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Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Committee on Armed Services

NOMINATION OF GEORGE BUSH, OF TEXAS, TO
BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. VICE
WILLIAM EGAN COLBY

Monday, December 15, 1975

Washington, D. C.

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C O N T E N T
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STATEMENT OF:

PAGE

The Honorable John Tower, A United States Senator
from the State of Texas

3

George Bush, of Texas

11

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1 NOMINATION OF GEORGE BUSH, OF TEXAS,
2 TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE,
3 VICE WILLIAM EGAN COLBY

4 - - -

5 Monday, December 15, 1975

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7 United States Senate,
8 Committee on Armed Services,
9 Washington, D. C.

10 The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 o'clock a.m.,
11 in Room 1114, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John C.
12 Stennis (the Chairman) presiding.

13 Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, McIntyre,
14 Byrd, Hart, Leahy, Thurmond, Tower, Goldwater and Bartlett.

15 Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., Chief Counsel and
16 Staff Director; W. Clark McFadden, II, Counsel; John T. Ticer,
17 Chief Clerk; Phyllis A. Bacon, Assistant Chief Clerk; Edward
18 B. Kenney, Professional Staff Member; John A. Goldsmith, Pro-
19 fessional Staff Member; Don A. Lynch, Professional Staff Member;
20 Francis J. Sullivan, Professional Staff Member; Roberta Ujakovich,
21 Research Assistant; and Doris E. Connor, Clerical Assistant.

22 Also present: David Raymond, Assistant to Senator
23 Symington; Charles Stevenson, Assistant to Senator Culver; Ed
24 Miller, Assistant to Senator Hart; and Doug Racine, Assistant
25 to Senator Leahy.

1 The Chairman. Members of the Committee, the Chairman
2 proposes that we have a statement from Senator Tower of Texas,
3 the nominee, Mr. Bush, being from Texas, and then I have a
4 short statement here as Chairman and I will ask if the gentle-
5 man from South Carolina has a brief statement, too, a short
6 statement, and I understand Mr. Bush has a statement that I
7 have not read, but I will call on him then and then we will
8 proceed with questions.

9 We are glad to have our visitors. We are glad to have
10 the press and radio and television. We will all have to keep
11 quiet, otherwise it will nullify the cause you have for being
12 here. That is a mutual undertaking of all of us. I am sure
13 that all will observe it. It is just the price of staying in
14 here and that is a very cheap price to pay, especially
15 when it serves your own purpose.

16 All right. Senator Tower, we will be glad to recognize
17 you, sir, and you have a statement. You may proceed.

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1 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN TOWER, A UNITED
2 STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
3 Senator Tower. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 It is a great pleasure for me to be able to present to
5 this Committee, on which I am proud to serve, my fellow Texan,
6 George Bush, who has been nominated for the Office of Director
7 of Central Intelligence. I believe that George Bush is
8 eminently qualified. He is a native of New England, has a
9 distinguished war record, got his education at Yale, then
10 had the eminent good judgment to move to Texas, where he has
11 spent all of his adult life.

12 He has been very successful in the areas of petroleum
13 resources development and drilling, always public spirited
14 and always involved in public affairs. He resigned his
15 corporate responsibilities in 1966 to run for the House of
16 Representatives. He was re-elected without opposition in 1968.
17 He has served as the Permanent Representative to the United
18 Nations. He has served as Chairman of the Republican National
19 Committee. He has served as United States Liaison to the
20 Government in Peking.

21 He has served always in every capacity with great distinc-
22 tion and he was recognized early in his public career for his
23 enormous accomplishment of being the first freshman Congressman
24 to be appointed to the Ways and Means Committee in some 50 years
25 prior to that time.

1 I believe that the fact that he has a good intellect and
2 good mind, and ability to marshal facts and reduce them to
3 manageable proportions and draw the appropriate conclusions,
4 in view of his proven good administrative ability I think that
5 he has all the equipment necessary to make for this country one
6 of the most outstanding Directors of Central Intelligence that
7 we have ever had.

8 I am therefore pleased and proud to have the opportunity
9 to present him before the Committee and to urge that the
10 Committee recommend favorably his confirmation to the Senate.

11 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Senator Tower, as I
13 said in the beginning, is a valuable member of our Committee
14 here. We are glad for him to appear here in his special
15 capacity.

16 Senator Jackson is unable to be here this morning but
17 will be here according to his plans this afternoon.

18 I do not think that there is any chance to be voting on
19 this matter today anyway, but I -- due to some who had to be
20 away, I will just say we will not have voting today. I am
21 sure that is agreeable to all the group.

22 Members of the Committee, I have a short statement here
23 that -- an introductory statement in a way, that I wrote out
24 on the back of an envelope, so-to-speak. I have another
25 statement that is partly historical about reviewing the enactment

1 of the original Act. I want to say just a few words here.
2 My desires and wishes would be that there not be any secret
3 intelligence agency at all, the CIA, but my judgment and exper-
4 iences here tell me that we must have such an agency. This is
5 a new and different concept of government as I see it from
6 anything we have had heretofore, but soon after the end of
7 World War II we realized that we must have an intelligence
8 gathering agency. Much of its work would have to be carried
9 out in secret. Thus, we enacted as a part of the National
10 Security Act of 1947, provisions for the creation of this
11 Agency.

12 As I said, this statement here is more or less for the
13 record and for the information of the public at large if
14 the media should see fit to use it. Later, with the joining
15 of NATO and other commitments, and I was here when these things
16 happened, we were further convinced that such an agency,
17 properly managed, was not only necessary but was very apt and
18 useful in carrying out those commitments which were considered
19 a part of our own national security, and in spite of some bad
20 things that have happened along from time to time in different
21 administrations, I know as a fact that the CIA has rendered
22 some very valuable services to our Government, to our national
23 security.

24 Now, our Government, and this includes the Chief Executive
25 and at least a major segment of the Legislative Branch, must

1 have the benefit of what is going on in other countries, be they
2 friendly or unfriendly. It is actually frightening to me to
3 think of any President trying to proceed without intelligence
4 of the nature that I have mentioned. Of necessity that power
5 is given to this Agency under law and is placed largely in the
6 hands of the Chief Executive, whoever he may be.

7 First, through these hearings, we can emphasize the absolute
8 necessity of a clear consciousness on the part of the Chief
9 Executive of the Nation of this special power and of the care
10 and personal attention the President must give to this special
11 and exceptional power and also give to the individuals that he
12 selects to act for him under this law. And I hope these hearings
13 will emphasize that point. That is a fact of life that we know
14 now that we did not know when the Act was originally passed.

15 It is a fact that the funds that Congress appropriates for
16 this special Agency are placed directly in the hands of the
17 President of the United States. In the final analysis he is
18 the one that directs the Agency in the use of these funds.

19 Further, there must be a surveillance by the Congress of
20 the exercise of the power given and the funds provided to a
21 President, any President. This system of surveillance must be
22 mocked out and carried out more intensively in the future than
23 in the past.

24 Again I mention these points now just to make clear that
25 even though changes in the law and the system are needed, as I

1 see it, proposed changes are not now the main focal point of
2 these hearings. They are relevant and, of course, the question
3 will be in order, but changes in the law or the system would
4 require hearings quite extensive indeed. That is my belief,
5 that extensive hearings planned for that purpose would be held
6 on any major change of the law. The chief focal point of our
7 hearings beginning today relate to the nominee, the Honorable
8 George Bush of Texas. Mr. Bush is a gentleman that so far as
9 I know has an honorable public career, a man of capacity and
10 integrity. These matters and others are all placed in issue
11 by his nomination. I believe this Committee wants to make a
12 full examination of his character, his integrity, his capabil-
13 ities and other qualifications that pertain to the duties
14 of the Director and related matters.

15 I have a further statement, members of the Committee, that
16 is just more or less historical as to the law that I would like
17 to place in the record at this point, together with a biographi-
18 cal sketch of Mr. Bush.

19 (The prepared statement of Senator Stennis, together with
20 biographical information on Mr. Bush follows:)

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1 All right, Mr. Bush. We are glad to have you here. You
2 have been before Committees of the Senate before. I remember
3 one in particular, and we are glad to have you, sir, and you
4 do have a prepared statement you told me a few minutes ago,
5 and the members have it here.

6 Senator Thurmond, our valuable ranking member of our
7 Committee, I want to recognize him now. Senator?

8 Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Mr. Bush, I am very interested in the work of the CIA.
10 I have been very concerned over what has been happening in
11 this country, the attitude of some people towards the CIA and
12 the other intelligence gathering agencies of our Government.

13 In fighting a war one of the most important things is
14 known as the G-2. The G-2 is a man who collects intelligence
15 on the enemy. In peacetime, if our President is going to make
16 wise decisions, he must have intelligence, he must have knowledge,
17 he must have information as to what is going on in different
18 parts of the world and especially with regard to potential
19 enemies.

20 If you are confirmed to this position, it is my sincere
21 hope that you will not have your ardor lessened in the least
22 because of this investigation of the CIA and other intelligence
23 agencies. We have three members, I believe, of this Committee
24 who are on that Committee -- Senator Tower, Senator Goldwater,
25 and Senator Hart. In my judgment, it is extremely important,

1 regardless of what some of the big newspapers say and news media
2 of every kind say, that you dedicate yourself to gathering the
3 information that the President of the United States needs
4 because he cannot act wisely unless he has it. It is vital
5 to our survival in my judgment. And I just hope that in the
6 performance of your duties you will not be discouraged in the
7 least by the actions of some people, especially some news media
8 in this Nation.

9 In looking over your biography, I notice you are well
10 educated. You graduated from Yale, Phi Beta Kappa. You were
11 an athlete, in varsity baseball, I believe, three years, captain
12 of the team. You went into the service at age 18, became an
13 ensign, served three or four years in the Navy, was shot down
14 in combat, awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, and three
15 Air Medals, all of which to me is impressive. It is impressive
16 to me because you have served your country in uniform and you
17 have been acknowledged by your country as being worthy of
18 decorations.

19 Then you have held important positions -- Congressman from
20 Texas I believe three terms, Permanent Representative of the
21 United States to the United Nations, Chairman of the Republican
22 National Committee, Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Peking, People's
23 Republic of China.

24 I was impressed, too -- it may sound like a little thing
25 but it shows a part of a man, an important part, I think -- the

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1 fact that you served as the Chairman of the Texas Heart Fund
2 and that you serve as Lifetime Trustee at Phillips Academy,
3 and Community Associate, Lovett College, Rice University.

4 I think all of this shows an interest on your part in
5 humanity, in civic development, love of your country, willingness
6 to serve your fellowman. From your experience and your intellec-
7 tual integrity, the reputation you bear for honesty, it seems
8 to me that from all of this experience and your personal qualities
9 that you are well qualified to fill this important position,
10 and speaking for myself I shall be very pleased to support you.

11 The Chairman. All right, gentlemen. If it is agreeable
12 with the Committee -- thanks, Senator -- we will proceed now
13 with Mr. Bush.

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1 STATEMENT OF GEORGE BUSH, OF TEXAS

2 Mr. Bush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
3 Committee. Particular thanks to my fellow Texan, Senator Tower.
4 I am pleased to be back in the United States. I am still on
5 Peking Standard Time so I am a little tired and I hope you will
6 forgive me, Mr. Chairman.

7 My nomination was sent to this Committee some time ago
8 but I was unable to leave China prior to the President's trip
9 to the People's Republic. The President left Peking on December
10 5 and Mrs. Bush and I left on December 7.

11 I recognize that I am being nominated as Director of the
12 CIA at a very complicated time in the history of this Agency,
13 and indeed in the history of our country. In fact, having been
14 in China for a year, I did not fully realize the depth of the
15 emotions surrounding the CIA controversy until I came back here.
16 But be that as it may, I have a few fundamental views that I
17 would like to set out in the brief statement and then, sir,
18 I will be happy to respond as frankly, as honestly as I can to
19 any of your questions.

20 First, my views on intelligence. I believe in a strong
21 intelligence capability for the United States. My more than
22 three years in two vital foreign affairs posts, plus my attending
23 Cabinet meetings for four years, plus my four years in Congress,
24 make me totally convinced that we must see our intelligence
25 capability certainly maintained and I would say strengthened.

1 We must not see the CIA dismantled.

2 Reporting and investigative reporting in the papers and
3 investigative work proper by the Senate and the House have
4 brought to light some abuses that have taken place over a long
5 period of time. Clearly things were done that were outrageous.
6 Some of them were morally offensive. And these must not be
7 repeated and I will take every step to see that they are not
8 repeated.

9 I understand that Director Colby has already issued direc-
10 tives that implement some of the decisions of the Rockefeller
11 Commission, decisions designed to safeguard against abuses.
12 If confirmed, I will do all in my power to keep informed personal-
13 ly, to demand to the highest ethical standards from those with
14 whom I work, and particularly to see that this Agency stays in
15 foreign, I repeat, foreign, intelligence business.

16 I am told that morale at the CIA and indeed in other
17 parts of the intelligence community is low. This must change
18 and I am going to do my best to help change it. Some people
19 today are driven to wantonly disclose sensitive information --
20 not talking here about the Congress -- not to the proper over-
21 sight authorities of the Congress but to friend and foe alike
22 around the world. In many instances this type of disclosure
23 can wipe out effective operations, can endanger the lives of
24 patriot Americans and can cause enormous damage to our security.

25 I view the job of Director of Central Intelligence not

1 as a maker of foreign policy but as one who should forcefully
2 and objectively present to the President and to the National
3 Security Council the findings and views of the intelligence
4 community.

5 It is essential that these recommendations be without
6 political tilt.

7 It is essential that strongly held differences within this
8 very large community be presented. It is essential that without
9 regard to existing policy or future policy, the intelligence
10 estimates be presented -- cold, hard, truthful.

11 I am convinced that I have the proper access to the
12 President that was strongly emphasized in the recent Murphy
13 Commission Report. I hope you find, gentlemen, that I have the
14 proper integrity and character to do this job.

15 Further, I see running of the CIA as very important, but
16 I see the responsibility for coordinating all of our foreign
17 intelligence activities as even more important. The CIA has
18 a fundamental input into intelligence estimates, but so must
19 the other agencies.

20 I will be fair to all, but I will do my level best to
21 eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and minimize inter-
22 agency bureaucratic disputes. It will not be easy, I am told,
23 but I will try hard on this.

24 Now, Mr. Chairman, a word about my personal qualifications.
25 I am familiar with the charges, very familiar with them, that I

1 am too political for this job. Here is my side of the story.

2 Yes, I have been in politics. I served four years in
3 Congress. I served two years as Chairman of my party and I
4 have no apology for either service. Indeed, I am proud to have
5 served in partisan politics.

6 Some of the difficulties the CIA has encountered might have
7 been avoided if more political judgment had been brought to bear.
8 And I am not talking about narrow political partisanship. I am
9 talking about the respect for the people and their sensitivities
10 that most politicians have a real feel for and understand. I
11 do not view political experience as a detriment, Mr. Chairman.
12 I view it as an asset, but I also recognize the need to leave
13 politics behind the minute I take on the new job if this Senate
14 confirms me.

15 And I would like to add, if confirmed I will take no part,
16 directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity of
17 any kind. I will not attend any political meetings. I will
18 give no political speeches nor make any political contributions.

19 My ability to shut politics off when serving in non-partisan
20 jobs has been demonstrated in two highly sensitive foreign
21 affairs posts, as I hope this Committee can verify.

22 For two years I was Ambassador at the United Nations, and
23 for a little over a year I served as Chief of the U.S. Liaison
24 Office in Peking. Both jobs taught me a lot about the product
25 of our intelligence community. Both taught me the fundamental

1 importance of retaining an intelligence community second to none.

2 Frankly, many of our friends around the world and some
3 who are not friendly are wondering what we are doing to ourselves
4 as a nation as they see attacks on the CIA. Some must wonder
5 if they can depend on us to protect them if they cooperate with
6 us on important intelligence projects.

7 I think many admire our ability, and justifiably so, to
8 cleanse ourselves and admit mistakes. But in something as
9 sensitive as intelligence they frankly hope that we do not go
10 so far that we will kill off an important asset that they them-
11 selves and the free world vitally need for their own security.

12 In addition to my foreign affairs assignments, I attended
13 Cabinet meetings from 1971 to 1974. Those four years gave me
14 I think a good insight into some of the foreign policy considera-
15 tions facing our country.

16 I think this foreign affairs background will be useful
17 in my new job.

18 I also feel the administrative experience that I had in
19 starting and running a business enterprise, which prospered,
20 will be helpful.

21 Now, lastly I will address myself to a question that is
22 on the minds of some members of this Committee. It is on the
23 minds of many people in the United States who are not on this
24 Committee, and I believe from reading the newspapers it is on
25 the minds of many people who are responsible for the editorial

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1 contact with many of the readers of newspapers, and that is
2 mainly the question of my having been considered in the past
3 for the post of -- the position of Vice President of the United
4 States.

5 When Secretary Rumsfeld was before this Committee not so
6 long ago, his name having been speculated on for Vice President,
7 he said "It is presumptuous of me to stand up and take myself
8 out of consideration for something I am not in consideration for."

9 The Committee accepted this answer then and I offer it now.

10 But let me just add a little bit more here.

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2 If some individual or group comes forward promoting me for
3 Vice President when I am Director of CIA, I will instruct them,
4 ask them, to cease such activity.

5 But then there is one other question and I decided to get
6 it out openly and frankly and I decided the Committee was
7 entitled to my frank feelings on this. The question is this.
8 "Even if you have not lifted a finger to seek the nomination
9 and even if you have actively discouraged others from advocating
10 you for office, and the nomination is then offered to you, will
11 you then accept?"

12 I cannot in all honesty tell you that I would not accept,
13 and I do not think, gentlemen, that any American should be
14 asked to say he would not accept, and to my knowledge, no one
15 in the history of this Republic has been asked to renounce his
16 political birthright as the price of confirmation for any
17 office. And I can tell you that I will not seek any office
18 while I hold the job as CIA Director. I will politics totally
19 out of my sphere of activities.

20 In this new job I serve at the pleasure of the President
21 and I plan to stay as long as he wants me to.

22 Some of my friends have asked me, "Why do you accept this
23 job with all the controversy swirling around the CIA, with its
24 obvious barriers to political future?"

25 My answer is simple. First, the work is desperately
important to the survival of this country and to the survival

1 of freedom around the world. And second, old fashioned as it
2 may seem to some, it is my duty to serve my country. And I did
3 not seek this job but I want to do it and I will do my very
4 best.

5 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 The Chairman. All right, Mr. Bush. You have made a very
7 impressive statement here.

8 On this Vice Presidential matter, I am glad you covered
9 that. I did not know that you were but I am glad you covered
10 it. And I say with all deference to all former Directors of
11 this agency, it is a difficult job. If I thought that you were
12 seeking the Vice Presidential nomination or Presidential nomi-
13 nation by way of the route of being Director of the CIA, I
14 would question your judgment most severely.

15 (Laughter)

16 That I would not vote to approve you on the basic judgment
17 and basic qualifications, because as I see it, this would be
18 the very opposite of preparation for aspirations or planning,
19 either one of those offices. Others may see that differently
20 but that is the way I see it and politically it is almost as
21 impossible a job as being Mayor of New York City, for instance,
22 and I say that with deference to Mayor Beame and others.

23 I think, too, personally as I see citizenship, you have
24 gone as far as a man should go in declarations. People jump
25 us, view anything as not being considered. Of course, as far

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1 as you know, our political system is contrary to a man
2 renouncing every other office or any other office unless he has
3 a personal desire to.

4 Now, you have answered most of the questions that I have
5 and I questioned in the beginning -- by the way I want to say
6 to the Committee that these two nominations came over either
7 together or one followed the other, Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Bush,
8 and discussing the question of the hearings, I just told them,
9 well, we would take up Secretary of Defense first. I understood
10 Mr. Schlesinger was leaving before that week was out, and
11 Mr. Colby was going to stay on. And they said then that you
12 were in China and would have to remain there some time at least
13 and that when you got back and you got acclamated a little,
14 let the Committee know, and this is the way this thing happened
15 about it being delayed.

16 I was first concerned that we might not be here this
17 week but found out we were and most likely all of the week. So
18 we set it at this time.

19 Now, to go to your background, Mr. Bush, in preparation
20 for this very difficult assignment, I wish you would state a
21 little more about the experiences you had that relate to these
22 duties. For instance, NATO and how long you were there and
23 something about your contacts there, the feel of things, and
24 then your experiences in China without making disclosures of
25 intimate things, of course, but you have a background that few

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1 men have that come to this office. Enlarge on that some, please.

2 Mr. Bush. Mr. Chairman, at the United Nations where I was
3 the Permanent Representative for two years, I came into
4 contact -- in those days I think there were 134 member nations,
5 and now it is 148 or 145, and I felt then, and I will elaborate
6 on that when I come to China, that in spite of the rhetoric in
7 that place, much of it hostile to the United States, particu-
8 larly because the United Nations is getting to be more and more
9 group oriented -- the African group, the Latin American
10 group -- there is an Arab group -- and I think for those
11 members who have served there from the Foreign Affairs Committee,
12 Foreign Relations Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee, they
13 find that member countries they can talk to individually will
14 tell them one thing, but in groups, their group positions, no
15 nation seems to want to stand up and depart from them.

16 My observation, based on bilateral contacts, is that many
17 countries whom we might assume were hostile to us from group
18 statements are really friendly to us. I took a trip in 1972,
19 I believe it was, to nine or ten African countries for the
20 President and when you got into a bilateral basis, I found that
21 most of these countries individually were extremely interested
22 in seeing the United States stay strong and in seeing -- we did
23 not get into the intelligence question but in linking the
24 United States to their freedom or to their right to exist
25 independent of others.

1 In China, that was a very different experience and that
2 experience put me in touch with the largest country in the
3 world. It put me in touch with very, very powerful and strong-
4 willed principled leaders. I saw more clearly then through
5 their eyes and through the eyes of my diplomatic colleagues,
6 the importance of being strong as a nation, with particular
7 regard to the possible problems that can emerge from the Soviet
8 Union.

9 And the diplomatic community there again reflected the
10 same thing I experienced in the United Nations, sometimes in
11 group enforcing positions of their goverments that I was not
12 particularly happy about, but then on a bilateral basis
13 encouraging us to stay strong as a nation.

14 So without going further, I will be glad to be responsive
15 in more detail on it, and I think these three years in foreign
16 affairs convinced me that we are the only hope of the free
17 world. There is no other one. None at all in this world. And
18 we have got to be strong militarily, but to do it we have got
19 to understand the threat. We have got to utilize intelligence
20 and it has happened since history began and we must keep and
21 strengthen our intelligence capability, and having said that,
22 I repeat I am not condoning any of the excesses of the past.
23 Indeed, I pledge myself to do what I can to see that they are
24 eliminated.

25 That is a very general answer, sir.

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1 The Chairman. Well, it has been my observation in the
2 case of other nominees who undertook this job that as a minimum
3 it takes 12 months of intensive application, intensive applica-
4 tion, to get on top of the job, so to speak, to get the feel
5 of it, the many angles, the ramifications. These are worldwide
6 as you know. Certainly domestic too.

7 Are you willing to put in that -- whatever intensive
8 application is necessary just to get on top of it, so to speak?
9 Have you thought --

10 Mr. Bush. Mr. Chairman --

11 The Chairman. Have you thought that out?

12 Mr. Bush. I have thought it out. I am committed to it.
13 I hope that my record reveals I am not opposed to hard work.
14 Indeed I have done it since I can remember and I certainly will
15 make that commitment and I plan -- I have no other plans. My
16 plan is to get in there. There is an awful lot of learning to
17 be done. I have been back here a week and have not had access
18 to much of the classified information even now, and probably
19 that is better until this Senate disposes of this matter one way
20 or another, but I promise you, sir, that I will set an example
21 out there in terms of hours, in terms of hard work, that I
22 think this Committee will be proud of. And I have done it
23 before and I am prepared to do it again.

24 The Chairman. Well, I ask every nominee this question
25 just in simple terms. Now, boiled down, why do you agree for

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1 your name to be submitted and you undertake this job?

2 Mr. Bush. I have a -- I hope you understand this one. I
3 have a sense of obligation to this country. I am one who is
4 old fashioned in the sense that I think duty and obligation to
5 serve still should be inculcated into every son and every
6 daughter of every father, and I feel strongly about it. My
7 foreign affairs experience has taught me the absolute essen-
8 tiality of this work and it is for -- the reason that it is no
9 more complicated than that.

10 Mr. Chairman, I did not seek this job. I was riding my
11 bicycle in Peking, coming home from church. A messenger came
12 up and said, say, there is news for you back there. I went
13 back there, held up this telegram, and it was out of a cold
14 clear blue China sky that this thing descended on me. And I
15 thought about it, not long, thought about it and decided as I
16 think maybe your opening comments, there is nothing in this
17 politically for me. It is my obligation to my country and I
18 just hope I can convince those who cannot accept that because
19 maybe they do not know that to me that is what motivated me and
20 I think my reply to the President of the United States when I
21 sent it back reflected that.

22 The Chairman. All right.

23 You did not volunteer. They just volunteered you.

24 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.

25 The Chairman. All right.

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1 Senator Thurmond?

2 Senator Thurmond. Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions
3 here that can be answered for the record and save time. I am
4 very pleased with the statement Mr. Bush has made here and I
5 suggest that he answer these questions for the record.

6 Mr. Bush. Thank you, sir.

7 The Chairman. All right, Senator.

8 Senator Symington?

9 Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 Mr. Ambassador, this is a very impressive statement in my
11 opinion that you have made. Based on the remarks that have
12 been made already, it looks to me as if you are already con-
13 firmed. But I would like to ask you a couple of questions and
14 make some comments.

15 The first one is that I think a strong economy and a sound
16 dollar is just as important to the national security as any-
17 thing else. Without an economy that is viable, this country
18 could not preserve its system. You would agree to that, would
19 you not?

20 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.

21 Senator Symington. Well, I thought you would based on
22 your record and your experience which has been extensive. I
23 do not think I know of any man your age who has had more
24 experience in government. Much of the criticism of the CIA,
25 it is as clear as light to me, is the fault of Congress, not

1 just the people working for the CIA. This Committee -- and I
2 have been on the Committee, the Subcommittee on the CIA for
3 perhaps 15 years, it has never really looked into the CIA which
4 it should do if it wants to have the obligation.

5 As perhaps the greatest industrialist I ever knew said,
6 if a man thinks he is being watched, it is just about as good
7 as watching him. And the Central Intelligence Agency has known
8 for many years that in effect it was not being watched. And I
9 hope that you will do in this job what was done in the Atomic
10 Energy Act. It was very difficult for me to get any real
11 interest in this Committee for a long time in the development
12 of nuclear weapons and it was very difficult in the Foreign
13 Relations Committee to get any knowledge of nuclear weapons.
14 It was like trying to pull teeth.

15 So I went on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee where under
16 the law it is the obligation of the Atomic Energy Committee to
17 keep the Joint Committee informed and I found out more about
18 atomic weapons in a few weeks than I had in the previous 20
19 years, even though I had served 20 years already on this Com-
20 mittee, even though I think the Backfire and the Cruise missile
21 are the two most important considerations, especially the
22 latter, from the standpoint of the future of your children and
23 my grandchildren.

24 So I would hope that you would agree that even if you
25 were not questioned, that you would come before this Committee

1 and volunteer anything that you thought was wrong in the way of
2 actions that were being asked of you, or that you were con-
3 sidering from the standpoint of what is best for the country.

4 Would you do that?

5 Mr. Bush. Senator Symington, I hope that I -- I know that
6 my experience in Congress has taught me great respect for it,
7 and I am confident that I could cooperate fully with the proper
8 oversight committees in that regard. And I would.

9 Senator Symington. That is not a direct answer, but I
10 would hope --

11 Mr. Bush. The answer is yes.

12 Senator Symington. I would hope you would. That is a
13 direct answer. And I appreciate it very much.

14 The reason I say that is that with one exception, one
15 conspicuous exception, the estimate of what the enemy had by
16 the CIA was invariably lower when it came to ground power than
17 that given to the Committee by the Army, and the estimate by
18 the -- the original estimate always before the massaging took
19 place was the same with respect to the Navy and the Air Force,
20 and there are some of us who believe that most of what we buy
21 is necessary for the security of the United States, and much of
22 what we buy is not necessary and that directly affects the
23 economy.

24 So I would hope you would come to us -- as I understand,
25 you report directly to the President of the United States, do

1 you not?

2 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir, and the National Security Council,
3 but I have --

4 Senator Symington. The National Security Council is
5 merely an advisory body to the --

6 Mr. Bush. President.

7 Senator Symington. -- to the President, and I would hope
8 that -- I have had two positions myself on the National
9 Security Council in the past and with all due respect to the
10 National Security Council, what I want to know is if President
11 Ford will give you direct access to him.

12 Mr. Bush. One of the -- Senator Symington, that has -- I
13 did ask that in the acceptance and it was agreed to.

14 Senator Symington. I am very glad of that.

15 The Chairman. Pardon me, Senator.

16 You did ask --

17 Mr. Bush. I made clear before -- as a matter of fact, as
18 a provisal of acceptance of the job -- that I would have direct
19 access to the President and the President agreed to that,
20 Mr. Chairman.

21 The Chairman. That was not clear.

22 Senator Symington. Thank you.

23 Some years ago, about four or five, two of the ablest
24 investigators that I know went around the world, as a matter
25 of fact. They were primarily interested in uncovering the

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1 covert operations in Laos. But on going back they looked over
2 various things and they said that the duplication and waste of
3 intelligence in the Mediterranean was the most they had ever
4 seen anywhere, anyplace, any time. You had the CIA, you had the
5 DIA, you had the NSA, you had the ONI, you had Air Force
6 intelligence and Army intelligence. You also had a setup in
7 the State Department under a former Deputy Director of CIA.
8 So you had -- and everybody was collecting everything.

9 Much of it, if not most of it, was not being read and the
10 taxpayers were paying for all of it.

11 With your background, would you be interested in looking
12 into that? I would hope you would. After all, you are the
13 number one agency in intelligence in the government, even though
14 you only get a small fraction of the total intelligence dollar.

15 Mr. Bush. Senator Symington, I certainly would. I cannot
16 tell you at this time that I know exactly where the major
17 points of duplication are. I know enough about the job now to
18 know that as the Director of Central Intelligence that you do
19 have some responsibilities, major responsibilities, though in
20 some places not total authority for coordination, but as I
21 implied in my statement or stated in my statement, I viewed
22 that responsibility as terribly important and I will do my best
23 to eliminate duplication, though I noticed that previous
24 Directors testifying here indicated that in some cases duplica-
25 tion of getting a new look at analyses, say, from DIA, CIA,

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1 could be helpful. But that is not what you are talking about.
2 You are talking about waste and I will do my best to eliminate
3 that.

4 Senator Symington. Thank you.

5 Somebody mentioned the Mayor of New York. A prominent
6 banker said if the truth was actually known the condition of
7 the federal government from the standpoint of assets versus
8 liabilities, and so forth, was far worse off than the city of
9 New York. The only difference is that the people in Washington
10 have printing presses. That was said by a prominent banker
11 who I happen to know you know well, and I think there is merit
12 in that observation.

13 Now, just one more line of questioning. An article came
14 in written by General Graham, and I will read you what -- just
15 one paragraph from this article, and, Mr. Chairman, I ask
16 unanimous consent that it be made a part of the record at this
17 point.

18 The Chairman. All right. Without objection the article
19 will be included in the record.

20 (The material referred to follows:)

21 COMMITTEE INSERT

22

23

24

25

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1 Senator Symington. This article said:

2 "If the military profession loses its role in describing
3 these threats to national security it surrenders much of its
4 influence in decisions about military strategy, military force
5 structure and the nature of its own armaments. We have in the
6 past 10 years come perilously close to losing this vital role.
7 The impact of the intelligence views of the Department of
8 Defense was progressively weakened between 1960 and 1970 and
9 the voice of civilian agencies in all facets of military intel-
10 ligence became progressively more dominant. The military
11 budgets carried the onus of heavy outlays for intelligence
12 collection but the key intelligence judgments derived from this
13 costly effort were for the most part made in other agencies."

14 I was involved in the creation of the National Security
15 Council. I doubt if there is more than one person in a 100
16 in this room that remembers the name of the first Director of
17 the CIA. But the Agency was, in my opinion, created as much in
18 the thinking of Secretary Forrestal as that of anybody because
19 although he was very pro-military, he realized that there must
20 be some brake on the various demands of the various services
21 for the various new weapons systems that were being proposed
22 by various people, and so forth and so on.

23 And when I read that the gentleman who made this statement
24 was being taken over by the Central Intelligence Agency that
25 worried me, so I called up the Director of the Central

1 Intelligence Agency and asked him if he knew about this speech.
2 because it worried me. He said, have you read the speech? I
3 said, no, just the record. And so he said, well, if you read
4 the speech, I do not think you would feel that way about it.

5 So I read the speech and then wrote the Director of the
6 CIA, the Honorable James R. Schlesing:

7 "Dear Jim, as you can see by the attached, I have read
8 the article in detail and have extracted certain statements
9 made hopefully not out of context. At the end of the article
10 as presented he states, and I quote, 'there is no longer a need
11 in my judgment to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies.'"

12 As you know, the Defense Intelligence Agency is part of
13 the military setup.

14 "Especially in this article, and the fact that he is
15 going to work for you in the Central Intelligence Agency have
16 created much comment down here. I would hope we would get
17 together soon re same. Sincerely."

18 And then I put in a long-hand note, "specifically where
19 does this leave the CIA?" The second paragraph which I just
20 read to you.

21 To my surprise, and I think it is fair to say to my
22 regret, this letter was dated April 13, 1973, and a few days
23 or weeks later Mr. Schlesinger went over as Director of the -- as
24 Secretary of Defense. One of the first things he did was to
25 take this gentleman back into the Pentagon and make him the

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1 Director, make him the head of the DIA. And to me that was
2 rather questionable from the standpoint of what the man had
3 written in a talk if he was sincere in his opinions.

4 Now, what I am getting at is this. You will feel entirely
5 independent of anybody, but your own mind, based on your own
6 experience when you analyze what this country needs for its
7 national security. Am I correct in that?

8 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.

9 Senator Symington. I am very -- I am very pleased that
10 you have taken that position. I accept, knowing you and your
11 family for a great many years, I accept every statement that
12 you have made today as accurate. I think you are extremely
13 well qualified for the position and if you will stick to your
14 guns as you have said you would this morning, I see no reason
15 why you cannot make an outstanding success in this position.

16 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 The Chairman. Thank you very much.

18 Senator Tower, did you have any questions?

19 Senator Tower. No, I defer --

20 The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?

21 Senator Goldwater. George, I think in -- I do not have
22 any questions but because there is a strong possibility that
23 you might be asked about Vice Presidential intentions by one
24 member who is a candidate and another one who might be, I
25 thought it might help if one who has been through that track,

1 around that track, I might make a few comments on it. I agree
2 completely with your statement. You say, "I don't think any
3 American should be asked to say he would not accept."

4 And I do not think any American would. I do not mind
5 telling you that I recommended that you be Vice President to
6 Mr. Nixon and again to Mr. Ford. To your advantage they saw
7 differently than I did.

8 Now, Vice Presidents are not selected in the committee
9 room of the Armed Services. Maybe the way we do it is not the
10 way it should be done. I do not think it is. It may not be
11 the best, but usually some hotel room is the meeting place and
12 I remember in 1956 when Mr. Nixon was picked in a hotel room
13 in Chicago. Then in 1960 another hotel when Mr. Lodge was
14 picked.

15 In my case I forget whether it was my room in a hotel or
16 somebody else's room, but I called on the members of the
17 Congress and asked who they would like me to name as Vice
18 President and they gave me the name of Bill Miller.

19 In 1968 in a hotel room in Florida, the Fontainebleu, I
20 believe it was --

21 Senator Tower. Hilton.

22 Senator Goldwater. What?

23 Senator Tower. Hilton.

24 Senator Goldwater. I forget where it was. It was so
25 damned many years ago.

1 From about 1:00 o'clock in the morning to about 5:00
2 o'clock in the morning we met with Mr. Nixon and he finally
3 said, could you live with Mr. Agnew? So that is the way this
4 job is going to be chosen and it is not going to be done here
5 and I hope none of our members bedevil you about whether you
6 will or will not because you might ask them the question who
7 asked you to run for President. And that would be a good
8 point. Do not ask me.

9 I just want to tell you, George, it is a real pleasure to
10 have you here. I know Senator Symington, your father and I
11 all started service in the Senate at the same time, and you
12 follow all the fine traditions of your father and the only
13 mistake you have ever made is moving to Texas.

14 (Laughter)

15 The Chairman. All right.

16 Thank you, Senator.

17 All right. Senator MacIntyre?

18 Senator MacIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 As I started to think of what to do with this nomination,
20 I am reminded how it was that we seemed to get all the real
21 difficult ones here. The key issue is, of course, the
22 political background that you have already achieved. In your
23 courtesy call to me, Mr. Bush, you stressed that your political
24 background should be considered as an asset, especially when
25 contrasted or measured against the performance of some CIA

1 career men. I have to admit this position does have some appeal.
2 But there is another strong and reasonable position that says
3 that no one with your political background and past should be
4 considered. That goes on to say that the FBI and the CIA are
5 two posts in Washington that have to be considered differently
6 than Cabinet posts.

7 Those positions, like the Supreme Court, should be
8 insulated completely from politics and if -- if you agree with
9 this opinion, then no matter how good you are, you are
10 disqualified.

11 There is another position, too, as you tried to figure out
12 what to do with a George Bush's distinguished career, ability,
13 everything that one could hope for, and that is that a poli-
14 tician should not be automatically disqualified if he possesses
15 the other necessary qualities. And certainly, Mr. Ambassador,
16 it would be beneficial to have someone who is sensitive to the
17 public and who understands the concepts of accountability to
18 the people.

19 However, is it appropriate to have someone with a clear
20 political background at this time in the history of the CIA?
21 Public confidence in the CIA must be at a low point now after
22 Watergate and the revelations of political abuses in past
23 administrations.

24 Now, as a firm believer in the importance of the CIA and
25 the necessity of its legitimate functions, I do not want to

1 see the agency further weakened by the appointment of a person
2 who is perceived, whether rightly or wrongly, by the public as
3 a political person.

4 Thus, at this particular or peculiar time in the history
5 of the CIA, the question that hits me is this. Is it
6 appropriate to appoint someone like you, Ambassador George
7 Bush, with a distinguished career? Is it? And I would
8 appreciate your reaction to this middle position, this third
9 position, that you could not, should not be disqualified if you
10 have the other characteristics, but at this time in history,
11 what are the perceptions going to be out there in the great,
12 wide, mid-United States?

13 Mr. Bush. Senator MacIntyre, it is my view that there
14 should be one criterion. I am not trying to tell you how to
15 run your business, but I think there should be one criterion.
16 If you accept that my foreign affairs background has been
17 conducted without political favor, and if you accept the
18 premise that it does not hurt to have been involved in politics,
19 not wholly partisan but so you have a feeling for the people,
20 then it seems to me that I think if I tried to put myself in
21 your shoes that I would not be concerned about appearance.
22 That is what editorials say.

23 But does this man have the character? Does he have the
24 integrity to do this job? And if you have a reservation in
25 your mind about that, I understand you are voting it down right

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1 now, but if you do not, I would find it difficult for you to
2 say, George, you are qualified, you have the background, you
3 have the ability, you have the political feel, but you are
4 disqualified because other people will not think it is all
5 right.

6 So that would be my answer to that question, sir, and I
7 hope you find I do have it and I hope you find that in two
8 rather sensitive jobs -- the minute I walked into them,
9 politics was put behind me. You put that United Nations
10 mission -- 104 people -- I do not think you will find any one
11 of them saying I did anything to politicize. What I think,
12 sitting here blowing my own horn, what I did was lift the
13 morale in the place and although there were understandable
14 reservations about my qualifications when I went there, I
15 think some of your colleagues that served with me and the
16 others would say that this guy did a good job.

17 So I would hope you would put emphasis on my ability to
18 do it because I understand there is this appearance. I just
19 do not think this Committee should knuckle under to appearance
20 if indeed I have the qualifications.

21 So I would ask to be judged on integrity and character as
22 opposed to how somebody else might view a job.

23 Senator MacIntyre. Let me ask you one very sizeable,
24 mean question that I would not think of asking of a similar
25 appointee five years ago, but in view of history, let me ask

1 you this question.

2 You said you were riding a bicycle in Peking when you
3 suddenly got word, when a messenger in the Embassy called you.
4 You did not seek this appointment. I know you told me, and I
5 do not think I am giving off anything that is secret, but as
6 you looked at it, you felt that if the President wanted you to
7 take this vital position, that your sense of duty to the country
8 and to the President was paramount and you accepted it.

9 Now, let us assume you are appointed. Let us assume we
10 are moving three or four months down the campaign trail, that
11 you are not going to be impervious to. You are going to read
12 the papers about it, I know.

13 What if somehow you get a call from the President next
14 July or August, George, I would like to see you. You go in the
15 White House. He takes you over in the corner and he says, look,
16 things are not going too good in my campaign. This Reagan is
17 gaining on me all the time. Now, he is a movie star of some
18 renown. He traveled with the fast set, I guess, I do not know,
19 maybe it was a slow set. He was a Hollywood star. I want you
20 to get any dirt you can on this guy because I need a jolt.

21 Now, what are you going to do and what can you do and
22 where would you go? Now, I may have asked the question poorly,
23 but I am trying to say what if something miserable like this
24 came right on your chin?

25 Mr. Bush. I do not think that is difficult, sir. I would

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1 simply say but that gets back to character and it gets back to
2 integrity, and furthermore, I cannot conceive of the incumbent
3 doing that sort of thing, but if I were put into that kind of
4 position where you had a clear moral issue, I would simply say
5 no because you see I think, and maybe -- and I have the
6 advantages as everyone on this committee of 20-20 hindsight,
7 that this agency must stay in the foreign intelligence business
8 and must not harrass American citizens, and Operation CHAOS,
9 and that these kinds of things have no business in the foreign
10 intelligence business, and under my leadership they will not
11 have, and so that causes me no problem whatsoever because, as
12 I have said, and I really believe I am putting politics behind
13 me on this, and again we get back, Senator MacIntyre, to my
14 being able or not able to convince you of that.

15 That is the main thing. And then if I can, then you should
16 no longer be troubled by that kind of -- I understand you are
17 raising it but I think if I have got it, you should not be
18 troubled by it.

19 Senator MacIntyre. But your answer is you would say no,
20 Mr. President.

21 Mr. Bush. That I would --

22 Senator MacIntyre. That is it.

23 Mr. Bush. I would say no, Mr. President. Yes, sir.

24 Senator MacIntyre. I think somehow, Mr. Chairman, in this
25 law when the CIA Director is asked to do something like that he

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1 should report it to the U.S. Senate because as you may or may
2 not know, in almost the same fashion this was done and the
3 CIA Deputy Director agreed with the telephone call because he
4 said he knew it was the President of the United States talking.
5 That is why I asked the miserable question.

6 I cannot conceive that you would do it.

7 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.

8 Senator MacIntyre. But I do think because I talked to
9 one of the former Directors just recently, and he said, Tom, I
10 had no place to go.

11 I do not know how that true that is, but he said so.

12 Thank you very much. I will give you every consideration.

13 The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.

14 Senator Bartlett, you are next.

15 Senator Bartlett. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

16 There has been a lot of talk about different approaches
17 and vehicles to be established -- oversight capabilities over
18 the CIA. How would you welcome much closer oversight as a
19 means that you meet your goals and do a better job?

20 Mr. Bush. Senator Bartlett --

21 The Chairman. Pardon me just a minute.

22 Mr. Bush. I heard the question, Mr. Chairman.

23 My view on that matter, Senator Bartlett, is that is a
24 matter for the Senate to determine, whatever the oversight
25 responsibilities should be. One of the recommendations of the

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1 Rockefeller Commission was some kind of a joint -- a joint
2 committee and all I can tell you is that I will closely cooper-
3 ate with whatever authority is set up for the Senate, the House,
4 of joint, whatever is determined by the Congress, but I have no
5 hesitancy in saying that I will cooperate. I am sure there will
6 be times, very frankly, when there could be differences as to
7 what may be disclosed, but I will cooperate to the best of my
8 ability with whatever oversight authorities are in existence now
9 and with whatever oversight authorities the Congress decides on
10 for the future.

11 Senator Bartlett. What I was getting at, with your back-
12 ground in Congress, do you feel it would be helpful in
13 achieving the goals of CIA to have committees better informed
14 than they have been in the past on a continuing basis?

15 Mr. Bush. I do, sir. And I would approach my job in that
16 manner.

17 Senator Bartlett. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned on page 5
18 of your statement, "Many of our friends around the world and
19 some who are not so friendly are wondering what we are doing
20 to ourselves as a nation as they see attacks on the CIA."

21 Where do you think the line should be drawn in the
22 investigations presently going on?

23 Mr. Bush. Well, it is a very hard question because I have
24 been gone and have not watched all the details. Certainly I
25 have no problems with the Congressional investigations per se.

1 This is the prerogative of the Senate. It is the prerogative
2 of the House. They ought to do it.

3 I was somewhat alarmed when I turned on a television
4 program the other night and saw some individual on a British
5 program wantonly disclosing names of corporations that had
6 cooperated with the CIA. I do not find that useful to our
7 security and intelligence or anything else. I have no detailed
8 knowledge of what these organizations do. I just do not have
9 that. I have not been briefed on that. But I just have the
10 feeling that there is some -- pick up Playboy magazine and read
11 a -- which I do not do very often, Senator Bartlett --

12 (Laughter)

13 And read a detailed expose naming names of CIA agents
14 which could endanger their families, possibly. I would have to
15 look into it more to make that charge. But I do not like that.
16 I think those kinds of things confuse our friends and delight
17 those who would like to know a great deal more about our intel-
18 ligence.

19 So in this statement I just wanted to get it out there.
20 There are some people that feel differently about it. I think
21 you need a balance between disclosure to the public and what I
22 would consider wanton disclosure that does not work in the
23 interests of the United States.

24 Senator Bartlett. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to say I
25 applaud what you have said about the comments that have been

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1 made in your direction concerning your Chairmanship of the
2 Republican party and your being a politician. I think there
3 can be real hypocrisy involved in such attacks.

4 I think that politicians are like other professions or
5 other people, that they can be good or bad or in the middle, and
6 I think a person should be judged on his own character and his
7 own abilities and he could have been or could not have been a
8 politician and meet the test.

9 So I really applaud you on that because I think that we
10 could not have people who wanted to serve in whatever capacity
11 they might be asked, or they wanted to be available to do their
12 best and be unable to do it because of some experiences in the
13 past that were perfectly fine and honorable but were so-called
14 political. So I commend you very much.

15 Mr. Bush. Thank you.

16 Senator Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 The Chairman. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator.

18 Gentlemen, it looks to me that you are not using the tele-
19 vision cameras. I wish you would turn those lights out. It
20 would save me and perhaps others a headache.

21 Senator Byrd?

22 Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23 The Chairman. We will go to you and then we will turn
24 them back on.

25 Senator Byrd. Mr. Bush, we know each other and have had

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1 an opportunity to talk and know each other's views. I think it
2 is very important that our country have a strong intelligence
3 agency. We are spending \$90 million on defense. Most of the
4 members of the Congress feel that is necessary. And indeed it
5 is in my judgment. So a strong intelligence, it seems to me, is
6 a very important part of the defense mechanism and I know from
7 talking with you that that is your view as you enunciated here
8 today.

9 I think it is vitally important also that the CIA be
10 completely divorced from partisan politics, and in reading and
11 hearing your statement this morning, it seems to me you have
12 gone about as far as a person can go in that regard. On page 4
13 you say, "I recognize the need to leave politics the minute I
14 take on the new job if confirmed."

15 And on page 5 you say, "If confirmed, I will take no part,
16 directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity of
17 any kind."

18 And then on page 7 you say, "I will put politics totally
19 out of my sphere of activities."

20 So you have gone very far in your --

21 The Chairman. All right, gentlemen. Have seats, please.

22 Senator Byrd. -- in your statement in that regard.

23 I have one question which is along the line of Senator
24 MacIntyre's but is a broader one, I suppose. I assume that if
25 confirmed, you would not permit the CIA to be used by any

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1 individual or any groups for partisan political purposes.

2 Mr. Bush. That is correct, sir.

3 Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I think the nominee has the
4 judgment, that he has the ability and that he has the character
5 to assume this very important position. I was concerned when
6 it was first announced about the political aspects but in
7 thinking about it I am convinced that being the type of man
8 that I know George Bush to be that I do not have that concern
9 and I think the Chairman brought out a very good point, that if
10 a person did have political ambitions, this is about the worst
11 place possible to use as a stepping stone.

12 Be that as it may, I have no longer any concern about the
13 nominee's position on these matters, and I shall be glad to
14 support the nomination.

15 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

16 Senator Hart?

17 Senator Hart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 Mr. Ambassador, along with Senators Tower and Goldwater,
19 I have worked for the last 10 and a half months on the Select
20 Committee having to do with the intelligence community, so I
21 think those of us who have been involved in that experience feel
22 very strongly about not just this confirmation but the future
23 of the intelligence community in this country.

24 You have said, and I think it is admirable, that "things
25 were done that were outrageous and morally offensive. These

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1 must not be repeated and I will take every step possible to see
2 that they are not."

3 I would like to probe a little about what steps you would
4 take to see that they are not.

5 You have talked, and I think rightly so, about political
6 insulation but along the lines more of insulating the agency
7 from your own political background. I am most concerned
8 frankly about insulating you from the rest of the political
9 process, particularly in the White House. What those of us on
10 the Committee have found out is that sometimes the agency was
11 off on its own, but just as often it was operating under the
12 direction of political figures of various administrations in
13 both political parties.

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1 What steps would you take to insulate yourself from the
2 wishes of the President to promote his own singular political
3 purposes or conduct some operation abroad that in your judgment
4 was not what this country should be doing?

5 Mr. Bush. Senator, I do not know how one insulates oneself
6 from the wishes of somebody else. I mean I do not -- if one
7 has access he is -- this is going to be nit-picking here but
8 it is hard to insulate oneself from the wishes.

9 In terms of the execution of something I think is wrong
10 I would clearly -- and it gets tough because the President has
11 certain rights and certain, you know, responsibilities over the
12 intelligence community and certainly over the Defense Intelligence
13 Agency where he is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, but
14 again I would not try to insulate myself from the President
15 per se as an answer to the question. I would insist that to
16 the degree it was possible, given the timeliness of whatever
17 the situation was, that the proper bodies of the National Security
18 Committee, National Security Council, have the right to act on
19 these matters.

20 I think we need to study it. There is a wide range of
21 committees in the intelligence community, some of which I am
22 familiar with, many of which I am not, and I think there are
23 all kinds of ways to be sure that what you do in the final
24 analysis is properly recommended. But once it was recommended
25 and you get down to a moral question that you disagree with,

1 you in the final analysis after urging reconsideration or
2 saying I want 24 hours to present the views of the intelligence
3 community or the CIA or whatever it is, in the final analysis
4 you have only one remedy. I think we both know what that is.

5 Senator Hart. Well, it seems to me --

6 Mr. Bush. That is to get out.

7 Senator Hart. -- there is another one. That is to let
8 the President know where you stand on some of these things
9 before you go into office because -- so there is no doubt in
10 his mind how far you are willing to let the CIA go.

11 Mr. Bush. I accept that, sir, yes, sir.

12 Senator Hart. Let us probe what you feel to be morally
13 offensive and outrageous. How do you feel about assassinations?

14 Mr. Bush. I find them morally offensive and I am pleased
15 the President has made that position very, very clear to the
16 Intelligence Committee and I think also Director Colby who I
17 think knows about this, I know he feels --

18 The Chairman. Excuse me. What was your question?

19 Senator Hart. The question was whether, one, a Director
20 of the CIA can insulate himself from wrong political pressures
21 by letting the President know the bounds beyond which he will
22 not go as Director --

23 The Chairman. Yes.

24 Senator Hart. -- before he takes office.

25 The Chairman. Yes.

1 Mr. Bush. I accept that and I think it is an excellent
2 suggestion and I would be prepared to do it and I think in
3 matters that did come up that this be in violation of domestic --
4 of the rights of citizens in this country, I think if I continue
5 to emphasize we are talking about foreign intelligence, even
6 though there are some legitimate, not operations, but things
7 that must be done domestically by the CIA, in its own security,
8 for example, that could help with the problem that understandably
9 troubles the citizens in this country.

10 Senator Hart. Well, I want to get to that but let me
11 pursue some of the foreign techniques. What about supporting
12 and promoting military coups d'etat in various countries around
13 the world?

14 Mr. Bush. You mean in the covert field?

15 Senator Hart. Yes.

16 Mr. Bush. I would want to have full benefit of all the
17 intelligence. I would want to have full benefit of how these
18 matters were taking place but I cannot tell you, and I do not
19 think I should, that there would never be any support for a
20 coup d'etat, depending on what the facts were from -- in other
21 words, I cannot tell you I cannot conceive of a situation where
22 I would not support such action.

23 Senator Hart. What about a government that was constitu-
24 tionally elected?

25 Mr. Bush. I think we should tread very carefully on

1 governments that are constitutionally elected. That is what
2 we are trying to encourage around the world and I feel strongly
3 about that.

4 Senator Hart. What about paramilitary operations, providing
5 funds and arms to establish a government that we wanted?

6 Mr. Bush. I can see certain circumstances where that
7 would be in the best interests of the United States, the best
8 interests of our allies, the best interests of the free world.

9 Senator Hart. How about providing money for political
10 parties and candidates in various countries?

11 Mr. Bush. I have a little more difficulty with that one
12 but, again, without having the benefit of the facts and what
13 the situation is surrounding it, I would not make a clear and
14 definitive statement whether that ever or never should be done.

15 Senator Hart. Well, you raised the question of getting
16 the CIA out of domestic areas totally. Let us hypothesize
17 a situation where a President has perhaps stepped over the
18 bounds. Let us say the FBI is on the track of some people who
19 are involved in that and they go right to the White House.
20 There is some possible CIA interest. The President calls you
21 and says, I want you as Director of the CIA to call the
22 Director of the FBI to tell him to call off this operation
23 because it may jeopardize some CIA activities.

24 Mr. Bush. Well, generally speaking, and I think you are
25 hypothecating a case without spelling it out in enough detail

1 to know if there is any real legitimate foreign intelligence
2 aspect, but generally speaking the CIA should butt out of the
3 domestic business and it certainly ought not to be a domestic
4 police force and it certainly ought not to be involved in
5 investigations domestically of this kind of thing.

6 Senator Hart. That is the easy side.

7 Mr. Bush. Well, it is not --

8 Senator Hart. I am hypothesizing a case that actually
9 happened in June 1972. There might have been some tangential
10 CIA interest in something in Mexico. Funds were laundered
11 and so forth.

12 Mr. Bush. Using a 50-50 hindsight on that case, I hope I
13 would have said the CIA is not going to get involved in that
14 if we are talking about the same one.

15 Senator Hart. We are.

16 Senator Leahy. Are there others?

17 Senator Hart. There has been a doctrine operating between
18 the political structure and the intelligence community for many
19 years called plausible deniability. It is letting the President
20 know just enough about what is going on, but not enough so that
21 when the question is asked, did you know this was going on,
22 he has some grounds for denying that he knew.

23 How do you feel about that, particularly where major covert
24 operations were involved?

25 Mr. Bush. I think the President should be fully involved

1 and though I understand the need for plausible deniability, I
2 think it is extremely difficult. I just do not think a President
3 should be shielded when you are dealing with something this
4 important from the totality of the information. That is my
5 own view on it.

6 Senator Hart. Now, Senator Symington pointed out the
7 fact that, of course, I think too many -- too few people in
8 this country are aware of and that is even though we have an
9 individual who is the Director of Central Intelligence, that
10 individual as the Director of Central Intelligence only controls
11 about 15 or at most 20 percent of the intelligence budget.
12 80 percent of that is under the control of the Department of
13 Defense, Secretary of Defense.

14 Do you have any recommendations or thoughts on how one
15 operates as the Director of the entire intelligence community
16 and yet does not control the vast bulk of their budget?

17 Mr. Bush. No. I will welcome the recommendations from
18 your Committee or welcome the recommendations of the Pike
19 Committee. I will welcome the recommendations that are being
20 prepared as I understand it in the White House now. I have
21 been here a week and I have no firm judgment on how that should
22 be done. I would make a general statement, though, that I
23 think if a man -- if the Director of Central Intelligence, if
24 it is determined by these recommendations that the Director
25 should have the authority, it seems to me that the best way to

1 have the responsibility is to have something to say about the
2 funds, and so I think in that area you might find the answer,
3 but again I would accept and look at and study before I took
4 a personal position on the various committees that are studying
5 these matters to come up. They have been on it for several
6 months and I have been back here one week, and I would be
7 presumptuous I think to say these are my views.

8 I have got some general feelings on it and one is I think
9 the Director of Central Intelligence needs some kind of a base.
10 He has some kind now in CIA and I am not enthralled with the
11 concept that everybody has his empire and you are just floating
12 around EOB someplace and that is a generalized concept, but
13 if you are going to have the authority, the responsibility,
14 he ought to have some muscle to do something about it with.

15 So I would hope whatever your Committee recommends and
16 whatever others recommend is that they do not set up some
17 Director of Central Intelligence and then not give him the tools
18 to enforce these coordinated activities or budgetary expenditures,
19 you know, increases or decreases.

20 That is very general, Senator Hart, but I do not --

21 Senator Hart. But I think what you are saying --

22 Mr. Bush. I have not any recommendations yet.

23 Senator Hart. You would be willing to go to the mat with
24 the Secretary of Defense to get a little more authority over
25 how that 80 percent of the intelligence budget is spent.

1 Mr. Bush. Well, particularly if -- yes, sir. The answer
2 is yes, sir, but particularly if you are supposed to have the
3 responsibility for it, I think you must do that, and I think
4 I would be in a position to -- I would not say have equal
5 standing because those are Cabinet positions, both State and
6 Defense, with policy making functions. This is not as I
7 conceive it and I think it is properly conceived as defined in
8 the statute, is not a policy job, but I think I have -- I think
9 I can see situations where I would want to forcefully present
10 the views of the intelligence community even though they might
11 be on a different direction from existing policy, and let
12 somebody else make the policy, but get those views in there.

13 Senator Hart. How is my time coming, Mr. Chairman?

14 The Chairman. You have run over.

15 Senator Hart. I had some other questions, but let me
16 just make one observation that I made to you when we visited
17 in my office briefly, and that is I think leaving aside your
18 own qualifications and background and integrity, etc., and
19 your ability to convince us in spite of your political background
20 that you will not politicize nor permit the CIA to be politicized
21 under your direction, there is still a separate question I think
22 all of us have to acknowledge, and this is the precedence
23 established by this kind of appointment and however qualified
24 and all the rest of it you may be, I think it is a step in the
25 direction that troubles an awful lot of us that does not reflect

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1 on you personally one iota.

2 Mr. Bush. May I respond to that, Mr. Chairman?

3 The Chairman. Yes, yes. Make it as brief as you reasonably
4 can. Mr. Leahy has been waiting.

5 Mr. Bush. Senator Hart, I would simply appeal that you
6 not be -- not make judgments on your vote based on outside
7 appearances, editorials, fear of whether somebody is going to
8 say a politician, which I do not think is a bad word there.
9 I think it should be made on the basis of qualifications and
10 integrity and how it is going to be viewed a year from now,
11 two years from now, three years from now, and that is what I
12 appeal to you to do in determining whether I am fit to take
13 this job.

14 Senator Hart. Mr. Bush, I do not make my judgments based
15 on editorials..

16 Mr. Bush. Yes.

17 The Chairman. Senator Leahy.

18 Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 Mr. Ambassador, earlier in a statement made by Senator
20 Stennis as Chairman of this Committee, he said that he would
21 question your judgment if you were using the CIA as a stepping
22 stone to the Vice Presidency. I might add I would question
23 your sanity if you were going to use the CIA as a stepping stone
24 to the Vice Presidency. I cannot imagine any worse way today
25 to get into that. But I would like to go into a couple of

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1 areas.

2 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.

3 Senator Leahy. Senator Hart has asked you about political
4 assassinations and absent, I would assume -- we will not get
5 the question too muddy -- absent a declaration of war in a
6 particular area, do I understand your answer that you are totally
7 opposed?

8 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.

9 Senator Leahy. To political assassinations?

10 Mr. Bush. I understand a directive has gone out on that.
11 We would not need it as far as I am concerned. I do indeed.
12 It is appalling to me.

13 The Chairman. Mr. Bush, excuse me a minute. Use your
14 loudspeaker.

15 Mr. Bush. I am opposed to political assassinations and --

16 Senator Leahy. I understand there is a directive from
17 President Ford on that. Supposing you were serving under another
18 President and such a request was made of you as CIA Director.
19 What would you do?

20 Mr. Bush. I would -- I feel strongly enough about that
21 one -- you have precluded wartime -- to say that would be the
22 place where I got off or he changed his mind, one.

23 Senator Leahy. Let me follow up, and this follows up a
24 question asked by Senator McIntyre. Besides resigning would
25 you feel strongly enough about that to report it to the proper

1 oversight committees? For example, in the Senate the Armed
2 Services Committee?

3 Mr. Bush. On that matter, yes, sir.

4 Senator Leahy. Then let me ask you --

5 Mr. Bush. Can I elaborate once more? I can see situations
6 where I might resign.

7 Senator Leahy. Certainly.

8 Mr. Bush. Over something that I conceived to be a real
9 moral problem but where the Chief -- where the President had the
10 legal right to go through with it where I would not do that
11 or I might quietly fade away without calling a press conference
12 or without -- but I would always faithfully try to testify
13 before the appropriate oversight committees of the United
14 States Congress.

15 Senator Leahy. I am not concerned on what is the best
16 way for Congress to carry on this oversight function. For
17 example, can the Congress carry on its oversight function if
18 it has full control and debate over the CIA budget or should
19 they --

20 Mr. Bush. I think the proper investigative bodies of
21 Congress, I mean the proper oversight committees, should be
22 informed on the budget but I would oppose making the CIA budget
23 public.

24 Senator Leahy. I am concerned -- I recall once in a debate
25 in this Committee, and without giving out any secrets, having

1 a whole series of little items, \$5 million and \$10 million, etc.,
2 until we got down to the bottom item of several hundred million
3 dollars put in there for miscellaneous use. Coming from a
4 small state, that seems like a lot of money, and I wondered
5 exactly what it was. I am wondering how we do carry out this
6 oversight.

7 Mr. Ambassador, do you feel the Congress has done an
8 adequate job of carrying out its oversight function of the CIA
9 during, say, the past four or five years?

10 Mr. Bush. I think many individuals in the Senate that I
11 have talked to feel that it has not and I would be inclined
12 to go along with that. But I again do not have all the evidence
13 on that that has come to your Committee, but I have not --

14 Senator Leahy. Has this Committee itself, has this
15 Armed Services Committee done an adequate job?

16 Mr. Bush. I am not about to sit here criticizing the
17 Senate Armed Services Committee, given the limited amount of
18 information I have. Your Committee has had access to a tremen-
19 dous amount of information. I have had access to none of it,
20 and I do not know how many meetings they have had and I just
21 simply am not going to criticize this Committee because I do
22 not know how many times you have met on this. I have not been
23 briefed.

24 Senator Tower. Would you Senator from Vermont yield for
25 a comment from the Select Committee on that point? Senators

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1 Hart and Goldwater and I have served on the --

2 Senator Leahy. Your time, Senator.

3 Senator Tower. I will not use my time. I mean, you
4 may have all of my time you like.

5 The Chairman. All right, gentlemen. I did not catch the
6 point exactly. Did you yield to him?

7 Senator Leahy. Yes, I yielded to the Senator.

8 Senator Tower. I think it would be useful for the
9 Committee to know at this point that the Select Committee is
10 at the moment considering various oversight options to recommend
11 to the Senate. That is currently ongoing in the Select
12 Committee and that on the 20th the Chairman of the Committee and
13 the Vice Chairman, myself, will testify before the Government
14 Operations Committee on this very matter. So it is a matter
15 currently under consideration.

16 The Chairman. All right, Senator Leahy.

17 Senator Leahy. Does the investigation made by the two
18 Committees, House and Senate Committees, those investigations,
19 in your opinion have they hurt the CIA? Let me rephrase it to
20 make sure we are exact on that. The Congress has this year
21 carried out two fairly substantial investigations of the CIA,
22 both in the House and in the Senate. Has that hurt the CIA
23 in your estimation?

24 Mr. Bush. I have not been out there. I do not know what
25 effect it has had on the morale of the CIA. I simply cannot

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1 answer that question.

2 Senator Leahy. Has it hurt --

3 Mr. Bush. Around the world I think some do not seem to
4 understand our Constitutional process, and so perhaps it has
5 raised some eyebrows. I know it has in some other countries,
6 but whether it has hurt it here, I simply cannot say. To the
7 degree it has encouraged the outside and wanton disclosure,
8 and my understanding since I have been back here for six days
9 is that these Committees have both been very responsible with
10 classified information and stuff, I do not see how the charge
11 can be made that in doing its Constitutional duty that it has
12 hurt.

13 Senator Leahy. If the Congress had done a thorough,
14 continuing, ongoing oversight of the CIA during the past five
15 years, would these Committee meetings have been necessary?

16 Mr. Bush. Probably would not have been necessary.

17 Senator Leahy. Thank you.

18 Mr. Bush. On the other hand, perhaps it is timely to have
19 a review that will make some substantive suggestions. It is
20 my understanding that both Committees are empaneled in order to
21 suggest legislative change and it is those suggestions that I
22 would like to see and I would certainly believe to the degree
23 they are left for administrative decision, I would consider them
24 very, very thoroughly because I know people have put in an
25 awful lot of hard work on those Committees.

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1 Senator Leahy. How would you feel about taking the
2 oversight away from the present Committees that have it and
3 putting it into a special joint committee?

4 Mr. Bush. My four years in the Congress taught be one
5 thing and that is to let the Congress determine its own procedures,
6 and I would simply bow to the will of the Congress and cooperate
7 fully with whatever your Committee, you know, whatever is
8 decided by the Congress. I would cooperate.

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1 Senator Leahy. I am not on the Select Committee. Senator
2 Hart and Senator Tower and Senator Goldwater are but could that
3 be -- maybe I should ask it this way. Could that be an effec-
4 tive way of carrying out the oversight of the CIA?

5 I am not lobbying for any particular method of doing it,
6 Mr. Ambassador.

7 Mr. Bush. I think it could and it is a recommendation of
8 the Rockefeller Commission. I support that recommendation, but
9 having said so I would, if there is some new situation that
10 comes forward, I would be glad to -- I will offer my full
11 cooperation if I am confirmed.

12 Senator Leahy. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned the Rocke-
13 feller Committee and that has spoken of having a Presidential
14 advisory committee, oversight, and you support that?

15 Mr. Bush. There already is a Presidential advisory
16 committee -- the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board -- and it
17 would have my full cooperation, sir.

18 Senator Leahy. Well, that was going to be my next
19 question.

20 The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was first
21 established back in the mid-50s by President Eisenhower. It
22 was the President's board of consultants on foreign intelligence
23 activities. I understand the name was changed in 1961 by
24 President Kennedy to the President's Foreign Intelligence
25 Advisory Board.

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1 There have been three different charters -- 1956, 1961
2 and 1969. The contents were about the same.

3 This summer I had my staff look at the President's Foreign
4 Intelligence Advisory Board. I cannot really see where it can
5 carry out much in the way of oversight findings. They have had
6 a relatively small budget. They get almost all their informa-
7 tion from the CIA. And according to their staff director, I
8 mean from the -- yes, they do, almost all their information,
9 from CIA, when the -- on foreign intelligence matters.

10 According to their staff people down there, they point out
11 that their job did not include oversight and review of the CIA
12 but rather is confined to coming up with ideas which would
13 improve our intelligence efforts and they brought out one of
14 them, the U-2. The Commission report on the Board said it does
15 not exert control over the CIA. In fact, the CIA is the Board's
16 only source of information about CIA activities.

17 Do you think that is really going to do an awful lot for
18 us?

19 Mr. Bush. I think that depends on whether the recommenda-
20 tions -- what these committees come up with. I do not -- if
21 your implication is, and maybe I missed it in the question,
22 Senator Leahy, you said they rely on the Director of Central
23 Intelligence or the CIA for intelligence. I would oppose yet
24 another intelligence gathering organization. So maybe I mis-
25 read that. But I feel that the Board has a useful function.

1 I noticed one of the recommendations in the Rockefeller
2 Commission is that the Inspector General should report any
3 irregularities that he finds to the President's Board and I
4 think in those areas and perhaps others that your Committee can
5 suggest it would be good, but I would oppose -- the fact that
6 they get their information from the existing intelligence
7 community does not trouble me because I do not think we need
8 another intelligence agency.

9 Senator Leahy. I agree with you on the Inspector General,
10 but the Commission also found that because of the CIA's
11 compartment -- the way they have set up their compartments in
12 there, their compartments' secrecy and all, that the Inspector
13 General never even knew of the illegal and improper activities
14 which recently have come to light.

15 Would you, if you were the Director of the CIA, would you
16 upgrade the staff and responsibility of the Inspector General?
17 Would you give him access to all CIA files?

18 Mr. Bush. I think I read enough on that, sir, to answer
19 affirmatively, yes, I would.

20 Senator Leahy. Would he be allowed to report directly to
21 the appropriate Congressional oversight committee if one is
22 set up?

23 Mr. Bush. I sure would want to be sitting next to him
24 because I do not believe if you are going to give a person the,
25 you know, under the statutes, the Director has certain

1 responsibilities and I view one of them -- rather, I would view
2 it reporting to these committees. I do not think that you need
3 to be able to have absolutely everybody go off free wheeling
4 but certainly he should be made available to these committees,
5 but I would like to know what was going on, and it is my inten-
6 tion if confirmed for this job to know what is going on as much
7 as possible.

8 If you suggest, and I may be misreading it, that I would
9 not know what the testimony was or I would not know what he was
10 doing, just testifying --

11 Senator Leahy. I am not suggesting that at all.

12 Mr. Bush. -- that is against the very compartmentaliza-
13 tion, that it might have caused some of the problems, so I
14 would simply think, yes, he should be available. I would like
15 to know about it.

16 Senator Leahy. I am not suggesting you not know what he
17 was talking about at all, Mr. Ambassador. I would not suggest
18 that of any agency head of their own Inspector General.

19 What I was concerned about, the Inspector General in many
20 ways has far more time to look for these things than the
21 Director does, and I want to be sure you have such access
22 because in the past apparently he has not had such access and
23 that is probably one of the reasons we are facing this problem
24 today.

25 Mr. Bush. Let me tell you why I respond that way.

1 In the Rockefeller report there was a suggestion that he
2 go directly to the CIA base. I have no problems with that. But
3 I want to be informed. I want to know about it. And if he was
4 saying what his suggestions were, I would like as the Director,
5 I would like to know about it and then also have the right to
6 say whether I agreed or disagreed.

7 You have got to have a disciplined organization.

8 The Chairman. I am sorry. Outside of Senator Tower's
9 time, you have gone over. Ask one more question. Or do you
10 want to complete --

11 Senator Leahy. I will wait until the next go-around.

12 The Chairman. All right.

13 Mr. Bush, some minutes ago on the proposition there of
14 having a request from the Executive Department, be it the
15 President or someone under the President, you gave a response
16 as to what your action would be. Would you direct your first
17 assistant, we will say, to report anything of that nature, any
18 request of that nature that he might receive, report it to you?

19 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir, I would.

20 I think that it is essential that the Director be informed
21 of White House requests.

22 The Chairman. Yes.

23 Mr. Bush. And I do not know how many they get over there.
24 Some of them I am sure are strictly routine, but certainly as
25 a matter of principle I think whether they come into the

1 Counsel's office, the Inspector General's office, the Deputy's
2 office, I would insist on being informed.

3 The Chairman. I was directing the question mainly at
4 matters of serious importance and consequence, and you would
5 say -- would you apply that same rule, then, to your chiefs of
6 divisions? I do not know just what term you may use in the CIA
7 but I am thinking in terms of those that have charge of various
8 major operations. Would you instruct them, too?

9 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.

10 The Chairman. It seems to me that is like getting at
11 the thing in such a way as to make the total responsibility and
12 authority on you.

13 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir. I would.

14 There are four deputies in addition to the -- and I would
15 do that, the same for the Inspector General, the same for the
16 General Counsel's office.

17 The Chairman. And to insure that you are directing the
18 policy on those kinds of question, and I am not hitting at any
19 President, but to insure that you did have that responsibility
20 and power you would also direct any others that are in a key
21 place to give the same reports to you.

22 Mr. Bush. I would, Mr. Chairman.

23 The Chairman. Now, a matter that I have been concerned
24 with for years is the fact that you are not only Director of
25 the CIA but you are Director of all the Central Intelligence

1 which includes operations of the DIA and others, but still you
2 do not have the authority over them. You just have the authority
3 over what I call the CIA proper or hard core. That money and
4 all is put in another budget. It is a separate matter.

5 Now, if you are confirmed, I want to strongly suggest that
6 you take the lead in trying to get a workable, practical plan,
7 that if you are going to have the responsibilities, that you
8 have the authority. Did I make that clear to you?

9 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir, and I hope --

10 The Chairman. What is your response on that?

11 Mr. Bush. My response, Mr. Chairman, is I hope I can find
12 ways to implement that suggestion.

13 The Chairman. Yes.

14 May I divide time with you, please. I will yield to you
15 in a minute. In the meantime we will try --

16 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.

17 The Chairman. Those of you not on the machine have a seat.

18 Sorry we were invaded there. Some very able men have
19 tried and have undertaken just such a mission here and due to
20 the pressure of other things and various matters, they did not
21 come up with anything very practical, but you already see that
22 problem facing you, do you not?

23 Mr. Bush. I see the problem, Mr. Chairman, but I cannot
24 in conscience tell you I see the clear answer.

25 The Chairman. No.

1 Mr. Bush. Because I see between the Defense Intelligence
2 Agency and CIA and others in the community, I see an enormous
3 problem of coordination, but I can pledge to this Committee I
4 will address myself to it as best I can.

5 The Chairman. Yes.

6 Well, it is a very delicate and sensitive matter by nature
7 and then it is a very practical problem, too, of getting at it,
8 but I think it can be handled. It just takes some cooperation
9 between the Executive branch and the Legislative branch.

10 I have been impressed there with your answer, too, to
11 Senator Leahy's questions, all of which were good, regarding
12 the Inspector General. You said you would want to be with him,
13 or be informed. I judge that it is by no means -- by no means
14 you were trying to control what he said, anything of that kind,
15 but since the responsibility rests on you, you would want to
16 know and would be entitled to know, I think, what his testimony
17 was or what he was saying. Is that correct?

18 Mr. Bush. That was my point, Senator.

19 The Chairman. Well, I have always advocated keep the
20 power where the responsibility is, keep the responsibility
21 where the power is. I said here in a brief opening statement
22 that through these hearings we can emphasize the absolute
23 necessity of a clear consciousness on the part of the Chief
24 Executive of the nation of this special power that is invested
25 in him under the Act and of the care and personal attention the

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1 President must give through this exceptional power and also to
2 the individual that he selects to act for him.

3 Quoting further I said I hope these hearings will
4 emphasize that point. I think the hearings have emphasized
5 that point to you and to the public and to the President, the
6 questions that came from members other than me, and my time ran
7 out. And I think, as I see it, it is an obligation that you
8 owe to the President especially, to keep him directly advised
9 of the enormous duties.

10 I know it is beyond human comprehension almost, ability to
11 reach the obligations the President has. But this is a special
12 law and operates in a special way and it is not within the
13 pattern of other agencies as I see it, and he is going to need
14 your help as well as you need him. So you are conscious of
15 your obligation in that way.

16 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir, I am, Mr. Chairman.

17 The Chairman. Not trying to alone protect him from things
18 but to protect the country and protect your position, your
19 obligation that you assume. Is that the way you see it?

20 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir. I see it -- I see that relationship
21 clearly.

22 The Chairman. Yes.

23 Mr. Bush. Some have changed that because -- I know the
24 President -- that would be bad for some reasons. I think it is
25 good. If I have the proper integrity for this job I think the

1 intelligence community is entitled to have its views forcefully,
2 firmly presented to the President and then have the policy
3 makers take over, and that is my concept of this relationship,
4 and certainly if there was wrongdoing or I detected improper
5 pressures from the White House, I think because of access I
6 would be in a reasonable position to do something about it.

7 I am not saying I am omniscient and would see right away
8 that it was good or bad. I think there are some gray areas.
9 But I would have the access and I think I would use it not to
10 do bad things suggested by the White House but the other way
11 around.

12 The Chairman. Yes.

13 And you would either correct it yourself or take it up
14 with him, those matters of any greatness at all.

15 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.

16 The Chairman. All right.

17 I thank you very much.

18 Senator Symington?

19 Senator Symington. Mr. Ambassador, just several points
20 you made this morning that worried me a bit. I really do not
21 think you meant it that way when you said that maybe you were
22 old fashioned because you still believe in effective patriotism.

23 I have watched my four grandsons and I think it is the
24 children today -- the youth of today are just as patriotic as
25 anybody has ever been. I am not looking for votes because I

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1 am not going to run again. But I think the leadership in the
2 White House, and I am not talking about any one administration,
3 and the leadership in the Congress is more responsible for the
4 lack of desire to join the armed services than anything -- any
5 other single situation. These "no-win" wars, for example.

6 I have got a son who is a disabled veteran and his son
7 is -- I would not want to have to argue with him physically
8 anyway -- said to me I will go to Vietnam. I know that he would
9 not have felt that way if it had not been for actions in the
10 government itself.

11 And so I would hope that you would not think that a lot
12 of the youth are not patriotic.

13 Mr. Bush. I have four sons, one daughter. I have just
14 as much confidence. I do get concerned about what sometimes
15 seems to be -- well, take the word "politician". The connota-
16 tion of the politician has changed, some of it with reason,
17 some of it in my view without. I stand here and say I think it
18 is honorable. I know a lot of people do not. So it is this
19 kind of general feeling I have rather than any lack of confi-
20 dence in my four sons and I am sure yours, sir.

21 Senator Symington. Well, I wanted you to expand on that
22 because you made that statement and I knew in my heart how you
23 felt about it. I wanted you to explain it. The basic problem
24 in my opinion in the United States today is greed and I remember
25 reading an article that there was much more greed, desire for

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1 power, than there was for money and as I watch the operations
2 around here sometimes I get pretty disgusted with the whole
3 situation. The efforts the authority, the efforts for votes.
4 And that has not got anything to do with money, although there
5 are an awful lot of people who are interested in getting as much
6 money out of the government as they can. The record so proves.
7 Most of them are not in government. Some of them are.

8 So I think our great problem today is greed and the only
9 way we are going to solve it is sacrifice, and I do not know
10 anybody who is asking me to sacrifice anything. I watch
11 people go by me 20, 30 miles above the speed limit, one person
12 per car, etc. We could go into a lot of detail about that but
13 I think you know what I am getting at.

14 Mr. Bush. I do, sir.

15 Senator Symington. This country has got to have a leader-
16 ship that shows the way and I will take my full responsibility
17 and inability to do it in the legislative branch and I honestly
18 do not think in recent years it has been characteristic of the
19 executive branch either.

20 Now, another matter that worried me a bit is we are getting
21 very open, you might say, and I hope that that does not impinge
22 too heavily on your job. It is my understanding that the man
23 who really runs the system of the country that is considered
24 generally to be our leading opponent, that his title, actual
25 title at least among his colleagues, and I get this pretty

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1 straight, is Director of Misinformation. So I hope you do not
2 feel obligated by what in the past has happened and I happen to
3 have been Acting Chairman of this Committee when this business
4 broke about the CIA and the laundered money, and so forth, and
5 I hope you do not feel obligated to run out and report every-
6 thing that is going on. Otherwise you in effect defeat the
7 basic concept of your job which has got a covert operation
8 involved.

9 It is done with the premise that it is important to the
10 security of the United States, and may I say having spent many
11 years in the Pentagon and years in other parts of government
12 as well as in the Senate that I think it is vitally important
13 to the United States and I hope you agree that there is infor-
14 mation that you only have to give the President and you do not
15 necessarily have to give the Congress.

16 Mr. Bush. I agree. I do feel that one of the things that
17 troubles me is the tendency -- as I understand it, the
18 employees of the CIA, and I think properly, take a pledge of
19 secrecy, not to disclose classified information when they are
20 there and not to disclose it after they leave, and I am appalled
21 at indications that some do not take that pledge seriously
22 because it is not fair to those who are working faithfully for
23 their country in this important place.

24 I think it is wanton and I do not think it is right and I
25 will certainly do what I can -- this is a side area but I will

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1 certainly do what I can to see that the families and the indi-
2 viduals who do abide by the rules of that game there are not
3 endangered by the wanton disclosure on the part of others and
4 that clearly moves over into some of the more sensitive areas,
5 I think, but I have a general feeling that Congress must be
6 kept closely informed, and yet I am confident when I get in
7 there I will find things that are between the Director and the
8 President just as there are between the President and other
9 appointees.

10 Senator Symington. Well, I completely agree with you.

11 Mr. Bush. That should be kept confidential.

12 Senator Symington. I only mention it so you would further
13 expand it.

14 There was one forceful remark made a few years ago by the
15 person who had the most responsible field in this Congress and
16 he was asked did he know what the CIA was doing with its money
17 and he said, no, he did not want to. We just cannot operate
18 that way.

19 But that is what we are talking about. We are talking
20 about covert operations.

21 One other point that worried me a bit in your testimony
22 is that you said something about the fact that you were not a
23 Cabinet member and you were not in policy and therefore you
24 might not have a -- did not have Cabinet rank, that you were
25 an operating man primarily. I will agree with that but, on the

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1 other hand, it is very difficult -- it has been in the past -- in
2 my executive experience in government and business experience,
3 it is very difficult to separate policy and operations. It is
4 hard to do. And I would hope the fact that you were not a
5 member of the Cabinet but especially in the theory of the
6 original law and the law as it is today you report to the
7 President, to the National Security Council, you would have no
8 hesitation in giving him the situation as you saw it regardless
9 of whether you were formally a Cabinet member or not.

10 Mr. Bush. That would be my intention, sir, and I was
11 simply referring to the essentialities of presenting to the
12 policy makers the most objective possible analysis, whether it
13 agreed with existing policy or not, but I do recognize the
14 Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA function as well
15 does not make foreign policy. That is the point I was trying
16 to make.

17 Senator Symington. I think you cleared it up adequately
18 and again I thank you for your courtesy.

19 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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1 The Chairman. Excuse me, just one minute, please.

2 Gentlemen of the Committee, on this matter of alleged
3 conflict of interest that we always go to, go into, in these
4 matters Mr. Bush has conferred with Mr. Braswell, our valuable
5 Chief of Staff, Staff Director, and has written a letter to the
6 Committee dated December 14 addressed to me as Chairman, I
7 considered that to the Committee about these matters and I
8 have it here for the inspection of any member of the Committee
9 that might want.

10 Let me ask Mr. Braswell one question. Mr. Braswell,
11 you heard my statement made here. You have handed me this
12 letter dated December 14, 1975, and in your conferences now
13 with Mr. Bush and those representing them, does he meet all
14 the requirements of the Committee that we customarily apply
15 with reference to reported nominees?

16 Mr. Braswell. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bush does meet these
17 requirements. The letter indicates that he will sell any
18 holdings which pose any conflict of interest with the Central
19 Intelligence Agency. There are a limited number of securities
20 which have certain relationships and it is indicated that he
21 will dispose of those within 30 days after confirmation.

22 The Chairman. All right. All right, members of the
23 Committee. We will put this letter with its exhibit in the
24 file. It is available to any Committee member that might want
25 to examine it. But it is -- we do not customarily put these

1 matters in the record, the regular record, but keep a special
2 file on it.

3 (The document referred to will be found in the files of
4 the Committee.)

5 The Chairman. Senator Hart, that brings us to you.

6 Senator Hart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7 Mr. Ambassador, back in 1952 at the request of President
8 Eisenhower, the Committee or Commission looked into the state
9 of the intelligence community at that time and under the
10 chairmanship of General Doolittle they reported back some
11 recommendations for changes, but most importantly in the
12 Preamble of their report there is a statement that I think many
13 of us have found rather shocking. It is to the effect that
14 at that period of the Cold War that this country was faced
15 with a ruthless enemy and that to survive in the world, a
16 world populated by enemies of this sort, we had to become at
17 least as ruthless as that enemy or those enemies and in effect
18 discard or shelve what the report called the traditional American
19 values.

20 In the judgment of some of us who have been looking into
21 this area for many months, it is that kind of an attitude or
22 mentality which has led to some of the conduct which you described
23 as outrageous. What is your feeling generally about the activi-
24 ties of this country with relation to those of others? Do we
25 in your judgment have to adopt the same techniques to survive in

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1 this world?

2 Mr. Bush. Senator, I made my public position on assassina-
3 tion. Having said that, I am somewhat aware, not perhaps as
4 aware as the Committee, having not had access to the information,
5 that we are up against some pretty ruthless people and they
6 are today ruthless and they are tough and today they will resort
7 to schemes that are not overly pleasant.

8 I am not going to sit here and say we need to match ruthlessness-
9 ness with ruthlessness. I do feel we need a covert capability
10 and I hope that it can minimize these problems that offend our
11 Americans. We are living in a very complicated, difficult world.

12 Senator Hart. But you would not go so far as to say we
13 have to abandon our traditional values or sense of fair play.

14 Mr. Bush. I would not abandon my own traditional values
15 or sense of fair play, certainly, and I do not think we should
16 as a nation.

17 Senator Hart. The principal intelligence judgments are
18 products of the intelligence community, national intelligence
19 estimates. They are not presently or have not been traditionally
20 given to the Congress or Congressional committees. Rather,
21 the judgment of the intelligence community is summarized when
22 it is given.

23 What would be your view on having the CIA's national
24 intelligence estimates made available to the appropriate committee
25 of Congress, particularly Foreign Relations and Armed Services?

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1 Mr. Bush. I would want to take a close look at that.
2 I would -- I am not too familiar with the totality of the
3 national intelligence estimates, what that involves, so I am
4 not going to commit ahead of time to what would be delivered,
5 but certainly in terms of keeping these committees involved,
6 keeping them involved on important matters, I would be inclined
7 to say at this point yes, but I would reserve the right, if
8 I could, to at least understand the totality of what we are
9 talking about.

10 I think, getting back to Senator Symington, I think there
11 are some things that must be between the intelligence and
12 the President and must be determined by the President, and that
13 I would have to stand with.

14 Senator Hart. Under present procedures, when the Congress
15 is informed about covert operations, it is informed after the
16 Executive Branch has already approved those operations. It
17 seems to me that an alternative would be for the Director of
18 Central Intelligence to present the proposed action to the
19 Congress, or the appropriate Committees, at the same time,
20 simultaneously with proposing that action to the Executive
21 Branch. What would your feeling be about that?

22 Mr. Bush. I would oppose that.

23 Senator Hart. On what grounds?

24 Mr. Bush. On the grounds I think it is the obligation
25 of the President to determine the covert activities and I would

1 say after plenty of adequate consultation with the NSC and
2 representatives of the intelligence community, but I think he
3 must make that decision and I do not think it ought to be a
4 joint decision and I think it might be a joint decision if
5 it were done in the manner you suggest.

6 Senator Hart. So the only way to prevent the Congress
7 from vetoing a decision is to just not let them know.

8 Mr. Bush. There are things in intelligence, Senator Hart,
9 that I think have to be kept confidential, but that is not to
10 say they should not be disclosed and that is not to say they
11 should not be fully informed at the appropriate time. The law
12 specifically, as I understand it -- the amendment specifies
13 they shall be informed and I will do my best to inform them
14 but before a foreign policy decision is made, I do not think
15 that there has to be a group decision on that. I think that
16 is what the Presidents are elected to do.

17 Senator Hart. Well, one, information does not presume
18 decision. Nor does it presume disclosure. And I think --

19 Mr. Bush. I did not suggest, sir, that it meant disclosure.

20 Senator Hart. You certainly did. Your response was you
21 do not think there should be disclosure.

22 Mr. Bush. I mean public disclosure. I was not suggesting
23 a leak if that is what you meant.

24 Senator Hart. Well, that takes us to a current case and
25 that is Angola. It has been suggested in situations such as

1 Angola that rather than have assistance provided, if you will,
2 under the table, why do we not just openly acknowledge the fact
3 that we are assisting certain governments and certain political
4 groups around the world, that we feel that they stand for
5 democracy and the kinds of things we represent. We are assisting
6 them openly, rather than have it sort of come out piecemeal
7 as it always is done.

8 Mr. Bush. I think in some instances we should do that.
9 Angola I have not been briefed on. I do not know the facts.
10 I do not know the problems. Neighboring countries -- I do not
11 know what the extent of the Soviet aid is to the MPLA. I
12 just simply do not know, so I would have to defer but I think
13 in this instance that is correct, and in some instances we do
14 this with arms programs.

15 Senator Hart. So you would not preclude the possibility
16 that there might be situations in the world where we would
17 want -- and I am not talking about arms programs, I am talking
18 about whether it is political conflict, the nature of the
19 government which will emerge in dispute, and we take sides with
20 one party or another and openly provide them financial assistance
21 or arms in the struggle. You would think that would be a
22 possibility.

23 Mr. Bush. This gets close to the responsibilities of the
24 Congress during war and things of that nature, you see.

25 Senator Hart. That is right.

1 Mr. Bush. And I think each case has to be looked at on
2 its own merits.

3 Senator Hart. But you do not preclude that possibility.

4 Mr. Bush. Would you repeat what I am not precluding once
5 more?

6 Senator Hart. That we would openly assist financially
7 and with arms where a dispute is going on as to what kind of
8 government should emerge in a country, not after a government
9 has emerged and been recognized, and then we provide arms.
10 When there is conflict, when there is hostility, when the
11 nature of that government is not determined.

12 Mr. Bush. I would not preclude that in some cases this
13 might be done but I am not arguing the merits of how Angola
14 is being handled at this time because very candidly I am not
15 briefed on that.

16 Senator Hart. You have been very critical of previous
17 CIA and other intelligence officials and officers for disclosing
18 the nature of their experiences. Would you favor anything like
19 a British Official Secrets Act to prevent that kind of thing?

20 Mr. Bush. Where, sir, did you point to my being critical --
21 what was the first part of the question?

22 Senator Hart. I said in your opening statement and at
23 other times you had been critical of former CIA officials and
24 officers who were -- I think you cited public broadcasts.

25 Mr. Bush. Oh, those were -- oh, excuse me. Ex-CIA employees

1 yes. Go ahead.

2 Senator Hart. To prevent such -- would you favor something
3 like the British Official Secrets Act?

4 Mr. Bush. Well, I understand that was one of the recommenda-
5 tions of the Rockefeller Commission. Certainly I would give it
6 some serious attention. Again I am not fully up to date on it
7 but just from reading their recommendations, provided the indivi-
8 dual rights are safeguarded, I can see some reason. What I
9 was talking about is existing oaths of secrecy that are taken
10 by these employees, some of whom then go out and at their own
11 discretion leak classified information and I oppose that.

12 Now, what needs to be done to guarantee against it I do
13 not know, but perhaps that suggestion in this Rockefeller
14 Commission report might be the answer. I am not prepared to
15 do it. I have not really fully gone into the details of it.

16 Senator Hart. Do you believe --

17 Mr. Bush. In six days.

18 Senator Hart. Do you believe, Ambassador, that our
19 ambassadors and heads of missions should be fully apprised of
20 CIA activities in their countries?

21 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.

22 Senator Hart. Absolutely?

23 Mr. Bush. Yes, sir. I feel strongly about it for chiefs
24 of missions.

25 Senator Hart.. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

1 The Chairman. Senator Tower, will you excuse me? I
2 overlooked the fact that you might have additional questions.

3 Senator Tower. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

4 The Chairman. Then, gentlemen, when we recess we propose
5 to recess until tomorrow morning at 10:00 o'clock in this
6 room, at which time I had agreed that we would hear Senator
7 Church for a statement. I invited him to come and sit with
8 us today or make a statement today but if he would like, he
9 will be with us tomorrow at 10:00 o'clock to make a statement.
10 Tomorrow at 10:00 I would propose that we first then recognize
11 the Senators who could not be here today and then we would
12 proceed with those that have been.

13 All right, Senator Leahy.

14 Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to follow
15 up on Senator Hart's questioning on Angola, Mr. Ambassador,
16 I understand you do not feel that you have enough information
17 about that to state whether prior to any CIA intervention in
18 Angola there should have been consultation with the Legislative
19 Branch, either in closed session or other confidential fashion.

20 Mr. Bush. I do not know the facts on Angola, but I
21 thought I responded to the Senator that I do not think there
22 had to be consultation with Congress before doing what --
23 providing arms to Angola.

24 Senator Leahy. I understand that and it somewhat concerns
25 me if you will allow just a little editorializing which I

1 understand sometimes goes on. You have had more experience in
2 Congress than I have. But, you know, if the CIA had the oppor-
3 tunity to support forces we are now opposing it looks -- many
4 people feel that the CIA is trying to correct its own mistakes,
5 pouring arms and money into what could be potentially a terribly
6 dangerous conflict, and I recall at the time of the winding down
7 of the Vietnam War when we had the President of the United
8 States telling us we had to give them \$200 million or \$400 million
9 more or there would be a calamity. We were told by the Adminis-
10 tration there would be hundreds of thousands of lives lost in
11 Vietnam, in a blood bath, if we do not pour in more money. At
12 the same time our own reports, intelligence reports, show no
13 matter what kind of money we put in, unless we put in American
14 manpower and airpower it would not make any difference at all.
15 And I think that whole debate -- we went through another whole
16 wrenching -- this thing might have been avoided if we had just
17 been honest instead of having the White House and others say
18 they will give us this so we can turn the corner one more time.
19 If they had just been honest and said what we had, had full
20 consultation with complete reports, we would have realized it
21 would have been useless at that time and Angola just points up
22 again the same question.

23 As I say, that is editorializing and I am concerned and
24 I realize there is a dichotomy of views on this, but I am
25 concerned about the fact that somehow we seem to have that

1 feeling that we can get into these things and people somewhere
2 along the line can make these decisions in total secrecy and
3 the best purposes of the United States would be served, and
4 really we should not ask questions because nobody in the United
5 States, high in the United States Government, would make a
6 decision that was not for the best interests of our country.

7 That may be so, but I think there are a lot of people in
8 the Congress that may question just whether it is, whether it
9 really is in the best interests of the country in those regards.

10 So I hope that if you concerned that you will have a
11 fairly open idea of in which areas there should be consultations
12 with the Congress and so advise the President. I think that a
13 number of things that we find ourselves getting involved in,
14 we would not if we made it with more thorough consultation.

15 Incidentally, do you favor a fixed statutory term for
16 CIA Director, say a term of years?

17 Mr. Bush. Again, understand I have not studied anything
18 but I am inclined to say yes to that. I do not have any views.
19 I think they recommend in here ten years. I think it makes
20 sense to have a certain fixed term.

21 Senator Leahy. If a Democrat were elected President next
22 year and you were CIA Director, would you feel duty bound to
23 turn in your resignation?

24 Mr. Bush. No, but I feel he would be duty bound to take
25 my resignation. Yes, I feel duty bound to hand in the resignation

1 and he could act on it if he wanted to.

2 Senator Leahy. Would you feel that because it was a
3 Democrat or just a new President?

4 Mr. Bush. Because I serve at the pleasure of the President
5 and the new President should not have to throw me out and go
6 through the embarrassment of calling friends and saying, go
7 get this guy out. I want to put somebody else in. And I would
8 do it just as one Republican Administration changes hands and
9 I had done it and was out -- the United Nations. No, I feel
10 strongly as long as we have it the way it is that you serve
11 at the pleasure of the President, that you should not be --
12 should not embarrass the President in trying to derrick you
13 out of the office.

14 Senator Leahy. You do not think it is a partisan thing.

15 Mr. Bush. It is objective, the way the rules are.

16 Senator Leahy. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make a very
17 brief statement.

18 The Chairman. All right, Senator.

19 Senator Leahy. This is a crucial period as we all know
20 for the intelligence community. Public trust, confidence
21 have been badly eroded and I think in many instances justifiably
22 so, but the intelligence community can serve a valuable function
23 in our government. Any one of us would be naive in thinking
24 that a country with the military power of the United States
25 could survive without an intelligence community. But it has to

1 operate within the law and it has to respect the rights of the
2 American people and in the past there are many instances where
3 it has not.

4 Intelligence capability is needed, deserves the support
5 of our people. So far it has to be concerned. In its final
6 report to the President the Rockefeller Commission concluded
7 that the proper functions of the Agency must depend in large part
8 of the character of the Director of the Central Intelligence.
9 The best assurance against the misuse of the agency lies in
10 the appointment to that post of persons with the judgment, the
11 courage, the independence to resist improper pressure and
12 importuning, whether from the White House, within the agency,
13 or elsewhere.

14 We are to decide whether the President has ignored that
15 advice in this case. I do not mean that in any way to detract
16 from your own obvious qualifications. I think you served
17 extremely well at the United Nations. I think you served
18 extremely well in China. The CIA needs a Director who would be
19 free of political biases. While a man with a political back-
20 ground should not be rejected automatically, I think a man
21 whose background has been primarily political is not a good
22 choice, not a good choice for this position at this time. For
23 the CIA to function properly it must have an independent voice
24 in policy determinations. The agency must be free from partisan
25 political pressure, from all groups, both inside and outside

1 the Government, and that includes the White House. Most impor-
2 tantly, the public must have the perception that the CIA
3 Director will have an independent. If the Director is perceived
4 to be governed by political considerations, the public confidence
5 which we so desparately need at this time might not be attained.
6 The position of the Director requires a person of proven strength
7 and independence, someone who will be willing to tell the
8 President that he is wrong, if that becomes necessary, and a
9 person who in that same way will help us in the Congress to
10 carry out our own oversight functions, our own responsibilities,
11 because quite frankly the Senator from Vermont feels in many
12 instances we just have not.

13 So I thank you for taking the time to listen, Mr. Bush.

14 Thank you very much.

15 The Chairman. All right. Thank you, Senator.

16 Does any other member of the Committee have any questions
17 of Mr. Bush?

18 Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask two quick
19 questions, if I may.

20 The Chairman. All right, Senator Hart.

21 Senator Hart. Mr. Ambassador, if the President of the
22 United States ordered the CIA to attempt to overthrow a foreign
23 government and you were requested to appear before the appro-
24 priate Congressional Committees in executive session and under
25 oath were asked if in fact this Government or any of its agencies

1 were involved in attempting to overthrow that government, the
2 President also instructed you that you were not to disclose the
3 fact that we were involved in that kind of activity to anyone,
4 including the Congress, what would be your reaction?

5 Mr. Bush. My reaction would be to get a -- to understand
6 thoroughly what the law said on that.

7 Senator Hart. The law says do not lie to Congress.

8 Mr. Bush. The law --

9 Senator Hart. The law says do not lie to Congress.

10 Mr. Bush. I would not lie to the Congress, Senator Hart.

11 Senator Hart. Do you have any feelings whatsoever about
12 separating clandestine services from intelligence evaluation,
13 particularly covert operations, putting them under some other
14 direction?

15 Mr. Bush. I have a feeling that they ought not to be under
16 policy and in peacetime under policymaking bodies and thus I --
17 unless somebody comes up with a more clear answer, I think that
18 they should be in the Central Intelligence Agency. I would be
19 somewhat appalled if somebody suggested they be put into the
20 State Department or Defense Department because I think they
21 should be separate. I perhaps properly, perhaps improperly,
22 separate policy from -- to the degree you can, CIA from those
23 two other agencies.

24 The implementation of policy is covert but I have seen
25 no housing that would be more appropriate than the CIA at this

1 juncture. I am open-minded on it.

2 Senator Hart. The National Security Council? If we really
3 came to the view that a lot of people have suggested, that
4 covert operations should be ad hoc and not continuing, then
5 could not the National Security Council set those in motion
6 other than having an in-house capability all the time?

7 Mr. Bush. Frankly, Senator, I had not thought about that
8 in particular, and I have studied the recommendations of your
9 Committee very carefully if that is one of them.

10 Senator Hart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 The Chairman. All right, gentlemen. Any other questions?

12 Gentlemen, just for the information generally, we were
13 talking about disclosures. I would think the only reason anyone
14 would hold back a disclosure would be some kind of a fear that
15 it might be injurious to the welfare of the country if it got
16 out, so to speak, in the public domain where the adversary, a
17 potential adversary, would know it.

18 We find there is an old espionage act passed in 1917
19 or 1918, anyway, during World War I, whose language is very
20 inadequate. That is the only law except one I mentioned that
21 makes it a criminal offense -- I want Mr. Leahy's attention --
22 makes it a criminal penalty --

23 Senator Leahy. I am sorry.

24 The Chairman. -- for anyone to go on and disclose these
25 sensitive matters. And that exception is the Atomic Energy Act

1 which has written into its provision a proviso that makes
2 criminal anyone who discloses sensitive and classified informa-
3 tion. And it was under that Act as I understand that partly
4 was used after World War II, was passed after World War II,
5 but that was involved in the Rosenberg case. So we looked this
6 up closely last year in connection with a matter that we had
7 in our Committee and found that this old espionage was insuffi-
8 cient, the old espionage section of the law, and of course
9 the Atomic Energy Act did not apply to the facts we had.

10 My point is as long as the law is in that shape, these
11 people are going to be slow to divulge these super sensitive
12 matters to members of Congress, to members of the Executive
13 Branch at the level, say, lower than the President and Cabinet,
14 or to anyone. It is going to be slow to do it because there is
15 no criminal penalty protection that applies to those facts. And
16 we have been concerned about that.

17 This question of ordinary amendment to the criminal code,
18 you know, would be one way to get at it. Another would be to
19 amend this Atomic Energy Act. It is a very difficult matter
20 to get at and I have got some good lawyers on this Committee,
21 better lawyers than I am. I refer the matter to -- it is one
22 of the problems and I think it would be worth looking into,
23 Senator Leahy. I know you are a man of competence in the
24 law and I wish you would look into it some, please.

25 My point is that when we disclose it, it is barefoot and

1 free. There is no penalty on them. This leads to further
2 disclosure.

3 All right, Mr. Bush. Is there anything else you wish to
4 say?

5 Mr. Bush. No, sir.

6 The Chairman . Well, we thank you very much for being
7 here.

8 Mr. Bush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 The Chairman. You made an excellent witness. You have
10 already heard me say that when we recess we will recess until
11 10:00 o'clock in the morning. Now, please keep your seat. Please
12 keep your seats. 10:00 o'clock in the morning, and I will
13 recognize Senator Church and then the absent Senators who
14 could not be here today, I mean, and Mr. Braswell, notify them,
15 please, if they are here that they will be recognized first
16 and then we will get to the others.

17 All right. Thank you very much. We will take a recess
18 until tomorrow at 10:00.

19 (Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed,
20 to reconvene at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on Tuesday, December 16,
21 1975.)

end 6

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