early negotiations. Many women will answer with an "I don't know" to pollsters' questions about specific steps or solutions—but there can be no mistaking the general tenor of their position and its potential effect on this year's Presidential balloting. More women than men support the "peace candidacy" of Senator Eugene McCarthy.

Certainly neither party is going to forget that Senator Goldwater's chief handicap among female voters in 1964 was the Vietnam war and that it remains President Johnson's chief handicap among them today. And certainly neither party is going to forget that a large part of Eisenhower's lead among women voters in 1952 was the expectation that he would bring peace in Korea.

In short, the candidate in 1968 who chooses to address the local women's club on the perils of inflation instead of on the perils of Vietnam is doing so at his own peril.

All the foregoing observations and conclusions, for the reasons stated at the outset, as well as the very studies from which they were drawn, are subject to different interpretations. But one conclusion unfortunately is clear and undisputed on the basis of all the evidence: American women do not turn out to vote the way American men do.

This country has substantially more *potential* women voters than men voters; but even in Presidential elections substantially more men than women *actually* vote. Women, in fact, are more likely than men to tell interviewers that they do not plan to cast votes on election day. Those who say they will vote are apparently more likely than men to do as they said they would, but the number of women who do not vote is appallingly high.

It is not only appalling, but sad. If indeed there are certain issues that concern women deeply and on which they take a particular position—such as Vietnam, education and civil rights—election day is their day to show it. Every woman who fails to exercise her political right is failing her moral responsibility as well. She gives up her opportunity to participate in self-government, and she provides ammunition for those who say that it's a man's world. In addition, since there are more women than men in this country, their failure to turn out and vote reduces the national average turnout, which in comparison to that of many other Western democracies is inexcusably low.

With more women working in jobs or attending colleges that expose them to political discussion, with more women moving out of the rural and poverty-stricken areas where their political participation was not customary, with more laborsaving devices giving the housewife additional time for political study and activity, the tendency of women to avoid involvement in politics may be—and certainly should be—reversed. But this tendency is not being reversed fast enough.

I realize that it is particularly difficult for mothers of young children to find time to go to the polls. The statistics on their voting participation are especially low. But they are also the citizens who have a very special stake in the future. These young women have a very special concern in what happens to the struggle for peace, to the quality of our schools, to the relations between the races and to the future of the country their children will inherit.

It is an ironic fact that according to the surveys, certain groups of voters in this country turn out to cast ballots in great numbers despite a relative lack of interest and information, while young mothers, a high proportion of whom are actually registered and have a real sense of responsibility and involvement, stay home on election day. That contrast can only weaken the society in which the children of these young mothers will grow up.

Surveys tell us that females more often than males feel less able to cope with the complexities of politics and attach less significance to the importance of their individual vote. Surely neither of these conclusions is justified on the part of the modern American woman in the Presidential election of 1968.

This year the stakes are too high, the dangers too clear and the risks too great for any voter, man or woman, to fail to register and vote. THE END

DIALOGUE ON MARRIAGE

Continued from page 52

and necessary for a well-balanced life. They have listened to the lectures on the importance of being sure you are marrying the right person, someone you can live with all the rest of your life. They have been taught and they still believe that marriage should be for life.

Any solution at present is unsatisfactory. In states in which divorce is easy and cheap and does not demand an abhorrent resort to lying or defaming of character a couple can, of course, "just get married," with the tacit agreement on all sides that if it doesn't work, they can "just get a divorce." The more devoutly their parents believe that marriage is a sacrament and remarriage after divorce a sin, the more the parents may counsel a civil marriage—not so serious, socially more easily dissolved—in case it "doesn't work out." And many young people are taking this course—which is again a compromise and a concealment of their real intentions. They are accepting such a marriage as a real marriage, with the hidden proviso—in their own, their parents' and their friends' minds—that "if it doesn't work, we can always get a divorce."

Yet I do not see how the senior world of parents, teachers, preachers and counselors can give any other advice until the laws are changed. However much we respect the integrity of what the young people are asking for, there is no way we can give it to them, inside the law. We have seen the effects on the moral fiber of the country and the lawbreaking that came with the lack of belief in the Prohibition law, which was felt to be unfair and was therefore evaded. Lawbreaking by the lawless is a matter for better education and better police, but lawbreaking by resentful, normally law-abiding members of society can in the end bring the whole social order down.

I believe we have to say at present: If you want the experience of full-time companionship with someone you love—and this is what you should want, for it is the most satisfactory and fully responsible relationship—you had better get legally married, use contraceptives responsibly and risk divorce later. You are risking even more if you don't. THE END

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Close-up:

A TALK WITH THEODORE C. SORENSEN

"I want to keep Ted with me wherever I go in this campaign. You need somebody whom you can trust implicitly." This close relationship between President John F. Kennedy and Theodore C. Sorensen was born in January 1953, when the then freshman Senator from Massachusetts hired the 24-year-old Nebraskan—after two five-minute interviews—as his Number Two legislative aid.

Sorensen, as nearly everyone knows, stayed with Kennedy—writing speeches and generating ideas—all the way to the White House, where he became Special Counsel to the President. He was also somewhat of an anomaly on the New Frontier: he was not a Democrat, did not come from the East, had not gone to an Ivy League college, and developed no reputation for partygoing in the sophisticated Washington of the Kennedy years. Resigning in February 1964 (to the regret of President Lyndon Johnson, who hailed him as "my trusted counselor and adviser"), Sorensen set out to write *Kennedy*, the widely acclaimed account of his years with the late President.

Now a partner in the prestigious New York law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, Sorensen, drawing on his own experience, spends much of his time advising corporations on their relations with government. In this interview with DUN'S REVIEW Associate Editor John Berry, he discusses some of the pitfalls in dealing with Washington, and offers businessmen some valuable suggestions for overcoming them.

Mr. Sorensen, as a man who has been a firsthand witness to government-business relations—first in the Congress, then in the White House—would you list some broad trends that have evolved from that relationship during the past three Administrations?

Generally speaking, I have seen a maturing on both sides. I cannot speak for the Republican Administration, but I have noticed that some of the old clichés about malefactors of great wealth, which may have had some currency in previous Democratic Administrations, virtually disappeared under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. At the same time, there has been increasing recognition on the part of many business executives that the government is not out to crush private enterprise and that it is open to reason on issues affecting business.

But even with this improvement, can it be said that reason always prevails?

It's true that there is still a considerable amount of suspicion and misunderstanding on both sides. If I may interject a personal note, one of the reasons I undertook the practice of law was an appeal made to me by a senior lawyer that the business community needs persons who have some understanding of the federal government and who can build bridges of understanding between the private and public sectors.

Citing a classic case, do you think the clash between President Kennedy and Roger Blough in 1962 caused a setback in government-business relations?

I think there was a temporary setback in relations, just as I think there was a temporary setback in relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as a result of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. But I believe the missile crisis in the long run cleared the air and gave both the U.S. and the Soviet Union a better understanding of what a real war would be like and better grounds for working together. Similarly, I think the steel crisis caused both business and government to look at each other's policies and problems in a more realistic way and to work harder to avoid such crises in the future.

Although much has been said about business and the Executive Branch, what about business' relations with the Legislative Branch?

Too many executives still have a very naive notion about how and why Congress, Congressional committees and individual Congressmen operate the way they do. Some spend large sums of money to retain supposedly well-connected lobbyists and to wine and dine a Congressman—who would probably rather be at home. Many underestimate—indeed dismiss—the possibilities of help or understanding from a Congress, a committee or a legislator with a different political point of view from their own. Still others seek intervention from the Executive Branch—whose intrusion may well be resented—or rely entirely on a trade association or national business organization whose spokesmen are often discounted.

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

Sorensen meets the press at a party to introduce his book on John F. Kennedy

There are any number of steps too often overlooked, among them: personal presence and presentation in Washington by corporation executives; constructive, realistic alternatives to proposed bills; and personal understanding of Congressional moods and activities with the help of outside counsel or consultants.

How can the small corporation make itself heard in Washington?

A small corporation rarely needs a full-time Washington office or lobbyist. The small businessman contacting his own Congressman and Senator is often his own best advocate.

Would not business be more effective and constructive in the role of loyal opposition to economic policies of the overwhelmingly Democratic Administration? Has it, in fact, fulfilled this role?

I would not assume that the business of the opposition is solely to oppose. It is required to come up with some constructive alternatives, some creative solutions of its own, some reasonable compromises. Many businessmen are doing just that. Too many still simply take a negative stand on everything, but hopefully their numbers will dwindle.

There is always talk of revamping governmental functions. What agencies, bureaus or departments could be streamlined to the mutual benefit of both government and business?

We should not rely on government reorganizations to achieve miracles. They matter comparatively little. What matters most to a businessman, indeed to any citizen, is the policy that is adopted by a particular department and the people who are running it. Businessmen, to be sure, have a particular interest in the Department of Commerce. That department today certainly is an unwieldy conglomeration of agencies and bureaus; no doubt its strengthening would better serve business. The creation of a Department of Transportation may well improve the efficient handling of those particular problems. But nearly every department and agency affects some business group, and it would be hard to single out any one for improvement.

You say that you put little faith in reorganization. What do you mean?

You asked what departments need to be streamlined. No doubt every department offers room for some streamlining, some reorganization, some improvement in its procedures and structure. But these offer fairly minor benefits compared with change in policy, personnel and channels of communication.

Does the fact that John Macy Jr. of the U.S. Civil Service has been hiring so many businessmen indicate a larger role for them in government?

I don't think that businessmen in government is a particularly new departure. They were serving in the Roosevelt Administration, and I'm sure in earlier Administrations as well. But I hope they will serve for still longer periods. Presently the talk is about a businessman going to Washington for a few years. I would like to see them stay for whatever time the successful completion of their particular public task requires.

In your opinion, will a curtailing of the inflation, accompanied by an easing of the boom, signal a change in the existing cordiality between the White House and industry?

No, I don't think so. Of course, it's impossible to generalize about all business and all businessmen. There are some who have not been friendly to government in fair weather, and others who may be friendly only in fair weather—particularly if new curbs on inflation apply directly to them. But businessmen increasingly seem to understand the problems that face the President of the United States, whoever he might be at any given time. I think that more and more businessmen will be able to work with the White House and the Administration in helping to formulate responsible proposals that are acceptable as a basis for talking by both sides instead of simply fighting everything and everyone.

Finally, Mr. Sorensen, could we turn briefly to business and its role in foreign relations, particularly in Latin America? Keeping in mind that 40% of U.S. business' foreign investments is in that sector of the world, do you think it can survive the drastic changes that are occurring and will occur in Latin America?

In the long run I think that most Latin American governments will welcome the infusion of capital and managerial and technical know-how that American business is equipped to provide, and that American business, at the same time, will recognize that it must conduct itself in a responsible fashion, avoiding any taint of exploitation or special privilege.

In your opinion, is the much heralded Alliance for Progress working? Many critics of the Alliance say it could be strengthened by private enterprise.

It is working slowly but that is not surprising. A vast underdeveloped continent neglected for a generation or more cannot be expected to build modern economic and political institutions without a long and difficult struggle. Private enterprise has already made a significant contribution to the Alliance. I hope those who are criticizing are willing to agree to a lowering of U.S. tariff barriers, to grant fair wages and working conditions to their Latin American employees and to subject their holdings to the land-reform proposals of the Latin American governments. -END

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Saturday Review

October 4, 1969

The View from Allenby Bridge

A Report from the Middle East

by THEODORE C. SORENSEN

The Allenby Bridge is not much of a bridge. The old structure was bombed into the River Jordan during the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War of 1967, and a rude wooden span now crosses in its place. In fact, the River Jordan is not much of a river at that point, however great its tide in biblical times. Certainly the volume of water was insufficient to offset the heat and dust that pervaded the valley last August when our car approached the bridge from the Israeli side, having cleared the last of the military check points. The American Consul from Jerusalem, who had arranged for our trip into the Kingdom of Jordan and back with his counterpart in Amman, chose the only available shade as the most logical place to park. It was provided at the foot of the bridge by a small tree that had somehow survived the ravages of war and climate. "Move the car, please," came a voice from behind us. "You are in the line of fire."

Looking back, we saw an Israeli pillbox with machine gun and mortar pointed across the bridge at a Jordanian outpost that had similar guns pointed in our direction. It would have been an awkward moment for war to break out. We moved and stood waiting in the silent sunlight. "You may go to the middle of the bridge but no farther," said the Israeli officer. "Take care." Finally the car from the American Embassy in Amman appeared, its passenger walked to the middle of the bridge (but no farther) with the necessary papers, and—feeling a little like two prisoners being exchanged—my wife and I were handed over to his care.

There was tension at that bridge—tension, danger, hostility, occasional incidents (I was told), and yet no real war. No real war and no real peace and no real likelihood of either for some time to come. That is the situation that prevails in the Middle East today and is likely, in my view, to prevail for a considerable period. Recent escalations in the number and nature of incidents—bombings, hijackings, guerrilla raids, reprisals, and the like—have given rise to speculation about the imminence of all-out war; and one can at least hope that there may again be lulls in the conflict that will give rise to new hopes for peace. But in my recent talks in Jordan and Israel I found little reason to believe that either a full-scale war or a final treaty of peace is very close at hand.

I carried no secret messages either way across the Allenby Bridge. In Israel on a private visit with my family, I worked into our sight-seeing schedule a series of appointments with government and military leaders in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Desirous of hearing both sides, I requested an appointment with Jordan's King Hussein, which he generously granted. I asked Golda Meir, Israel's grandmotherly but firm-spoken Prime Minister, whether she wished me to convey any thoughts to His Majesty. "Tell him," she replied with a smile, "that Israel is his best friend in the Middle East." That was the only message I carried. (I refrained out of deference to his office from pointing out that her observation was true—that his costly entry into the six-day war had been the result of Nasser's deceiving him, that the Syrian troops entering his country were a threat to his sovereignty, and that his other Arab neighbors were helping arm and subsidize Fedayeen guerrilla groups, such as the Fatah, whose growing power in Jordan had undercut his command and whose futile attacks on Israeli settlements had brought about damaging reprisals.) The King also smiled when I delivered Mrs. Meir's message, but his smile seemed tired and wan. "Some people say," he replied, "that I am one of Israel's best friends in the Middle East."

This also was true. That by itself says very little, considering the atti-

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tude of most other Arab countries toward Israel. But it seemed to me that Hussein, a nice little man who looks like a despondent Thomas E. Dewey, genuinely wished he could have peace with Israel and would be willing to recognize its sovereignty and permanent existence. He told me of his admiration for the country and its accomplishments. He resorted to none of the customary Arab rhetoric about reconquering lost territories and pushing Israel into the sea.

He could not, however, make any move toward peace. Any settlement must be an all-Arab settlement, he told me, not piecemeal—a logical position but one that doomed the prospects for any early solution in view of the continued Egyptian and Syrian calls for war. Nasser, he thought, was talking in private more reasonably than ever. But, unfortunately, that was before the small yet tragic fire in the Mosque of Al Aksa in Jerusalem—apparently set by a fanatic member of a Christian sect—gave Nasser an opportunity to renew his cry for a holy war. (It would be well, nevertheless, for both Israelis and Americans to bear in mind that the traditional penchant of Arab leaders for emotional exaggeration, while undoubtedly adding to the tensions and expectations on both sides in the Middle East, is not always the prelude to an Arab invasion that it appears to be.)

King Hussein had other reasons for not going to the peace table alone. Since the Six-Day War, as many as half the inhabitants of his kingdom have been either refugees from territory that is now within Israel or Jordanians with ties to what was formerly Palestine. The so-called Palestinian Arabs—bitter that their land, rightly or wrongly, became a part of a new Jewish state more than twenty years ago—will remain a dangerously independent political power in the Middle East until some equitable means can be found to permanently resettle and compensate them. Their hatred for the Israelis has been stirred over the years not only by Radio Cairo but also by local agitators thriving in the hot, overcrowded atmosphere of idleness and despair in which the Egyptian and Jordanian governments have deliberately left the refugee camps. Whatever the Arab heads of state demand of Israel by way of land and blood, the Palestinian Arab leaders demand more. The refugees are the chief source of manpower for the various irregular guerrilla units. Fedayeen leaders are the heroes of the refugee camps.

The Fatah, Palestine Liberation Front, and other Fedayeen groups are not secret, illegal organizations. On the road to Amman and in the city I saw them everywhere, dressed more raggedly than the Jordanian Army but equally well armed. "I must know, in advance of any peace talks," King Hussein told me, "that I would not come back empty-handed." He did not need to spell out the internal turmoil that would rack his country, and very possibly threaten his throne or even his life, if he agreed to a settlement that was unacceptable to his populace. He has not forgotten that his grandfather, King Abdullah, was assassinated, reportedly for talking compromise with the Israelis.

On the basis of my talks with Israel's leaders and their references to possible concessions to Jordan—giving it a much needed corridor to the Mediterranean, returning to it at least those sectors on the west bank of the Jordan River that were heavily inhabited by Arabs, working out some arrangement on Jerusalem that would protect the access and rights of all—I sought to reassure the King that he would not return empty-handed. The Israelis, I told him, do not want 1,500,000 Arabs inside their borders with only 2,500,000 Jews. I quoted Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon's statement to me: "We do not want territory; we want security." I also expressed concern, in light of the history of past conflicts, that this attitude of compromise in Israel would not endure through many more years of struggle—just as extremists would grow in power in the Arab world the longer the conflict continued without resolution.

"Whatever the Arab heads of state demand of Israel by way of land and blood, the Palestinian Arab leaders demand more."

But King Hussein remained unconvinced. His reading of the Western as well as the Arab press had persuaded him that the Israelis were interested only in his abject surrender (just as the Israeli people had heard little of *his* willingness to compromise). "Such a conference would not be a peace table," he insisted, "it would be a table of capitulation." He had searched in vain for some tangible sign that he would gain some concession, he said. Instead, he kept repeating, Israel had not even accepted the U.N. resolution on a Mideast peace settlement. In fact, Israel, like the Arab states, had accepted in principle the terms of that resolution. But no one pretended that it offered a very precise mandate in the absence of more specific negotiations.

Hussein struck me as a sincere and articulate advocate of his country's position, extremely moderate and soft-spoken in our conversation, but never able to forget that a large portion of his budget is now supplied by the oil-rich governments of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait, which delight in hiring someone else to fight Israel for them. The more Israeli reprisals impaired his national economy, the more he was forced to rely on his militant neighbors for assistance. At the same time, those neighbors, along with the Soviet Union, were bypassing his government and his army to supply money and arms to the guerrillas who provoked those same costly reprisals.

The previous day I had visited a kibbutz across the Jordan River in a sector that had been subjected to constant Fedayeen attacks. The children slept in bomb shelters every night. A network of tunnels and trenches had been built into this agricultural settlement where Arabs and Jews once worked side by side. The settlers, weary of the indiscriminate shelling that interfered with their harvest and frightened their women and children, had urged the Israeli government to seize that portion of Jordan that served as a staging ground for those attacks. If that were politically impossible, they wanted the Israeli army to raid and remove the guerrilla camp. But the number of guerrillas was small, their mobile weapons were concealed from the air, and the Israeli chief of staff had concluded, for the present, that the temporary gains to be achieved by such a raid would not outweigh the two or three lives that it would surely cost his forces. Israeli aircraft have made clear that every guerrilla operation would bring a reprisal, confined to Fedayeen targets to the extent possible, but recognizing that regular Jordanian Army guns had often joined in, supplied cover for, or even initiated the shelling and other operations.

I urged the King to break this vicious circle by preventing the Fedayeen attacks. Some weeks earlier, through the American Embassy, he had secretly promised to halt them if the Israelis would forego interfering with repairs on the East Ghor irrigation canal. What appeared to be a temporary lull followed, but soon the guerrilla raids mounted again and the canal was put out of action again. His own kingdom, I told Hussein, was the net loser from the activities of the Fedayeen. He replied with a shrug: "I cannot control the Fedayeen. The Israelis created the Fedayeen." It was a sad admission

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from a sovereign leader of a gaping hole in his power, but the strength and popularity of the guerrilla groups had become so great that only his army could curb them and that would have been politically unacceptable.

"How, then, will it all end?" I asked him, for he had acknowledged that the present course could not lead to a settlement. "I don't know, sir," he replied gravely. I felt sorry for him in many ways. The brave little king in the heavily guarded palace was no longer master of his fate, much less his state. He could only sit and wait, hoping to survive, hoping that some outside source or unpredictable force—the United States, or the United Nations, or another great power, or a modern Saladin, or Allah Himself—something, someone, somehow—would come along and bail him out. Surely it is an unusual event in military history for the losing nations to refuse to meet with the victors, but it is also unusual for the governments who presided over such a loss to remain in power long thereafter. The present Arab governments are understandably fearful that they would be risking their political positions at home if they publicly acknowledged defeat by sitting down to talk terms with the Israelis they have refused to recognize.

Two days before my meeting with King Hussein, I had put the same question to Golda Meir: "How, then, will it all end?" She, too, acknowledged that the present course of raids and reprisals was not conducive to a settlement. Her government used military power to make clear to the Arabs that a new war would be futile, but that was no substitute for negotiations. The Big Four talks initiated this year by the United States had merely halted what little progress U.N. mediator Gunart Jarring had been able to eke out—without making any new progress of their own. The Soviet Union in these talks merely acted as Nasser's lawyer, said Mrs. Meir, and the lawyer takes instructions from his client. Yet she did not wholly despair. "At least we know one thing," she said in answer to my question. "It can only end in peace."

Perhaps her view was unduly optimistic. Perhaps one more giant paroxysm will be required before the Arabs realize that they have no choice but to accept in their midst a permanent Israel with secure boundaries and sovereign rights. Perhaps Egypt's Nasser, recognizing that his hope of harassing Israel into withdrawing without negotiations is surely doomed, will feel obligated by history, politics—and his own self-proclaimed role as leader of not only the Middle East but also the entire Arab and Moslem worlds—to attempt some dramatic act, such as recapturing the east bank of the Suez Canal.

But logic and caution have played a greater role in the actions, if not the words, of Arab leaders ever since the humiliation of the Six-Day War. For the combined armed might of the Arab world to be defeated once again by a nation less populous than the city of Cairo alone would be, they realize, a disaster. The Soviet Union has rearmed the Arab nations to their 1967 prewar levels, trained their personnel and encouraged their defiance. But Moscow's leaders can hardly be enthusiastic about the prospects of another all-out war in which their expensive equipment would once again be captured, abandoned, or destroyed, their protégés routed, and their own standing impaired for having failed to intervene in force. The Kremlin bosses like it the way it is—no real war in the Middle East that might suck in other nations, and no real peace that might lessen Arab dependence upon them.

The Israelis do not like it the way it is. The Arab attempt to wage a war of attrition has not worn them down, but its weekly toll of lives, however small in terms of other wars, is large in a tiny nation that sanctifies human life. A vast proportion of Israel's population is serving in the armed forces; too much of its economy is committed to wartime mobilization; and the tensions produced by a necessary preoccupation with security are inevitably fatiguing. Israel wants peace and is more willing to compromise than some public statements from her leaders have implied. "We are prepared," Mrs. Meir told me," to go to the conference table tomorrow without any lines drawn on a map, without any preconditions whatsoever."

But that conference will not be convened tomorrow, and Israel can afford to wait, as unpleasant as it is. Time, the little nation feels, is on its side. Sitting behind the Suez Canal and Sinai Desert to the west and the Jordan River to the east, its cities no longer live in daily fear of a sudden successful air raid or blitzkreig. ("The Jordan River," said an Israeli leader, "is no longer much of a river—but as a tank barrier it is very helpful.") Israel will not permit the Arabs to gain control of the air, nor will it permit them to miscalculate their strength by conducting intermittent attacks with impunity. By demonstrating an ability to retaliate at will, Israel makes clear to the Arabs that they could not win the next war. But no matter how numerous, well trained, and well equipped the enemy becomes, Jerusalem's military leaders told me, Israel will never again be driven by fear into striking an all-out pre-emptive blow. Its fighting men are superior because they fight not out of religious or national hatred but out of concern for the survival of their families and nation. Its population, despite the casualties and the tension, has been infused since the 1967 war with a spirit of determination and a sense of permanence unlike anything they had before. The Israelis are suffering, but they are not complaining. They can wait.

How long can her Arab neighbors wait? Arms from the Soviet Union and subsidies from their wealthier colleagues are poor substitutes for the boost to their economies that peace and disarmament would make possible. Growing pressures of increasing populations are adding to their handicaps. The longer the Suez Canal remains closed, the longer the Western

(*Continued on page 66*)

"I suppose you can only be awakened with a kiss."

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Continued from page 25

maritime nations learn to do without it, much to Egypt's despair. Each day that goes by without either an Arab military victory or a restoration of their lost territories adds to the questions in the minds of the Arab people about what their leaders have been telling them. Some day—perhaps after another war, perhaps after one or more changes in government, perhaps next month or next year or in the next decade or even century—the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and other Arab nations will agree to seek a peaceful accommodation with Israel.

There are only three kinds of accommodation: 1) forcing Israel back to all the pre-1967 borders that bred constant terror and tension, an alternative which Israel can never accept; 2) permitting Israel to retain all the Arab territory she occupied in the Six-Day War, an alternative that the Arabs can never accept; and 3) effecting a compromise peace treaty hammered out by both sides on the basis of present realities and future self-interests.

Fomulating such a treaty will not be easy. Nothing in the Middle East will ever be easy. But the present cycle of raids and reprisals, acceleration and escalation, attack and counterattacks surely makes life harder for both sides than would the acceptance of a final peace treaty that gives neither side all that it asks. Israel may hold the strategic military cards now but those cards offer security rather than solace. "Our real prayer," Yigal Allon told me, "is not to win the next Middle East war but to avert it." His prayer should be reflected in our own.

WIT TWISTER #133

Edited by ARTHUR SWAN

The object of the game is to complete the poem by thinking of one word whose letters, when rearranged, will yield the appropriate word for each series of blanks. Each dash within a blank corresponds to a letter of the word.

The lamb that _ _ _ _ _ _
and stops to rest
Beside the _ _ _ _ _ _
with four others
Will by our _ _ _ _ _ _
cooks be dressed
To grace our _ _ _ _ _ _
with his brothers.

—A. S.

(*Answer on page* 81)

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escalation. Also we must make it clear to the enemy that we have the staying power—we're willing to continue for thirty years—and that we happen to be richer and more powerful.

"*Q.* Why do you oppose a greater American effort?

"*A.* By our escalating the war and simultaneous hustling around searching for peaceful formulas, we produce only one effect: We convince the other side that we're impatient and have no staying power.

"*Q.* In this present situation in Vietnam, would you attempt to lead the other side to de-escalate, perhaps by stopping our bombing of the North?

"*A.* No, because *some* bombing of the North, I think, is desirable simply as a form not only of payment for North Vietnam's involvement in the South, which is quite deliberate, but also for military logistical reasons. There's no doubt that bombing does interfere with the enemy's efforts.

"*Q.* You said you would oppose sending in 1.5 million Americans because Vietnam is not worth that cost. Why do you oppose pulling out of Vietnam entirely?

"*A.* I don't think a country like the United States can commit itself to the extent it has, and 'chicken out.' The consequence of getting out would be far more costly than the expense of staying in." ("U.S. Will Be Involved for Rest of Century," *U.S. News & World Report,* Feb. 26, 1968)

A former aide to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson:

Theodore C. Sorensen

"We are in a box in Vietnam—a six-sided box we did not intend to make and cannot seem to break. Briefly, those six sides can be summed up in three sentences: Our worldwide military primacy cannot produce a victory and our worldwide political primacy cannot permit a withdrawal. We are unable to transfer our will to the South Vietnamese and unable to break the will of the North Vietnamese. Any serious escalation would risk Chinese or Soviet intervention and any serious negotiation would risk a Communist South Vietnam.

"First . . . we have made Vietnam a test of our word and our will; and we cannot simply abandon that commitment without incurring unacceptable injury to our interest all over the globe . . . this is not simply a matter of pride or prestige; it is a reality of responsibility. . . .

"Second . . . to use the plenary power of our military might . . . would require Peking and Moscow to make good on their own commitments to Hanoi. . . . Neither could afford to accept a military victory for what they would regard as capitalist aggression on China's very borders. . . .

"Third, our Vietcong and North Vietnamese adversaries refuse to accept or even contemplate defeat . . . (and) have captured for themselves the banner of Vietnamese Nationalism. . . .

"The fourth side of the box is our inherent inability to implant democracy in another country, integrity in their government, initiative in their military and enthusiastic support in their populace. . . .

"Fifth is our demonstrated inability to employ our clear-cut military superiority with sufficiently conclusive results to save South Viet-

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nam without destroying it and to force North Vietnam to the bargaining table....

"The sixth and final side of the box is the impossibility of any negotiations that will not assure both American withdrawal from the scene and full Vietcong participation in any postwar elections and government . . . very possibly leading to a Communist-dominated government.

"That box begins to look more and more like a coffin for American hopes and ideals. . . .

"The basic question . . . is whether we stay in this box, sending more troops to fight more battles in more territories for many more years or whether we choose instead to attempt to break out through whichever side we believe contains the least unacceptable risks. . . .

"What then would I recommend? It is far easier to complain about both the Asian flu and the impotence of all of the various remedies than to find a cure. But at least we can minimize the damage to our own body when we have the flu and minimize the danger of spreading it to others. We can, in Vietnam, restrict our effort and commitment to emphasize the protection of South Vietnamese civilians instead of assaults on enemy forces. We can do more to avoid the destruction of the country and culture we are there to save. We can end the bombing of the North, not because Hanoi demands it, but because its limited effectiveness has not proven to be worth its cost in American resources in world opinion. We can pursue unconditional talks with all parties, including the National Liberation Front, with the same ingenuity and relentless consistency with which we have prosecuted the war.

"We can encourage the rise of independent political forces in the South capable of sustaining both peace negotiations and a coalition government with the N.L.F. We can make more clear to the other side that we are not determined upon either their destruction or our control of the South's future. We can hope that our de-escalation will be matched by theirs but modify ours, regardless of their reaction, to a level that can be indefinitely maintained at less cost and less risk until a reasonable settlement is possible. . . .

"Our sacrifices would not have been in vain—for we would have prevented a Communist military conquest, preserved South Vietnam's very existence and entrusted its future to an electoral majority instead of an armed minority.

"That, in this day and age, is all the victory one should ask." (Remarks, Conference on Vietnam, American Jewish Congress, New York, N. Y., Mar. 3, 1968)

WILL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE USED?

The defense correspondent of The Times *(London):*

Charles Douglas-Home

"If Khesanh was in danger of being overrun by the North Vietnamese army would the United States use nuclear weapons to retrieve the situation? The official Washington reaction to this question has been that the President has not considered such a suggestion and because no such decision could be taken by anybody else but the President *ipso*

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The Importance of Being Civil

"SO LET US BEGIN anew," said John Kennedy in his Inaugural plea for peace, "remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness. . . ."

Many of those heartfelt injunctions to "both sides" seem lost or forgotten today. Indeed that snowy Inaugural Day, that speech, that new age of poetry and power which they inaugurated, all seem longer ago than they truly were. But few of the phrases which summoned an entire people at that hour are more frequently forgotten today than President Kennedy's request for "civility" in foreign policy.

The Red Chinese, whatever their claim to seniority in civilization, were uncivil in their comments on that speech and have remained uncivil in rejecting every twig of an olive branch since offered. Soviet leaders, although at least not resorting to the shoe-banging pyrotechnics of an earlier day, have re-escalated the Cold War rhetoric of insinuation and insult. (Fortunately for the Western world, the Soviets and Chinese save their choicest examples of vituperation for each other.)

Diplomatic discourtesy is not confined to large and powerful nations. One need only note the incessant harangues of almost any Albanian or North Korean spokesman. Nor is it confined to Communist states. Delegates from African nations regularly walk out on speakers, speeches, or even discussions of which they disapprove. Arab and Israeli leaders boycott each other to an extreme that is best summed up by Sam Goldwyn's alleged advice regarding movie critics: "Don't pay any attention to them—don't even ignore them." Somehow nearly every nation, large and small, seems to find it necessary to ignore, insult, or indict with harsh tongue some other nation, large or small.

Unfortunately, our own country has not been free from incivility in diplomatic word and deed. Indeed, the acceleration of events in Vietnam seems to have heightened our tendencies in this respect. War is war, it is said, and the enemy is the enemy. But are our war aims advanced by the sweeping rhetoric of denunciation? Will our willingness to enter serious negotiations be believed if the enemy feels we are capable of treating him only with contempt?

Nor is our conduct only a matter of the Vietnamese war. No doubt it is protocol to return to the East German regime a note on disarmament we would not deign to open—or to exclude the Cuban, Albanian, and Mongolian U.N. delegates from a White House reception, stating as grounds the fact that we had no diplomatic relations with them, but nevertheless inviting the Brazzaville, Congo delegate, whose government was not recognized then, either. No doubt it is accepted diplomatic practice for American ambassadors to walk out on offensive speeches delivered by spokesmen for our adversaries. But should not protocol and diplomacy in modern times take into account what is potentially tension-reducing or tension-building as well as what is formally and traditionally correct? Would civility in any of these cases be seriously regarded as a sign of weakness?

No nation on earth is stronger than the United States. We would demonstrate our confidence in that strength, in my view, by refusing to stoop to the petty discourtesies required by traditional diplomatic practices and protocol. If we feel our case is weak or shameful, let us change it. But if we are proud of our course and our convictions—if we are immune to threats and abuse—then surely we have no need to fear any kind of contact or communication on any subject with anybody, anywhere, any time. Responding to discourtesy with more discourtesy may demonstrate our disagreement or our displeasure—but it is hardly a display of our self-assurance.

THE problem is not confined to the Department of State. The Mayor of New York, with obviously political motives, felt compelled to snub the King of Saudi Arabia upon the latter's visit to New York. Later, in massive retaliation, twelve Islamic Chiefs of Mission boycotted the Mayor's dinner dance for U.N. delegates. The AFL-CIO representatives to the International Labor Organization boycotted its sessions when a Communist president was chosen. No doubt the State Department deplored these and similar actions—but its own example makes removal of the mote from other eyes more difficult.

Before liberal and intellectual critics nod too quickly in agreement let them consider the discourtesies practiced in their own ranks. For students and faculty members to walk out on a distinguished commencement speaker is the height of rudeness, whatever their disagreement with his policies. For anti-war demonstrators to interrupt the President of the United States with chanting or heckling, or to smear his motorcade with paint, is a demonstration not of their pacifistic zeal but of their militant bad manners. (It is also the kind of act that encourages among extremists of every shade a disrespect for the office of the Presidency, and this can create an atmosphere in which an uglier violence can be—and has been—bred.)

If any faction within the anti-Vietnam movement is so lacking in logical appeal that its members must resort to intolerance, insults, and illegality, then that faction deserves to be ignored. If, on the other hand, its members can respect the rights and views of others, and seek an orderly change through reasoned appeals to the majority, then their cause and their spokesmen are more likely to earn similar respect. To be sure, there would still be no guarantee that their views—or those of any group in a free society—would prevail. But a show of civility would not be a sign of weakness.

—THEODORE C. SORENSEN.

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

I hold every man a debtor to his profession; from the which as men of course do seek to receive countenance and profit, so ought they of duty to endeavor themselves by way of amends to be a help and ornament thereunto. FRANCIS BACON

BOOKSELLERS' STAKE IN INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM

In three speeches at the ABA convention, booksellers were alerted to the ways in which they may be injured—and their service to citizens impaired —by new trends against intellectual freedom.

Both Dr. Mason Gross, president of Rutgers and chairman of the National Book Committee, and Theodore Sorensen, author and former aide to President Kennedy, made the case with frightening clarity (*PW*, June 9, and page 41 this issue). In addition, legal threats, coming about because of a wave of public anger against pornography, were defined by Alan Suits, Michigan paperback wholesaler (page 49).

We are entering an era when, on many fronts, Americans who believe in an open society and a free market for ideas are being forced into a defensive position. Some of the things Ted Sorensen said provided ammunition for the fight that may now be starting. In addition to what is quoted on page 41, he said, in part:

"The book business needs only one assurance to flourish anywhere in the world, and that is the assurance of intellectual freedom. Books can be successfully written, published and sold wherever they can be freely purchased, debated and read—but nowhere else. Throughout history and throughout the world, liberty and literature, therefore, have inevitably risen and fallen together. Where intellectual freedom dies, the book business dies. Whenever such labels as blasphemy or heresy or sedition have been applied to the written and spoken word, or whenever the pressures of public officials or public opinion have sought to stifle voices that are unorthodox or unpopular or uncomfortable, or whenever the guarantees of free speech and free press are imparted only to Truth with a capital 'T' and are witheld from Error with a capital 'E,' then in those lands and at those times, authors become either flunkeys or fugitives. Publishers are either overcontrolled or underground. And those booksellers who survive are forced to operate without pride, if not profit.

"For that reason, the American book industry has always been in the forefront of the fight against any threat, public or private, official or personal, to intellectual freedom in this country.

"The book publishers and booksellers must always be especially wary of any effort to prescribe or proscribe what is acceptable, what is debatable, and what is printable in the world of ideas and ideology. When freedom of expression is threatened anywhere in America, the members of your industry have a special obligation to respond, for the liberty you save may be your own."

Disruption of free expression on the campus, Mr. Sorensen emphasized, is closely linked to the freedom of publishing and bookselling. "Freedom cannot flourish in an atmosphere of fear created by the burning of crosses or the bearing of arms, by policemen indiscriminately swinging nightsticks or by vandals ransacking files . . . . If we allow freedom of expression to be curbed in the universities, then I warn you that the book industry may be next."

The strong support that censors may readily muster from the public was dramatized by Mr. Sorensen when he cited a recent California opinion poll in which 57% of the voters sampled said "that professors who advocate controversial ideas have no place in a publicly supported university."

Many Americans have too little grounding in the necessity for intellectual freedom. Bookmen, as Mr. Sorensen said, must be quick "to stand up and object against any encroachment" upon it. *C.B.G.*

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Who Are the Isolationists?

THERE is a growing tendency among those who developed or defended the Americanization of the Vietnamese war to label their critics as "isolationists." Unless we are prepared to take the same stand and the same policy in future Vietnams, they say, we will return the United States to the dangerous ostrich-like position it occupied when the Second World War was first brewing. The coming "Great Debate" on U.S. foreign policy foreseen by Secretary of State Dean Rusk should heighten this issue, as he suggests; but it will not do so if isolationism is projected as the only alternative to Vietnam-type interventionism, as he seems to imply.

To be sure, critics of our policy in Vietnam have been called worse things than "isolationists." But this is more than a question of labels. Many of us share the Secretary's opposition to a return to isolationism. We know America cannot afford to be alone--politically, militarily, or economically alone—in a world dominated by hostile interests. Nor can we in good faith abandon those obligations to the community of nations which our national power, wealth, and conscience, as well as our national interests impose upon us. We need allies in this world. We need friends. We need respect. And our past policy of escalation in Vietnam hurt far more than it helped in this regard.

If the new Administration insists on a hard line in Paris, seeking at the negotiating table what could not be won on the battlefield—if the new President believes, as some have written, that Vietnam, like Korea, can be settled with the threat to unleash our nuclear weapons—if disappointment and impatience lead to a renewal of the bombing of the North, or an increase in the bombing of Laos and Cambodia, or a new American thrust somewhere else in the world—America will truly be isolated in the worst possible way.

Those who advocate a policy of "no more Vietnams" do not thereby deserve the label of isolationists. They are responsible realists who recognize the practical limitations of our military and diplomatic power. They realize that we our way upon other peoples. They w... us to lead by the force of example, not force of arms, by emphasizing multilateral instead of national solutions, and non-military instead of military means. That is not isolationism.

On the other hand, those who developed or now defend these past few years of America's policy in Vietnam—who look upon our role as that of world policeman and who advocate a hard line in the Paris talks today—these are the real isolationists.

Already, escalating the hot war in Vietnam, and the cold war in general, have cost us heavily in terms of international prestige and respect. They have diminished the attention and assistance we have been able to give to the Atlantic alliance, to the Alliance for Progress, and to other key spots around the globe. They have helped to build unnecessary economic barriers between ourselves and the rest of the world.

Because of the war in Vietnam, and its effects on our budget, our economy, our international accounts, and our outflow of gold, we have witnessed unprecedented controls on the overseas investments of American corporations, unsuccessful restraints on American tourism abroad, and a revival of high tariff protectionist sentiment in the Congress.

Because of the war in Vietnam, United States trade in non-strategic goods with Eastern Europe has continued at a pitifully low level, limiting our influence in the evolution of that region.

Because of the war in Vietnam, our Government has been unable and unwilling to assist those less affluent parts of the world whose freedom of choice is threatened by chaos, and equally unable and unwilling to apply sufficient resources at home to the mammoth tasks of ending the shocking conditions of urban deprivation and discrimination which are more responsible than anything else for the worsening of our image around the world.

Because of the war in Vietnam, finally, we have handicapped our nation's prospects for new agreements on disarmament with the Soviet Union, a new approach to Mao's China, and new steps toward a world of law instead of despair.

In short, the dangers of a trend toward isolationism in American foreign policy are very real. But they have been brought on less by doves than by hawks—by those whose responses to the challenge of Communism still assume that American omnipotence and omniscience require our omnipresence—by those, finally, who may have forgotten that this nation was founded by men mindful of their obligations to pay "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind."

—THEODORE C. SORENSEN.



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RFK: A Personal Memoir

"A beautiful life—so unfairly brief but so incredibly full."

By THEODORE C. SORENSEN

TO begin with, Robert Kennedy is dead. No words can alter that unalterable fact. No tears can console our inconsolable grief, and no monument or memorial can replace that irreplaceable figure whose leadership and laughter and love of fellow man are now lost.

Thus it is hard for those of us who loved and looked to him to expose our wounds with words before time has crusted them over just a little. But much of what *is* being spoken and written today revolves around Robert Kennedy's death; and we shall only be multiplying the tragedy of that mindless, senseless act if *our* memories do not revolve around his life.

It is not his death but his life that speaks volumes against the folly and futility of violence. If his spirit now cries out to us to halt, it calls upon us to halt not merely the unlimited sale of guns, but the unlimited killing of men, whether it is done in defiance of the law or in the name of the law, by an assassin or by a nation. And to urge in his name repressive anti-crime legislation which he opposed is to turn tragedy into travesty.

Oh yes, much will be said and written about his death. Let *us* honor and remember his life. It was a beautiful life—so unfairly brief but so incredibly full, marked by sorrow but overflowing with joy, too short to do all that he wanted to do, but long enough to leave more lasting legacies to all mankind than a legion of lesser men could have achieved at twice his age. It was a meaningful life—blessed with the love of a wonderful wife and children, enriched by the shining example of a brother whom he loved and served and helped make great.

And yet, for such a public man, it was a surprisingly private life. He was adored by millions, excoriated by thousands, but known, truly known, by very, very few. Those who saw only the toughness of his hide could not have believed the tenderness of his heart. Those who marveled at the majesty of his public presence could not have understood the modesty of his private thoughts. It would surprise those critics who spoke so stupidly about his ruthlessness to know that in fact, in the poet's words, "His life was so gentle, and the elements so mixed in him, that nature might stand on its feet and say to all the world: this blur the picture. Because his foes tried to picture him as tough, ambitious and relentless, we tried to say that he was not. But he was--tough enough to withstand those slings and arrows of misfortune and malice that have driven other men from the field, ambitious enough to increase his contribution to his country, and relentless in his pursuit of justice for all and hopelessness for none.

Unlike his brother, Robert Kennedy never became President of the United States—although I truly believe he was on his way to becoming one of the greatest—but he molded more minds and inspired more hearts in this and other nations than nearly all of the men who served in that exalted post. Like his brother, he forsook comfort for country, grew wiser and warmer as he grew older, preferred candor to clichés in both formal and informal utterances, laughed at himself more often than at others, forgave even those who reviled him, and was struck down by the assassin's bullet at the height of his power and glory.

There is no curse upon the Kennedys. They have more than their share of ill-fame because they had more than their share of the courage and the conviction required to dare and to try and to tempt fate. They believed with Sir Francis Bacon that there is no comparison between that which is lost by not succeeding and that which is lost by not trying. They died heroic deaths because they lived heroic lives.

Those lives were not wasted. The bitterness of our anguish today cannot cause us to forget the lasting value of their valiant labors. And so it is that we remember now, especially now, how Robert Kennedy appeared before the Democratic National Convention's memorial service for his brother in 1964 and recited these words from Shakespeare:

> When he shall die
> Take him and cut him out in little stars
> And he shall make the face of heaven
> so fine
> That all the world will be in love with
> night . . .

—Paul Conklin, Pix.

Sat Rev June 22, 1968

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Let No Drum Be Muffled

An address delivered February 22 at the Chicago Catholic Interracial Council's John F. Kennedy award dinner honoring Fr. Richard F. Morrisroe.

THEODORE C. SORENSEN

✦ WE HONOR tonight with words a man whose deeds have done honor to us all. In an age still riddled with complacency Fr. Richard Morrisroe showed conviction. In an atmosphere of fear he had courage. Encountering hate, he responded with love. To those with malice he offered charity, and for seeking peace he suffered violence.

John Kennedy, for whom this award is justly named, would have approved of its being conferred upon Fr. Morrisroe — not because they were both Catholics but because they both despised injustice and defied inaction, not because they were both gunned down in the course of duty but because they both believed that "one man can make a difference and every man ought to try." John Kennedy went to Dallas, Texas, and Richard Morrisroe went to Hayneville, Alabama, not in an act of bravado or a gesture of defiance but on missions of reconciliation.

"A man does what he must," wrote the author of *Profiles in Courage*, "in spite of personal consequences, in spite of . . . dangers — and that is the basis of all human morality." Clearly, President Kennedy would have saluted Richard Morrisroe as another profile in courage.

I

But, of course, not everyone has — not even all those who deplored the violence that befell him. While Fr. Morrisroe lay critically wounded in a Baptist hospital where nuns came to pray for his life, while black men north and south offered tears for this white man's recovery, while Fr. Morrisroe's friend and companion, the young seminarian Jonathan Daniels, lay dead as the result of the same shotgun assault, the county solicitor in Hayneville was quoted as saying to a reporter, in tones clearly shared by most of his constituents: "If they had been tending to their own business, like I tend to mine, they'd be living and enjoying themselves today."

If they had been tending to their own business — if they, in short, had been back in their own pulpits in their own cities — if they had only accepted the common notion that a preacher's business is but to preach — then everything would have been all right. That doctrine, I regret to say, has not been applied to Fr. Morrisroe alone, nor has it been expressed by southern racists alone. It has been increasingly applied to that increasing number of clergymen of all faiths who have chosen to engage in direct action on behalf of civil rights in the north, or peace in Vietnam, or better treatment for the poor. It has been expressed by businessmen and by bishops, by politicians and professors, by fellow clergymen and communicants. It underlies a growing debate in this nation's churches today, from Albany to Sacramento, from Milwaukee to Mississippi.

That debate is not confined to the Catholic Church, as many assert. The issue may be newer to most Catholics. Their traditional concepts may be more sharply exposed. But clergymen of other faiths have also been warned or forced to cease and desist their social action activities — warned or forced by their superiors, by their financial supporters, by their trustees or by their congregations. "In the past," said Robert McAfee Brown, a leading Protestant observer, "controversial ministers were burned. Now they just get fired." Clergymen of all faiths in Mississippi and Alabama denounced what they called the "outside intervention" of their northern colleagues. Protestant ministers in California have bitterly assailed those taking part in a local agricultural strike. And one of the most famous Protestant preachers has chided his fellow pastors for "going far beyond the Ten Commandments."

In a sense they have. Particularly since a man named Kennedy in 1963 and a place called Selma in 1965 galvanized them into action on civil rights, more and more clergymen — and nuns — have been found in picket lines, in protest marches, in the organization of boycotts, and even in jail. They have expressed a concern over Vietnam that goes far beyond traditional religious pacifism. They have encouraged strikes by the underpaid and demonstrations by the underprivileged. They have stirred division and dissension in their own churches and communities, embarrassed established business and political interests, involved themselves in issues not traditionally or directly related by most people to the gospel and subjected themselves to indignity and humiliation. It is not, therefore, surprising that

Mr. Sorensen, special counsel to the late President Kennedy, is an attorney with the New York law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison.

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some of them — not all, not even most, but some of them — have been silenced without explanation, or driven from their pulpits, or shipped out of the country, or forced to cancel speaking engagements, or opposed as outsiders by local clerics, or denied the funds they needed to carry on the work of their churches and church schools.

The meaning of this debate for our churches has been weighed in the religious press and by clergymen concerned over these negations — particularly in some parts of the Catholic press, including an excellent recent issue of *Ave Maria* magazine. But I speak tonight because I believe it is time that someone who is not a Catholic or a clergyman was heard on this issue. I think it is time that we weighed the effects of such repression not only on the church but on the country. I leave to theologians (and to more regular churchgoers) the question of a clergyman's obligations to his superiors. I am talking about his obligations to his country.

No man has been more concerned than I, after my experiences in the campaign of 1960, about the appropriate role of clergymen in public affairs — but no man is more concerned than I today about the disastrously narrow limits which have been placed on that role in some quarters.

II

The United States of America is not so rich in intellectual and inspirational leadership, or so certain of its course in the world, or so perfect in the treatment of its citizens, that it can afford the suppression or repression of any thoughtful view or voice — and that includes the views and voices of our preachers as well as our teachers, editors, authors and others. We cannot afford to listen merely to spokesmen for the state and the status quo, for the comfortable and the conformed. We have enough timidity and stupidity in our ranks without saying "Sit down" to the Richard Morrisroes of this world who are willing to stand up and be counted.

I do not say that any of these movements — civil rights, peace, antipoverty and others — would wholly collapse if clergymen were not allowed to take part. But I do say that these ministers of the gospel have a special contribution to make. Unlike political and business leaders, unlike the often competitive leaders of civil rights and other kinds of organizations, churchmen are in an ideal position to remain above suspicion of self-interest. By casting out fear and hate as they have been trained to do, they can prevent the extremists from taking over these movements. Fr. Morrisroe can testify otherwise, but their very presence can also discourage violence. As one of the churchmen involved in the California grape strike explained it, "No one wants to be cited in the newspapers for beating up a minister."

The man who shot Fr. Morrisroe in the back and killed Jonathan Daniels was acquitted of murder on the grounds that these clergymen carried weapons. Indeed they did — not knives or guns but the weapons all clergymen should carry: love and reason and trust. And these are the very weapons the civil rights and other movements must carry in the difficult days ahead.

Some of our more tolerant observers have declared that social action by a clergyman is perfectly permissible so long as he makes it clear that he is acting as a private citizen, not as a churchman. I reject that view. I am not certain that a clergyman, like a President, is ever a private citizen, wherever he may be and whatever collar he may be wearing. I am not certain the public could or would distinguish between the clergyman's role as prophet and his role as private citizen. And I am not even certain the clergyman could. For his vocation is to protest evil and injustice — not merely with an empty, ill heeded string of "thou shalt nots" from the Sabbath pulpit but with daily deeds that back up his doctrine. His obligation is to live as he lectures, to give active as well as verbal witness to the gospel's meaning for modern problems.

Acting, therefore, not as a private citizen but as a churchman, he may often find himself in conflict with the views of those to whom he reports. I repeat that I have no desire to argue church structure here tonight. But I question whether the minister of any church is simply a hired hand, wholly the creature of his superiors or parishioners, wholly bound to accept their dictates and doctrines on matters unrelated to dogma, wholly unable to act in accordance with his own conscience and sense of justice.

To be sure, he should not purport to speak for them. He should not deliberately pressure or embarrass their position. But surely there is a 2,000-year-old precedent for a preacher's going beyond good words to good deeds, and then going beyond those good deeds to a direct challenge of both religious and secular authorities, and then going beyond even that direct challenge to enduring imprisonment and violence in order to alter man's ways. Surely, as one clergyman has put it, the members of his profession were not intended to be nothing but an ancient Greek chorus, merely standing on the side of the stage and offering occasional comments as the tragedy unfolds. Was it not Cardinal Newman who told Gladstone he would propose a toast "to conscience first and the pope second"?

Most men of the cloth, one critic recently charged, are not competent to deal with such issues. But who among us *is* competent to solve the problems of Vietnam or Watts? The stakes are too great to leave war to the generals, or civil rights to the professionals, or poverty to the social workers. And why should moral battles to right old wrongs, in scriptural fashion, be left entirely to the laymen

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of the church. Clergymen, like all the rest of us, must learn by doing, by involving themselves in the practical problems of men. The Civil Rights bill of 1964, according to Senator Russell of Georgia, passed because "those damned preachers had got the idea it was a moral issue." Indeed they had — and indeed it was.

III

Of course, there will always be churches and churchmen who shun the problems of the world, who preach and prefer a religion of pomp and ceremony unrelated to public affairs, who measure their success by the number of "decisions for Christ" which look to another life and another world. Clergymen involved in the California grape-pickers strike were accused by the local ministerial association of not staying within the "spiritual area." Questions of race, said certain other clerics, have nothing to do with questions of religion; while it was interesting to note in Selma a year ago which of our famous clergymen were there, it was equally interesting to note which were not. As Msgr. George Casey of Lexington, Massachusetts, has observed, "There is more danger of the church becoming irrelevant than radical."

But these reverend leaders of irrelevance are not, I am convinced, the leaders of the new and future church. More and more clergymen — including the recent winners of this award (all of whom, interestingly enough, know the inside of a jail) — recognize that their ministry belongs most with those who need it most — not with the white middle class and upper class establishments but with the poor, Christ's favorite people, with the peacemakers, with the oppressed. The spirit of renewal in the Catholic Church — and indeed in all churches — has been advanced by religion's most enlightened leaders not merely as a matter of new vestments and new liturgy but of atoning for the church's own guilt on these basic issues of race and poverty and peace, of suffering with the world's sufferers in order to communicate better with them, and of granting more freedom to the church's own clergymen in order to gain more freedom for the church.

Is all this really so new? Richard Morrisroe in Hayneville was simply following the path of St. Francis of Assisi: to sow love where there is hatred, pardon where there is injury, hope where there is despair, light where there is darkness. He was not an "outsider." For injustice is never local. Our concern cannot be geographic. And ours would be a poorer world if Christ had never left Nazareth, or Paul Tarsus, or Pope Paul the Vatican, or Martin Luther King Atlanta, or Richard Morrisroe Chicago.

Let us not assume, however, that there are no limits to this kind of clerical activity. It is a basic right because it is a basic responsibility, to be exercised responsibly — not indiscriminately, not impetuously. Rash, unprepared action can undo gains carefully achieved. Positive, constructive actions have a higher value than protests that primarily seek publicity. Clergymen should not let themselves be used as mere symbols or shields. Not every possible cause and every tiny fragment of a problem need be tackled with a burst of defiance and disorder. Public opinion, after all, must be won, not alienated. Opposing sides must be reconciled, not polarized. The good of the church and its spiritual code cannot be forgotten. The participation of laymen must not be excluded.

Above all, the mote in our own eye should not be ignored. We should not go to Hayneville or to Jackson or to Birmingham in order to forget about Chicago or New York or Boston. The mere fact that our cities already have local ordinances against discrimination is no cause for relaxation or even pride, as can be seen by a comparison of white and Negro unemployment figures in northern and southern cities.

It was easier in many ways to march at Selma last year than it is to admit today that this problem is not just the south's or the nation's, or even the mayor's or the school board's, but ours — and we white liberals are part of the Negro's problem. As this issue moves more rapidly from south to north, the pressures on our northern churches are going to increase — pressures from parishioners who want no Negroes in the neighborhood, pressures from important contributors and important church leaders and important politicians. Then will be tested the courage and commitment of your churches far more than they were tested by the events in far-off Selma.

IV

One final word of caution. While the church must resist improper state pressures on these matters, so must it refrain from improperly pressuring the state. The lessons of 1960 are too fresh in my mind to permit me to endorse tonight any weakening of church-state separation, even for the good causes here discussed. I am as opposed now as I was then to any church's or churchman's dictating to, or being dictated by, any government — or being singled out for any special privilege or punishment — or becoming the tool of any party or administration. I hope that those clergymen who are newly active on what are necessarily political issues will nevertheless refrain from endorsing political candidates or political parties.

But church-state separation does not mean disregarding the moral issues involved in public controversies. Church independence from state control does not mean independence only to support the state's views. Nor can I understand, frankly, why some high clerical authorities who had no compunctions whatsoever about interfering with other public policy decisions — on education, for example, or

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birth control — now refuse to let their subordinates work on the issues of Vietnam or civil rights.

I hope that they will, upon reconsideration, let these men work. I hope that they will let them speak out — not only for the good of the church, which I do not judge, but for the good of the country.

My fellow citizens: in the darkest period of the French Revolution, Edmund Burke begged that his body be beaten into a drum to arouse all Europe against tyranny. We want no such sacrifice today. John Kennedy is gone. Jonathan Daniels is gone. Richard Morrisroe's body has been beaten enough. The whole civil rights movement has too many martyrs already. But at least let no drum be muffled now. Let no voice of conscience be stilled. Let no man of God be silenced. For as John Kennedy said, "this nation, for all its hopes and all its boasts, will not be fully free until all its citizens are free."

Dilemma for Dr. King

The Vietnam war is perhaps the greatest challenge of this Negro leader's career — and conceivably its culmination.

CHARLES E. FAGER

✦ AS THE LEADER of the Negro struggle for equality, Martin Luther King is faced with the perils of success. His movement, it is now clear, is going to bring America's Negroes into the mainstream of national life. The job will not be done "NOW!" or even within a generation, but the forces set in motion by five years of mass nonviolent effort are too far-reaching to be reversed. The nation's "white power structure" has come to realize not only that integration can be accomplished without major upheavals in the present American socioeconomic system but also that it will in the long run serve to enrich that system.

With victory on the horizon, the Negro leadership — with Dr. King as its symbol — seems uncertain about what to do next. There is a strong temptation to dig in, to consolidate and expand the gains already made; in short, to begin playing the political game for an ever larger piece of the national pie, as did the labor movement at the end of its rise.

I

Such a feeling is natural. "Freedom Now!" translated into more specific terms means for most Negroes simply: "We want *in*!" Into the economy, into the political circuses, into all the currents and eddies of the American mainstream. This is why the Muslims and Black Nationalists failed to catch on with the Negro masses: they preached revolution and prepared for an Armageddon which would destroy the white world. But the average Negro doesn't want to destroy anything; he wants to spread it around. He isn't basically opposed to "the system"; he just doesn't like being at its bottom.

The way is not so clear for Dr. King, primarily because during his entire career his whole stance has been not merely an economic one but more basically a *moral* one. He opposed segregation not simply because it was economically debilitating but because it was *evil* — and unchristian. Perhaps such a focus on ethical matters was but part of a strategy, a necessity if the conscience of the nonsouthern white community was to be stirred and drawn into the struggle. If so, it now stands revealed as a two-edged sword, because many of the moral issues which Dr. King and the movement have raised in the restricted context of the segregated south have national and international contexts and implications as well. With the entry of the civil rights movement into the level of full national participation, the leaders are no longer just confronting the nation with its regional sins but are themselves confronted — as full-fledged citizens and moral spokesmen — with the issues of over-all national policy.

The most unsettling context for these issues is, of course, the war in Vietnam. Negro leaders, even up to last spring in Selma, frequently told draft-age males in their audiences that they had no business fighting for anything abroad until things were straightened out at home. Now, faced with the realities of tripled draft calls and Negro bodies being shipped home from southeast Asia, many are wishing they had kept their mouths shut. When some worker in Mississippi (who apparently hadn't got the word) seriously suggested that Negroes refuse the draft, the resulting flap reverberated all the way to Harlem and back. The traditional Uncle Tom leadership hastily scrambled aboard the Johnson escalator; the militants, and Dr. King as the

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Mr. Fager, formerly on the staff of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, is now on the faculty of Friends World Institute in East Norwich, New York.

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The New and Future Clergy

THE ENTRANCE of American clergymen into direct social action has, not surprisingly, produced strong counter-action in some quarters. Galvanized first on the civil rights issue by President Kennedy in 1963 and at Selma in 1965, clergymen of all faiths—and nuns as well—have left their pulpits and parish houses to involve themselves in such issues as civil rights, poverty, and peace. They have in growing numbers been found in picket lines, in protest marches, in the organization of boycotts, and even in jail. Many have expressed a concern over Vietnam that goes far beyond traditional religious pacifism. Others have encouraged strikes by the underpaid and demonstrations by the underprivileged. They have stirred division and dissension in their own churches and communities, embarrassed established business and political interests, related themselves to issues not traditionally or directly related (by most people) to the Gospels, and subjected themselves to indignity and humiliation.

Thus it is not surprising that some of them—not all, not even most, but some of them—have been silenced without explanation, or driven from their pulpits, or forced to cancel speaking engagements, or opposed as outsiders by local clerics, or denied the funds they needed to carry on their churches and church schools. From Albany to Sacramento, from Milwaukee to Mississippi, assorted bishops, businessmen, theologians, and fellow clergymen have told the activists that preachers should stick to preaching.

This issue is not confined to the Catholic Church, as often assumed. The issue may be newer to most Catholics. Their traditional concepts may be more sharply exposed. But clergymen of other faiths have also been warned or forced to cease and desist their social action activities by their superiors, by their financial supporters, by their trustees or by their congregations. "In the past," said Robert McAfee Brown, a leading Protestant observer, "controversial ministers were burned. Now they just get fired." Clergymen of all faiths in Mississippi and Alabama have denounced what they called the "outside intervention" of their Northern colleagues. Protestant ministers in California have bitterly assailed those taking part in a local agricultural strike. And one of the most famous Protestant preachers has chided his fellow pastors for "going too far beyond the Ten Commandments."

I LEAVE to theologians the question of a clergyman's obligations to his superiors. I am interested in his obligations to his country. As one who has been particularly wary of clergymen's mixing improperly in politics and public affairs, I am nevertheless concerned by the excessively narrow limits placed on their participation by some religious authorities.

The United States is not so rich in intellectual and inspirational leadership, or so certain of its course in the world, or so perfect in the treatment of its citizens, that it can afford the suppression of any thoughtful view or voice—and that includes the views and voices of preachers as well as teachers, editors, authors, and others. We cannot afford to listen merely to spokesmen for the state and the status quo, for the comfortable and the conformed. We have enough timidity and stupidity in our midst without telling those clergymen who are willing to stand up and be counted to sit down.

It is not that any of these movements—civil rights, peace, antipoverty, and others—would wholly collapse if clergymen were not allowed to take part. But they have a special contribution to make. Unlike political and business leaders, unlike the often competitive civil rights and other organizational leaders, churchmen are in an ideal position to remain above all suspicion of self-interest. By living up to their tradition and training in casting out fear and hate, they can prevent extremists from taking over these movements. While tragic exceptions are obvious, their very presence can discourage violence.

Some more tolerant observers have declared that social action by a clergyman is perfectly permissible so long as he makes it clear that he is acting as a private citizen, not as a churchman. But I am not certain that a clergyman, like a President, is ever a private citizen, wherever he may be and whatever collar he may be wearing. I am not certain that the public could or would distinguish between the clergyman's role as prophet and his role as private citizen. Nor am I even certain that the clergyman could make that distinction. For his very vocation is to protest evil and injustice, to live as he lectures, to give active as well as verbal witness to the Gospel's meaning for modern problems—not merely with an empty, ill-heeded string of "Thou shalt nots" from the Sabbath pulpit, but with daily deeds that back up his doctrine.

Acting as a churchman instead of a private citizen, he may often find himself in conflict with the views of those to whom he reports. I have no credentials or desire to argue church structure. But I question whether the minister of any church is simply a hired hand, wholly the creature of his superiors or parishioners, wholly bound to accept their dictates and doctrines on matters unrelated to dogma, wholly unable to act in accordance with his own conscience and sense of justice.

To be sure, he should not purport to speak for them. He should not deliberately pressure or embarrass them. But surely there is a 2,000-year-old precedent for a preacher's going beyond good words to good deeds, and then going beyond those good deeds to a direct challenge of both religious and secular authorities, and then going beyond even that direct challenge to enduring imprisonment and violence in order to alter man's ways.

Most men of the cloth, one critic has recently charged, are not competent to deal with such issues. But who among us

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Vietnam or Watts? The stakes are too great to leave war to the generals, or civil rights to the professionals, or poverty to the social workers. And why should moral battles to right old wrongs, in scriptural fashion, be left to the laymen of the church? Clergymen, like all the rest of us, must learn by doing, by involving themselves in the practical problems of men. The Civil Rights Bill of 1964, according to Senator Russell of Georgia, passed because "those damned preachers had got the idea it was a moral issue." Indeed they had—and indeed it was.

Many communities and their clergymen have denounced visiting pastors as "outsiders." But injustice is never local. Compassion cannot be geographic. And ours would be a poorer world if Christ had never left Nazareth, or Paul Tarsus, or Pope Paul the Vatican, or Martin Luther King Atlanta, or the late James Reeb Boston.

There will always, of course, be churches and churchmen who shun the problems of the world, who preach and prefer a religion of pomp and ceremony unrelated to public affairs, who measure their success wholly by the number of "decisions for Christ" that look to another life and another world. Clergymen involved in the California grape-growers' strike were accused by the local ministerial association of not staying within "the spiritual area." Questions of race, said certain other clerics, have nothing to do with questions of religion. And, while it was interesting in Selma a year ago to note which famous clergymen were there, it was equally interesting to note which were not. "There is more danger," Monsignor George Casey of Lexington, Massachusetts, has observed, "of the Church becoming irrelevant than radical."

But these reverend leaders of irrelevance, I am convinced, are not the leaders of the new and future church. More and more clergymen recognize that their ministry belongs most with those who need it most—not with the white middle-class and upper-class establishments, but with the poor, Christ's favorite people, with the peacemakers, with the oppressed. The spirit of renewal in the Catholic Church—and indeed in all churches—has been advanced not merely as a matter of new vestments and new liturgy but of atoning for the church's own guilt on such basic issues as race and poverty and peace.

A clergyman's right to participate in direct social action activities is not only a basic right but a basic responsibility. It should be exercised responsibly, not indiscriminately, imprudently, or impetuously. Rash, unprepared action can undo gains carefully achieved. Positive, constructive actions have a higher value than protests that primarily seek publicity. Clergymen should not let themselves be used as mere symbols or shields. Every possible cause need not be tackled with a burst of defiance and disorder. Public opinion must be won, not alienated.

ABOVE all, the mote in one's own eye should not be ignored. Clergymen should not travel to Selma or Jackson or Birmingham in order to forget about Chicago or New York or Boston. As this issue moves more rapidly from South to North, the pressures on Northern churches will increase—pressures from parishioners who want no Negroes in the neighborhood—pressures from important contributors, and important church leaders, and important politicians.

One other limitation is important. While the church must resist improper state pressures on these matters, so must it refrain from improperly pressuring the state. Any weakening of church-state separation, even for a good cause, would be a mistake. No church or churchman should ... government—or be singled out for any special privilege or punishment—or become the tool of any party or administration. Clergymen newly active in what are necessarily political issues must nevertheless refrain from endorsing political candidates or political parties.

But church-state separation does not mean disregarding the moral issues involved in public controversies. Church independence from state control does not mean independence only to support the state's views. Nor can I understand, frankly, why some high clerical authorities who have had no compunctions whatsoever about interfering with other public policy decisions—on education, for example, or birth control—now refuse to let their subordinates work on Vietnam or civil rights.

I hope that they will, upon reconsideration, let these clergymen work. I hope that they will let them speak out—not only for the good of the church, which I do not judge, but for the good of the country. —THEODORE C. SORENSEN.

A House Named Sylvia

By Arnold Lazarus

WALLFLOWER by a mossy wall
in the shadow of maple and oak
she had stood too long neglected by swain.
We were going to do her over
—or so we thought.
We lifted her face and furnace
washed out her coal-smoked soul
painted sun to her clapboards
and after a fashion becoming to ladies
dusted her shingles blue-white.

But she spat diamonds to the winds
stuck to her zinc hatpin
winked at clouds
made pacts with tornadoes.

To inform our maudlin sunshine
her brown stain bled
and soot drifted from her pores.

Darkly from her chimney she sent signals;
her messages came from the hearth.
Conversant in more than one tongue
though resisting polyglot
she rehearsed us in substitution drills.

At night she ran labs and seminars
leading us mim-mem into restoring
her original weather-warped front tooth.
We learned from her the language of welcoming.

With a clock in each mouth
she smiled at forests.
For Sylvia we went into woods
we never came out of.

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Scrooge and the Students

IN RECENT MONTHS my work and lectures have brought me into contact with business executives and college students. I doubt whether any two groups in the country—including management and labor, farmers and city-dwellers, or even Negroes and whites—could be more lacking in mutual rapport, respect, and understanding. Nor does any other gap have more serious implications for the long-range success of our economy.

Businessmen too often dismiss the student as an alienated radical, a rebellious nonconformist at best and an unstable misfit at worst. Although many corporate leaders have expressed genuine concern over polls revealing the disdain in which business careers are held by prospective graduates, they attribute this simply to ignorance, ingratitude, or immaturity.

Students too often dismiss the businessman as a selfish profiteer, a mindless right-winger at worst and a narrow organization man at best. Although many students are able to attend and complete their college courses only with the help of corporate donations and scholarships, they tend to attribute this largesse simply to the donor's desire for power, glory, or tax deductions.

Unfortunately, there is some truth in these distorted viewpoints. Too many students refuse to exercise the reason with which their education has supposedly endowed them and dogmatically embrace in the name of dissent every neosophist deviation from the ideal, the practical, and the traditional. And too many businessmen refuse to recognize their obligations to the community and country which nutured their enterprises, and doggedly pursue their private profits without concern for the public interest. But these are hopefully a small minority in both cases; and on the whole these depressing and demeaning pictures are wildly inaccurate and sadly underestimate the breadth and brainpower on both sides.

Students, for the most part, would not seem to be concerned about how they appear to the business community. But businessmen are rightly concerned about the growing difficulty of attracting into corporate careers the college students—even the business-college majors—from whose ranks most future entrepreneurs must come. The number of dropouts in high corporate positions today is testimony to the determination and industry of those individuals; but it is not a refutation of the fact that business leadership increasingly requires the formal talents that our institutions of higher learning can best provide.

WHAT is the remedy? Patient silence on the part of business is not likely to improve the situation; but angry denunciations of student distortions can only worsen it. The obvious answer is improved communication between the corporate and academic communities—and it is the content, not the mode or frequency of that communication, that matters most.

A recent business seminar which I attended recommended that more businessmen talk to more students about property rights, technological progress, and the social function of profits. These are all honorable values—but today's brightest student is more likely to be concerned about human rights, the ill effects of automation, and the faltering war on poverty.

He wonders whether a business career offers any outlet for his idealism, his creativity, and his concern for the individual and mankind. He is interested in a prospective employer's efforts to eliminate discrimination and pollution and blight. He seeks assurance that the pricing, labor relations, overseas development, and other policies of a particular corporation are compatible with his own. Perhaps these are the concerns of a dreamer or "do-gooder" but American business would not have achieved the levels it enjoys today without a considerable number of dreamers and do-gooders.

Merely propagandizing our college campuses along these lines, however, will not work unless the story that is told is true. Increasingly it is true. Increasingly the modern corporation is a modern, if not always model, citizen—with a concern for its community and a compassion for its neighbors going far beyond the profit motive. Today government and the professions, contrary to these recent student surveys, are not the only channels of broad-scale challenge and commitment. Business offers them as well.

TO be sure, more—much more—remains to be done before businessmen can consistently and persuasively convey to the college student an interest in the student's values and views. The overspecialization of today's business executive too often interferes with his contribution to the causes and cultural trends which interest the college student. But, as the Christmas season in which this is written reminds us, even Ebenezer Scrooge discovered that it is never too late to learn. Terrified by Marley's ghost, by his tale of ceaseless wandering, and by the chain of ledger books and cash boxes which bound his legs, Scrooge cried out: "But you were always a good man of business, Jacob!" And the ghost replied:

> Business? Mankind was my business. The common welfare was my business. Charity, mercy, forbearance were all my business. The dealings of my trade were but a drop of water in the comprehensive ocean of my business.

The corporate executive of today can voice that same message to the college student of today—and to the extent that he means it and lives up to it, the understanding which can grow between them will serve both groups beneficially.

—Theodore C. Sorensen.

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Sorensen Looks at '68—

"NOT A SINGLE STATE SAFE FOR DEMOCRATS"

NEW YORK—Is President Johnson facing a serious possibility of defeat in 1968?

This prospect has been raised by Theodore C. Sorensen, onetime White House aide and No. 1 political adviser to President Kennedy.

Mr. Sorensen paints a bleak picture of Democratic chances in the next election. Not a single State, he says, can now be counted on as safe for the Democratic ticket.

Speaking before the Lexington Democratic Club on December 12, Mr. Sorensen had this to say about 1968—

"We have to assume today that George Wallace [of Alabama] will run as a third-party candidate and carry most, if not all, of the Southern States. . . .

"We have to assume today that the Republican ticket . . . will win back to their party's column most, if not all, of the smaller, traditionally Republican States of the Great Plains and the Rocky Mountain regions.

"If these assumptions are correct, then there is no possible way by which Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey will be able to secure a majority in the Electoral College without carrying at least two and probably all of the five largest States: . . . New York, which has just re-elected Rockefeller; California, which has just elected Reagan; Pennsylvania, which has just elected Shafer; Ohio, which has just re-elected Rhodes, and Illinois, which has just elected Percy."

These winners, as Mr. Sorensen's audience did not need to be reminded, are all Republicans. He continued:

"Even with all five of those States, we could not be sure of winning without Michigan, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Wisconsin, all of which went Republican this year.

"The fact is that there is not now a single State in the union which can be counted on as safe for the Democrats in 1968—not Texas with its Republican Senator, or Rhode Island with its Republican Governor, or Georgia, which went Republican last time."

Mr. Sorensen cited another conclusion—that Republican gains in Congress have put President Johnson's legislative program in jeopardy.

But does he really believe the Democrats will lose the Presidency?

"I still think we can win in 1968," Mr. Sorensen said.

"I still think this country will see the need for Democratic leadership in 1968. . . .

"We have been fortunate enough to have received an advance warning. . . . Excuses, explanations or rationalizations are always available. But politics, in the last analysis, is not words but arithmetic—and the arithmetic in this case is inexorable, unmistakable and ominous."

—Wide World Photo

MR. SORENSEN finds Johnson Administration in trouble, but—

WHAT CAUSED THE RISE IN THE PRICE OF BREAD?

WASHINGTON—When the price of a loaf of bread jumped 2 to 3 cents last July it brought strong consumer reaction and an investigation in Congress.

Results of that investigation—by a subcommittee of the House Agriculture Committee—have now been made public. Among the findings:

- No one, from the farmer to the retailer, is making "unconscionable profits" in production and distribution of bread.
- There is evidence, however, that distribution systems are inefficient. The cost of moving bread from baker to consumer, the subcommittee found, was almost equal to the cost of growing the wheat, milling the flour and baking the bread.
- Consumers also tended to contribute to higher prices by demanding more variety in baked products. One chain system reported it baked more than 150 sizes and varieties of bread.

Over all, the subcommittee found that bread is still a good buy. "Bread was cheaper in 1966, in relation to the wages received by Americans, than ever before," the report said. "In 1939, the average factory wage earner could buy only 7.9 loaves of bread with his pay for one hour's work. In 1960, this had increased to 11.1 loaves; and in July 1966, he could buy 12.4 loaves with one hour's wages."

THE OUTLOOK NOW FOR CLEANER AIR

WASHINGTON—The chances are that you and your children will never again breathe really clean air in the United States. Experts agree on that.

The question now is: How much dirt in the air is tolerable and how can the level of tolerance be attained and maintained? No clear answer to that question has yet emerged.

These are the conclusions reached at a national conference on air pollution held in mid-December, under sponsorship of the U. S. Public Health Service.

More than 3,000 public officials, scientists and industry representatives attended. They heard calls for "action now" to combat pollution. Among the recommendations:

- The Federal Government should establish guidelines on how much fouling of the air is tolerable from autos, industry, community waste disposal.
- States and communities should adopt regulations or ordinances on the degree of air pollution to be permitted.
- There should be better monitoring of pollution at the State and local levels, and punishment of violators.
- U. S. aid—perhaps in the form of tax incentives or rebates—should be provided States, localities and industries for pollution-abatement efforts.
- More regional antipollution agreements should be drawn up between States or areas, with federal help in setting them up and keeping them working.

Two warnings were sounded by various speakers:

1. Unless States and localities act soon, the Federal Government will step in. And if the U. S. Public Health Service doesn't act, Congress will.

2. The whole pollution problem is growing worse all the time. John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, put it this way:

"We are actually losing ground in the fight against pollution. The smog grows more dense even as we talk about it."

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THE LOOKING-GLASS WAR OF WORDS

What is the issue in Vietnam? Games rhetoricians play.

"THE FOLLOWING is a summary of this nation's reasons for unswervingly supporting the brave people of South Vietnam in their effort to drive out the aggressors. It is designed to sustain our national unity and acceptance of sacrifice in order to prevail in a long and costly struggle.

1. *The Importance of the War*

"The meaning of this struggle is not confined to Vietnam but is world-wide. Mankind learned in the Thirties and before that aggression must be checked before it is too late, that those who have no respect for international law must not be permitted to extend their domination over others. The doctrine that all peoples are equal from birth, with an equal right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, is contained in our nation's birth certificate; and while we are particularly concerned about foreign ideologies being imposed upon our nearby neighbors, our aim is to strengthen the hopes of like-minded peoples everywhere. Certainly we will never barter away another people's real estate to assure our own survival.

"That is why we have no rational alternative but to stand firm in Vietnam against the invaders and their shameful war against a liberty-loving people striving for independence. We covet no additional territory for ourselves; but neither can we stand by and see Vietnam and indeed all of Southeast Asia victimized by aggression. Our chances, and our children's chances, for a better future depend upon the outcome of this war. . . .

2. *The Historical Background*

"The current struggle is merely one further chapter in a vast and continuing struggle in which we have long been engaged against an implacable foe, one further chapter in their cynical and systematic effort to extend the periphery of their power by force.

"After the French defeat and withdrawal, Vietnam was intended to live in peace and independence under the Geneva Accords of 1954. But the Accords were violated, final independence was blocked, the peace was upset, the all-Vietnam elections scheduled for 1956 were made impossible, and the work of the impartial International Control Commission appointed by the Geneva Conference was obstructed, all by a handful of self-appointed Vietnamese leaders who served the interests of an outside power. Their heirs and collaborators in South Vietnam today—also mere puppets despite their talk of independence—do not speak for the people of South Vietnam. . . .

"Their efforts are sustained only by outside intervention, master-minded by one of the major powers who seeks to dominate the rich natural resources and strategic location of South Vietnam as a base for future Asian aggression. This raises the risk of our own intervention, but if the small nations of Asia are to have any hopes for independence, we must take our stand against the intruder regardless of what a hostile power might do.

3. *The Prospects for Peace*

"Our hope is to see an end to the war, for it is a cruel war. In violation of international law, enemy troops wage indiscriminate warfare, murder civilians, burn crops, and destroy undefended villages without reason or explanation. Our servicemen, when captured, are brutally interrogated and mistreated. But we have reason to believe that the other side is depressed and divided. We are killing their men in increased numbers.

"But the only negotiations they are thus far prepared to accept would be fraudulent and deceptive, trading away the freedom and independence of the Vietnamese people. Politically they cannot afford to sit down at the conference table with us; and we on our part can no more afford to withdraw under the cloak of a meaningless agreement than we can in military defeat. For that would convince the aggressors that our cause is but a 'paper tiger,' unwilling and unable to fight on to victory. Nor can we recognize at a conference table their puppet regime as the true representative of the South Vietnamese people. . . .

"In short, peace can come, and come very quickly, if (but only if) the other side would acknowledge defeat, unconditionally halt its aggression, withdraw its troops and respect the sovereignty and independence of the Vietnamese people under the Geneva Accords. South Vietnam can then become a peaceful and neutral country, without military alliances or foreign bases, free to decide on unification, maintaining close relations with Laos and Cambodia, and governed by a new Constitution and National Assembly that will guarantee universal suffrage, freedom of speech, freedom of worship, and genuine land reform. Until this goal is obtained, we shall fight on."

The above statement, though a fictitious document never actually issued, is nevertheless based entirely on actual quotations from government sources. What makes it interesting is the fact that these quotations came from both sides, both American and Communist—North Vietnamese, Chinese, and Vietcong. And it is doubtful that any official on either side can say with certainty which government declared (or might well have declared) which sentences.

This little exercise does not, of course, demonstrate that both sides have identical, or even equally honorable, goals and purposes in the Vietnamese war. I would not for a moment equate America's historical role and motives in Vietnam or elsewhere in the Cold War with those of the Communists. Nor could any objective observer, if there is one any longer, accept as true all the above charges and claims when asserted by Communists (nor might he accept them all when coming from us). But this exercise can at least teach us to use restraint in our rhetoric; to see ourselves as others see us; to put ourselves in our enemy's shoes; and to recognize that the gap between the two sides is not unbridgeable and that this war, like all wars, is fought in part over issues more symbolic than substantive. If we can learn those lessons, there is still hope for Vietnam.

—THEODORE C. SORENSEN.

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QUESTIONS ASKED ABROAD

(SR editor-at-large Theodore C. Sorensen has just returned from a trip around the world, occasioned by a visit to New Zealand as the first Kennedy Memorial Lecturer.)

WHOEVER coined the phrase "it's a small world" never tried to go around it. Even in the jet age, the distances to be traversed are enormous, the time spent sitting in airplanes seems endless, and the damage done to one's "internal clock" is more telling than surface appearances may indicate.

Yet it is a small world in the sense of those similarities of trait and tradition that link this planet's inhabitants. In the dozen or so countries in which I have in recent months held forth at lectures or press conferences and talked with Prime Ministers, publishers, and everyday people, I have been struck by the recurring patterns of questions, answers, and attitudes that I have encountered. Indeed, both newspapermen and students in different corners of the globe inevitably ask the same three questions I am asked by newspapermen and students in this country:

1) Would President Kennedy have acted as President Johnson has acted regarding Vietnam? (No one can say with certainty, the situation having drastically changed from the comparatively low-level insurrection for which Kennedy had refused American combat troops.)

2) Will there be another Kennedy in the White House? (Not before 1972, very possibly thereafter, possibly more than one—but neither of the Senators Kennedy is counting on it, knowing better than most the unpredictables in politics.)

3) Do you accept the conclusions of the Warren Commission Report? (Yes.)

Other questions are repeated in different lands and languages, but it is interesting that these three almost invariably arise. John Kennedy is still widely mourned and missed, his historic views and victories in some ways appreciated more in other countries than in his own. Robert Kennedy, like his older brother and Adlai Stevenson, has a world-wide following, a self-appointed constituency that cheers his every utterance and overlooks any possible errors. And millions of free-world citizens—because it would seem more meaningful to them if John Kennedy had been the victim of a right-wing, left-wing, racist, or political plot—refused to accept the harsh verdict that the course of the world was senselessly changed merely by a lunatic with a rifle.

I do not claim to have visited enough countries or spent enough time therein to be an expert on any of them. But I have been left with other impressions of similarity. Almost no one I met likes the war in Vietnam, but almost no one has any constructive alternative and almost no one is as interested in it as are we Americans. Almost everyone is critical of American race relations—and yet almost every country I have visited has a racial problem of its own, and few, if any, are making the progress we are. Barriers against certain immigrants, prejudice against certain inhabitants, attitudes ranging from patronizing to hostile—all are encountered in countries openly critical of America's slow progress toward equality. Victims of this injustice include Maoris and Polynesians living among New Zealanders, Asians living among East Africans, Chinese in South Asia, and Lapps in Scandinavia and Italians in Western Europe. (On the other hand, a club exclusively for American women in Tunis hardly sets an example.)

THERE are other unpleasant similarities in world travel. Entry into most nations I visited—or even passage through most air terminals—is delayed by the same kind of petty bureaucracy, with its endless forms, queues, stamps, and counter-stamps, that foreigners complain of encountering here. And too many of the world's newspapers concentrate on crime, sports, and provincial detail to the detriment of adequate foreign news coverage. An American abroad this summer might well have wondered whether anything other than mass murders and race riots was taking place in this country until he had an opportunity to read an American publication.

Two special notes of hope remain vivid from my latest trip. At "Operation Deep Freeze" headquarters in Christchurch, New Zealand, I learned in depth about the effort conducted by this nation in cooperation with the Soviet Union and a dozen or so other nations in exploring the mysteries and treasures of Antarctica. By treaty, that vast and potentially valuable continent is preserved for peaceful use and scientific inquiry. No territorial claim or Iron Curtain divides it; the continuation of total disarmament is assured by reciprocal inspection; and men of many nations—however disparate their political ideologies and social systems—are concentrating on unlocking secrets more constructive than military.

IN Kenya, too, men of all races and nations have forsaken another traditional use of firepower—the useless slaughter of wild animals. The big game preserves offer the sportsman, armed only with a camera, all the thrills of the search, but produce photographs instead of stuffed heads for his trophy room.

In a sense, Antarctica is a "human-being preserve" where men have renounced their habit of killing other men. Perhaps in time we shall have more such preserves—until one day this entire planet can be a "human-being preserve." For the world traveler who despairs of both the differences and the similarities he witnesses cannot help being reminded of President Kennedy's words at American University:

> If we cannot now end our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis our most basic common link is the fact that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

—THEODORE C. SORENSEN.

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Reforming Congress

IT IS EASY to criticize Congress. Reflecting the diversities and divisions of our imperfect society, it is certain to produce voices and viewpoints displeasing to some. Viewed in the light of two powerful Presidents, Kennedy and Johnson, the Congress is charged with being obstructionist one year, a rubber-stamp the next. No doubt the original constitutional balance between the two branches is gone. But the least logical type of remedy urged seems a restoration of the balance by curbing and weakening the executive branch.

As this country has become more urbanized, industrialized, and internationalized, it has – like all Western democracies – experienced a necessary increase in the role of the executive. The fluidity and complexity of national problems require all the initiative and discretion the White House can properly be given. The answer to the present imbalance lies not in reducing its voice to the level of the legislative branch, but in strengthening the voice of the latter –streamlining its procedures, elevating its debates, permitting its majorities to be felt, making it more representative of grass-roots change, and safeguarding its ethics and honor.

To be sure, despite its talk about economizing elsewhere in government, the Congress's own budget has grown to more than eight times its postwar level. But, with the exception of those sums spent on an excessive number of *ad hoc* investigations, these increases in legislative funds and staffs have been neither surprising nor sufficient. The size and intricacy of the federal agenda, the power and practices of the executive branch, the population and problems of the entire country all have grown even more extensively; and while their growth has been reflected in the Congressional workload (some 20,000 bills and 85,000 nominations presented to a modern Congress), it has not been reflected in Congressional procedures.

BOTH Houses of Congress do the bulk of their important work in committees. Indeed, one Congressman has perceptively described the House as "a collection of committees that come together in a chamber periodically to approve one another's actions." Yet most of those committees still do not have: 1) adequate staff assistance for both majority and minority members; 2) expert advice on such complexities as economics or weaponry beyond that provided with some bias by the executive branch or private pressure groups; 3) consistent jurisdictions and procedures; 4) an obligation even to consider major problems, proposals or alternatives; or 5) any assurance that a majority of their members could convene or conduct or conclude a meeting without the presence or consent of their chairman—a man who may have reached that powerful post without any regard to his ability, health, interest, or attitudes.

The House can still be paralyzed by the stubbornness or deliberate absence of one man. The Senate still has no effective rules for keeping discussion or amendments germane or for terminating extended debate. A bill actually passed by both Houses but in different forms can still die in a conference committee composed of members opposed to the bill. In recent years the time wasted—on constituent errands, local projects, private bills, petty feuds, needless delays, irrelevant debates, duplicate hearings, and neglect of the District of Columbia—has grown greater and greater. Generally, appropriations have been enacted later and later, and Congressional sessions have lasted longer and longer (with intolerable congestion in the closing weeks).

RESPONDING to increased executive leadership and (since 1964) a heavy one-party majority, the Congress has in recent years produced record quantities of reform legislation. But not since passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 has it faced up to the problems of its own reform—problems which it must face if it is to be more and continually effective over the long run. No doubt there are those who believe that Congress should serve primarily as a brake—that the more difficult it is for a bill to be passed or a vote to be cast the better it is. But that is a dangerous premise on which to base the governing of a twentieth-century nuclear power.

As in the past, there may be shifts, written and unwritten, from one power faction within the Congress to another—between the rules committee, the leadership, the committee (or subcommittee) chairmen, and the party committees or caucuses. Further reapportionment, improved methods of campaign financing, and increased citizen participation will also help. But only fundamental reforms can produce a net, long-term increase in that body's institutional capacity for positive policy-making contributions.

Fortunately, the Congress, far more than an institution, is a group of men and women. Today, compared with a half-century ago, those men and women are better educated and better informed; better acquainted with more issues but more often likely to specialize; better (but still inadequately) staffed and briefed; less likely to be new members (despite considerable youth); more likely to be reelected (especially in the House); more responsible to the public interest; more responsive to public opinion; more concerned with foreign affairs; and—let us be frank about it—more likely to be Democrats.

Thus, the future strengthening of the Congressional role, in the absence of essential institutional changes, depends upon the ability and willingness of its members to govern affirmatively, to serve not merely as filters for detail and delay, but as analysts and catalysts and creators. That in turn depends upon us all.

—THEODORE C. SORENSEN.

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Public Obligations and the Private Corporation

PART OF THE RITUAL of our times is the repeated call by both government and business leaders for more business-government collaboration, or for more business involvement in public affairs, or for more business support for community improvement. The appeal is nearly always based upon a single theme that is best and most often summed up in the words: "Enlightened self-interest."

Businessmen of America, the message reads, help your company by helping your community: Money expended on the public interest is a long-range investment, likely to reap rich dividends. Fight unemployment because it is bad for business. Support the community hospital because the employees use it. Build higher education and research centers because they attract student customers and government contracts, and produce new business ideas. End racial discrimination in order to increase the gross national product. Expand world trade to increase sales abroad. Help with job retraining to improve the supply of manpower. Accept federal or state requests to war on poverty, or to analyze crime, or to clean up slums, or to study transportation, as a means of diversifying your product and risk—and always at a profit.

A recent New York City conference on business support of the arts spelled out this basic pocketbook theme in admirable detail. A corporate patron of culture, it was pointed out, can obtain extensive but inexpensive advertising and publicity, a brighter public reputation, an improved corporate image. The promotion of art and culture can improve the morale of employees, the recruitment of executives, and the appearance of advertising copy or even merchandise. It can build better customer relations, a better acceptance of company products, a better appraisal of their quality, and a higher income level in the local market. Aiding cultural resources can enhance the business environment; help attract top personnel, tourist trade, or other firms; and provide some income and job opportunities directly. Last but far from least, it is tax deductible.

These economic motives and those who act upon them are not to be disparaged. On the contrary, congratulations are due those firms with the vision to recognize—and the initiative to act upon—the unmistakable fact that corporate support of art or culture, or corporate wars on poverty or prejudice, are indeed in their enlightened self-interest. Their contribution to society, moreover, is certainly greater than those whose contribution consists merely of succeeding in business, paying their taxes, obeying the wage-hour laws, providing pensions, and charging off as an unwelcome but unavoidable business expense whatever donations their customers, employees, or associates pressure them into making.

But is business support of community endeavors for economic reasons enough? Is self-interest, no matter how enlightened, ever enough? Is a corporation to refrain from public-spirited activities if it cannot find an economic benefit? Are there no broader motivations, no higher obligations?

I believe there are. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, *the modern corporation has evolved into a social as well as an economic institution.* Without losing sight of its need to make a profit, it has concerns, ideals, and responsibilities which go far beyond the profit motive. It is no more expected to confine itself to economic issues than the modern clergyman is expected to speak only of religion, or the modern educator only of education. It has become, in effect, a full-fledged citizen, not only of the community in which it is located but of the country and world we all inhabit. What would become of that country and world if all its citizens acted only out of self-interest? What if every citizen supported art or public charities or took part in public affairs only in the expectation of an economic gain?

Not so many years ago, when I was a student of law, the casebooks on Corporation Law often emphasized this same message of economic self-interest. According to one basic work on corporate giving, "Enlightened selfishness is a legal requirement." The old common law rule required the showing of a direct corporate economic benefit before the corporation's funds could be used for any outside purpose. After all, it was argued, those funds belonged to the employees, the management and the shareholders. If they wished to donate or spend their money on culture or public causes, they could do so as individuals—but the board of directors or officers had no right to spend their money for them on any activity not calculated to bring a profit. Those directors and officers, it was pointed out, were selected for their business ability, and not for their social, political or artistic inclinations—which might or might not represent those of a majority of the stockholders.

BUT over the years—and especially in the last ten to fifteen years—this concept has been increasingly recognized as both invalid and outmoded. The statutes of nearly every state have been amended to permit a wider latitude of corporate activity. The Federal Banking Act, the Internal Revenue Code, the form of most new corporate charters, and the stockholders of most modern corporations have all reflected this same trend. Where the statutes have not been changed sufficiently to dispose of all questions, the courts have been increasingly liberal in finding (or inventing) indirect corporate benefits to support worthwhile corporate efforts that go beyond narrow business purposes. The welfare of business generally, for example, or the intangible goodwill to be earned by a company, or the higher taxes that would be required

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Editorial

Continued from page 24

if the government assumed all responsibility for such endeavors, or the broad benefits a corporation receives from its community—these are among the justifications which have been cited in judicial decisions in order to uphold public-spirited business activities.

Today, there is reason to believe that the courts, if necessary, would uphold corporation expenditures for the public good without a showing of even indirect economic benefit to the corporation. Justice Jacobs of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in the 1953 case of *A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. vs. Barlow*, came very close to doing just that in upholding what he termed a desire by corporations "to insure and strengthen the society which gives them existence." "Modern conditions," he declared, "require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of the communities within which they operate."

THE trend of the law, as is usually the case, reflects the trend of history. The decline of kings and clergy as wealthy patrons of charity and the arts, and the reduced proportion of great personal fortunes as the result of estate and income taxes, have combined to increase the role and responsibility of the corporation. Two world wars, a depression, a civil rights revolution, the effects of industrialization and automation, and a host of other changes have impressed upon corporations their obligations of citizenship. Business enterprises, like all other citizens, now recognize more clearly than ever that they can survive and succeed only in an atmosphere of liberty, progress, and prosperity.

It is still possible and even popular to quote Sir Edward Coke's declaration of 1612 that corporations "have no soul." But certainly today they can have hearts. They can have consciences and social responsibility. They can understand values as well as prices; and they can make sacrifices as well as profits.

This is not merely a change of public relations image. Nor is it merely a response to the growth and maturity of the stockholder public. It is an evolution in the role of the corporation as an institution—a recognition of its social and other unwritten obligations as a central bulwark of our society. The corporation's concerns, its responsibilities, and its influence are broader than ever before. Business is a citizen in the deepest sense, an integral part of a larger community, and must meet its obligations to that community and to its fellow citizens. Forty years ago Calvin Coolidge could make his famous remark that "the business of America is business." Today the business of business is America.

Financial contributions to good causes, the promotion of art and culture, cooperation with the voluntary White House guidelines on wages, prices and overseas investments, are all important but not enough. I would hope to see more corporations involving themselves—actively, not simply verbally—in the search for solutions to some of the tough problems of our time: the reduction of hard-core unemployment among teenage drop-outs and unskilled Negroes, for example, or untangling the strangled state of transportation, or smoothing the way for the good and ill effects of automation and cybernetics.

These efforts should not be confined to domestic issues. The current famine in India requires more than U.S. Government funds and food surpluses. It requires extraordinary amounts of talent and imagination in transportation, distribution and other fields well known to business. The current war in Vietnam requires more than troops and weapons. It requires new social, economic and educational programs to make pacification work—programs which by comparison must dwarf industry's efforts to war on poverty here at home. The new and proclaimed policy of ending China's isolation without ending its containment requires more than diplomatic pronouncements. It will in time require, among other things, the kind of export-import market surveys and trade initiatives in non-strategic goods that American businessmen must undertake.

None of this is easy. The exercise of corporate leadership in the public policy arena is certain to bring clashes with customers, employees, stockholders, other corporations and the federal government itself. I have sat on both sides of the table in situations pitting business against the government, and seen how all too often those conflicts arose because one side never stopped to think of the other's interest. We need more bridges of communication and understanding between government and business—and they should not all be built by the government.

No doubt, in this age of specialization, many business leaders will plead that they have no interest in problems outside their business. That the country cannot afford. We are all citizens first and businessmen or lawyers or doctors or whatever second. The corporation's influence upon our nation, its power for good and for progress, imposes upon it obligations of citizenship and leadership which it has no choice but to accept—in support of the goals of the Great Society (whether or not its politics are endorsed by the corporation's owners and managers) and in support of the good society as well.

—THEODORE C. SORENSEN.

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rhetorical principle of amplification, various repetitions of the same sinister theme that is, in sum, a highly dramatized exaggeration (or "hyperbole," to use a term that Bloom does exceptionally well by) for this temporary fanciful "return" to the exacting conditions under which his "poetic ancestry" took form. Here is another notable respect in which the motivations of the poetic breakaway are not dealt with throughout; yet one can't deny that they are there.

Two other major fields should still be considered. Having glancingly noted that Vico and I stress the four "major tropes" (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony), Bloom adds hyperbole and metalepsis (or transumption). And he does wonders by them all. I started this review on that theme. But I abandoned that start because it involves issues too specifically literary for a general approach to the book. As I understand Bloom's added emphasis, atop the stylistic exaggeration (hyperbole) of the "Childe's" temporary imaginary return to guilt-laden origins (essentially experienced as a relationship to his actual parents as vs. his new poetic unnaturalization), I'd take it that metalepsis, or transumption, would involve considerations of this sort.

The *Phaedrus* takes us from seed in the sense of sheer sperm to the heights of the Socratic erotic, as transcendently embodied in the idea of doctrinal insemination. And similarly, via hyperbole and metalepsis, we'd advance from an ephebe's sheer *physical* release to a *poetically* ejaculatory analogue, implicit in the imagery of Childe Roland's hornblow.

There is at least one more major strand that should be mentioned in a review (the "news") of this exceptionally and admirably subtle and complex work. Whereas, in my *Rhetoric of Religion*, for the start of things I had been content to borrow secular "logological" analogies from the opening chapters of Genesis, Bloom prefers a "logocentric" version by Isaac Luria, "a sixteenth-century master of theosophical speculation," who "formulated a regressive theory . . . in a revision of the earlier Kabbalistic emanation theory." In any case we coincide to the extent that his "Lurianic story" contains "a vision of creation-as-catastrophe," and mine builds around the orthodox biblical account that integrally connects the "Creation" with the "Fall." Maybe we could settle for this quotation from Coleridge's *Table Talk*: "A Fall of some sort or other—the creation, as it were, of the non-absolute—is the fundamental postulate of the moral history of man."

Bloom announces that he intends to do more with Luria's visionary ways. I am sure that the job of following him will be well worth the effort of any reader who, along with both poetry and poetics, also loves criticism in general for its own sake.

Kenneth Burke

Kenneth Burke, distinguished American critic, is author of *Philosophy of Literary Form*, *A Grammar of Motives*, *The Rhetoric of Religion* (University of California Press), a novel, short stories and poetry.

Half Lesson

Watchmen in the Night by Theodore C. Sorensen

(MIT Press; $8.95)

"Watergate is like a Rorschach," Aaron Wildavsky observed at a Washington seminar last year. "If you want to know what anyone thinks is wrong with the country, ask him what Watergate has to teach us."

Theodore Sorensen bears out that thesis: it was not that Richard Nixon was too *strong* a President that led to the Watergate abuses, argues John Kennedy's White House special counsel; on the contrary it was that he was too *weak*, *i.e.*, "he was not in the mold of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, the two Roosevelts, and others."

That he was not. Nor was he in the mold of Millard Fillmore and Calvin Coolidge. But Sorensen has a point to make, and he does it in the way Ben Sonnenberg once described the art of successful public relations: "First, throw your dart. Next, draw a circle around it. That was the target."

Sorensen is not without strategic purpose in this treatise, the outgrowth of lectures given last fall at MIT. He came to political maturity in the school that holds that there has never been anything wrong with the country that a good strong President couldn't set right. The accession of a not-so-good President—but one nevertheless capable of using the sinews of his powerful office for ends inimical to the democratic process—has clearly confronted the author and other members of the school for strong presidencies with a doctrinal dilemma.

Sorensen acknowledges that problem, at a personal level, in his preface:

> *I helped write John Kennedy's speeches on a strong Presidency and helped him forge the legal tools of a stronger Presidency in the mistaken belief that what was good for the Presidency would inevitably be good for the country.*

The style is reminiscent: New Frontier, playing off the simplism of Engine Charlie Wilson. Or, again: "Nixon kept saying that the charges against him raised fundamental questions about our whole concept of the Presidency; and in my heart I know he's right." This is vintage Sorensen, of the turning phrase, familiar to all who recall his contribution to those dazzling exercises in presidential persuasion of the early 1960s.

Central to this exercise is Sorensen's laundry list of suggested institutional reforms to make the presidency more "accountable" without diminishing its power. He believes Congress must show more "guts" in carrying out its constitutional role; that the press must remain vigilant (his defense of leaks-in-government is the liveliest section of the book); and that the judiciary must assert itself more vigorously as a check against executive authority.

Yet, too often, the author's stylistic whorls and semantic inversions posed problems for this reviewer—not unlike those I sometimes encountered on reexamining the presidential speeches he helped craft, after their initial dazzle had faded.

"No doubt," Sorensen confesses at one point, "my view of the Nixon Presidency is distorted by bias." He does admit he was "mistaken" in his simplistic faith regarding the absolute virtue of presidential power. Given that fresh insight, a pre-Nixon White House aide of his ability and experience might provide instruction far more valuable than anything a Dean or Magruder could impart at this advanced stage of the public's post-Watergate education.

The Nixon presidency has been anatomized as has no presidency gone before. But if we know the Nixon White House better than any other, what of its predecessors? If a lawyer (as distinguished from a journalist like George Reedy) of Sorensen's unique back-

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ground were now to apply his critical faculties to the subject of presidential power-before-Nixon, what might we learn about the institutional genesis of Watergate?

That question, of course, presupposes recognition of a link between the criminal excesses of Nixon's White House and the growth of presidential power during the previous half-century of war and domestic emergency. It suggests that whatever Nixon's failings as a national leader, he was not a mere aberration but an inevitability; that if there had been no Nixon in 1972, there would have been some future "strong" President to cross the line between bugging a foreign embassy (for "national security" reasons) and bugging his domestic political opposition (for "national security" reasons).

Sorensen, however, remains stylistic but contradictory on this question. In a chapter titled "Was Nixon an Aberrant?" he first tempts the reader:

> *I cannot deny, based on my own heady atmosphere in the White House, that the same conditions and motivations that led to Watergate could well recur. The dangers it symbolized did not begin and will not end with Richard Nixon.*

But after only that brief reference to his "own experience," he again shifts into high imagery:

> *An overreaction to [Nixon's] singular deeds in the form of drastic institutional or structural alterations [in the presidency] would be equally dangerous. But as John Dean said in his famous warning to Nixon, there is a 'cancer growing in the White House.' Cancers being hard to curb completely, this one was not wholly terminated in 1974. I now realize I saw traces of it in 1964. Unless we act, it could reach Orwellian proportions by 1984.*

Well, then, *does* the author consider Nixon an aberrant? It would appear from this passage that he does not. Yet, at a later point, Sorensen goes to some lengths to establish that our 37th President was not only an institutional mutant, but even a political accident! (He would never have been elected in 1968, you see, if only. . . .)

Indeed this passage encapsulates both the recurrent theme and pervasive flaw contained in this book. Why, pray tell, "1964"—rather than, say 1962 or 1963, the halcyon years of the author's "own experience" in "that heady atmosphere"? There are two possibilities. First, that Sorensen chose to sacrifice substance for digital symmetry. Second, that despite his profession of "mistake," the author is unable to overcome his bias, not simply as an old Nixon adversary but as a polemicist for the Kennedy presidency and its legacy.

"Emotions (*re* Watergate) may still run too high to permit a careful and objective evaluation of long-standing institutional arrangements," Sorensen says. "But we cannot ignore the problem."

No, we cannot. But neither do we "learn" from Watergate through texts that face up only to that part of the lesson that gives comfort to an author's partisan predispositions.

Victor Gold

Victor Gold is a syndicated columnist whose columns appear in many newspapers in this country.

Grunt's Viewpoint

American Boys by Steven Phillip Smith

(Putnam; $8.95)

No great work of American literature has emerged from the wreckage of Vietnam, and perhaps none ever will. The cool eye of the camera told us that the real Vietnam consisted of defoliated jungles, bomb-pocked rice paddies, squalid refugee camps and GIs going home in plastic body bags.

Perhaps somewhere in the jungles and mountains of that troubled land a Vietnamese soldier is compiling an account that will one day be the *War and Peace* of his nation, but no American novelist could ever hope to create such an epic. Suffering unredeemed by a larger purpose will never be a theme of great literature.

The images recorded by the camera, so vivid at the time, have begun to fade. The historian will one day tell us what happened, but the novelist must tell us what it was like being an American soldier in Vietnam. Steven Phillip Smith has attempted to do that in his first novel and has largely succeeded. Although he fails to sustain his description and characterization sufficiently for us to develop a strong sense of place and person, the language, vignettes and attitudes of American soldiers are authentic and frequently enthralling.

Four young soldiers meet on the Trenton-to-Newark train and subsequently team up, volunteering for assignment to Europe. They go to Fulda Gap, Germany, suffer from the boredom of garrison life and volunteer for Vietnam a short time after the first American combat troops have landed there. If the situation seems stock, so do the characters: a college football jock who likes to kill, a black pulled between his artistic inclinations and street-fighting realities, a college drop-out who tosses away academic values and experience and a Minnesota farm boy who discovers those values and hungers for the experience the ex-Berkeley student gave up. All that is missing is that standard World War II scene where the private, about to go into combat for the first time, turns to his sergeant and says, "Gee, Sarge, I'm scared." (To which the sergeant inevitably replies: "That's all right, son. So am I.")

Although the approach is reminiscent of the novels of other wars, the content is not. Vietnam was unique in the American experience, and the author is at his best when he describes the attitudes and frustrations of soldiers in pursuit of an enemy who is everywhere and yet nowhere. They rarely encounter him face to face; more often than not, they simply fire at trees, bushes and mountains where they suspect he may be hiding. When they finally do see a rifleman in the open shooting at their helicopters, all their rockets and machine gun bullets cannot kill him; a squad of infantry is sent in, but they cannot find him. They presume he must be dead but then he reappears, fires several shots and once again disappears. The Minnesotan tries to calculate the cost of the ammunition fired at this one man by his two-helicopter team and then ruminates: "Add the other three pairs of gunships like Webster's, and you got a combined total, conservative estimate, of fifty thousand five hundred dollars, not counting postage and handling. The B-52s would surely push it over a hundred—making the man worth more than Willie Mays—and yet he knew, come morning, the man would be dancing on his pile of rubble after

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A DIALOGUE WITH BONN

Some suggestions for what might—but won't—be said.

By THEODORE C. SORENSEN

WEST GERMAN Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger plans to meet soon with President Johnson in the White House. If the customary procedure is followed, the joint communiqué—which is to be issued by the two governments *after* the conference in order to tell the world of the progress achieved—will be drafted well in *advance* of the conference, borrowing phrases from a barrelful of previous such communiqués to describe the "atmosphere of mutual respect and cordiality," the "frank and useful talks," the renewed "pledge" to achieve German reunification, and the "increased understanding, friendship, and harmony" which was achieved without the need for any "new, specific commitments" by either government.

In this same spirit of planning ahead, I would like to suggest the following advance draft transcript of the top-level conversations themselves, not, in all probability, as they *will* be, but as in my fondest hopes I think they *should* be:

JOHNSON: Welcome to Washington, Mr. Chancellor! I appreciate this opportunity to talk with you and get your advice. Frankly, the Vietnamese war has required—because it is a war—so much of our time and attention that you have some justification for feeling neglected by everyone except Hubert. But I want to assure you that our responsibilities elsewhere have not in fact diminished our concern for Western European affairs or our obligations toward our allies. And let me also assure you that—while we welcome your understanding of our position in Vietnam—we are not in any way conditioning our regard for you, and our cooperation with your government or any other government, upon your endorsing every aspect of our Vietnamese policy.

KIESINGER: Thank you, Mr. President, for those words of welcome and friendship. We have needed to talk frankly for a long time and should not reserve consultations for moments of crisis or antagonism. I am reassured by your statement that Western Europe has not lost its place in your priorities by virtue of the war in Vietnam; and we hope that your new consular pact, East-West trade bill, and other bridges to the East are forerunners of a renewed effort by your government to solidify the present détente in Europe. We recognize that Vietnam has understandably preoccupied your thoughts and we hope that the war can soon be ended; but we also know from recent experiences with the East Germans that it takes two to negotiate, and we have no wish to meddle in that matter.

JOHNSON: Why, then, have some Germans denounced our Vietnam policy?

KIESINGER: It is not popular, Mr. President, but only a small and sometimes noisy group is deeply concerned. There is an unease about American policy among West Germans but it is related to the war only in the sense that Vietnam has prevented you from devoting as much attention as you might otherwise to Western and Eastern Europe. My country has a fresh impulse now for seeking reconciliation with the East, and we intend to go ahead without waiting for you. Do not be angry. Germans are grateful for America's long years of aid and mindful of the importance of your military shield. But we want to be your partner, not your dependent, and we do not want our own initiatives stifled by your embrace.

JOHNSON: Far from being angry, Mr. Chancellor, we welcome the new vigor of your foreign policy. We see no reason to mistrust your contacts with the Soviets and hope you will not mistrust ours as some of your predecessors and colleagues have done. Neither one of us is going to betray the other or the alliance, or reach an accommodation at the other's expense, or for that matter forget that the Soviet Union, for all its new ways, still hopes to gain advantages for itself in Europe by splitting the West and isolating the United States. In that kind of peaceful but serious contest this government realizes that it has more to gain by having free and outspoken allies than simply submissive satellites who, having lost the taste for involvement, might prove to be useless at some critical moment of testing.

KIESINGER: I am delighted to hear you say that, Mr. President; and I will report [illegible] West European leaders, for I think the Soviets have been particularly active in pressing their points with all of us lately while you have been looking the other way toward Asia. It is true that some Germans were afraid that you might, in exchange for the Kremlin's help in ending the war in Vietnam, make some deal which would possibly destroy our hopes for the future. But you're right, there is no more reason for us to be suspicious of your bridges to the East than there is for you to be suspicious of ours. We are going right ahead and building all we can. We no longer refuse diplomatic relations with those Eastern European nations that recognize the East German regime; we are expanding trade, travel, and talks with Eastern Europe; and we've tried to make it clear to the Kremlin that we are not doing this for anti-Soviet reasons, to weaken their role—we want to talk more with them, too.

JOHNSON: That is the same spirit in which we have approached the nonproliferation treaty some of your people have been grumbling about. If we cannot prevent a world in which a dozen or two dozen nations have nuclear weapons, then everyone—you and I and the Russians and the French and everyone else and their children—will be living in constant terror.

KIESINGER: We have been giving that some thought, Mr. President. We have accepted your assurances that you and the British intend to keep us completely informed on both diplomatic and scientific developments, that we will not be denied the opportunity to master the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and that we will not be left behind in the age of nuclear technology. So we have decided to support the treaty wholeheartedly.

JOHNSON: Wonderful!

KIESINGER: More than that, inasmuch as Soviet suspicions about our participation in a NATO or West European nuclear force are helping hold up the treaty, we have decided to renounce for all time any desire to have any kind of West German finger on a nuclear trigger . . .

JOHNSON: Pardon me, I'm not sure either the interpreter or I understood you correctly. Did you really say "renounce for all time"?

KIESINGER: That's right. We wouldn't like you or the Soviets pressuring us into doing that. We have our pride, too. But we have decided that our prestige is secure with our economic, cultural, political, and diplomatic leadership, and that our safety is secure with our allies. We don't need or want nuclear weapons. They would only cause more suspicion in the East, more disunity in the West, and more fear from those in both East and West who, I recognize, have some basis in history for fearing Germany as a military

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power. The resulting isolation could make us less secure than we are now; and our principal interest is to prevent a nuclear war, because we'd be among the first to get hit.

JOHNSON: You are very wise, Mr. Chancellor. I learned in Texas and Capitol Hill politics a long time ago how well it is to make a virtue out of necessity. But I thought you might preserve this for future bargaining power.

KIESINGER: We had considered that. But that would only cause the other side to increase the price of reunification; and in the meantime it would raise expectations and demands in our own country that can never be fulfilled. I know Germany would never be permitted to become a nuclear power, even if we wanted to be one. So I see no point in preserving that threat merely to trade it away in the future. Instead of increasing the militancy and unity of the East with that kind of demand, we want to make this our special contribution to peace and reconciliation. We will announce it soon in Bonn—a renunciation for all time of the acquisition of any degree of ownership or control of nuclear weapons.

JOHNSON: You and your country can take great pride in that, Mr. Chancellor. And I am certain it will help make possible the kind of reconstituted Europe in which Germany can some day be reunited. Yet you and I know that goal is still a long way off, and no pressure or threat either one of us can bring to bear will help achieve it.

KIESINGER: I know that, Mr. President; and I know reunification will never come about without both American and Soviet support. My government is trying to do away with a lot of wishful thinking and empty protest practices of the past. We know we don't control or speak for the people in East Germany. We may not recognize their regime as a legitimate *foreign* government, but we know it's there and we have to deal with it on common problems. We ask that none of your statements or actions or pacts with Moscow appear to foreclose reunification permanently . . .

JOHNSON: Of course we won't . . .

KIESINGER: But we won't object to every pact that doesn't promise it. On the contrary, we are going to find a way to drop our claim to the prewar Eastern boundaries and accept the Oder-Niesse frontier with Poland. That's another "bargaining point" we might as well forget right now in the interest of peace. And we are making it clear that we will respect all borders in Central and Eastern Europe and never use force to change them.

JOHNSON: Mr. Chancellor, you are stamping yourself and your country as foremost leaders in the pursuit of peace. We Americans support reunification because we know that the unnatural division of a land and of a people can be a dangerous source of tension and conflict. So reunification is in everyone's interest if it comes peacefully. What a shame that the East Germans seem to be backing away even more.

KIESINGER: Yes, they want as little as possible to do with us or our new policies. But we intend to keep after them—trying to ameliorate the situation in Berlin especially, with more openings of the Wall, more cooperation on travel and traffic, more contacts of every kind. The only response so far has been for them to charge us with reviving Nazism and *revanchism* and to call me a Nazi as well.

JOHNSON: Mr. Chancellor, I regret very much that a few people in this country have laid unnecessary and irrelevant stress on your acknowledgement of the fact that you were very briefly a member of a Nazi organization a long, long time ago. Certainly you have demonstrated your belief these past many years in democratic values and human dignity; and if the sins of our youth were used to judge any one of us in public life today, very few would meet the test. As the first postwar chancellor to denounce formally the Munich past, you have every right to resent these attacks, whether they come from Communists or misguided Americans. In fact, West Germany as a whole has earned through these long years of testing and scrutiny the right to be judged by its present adherence to a free society and not by its tragic past. But, Mr. Chancellor, there is legitimate concern in this country and elsewhere about the revival of nationalist-minded parties in some parts of West Germany. Is there a danger of Nazism and anti-Semitism coming back?

KIESINGER: We are aware of your concern, Mr. President, and to a large extent we share it. In perspective, however, these new right-wing forces have made very small political gains. Under our system, we cannot ban their party, and I doubt whether that would help anyway. But I can assure you that the overwhelming majority of West Germans detest this new group's invocation of the old Nazi memories and anti-Semitic whispers; and we will watch them to make certain they become no real danger.

JOHNSON: We have talked before, Mr. Chancellor, as have our representatives, about a thinning-out of American troops now stationed in Germany. Is it true that this would only play into the hands of your right wing?

KIESINGER: Mr. President, you cannot base your policies on the predictions of their impact upon our domestic politics. Those who continually build up the specter of a militarist revival are only going to help it come true. We know that your present force levels in our country cannot stay there forever and that your military, fiscal, and balance of payments problems call for a reduction.

JOHNSON: A thinning-out of troops will not reduce our commitment or intention, I assure you, nor—with modern air troop transports—will those men be any further away from Berlin in terms of hours than they were when first stationed in West Germany. We are not, I can assure you, going to make this decision on the basis of how many arms you purchase from us to offset the dollar cost. You are absolutely right to have resented our doing it on that basis, which was, in reality, making an end out of a means. But we do feel that the threat of Soviet aggression in Europe has sharply declined since the Cuban missile crisis.

KIESINGER: We agree, Mr. President, and we hope that your action will cause the Soviets to reduce their troops in East Germany and Eastern Europe. So don't worry whether you call it a thinning-out or a redeployment. We know it's a withdrawal and we can live with it. But I want you to know that we do not share General de Gaulle's opposition to an American presence in Western Europe or his contempt for the NATO commitment. NATO's role should change to meet the new challenge of détente but we cannot afford to have it dissolved.

JOHNSON: I appreciate that, Mr. Chancellor. And it is not our desire to put you into a position where you have to choose between France and the United States, or between the status quo and the end of our friendship, or between a détente with the East and an alliance with the West. Forcing any of those choices upon you would not be in our interest, either.

KIESINGER: Mr. President, our degree of agreement is astonishing.

JOHNSON: It certainly is; and that, along with all these new initiatives, makes this proposed communiqué drafted for us by the State Department obsolete. I'll just tear it up. Incidentally, how do you explain your ability to undertake all these bold new policies in contrast with your two predecessors?

KIESINGER: One reason is our Grand Coalition. The major opposition party and our own have formed a joint government; and as long as it lasts, hopefully until the next election, we can push forward in many directions without fear of political reprisals.

JOHNSON: There's a thought. Now, when we go over to lunch, why don't you go up to Senator Dirksen and . . .

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The Rate of Dissent

EDITOR'S NOTE: *With this issue Theodore C. Sorensen joins the editorial board of Saturday Review. Mr. Sorensen, former special assistant and counsel to President John F. Kennedy and author of "Kennedy," and currently with the New York law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, will become an SR Editor-at-Large and will contribute occasional editorials, articles, and reviews to these pages.*

AN AIRCRAFT'S rate of descent, if too steep, can be disastrous, as recent crashes have demonstrated. A nation's rate of dissent, however sharp, may actually be a sign of its political health. A society strong enough to sustain strong criticism is one that the people are most likely to sustain.

Unity, not dissent, is every President's goal. The kind of national unity that is produced by a careful exposition and examination of all possible courses, and by an effective, informed consensus behind the course that is ultimately taken, is a considerable asset for any administration confronted by crisis or war. But unity does not depend on unanimity. Even a nation stirred by controversy is better prepared for its world responsibilities than a nation locked in complacency. The United States has won wars and worldwide respect over the years not simply by virtue of its greater firepower, or manpower, or financial power but also because of its brainpower—the strength of its ideas and ideals and intelligence.

In Vietnam today, military force alone offers no final solution. It can at best provide only the time, territory, and sense of security in which a solution can be worked out. The solution will require a range of diplomatic, political, social, and economic ideas not automatically or easily available to our policy-makers. In that light, all responsible discussion and debate over alternatives—and over alternative military strategies as well—should be encouraged.

Dissent, it is said, can aid our adversaries. That is true. Totalitarian societies, reading censored news in the light of fantastic dogma, have a considerable capacity to delude themselves that a divergence of American opinion represents weakness and lack of will. Our national purposes should not be misunderstood. But the remedy lies not in shutting off debate, but in making those purposes clearer than ever before—to both our adversaries and our allies, to both world and domestic opinion. The essential message here should be that the very diversity we permit is what we seek to protect in more vulnerable lands, a diversity of political, economic, religious, and social institutions and beliefs, free from the tyranny of any one party, clique, or external power.

Our indulgence of dissent and debate, far from deserving the label of unpatriotic, is in fact the quality that distinguishes us most from our adversaries in Vietnam and around the world. Surely none of the Founding Fathers, who bitterly debated with one another over the form of union, was any less a patriot for denouncing the majority view. The greater danger to this country over the long run lies not in debate and dissent [...] topic, policy, man, or institution beyond the realm of criticism.

The critics and dissenters, it is said, rarely have as much information as the official policy-makers. That, also, is true. But the remedy once again should be not less debate but more information. "Knowledge," said Emerson, "is the antidote to fear"; and the present widespread uneasiness about our course in Vietnam—a deep sense of concern and despair not yet accurately reflected in the opinion polls—cannot be allayed without more knowledge.

The worst reason of all a man may have for not speaking out in dissent is the notion that his voice is too small to accomplish anything. The question of how many voters a dissenter represents is no more relevant than Stalin's old question about how many divisions were around the Pope. The evolution of an "idea whose time has come"—the gradual, almost imperceptible shifts in the atmosphere of decision—the combing and weighing of a thousand ideas before the right blend is produced—who can say what his contribution is to these processes? George Norris maintained that his toughest battles were fought for losing causes so that "sometime in the future . . . [others] would be able to see the light."

DISSENTERS, of course, must be prepared to accept criticism as well as hand it out. They must recognize that they have no more monopoly on truth than the majority. They must admit that they have a lot to learn from practical politicians, diplomats, and generals who have direct operating responsibilities. They must be prepared to come forth with constructive alternatives, and not permit every protest movement to be taken over by irrational misfits, malcontents, and publicity-seekers.

There is no gain in making a fetish out of rebellion and alienation. Dissenters who are as inflexible and intolerant of disagreement as those at the opposite end of the spectrum are merely creating a new conformism of their own. To reduce complex questions of foreign policy to a series of slogans or shouts—to agree with the Far Right, for example, that our only choice in Asia is surrender or nuclear war—acts only to obscure the debate, not to improve it.

The debate must be improved. It must be continued. It helps test those policies that are right, it helps correct those that are wrong. More than seventy years ago the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, dismissing "socialist" charges against Professor Richard T. Ely, endorsed for all time "that continual and fearless sifting and winnowing by which alone the truth can be found." We can do no less today.

—THEODORE C. SORENSEN.

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Stars at Night But No Electric Light

A Giant Step, by Clyde T. Ellis (Random House. 267 pp. $5), records the struggles of the REA and the NRECA to bring electric power to America's rural population. Theodore C. Sorensen, SR editor-at-large and former special counsel to the President, is author of "Kennedy."

By THEODORE C. SORENSEN

ONE OF my clearest childhood recollections is of my father addressing the dedication of an early Nebraska rural electrification project (REA). He illustrated his point with a story his children found only fairly funny—the tale, herein abbreviated for the sake of more sophisticated readers, of the farmer berated by his wife for purchasing a pair of overalls some twelve inches too long. In the dark of the night, upset by their quarrel, the wife found the overalls and her scissors and snipped off a foot from each pant-leg. So did the farmer. So did his mother-in-law, hoping to restore peace. In the morning all discovered that their good intentions had been ruined by a lack of cooperation—and cooperation, concluded my father, who had helped found Nebraska's unique public power system, was the theme of REA.

It is also the theme of this book. The struggles of American public power development in general, and of the Rural Electrification Administration and its programs in particular, are here related with understandable pride and prejudice by one of their foremost champions, Clyde Ellis, general manager of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) since its founding in 1942, and for the previous four years a young Congressman from Arkansas. Ellis provides a readable, personalized, "inside" account of the battles lost as well as those that were won in the process of this nation's taking "a giant step."

That the electrification of American farms was a giant step is no longer denied by the private power companies who, with few exceptions, openly fought the REA and the NRECA every inch of the way. Rural America in 1934 had many of the attributes of an undeveloped nation. Nine out of ten farms had no electricity. Days were spent in needless drudgery, nights in near-darkness. Franklin Roosevelt, George Norris, Sam Rayburn, and a host of others—including Congressman Lyndon Johnson—fashioned in the REA the instrument by which federal credit and leadership, working through local cooperatives and power districts, could revolutionize life on the farm. Today, with power lines serving the most remote and humble farm family in America, nations that despaired of ever developing their own countryside now look to the REA experience as a model.

Indeed, the steps taken since 1961 to "export" the REA pattern form one of the most interesting and important parts of this book. In Latin America, in Vietnam, and elsewhere in Asia and the developing world, REA and NRECA specialists have been at work, establishing cooperatives, building projects, and demonstrating American idealism, compassion, and talent in a way no ambassador or Voice of America broadcast could match. Ellis recalls his role in helping initiate these efforts, and his many visits to these areas. The pride he expresses can be shared by all his fellow citizens.

These fascinating episodes in American history—particularly the birth-pangs suffered by REA at the outset and its buffeting under Ezra Taft Benson—are here set forth in a low-key, dry, and often colorless fashion that relies on the facts themselves to provide the drama. Indeed, the book in many ways is like Clyde Ellis himself—modest for a man who has worked with five Presidents; uncompromising but soft-spoken; dedicated but easygoing; more intent upon proving a point than upon leavening his message with humor or human interest. Thus a potentially hilarious tale of how Ellis and President Truman included identical paragraphs in their speeches at a dam dedication, and a potentially moving account of a poverty-stricken Latin American farmhand offering his child for sale to Ellis's group of touring AID advisers, lack the elaboration which a professional writer might have offered.

Clyde Ellis makes no pretense of being a professional writer. Nor does he pretend to live up to the stereotype of the typical high-powered lobbyist who dispenses vast funds or ugly threats. Nor, finally, does he pretend to be the naïve idealist who wants his crusade untarnished by political considerations, pressure tactics, and the use of such devices as the filibuster or the unauthorized disclosure of government memoranda. Ellis is, as this book makes clear, unabashedly a single-interest lobbyist. That is both the book's strength and its weakness. Some will complain that he overstates his case and oversimplifies the problems, that he magnifies both the virtues of REA's friends and the vices of REA's enemies. But others will profit from his firsthand insight into the operations of political, public relations, and, especially, legislative campaigns. It is to his credit that he recounts those efforts which ended in defeat as well as his successes.

IT IS further to his credit that this book looks ahead as well as back. In many ways the original goals of REA have been all but fulfilled. The farms are electrified, the Agency is secure, the cooperatives are flourishing. But Ellis and his associates are not resting on their accomplishments. As long as farms in other parts of the world need help with their electrification programs, as long as poverty continues to scar large parts of rural America, as long as the need for more sources of credit and electric power in the future concern NRECA members, and as long as the great potential of electric power pooling and interconnections in the country lies largely untapped, Clyde Ellis will not be satisfied. Neither, may I add, will I.



"Independent research having established that the attention level of any audience that would watch this show is practically nil, I must ask you to pay particular attention while I repeat this commercial message for the third time."

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Do We Need Peace Candidates?

I. The Case for the Mainstream

EDITOR'S NOTE: *It has been suggested that adherents of peace movements should run for public office on a Peace Ticket. Here are two views on the subject, by SR Editor-at-Large Theodore C. Sorensen and by Arthur I. Waskow, resident fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.*

THE SINGLE MOST important fact for *SR* readers to grasp about the 1966 American "peace politics movement" is that there was no such thing.

To lump together the candidacies of various Republicans, Democrats, independents, "New Leftists," and Communists as a "movement" is the height of absurdity. To claim that all or even most of the votes received by successful incumbents or even by nearly successful challengers represented voters favoring immediate withdrawal from Vietnam is the height of naiveté. To label as a success an effort which after considerable noise and energy cannot accurately claim as its own a single new Congressman or solid new organization of respectable strength is the height of exaggeration.

Absurdity, naiveté, and exaggeration in American politics are neither new nor [illegible]. But when they are self-deceiving and self-destructive, then those who are [illegible] concerned about more emphasis on peace in American foreign policy ought to reconsider the wisdom of these tactics.

I admire the idealism of those who advocate this kind of "peace politics movement." I share their distress over the frequent lack of high quality candidates in both parties in many areas. I sympathize with their frustrations over Vietnam. But I question whether they are helping the cause of peace as much as they are hurting it.

In those areas in which the peace candidate was principally supported by extremists in politics, appearance, and mores, it became more difficult for voters or candidates in the mainstream majority of American life to identify with peace causes. In those areas in which the peace candidate received a pitifully small handful of votes, it became easier for "hard-line" Congressmen to ignore all future pleas and petitions in that direction.

In those areas in which the peace candidates were entered as independents or write-in candidates in the general election, they diverted into a hopeless effort the votes, money, and energy sorely needed by the least hawkish of the main party candidates. In those areas in which the peace candidates, by dividing the liberal vote, made even greater the margin of conservative victory, they [illegible] hailed the victory as a stronger mandate for escalation.

In those areas in which the peace candidates diverted enough votes to defeat the Democratic nominees—which apparently happened in Connecticut and possibly Michigan—they antagonized the Democratic leaders whom they hoped to persuade, and elected Republicans unlikely to give the "peace movement's" views a moment's thought. In some areas, peace-minded incumbents (whose victories nevertheless are now claimed by those hailing the new "movement") were even opposed by other peace candidates who did not find the incumbents peaceful enough.

In short, the "peace politics movement" is not a movement, did not serve the interests of peace, and clearly knows little about politics.

I can understand why these peace warriors—many of them as uncompromising, dogmatic, and militant as any "hard-liner"—would not have wanted Paul Douglas or Pat Brown to be Secretary of State. But does that justify their refusing to support for re-election "the Conscience of the Senate," who was for so long a leader in the struggle against discrimination and poverty—or justify their permitting Ronald Reagan to take over responsibility for Watts, for California's system of higher education, and for all the other problems of the nation's largest state? If this country moves toward the Reagans and away from the Douglases, does that build the kind of domestic climate from which a new foreign policy can emerge?

The fact is that the American electorate in 1966 contained widespread and deeply felt discontent over Vietnam and related issues. But that discontent could not be effectively tapped by a wildly unrealistic, undisciplined, unappealing assortment of write-in and independent candidates. Nor will it in the future. Americans desirous of a basic change in our foreign policy in general and our Vietnam policy in particular ought to face frankly the fact that the two major parties, as imperfect as they may be, offer the best and probably in [illegible] the only hope for bringing about such change.

No doubt many of those who feel strongly about the war in Vietnam sincerely feel that neither major party in 1966 or 1968 offers them a real choice on the issues that matter to them most. That is the same cry now being [illegible] by former Governor Wallace of Alabama. But despite all the talk [illegible] about a coalition peace movement embracing everyone from businessmen hurt by the war to student radicals, it is extremely doubtful that control of [illegible] party, or the Congress, or the [illegible]

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House, will ever ma... and single-issue candidates and parties (who, no matter how much they pretend to be multi-issue in character, inevitably relate all other issues to Vietnam) are not truly helping the cause of peace when they ignore or oppose those "imperfect" mainstream candidates whose efforts on race relations, foreign aid, poverty, education, and population control may in the long run shape our posture in Asia far more than their stand for or against Marshal Ky.

I do not want those stirred by the war to drop all interest in politics. I want them to take a realistic interest—by seeking to influence those major party figures ... key decisions not by denouncing them or pressuring them, not by entering against them extremist candidates with no appeal to the general electorate, but by educating and involving the opinion-makers in each constituency to a point where they are ready to urge reason upon the incumbent or urge a more reasonable candidate to run. For, as John Kennedy said at American University:

"Genuine peace must be . . . a process . . . the sum of many acts . . . based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions. . . ."

—THEODORE C. SORENSEN.

2. *Building from the Grass Roots*

FOR THE AMERICAN peace movement, 1966 was a year of putting unprecedented energy into electoral politics. In the process it learned—or should have learned—two major lessons: 1) Victory is never enough; 2) you don't campaign for peace alone.

Victory is never enough and defeat is not always a disaster because in American politics there is one factor more important than the number of votes you won on Election Day: the number of people who came together *and will stay together* to organize, pressure, question, and energize. Without such a permanent group at home, a victorious "peace candidate" can find the opportunities of Washington distracting him from his original commitments; with them, a defeated candidate can build a wider, deeper base for another day.

The point of multi-issue peace politics is that only by joining the issue of war and peace to issues of immediate domestic concern can those who care most about peace command the attention of those who care most about the schools, or the slums, or food prices. And indeed, since American society is not a cluster of unrelated elements but a system of interrelated parts, the achievement of peace is closely connected to the workings of our domestic institutions. The need to plan ahead to cope with the economic impact of disarmament is only the clearest instance of that rule.)

But although the multi-issue approach is essential, peace people ought not to feel apologetic about their own issue. If they do, the multi-issue approach could degenerate along the lines of a story told in New York recently:

"My favorite uncle visited me last month, and he was the most remarkable ... He painted and repaired the house, built me a garage, took my children to the museum, worked out a way for me to make more money and give some of the surplus to my maid, discovered that my maid's son was not mentally retarded as everyone had thought but had been psychologically damaged by insensitive teachers, taught him to read, and even got him registered to vote. Great guest!

"Only objection anyone might have—and I mention this with reluctance—is that one day he tied up two teen-agers who live down the street, poured gasoline on them, and burned them to death. But you have to remember that *one* of the kids was a real delinquent, used to deface our property; and the other one was an honest mistake on uncle's part . . . and besides, he's a *great* guy!"

IT was the kind of story that bitter old grandfathers tell, but perhaps the grandchildren should heed this one. While heeding it, they should realize that there are many ways of being "multi-issue." They range from Mark Hatfield's letting solid Oregon businessmen know that *he* knew the war was disrupting the housing and savings-and-loan industries, to the way in which Theodore Weiss of Manhattan united middle-class liberals and Negroes by attacking the war as not only immoral and illegal but also totally destructive of the poverty program and social reform at home, or to the radicalism of Robert Scheer of California, who won both the desperate Negroes of Oakland and the young people of Berkeley with the claim that the war was only one symptom of a pervasively sick society.

Where next? Just as during 1966 the National Conference for New Politics brought together at the national level peace people and civil rights people, Reform Democrats and the New Left, in order to raise money and place volunteers for peace and civil rights campaigns, so on the local level similar alliances must now be created. The peace movement should take the lead in dozens of local communities in bringing together the "new class" who care about education and a society of high quality, Negroes and others caught in poverty and racial injustice, and the lower-middle and working-class people hurt by the war inflation, in a joint electoral effort. (In some areas businessmen hurt by the war could be added to this alliance; in others, where students are especially numerous, the alliance might turn more radical.)

These local alliances should base their campaigns on the platform of a local and national "peace and freedom budget." Such a budget should first of all spell out the savings possible if the Vietnam war were ended and the reforms proposed two years ago by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric were adopted—a total of $40 billion a year. Secondly, it should explain how this money, plus other huge sums accruing from our increasing productivity, could be used to end poverty, end air and water pollution, and create schools which have excitement and individuality. And finally, the peace and freedom budget should call for this money to be spent in accord with the wishes of those in every locality who would be most directly concerned (the poor, in the poverty program; faculty and students in the colleges), rather than by some national bureaucratic plan.

With such a platform, Congressional candidates for '68 could start campaigning now. Men can run for local and state

offices on the basis that no man can govern Detroit decently so long as the war is eating up the money. Campaigns should begin for seats as delegates to the national party conventions—pledged to oppose war candidates for President (including Lyndon Johnson) and to support either a favorite son who opposes the war (Spock in Ohio, Nelson in Wisconsin, etc.) or a national figure like Kennedy or Percy who gives some sense of seriously wanting to negotiate. In some states elections could be called through popular initiatives to set up local or state offices to work on the redirection of funds from war to peace.

But always, always, the goal should be to energize new people and create new working relationships around the question of peace—relationships that will stay alive even if an election is lost.

—ARTHUR I. WASKOW.

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Saturday Review

July 15, 1967

THE QUIET CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION



By THEODORE C. SORENSEN

THIS NATION is nearing a crisis—a crisis of which most Americans are not yet aware and for which our leaders are not yet prepared—a *constitutional* crisis, potentially the most serious since our Civil War.

Already thirty-two state legislatures have called for a new Federal Constitutional Convention, presumably to reverse the Supreme Court's "one-man—one-vote" doctrine on reapportionment. If only two more state legislatures so petition the Congress, it will be faced for the first time in history with implementing the provision in Article V of the Constitution specifying that it call such a convention upon application of two-thirds of the states.

[illegible] follows is likely to be [illegible] constitutional nightmare: whether the [illegible] in fact calls a new convention, [illegible] final product no man can predict [illegible] whether the Congress refuses to [illegible] thirty-four state applications [illegible] powerful support; whether [illegible] brings suit in the Supreme [illegible] the Congress to act—and [illegible] in fact the Court so orders the [illegible] is compelled to seek en[illegible] of that order; and whether [illegible], once held, proposes one or [illegible] amendments and whether [illegible] in turn ratified or rejected by [illegible].

[illegible] C. Sorensen, former Special [illegible] to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, [illegible] editor-at-large.

While the sudden realization that we were nearing a national Constitutional Convention took many by surprise, it is not really so surprising. In most state legislatures it is not difficult to petition the Congress for anything, including a Federal Constitutional Convention. A joint resolution, regarded as no more than a passing opinion, can—unlike an amendment to a state law or particularly a state constitution—be brushed through both houses in a matter of minutes. Most state legislators voting for these petitions did not seriously believe that a new Federal Constitutional Convention would really be held or that anything more than reapportionment was at stake. They simply used this means of voicing their displeasure on the "one-man—one-vote" doctrine and pressuring the Congress for a change. Most of these legislatures, moreover, were, at the time of their petition, still not reapportioned and were ruled by a majority of legislators representing a minority of voters.

The fact that this seemingly extreme step was taken by thirty-two legislatures is not only not surprising; it is not improper or illegal. Alarmed opponents have called it a "sneak attack," a "back-door method" of changing the Constitution, an attempt to "usurp the Congressional function of proposing specific amendments." But it is none of these. It is true that its backers are trying to use this threat of a convention to frighten the Congress into undoing "one-man—one-vote" by the usual means of amending the Constitution—that is by obtaining a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate to send the Dirksen Amendment to the states for ratification. It is also true that the convention route has never been undertaken before. But the fact remains that the convention procedure for proposing Constitutional amendments is as much a part of Article V as the Congressional procedure; and the fact that it has never been utilized in twenty-five amendments does not make its use any less valid today.

SOME convention opponents openly hope that, if thirty-four valid legislative applications for a Constitutional Convention are filed, Congress will find some way to circumvent its obligation under Article V—that it will refuse to call a *general* convention on the grounds that the petitions speak only of one specific subject, or that it will simply fail to pass the necessary implementing legislation, or that the measure will be filibustered or bottled up in committee, or that the petitions will be returned to the states for further action or reconsideration, or that they will be rejected as an attempt by the states to take over a Congressional function, or that they will be ignored as the hasty, careless actions of state legislatures not really serious about a convention. But the mandate of Article V is clear, and the Congress cannot place itself above the Constitution.

Hamilton, in *Federalist* Paper 85, stated:

> The words of this article are peremptory. The Congress "shall call a

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convention." Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body.

The Congress can and must judge the legal validity of these applications—but it has no right to judge their merit. And if the Congress refused to act on thirty-four valid petitions, surely one or more states would seek a writ of mandamus in the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that only a ministerial act by the Congress was then required. Long before that theory or its enforcement could be tested, I would hope that the Congress would either call the convention or disprove the legal validity of the state petitions.

It is this latter approach which has thus far been ably pursued by Senator Tydings of Maryland, aided by Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin and a handful of others. The wisdom of this approach lies in its avoidance of the position that the Congress should refuse to do its duty by the Constitution. But the weakness of this approach lies in its dependence upon standards and interpretations so strict and rigid as to contradict the very spirit of the Constitution.

The language of Article V is both simple and broad. It was intended to be a safeguard against unfair federal action; and if that purpose is to have any meaning at all, Congress cannot invent harsh new rules for this one situation after thirty-four applications have been filed.

At best the law is unclear; and if these petitions cannot be successfully or legally rescinded, and if legal challenges to their validity cannot stand up, and if two more applications do come in, Congress will be required to call a convention.

Then Pandora's Box will be opened wide. For no matter how these state applications are worded, no matter what limitations are given by the Congress on its convention call, there is no possible way by which such a convention can be required to confine itself to reapportionment or any other issue. A national Constitutional Convention, by definition, would represent the highest power in our system. Like its single predecessor in 1787, which had in its day been specifically told by a cautious Congress to confine itself to the "sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation," this new convention could ignore any instruction, tackle any subject, and propose any amendments or revisions that it sees fit.

If it wishes to tinker with the Bill of Rights, to halt supposed pampering of the criminally accused, to stop so-called abuses of the Fifth Amendment, to limit free speech for the disloyal, to reopen the wars between church and state, to limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the President's veto power or the Congress's war-making authority, it would be free to do so.

The kind of amendments likely to be considered are reflected in those introduced in the Congress this year, including those that would abolish the income tax, require a balanced budget, permit prayers in public schools, elect the Supreme Court, regulate pornography, limit social security taxes, restore to the states certain rights taken away by the Court, require the advice and consent of the House to treaty-making, allow each state to enact its own legislation on questions of decency and morality, preserve our nation's spiritual heritage, and establish the paramount right of society and the individual to be protected from crime.

Reversing the Court's reapportionment decisions alone would be bad enough, permitting a return to the minority rule in our state legislatures which made them too unrepresentative and unresponsive to halt the drift of power to Washington. But whatever one's view of "one-man—one-vote," no thoughtful citizen can look forward with equanimity to this kind of wide-open, unpredictable dabbling with our historic charter.

But, o ye of little faith, Senator Dirksen and his backers reply, with both effectiveness and logic, a convention can only do what the Congress can do—namely, *propose* amendments for ratification by the states; the Congress also could pass wild amendments, but it has not done so; and neither a Congress nor a convention could be reckless successfully, because at least thirty-eight states must ratify any amendments which are proposed.

There are three basic answers to this argument:

► *First*, the convention route is completely dominated by the state legislatures which, by this route, can bypass the Congress, force the calling of a conven-

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to Senator Dirksen, control the selection of delegates. But it is the Congress who will bear the burden of implementing these proposals. When the Congress exercises its jurisdiction under Article V, it does not merely *propose* amendments. It first *approves* them on the basis of its own insight into federal Constitutional problems. Neither the members of a new convention, nor the state legislatures (or state conventions) which ratify their proposals, could possibly have the same knowledge of federal problems as the Congress or the same degree of responsibility for meeting them. Nor could a temporary convention, whose members are not required to present their records to the voters for re-election, possibly represent the national interest and long-range perspectives as ably as a continuing national body.

The necessity for ratification by the state legislatures is no safeguard in the absence of a two-thirds vote in the Congress to recommend such amendments. Seven state legislatures, for example, have officially endorsed the so-called Liberty Amendment—which would repeal all federal income, gift, and estate taxes, liquidate most federal programs and necessitate a national sales tax. But few if any of the Congressmen and Senators from those seven states would ever vote for such a proposal.

► *Second,* there is a mathematical difference between amendments proposed by the Congress and those proposed by a convention. Any amendment submitted by the Congress has first been approved by not only two-thirds of the Senate—which means at least thirty-four states and possibly all of them—but also two-thirds of the House, which means at least 290 members who, even if they came from the smallest constituencies, would still represent roughly two-thirds of the population. But when an amendment is forced via the convention route—particularly if such a convention, like its predecessor, should make its decisions by a majority unit vote with one vote per state—then thirty-four states representing 30 per cent of the population could call the convention, twenty-six states representing one-sixth of the population could propose new amendments, and thirty-eight states representing less than 40 per cent of the population could ratify them. The convention route, by omitting Congressional participation, is not the voice of the people, as its backers claim.

► *Third,* a Constitutional Convention is a unique and potent instrument to be used with extreme rarity when the time is right. In 1787 the time was right. The mood, the men, the need were all right. In 1967 the time is not right. There is no nationwide need or demand for such a Convention. There are no flaws in our system requiring so radical a step, no difficulty (as is true of some state constitutions) in invoking the usual amendment route.




"They come on every day from four to six."

Instead there seems to be a growing mood of ugly irresponsibility and reaction—reaction against the Supreme Court, the federal government, civil rights, and civil liberties. This mood helped give rise to the forces calling for this convention; and those same forces would seek to dominate the selection of delegates, the actions of the convention, and their ratification by the state legislatures, where their power has always been greatest.

In short, both in composition and spirit the proposed convention might well resemble the so-called (but unofficial) General Assembly of States which first recommended it in 1962. The flavor of that distinguished body is indicated by its simultaneous proposal for another Constitutional amendment under which any Supreme Court decision "relating to the rights reserved to the states or to the people" could, upon demand of five state legislatures, be reviewed and reversed by a "Court of the Union" composed of all the state court Chief Justices. If that kind of proposal could be adopted by an Assembly of States composed of state government delegates from forty-six states, what can we expect from a national Constitutional Convention, especially if it is dominated by Western and Southern state legislatures (including those which have endorsed the "Liberty" Amendment)? Even a convention dominated by liberals could not be expected to adjourn without trying its hand at improving on the classic work of 1787—and that, too, could only lead to catastrophe.

What can be done? Obviously the first line of defense is comprised of those state legislatures which have not yet passed an application for a convention. The possibilities of rescission should be further explored in the other thirty-two. But the Congress, in the absence of thirty-four valid petitions, is not as helpless in this matter as some would have us believe. I suggest that it *would be timely, appropriate, and reasonable for the Congress to enact this year a general statute for the implementation of Article V,* aimed not simply at this one effort but at all such efforts, now and in the future. Such a statute could properly specify:

1) That applications from at least two-thirds of the states under Article V must be received in the same Congress, just as the votes of two-thirds of the House and two-thirds of the Senate must be obtained in the same Congress before the other Article V procedure can be initiated.

2) That such applications be the product of the same legislative processes at the state level as such state requires for the enactment of a state law, including approval by the Governor (unless his veto is overridden).

3) That no action be taken by the Congress upon receipt of the thirty-fourth valid application until at least one regular session of the Congress has elapsed.

4) That such a convention, when called, shall be apportioned by the Con-

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gress in its call according to population, with each delegate (not each state) having one convention vote.

5) That all such applications shall be officially transmitted to the Vice President and Speaker, who shall regularly report on their progress to avoid any future surprise developments.

6) Such other requirements as to the form and wording of such applications, the selection of delegates, and the time, place, voting, and financing of such conventions, as the Congress may deem suitable.

I see no reason to believe that the Courts would upset such a statute. It is not *ex post facto* as applied to the present petitions so long as they have not yet reached thirty-four. *Ad hoc* rules which might be unfair if pulled out of nowhere to reject a specific application are not arbitrary if contained in a generalized statute which fulfills Congress's duty to implement Article V. Nor do I believe that such a statute would encourage the state legislatures to seek the convention route—indeed, they may well be discouraged.

But unless Article V itself is amended to eliminate this state legislative route—a possibility which I neither favor nor forecast—it is only through some such statute as this that we can prevent the confusion and conflict of a constitutional crisis if and when that day ever does come when thirty-four state legislative convention applications are presented to the Congress. The urgent need for reason and for a regular procedure then require action by the Congress now.

The Quiet Campaign: One State's Story

By PAUL SIMON

WITHOUT fanfare, the legislative body of Senator Everett Dirksen's home state in March passed a resolution calling for a precedent-shattering convention to amend the Constitution of the United States. No Illinois legislator—including those of us who opposed the resolution—then knew the full significance of our action.

About the time Illinois was "considering" the resolution, Chicago's *American* published a story indicating that as many as twenty-seven states had passed resolutions calling for such a convention, but the weekend after the Illinois action *The New York Times* reported that thirty-two states had taken action—only two short of the thirty-four needed to mandate Congress to call a convention.

Illinois's action was swift and silent.

On March 1 the resolution was introduced by the Republican leadership of the House, at the specific request of Senator Dirksen. The next day it passed that body without committee hearings and without much discussion. The Senate received it on March 6, and the resolution was given a Committee-of-the-Whole hearing—which, because the Committee of the Whole is the Senate itself, may sound impressive to the uninitiated, but actually means no committee action. There was one witness: John Alesia, an officer of the United Steelworkers Union, who testified against it. No one testified for it, yet it carried by a straight party vote—despite the fact that the Supreme Court's reapportionment decision had given the suburbs a big increase in power and therefore meant that Republicans from the suburbs in effect were voting against their districts. In less than two weeks, with only a handful of us discussing the matter, Illinois had called for a convention which could alter the structure of government.

To illustrate the relative ease of changing the U.S. Constitution, and the indifference of the states on the matter, I asked the legislature's bill-drafting agency to prepare a dummy measure to appropriate $5 to the Department of Children and Family Services for the purchase of a new wastebasket. While a resolution of the utmost importance to the nation breezed through without even semi-serious attention, my measure for the wastebasket would have to go through four committees (two in each House), six readings, two separate roll calls requiring a favorable vote by a majority of legislators, and even then might be vetoed by the Governor. If I wanted to give the $5 to the department before the next biennium, a two-thirds majority would be required. Almost no such safeguards are present for a resolution to change the Constitution.

Only one group generated any opposition to the resolution passed in Illinois: The League of Women Voters (referred to by one of my unadmiring colleagues as the "League of Women Vultures") stimulated a few telegrams of opposition.

After *The New York Times* story revealed the immediacy of the threat, I introduced a resolution in the Senate to rescind the action taken. A Chicago suburban representative, Anthony Scariano, introduced a similar resolution in the House. We were backed by several organizations and by some news media, but by then it had become a party issue. Though the original resolution did not receive committee consideration the motions to rescind were sent to committee.

I had two proposals that day before the Senate Executive Committee, one calling for a nonpolitical full-time pardon and parole board, the other the resolution to rescind. The Republican leader of the Senate spoke against my parole board bill, which had been recommended by every organization studying Illinois's archaic penal system. He said it was "too complex" to be considered then. Next came the resolution to rescind, and the same GOP leader said that the original action had been "amply discussed." The Senate Democratic leader, Thomas A. McGloon, protested, "The original resolution was railroaded through the legislature and everybody knows it." But—again by a straight party vote—the motion lost.

One of the real puzzles is: Why should such a resolution calling for a Constitutional Convention be pushed?

Both the Gallup and Harris polls show that public opinion overwhelmingly accepts the Supreme Court reapportionment decision. In Illinois, political leaders of the majority party are defying opinion on this matter for several reasons, among them:

1) They know that the public really does not seem to care much. We received hundreds of times more mail on issues like registering guns, legalizing bingo, and teachers' pensions.

2) For the more conservative members—and almost all of Illinois's GOP Senators fit that category—this was a chance to slap at the Supreme Court.

3) Powerful special interest groups want to keep state legislative bodies under their control. The "one-man—one-vote" decision makes this more difficult.

4) There continues to be fear of the big city—in Illinois's case, Chicago. (It is apparently not understood that the same system which can throw an imbalance in one's favor can throw an imbalance against him—that ultimately the only protection is in the "one-man—one vote" principle.)

After the passage of the resolution, a member of the Illinois State Senate suggested on a radio program that it might be wise to consider a representative system in the second chamber which would give all citizens one vote, give an additional vote to those who have achieved a relatively high degree of education, and give still another vote to those who own property, so that the wealthy and educated could cast three votes against one for the low-income group. His next step, presumably, is to take this idea to a Constitutional Convention. What is to stop him?

Paul Simon, a Democratic State Senator from the Illinois community of Troy, has won several awards for public service.

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McCall's, June 1967

"May 29, 1967 would have been ohn Kennedy's 0th birthday"

By THEODORE C. SORENSEN

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Saints—such as Valentine and Patrick—are customarily honored on the day of their death. Statesmen—such as Washington and Lincoln—are remembered on the day of their birth. John Fitzgerald Kennedy was an extraordinary human being, but he was not a saint. He performed no miracles for the multitudes, and he claimed no immunity from the vices and vicissitudes of ordinary men. It becomes clearer, not dimmer, with each passing year, however, that he was a statesman—a statesman whose exhortations and initiatives radically altered this nation's standards and standing both at home and around the world. Those of us who would do special honor to him, therefore, do well to remember him on the day of his birth, not the day of his death.

It was not his death that changed this country, as some have maintained (largely because they could not recognize his greatness before). It was his life. And it was a life so full of hope and promise and drive that it is far better summed up and symbolized by the joys of birth than by the pangs of death.

It is too early to say whether John Kennedy's birthday will ever become a national holiday. Washington's and Lincoln's birthdays were not officially commemorated by most states until many years after their deaths. Already, however, some labor unions—seeking in their collective-bargaining contracts another paid holiday instead of a shorter workweek—have proposed November 22nd as an additional day off; and continued increases in automation and productivity may well create more pressure for some such holiday before the six-hour day or thirty-hour week evolves in an economy of leisure. I make no claim to objectivity on the question of whether a national holiday should honor our thirty-fifth President. But if it is to be, I strongly urge that it be on May 29th, not November 22nd.

May 29, 1967, would have been John Kennedy's fiftieth birthday. He would have been a "young" fifty, as the saying goes. The long days and nights in the White House had added more than a thousand days' worth of lines to his face and gray to his hair. He needed more effort than he previously had to read without glasses and to keep his weight down. But he was, in November, 1963, healthier than he had ever been before, partly because he was happier than he had ever been before. The health and happiness were reflected in his face, his voice, his bearing and his overall vitality. With young children, a young wife, youthful clothes and a young man's exuberance for life, he would have been a young fifty.

Would he still have been in the White House on May 29, 1967, had no assassin's bullet cut him down? I think there can be no doubt of that. Determined upon making his maximum possible contribution to the course of public affairs, he would have sought a second term as President. Clearly in command of his party and beloved by all but the George Wallace wing, he would have been renominated in 1964 by acclamation. And no longer handicapped by voter suspicion of his religion, age and inexperience, he would have readily defeated Barry Goldwater (who, in my opinion, would still have been the Republican nominee) or any other opponent. In short, he would have been in the White House now; and it both stimulates and saddens the mind to imagine him there, pressing his advisers at a National Security Council meeting, grinning impishly at a press-conference question, talking intimately with a visiting head of state, chatting aimlessly with his son, speaking solemnly to the American people, and moving gracefully through the kind of birthday reception his staff gave him four long years ago.

Would the world be very different were he in the White House now? No one can say with any certainty. No two men are alike in their experience, outlook, methods or mannerisms. John Kennedy selected Lyndon Johnson as his running mate in 1960 not because Mr. Johnson was a carbon copy of Kennedy but, at least in part, because he was different—because his background and style and strength appealed to a different segment of the electorate from that with which Kennedy was strongest. So it is inevitable that contrasts are noted today; and, equally inevitably, some are pleased and some are displeased by the changes that have occurred.

But those who are quick to criticize the changes under Mr. Johnson should bear in mind that President Kennedy, on more than one occasion, publicly spoke of his administration as the "Kennedy-Johnson" administration. Aware of the frustrations inherent in the Vice-Presidency, he took pains to keep Mr. Johnson as informed and involved as possible regarding all major decisions made at the White House. And President Johnson, on taking office, faithfully restated the legislative and foreign-policy goals of his predecessor and skillfully set out to achieve them. Most of the men on whom he has depended previously worked with Kennedy. Most of the burdens and risks and limitations of his office had equally vexed John Kennedy. So let no one assume that Kennedy's continuation in the White House would have somehow vanquished by magic all the problems facing President Johnson today.

No one can doubt that, given two such different men, Kennedy's continuation would have meant some differences, differences that in no way reflect on Mr. Johnson's ability. Some would have been intangible and very nearly indefinable—a sense, a feeling, a hope. The younger generation, for example, felt a strong sense of identity with Kennedy, a feeling that he understood their anxieties and listened to their grievances, even when his broader commitments did not permit him to implement their viewpoints. Deliberately he had sought to shatter the atmosphere of complacency and noninvolvement that enveloped too many of our campuses in the 1950s; and his removal by death from the White House may well have increased among many young people a sense of isolation and alienation, inducing some of them to express their concerns and dissatisfactions in picket lines and protest movements.

Nor was it only the young who looked to John Kennedy in the White House for hope. The housewife watching his press conference, the Negro freed from a century of virtually silent indifference, the Democrat who laughed at his partisan jokes, the miner retrained as a mechanic, the intellectual whose letters were answered, the tourist who marveled at the transformation of the White House—these and many others were all infused with a new breath of national aspiration. Indeed, it was a worldwide, not merely a nationwide, phenomenon, enhanced by the President's youthful looks and earnest eloquence, but far more dependent on the substance of his convictions than the style of his expressions. A new birth of hope made America alive and alert to its own greatness, altered our relations with the Soviet Union, attacked the plight of those victimized by poverty and prejudice, and gave to the office of the American Presidency a new stature in the eyes of the world.

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fully and half mischievously, "Is t
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THE SATURDAY EVENING POST

Fall, 1971

AN ESSAY ON HUMOR IN POLITIC[S]

By THEODORE C. SORENSEN

Have we lost our national sense of humor?

I am not talking about manufactured com[e]dies on Broadway or television, or the largely [u]nfunny "funny papers," or the latest scato[lo]gical story making the nightclub or locker-[ro]om circuit. Comedy as a whole is not dead in [A]merica, thank God, or we would all be dead [fr]om the unrelieved tension. I'm talking about [po]litical *humor*. Columnists like Art Buchwald [an]d Russell Baker and cartoonists like Herblock [an]d Bill Mauldin keep their traditions alive. But [m]ost of our best-known comedians, although [w]illing to try a few broad gags, shy away from [th]e truly pointed thrust that enables Americans [to] laugh at their worst problems and their best [po]liticians. What is worse, the politicians them[sel]ves have forgotten how to laugh at each other.

Network and advertising executives discourage [th]e political satires of Rowan and Martin and the [Sm]others Brothers, among others, forgetting that [lon]g before Fred Allen, Will Rogers and H. L. [Me]ncken – even before Mark Twain, Finley [Pet]er Dunne, Artemas Ward and Josh Billings – [ou]r most distinguished officeholders have con[sist]ently been subjected to biting ridicule by the [bes]t laugh-makers of their time. That is – at least [it s]hould be – an inherent part of the American [pol]itical system.

To be sure, Joe Miller was never elected Presi[den]t, and Bob Hope will probably never make [Secr]etary of Defense. But pointed, pertinent [poli]tical humor – applied with the rapier, not [the m]eat-axe – has been a characteristic element [of t]he American political scene for at least 150 [year]s. From Andrew Jackson to Teddy and [Fra]nklin Roosevelt, presidential candidates were [expe]cted to entertain as well as enlighten, to [trade] jokes along with slogans, and to demolish [their] opponents with sarcasm as well as logic.

[I]n recent years that tradition has been fading. [Toda]y's American political leader is more likely [to pu]t his foot into his mouth than his tongue [in] his cheek. He would rather sound the alarm [than] tickle the fancy. Personally, I would like a [little] more leg-pulling along with all the hand[wring]ing. So much of politics and government [these] days is serious, complex, and even tragic [that t]he human brain cries out for a little leaven[ing an]d spice in this steady diet of doom and [gloom].

[To] be sure, many politicians begin each [stand]a[rd] speech with a formula joke. But these [...] phrased speechwriters' products are not [enoug]h. Fictitious stories, even when funny, are [not en]ough when they are wholly unrelated to [curren]t political events and personalities.

[I w]ould like to see our leaders themselves, our [Preside]nts and Senators and Governors and [a]ll candidates, both possess and reveal their [ge]nuine senses of humor. A man unable to [laugh i]s no more equipped to lead this country [or to] understand its plight and feelings than a [man un]able to cry.

[S]o Agnew gets off the best politically [...] lines in Washington these days (Martha [Mitchel]l doesn't count until she runs for office [on her o]wn).

> *At one juncture in the Lincoln-Douglas debates in Illinois, Douglas persisted in referring to Abe as two-faced. When Lincoln took the podium he began with – "Ladies and gentlemen of the audience, I leave it to you: if I had two faces, would I be wearing this one?"*

But with Everett Dirksen ("I am trying to unscrew the unscrutable") gone from the scene, Republicans as a whole appear to be as lacking in humor as the Democrats. What political speakers today, merit and wisdom aside, are *fun* to hear? William Buckley and Dick Gregory are only on the fringes of politics at best. John Lindsay and Ronald Reagan have a highly polished platform presence, but that is not necessarily the same thing as an authentic sense of humor. For unrehearsed situations Hubert Humphrey and, in his own way, to say nothing of his own party, George Wallace, have demonstrated spontaneous comic touches. Democrats historically have been more boisterous than Republicans, more earthy and less inhibited in their various fights and frolics, and their greater skill at repartee and drollery has been developed in that kind of atmosphere. But where is their humor today?

The assorted collection of Democratic presidential hopefuls now tuning up for next year's race against Mr. Nixon have preferred to stress their wisdom to the neglect of their wit. Maybe they believe this is smart political strategy. After all, Hubert Humphrey in 1968 was a lot funnier – even to his critics – than Richard Nixon who, as most readers will recall, nevertheless emerged the winner. In 1952 and 1956 the speeches of Adlai Stevenson, while they may not have always inspired belly laughs, were full of dry, intellectual, frequently self-deprecating humor. Yet Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was more beloved for his fine grin than his sense of humor, had the last laugh.

No doubt a great many American voters will always prefer a serious, solemn Woodrow Wilson or a sour, sober Calvin Coolidge in the White House. (Coolidge, said Theodore Roosevelt's daughter Alice, must have been "weaned on a pickle"; but it was Coolidge who, when pressed why he did not choose to run again, replied: "Because there is no opportunity for advancement.") Maybe that is one reason why stately George Washington was everyone's choice for our nation's first President instead of Ben Franklin with his ribald jokes.

But history, like statistics, can be argued both ways. For there is plenty of evidence that the voters do respond to genuine humor. Franklin D. Roosevelt could cut the ground out from under his opponents with a series of deft and titillating thrusts (". . . that great historic trio, Martin, Barton, and Fish"). Barry Goldwater *lost* ground in 1964, when his natural breezy style ("If we get back to readin', writin' and 'rithmetic, and an occasional little whack where it will help . . . our educational system will take care of its[elf]") [gave] way to the heavy ideological polemics [thrust] upon him by his associates ("We have [...] that the proper function of the school is [to trans]mit the cultural heritage of one gene[ration to] another, not to educate or elevate so[ciety but] rather to educate the individual . . . .")

The prize precedent of them all, [Abraham] Lincoln, not only overcame the crit[ics who] denounced his consistent storytelling [but con]tinued to ease the burdens of the wartim[e White] House by making light of himself and [his trou]bles. (Those current candidates who [would do] anything – short of growing a beard [– to be] known as "Lincolnesque" should learn [that if] they take themselves too seriously, as [Lincoln] never did, that false modesty was not h[is style].) Told by a well-wisher at a White House [recep]tion, for example, that the latter's ho[me town] believed God Almighty and Abraham [Lincoln] were going to save the country, he [replied] jovially: "My friend, you're half right."

I do not advocate that the White H[ouse be] turned into the Fun House. But those P[residents] who are endowed with the ability to l[augh at] themselves and their predicaments ha[ve been] thereby better equipped to endure bo[th the] terrible tensions and the servile flattery [that in]evitably surround them in that Oval [Office]. "Storytelling," said Lincoln at the height [of the] Civil War, "saves me much friction and di[stress]." I recall John Kennedy impishly obser[ving to] Khrushchev during their tense and [difficult] Vienna summit meeting in 1961, when the premier boasted of his Lenin Peace Me[dal: "I] hope you keep it." Eisenhower, while h[e may] not have been a giant of humor, at least [recog]nized the necessity of this element in the [presi]dential picture when he encouraged th[e late] George Allen to be his frequent comp[anion]. Other Presidents have kept similar "court j[esters"] close at hand.

Will any presidential candidate next [year] laugh at his own qualifications as Barry [Gold]water did some years ago, stating: "I fe[el the] White House is ready for me since Jacque[line re]modeled it in an eighteenth-century decor"? [Or] will one of them say, as did Adlai Stevenson [fol]lowing his defeat in the election: "A funny [thing] happened to me on the way to the W[hite] House." What member of the House has re[cently] equalled the Indiana Congressman of old [who,] when asked to retract his reference to a coll[eague] as a jackass, withdrew the word but adde[d as a] parliamentary afterthought [that] his adve[rsary] was out of order – and that only a veteri[narian] could tell him how?

There have been other notable flights, [here] and there, some of them due to the peculiar [frus]trations of what Adlai Stevenson called [the] simple brutalities of politics." Senator H. Wilson of Massachusetts was a[n]e of this [...] he commented during a particularly torrid [de]bate: "I believe that if we introduced the Lo[rd's] Prayer here, Senators would propose a l[arge] number of amendments to it."

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AN ESSAY ON HUMOR IN POLITICS

continued from page 13

Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, under similar circumstances, dug in for a long fight: "I expect to fight that proposition until Hell freezes over. Then I propose to start fighting it on ice."

Alben W. Barkley, veteran of a thousand campaigns, and generally considered one of the most effective public speakers of his day, took his honors lightly enough. Said he: "The best audience is one that is intelligent, well-educated, and a little drunk."

Unfortunately, too many voters today pay little or no attention whatsoever to the broadcasts of political speeches and debates, much less attend them in person. Campaign statements *must* get through to more voters if democracy is to be based, as it should be based, on the thoughtful consent of an informed electorate. If spicing those speeches with humor is the only way to get people to listen, then every candidate for President in 1972 should do it. He need not overdo it; he need not sound more like a comic than a statesman; and it is not necessary to label one's whole approach "the politics of joy" as a bouncy Hubert Humphrey did to his regret in opening his 1968 campaign. But a candidate can often reveal something of his own character and intelligence better and more memorably through a few humorous touches than he can by confining himself to solemn pronunciamentos.

It should not be difficult. Most successful politicians by occupation and training have the quick minds and tongues necessary to unleash a barbed sally about their opponents or predicaments. Political speakers, moreover, enjoy extra protection under the laws of libel and slander, in part because of our national faith that no public figure in a democracy should be above caricature and no issue immune from comic comment. Even elementary speech courses urge aspiring politicians to work topical humor into their talks, or at least to build audience rapport with a few opening jests. A skeptical campaign crowd will be more likely to relax a little if offered a few gracefully funny lines. Reporters bored by hearing the same stump speech over and over again will appreciate it. Young people turned off by traditional political rhetoric will warm to it.

Al Smith, told in 1928 of the Republican prediction that his election and administration would cause grass to grow in the streets, expressed the hope that he could have a putting green in Times Square.

Fiorello LaGuardia, upon being elected Mayor of New York, swept patronage seekers aside with his famous comment: "My first qualification for this great office is my

"Well, it's a brand-new ball game now, Ed!"

monumental personal ingratitude." (He, too, might have borrowed from Lincoln, who, upon falling mildly ill in 1861, said: "Tell all the office-seekers to come see me — at last I have something to give them.")

Thomas E. Dewey's first presidential ambitions in 1930, at the age of 28, never recovered from Harold Ickes' dismissal of a major Dewey speech with the words: "No, I did not listen because I have a baby of my own." (Ickes, a master of humorous invective, distinguished himself in that same campaign by such utterances as "I see Dewey has thrown his diaper into the ring," and his scornful reference to the image-building Republican nominee, Wendell Willkie, as "a simple barefoot Wall Street lawyer.")

James Cox, told in 1920 that the "people had spoken" in the landslide election of Warren G. Harding, philosophically sighed: "Yes, but they didn't have to speak so loudly."

Why do we see so little political humor at the top? Is it because our leaders in both parties are so dull and pompous that they are unable or unwilling to make us laugh? I hope not. Is it because the packaged, hucksterized campaigns of today cannot work humor into their slick 30-second commercials and computerized mailings? That may be part of the reason.

The possibilities are always there. Even President Charles de Gaulle, a man never noted for levity, once found the occasion to remark: "How can you expect to govern a country that has 246 kinds of cheeses?" President Lyndon Johnson lent a rich American flavor to his "One of the wisest things my daddy ever told me was that 'so and so is a damned smart man, but the fool's got no sense!' " In 1965, describing his plight at that time to a dinner audience in Washington, D.C., President Nixon commented on the fact that he had been "overnominated and underelected."

An even more basic explanation, I am afraid, lies in the tensions and timidities of the times in which we live. Believers of both the extreme left and the extreme right look suspiciously on those who do not rigidly and unquestioningly fit their particular molds all the time, which no one with a sense of humor can. Political humor is a form of skepticism and dissent, a means of deflating the powerful, ridiculing the fanatical, and questioning whether the Emperor is really wearing clothes. For that reason it is repressed in a totalitarian regime, and its voluntary decline today in our country is a danger sign for us all.

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Israel under siege

The tourist finds life goes on normally, but what is normal in a country in a constant state of war?

by Theodore C. Sorensen

Illustration by Sedat Pakay

"Life goes on here very much as it always has," the kibbutz coordinator told us, and at first glance that seemed to be true. The fields and orchards were being cultivated that day as they had been for thirty-two years. Children romped in the playgrounds and swimming pool that adjoined the neat rows of tree-shaded houses. The Arab-Israeli conflict seemed very far away.

But it was very near. Here, in the Beisan Valley below the Sea of Galilee, the boundaries of Israel had always extended eastward to the Jordan River. After the Six Day War drove the Arab armies back from the Golan Heights to the north and that part of Jordan occupying the west bank of the Jordan River to the south, the Beisan Valley settlements were the only part of pre-war Israel to remain within easy distance of enemy guns.

Always before there had been peace in the valley. Even after Israel's war for independence in 1948 the residents of this kibbutz near Beit Shean had remained friends with the Arab farmers across the river. Weather and crop information were exchanged. Once thieves escaping into Jordan with kibbutz savings were apprehended and the money returned, all on an informal, unofficial basis. But after the Six Day War, Arab guerrillas looking for positions from which to strike moved onto the Jordanian side of the river in force, and the friendly Arab farmers moved out. When the infiltration of terrorists into the kibbutzim failed, the guerrillas brought up guns—heavy guns, bazookas and mortars acquired from the Soviet Union and her allies. Fearful of the Israeli Air Force by day, they lobbed shells across the river at night.

Life in the kibbutz near Beit Shean became more strained beneath the surface. Bomb shelters were built. Covered trenches crisscrossed the lawns. With a network of tunnels, every resident of the kibbutz was within thirty seconds of shelter whenever the shelling began. When doctors warned of the psychological damage being inflicted upon children awakened nearly every night to be rushed into an underground bunker, several shelters were converted into children's dormitories and every child under the age of eleven slept there every night. Another bunker was made into a teen-age discothèque to encourage the young people to stay close to it after dark.

The men, women and children who inhabited this cooperative farm were no strangers to danger. But this was an agricultural settlement, not a military camp. Nightly terror and the threat of daytime harassment marred their lives and interfered with their work. Previously those in charge of the harvest had gone to the fields at 4:00 A.M. each morning. Now they had to wait for an all-clear signal from the army. Large gatherings, even funerals, were frowned upon. For their annual Passover dinner stairs were built to each window in the dining hall to enable all present to escape quickly if the shelling began. One little girl, visiting relatives in Tel Aviv, was afraid to go to sleep because they had no shelters. "But we cannot abandon this settlement and start again farther away from the boundaries," the coordinator told us. "This is a small and infertile country, and to retreat under fire would be the beginning of the end." And so life among the residents of the kibbutz near Beit Shean goes on; their work goes on, their games go on and visitors are welcomed with warmth and shown about with pride.

The story of that kibbutz and others like it in the Beisan Valley captures in capsule form the story of life in Israel today. We saw a land at peace that in fact, as Prime Minister Golda Meir told me, is "in a constant state of war." The signs of war, past, present and future, were not hard to see. We relaxed one Sunday on the Dead Sea beach from which, the previous Thursday, an Israeli Army guard had kept away all traffic. An American tourist had been killed on that same beach earlier in the summer by a shell from the Jordanian side. We were unable to sit four across in the El Al plane that flew us from New York to Tel Aviv because the aisle seat was occupied by an Israeli security agent. Without public announcement or even official acknowledgment, such agents have ridden every El Al plane

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

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...Israeli airliners were attacked in ...rich and Athens months ago.

Near Jericho my sons played in a ...nt out Jordanian mobile cannon ...t had been virtually destroyed in ...mbat against the Israeli forces in ...67. It was made in America, as were ... shells that destroyed it. No doubt ... munitions merchants made money ...both sides. The Russians clearly lost ...ney. Embarrassing as it was for the ...ptians and their comrades to be ...nquished so quickly despite their ...v Soviet equipment, it is even more ...miliating for the Russians now to ... Israeli soldiers driving about in ...tured Russian-made trucks with ...eli army insignia attached.

The Israelis joke about this—"We'll ... spare parts to Moscow... Unfortu...ely for the Egyptians those Russian ...ks had every gear but reverse..."— ...as they joke about the danger sur...nding them, and it really does sur...nd them. A bomb blew up a super...ket in Jerusalem, another exploded ...he student cafeteria of the Hebrew ...iversity, another devastated a bus ... Hebron, another failed to go off ...de a watermelon for sale outside a ...us.

...et the jokes go on. "My wife says ...have to show our spirit by shopping ...hat supermarket that was blown ... one man tells another in a radio ... "That's not so bad. It's one of Jeru...m's better stores," replied his ...nd. "Yes, but we live in Tel Aviv!" ... humor is not mere bravado. Dan... has become a way of life for the ...zens of Israel and they show no sign ...ielding in the face of it. No one ...left the Beisan Valley kibbutz. The ...l damage is quickly cleared out of ...t each day. Some of the residents ...plain about the heat in their shel..., others complain about the loss of ...king time during harvest. Still ...rs wish the government would ... that portion of Jordan across the ...r from these settlements. But none ...ese complaints leads to a sense of ...air or even hatred.

...the Old City of Jerusalem, now ...ited with East Jerusalem, Arabs ... Jews again work side by side. Un...the situation I saw has been wholly ...ged by the fire in the el-Aqsa ...que, thousands of Moslems pour ... East Jerusalem each morning to ... at higher wages than ever before, ... hundreds of others work in the ...alem police and civil service in ...Old City. Below—and sometimes ... the surface there will always ...llen resentment among the peo... of any occupied area. (Israel tact... prefers to call them "adminis... areas.") Reuniting Jerusalem is ...ch more difficult task than split... it. Terrorists are arrested every ... and new arms caches are found ... week. But many West Bank and ...alem Arabs felt all along that the ...ernment of Jordan had neglected ... Of course many are now cooper... with Israeli authorities to the ... of putting up candidates in the ...don municipal elections in ... thousands of Arab women and landless men are eligible to vote for the first time. Many who are unable to bridge the religious, cultural and political gap watch their children mix with Jewish children in games and social activities. Both in Jerusalem and the West Bank some cooperative Arabs have themselves been the targets of guerrilla violence.

One day our family drove off the road near Jericho to visit a small Bedouin tent camp. Its leader, who had learned English before discontinuing his education to return to the family camel herd, was listening to the Jordanian radio and invited us in. We sat on quilts and blankets spread out on the dirt floor of the tent and sipped tea with our genial host (but not with his women folk, who were confined to the adjoining tent despite my wife's presence at the tea party). Our Israeli guide was as welcome in this Arab home as we were. Jordanian bazookas and machine guns went into action not very far away, but in that tent it was easy to forget about the conflict, the tensions and the threat posed by other Arabs inside and outside of Israel's present borders.

The Israelis do not forget. "Security is uppermost in the minds of us all," I was told by one farmer whose kibbutz is now far from Arab lines. Hourly newscasts are tuned in by most of an anxious population. Sabotage and guerrilla strikes take a toll that is exceedingly heavy for a tiny nation that sanctifies human life. Every family has kin in the service, every citizen knows soldiers who have been killed. But there was none of the oppressive atmosphere I have seen in other nations preoccupied with questions of security. Young soldiers of both sexes hitchhiking home on leave are a common sight on every highway, but troop convoys and patrols are rarely if ever seen. Movement about the country is untroubled. Moshe Dayan feels free to browse in the Arab antiquity shops of the Old City without guard. The Communist Party is allowed to assail the government daily. Anyone is free in Israel to watch Jordanian television newscasts and propaganda programs, and many do.

Above all the people of Israel, for all their vigilance, continue to relax, and thousands of tourists relax with them. The beaches and resort areas are crowded, particularly on weekends, by both Israelis and foreign visitors. The holy places of three religions attract crowds of every faith and nationality. Threats of hijacking and terrorism have not slowed the stream of Americans visiting Bethlehem, Nazareth, the Sea of Galilee, the Stations of the Cross, the Dead Sea, the Wailing Wall and other shrines. After all, the visitor from New York City can walk without fear in any part of Jerusalem at any hour of the night, a welcome change from conditions that prevail at home.

Tens of thousands of Israelis and their guests crowded into a stadium last August to watch the International Maccabia Games, unconcerned about the devastation one well-pl... bomb could have created. "No one had to come," Prime Minister G... Meir said to me the next day, "b... they refuse to show fear." She told ... of her previous visitors that aftern... three small boys who sold lemona... to raise money to help the governm... to buy Phantom jet fighter aircraf... from the United States. Fervent pa...tism is not old-fashioned in Israel. "Maybe," one boy had said to her, "w... the... when we grow up." "Ma... ha... replied optimistically, "y... ha... to." Maybe they won't ... bo... Israelis are called Sabr... the cactus fruit that is soft on... on the inside but formidably ... the outside. That particular ... of pugnacity and pleasure w... lik... be the state of Israel's l... lo... time to come.

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