

13 May 1985

Revised Version

REACTION TO WASHINGTON POST STORY ON LEBANESE COUNTERTERRORIST ACTION

The Central Intelligence Agency never conducted any training of Lebanese security forces related to the events described in THE WASHINGTON POST's article on 12 May 1985. It also had no foreknowledge of the bombing incident which took place on 8 March 1985 which was mentioned in the article.

The Central Intelligence Agency scrupulously observes the requirements to keep all the Congressional oversight committees appropriately informed.

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ON PAGE A-35

WASHINGTON POST
16 May 1985

Shultz Labels Report By Post 'Blind Alley'

Secretary of State George P. Shultz said yesterday that a report in The Washington Post about a U.S. counterterrorist program that was terminated after an unauthorized car-bomb blast in Lebanon is "a blind alley."

"It's absolutely a blind alley . . . a story that's created a big hubbub about something that's not correct," Shultz said.

Questioned further, he said, "I don't want to get into it because I just haven't been able to inform myself well enough."

Until now he had declined all comment on the story. When someone mentioned the Central Intelligence Agency's denial as being pro forma, Shultz responded, "If the CIA denies something, it's denied."

AS PUBLISHED

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WASHINGTON TIMES
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COMMENTARY

CORD MEYER

The CIA appears to be more a victim of sensational journalism rather than an indirect accessory to a mass murder.



BUM RAP FOR THE CIA?

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After a headline story and a lead editorial in *The Washington Post* last week charging the CIA with indirect involvement in the murderous March 8 car bombing in Beirut, chants of "death to America" punctuated the funeral orations for the victims, and the State Department alerted U.S. Embassies in the Middle East to the danger of violent retaliation against Americans.

From the welter of accusations, denials, and explanations left behind by this journalistic coup, the real sequence of events is gradually beginning to emerge. As the roles and motives of the principal players become more clearly understood, the CIA appears to be more a victim of sensational journalism rather than an indirect accessory to a mass murder.

In contrast to the *Post's* implication of CIA involvement, all U.S. officials with knowledge of these events from Secretary of State George Shultz on down are unanimous in denying that the agency had any connection, direct or indirect, with the Lebanese intelligence team that arranged the car bombing.

All informed American officials agree that the CIA did not in any way train the Lebanese who planned and carried out the bombing nor did it have advance knowledge of the event. Typical of the official reaction is the comment by Robert E. Oakley, the director of the State Department's office for counterterrorism, who found the *Post's* handling of the story "outrageous."

But in retrospect it is easy to see how the *Post's* investigative reporters were led astray by startling discoveries they made after the bombing. For example, they unearthed for the first time the fact that President Reagan had secretly directed the CIA last December to train and support Lebanese intelligence teams for the purpose of using violent action to pre-empt and abort terrorist activity aimed at American targets.

As permitted by law in cases of extreme sensitivity, this presidential finding was reported not to the whole membership of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, but only to their chairmen and vice chairmen. In spite of such extra precautions, this highly-secret information was somehow leaked to the *Post* either from the Congress or from the executive branch, and the leak has fueled a growing demand for a radical review of the whole congressional oversight process.

Meanwhile, with evidence of this top-secret presidential directive in hand, it was natural for the *Post* reporters to assume at least some indirect agency connection with the bombing attack on one of the suspected terrorist strongholds. But in fact no such connection existed for two separate reasons.

First, the top professional intelligence officers in the CIA had long been skeptical of any attempt to recruit and train anti-terrorist Lebanese hit squads for fear they might get out of control in the anarchy of a disintegrating society. Only very reluctantly did these intelligence pros accept the new responsibility, and they would have preferred concentrating on the counterintelligence penetration of the terrorist organizations as a better way of ensuring an effective defense.

Moreover, once the presidential order had been issued, the agency operators in the field found the Lebanese security services so fractured by political and religious rivalries that no recruitment or training had been undertaken by March 8 when the car bomb exploded. In a sense, this event was looked upon by CIA officers as a reprieve because it vividly demonstrated all the dangers of indiscriminate violence they had been predicting.

In the aftermath of the Beirut massacre, the presidential finding in favor of pre-emptive counterterrorism was rescinded and the agency let off the hook for having to carry it out.

One other facet of the American intelligence relationship with Lebanon may have misled the *Post* reporters. For more than 20 years, the CIA maintained a routine liaison relationship with Lebanese intelligence as with the intelligence services of other non-communist countries. An exchange of visits and some training was involved but this had nothing to do with recruiting and training counter-terror hit squads.

In the light of this background, it does seem that the *Post* story was inflated to suggest conclusions well beyond what the facts could support and that the CIA got a bum rap. In the process, American lives may have been needlessly endangered.

In fairness to the top editors of the *Post*, it should be pointed out that the press spokesman for the CIA strongly objected to the story when it was read to him 24 hours before publication. In the absence of CIA Director William Casey, the agency,

however, passed up the opportunity it was given to appeal up the line where the judgment might have been different once all the facts were on the table.

Cord Meyer is a nationally syndicated columnist.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1

ARAB HIJACKERS FORCE T.W.A. JET TO FLY TO BEIRUT

ONE KILLING IS REPORTED

104 Americans Are on Airliner — Gunmen Said to Belong to the Islamic Holy War

By JOSEPH BERGER

Arab gunmen commandeered a Trans World Airlines jetliner with 104 Americans and 49 other people aboard yesterday and forced it to fly on a twisting course from Athens to Beirut to Algiers and then back to Beirut, where the pilot said one passenger was shot to death.

Minutes after the plane landed for a second time in Beirut, according to The Associated Press, the pilot radioed the control tower there: "He just killed a passenger! He just killed a passenger!"

One of the hijackers then got on the radio and told the control tower: "You see. You now believe. There will be another within five minutes."

Islamic Terrorist Group

The hijackers, whose number was put by passengers released during the odyssey at either two or three, were reported to be members of the terrorist group Islamic Holy War, which took responsibility for the suicide bombings of the American Embassy and the United States Marine compound in Beirut in 1983. More than 300 people died in those blasts.

There were earlier reports that one man had been shot and that several passengers had been beaten when the plane stopped in Beirut the first time, but these were contradicted by other reports that said that no passengers were hurt. During the first stop in Beirut the hijackers freed at least 19 passengers, most of them women and children, and they released at least 18 more in Algiers. Most of those released were said to be Americans.

A Threat of Executions

While in Algiers, the gunmen threatened to execute the remaining passen-

NEW YORK TIMES
15 June 1985

gers and crew unless Israel released Shiite Moslem prisoners captured in Lebanon, the Algerian press agency said. But they did not carry out their threat before the plane, T.W.A. flight 847, took off once again for Beirut.

At 2:20 A.M. today in Beirut (7:20 P.M. yesterday New York time), the jet landed in Beirut. Air controllers in Larnaca, Cyprus, said that before landing, the pilot radioed to say he had only 50 minutes of fuel left.

Hijackers Press Pilot

"We want to determine whether there are any people on the ground at Beirut airport," the pilot was quoted as saying. "We are exhausted, we have been flying all day, and low on fuel." He said the hijackers "are pressing us to know what are the circumstances at Beirut airport."

The hijacking yesterday was the third this week in the Middle East. The Beirut airport was involved in all three.

A man captured at the Athens airport reportedly confessed to being an accomplice to the hijacking today and said he was a member of Islamic Holy War.

The man, identified as Ali Atwa, a 21-year-old Lebanese, reportedly told authorities in Athens that two gunmen had seized the plane after smuggling two grenades and two 9-millimeter pistols through X-ray machines at the Athens airport by wrapping the weapons in fiberglass insulation.

He identified the two men as Ahmed Karbeia and Ali Yunes, both 20-year-old Shiite Moslems, who he said had come with him from Cairo and spent the night at the Athens airport.

The volatility of the situation became apparent as the Boeing 727 approached the Beirut airport for the first time. When the control tower at first denied permission for the plane to land, the pilot made a frantic appeal that was recorded by journalists.

"They are beating the passengers, they are beating the passenger!" he said. "They are threatening to kill them now. We must have that fuel now, immediately!" Cries and groans that sounded as if someone was being beaten could be heard in the background.

While in Algiers, the gunmen asked that Michael H. Newlin, the United States Ambassador there, be brought to the airport. It was not clear what role he played in the release of the passengers. In Washington, President Reagan said American officials were "doing everything that can be done" to gain the release of the Americans, but he declined to provide details.

Passengers From Illinois

Among the passengers were a group of at least 24 Roman Catholics from Il-

linois who were returning from a visit to Israel, according to Jackie Soucek, parish secretary of St. Margaret Mary Roman Catholic Church in Algonquin, Ill.

Flight 847, carrying eight crew members and 145 passengers, left Cairo yesterday morning for Athens, where it was scheduled to pick up passengers and continue on to Rome. In Athens, 10 passengers boarded, including two well-dressed Arab men in their early 20's carrying leather suitcases and a nylon traveling bag, according to a police spokesman.

Within minutes after takeoff, the police said, two armed Arab men rose from their seats in the rear of the plane. One of the men approached the pilot and threatened to blow up the jet. He ordered the pilot to divert the flight from Rome to Beirut, a 700-mile journey across the Mediterranean Sea in the opposite direction.

According to passengers who were later freed, the armed men — some passengers said there were three — directed them to put their hands behind their heads and seized passports as they went down the aisles.

Frances Reynolds, 67 years old, a passenger from the Chicago area, said the hijackers, "all looked Arabic and they had beards."

She said, "They kept yelling 'Down! Down!' in Arabic. One of the stewardesses translated for us. The stewardess said they had a bag of grenades and were going to blow the plane up."

The hijackers, she said, "were beating people on the head." She said, "I didn't see it, but I could hear the thumps."

As the plane approached the airport, the control tower told the pilot: "You have not permission to land Beirut Airport. It's up to you and to the hijackers to go on."

"Beirut," the pilot radioed back, "the hijacker has pulled the pin on his hand grenade. He will land at Beirut. He is desperate."

"We must, I repeat, we must land at Beirut. We must land at Beirut. No alternative."

Beirut officials had at first blocked the runway with buses, but removed them. The plane touched down not far from the burned wreckage of a Jordanian airliner that had been seized Wednesday by men believed to be Shiite Moslems. The Jordanian plane was blown up on the ground after its 66 passengers and crew members were released unharmed.

Hijacker Reads Statement

The jet's first stop in Beirut, which lasted two and a half hours, appeared to be primarily for refueling. During the stop one of the gunmen read a statement in Arabic over the aircraft's radio outlining their demands.

These included the release of Shiite Moslems captured by Israel while its troops were in Lebanon; international

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condemnation of Israeli military actions in southern Lebanon; condemnation of United States support for Israel and of United States actions in the Arab world; and condemnation of a car bombing in Beirut March 8 that killed 80 people. Published reports have said the bombing was carried out by a that may have had training from the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

The Israelis are holding about 800 Lebanese Shiite Moslems at a prison near the port of Haifa. The prisoners were arrested on charges of carrying out terrorist activity against Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon. The hijackers asked that the prisoners be transported to Sidon, Lebanon.

The released passengers, mostly elderly women and children, were permitted to slide down the plane's yellow emergency chute, according to reporters at the scene. They were flown on a Middle East Airlines plane to Larnaca, Cyprus.

There, discussing the first reported shooting, one of the freed women, Irma Garza of Laredo, Tex., said the hijackers had shot in the neck a passenger she described only as black man. She said the man did not appear to be seriously injured, according to The Associated Press.

Mrs. Garza was freed in Beirut along with her daughter, Irma Trautmann, and two of the daughter's children, Katherine and Susan. her husband, Vincente, and her son-in-law, Robert Trautmann, reportedly remained on the plane.

The T.W.A. plane, with about 130 passengers and crew aboard, took off again, this time heading west across the Mediterranean for Algiers, a voyage of 1,900 miles.

Authorities at Houari Boumedienne International Airport there gave the hijackers permission to land because they were told the T.W.A. jet was again low on fuel, the official Algerian press agency said.

The plane touched down at 3:30 P.M. at the Algiers airport and came to a halt a mile from the air terminal. Fire-fighting equipment was taken to the runways and flights into and out of Algiers were blocked.

The gunmen this time threatened to "execute" the remaining passengers unless Israel released Shiite Moslem prisoners. A series of tense negotiations were conducted between the Algerian authorities and the hijackers, with Ambassador Newlin consulted at various stages. Reports in Algiers said Chadli Benjedid, the Algerian President, received a letter from President Reagan about the hostage situation, but its contents could not be learned.

After a time, two buses approached. At about 8 P.M., United Press International reported, the buses drove back to an airport lounge carrying 18 passengers.

Other dispatches put the number at 20, and said they included 17 men, 2 women and a child. Many were in tears, the agency said, though none was injured. In New York, T.W.A. said 21 passengers were released in Algiers.

A half-hour later, after a five-hour stop in Algiers, the Boeing 727 taxied onto a runway and took off.

Reuters reported from Beirut that Islamic Holy War was taking responsibility for the hijacking and said it proved the organization could strike against "U.S. imperialism" at will.

A United States official told The Associated Press in Algeria that unconfirmed information indicated the passengers on the plane included at least 104 Americans, 5 Greeks, 3 Australians, 2 Lebanese, and one Sudanese and one Mexican. The nationalities of the others were not known.

The hijacking was the third in the Middle East in three days. Hours after the Jordanian plane was hijacked Wednesday, a Lebanese 707 jet carrying 80 passengers and 6 crew members that had landed from Cyprus was taken over on the ground by a Palestinian who said he was retaliating for the Shiites' hijacking. After he held three crew members hostage, authorities granted his demand to be flown to the Jordanian capital, Amman.

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Nation

TIME/JUNE 24, 1985

COVER STORY

Terror Aboard Flight 847

Muslim hijackers hold Americans hostage on a murderous journey

Millions around the world watched their television sets or listened to their radios as the horrific drama unfolded. "He has pulled a hand-grenade pin and is ready to blow up the aircraft if he has to. We must, I repeat, we must land at Beirut. We must land at Beirut. No alternative." After much delay, the curious, grudging reply of the Beirut control tower: "Very well. Land. Land quietly. Land quietly." Then another desperate plea: "They are beating the passengers. They are threatening to kill the passengers. We want fuel now. Immediately. Five minutes at most, or he is going to kill the passengers." After that, another, more excited, more hostile voice, in broken English: "The plane is booby-trapped. If anyone approaches, we will blow it up. Either refueling the plane or blowing it up. No alternative."

After airport authorities complied, the stricken plane took off from Beirut, where it had landed after having been hijacked out of Athens. Hours later, it landed in Algiers, then took off again and returned late that night to Beirut, the tension rising, the crew bone-weary. And minutes after landing, the senseless slaying of a hostage, and a harsh voice over the plane's radio: "You see? You now believe it. There will be another in five minutes," and the nightmare rolled on.

In the beginning, the hijackers were outnumbered by their captives 153 to 2, and U.S. authorities tended to believe that the terrorists would soon be overwhelmed by exhaustion if nothing else. By Sunday morning, however, with the plane on the ground in Algiers, the ranks of the hijackers had swelled to between twelve and 15, and all but 32 male American passengers and crewmen had been released. The gunmen set a 10 a.m. deadline (5 a.m. E.D.T.) for their demands to be met, but then inexplicably left Algiers more than an hour ahead of time. Once again, their destination was Beirut. On landing there, they demanded the release of 50 fellow Shi'ite Muslims currently detained in Israel, such a gesture was justified, the hijackers said, by their freeing of three American men the night before in Algiers. The terrorists had been seeking the

release of 700 Shi'ites from Israeli custody, and this appeared to be the first step in realizing that goal. If Israel and presumably the U.S. balked, declared the hijackers, "our blood will be a witness."

Tension and deep fatigue had marked the TWA jetliner's third arrival at Beirut. Not only was the crew frazzled, but the plane was thought to be in need of maintenance. Beirut authorities had again tried to refuse permission to land, but had been overruled by the hijackers and by a desperate-sounding pilot who said he had only five minutes' worth of fuel. Even as he prepared to land, Shi'ite militiamen around the airport fired their weapons out to sea, at what they claimed was an Israeli gunboat. The lives of remaining passengers and crew were obviously still in danger. But particularly disturbing was the news that on the plane's second stop in Beirut the previous night, some six or eight passengers with Jewish-sounding surnames had been hastily removed from the aircraft in the darkness. In effect, this meant that the well-organized hijackers had created a hostage crisis within a hostage crisis, and there was no end in sight.

For the U.S., it was no ordinary sky-jacking, no incident involving some troubled soul who needed to be jollied or sweet-talked or strong-armed out of a free ride to

Havana or Timbuktu. It was an American plane, Trans World Airlines' Flight 847 on its leg from Athens to Rome, with 153 passengers and crew members aboard, at least 100 of whom were Americans. Most important, the hijackers were identified by an accomplice as members of Islamic Jihad (or Holy War), the shadowy Shi'ite Muslim organization that is regarded as a sort of umbrella for various fundamentalist terror groups operating in Lebanon and other Middle East countries. Loyal to Iran's revolutionary ruler, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and quite possibly subsidized and directed by the Iranian leadership, Islamic Jihad and its confederates are blamed for many of the suicide bombing missions that have afflicted American and other Western military bases and diplomatic missions in the Middle East in the past two years.

On a political level, the hijackers of Flight 847 called for the release not only of the Lebanese Shi'ites still held by Israel, but of a few others imprisoned in Cyprus and Kuwait. They also demanded the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon (a pullout has been under way since January and, except for patrols and forays back into the border area, is now virtually complete) and international condemnation of the U.S. and Israel. In a broader sense, the Shi'ites of Lebanon, newly radicalized by the violence that has plagued their country, particularly since the Israeli invasion of June 1982, are seeking a fairer shake after generations of neglect and discrimination by Lebanon's wealthier and more powerful Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims. Beyond all that, the Shi'ite fanatical fringe, inspired by the example of the Iranian revolution, wants to destroy the last vestiges of Western "decadence" in the Islamic world, particularly the presence of the U.S., that "Great Satan." To accomplish this goal, these extremists have demonstrated that they are willing and even eager to employ savagery and mass murder.

This was the first hijacking of an American airliner in the Middle East since Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, and the Administration was deeply disturbed. It was convinced that the hijackers of Flight 847 were in the same league as the ones who seized a Kuwaiti airliner last December, took it to Tehran and eventually killed two American passengers. That incident ended when the Iranians sent a platoon of security men aboard the plane dressed as a maintenance crew. The hijackers were arrested, but there is no evidence

that they were ever brought to justice.

As Flight 847 zigzagged around the Mediterranean, the Administration faced the vexing question of what it should, or could, do to respond to the crisis. By 9 a.m. Friday, a working group chaired by Robert Oakley, chief of the State Department's office for combatting terrorism, had gathered next to Secretary of State George Shultz's office in the State Department's antiterrorism suite. The group set to work on a 24-hour watch, monitoring events, establishing communication lines, serving as liaison

to the various foreign governments involved, soothing the families of hostages and working out options for U.S. action. That evening, the Administration dispatched antiterrorist Delta Force units from West Germany and Fort Bragg, N.C., to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean; the 40- to 50-man units are trained in such skills as counterintelligence and commando operations, but they have never been used to storm a pirated airliner.

When asked later in the day what the U.S. was doing to help, the President replied, "Everything that can be done." But when asked if it were true that Washington had threatened to retaliate against Iran if any U.S. hostages were harmed by Islamic fundamentalists, Reagan said flatly, "I can't answer that."

In fact, Shultz had warned Iran months ago that if any of the Americans kidnaped in Beirut were executed by its Lebanese surrogates, Iran would suffer the consequences. Precisely what that means would have to be carefully determined, but the U.S. has long since learned that it is difficult to retaliate against so amorphous an enemy as the Lebanese fanatics. Their headquarters and even their whereabouts are hard to pin down, and their precise links with Iran are not easy to define. As Friday turned to Saturday and the ordeal continued, the President remained in touch with the situation from his weekend retreat at Camp David, telling National Security Adviser Robert

McFarlane: "Let's do all we can to support the Algerians. Our main objective is to get those people out safely." Shultz canceled a trip to Evanston, Ill., where he had planned to accept an honorary degree from Northwestern University. On Sunday, Shultz and McFarlane were back at their desks tracking the ominous new trends in the crisis. The President remained at Camp David, but was due to return to the White House Sunday afternoon.


The hijacking of Flight 847 had begun Friday morning when the plane, a Boeing 727 that had taken off from Cairo two hours earlier, landed at Athens and took on additional passengers. Among them were 24 members of three Roman Catholic churches from towns in northeastern Illinois, who had spent a fortnight visiting the Holy Land. Also among them were two well-dressed young Arabs carrying shoulder bags who had arrived from Cairo the day before. Along with a third man, they spent the night in the airport lounge, waiting to board the TWA plane. As it turned out, only two of the men managed to get seats on the crowded flight; the third, after arguing with TWA officials, was forced to stay behind. He was later arrested at the airport by Greek police

and identified as Ali Atwa, 21, an air-conditioning technician from southern Lebanon. He identified his confederates as Ahmed Gharbiyah and Ali Youness, both 20 and also Lebanese.

According to police, Atwa said he and the others were members of Islamic Jihad, a claim later affirmed by an anonymous caller in Beirut and then disputed in a statement delivered to news agencies there. The confusion may stem from Iran's recent efforts to play down its connections with terrorists in hopes of winning international support for its 4½-year

said, "There was some shooting, but I didn't dare raise my head to see what was happening. The hijackers were beating people on the heads." Passengers were unnerved by the behavior of the hijackers. "They were hysterical, they were screaming," said Patricia Weber of Albuquerque.

Next stop was Algiers, where local of-



The jet's stops, Eastern times: 1) lands in Beirut 4 a.m. Friday; 2) arrives Algiers 10:30 a.m.; 3) back in Beirut, 7:20 p.m.; 4) Algiers again, 2:45 a.m. Saturday. On Sunday, it returned to Beirut.

struggle against Iraq. Atwa told police that his friends had managed to smuggle two grenades and a 9-mm pistol through the airport's X-ray machines by wrapping the weapons in fiber glass insulation.

Scarcely 20 minutes after the plane had taken off for Rome's Leonardo da Vinci Airport, on a flight that was supposed to continue via a Boeing 747 to Boston, Los Angeles and San Diego, it was taken over by the two terrorists, who wildly brandished their grenades and pistol. They gave the pilot, Captain John Testrake of Richmond, Mo., the first order: fly to Beirut. At Beirut International Airport, the last thing officials wanted was a skyjacking crisis on their hands, and so they blocked the airport runway with buses and other obstacles. But the terrorists and their captive pilot were having none of it. Demanded the pilot: "They are beating up passengers. We must land in Beirut. He has pulled the pin of the grenade. We must land. He is ready to blow up the plane."

On the ground in Beirut, the plane was refueled as the hijackers had ordered. The terrorists also asked to speak to an official of Amal, the mainstream Shi'ite Muslim political and military force, but Amal leaders refused the request. After announcing their demands, the hijackers released 19 women and children via a yellow escape chute lowered from the forward door. One freed hostage, Irma Garza of Laredo, Texas, said that the terrorists had shot a passenger in the neck. Another of the released passengers, Frances Reynolds of Chicago,

officials responded to the plane's landing request by closing their airport. But they changed their minds after the arrival of an urgent plea from President Reagan to Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid. U.S. officials, who well remember the important role played by Algerian diplomats in settling the Iranian hostage crisis almost five years ago, had hoped that the hijacking could be resolved one way or another in Algiers. But after remaining on the runway there for five hours, during which time they released another 21 passengers, the hijackers ordered the pilot to take off again and head back to Beirut.

It was well past midnight in the Middle East when Flight 847 again landed in Beirut. The airport-tower operator did his best to refuse permission, but Captain Testrake was adamant: he was running out of fuel, and the terrorists were threatening to kill him. A hijacker may have clinched the argument by shouting, "We are suicide terrorists! If you don't let

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us land, we will crash the plane into your control tower, or fly it to Baabda and crash into the Presidential Palace!" The tower relented. The plane touched down at 2:20 a.m. Saturday.

Once again, the hijackers asked to speak to an Amal official, and when none appeared, they responded by murdering an American passenger and throwing his body onto the tarmac. They claimed the victim, a young man with a crew cut, was a U.S. Marine who had taken part in "security blowups in Lebanon." It was then, after the pilot shouted over the radio, "He just killed a passenger! He just killed a passenger!" that a hijacker declared, "You see? You now believe it. There will be another in five minutes." When the control-tower operator remonstrated with him, saying, "Isn't it a shame, killing an innocent passenger?" the hijacker replied angrily, "Did you forget the Bir al Abed massacre?" He was referring to the March 8 car bombing in the Bir al Abed suburb of Beirut that killed more than 75 Shi'ite Muslims but

The body of the murdered American had been lying on the tarmac for about two hours when a hijacker told the tower, "The Red Cross can come and get the body." The hijacker then called for fuel, food and water, saying, "I want 200 sandwiches, 150 apples and 88 lbs. of bananas. But the fuel first, and make it fast." As the food and fuel were taken on, the pilot said he wanted the runway cleared for takeoff at dawn. He was asked for his destination. His reply: "I don't know."

The next destination turned out once more to be Algiers, where the plane landed, for the second time, at 7:45 a.m. local time (2:45 a.m. E.D.T.) Saturday. Algerian officials authorized the landing on condition that the hijackers not use violence. Before leaving Beirut, it turned out, the hijackers had demanded that Ali Atwa be released by Greek authorities and brought to Algiers. Otherwise, they said, they would kill all eight Greeks on the plane, including Singer Demis Roussos. Greek authorities complied and sent Atwa to Algiers in an Olympic Airways plane.



■ Terrorist Ali Atwa in Algiers on his way to join his comrades on Flight 847

failed to hurt Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadallah, one of Lebanon's pro-Iranian Shi'ite religious leaders. Shi'ites later claimed that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had engineered the bombing, in an attempt to fight Shi'ite terrorism with counterterrorism; the CIA denied the charge.

Moments after the killing of the passenger, an Amal official and his bodyguard went aboard the plane, where they remained for some time. As negotiations continued, a hijacker asked that all airport lights be turned off, and the demand was met. At the time, it seemed that the hijackers were fearful of an attack by the Israelis or by one or another of their enemies within Lebanon. In fact, however, it later became clear that they wanted the darkness for other reasons: to bring aboard about a dozen additional terrorists as reinforcements, as well as a supply of arms and ammunition; and to remove the six or eight passengers with Israeli- or Jewish-sounding names. A day later, a released passenger, Ken Lanham of San Francisco, reported that the hijackers went up and down the aisle calling out the names of these people, and then led them away

Soon after the TWA jetliner landed in Algiers, two ranking Algerian officials came aboard and began discussions with the hijackers. The negotiations evidently paid off. Having released three hostages on arrival, the hijackers then released 58 others. That apparently left only American men on board. "We're begging them to keep the plane in Algiers," said a State Department official. "Keep talking, keep wearing them down, but for Christ's sake, don't let that plane take off again."

Among the stunned and fatigued passengers released in Algiers was Dorothy Sullivan of Chicago, who described the tension during the seemingly endless ordeal. One of the original hijackers had been soft-spoken, the other brutal, she said, and the latter liked to go up and down the aisle thumping passengers on the head. Several passengers recalled that Stewardess Uli Derickson, of Newton, N.J., had stood up to the hijackers. Said she, speaking of her passengers: "They're doing what you tell them to do. Why do you keep beating them up?" The released passengers also noted that, before leaving the plane, they were relieved of their cash and valuables by the hijackers.

That evening, the terrorists announced that if their demands were not met by the following morning, they would

fly to an unspecified destination, and destroy the plane and perhaps its remaining passengers. By early Sunday afternoon, they had made good on only the first half of their ultimatum, arriving in Beirut for the third time. On the ground, the hijackers called for food, fuel, newspapers and videocassettes. They urged the International Red Cross to work for the release of the 50 Shi'ites in Israel and "move fast before it is too late so that all will achieve satisfactory results." The hijackers added ominously that the next communicé would be their last, presumably meaning that they planned to destroy the plane afterward.

Back in the U.S., some worried relatives learned of the hijacking only hours before they had intended to go to the airport to welcome travelers home. Against a backdrop of yellow ribbons and flickering candles, parishioners of three Catholic churches in the Chicago area spent the day praying, huddling around radios and exchanging bits of information. They were cheered by the news that many of their 24 friends had been released in Beirut or Algiers. "We're waiting, we're praying, we're hoping," said the Rev. Robert Garrity of St. Margaret Mary Church in Algonquin, where parishioners maintained an all-night vigil.

Elsewhere, reactions were much the same. "I just hope they're not beating people, like they say they are," said Pete Lazansky of Tulsa, whose parents were on board. Other passengers included Kathryn Davis and her fiancé James Hoskins Jr., both 22 and from Indianapolis, whose parents had given them European vacations as college graduation presents. "I was going to pick her up this evening," said stockbroker Stephen Davis of his daughter. "We just sit here and wait." Passenger Irma Garza of Laredo telephoned her brother-in-law from Cyprus to tell him that she and three relatives had been released but that her husband, a granddaughter and son-in-law were still on board. Said the brother-in-law: "She sounded real nervous. She was crying." Tina Migos, of Revere, Mass., had been preparing for the arrival of five relatives from Greece who were to attend the christening of her year-old son. "We had a party planned and everything," a cousin reported. "Now we're just waiting to

hear what's going to happen."

In Florissant, Mo., Katharine Ellerbrock tuned in a morning TV show and realized that she was listening to the recorded voice of her brother, Flight Engineer Benjamin Zimmerman, talking to the Beirut control tower. She said her brother, who manages to be both a full-time TWA pilot and a Lutheran pastor with a ministry in the mountains of

Continued

Idaho, was "strong, steady and stable" and "has got to be a comfort to the passengers." In Richmond, Mo., a small town northeast of Kansas City, friends and neighbors stayed up to follow the ordeal of Captain Tes-trake, who in his spare time raises horses, restores small antique planes and nurtures a recently planted vineyard on his nearby farm. "He's been an airman for a long time," said Howard Hill, editor of the *Richmond Daily News*. "He won't panic."

One of the most troubling aspects of the plight of Flight 847 was that it was the third hijacking that occurred in the region within three days last week, and the second apparently engineered by Lebanese

Shi'ites. In earlier times, Arab skyjackers tended to be Palestinians, from one or another faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, attempting to advance or at least dramatize the Palestinian cause. Shi'ite Muslim terrorism, linked to Iran ideologically if not logistically, is both more puzzling and more frightening: drive out the American Satan and all its influence.

The week's first hijacking had begun on Tuesday, when half a dozen Shi'ites stormed aboard a Jordanian-owned Boeing 727 at Beirut airport. They overpowered eight Jordanian security guards,

then ordered the Swedish pilot to fly to Larnaca, Cyprus.

Over the next 28 hours, as the plane bounced around the eastern half of the Mediterranean, the skyjackers had ample time to air their complaints. They were angry about an Arab League statement supporting the cause of the Palestinians in the Beirut refugee camps, which have been under attack by Lebanese Shi'ites for the past three weeks. The Shi'ites want to drive out the Palestinians to make sure

that the P.L.O. will never again be able to set up a "state within a state" in Lebanon. After several dire threats, the hijackers freed the passengers, blew up the plane and sped off in a Range Rover, disappearing into the Shi'ite neighborhoods near the airport.

Several of the released passengers then boarded the first plane they could catch out of Beirut, a Middle East Airlines flight to nearby Cyprus. But as the Lebanese Boeing 707 landed there, a young Palestinian, producing a hand grenade, threatened to blow up the plane as a protest against

the earlier Shi'ite hijacking. He soon surrendered to the plane's captain, however, after being granted his request to fly to Amman aboard a Jordanian airliner.

On board both the hijacked Jordanian plane and the hijacked Lebanese plane were Professor Landry Slade, an American who is serving as an acting dean of the American University of Beirut, and his teenage son William. "It wasn't bad," the younger Slade remarked, after he and the other passengers had been released in Cy-

prus, "but it isn't something we want to talk about." Two days later, when he learned of the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, Landry Slade told reporters, "God help them all. I know what it's like." Professor Slade was, in fact, a good deal luckier than his colleague, Thomas Sutherland, 54, dean of the American University's agriculture and food sciences faculty. Sutherland had been kidnaped earlier in the week as he was rid-

ing in a six-car convoy from Beirut airport to his campus home. He thus became the seventh American and the twelfth Westerner currently being held by various extremist groups in Lebanon.

In a sense, the hijackings were a microcosm of the horrors rampant in the two countries that formed the backdrop of the case, Iran and Lebanon. In Iran, 78 people were killed and 332 others injured one night last week in a series of bombing raids by Iraqi aircraft against the Khomeini regime. After a series of antiwar protests, the Tehran government sponsored a huge demonstration at which thousands of marchers chanted, "War, war till victory!" Iran has serious internal problems, but none so critical as to constitute an imminent threat to Khomeini's authority.

In Lebanon, as usual, superlatives were insufficient to describe the scene. The fighting in the refugee camps between Palestinians and Shi'ites spread to other parts of West Beirut. On Friday morning, a shell struck a vegetable market there, killing or wounding 50 people.

Two suicide bombers crashed an explosives-laden car into a Lebanese Army position, killing 23 and wounding 36. Since the victims were mostly from the predominantly Shi'ite Sixth Brigade, reports had it that the bombers were Sunni Muslims, who have sided with the Palestinians in the current struggle and view with apprehension the Shi'ites' lust for a greater share of political power. The Shi'ites and the Druze were allies until about a month ago, but last week they were shooting at each other after a group of Amal militia-men tried to stop a car loaded with Druze. Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt agreed to a cease-fire but later, when asked how long it would last, replied, "Only God and Syria know." Given all these circumstances, Syrian President Hafez Assad was content to let the rival factions in Lebanon fight on for a while before he risks his own troops to try to restore order.

In Lebanon, the Israeli forces were largely gone, but the impasse continued between the United Nations peacekeeping forces and the Israeli-backed, predominantly Christian militia known as the South Lebanon Army. Two weeks ago, the S.L.A. had seized 25 Finnish soldiers of the U.N. force, released three of them and taken the others to the Christian town of Marjayoun. It refused to let them go until eleven of its own members had been handed over by the Shi'ite Amal militia. The S.L.A. accused the U.N. force, which does not recognize the S.L.A. as an

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independent militia and customarily disarms its members whenever they try to pass through U.N. lines, of having captured the eleven S.L.A. members and turned them over to Amal. The Shi'ite militia, in turn, claimed that the eleven S.L.A. members had defected to their side.

At midweek, Israel arranged for Western newsmen to visit Marjayoun. The trip demonstrated not only that the Finns were in good condition, but that the Israelis, if they chose to do so, could have ended the

incident quickly by putting pressure on the S.L.A. The situation took a comic turn late in the week when the eleven S.L.A. men, all of whom happened to be Shi'ites in an overwhelmingly Christian militia, told U.N. and Red Cross officials that they had no desire to return to the S.L.A. Confronted with this information, the S.L.A. commander, General Antoine Lahd, released the Finnish soldiers the next day.

This was the world that had produced the nightmare of Flight 847, an ordeal that continued without resolution as the new week began. There were hints that Israel might be willing to release its Shi'ite detainees if the U.S. asked it to do so; after all, only a month ago, the Israelis had exchanged 1,150 prisoners, including some world-class terrorists, for three of their own servicemen. At the same time, there were reports that the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean had invoked a "radio

silence" on its movements—a possible sign of action to come.

Perhaps nothing so aptly epitomized the chaos of Lebanon for Americans last week as the fate of the body of the young man, said by the hijackers to be a U.S. Marine, who had been murdered on Flight 847. After lying on the tarmac for two hours, the body, with a bullet wound in the head, had been taken by an International Red Cross ambulance to a morgue at the American University Hospital in Muslim West Beirut. U.S. officials, based on the other side of the "green line" in Christian-dominated East Beirut, were unable to retrieve it for 24 hours. Not until Sunday morning did a State Department spokesman announce that the body was at last on its way to a U.S. air base in Spain for identification. Used first as proof of the hijackers' resolve, the stranded corpse had thus become a symbol of the obstacles and divisions that afflict the terrorists' homeland. —By William E. Smith. Reported by John Borrell/Algiers, Dean Fischer/Cairo and Johanna McGeary/Washington

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ON PAGE B-6

WASHINGTON POST
23 June 1985

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The CIA on the March 8 Car Bombing

In its lead news article May 12, The Post alleged that the CIA had "an indirect connection" to the March 8 car bombing in Beirut which killed more than 80 people and wounded many others.

Before the story was published, the CIA categorically denied to The Post reporters any involvement, direct or indirect, in the bombing. Moreover, in a statement immediately after the story appeared, the agency publicly denied any connection with this event.

The House Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) investigated The Post story and inter alia reported to the full House on June 12 that:

"The committee's review has uncovered no evidence that any U.S. intelligence agency—any U.S. government

agency—has encouraged or participated in any terrorist activity in Lebanon. Further, the committee was able to discover no evidence that any U.S. intelligence agency had foreknowledge of the March 8 bombing outside the residence of Sheik Hussein Fadlallah.

"Without addressing the specifics of the allegations raised in connection with this deplorable terrorist event, the committee states that its review of relevant documents and files and its interview of appropriate government officials leads to the conclusion that no U.S. government complicity, direct or indirect, can be established with respect to the March 8 bombing in Beirut."

The CIA regrets that The Post ignored our denial of any involvement in the March 8 Beirut incident and that

its article gave the American public and the rest of the world the false impression that the U.S. government was involved in terrorist activity. This misleading theme has been picked up by other journalists as fact and has even been cited by the Shiite terrorists as one of the motives for the hijacking of TWA Flight 847.

It is imperative that The Post promptly correct the record and bring to its readers' attention the HPSCI's refutation of agency involvement in the March 8 bombing. As Secretary of State George Shultz said in commenting on The Post's story, "If the CIA denies something, it's denied."

GEORGE V. LAUDER
Director, Public Affairs,
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington

99th Congress
1st Session

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Report
99-

RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING TERRORIST
BOMBINGS IN BEIRUT, LEBANON

June 12, 1985.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

Mr. Hamilton, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following

ADVERSE REPORT

[To accompany H. Res. 171]

The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was referred the resolution (H. Res. 171) requesting the President to provide certain information to the House of Representatives concerning covert training of counterterrorist units to act against anti-American terrorists in Lebanon or other parts of the Middle East, having considered the same, report unfavorably thereon and recommend that the resolution do not pass.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On May 14, 1985, House Resolution 171 was introduced by the Honorable Don Edwards and referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The resolution requests the President to furnish to the House all documents and factual information in his possession which relate to covert training or other support, from January 1, 1984 to May 15, 1985, of counterterrorist units (including any Lebanese intelligence personnel) to engage in action against anti-American terrorists in Lebanon or other parts of the Middle East.

Introduction of the resolution followed press allegations that the CIA had been authorized to train and support counterterrorist units of foreigners for strikes against suspected terrorists before they could attack U.S. facilities in the Middle East. Immediately after the introduction of the resolution, the committee began to interview intelligence officials and review pertinent intelligence documents. The purpose of this review was to determine whether or not any evidence existed to support the charge that the United States Government, and specifically the Central Intelligence Agency, knew about beforehand, or was in some way responsible for, a March 8, 1985 bombing incident in Beirut, Lebanon that caused the loss of at least 80 lives and 100 other casualties.

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On June 12, the committee met in closed session to consider the resolution. After a discussion of the information derived from its review, the committee ordered the resolution reported adversely.

BACKGROUND

The committee's understanding of the concern which underlies the introduction of House Resolution 171 is that U.S. counterterrorism policy not stoop to the tactics of terrorism in seeking to prevent it. The issue posed by the resolution of inquiry is a serious one. It relates to the U.S. policy in countering terrorism, about which there is as yet no clear national consensus.

The committee's review has uncovered no evidence that any U.S. intelligence agency - any U.S. Government agency - has encouraged or participated in any terrorist activity in Lebanon. Further, the committee was able to discover no evidence that any U.S. intelligence agency had foreknowledge of the March 8 bombing outside the residence of Sheik Hussein Fadlallah.

Without addressing the specifics of the allegations raised in connection with this deplorable terrorist event, the committee states that its review of relevant documents and files and its interview of appropriate government officials leads to the conclusion that no U.S. Government complicity, direct or indirect, can be established with respect to the March 8 bombing in Beirut.

COMMITTEE POSITION

On June 12, 1985, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, a quorum being present, ordered the resolution reported adversely by voice vote.

OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

With respect to clause 2(1)(3)(A) of Rule XI of the House of Representatives, the committee's findings and recommendations concerning House Resolution 171 are contained in the body of this report.

FISCAL YEAR COST PROJECTIONS

With respect to clause 2(1)(3)(B) of rule XI of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this resolution does not provide new budget authority or tax expenditures.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

With respect to clause 2(1)(3)(C) of rule XI of the House of Representatives, the committee has received no report from the Congressional Budget Office.

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RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

With respect to clause 2(1)(3)(D) of rule XI of the House of Representatives, the committee has not received a report from the Committee on Government Operations pertaining to the subject of this resolution.

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