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Beirut Bombing: Mysterious Death

Warriors Traced to Syria, Iran

This is the first of a series of reports on terrorism written and reported by Washington Post staff writers Bob Woodward, Richard Harwood and Christian Williams.

Three days before a bomb blast killed 241 American servicemen at the Beirut airport Oct. 23, a Lebanese financial emissary named Hassan Hamiz was given a check or voucher for approximately \$50,000 that could be cashed only at the Iranian embassies in Beirut or Damascus, according to reliable intelligence reports. The reports indicate that, after the bombing, it was cashed at the embassy in Damascus, where Hamiz, described as a "fixer" with high-level contacts, had very close relations with

Iranian Ambassador Ali Akbar Mohtashami, who has been identified by the CIA as a key figure in Middle East terrorism.

The \$50,000 payment is believed to be a primary link in the financing that set in motion two fanatical suicide truck-bomb attacks that destroyed the U.S. Marine emplacement and also killed 58 soldiers at the French military headquarters in Beirut that same October morning, according to a review of intelligence documents and interviews with officials in the United States, Middle East and Europe.

Investigations by the CIA and French, Israeli and Lebanese intelligence services have pieced together many of the essential

details of the devastation of Oct. 23, perpetrated by men who crave death as soldiers of their God and planned by others who rely on the terror factor as the most

effective brand of political warfare. The events that ended with the blood and rubble of that massive explosion included a complex series of transactions, codenames,

meetings in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon and Damascus, and trucks moving explosives under cover as rice transports.

In addition to Hamiz, 13 individuals now have been tied to the bombings by the intelligence services. They include a Syrian

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intelligence colonel, a former PLO security officer, Syrian members of the Syrian-controlled Saiqa (Thunderbolt) Palestinian terrorist organization, a relative of the Shiite Moslem leader in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, an Islamic fundamentalist clergyman from Beirut and several veterans of other terrorist operations. Among them are:

- The Syrian intelligence officer, identified by various intelligence organizations

as *Lt. Col. Diyab* (also spelled Diab), has been traced to a planning meeting Oct. 21 or 22, just before the Marine bombing. Surveillance reports show that he was in the southern suburbs of Beirut and was planning an attack against French and American installations.

- A key architect of the operation, according to Israeli intelligence, is identified as *Nablan Shaykh*, a former deputy chief of national security for the Palestine Liberation Organization. He operated under the code name Abu Kifah and had been in charge of security in a west Beirut neighborhood at the Museum Crossing on the

line dividing Christian eastern and Moslem western Beirut.

- Two other Syrian officials in Saiqa, a PLO organization founded and controlled by the Syrian military, attended meetings on Oct. 21 and 22 and discussed a strike against the multinational forces in Beirut.

One Saiqa member, *Ahmed Halaq*, is identified in intelligence reports as a specialist in assassinations. He had been in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, a Syrian-controlled area about 30 miles east of Beirut

that is a known staging ground for terrorists. Halaq was placed in the Bekaa region about a week before the Oct. 23 bombing.

The second man is *Bilal Hasan*. Within days of the suicide attacks, these two men were later found to have visited the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla, the former PLO neighborhoods where hundreds of people were massacred by Phalangist militia in 1982. The reason for their visit has not been determined, but Israeli intelligence sources claim that weapons and explosives were still stockpiled in such camps.

Halaq and Hasan were tied to attempted terrorism in Egypt in 1979, when two other terrorists were arrested in Cairo with toothpaste tubes filled with high explosives. After confessing, the two terrorists identified Hasan as the person who recruited them and Halaq as a Syrian intelligence captain who prepared their explosives.

- *Abu Haydar Musawi*, a cousin of a Shiite leader in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley, visited Beirut several days before Oct. 23 and was involved in obtaining the pickup trucks used in the bombing. According to intelligence reports, he heads what is called the Hussein Suicide Commandos, and intelligence reports say that immediately before or right after Oct. 23 he claimed he was going to report the outcome of the planned operations to his cousin *Hussein Musawi*, in the Bekaa Valley. Hamiz, the Lebanese financial emissary who cashed the \$50,000 check after the bombing, is also close to Hussein Musawi, the reports indicate.

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Hussein Musawi has previously been named in press accounts as one of the people involved in the bombing. He has denied a direct or indirect role but praised the bombing by saying: "I salute this good act and I consider it a good deed and a legitimate right, and I bow to the spirits of the martyrs who carried out this operation."

• *Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah*, the second person named in press accounts, is the leader of the Hezbollah (Party of God), a militant Shiite movement based in Beirut's southern suburbs. The movement embraces remnants of the radical Al Dawa (The Call) party, which is now based in Iran.

Fadlallah has close ties to the government of Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. He had frequent dealings with the Iranian Embassy in Beirut until the Iranians were expelled following the Oct. 23 bombings. At the time of this expulsion, Fadlallah led mass demonstrations in Beirut protesting the action by the Lebanese government. Hussein Musawi is considered to be Fadlallah's lieutenant and principal military commander.

Fadlallah and the key planner, Nablun Shaykh, attended a planning meeting Oct. 20 at the Soviet-Palestinian friendship house in Damascus, which since last summer has been used by dissident PLO leaders. They discussed attacks against the multinational force in Beirut, according to intelligence reports.

One week after the bombings, in an interview with Washington Post correspondent Herbert H. Denton, Fadlallah denied any involvement. He said any such charges were a frame-up by Christian Phalangist militiamen and the Lebanese Army intelligence. During the interview in Beirut's Shiite Moslem slums Fadlallah was guarded by men holding AK47 Kalashnikov assault rifles. Asked about the show of force by a man who said he was interested only in peace, Fadlallah laughed. "This," he replied, "is for people who don't understand my concept of peace."

Two weeks ago Fadlallah could not be located in Beirut, and sources said he was in Tehran for meetings with government officials. The speaker of the Iranian parliament, Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, met with Fadlallah yesterday, according to Reuter, and urged the recruitment of more "self-sacrificing youths" to carry out suicide attacks on the U.S. and French peace-keeping forces in Lebanon. According to Reuter, Fadlallah replied: "Our aim is to expel the aggressive forces of the United States and other so-called multinational forces including the Zionists."

Intelligence reports indicate that on the night of Oct. 22, just hours before the bombings, Fadlallah received—either in his apartment or at his mosque in Beirut—the two men who drove the trucks on the suicide bombings. He blessed them, gave them so-called deeds or guarantees to their places in paradise, where they would have eternal joy. According to one resident in Bir Abed, the suburb in southern Beirut where Fadlallah lives and has his mosque, as recently as two weeks ago Fadlallah preached to 300 fighters, aged 14 to 30, and promised any man who killed an Israeli in southern Lebanon a place in paradise.

• *Ahmed Qudura*, a former PLO Fatah member, and a second man identified in intelligence reports only as *Umayyah*, a security officer of the rebel PLO group led by Abu Musa, have also been tied to the planning sessions on Oct. 21 or 22 attended by chief planner Shaykh and Diyab.

The intelligence agencies have established that four others collaborated in the bombings. One of them obtained the explosives after being turned down by a Lebanese supplier. All four were followers of Hussein Musawi whose loyalty to him had resulted in their expulsion from the mainline Shiite group in Lebanon called Amal. Hussein Musawi formed a rival organization called Islamic Amal.

Two of the four, *Ali Fatuni* and *Ibrahim Aqil*, had been accused in the July 1983 terrorist attack on Lebanese Prime Minister Shafiq

Wazzan, in which a remote-controlled car bomb only partially detonated and no injuries resulted. The five suspects arrested in the assassination attempt named Aqil as the man who rigged the car with 154

pounds of explosives. He has also been tied to the Nov. 4, 1983, suicide-bombing of the Israeli Defense Forces interrogation center at Tyre, in southern Lebanon, in which 29 Israelis and 32 Arab detainees were killed.

The other two are *Ali Majid* and *Wafiq Safa*. It was Safa, intelligence reports say, who approached Lebanese and Palestinian suppliers several days before Oct. 23 to request about 4,000 pounds of explosives. He specified that the explosives were for a special operation and that they had to fit into two pickup trucks. According to a Middle East intelligence officer, Safa was asked at this meeting whether the special operation had been approved by the Islamic Amal leadership. Safa replied that, as a follower of Hussein Musawi, he was "immune" to Islamic Amal, and that the operation was authorized by Syria and was being organized as a result of Syrian "inspiration."

In all, Safa claimed he had three trucks with forged documents and falsified markings from TMA, Trans-Mediterranean Airways, a Lebanese cargo airlines. The cover was perfect, he said, because the trucks were precisely the type normally used to transport rice and other goods. These trucks were known by all and would not be stopped, the reports state he said. In the actual bombings, a Mercedes Benz truck was used at the Marine headquarters and a red van was used at the French headquarters.

The Lebanese declined to provide the explosives. An apparent effort to smuggle in the explosives from the Bekaa Valley was also unsuccessful. According to Israeli intelligence, Safa and his men tapped into secret caches still in west Beirut kept by persons loyal to PLO rebel leader Abu Musa, whose full name is Col. Said Musa.

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The Israelis, after invading Lebanon in June 1982, had little time that September to attempt to clean out such caches in Beirut, once the agreement was reached that resulted

in their withdrawal from Beirut. It is widely agreed that such arms and explosive stores still exist in the Lebanese capital and surroundings. For example, the Pentagon's investigation into the Marine bombing, released in December, said: "Stockpiles of explosives, built up over a decade prior to the Israeli invasion of June 1982, are reportedly still in place and available for future terrorist operations in and around Beirut."

According to the intelligence reports, these stockpiles provided the explosives that killed the marines.

The FBI, which was called in to assist in investigating the Marine bombing, and other intelligence agencies have determined that the explosives, which had the equivalent of 12,000 pounds of TNT, included the powerful plastic, PETN, tied into a sophisticated gas-enhancing construction that employed propane gas bottles to greatly magnify the blast. Another plastic explosive, hexogen, was used in the French bombing. The use of PETN and hexogen, highly restricted materials that are hard to obtain outside military channels, strongly suggests the involvement of government and military intelligence services.

A top-secret intelligence source reported just before Oct. 23 that Lt. Col Diyab was planning a terrorist act against unknown installations of the French and American forces on Oct. 23. The substance of this report—including even the date of a suspected attack, according to one account—was passed to the forces. But it was one of nearly 100 such warnings the multinational forces had received and it did not specify the target. Multinational officers, who had dealt for months with such threats that had not materialized, concluded little could be done.

The Pentagon commission investigating the bombing concluded that the Marine commander "was not provided with the timely intelligence, tailored to his specific operation needs, that was necessary to

defend against the broad spectrum of threats he faced." In addition the commission said that the United States did not have control over sufficient human intelligence—agents, informers, traditional spies—to track down warnings and obtain information on targets and methods.

Haydar Musawi maintains a business office in west Beirut on Assad Street. There, intelligence reports show, explosives were loaded or unloaded into three pickup trucks, one believed to be the yellow Mercedes Benz stakebed truck used in the Marine bombing.

In addition to the Marines and the French, the suicide commandos initially had two other targets. One was the Lebanese parliament; the other has not been determined.

Those operations did not take place, and the intelligence reports do not indicate why. The reports show that after Haydar Musawi said he was going to report on the operations to his cousin, Hussein Musawi, he claimed he would return to "explode the situation in Beirut."

Intelligence officials are perplexed by a reliable intelligence report that Haydar Musawi asserted that he lost three of his members in the Oct. 23 operations. Lone drivers were involved in the Marine and French bombings. It is not known how or why a third commando might have been lost. One analyst said a third may have been killed in a practice run.

Intelligence officials also place some significance on the intercepted communications, which show Haydar Musawi emphasizing that the attack on the French and U.S. forces was not so much to remove the forces from Lebanon, as is widely believed to be the motive, but rather because France was shipping arms to Iraq and supporting Iraq in its war with Iran. According to the reports on Haydar Musawi's assertions, the U.S. forces were attacked because the Americans were not opposing the French decision to back Iraq.

Israeli officials have called attention to this apparent motivation. Other officials said it was certainly one of the reasons, but by no means the exclusive or even chief

reason for the bombing. Citing widespread Syrian complicity in the Marine bombing, the officials said that the bombing served multiple purposes, and the Syrian policy is clearly to get the United States and entire multinational force out of Lebanon.

The intelligence agencies, using communications intercepts and other highly classified methods, have determined that the strongest Syrian connection to the bombing is Lt. Col. Diyab. He used a code name, Abu Nidal, which is also the name of a well-known international terrorist who has no known connection with the Marine bombing. Officials believe the code name was cleverly used to provide a false trail. To further confuse the picture, it turns out

there are two Syrian intelligence officers with the last name Diyab, and the intelligence agencies are not sure which one was involved in the bombings.

One of the two is Lt. Col Abd Gabar Diyab, who served in the Syrian Embassy in Paris under an intelligence cover as a second secretary in 1980.

The second is Muhammed Khayr Diyab. In April 1982, he replaced the Syrian military attache in Paris who had been expelled by the French after a car bomb exploded in Paris killing one person and injuring 63.

Much else is still not known and may never be known about the bombing and those responsible. Since the intelligence gathering was done after the Oct. 23 bombing, and because much of the material is based on highly classified intercepts of communications, sources and agents, officials said it is unlikely that any official or public case would be made by the United States or any other government for some time.

If a case had to be made in a court of law, several officials in U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies said, they might not be able to convince a jury. Several others said that the wealth of detail and the volume of circumstantial evidence could make a provable case. This is probably what led Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to say publicly a month after the bombing

that those responsible were "basically Iranians with sponsorship and knowledge and authority of the Syrian government."

That was the strongest public statement made by any Reagan administration official connecting the bombing to Iranians and Syrians. Officials have said that Weinberger opposed the Marine presence in Lebanon and, as the defense secretary, felt a deep personal responsibility for the death of 241 men under his command.

Other Reagan administration officials, particularly those in the White House and State Department who have to deal diplomatically with Syria, have kept their distance from such a direct, public accusation. Diplomatic officials note that Syria will be central to any negotiated settlement that might result in a face-saving withdrawal of the U.S. Marines from Lebanon.

After the bombings, a large number of people were observed rushing out of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut into waiting cars that sped off to an unknown destination, presumably the southern suburbs controlled by Fadlallah.

"It only takes them three minutes to get out of government-controlled areas," said a Lebanese intelligence source.

Soon after the incident, an unknown group calling itself the Islamic Holy War claimed responsibility in telephone calls to news agencies. Intelligence officials said they are virtually certain no such operational group exists, but that it is a psychological warfare arm covering the terrorist acts of various Islamic groups. Two days after the bombings, the group published a statement in Beirut newspapers that intelligence officials said quite accurately characterizes the degree of fanaticism felt by some—but only some—of those involved in the bombings. The published statement said:

"We are the soldiers of God and we crave death. Violence will remain our only path if they [the multinational forces] do not leave. We are ready to turn Lebanon into another Vietnam. We are not Iranians or Syrians, or Palestinians. We are Lebanese Moslems who follow the dicta of the Koran."

Washington Post staff writer John Ward Anderson and researcher Barbara Feinman contributed to this article. The next will appear Friday.

Governments of Syria, Iran Deny Supporting Terrorism

The governments of Syria and Iran have denied direct or indirect support of terrorism.

Abid Kahani, spokesman for the Syrian Embassy in Washington, said in an interview: "We are against international terrorism. We are suffering from it. At the same time we are against aggression and we want self-determination. President [Hafez] Assad has said that the U.S. supports terrorism—not on the part of any administration, but in general."

As for the Oct. 23 bombings in Beirut, he said: "If the U.S. did not have troops outside the U.S., there would not have been that incident. We never did it. They say we did because the Bekaa Valley is allegedly controlled by us but it was not 10 percent controlled by us."

Said Rajaie Khorassani, delegate of the Iranian mission to the United Nations, commented that "any group which terrorizes another group is a terrorist group. . . . When the Russians invade Afghanistan, or the Americans go into Beirut, that is terrorism, and more terrorism follows after that."

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Message From Iran Triggered Bombing Spree In Kuwait

THE TERROR FACTOR

Part 2

This article, written by Richard Harwood, is the second in a series of stories on terrorism reported by Harwood, Bob Woodward and Christian Williams of The Washington Post staff.

KUWAIT—In the brutal trail of terrorism in the Middle East today, a human fingertip recovered from the wreckage of the American Embassy in Kuwait has become a kind of Rosetta stone for our understanding of these events.

The piece of flesh was from the disintegrated body of a young Arab who sacrificed himself in the murderous truck-bomb attack on the embassy nine weeks ago.

His fingerprint revealed his identity: Raad Mefteil Ajeel. And it revealed links to organizations and movements in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon whose religious and political fervor has soaked in blood the region's desert sands and cities.

Ajeel, who also used the name Badran, was a 25-year-old driver for the Sultan trading company, Kuwait's answer to Sears Roebuck. He arrived in Kuwait

last September with an Iranian passport and a recommendation for a work permit.

Within a month he was involved in a plot to assault in one grand action the embassy and seven other targets: the headquarters building of Raytheon Co., an American corporation now installing a Hawk missile system in Kuwait; an apartment house occupied by

Raytheon employees; the control tower at the international airport; the Kuwait Ministry of Electricity and Water; the Kuwait Passport Control office; the French Embassy and a major petrochemical and refining complex at the port of Shuaiba. The instruments of destruction would be car and truck bombs of the precise type used for major terrorist actions in Lebanon last year.

What else Ajeel and his comrades had in mind is

something of a mystery. According to evidence later obtained, they had brought into Kuwait by boat—probably from Iran—stocks of explosives for the bombings. But they had also brought in large stores of more conventional weapons—rocket-launched grenades, machine guns, rifles, pistols and detonators of Soviet, Western European and U.S. manufacture, all of which were hidden away in safe-houses in three neighborhoods south of the city. Were a series of assassinations, or a coup, planned for this little oil domain on the Persian Gulf?

No answers to those questions have been forthcoming since the coordinated bombing attacks of Dec. 12 and the arrest of numerous suspects who, according to Kuwait authorities, confessed in writing and on tape that they collaborated with Ajeel.

Reports from the CIA and Israeli intelligence authorities establish that final approval for the operation came directly from a message carried to Kuwait by a

courier from Iran and that planning for it took place in Switzerland and the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon.

Of equal significance to those who would unravel and understand the terrorist chain in the Middle East, however, are the political and religious roots of Ajeel and his comrades.

Of the 22 men directly involved in the arms smuggling and bombings (four are still being sought), 18 were native-born Iraqis, all of whom were members of the Al Dawa movement, an Iraqi opposition group now based in Iran. Three were Lebanese, two of whom were Shiite Moslems who have been linked to Hussein

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Musawi, an antigovernment Lebanese military commander implicated by intelligence agencies in the bombings of the U.S. Marine complex and the French military headquarters in Beirut last Oct. 23. The third Lebanese was Elias Fuad Saib, 23, a Christian mercenary brought into the operation to wire the bombs.

For Americans, Arabic names and Arabic organizations present problems of comprehension. We can grasp the concepts of Weathermen, Black Panthers and the Puerto Rican terrorist FALN. It is these distant and alien groups that tend to baffle us.

Al Dawa, for example, is no household name in the United States. But it is a name important to this story. It leads us back to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the ruling figure in Iran; to Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the militant Lebanese Shiite leader who has been implicated—despite his denials—in the Marine and French bombings in Beirut; to Hussein Musawi, Fadlallah's strong-arm lieutenant; to the Hakim Brothers in Iran and their connections to the Middle East terrorism industry.

Raad Ajeel's fingertip helped open the window on all this. But the basic work on Al Dawa—totally unrelated to contemporary terrorism—was done by a scholar now at Georgetown University, Hanna Batatu, in an article on underground Shiite movements, published in the Middle East Journal.

The story begins in Najaf, Iraq, in the 1960s. Najaf is a holy city for the Shiite branch of Islam, a center for theological studies and debate. (About 10 percent of the world's 400 million Moslems are Shiites; the rest are Sunnis or members of smaller sects.)

Najaf in those years was a place of intellectual ferment. Khomeini was there from 1964 until 1978, an exile from the shah's Iran. Fadlallah was there as a student. Najaf was also the home of the chief Shiite theologian, Muhsin Hakim, and of Hakim's three sons, all of whom are now active in Iran. And Najaf was the home of a brilliant young Shiite philosopher and writer, Sayyid Muhammad Baquir Sadr.

He was, Batatu has written, the intellectual godfather of Al Dawa Al Islamiyah—the meaning in English is the Islamic Call. It was “a call for a return to God's dispensation,” Batatu wrote, a call that “necessitates a ‘social revolution’ against ‘injustice’ and ‘exploitation,’ but it is a revolution which has a ‘universal’ rather than a ‘class’ character and one in which the virtuous rich and the virtuous poor stand shoulder to shoulder.”

This message found fertile ground in the peasant and working class township of Baghdad called Thawrah. With the encouragement

of some of Sadr's theological colleagues in Najaf, “the call” led to the formation of Al Dawa as a revolutionary party of protest against the ruling authorities.

There were disturbances and disorders and a repressive response by the government of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Dawa leaders were executed. Notable theologians in Najaf were harassed and put under surveillance, including chief theologian Muhsin Hakim and at least one of his sons. Thousands of Iraqis, the Hakim sons among them, fled to Iran. Fadlallah returned to Lebanon to begin his career of militance. Khomeini left the country, later to emerge as the spiritual leader of the Iranian revolution in 1979. He took with him from Najaf his own version of “the Islamic call” and an abiding hatred of Saddam Hussein.

Baquir Sadr, whose writings had inspired the Al Dawa dissidents and left their mark on future militant Shiites, had such stature in Iran by the end of the 1970s that Tehran radio began referring to him as the “Iraqi Khomeini.” To the Iraqi ruler, Saddam Hussein, Sadr was an intolerable threat to his Baath Arab Socialist regime: he aroused the masses too much. Sadr and his sister, Bint Hudah, were arrested and executed in 1980, along with a number of the theologians of Najaf.

That was the year that Raad Ajeel, the bomber of the American Embassy in Kuwait, and his brother, Saad, were put under death sentences by Saddam Hussein. They had been swept up in the Al Dawa

movement and participated in what the Iraqis called “terrorist attacks” such as grenade assaults on police stations.

Saad was caught and hanged in Baghdad. Raad escaped to Iran to join the quarter-million refugees from Iraq including many Al Dawa followers who had preceded him. His movements there, if they are known, have not been revealed. But it is reasonable to assume that he came in contact with and was brought under

the wing of the Supreme Council of the Iraqi Islamic Revolution, headed by Mohammed Baquir Hakim, one of the three brothers from Najaf.

The Supreme Council provides humanitarian assistance to the refugees. But it has other functions, including the recruitment of Iraqi refugees for Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards and, according to the leftist French magazine *Jeune Afrique*, plays yet another role as a kind of parent organization for four operational terrorist groups. Al Dawa is one of them. The Mujaheddin is another and it is led by Baquir Hakim's brother, Aziz.

The council also has links to the Islamic Amal faction in Lebanon, headed by Hussein Musawi, a follower of Fadlallah who, upon his return from Najaf, created the militant Hezbollah (Party of God) in Beirut and brought into it the Lebanese elements of Al Dawa. These are the men—Fadlallah and Musawi—who have been implicated in the bombings of the U.S. Marine and French installations in Beirut last October, though both have denied involvement.

Whether Baquir Hakim and his Supreme Council recruited Raad Ajeel for the Kuwait operation, sent him to the Qom or Ahwaz training camps in Iran and provided him with a passport are elements of his history that have not been made public. CIA intelligence reports indicate that one member of the Hakim family, then residing in Kuwait, was the head of the bombing operation, and that planning for it included Syrian officers, Shiite leaders and Iranian intelligence representatives.

It is characteristic of terrorist operations with obvious state-sponsorship that “deniability” safeguards are

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always built into the planning; the chain of responsibility invariably has missing links. But it is inconceivable that Ajeel and his comrades were sent off to Kuwait with no training at all, just as it is inconceivable that such an intricate operation was

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spontaneously mounted out of the industrial neighborhoods of Kuwait.

What is known beyond doubt is that Ajeel and most of his collaborators entered Kuwait from Iran, that the explosives and weapons were shipped in by boat and that the final planning for the Dec. 12 action began in October, the same month the bombing plans for the Marine and French installations in Beirut were completed and carried out.

The 22-man team, according to Kuwaiti and American investigators, was divided into seven cells organized according to the "cutout" principle, which means that the members of each team were isolated from all the other teams; they did not even know one another's names. Planning sessions involving team leaders and the operation's supervisor were held in safe-houses in the neighborhoods of Jleeb Shuyoukh, Firdous and Sabah Salem.

Ajeel's first assignment was to buy or rent the vehicles needed for the Dec. 12 operation. He acquired five Subaru passenger cars, a Subaru van, a Buick passenger car and two trucks, one manufactured by General Motors, the other by Mercedes-Benz.

Other operatives acquired dozens of liquefied petroleum gas tanks, each filled with 25 to 30 pounds of butane or propane. The tanks were loaded into the mission vehicles and hooked up to large charges of the powerful explosive hexogen (also known as C-4 and RDX), which is used by military forces around the world in artillery shells, mines and bombs and for structural demolition. It can generate an explosive force twice as powerful as TNT.

On the night of Dec. 11, seven of the vehicles were parked at the selected targets to be detonated the next morning by timers or remote control devices. (It is of incidental interest that the car-bombs at the Raytheon business and residential facilities were placed by one of the Lebanese Shiites—Yusif Musawi, 28, thought by intelligence agencies to

be a relative of Hussein Musawi, a chief suspect in the Beirut bombings.) The eighth vehicle, the General Motors truck, was held back for Ajeel's mission: a direct attack on the U.S. Embassy.

Ajeel set out from the southern suburbs in the truck, probably about 9 a.m. on the morning of Dec. 12. His route probably took him along Gamal Abdel Nasser Street and then onto the Gulf Road on which the American Embassy is located. Ajeel turned off the Gulf Road into a residential street on which the embassy entrance is located. At 9:35 a.m. he crashed through the embassy gate, drove into the parking lot and detonated his load 10 feet from the embassy's administrative building.

He was, investigators concluded, a genuine "kamikaze," because he need not have died in the explosion. His lethal load was connected to two detonators. One of them, a safety fuse, would have allowed him 20 minutes to attempt an escape. But he chose the instant detonator which meant he chose instant death.

The car and truck bombs at the other targets were exploded by timers and remote control devices in the 45 minutes after Ajeel died. The toll from all the explosions was five dead, 87 wounded and severe property damage at some of the sites.

The destruction would have been worse if the Lebanese Christian mercenary, Saib, had been a more skillful demolitions man. His wiring of the bombs was so amateurish that only 10 of the 45 gas cylinders on Ajeel's truck exploded. The same defects minimized the power of other bombs that day.

The trial of the Kuwait plotters is to begin next week, despite a concerted campaign of intimidation from Iran. The state radio in Tehran has repeatedly demanded the release of the terrorists and has threatened the Kuwaiti government with dire consequences if the trial proceeds. Many of these broadcasts have been made in the name of Al Dawa.

Under Kuwaiti law at the time of

the bombings, hanging was the ultimate penalty for such acts. But a new penalty was decreed on Dec. 29: "limb amputation or death," and "the amputations would be carried out on two limbs simultaneously, severing the left arm and right leg or vice versa."

To risk such punishment, men need motivation. In the case of a few members of the Shiite sects, such as Al Dawa, Hezbollah and Islamic Amal, both religious and political motivations are involved. Terrorists, especially the unsophisticated, are promised places in paradise as participants in *jihad*, the Holy War.

But great political passions are the major forces behind these events—the passion to punish France for siding with Iraq in its war with Iran; the passion to punish the gulf states for the same offense; the passion to punish America, which Iran calls the Great Satan, for various international crimes; the passion to drive the Americans, French, Italians and British out of Lebanon; the passion to wage war on Israel and its benefactors; the passion to destroy Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

In these political crusades, the fanatical recruits of Al Dawa, Hezbollah and Islamic Amal become terrorist pawns in the larger game of such nations as Syria and Iran. They are moved around from country to country in the name of Holy War, dealing death to strangers—and to themselves.

One of the leaders of Al Islamic Amal al-Islami, Mohammed Taki Mudarissi, went to the heart of it in a recent interview given in Tehran. He said:

"In one week I can assemble 500 loyalists ready to throw themselves into suicide operations. No border can stop me. We are coming to the end of the world. Presidents and ministers are eating each other up. Military men are traitors. Society is corrupt. The privileged, the notables are not worried about the poor. Only Islam can give us hope."

The next article will appear Sunday.

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Abu Nidal Targets Backers Of Mideast Compromise

THE TERROR FACTOR

PART 3

This article, written by Christian Williams, is the third in a series on terrorism reported by Williams, Bob Woodward and Richard Harwood of The Washington Post.

LONDON—Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger was on a list of potential targets compiled by the three-man terrorist team that shot and severely wounded Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London on June 3, 1982, according to unpublished documents in the files of Scotland Yard.

The handwritten phrase "Kissinger and the Israeli ambassador" was found in the gunman's apartment along with what officials said was material identifying more than 100 potential targets, including the Kuwaiti ambassador, 16 Saudi embassy vehicles and various Jewish organizations including schools, a youth center, a synagogue and the Jewish Blind School of London.

Kissinger made trips to London in the two months preceding the Argov shooting, in April and May 1982. He and Argov, who have known each other for 20 years, both attended a reception held by a British publisher on one of these trips, but no evidence was developed to suggest that Kissinger was a more serious target than anyone else on the list. Kissinger said through a spokesman last week that he had never heard that his name was on the list.

In fact, the wide range of names collected by the terrorists,

Scotland Yard sources said, showed that a violent international incident, not a specific political execution, was the goal.

The randomness of the list served to reinforce the notion that no one is safe, and it gave the attack and its aftermath a global resonance of horror.

Argov was not selected for death until just hours before the attack, when his name was detected on a list of guests expect-

ed to attend a reception at the Dorchester Hotel.

The shooting, however extemporaneous, had another impact: Three days after the attack, Israel cited it as the provocation for the invasion of Lebanon. In that invasion, Israel ravaged the Palestine Liberation Organization, an avowed enemy of Argov's assailants.

The terrorists were operatives of Abu Nidal, a name for both an individual and a movement that even within the ranks of world terrorism represents what is most ruthless and indiscriminate. Also known as Black June or Al Asifa, the group strikes moderate Arab, Palestinian and Jewish targets. Its leader, Sabri Banna, whose war name is Abu Nidal, was expelled from the PLO and sentenced to death in 1974 on charges of plotting the murder of Arafat.

A review of intelligence files and interviews with officials in London and the Middle East show that Abu Nidal, with the continued state support of Iraq and Syria, is now expanding its operation with a new campaign of murder. Intelligence officials link the group to as many as 50 terrorist plots or

attacks in the last six months, including a concerted campaign against officials of Jordan, which has pursued a path of relative moderation in Middle East affairs.

The Jordanian ambassador to India was shot in New Delhi Oct. 25, and Jordan's ambassador in Rome was wounded the next day. In November, a security agent of Jordan's embassy in Athens was murdered. On Dec. 29, at the Jordanian Embassy in Madrid, one aide was killed and another wounded when they were sprayed with 9 mm sub-machine-gun fire. Officials say they have traced each of these attacks to Abu Nidal agents, and in some instances the group has taken responsibility for the attacks.

In London, unpublished evidence from the trial of the three terrorists who attacked Argov, all of whom are now serving prison terms of 30 to 35 years, provides a chilling portrait of terrorist personalities as well as a case study of how they entered the bustle of London to spend months under cover—sifting newspaper accounts, observing the diplomatic community, mapping routes, identifying cars and obtaining weapons and hand grenades in preparation for an eventual strike.

Patient and professional, they researched their mission with little apparent concern for their local institutional adversaries. The leader of the trio, Nawaf Rosan, was interviewed at 7:35 a.m. the day after the shooting by officials who identified themselves as representatives of Scotland Yard.

"Pleased to meet you," Rosan replied, according to a confidential report. "What is Scotland Yard?"

Abu Nidal, who dispatched the London terrorist team on its mission, is a native of Tel Aviv now in his early 40s. A shadowy figure who has escaped assassination by slipping over Middle East borders in the guise of a Catholic priest, he is an expert at negotiating the ever-shifting terrain of Arab politics.

He has maintained formal offices in Iraq and downtown Damascus, behind an iron gate emblazoned with crossed Soviet-de-

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signed Kalishnikov rifles. According to a high-placed Israeli intelligence source, a surveillance team sent to report on the possibility of killing or kidnaping Abu Nidal withdrew after "we ran smack into Iraqi intelligence."

The Red Brigades were smashed by Italian police, the Baader-Meinhof gang has been jailed and the PLO has been forced out of Lebanon. But the Abu Nidal group, numbering between 500 and 1,000 persons, has survived. Its goal is the instigation of military action for a Palestinian state, and its method is to halt or disrupt all attempts at compromise and political negotiation in the region. Its operations typically are military in nature, featuring close-in personal attacks with Polish WZ-63 machine pistols (used in the Argov attempt) and hand grenades aimed at synagogues and restaurants as well as ambassadors and PLO spokesmen.

Abu Nidal's power to terrorize moderate spokesmen is not disputed, and events have borne out his threats. In a newspaper interview in 1978, Nidal said that "anyone who tries to take a hand in our affairs will have his hand cut off."

Issam Sartawi, an Arafat aide who had proposed a dialogue with Israel, commented to a reporter for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz in 1982, "I shall tell you only this: Sabri Banna is a psychopath. His men are the most dangerous killers. They are capable of anything."

Sartawi was shot to death in a crowded hotel lobby in Portugal by Abu Nidal assassins on April 10 last year.

Of the London assassination team, much is now known. Rosan, the leader, arrived in England in the fall of 1981, and was joined later by his two accomplices. Rosan immediately enrolled in the Francis King School of English. At his trial, it was brought out that in his exercise book he had practiced again and again four English words: explosion, ransom, hijacking and assassination.

On June 3, with their target finally selected and the operation under way, Rosan and Marwan Banna, a Nidal relative who was to drive the getaway car, arrived at the Dorchester Hotel. They left the engine of their yellow Renault running, and took up observation positions.

The third member of the team, gunman Ghassan Said, arrived separately, armed with a WZ-63 machine pistol. As Argov left a reception and bent to enter his car, Said fired a single 9 mm bullet through his head, and fled. Argov's British bodyguard gave chase, and during the pursuit Said turned and fired one shot at him, after which his pistol jammed. The bodyguard then shot Said in the neck, and he was arrested.

Rosan and Banna escaped in the Renault and went to Said's apartment, where they gathered incriminating lists of potential targets. But they were stopped by London police only five miles from the Dorchester Hotel.

"They are cool, professional assassins," said Roy Amlott, the prosecutor in their trial. "It goes for all three of them that they showed very little concern for their own position throughout the trial. Their operation was very well planned, and they were only caught because Argov's guard chased Said and was able to hit him with one shot at a range of 20 yards while being fired upon himself, and because Banna panicked and ran to the getaway car."

A security guard at the nearby Hilton Hotel noted Banna's agitated sprint, and recorded the license number of the Renault as he and Rosan drove away. When he learned there had been a shooting the guard gave the license number to police, and the car was stopped.

"If Banna had just strolled to that getaway car, they would have been all right," said Amlott.

The terrorists maintained an air of serenity during their six-week-long trial. Rosan told a person close to his case that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that followed the Argov shooting was his "mark on history," and that Yasser Arafat—whose forces the Israelis attacked—was his enemy because he had "sold out to America." Rosan was the oldest, coolest and "roughest" of the three, according to Amlott.

"The one who showed the most outward appearance of confidence was Banna, he was the extrovert," Amlott said. "Said, who actually pulled the trigger, was very difficult to fathom out. He was withdrawn, quiet, almost intellectual, but filled with self-doubt. The character of Said didn't match his being the one to pull the trigger."

Unpublished writings taken from Said's London apartment show a certain amount of despair and uncertainty. The English translation of one of his Arabic writings before the attempt on Argov's life reads:

"Night, universe, sacrifice, suffering and conscience.

"Where am I living?

"I must define who I am.

"The world gets nastier every day.

"Everything appears to be established.

"I have one door in front of me."

Rosan is reported to maintain a completely isolated existence in prison, where he is well-behaved. One of his few moments of emotion came, according to a source, when he discovered his Moslem prayer rug had been stolen. He has left a

strong, almost haunting impression with those who have dealt with him as a man who has a very clear, unwavering idea of his function in life. For him the war is over. He has done his duty.

The jury in his trial was out for four days before reaching a verdict. London authorities who have seen the most professional of criminals buckle under the wait, noted that Rosan was cool every minute. He smiled when the guilty verdict was announced.

"Prison is a bonus," one source said. "If he weren't in prison, he'd be dead. Those were the alternatives when he undertook the assignment."

When asked who had recruited him, Rosan replied with one word: "Myself."

When asked who had instructed him to take part in the operation, he said: "Somebody. I don't know his name. Because it is secret. They call him Salim."

But Rosan would provide no more information on "Salim" and was evasive under repeated questioning. He said there may have been a fourth member of the London team named "Muthanna," but insisted that was a code name and he knew no more.

He swore at his trial that he was Jordanian, which the authorities now believe. But his passport is Iraqi and it states he was born in Baghdad. His political goal, he has said, is the creation of one large Arab state encompassing most of the Middle East from Libya to Iran.

However Rosan was recruited and directed, he achieved the goals of his terrorist outfit in London, just as they have been achieved by scores of other assassins since 1973, when as the PLO representative in Baghdad Abu Nidal declared war on Arafat and heaped scorn on his own death sentence in a statement to the Beirut weekly Al Diyar: "I am perfectly capable of reaching out for the vacillating leadership of the PLO to carry out my own sentence against them."

At first, his enemies list included Syria. The name Black June was adopted after Syria intervened on the Christian side in the Lebanese civil war in June 1976, causing the radical Palestinians there to flee in rusty steamers to the safety of Cyprus.

By December of that year, Syria was accusing the group of an assassination attempt on its foreign minister, and Abu Nidal terrorists had already attacked the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus, killing four guests, with 34 wounded as Syrian police forces counterattacked. In Amman, Jordan, that year, they hit the Intercontinental Hotel, leaving nine dead.

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By 1978, Abu Nidal's group had grown in impact, energy and effectiveness. The London representative of the PLO was murdered. Yussef Sebai, editor of Cairo's Al Ahram newspaper and a confidant of then president Anwar Sadat, was assassinated in Cyprus. The PLO chief in Kuwait was killed. In Paris, Izziddin Qalaq and Hadad Adnan, the top PLO representatives, were executed—Qalaq machine-gunned, and Adnan blown up with a grenade.

In Islamabad, gunmen went office-to-office, killing four persons, but were unable to find their apparent target, PLO chief of mission, Yousuf Abu Hantash, who remained seated behind his desk. Abu Nidal claimed credit for all.

During this period, according to intelligence sources here and in the Middle East, principal Abu Nidal financing came from Iraq. Maj. Gen. Yehoshua Saguy, the head of Israeli military intelligence from 1979 to 1983, said in an interview two weeks ago: "During my time, [Iraq] was giving from \$20 million to \$50 million a year to him, usually in cash. I am 100 percent certain that Abu Nidal agents used the Iraqi diplomatic pouch to transfer terrorist material . . . It happened time and time again. They shipped pistols, explosives, hand grenades, whatever was needed for the mission."

In 1981, Abu Nidal assassins murdered the head of the Austria-Israel Society, killed the PLO chief in Brussels and attacked a Vienna synagogue with machine guns and grenades, killing two worshipers and wounding 20.

In September 1982, in Madrid, Abu Nidal men murdered the first secretary of the Kuwaiti Embassy. The next week, four persons were wounded on the steps of a Brussels synagogue by Abu Nidal members armed with their WZ-63 machine pistols, the Abu Nidal signature.

It is a standard weapon issued to Iraqi tank commanders and, at 13 inches long and weighing about four pounds, it fits handily in a diplomatic pouch. It can be fired one-handed, like a pistol. With the forward grip folded down and the wire stock extended, it becomes a fully automatic submachine gun.

When Abu Nidal forces attacked a restaurant in the Jewish section of Paris in 1982, six people died and 22 were wounded. Two of those killed were Americans.

On two recent occasions, intelligence sources say, the Abu Nidal group has per-

haps attempted attacks on American targets. In August of last year Egyptians foiled an operation by several Abu Nidal agents who had entered the country posing as students. Their alleged targets were American instal-

lations in Cairo. And last November, sources said, his agents were found with a car bomb on the street in Amman, Jordan, where both the American and British embassies are located.

The death list is incomplete. It does not record all the terrorist attacks suspected of Abu Nidal, or his many foiled attempts. But it is a list that makes its point to those who oppose him and to those who support him: that he is a definite factor in the politics of the Middle East. Without nuclear weapons or battleships or tanks, he is one man, whereabouts now believed to be Damascus, who has proved the efficacy of terror techniques to the Middle East and Europe.

And there is something else at work in Abu Nidal's use of the terror factor. His capacity to outrage the world is served as well by today's global communications as by machine pistols and grenades.

When Abu Nidal struck Argov in London, there was no possibility his act would go untrumpeted. The more heinous the crime, the more urgent the news. Television control rooms in Tehran, London, New York and Jerusalem are simultaneously flooded with video images within hours of each terrorist attack, and can be channeled instantly on the air.

Radio news delivers instant bulletins. The editor of the Jerusalem Post, Ari Rath, learned that Argov had been shot while listening to the 1 a.m. radio news in his office. He stopped the presses and inserted a bulletin on page one.

Intelligence sources say Abu Nidal has that most valued of clandestine organizations: one that is solidly in place, with a proven method in an effective style and a communication and logistics system that permits the carrying out of his policy from India to Austria, from Athens to Britain.

A secret intelligence report states that in June 1980, Abu Nidal dispatched two of his men from Baghdad in a Mercedes car with 20 hand grenades and two automatic weapons hidden in the fuel tank. They were accompanied, for cover purposes, by a crippled man with no knowledge of their mission.

At the Bulgarian border, customs agents searched the car and discovered the weapons. The Abu Nidal men were jailed for two weeks. The Bulgarian Embassy in Baghdad requested that their government in Sofia release the men, according to an intercepted communication.

The men were freed, and their hand grenades and the machine guns returned to them. They proceeded to Italy.

Two years later, on Oct. 9, 1982, the grenades and the machine guns were used in an attack on a Rome synagogue, according to the intelligence report. A 2-year-old child was killed and 34 worshipers were wounded.

"The modus operandi is to give the team the privilege to pick the target . . . They will hit children, the elderly because they don't care," said a former head of the Israeli equivalent of the CIA, the Mossad. "That is what terror is all about."

Also contributing to this report were John Ward Anderson and Barbara Feinman. The next article in this series will appear Wednesday.

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Trail in Killing Of Gemayel Kin Leads to Syria

THE TERROR FACTOR

PART 4

Syrian officials have denied any role in terrorist bombings and assassinations. They say that the massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 is the primary cause of the current chaos in the country.

In the terrorist arsenal, political assassination is the weapon with the gravest consequences, setting in motion a chain of events that can reverberate unpredictably and uncontrollably through many nations. The murder of Bashir Gemayel is a case in point. Today, nearly 18 months later, it is clear that some very large portion of the disarray in Lebanon stems from that deed.

Less than one week after the assassination, Phalangist units of the Lebanese Army entered two refugee camps in Beirut, Sabra and Shatilla, and slaughtered hundreds of Palestinians, most of them women and children. The massacre led to an anguishing investigation by an independent Israeli commission, which concluded that Israeli leaders should have anticipated that the revenge-minded Phalangists they allowed into the camps would go on a killing rampage. This report precipitated a shake-up in the Israeli government and military leadership, including the resignation as defense minister of Ariel Sharon and the removal of Saguy as military intelligence chief.

In turn, the Gemayel assassination and refugee camp massacre brought the U.S. Marines back to Lebanon as part of the multinational peace-keeping force.

Robert McFarlane, President Reagan's national security adviser, last week cited the Gemayel murder as the event that triggered the return of the Marines. In an article entitled,

"Why the Marines Are in Lebanon," he wrote: "Following the assassination of Lebanese president-elect Bashir Gemayel, the entry of the Israeli Defense Forces in Beirut and the tragic massacre of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila camps, U.S. forces were reintroduced."

The first Marines returned to Beirut Sept. 29, 1982, and their continued presence there has become a source of great political and strategic controversy in the United States and in Lebanon, where the government of Bashir's brother, President Amin Gemayel, teeters.

Bashir Gemayel was a strong leader who showed some promise of controlling the intense political and religious forces in Lebanon. His brother Amin, elected president one week after the assassination, has been unable to bring stability to the country.

The 53-year-old Assad and his intelligence agents have played a key role in undermining the Gemayel government in neighboring Lebanon. Assad has ruled Syria since 1970 when he seized power in a coup and aligned his country with the Soviet Union. His government has been called a police state. In 1982, his forces brutally crushed a rebellion in Hama, Syria's fifth-largest city, killing at least 10,000 residents. Amnesty International, the London-based human rights group, says that Syria has jailed thousands without formal charges and regularly engaged in physical torture including beatings, electric shock and sexual abuses.

At times Assad has used western-style diplomacy, such as when he released the American shot down and captured by Syrian forces in Lebanon, Lt. Robert Goodman, to the Rev. Jesse Jackson. But intelligence reports on the Bashir Gemayel killing show a different side of Assad and his agents.

It has been known for some time

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This article is the fourth in a series on terrorism reported by Bob Woodward, Richard Harwood and Christian Williams of The Washington Post.

Syrian officers arranged the assassination of Lebanese president-elect Bashir Gemayel in 1982, according to intelligence officials in the United States and Israel.

Communications intercepts and surveillance reports show that the young Lebanese man who placed the bomb that killed Gemayel was directed by a Syrian intelligence captain who reported to the head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon. The reports show that Syrian Army and Air Force intelligence officers were aware of the planned bombing.

Some Israeli officials say they have evi-

dence implicating Syrian President Hafez Assad himself in the Gemayel murder, which was a central event in a series of terrorist acts and reprisals that have devastated Lebanon

in recent years. The Israelis, however, decline to specify the intelligence upon which their conclusion is based.

"The Bashir Gemayel assassination was at the initiative of the Syrians," said Yehoshua

Saguy, who was chief of Israeli military intelligence at the time of the bombing with the rank of major general. "It is based on hard evidence that President Assad initiated it. It was done through the intelligence officer of the Air Force."

Since Israel is facing Syria in their mutual occupation of Lebanon, its intelligence might be inclined to overstate Syrian involvement in the Gemayel murder. But the claim is backed up by senior intelligence officers in the United States, whose relations with Syria are more flexible.

"That assassination could be traced with hard intelligence evidence right to the top of the Syrian government, but we are not about

to do it [publicly]," said one senior CIA official last week. Another U.S. intelligence official, while not disputing that Assad was aware of the assassination plan in advance, said it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove what his exact role had been.

that the bomb that killed Bashir Gemayel was placed by Habib Char-touny, a 26-year-old member of the Syrian People's Party in Lebanon. Intelligence reports from agents and communications intercepts indicate a deeper Syrian connection. Char-touny's "operator" was named as a Captain Nassif of the Syrian intelligence service, who is said to have convinced the young man that the bomb would scare rather than kill Gemayel.

Nassif reported in 1982 directly to Lt. Col. Mohammed G'anen, who at the time was in charge of Syrian intelligence operations in Lebanon, the reports show. From there the intelligence reports say that both Syrian Army and Air Force intelligence were involved in or aware of the planned bombing. In addition, Assad's brother, Rifaat Assad, who heads the country's security forces, allegedly had some degree of awareness, according to the reports. And, said Israel's Saguy, the former military intelligence chief,

"... that means President Assad... even his brother Rifaat wouldn't dare do it without his knowledge."

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens said he could not confirm that the assassination was initiated by the Syrian president. But Arens said he is convinced that Assad was aware of the assassination plan in advance and approved of it.

In an interview in Tel Aviv on Jan. 23, Arens said: "I think we know with certainty today that the assassination of Gemayel, the president-elect of Lebanon, the attack on the American Embassy in Beirut [on April 18, 1983] the attack on the Marine compound in Beirut, the attack on the French military position in Beirut [both on Oct. 23, 1983]—all of them were carried out with the knowledge of the Syrian establishment.

"There's little doubt that with the knowledge and approval at least, if not more, of the president of Syria violent acts were committed against the U.S. armed forces. As far as we know, nothing gets done in Syria without Assad's approval—nothing of any consequence gets done in Syria without Assad's approval or disapproval. I don't know if there's another state in the world today that is run by one man to the extent that Syria is . . .

"His control is so total in Syria. It's really very difficult, the line beyond which [someone] doesn't have to get his approval goes much farther down than you might ordinarily think."

When asked to address the larger question of whether terrorists gain their political objectives, Arens said: "It depends on the texture and the strength of the society against which it is directed. In the case of Lebanon it certainly works. They killed Bashir Gemayel and it's not the same Lebanon anymore. I don't mean to say if he were alive there wouldn't be any problems in Lebanon, but there's no doubt that the problems have been compounded very significantly by his death.

"There's no doubt that the threat of the use of terrorism has its effect on the Lebanese body politic. There's no doubt that the threat of the use of terrorism has its effect on the Arab population. . . . People know that they can get knocked off and they are very careful about what they say and what they do in fear of getting knocked off.

"If you look at the problem of Lebanon, it has been influenced a very large measure by terrorism. I would say every one of the leading personalities in the Lebanese political scene today is affected by his fear of terrorism and probably would be acting differently, each in his own way, if you could somehow by magic wand remove that fear that he'd be knocked off if he steps out of line.

"I think that's true for the president of Lebanon [Amin Gemayel]. I'm sure that's true for the prime minister of Lebanon. I think that's true of Mr. Jumblatt [Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt]. That's true of Nabih Berri [the Shiite Amal leader] and all these people going right down to the people in the villages who are being held in line or being pushed in a certain direction by the knowledge that is transmitted to them that you either walk the line or you get knocked off."

A senior Israeli Foreign Ministry official said that Jumblatt once told a group of Israeli officials: "If I do not do what you Israelis want, we will have a dispute, but if I do not do what the Syrians want, I will get killed."

Jumblatt, much like Amin Gemayel, finds himself in command by virtue of murder. His father, Kamal Jumblatt, who had fought for a united, socialist and secular Lebanon, was killed in March 1977 when Walid was 28.

Walid, known as a fun-loving graduate of the American University in Beirut, was comfortable in jeans and upon taking command of the Druze faction still had a cutout of Brigitte Bardot on his apartment wall. He had never been active in politics, which had already taken its toll on his family with the political assassination of his aunt, grandfather, and several other ancestors.

He said then that his main mission would be to fight against the partition of Lebanon, observing, "My father was an obstacle to partition, and that's why they killed him." Of his own tenuous position, he said: "I have to live with death. One of the first things I have to do is to make my will."

Israel's Saguy said terrorism in Beirut has been effective in putting increasing pressure not only on the internal leaders but also on the United States and Israel. He added this note of caution: "I think it would be counterproductive for the United States to find evidence of terrorism by Syria The United States has to deal with them in a plan to get out of Lebanon. If not, the United States will have to deal with the Soviets on that issue."

The next article in this series will appear Friday.

ARTICLES APPEARED
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WHO ARE THEY?

People From Diverse Pasts and Faith Enter World of Cold-Blooded Political Murder

This is the fifth article in a series on terrorism by Christian Williams, Bob Woodward and Richard Harwood of The Washington Post.

Ibrahim Tawfiq Yousef, 49, serving an 18-year sentence in Israel's Ramla Prison, is in many ways typical of terrorists now in jail from London to Kuwait.

In 1969, Yousef was arrested in Switzerland after he and three comrades charged a taxiing El Al passenger jet with machine guns and hand grenades, wounding six passengers. Released from jail two years later in a prisoner exchange, Yousef returned to George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and he was arrested in 1976 while trying to smuggle a Soviet SA7 antiaircraft missile into Nairobi for what authorities said was to be another attack on an El Al plane.

Friendly, with a self-deprecating smile, Yousef is a well-behaved prisoner who continues to work on his English. In his life, a

personal tragedy (the death of his father in a bomb blast in Jerusalem in 1946) combined with the discovery of a system of belief (Marxism) to plunge him into a world of cold-blooded political murder.

Is Yousef a terrorist? "Of course not," he said in a recent interview. "I am a revolutionary." When his prison term is completed, he said, he plans to return to the Habash movement. "There are many ways to struggle. Wherever they put me, on whichever side—political, economic or military—I will work."

Yousef is a high school graduate from the town of Ramallah, on the Jordan River's West Bank, where at 17 he was intro-

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duced to Marxism, he said, by the "reality" of conditions in Palestinian camps. The bomb that killed his father and more than 90 other persons was set by the Irgun Zionist underground group, led by Menachem Begin, at British military headquarters in what is now the King David Hotel.

Yousef is married, with three children—including a daughter in Canada and a son who went to college in the United States and remained here. His wife is supported by his other son. Before his last arrest, Yousef worked as a radio operator in the Kuwait fire brigade.

His terrorist colleagues in the Middle East share no common social origin. George Habash, Yousef's leader, is a medical doctor, a graduate of the University of Beirut who was once "the guy every girl's mother wanted her to marry," according to a former U.S. ambassador to Lebanon. Nawaf Rosan, the leader of the 1982 Abu Nidal attack on Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London, is a former Iraqi army colonel. The terrorist who blew himself up in the December attack on the American Embassy in Kuwait was a mechanical engineer, and his 20 accused co-conspirators included four other engineers and a data processing supervisor from a Kuwait savings bank.

Their goals are as disparate as their backgrounds: They are Palestinians, demanding their own homeland and the elimination of the state of Israel; they are pan-Arab revolutionaries, demanding a united Arabia from North Africa to the Orient;

and their ranks also include religious fundamentalists who seek the imposition of an Islamic state and Islamic law throughout the region, without regard to secular national boundaries.

The wave of Islamic fundamentalism, which arose with Iran's revolution in 1979, now surges all the way to Ramla Prison.

There, a sweet-faced giant named Taffik Machadma, a Sunni Moslem, has adopted Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini as his leader, formed a cell of 30 Khomeini devotees and reformed and educated more than 100 other prisoners, his warden confirms. "We took criminals who use hash, who use opium, who use morphine. With the use of the Koran they began to pray," Machadma explained. "They soon didn't use anything. We also teach them to read and to write."

Machadma, now 28 and assigned as a prison cook, was arrested three years ago after he bought 180 hand grenades and 25 guns, organized 60 people into a group he calls "The Family Holy War," and prepared to wage attacks against the Israeli Army. He said he got the idea from the Koran. His aim is "to make here [in Israel] an Islamic government."

In conversation, the devout, soft-spoken Machadma, like his Marxist fellow inmate Yousef, demonstrates the social poise characteristic of many captured Moslem terrorists. His constant smile shows the humility and obedience prescribed by the Koran and also serves the ancient tradition of hospitality of both the Arab and Persian cultures. Like his fellow inmate Yousef, who does not believe in a God, Machadma was eager to explain his life's work and the death it might involve.

Yes, he said in answer to a question, "God ordered us not to kill ci-

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vilians in the Koran. But also that any man who puts in our way a bomb, to not let us go our way, we have to kill him. We have to put him beside, put him outside."

An example, he said, was the shah of Iran. "The shah and all of his family, they wanted to get in the way of Khomeini and the Islam group, so they had to be killed. And all his group also. Everyone who wants to stand in the way of Islamic groups in all ways, he must be put outside." That included Americans, he said.

Would Machadma, if so ordered by Khomeini, take a bomb into an American installation and blow himself up?

"If I am active in Iran and Khomeini orders me to, I will do it with a smile on my face," Machadma answered. "But he cannot order me now. He is not the imam [spiritual leader] of all the Moslems in the world. He is only the imam of Iran. [If he became] the imam of all the Moslems, and he ordered me, then I would do it."

There are millions of Moslems who find nothing in the Koran that inspires acts of terror, but Machadma said it was from his reading of it that he got the idea for "The Family Holy War"—including the need for 180 grenades and 25 guns. Asked what the Koran, written centuries ago, had to say about grenades, he explained: "Then, they

didn't know about bombs. But there was something else. It is written to bring everything that can be used as a force. Everything! All the kinds of forces! Each kind of force I can get, I have to get."

Who are the terrorists? They include Arabs and Iranians, Europeans and Jews. (The Jews call themselves TNT—Terror against Terror—and they demand that Israel use more extreme methods against radical Palestinians. Police believe it was Jewish terrorists who tried to dynamite the Dome of the Rock, an Islamic holy shrine, in Jerusalem last month.) The terrorists are Iranian Shiites and Abu Nidal assassins recruited in Iraq and Syria, they are men and women, educated and ignorant, vengeful or convinced of their politics or guided by what they consider the illuminations of God.

The American response to terrorist acts, however they are justified by their perpetrators, frequently is one of shocked innocence. To Said Rajaie Khorassani, however, America is not innocent, but ignorant—and its posture of opposition to terrorism a national hypocrisy. Khorassani is the delegate of the Mission of Iran to the United Nations in New York, a former philosophy professor in Iran's Tabriz Province who worked with revolutionary students after the seizing of the American hostages.

"Who are the terrorists?" Khorassani said incredulously in a four-hour interview in his New York office in December. "You could be. I could be. Anybody could do it. There are individuals who when they look at the world see only the dirt and the treachery and the awful things, and they throw themselves into destroying it. The rest of humanity reacts to that."

"People are not like a mountain of stones!" Khorassani said. "Their reaction is overwhelming. These terrorists, you call them, stand out, and they surprise you. This is because 10 or 15 years ago there was a calm international atmosphere, or so it seems to you. But in fact the neocolonialism was overwhelming the

people, so the people struck back. But you were unable to see the people at all! During this period, the U.S. was in the forefront of imperialism. The U.S.S.R. was in the forefront of another kind of imperialism."

Yes, Khorassani repeated, he could be a terrorist himself. "Sure. Why not? We are killing ourselves like that. In Islam, it's a personal commitment, not a state commitment. You [Americans] can easily justify arms to Vietnam, but not this. When you come to our country, we have to defend ourselves. The people do not have battleships or supersonic planes. When we say you are arrogant... this is what we mean. It's because you have great power and you think that you can just use it, anyway you want to, and nothing will happen. But you see, something will happen. It is happening."

In December, President Reagan told a private meeting of Citizens for America that 1,000 terrorists, many of them Iranian, were assem-

bled in Lebanon to conduct suicide bombing missions. Last month, U.S. warships in the eastern Mediterranean were put on alert against "kamikaze" airplane attacks. In Washington, the fear of suicide attacks led to the erection of barricades around the State Department and other buildings.

Human bombs, however, get limited credence in the Middle East.

"There are many fewer suicide squads than you think. The Shia aren't crazy, and they don't want to die any more than you do," said Dr. Ariel Merari, the foremost Israeli student of terrorism. His Project for the Study of Political Terrorism at Tel Aviv University keeps a staff of 13 busy collating and tracking each known terrorist for entry into a computer.

"My reasoning is simple," Merari said. "Between Sept. 15, 1981, and now, there were 28 major attempts by terrorists. Of these, five were suicide attacks: the April car bombing

of the American Embassy in Beirut; the Oct. 23 attacks on the Marines and the French in Lebanon; the attack on Tyre; and the Dec. 12 attack on the American Embassy in Kuwait. Suicide attacks are by far the most impressive. You will note that in Kuwait, they tried to do 11 attacks at once, but only the suicide attack really succeeded. If they had more suicide bombers they would have used them. They do not. There simply are not thousands of heart-pounding Shiites ready to charge to their trucks."

According to Merari, suicide as a terrorist method is in fact not new, or notably courageous. "For example, 10 IRA [Irish Republican Army] men starved themselves to death in prison in 1981. That takes 50 to 60 days, and they gradually became blind, and their mothers were brought in to try to talk them out of it. That is much more impressive than simply driving a truck bomb to its target, especially since the explosion is probably remote-controlled anyhow."

As for reports that Iranian soldiers in the war with Iraq have voluntarily walked onto known mine fields, he said: "That sort of valor is common in war. Look at Gallipoli. Look at France, where the best educated British youth climbed out of

the trenches over their own dead and into the machine guns, following orders."

Conventional warfare, no matter how horrible, follows a western tradition. Terrorism does not. It requires martyrs. The Shiite sect of Islam traces its system of beliefs to the original martyr Hussein, murdered in the 7th century. In Europe, too, there are martyrs—of the church, of inquisitions, of stake burnings. But Americans are less accustomed to martyrs. This culture tends to celebrate the meaning of a life, rather than the meaning of a death.

To a certain extent, it is a matter of cultural vocabulary.

"The concept of human bombs is not inconceivable to [some Islamic

fundamentalists]," said Prof. Moshe Sharon, head of the Institute of Asian and African Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. "You cannot understand the East with terms taken from a western dictionary. That's like describing a baseball game with cricket terminology. Friday is not the Sabbath, the Koran is not the Bible. And suicide is not what we think it is.

"I will go further and say that western society is guilt-oriented, and eastern is shame-oriented, meaning that the most important thing is to not bring shame on your family. The Koran says be obedient to Allah and your leaders, and all derives from that. We doubt, but they believe. So we developed democratic institutions, but they developed obedience.

"I'll tell you a story," Prof. Sharon said. "You know, after the massacres at Sabra and Shatila camps, we conducted a big investigation and aired everything in the newspapers and there was a lot of soul searching in Israel. Well, the Arabs couldn't believe we did that—they thought we had humiliated ourselves. An Arab friend said to me, 'In Israel you do not have democracy, you have *fauda*. That's the Arabic word for anarchy.'"

There is no anarchy in Ramla Prison, where under the watchful eye of Israeli warden Yoseph Pollak, Ibrahim Yousef told his tale of commitment.

He went to Switzerland to attack the El Al plane in 1969, he said, for the propaganda value: "This operation was a long time ago, but then our case was unknown in the world, and we wanted to make some [incident] to show the whole world there is a Palestinian people who want to live."

Asked why he was released after two years, he replied with a laugh. "Good question!" According to Israeli files, upon rejoining Habash, he trained and traveled in Damascus and South Yemen, and ventured as far as North Korea and Vietnam on missions.

Of his 1976 mission to Nairobi, he said: "I was just to take [the SA7 missile] from one man, to give to another. I don't know where he was going with it, and I don't care."

Yousef, who said he has been treated well in prison ("That's the warden's job"), has only one complaint: that he wound up in Israel at all. "We were arrested in Kenya. Tortured by Kenya police, with cigarettes up [the] nose, and kicked in [the groin] and especially [the] kidneys. Then after 10 days, Kenya police say, 'OK, you're finished, you can go.' Then we are taken to [the] airport with bags on our heads so journalists cannot see us and then in the plane I feel like a pin in my arm and then I don't know where I am. After three or four days I wake up, and it is a small room, and I am being questioned, and it is in Israel. After 14 months they brought us to Ramla and put us in the Eichmann Tower, where [Nazi mass murderer Adolf] Eichmann was held, and where we stay for 19 months." Later, he said, he was released to the general population of the prison. He feels it was wrong that he was brought to Israel at all. "I did something in Kenya," he said. "Why send me to Israel?"

Not all the terrorists in Ramla remain committed to violence, however.

Yosef A. Mansert, a thin, ironic figure in a faded field jacket, said he has now rejected violence. In 1971, Mansert helped place a bomb on a bus in Tel Aviv. The explosion injured three people. Mansert was captured and sentenced to life in prison. He would not plant a bomb again,

he said. "If anybody told me to do that now, I believe I would convince them not to do it." The Palestinian cause, he said, "will not be achieved by these actions, because we need the help of the Israeli people. If we work against these people, we will push them away from us so we will wind up working against ourselves."

The final article in this series will appear Sunday.

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U.S. Ponders Morality of Striking Back

THE TERROR FACTOR

PART 6

This article is the last in a series on terrorism by Richard Harwood, Bob Woodward and Christian Williams of The Washington Post.

In Saudi Arabia on Friday the 13th of January, a young prince with a half-smile on his face sipped tea and discoursed on the affliction of terrorism.

"These small countries," he said, "know that the only people who have stopped the American superpower have been terrorists. They stopped you in Vietnam. They stopped you in Iran. They are stopping you in Lebanon. That is why they attack you. It is the only way."

American novelist Don DeLillo put the matter in another context. One of his fictional characters says of the terrorist phenomenon:

"America is the world's living myth. There's no sense of wrong when you kill an American or blame America for some local disaster. This is our function, to be character types, to embody recurring themes that people can use to comfort themselves, justify themselves. . . . We're here to accommodate. Whatever people need we provide. . . . People expect us to absorb the impact of their grievances."

The impact of those grievances on American diplomacy, politics and life has not been inconsequential. The coffins of dead marines laid out in a warehouse in Dover, Del., are convenient symbols for the personal traumas the country has endured. But terrorist acts reach beyond fresh graves and the grief of mothers to the fabric of the governmental system.

It may not be entirely true that a mob of Iranian students drove Jimmy Carter from the White House, but they helped. History may not record that a fanatical truck driver in Beirut and anonymous killers in the right-wing "death squads" of El Salvador possessed the power to wreck Ronald Reagan's policies in the Middle East and Central America.

But they have hurt those policies and may yet trouble this president when the election comes around in November.

The speaker of the Iranian parliament was astute as well as hyperbolic last year when he declared: "The death of one U.S. marine is better for us than if 200 Phalangists are killed. . . . If the Moslem people of Lebanon fire one bullet hitting a French soldier, then that is better for us than the dropping of a hydrogen bomb by any of the so-called Islamic countries."

Like the Arabian prince, he was saying that the American political system is easily taken hostage by the "weak." If they are right, as seems to be the case, this is one of the momentous international developments of the 20th century.

A democratic society, with its partisan passions and imperatives, may be incapable of absorbing these wounds. Closed societies—the Soviet Union and Cuba, to be precise—can shrug off the terror in Afghanistan or Angola.

President Reagan, a week after taking office, naively declared that he would put an end to all that:

"Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution. We live in an era of limits to our powers. Well, let it be understood there are limits to our patience."

But each year he has been in office, the number and severity of terrorist acts against Americans, American institutions and American policies has increased.

Worldwide, terrorists killed more Americans and inflicted more political humiliations on the United States in 1983 than in any year in our history.

The "swift and effective retribution" promised by Reagan three years ago has not occurred. One result, of no great consequence, is that the president is now being ridiculed by some of the intelligence operatives he has sent out to deal with the problem.

In Beirut a few weeks ago, one of these operatives—in the presence of another American official—mocked the administration's "retaliation" against Iran for its suspected involvement in the bombing attacks against the American Embassy and the Marines in Lebanon.

The "retaliation" was nothing more than adding Iran to the list of "terrorist" countries ineligible for unrestricted imports from the United States.

"Golly, gee," the official said with disgust, "we really showed 'em this time, didn't we?"

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His solution is terror directed at terrorists and their sponsors:

"We have got to get our hands dirty, really dirty." Then, appropriating a line out of an old Bengal Lancers movie, he made a modest proposal: "Cut off a few Moslem heads, stick them in the belly of a pig, deliver the package to their comrades with a message: 'You aren't going to Paradise. You're going to be nothing but pig----.'"

"But, ethically, our society won't do that kind of thing. We're too moralistic and legalistic."

Perhaps. But very tough talk is now being heard in Washington at the highest levels of the government. A serious debate is underway over proposals to strike back at terrorists, using terrorist methods—"hit squads" or "surgical strikes" by military or CIA teams.

That such a debate should occur is another measure of the impact that terrorism is having on our society. It produces frustration, anger, fear and symptoms of a nation under siege.

In various foreign capitals today—Riyadh, Kuwait, Beirut and in Latin America and Europe—American embassies, once the most open diplomatic facilities in the world, have become fortresses.

They are surrounded by steel, concrete and sandbag barriers. Tanks and armored cars are parked at gates and nearby street intersections. Visitors pass through metal detectors.

Windows are freshly coated with Mylar to reduce flying shards of glass. Squads of hard-eyed security men, armed with automatic weapons and rocket launchers, wait in the wings.

In Saudi Arabia, the deputy chief of mission, Roscoe (Rocky) Sudarth, jokes about his high-priced government car—an \$85,000 Chevrolet armored against bullets and mines. In such places, diplomats and their families live with fear.

They are taught how to stay alive by changing their driving habits, the places they shop and jog and have picnics. Some of their children write school essays on the subject.

The fear has come home, too. Baricades have gone up at the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon. You can no longer wander freely through the Capitol.

These precautions have been taken "rarely if ever because of a specific, credible threat," explained a senior Secret Service official, but rather they "grow out of the general climate we are in."

Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) worries aloud about that climate, saying that 1984 may be a year for terrorist tragedy in the United States.

"Spectacular" targets are available, and not merely the president. The political parties will hold their national conventions this summer, there will be a World's Fair in New Orleans, and one of the most inviting targets of all will be the Summer Olympics in Los Angeles.

The apprehension over the Olympic Games is reflected in the recruitment of more than 17,000 policemen and private security guards for what was intended to be a joyous competition within the family of man.

But the history of this planet in recent decades has changed all that. "Security" and "prudence" have become universal watchwords at the same time that the realization has sunk in that there are really no places to hide.

Diplomats are shot down almost routinely in the streets of Paris. Christmas shoppers at a London department store are torn apart by a terrorist bomb. Four members of the South Korean Cabinet are murdered by North Korean bombers at a memorial service in Rangoon. An Iranian exile is blown away in his home in a quiet Bethesda neighborhood. Armenian killers stalk Turkish officials throughout the world. A rocket is fired into the federal office building in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Bombs are detonated in the Capitol building of the United States.

It is all done in the name of "politics" and frequently the actors are indeed the "weak" of the world, groups whose causes are so lacking in popular support that terror, anger and revenge are all that is left to them. That situation is being seen in the United States today where, according to the FBI, two-thirds of the terrorist incidents last year were carried out by remnants and spiritual allies of the old Weather Underground of the 1960s (operating under new banners) and by left-wing and right-wing Latins, such as the anti-Castro band, Omega 7.

One public figure who maintains a calm attitude toward terrorism in the United States is the FBI director, William Webster. He is fond of saying that there is no "rising tide of terrorism here, only a rising tide of concern." The statistics are comforting—42 incidents in 1981, 51 in 1982 and 31 last year, most of them bombings and most of them relatively harmless.

The diminished terrorist activity in this country reflects, in part, some FBI successes in penetrating and rounding up Puerto Rican nationalist and Armenian terrorist cells.

This kind of work—penetration and the gathering of credible intelligence—is considered the best defense against terrorism, and considerable manpower, money and time is going into it.

The CIA has had some successes along these lines. A notable example was the discovery in 1979 of a plot by Libya to assassinate America's ambassador to Egypt, Hermann Eilts. President Carter sent a cable directly to the Libyan leader, Muammar Quaddafi, warning him off.

But the lack of hard intelligence remains one of the weaknesses in the terrorist defenses of all countries, as the events of 1983 have shown. This weakness underlies the reluctance and inability of the United States to accuse countries such as Iran and Syria of direct complicity in some of those events.

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"We could not," a leading State Department official observed, "make such an ironclad case that we could go to Congress and ask for a declaration of war."

Nor could the administration make even a persuasive circumstantial case that the Soviet Union and the celebrated KGB mastermind the terrorism of our times.

Nowhere in Europe or in the Middle East in the course of reporting for this series did we encounter any intelligence officers or dealers in rumor who possessed significant information of Soviet involvement in terrorist enterprises.

That is also true of past and present CIA officials: suspicious are abundant but the hard evidence is not there. Said former CIA director Stansfield Turner:

"There is little evidence that the KGB or Soviets are the motivating force behind terrorism. I would fault the Soviets in a negative way for not distancing themselves from the terrorist support countries. The Soviets are not dumb enough to get involved in supporting indiscriminate terrorism because it could be turned against them.

"This is not to clear the Soviets of involvement and say they are clean. They are unscrupulous and will do anything that served a specific interest. But the borderline between terrorism and revolution, wars of liberation, is hard to define. You'll never get the Soviets to denounce revolution and revolutionary support. That is an important distinction."

Terrorism has an internal logic of its own. It may require external assistance in the form of weapons, munitions and travel documents. It may require safe havens and sanctuaries, such as the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon or the southern suburbs of Beirut or the nations of Iran and Syria.

But the internal logic is decisive, a logic that teaches, in the case of the United States at least, that a terrorist act is often very cost effective.

The seizure of hostages in Iran and the bombing of the Marine facility in Lebanon are examples of virtually cost-free acts—for the perpetrators—that caused deep wounds to the American psyche and reverberated throughout the world.

One of the curious psychic responses to such events is self-doubt, a kind of Patty Hearst syndrome in which the victim assumes a vague burden of guilt. One of novelist DeLillo's characters expressed it well:

"I thought I sometimes detected . . . in Americans some mild surprise that it hadn't happened sooner, that the men with the six-day beards hadn't come much earlier to burn them out, or uproot the plumbing, or walk off with the prayer rugs they'd bargained for in the souk and bought as investments—for the crimes of drinking whiskey, making money, jogging in shiny suits along the boulevards at dusk. . . . Wasn't

there a sense, we Americans felt, in which we had it coming?"

Rage and the primordial instinct to strike back are other emotional responses, as illustrated by the present debate within the administration over "belly of the pig" proposals.

The centrist view, which usually prevails in this country, is neither guilt nor an overpowering desire for revenge. An unnamed diplomat recently was quoted in a magazine as having said of terrorism: "It's like living with the bomb. You know it's out there but you can't worry about it every day."

Howard Bane, recently retired after 40 years in the CIA, said he is often told by European intelligence officers that "you bloody Americans are too damned moral to deal with these people [terrorists]; you've got too damned many scruples."

"Maybe so," said Bane. "But I think we can live with that for another couple of hundred years."