

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 (301) 656-4068

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Larry King Live STATION CNN-TV
DATE October 13, 1987 9:00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT Bob Woodward Interviewed

ANNOUNCER: Welcome to Larry King Live. Tonight, America's toughest reporter, Bob Woodward, lifts the veil on the inner workings of the CIA. But how secret are they?

Now, here's Larry King.

LARRY KING: It would be an understatement to say that this book is the most talked about book published in 1987. The book is "VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA." There you see the cover.

And we welcome to our microphones and cameras its author, Bob Woodward, investigative reporter for the Washington Post, assistant managing editor of the investigative staff. His field is investigative journalism.

Why, by the way, is that your specialty? Why do you like that the best?

BOB WOODWARD: Because it's always fun to find out what we don't know, what's hidden.

KING: Shouldn't that be what all reporters should be, though?

WOODWARD: I think they all do. And I have the luxury of lots of time, lots of patience from my editors at The Post and at Simon and Schuster, to spend two or three years on a project.

KING: Were you a sleuthy kind of kid? Were you the kind of kid who, "Nick is late for school today. I wonder why"? That kind of thing.

OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. • NEW YORK • LOS ANGELES • CHICAGO • DETROIT • AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES

Material supplied by Radio TV Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.

2

WOODWARD: Yeah, I guess I was. I was the janitor in my father's law firm. And at night I would go in and read the files in the attic of his law firm to find out what divorces there were in town and what was going on. It was quite apparent from reading those that the public face that you see of these people is not the real one.

KING: Must -- therefore, can we conclude that the good investigative journalist, the really good one, there has to be days he questions his morality?

WOODWARD: No. No. You have to play by the rules and be absolutely straight with people, because people are going to come around and ask you, "How did you do this? Is it fair? Did you let everyone have their side?" And so you can't stray over the line.

KING: So he doesn't open the mail that's not addressed to him?

WOODWARD: No. Absolutely not. And if I were a janitor now, I would not read the files in the attic.

KING: Would not.

WOODWARD: I would not.

KING: Isn't that hard, though? Especially when you're prone to finding out things.

WOODWARD: No. Because people like to talk. And if people didn't like to talk, you'd be out of business and I'd be out of business.

KING: You learned that a long time ago. Right? Anybody in the business knows that people like to talk. They'd rather talk than not talk.

WOODWARD: Absolutely. And what you have to do is be patient, set up an interview that is open-ended. You never want to go to an eight o'clock interview and say, "Gee, I have to be home at ten." You have to sometimes get home at one or two. And then if you chart the value of that interview, in the last hours of it you will get the most important information.

KING: And you must listen sympathetically all the time. Right? If it's Hitler or Roosevelt or Casey, or whatever, you are an attentive, interested listener.

WOODWARD: Yes.

KING: You can't mock what he says.

WOODWARD: Of course not. But you can challenge it. You can say, "Hey, that's not true," or, "So-and-so says this."

This is the first book that I have had, or had the opportunity to do with somebody I really got to know. I got to know Casey.

When I did the Supreme Court, I really never talked to Warren Burger. I never talked to Nixon. I never met John Belushi.

KING: That's right. Three of the books you've done, the most famous of which "The President's Men," you never talked to the principal person involved.

WOODWARD: Exactly.

KING: Here you did.

WOODWARD: Yes.

KING: Why did he agree?

WOODWARD: Well, I think he realized that the Washington Post was committed to following the CIA, monitoring the CIA...

KING: Because he knew you were going to do this book, no matter?

WOODWARD: Well, we were going to follow what was going on, that it's the hidden of hiddens, the CIA. And it's very, very important, as we now know, to discover what's happening. So we were writing regular periodict stories. So he wanted to shape the story.

Casey, as you know -- you knew him -- amateur historian all the way...

KING: Yeah.

WOODWARD: ...knew that this book would get a lot of attention. Knew, as he could tell from my newspaper writing, that if he wanted to say something, he wanted to make a point, it would be included in the story. He wouldn't control the story or dictate it.

KING: Do you think he told the President he was talking to you?

WOODWARD: Oh, that's a good question. I don't know the answer to that.

4

KING: I mean certainly he wouldn't be the kind of guy who would want Reagan surprised. So if he had lived, the President would have known this book was coming, wouldn't he? Don't you think?

WOODWARD: Oh, they definitely knew the book was coming. No question about that.

KING: No, I mean from Casey's own lips. He would have said to him, "I spoke to Woodward."

WOODWARD: I don't know.

KING: Wouldn't you have guessed it?

WOODWARD: I mean one of the things I could really not penetrate in this book is the full nature of the Casey-Reagan relationship.

KING: It was not a close friendship, was it?

WOODWARD: No, it was not. But they were soulmates. They shared -- you know, of the same generation, two years difference in their age, had gone through four years; very, very committed to capitalism; fierce, active anti-communists.

KING: Was this book a Casey book? Was it supposed to be the CIA through Bill Casey's and Bob Woodward's perspective of it?

WOODWARD: Well, it started out, it was going to be four years of the Turner era, Stansfield Turner, who was head of the CIA under Jimmy Carter; and then it was going to be four years of Casey. But it became quite apparent that Casey was a dominant figure in this Administration. I think, as eventually the book shows, Bill Casey became the shadow Secretary of State. He outflanked everyone in the Administration, and his -- the consistent theme in the Administration were his covert wars.

KING: When the question was asked during the Iran-Contra thing, one of the best questions asked was: If Shultz was against it and Weinberger was against it -- and they disagree on everything -- who the heck was for it to get Reagan to go against both of them? It had to be Casey.

WOODWARD: Oh, indeed Casey.

KING: By mathematics, it had to be.

WOODWARD: The book quotes from memos and various things that have been out in the hearings and the Tower Report showing

that -- see, this, the Iran arms sales was made for Casey: high risk, high gain, doing something, working out a secret deal with a couple of people who are your implacable enemies.

KING: His kind of shtick.

WOODWARD: Absolutely. Yes.

KING: Why -- by the way, did you expect the fuss that happened?

WOODWARD: Well, I've never written a book when there has not been a fuss.

KING: Not this much.

WOODWARD: Oh, yeah. Every time. Go back to "The Final Days."

KING: That was show-business fuss.

WOODWARD: No. Big fuss on the Supreme Court. How can you write about infighting and bickering at the Supreme Court?

I remember very vividly -- I think we did a show on this when "The Final Days" came out, the book on Nixon's last year in office. We wrote that Nixon and Kissinger got down on their knees and prayed.

KING: That's right. Yeah.

WOODWARD: And "Oh, absolutely. You can't know that. That's" -- you know, "You made that up," and so forth.

KING: All right. But let's say what made this unusual is your guy was dead.

WOODWARD: Well, Belushi was dead, too.

KING: Belushi was dead. But that was a book -- you didn't expect Belushi quotes. You started to write it after he died.

WOODWARD: Yes. That's right.

KING: Would you say that made this significantly different?

WOODWARD: No. I think it was getting to know Casey. Casey was one of the most complicated people, not a simple man, operated on many levels, networked Washington, as you know.

6

You were saying earlier that you had lunch with him one day, and so forth. I mean he dealt with everyone. He knew everyone.

KING: But he wouldn't go on programs and he wouldn't, we thought, talk to the press openly. I asked him at the lunch, "Would you go on?"

He said, "Maybe when this -- when the Administration's over, I'll sit down with you."

WOODWARD: Well, he knew he wasn't good on television. He was a kind of disheveled-looking person. He mumbled a lot.

KING: Terrible New York accent.

WOODWARD: But there were lots of reporters in town who had somewhat similar relationships that I had with Casey.

KING: Oh, really?

WOODWARD: Yes. Oh, sure.

KING: Many spoke to him frequently, then.

WOODWARD: No many, but some.

KING: How about from his New York days, from the financial press?

WOODWARD: When he was Chairman of the SEC, lots of people knew him, dealt with him. A lot of people give him very good marks as SEC Commissioner.

KING: Have you ever had your credibility questioned this much?

WOODWARD: Always. I remember during Watergate we wrote those stories, Ron Ziegler took to the podium one day and for 45 minutes called us just about every name in the book.

So, I think when you get at the truth and you scrape close to the bone, people are going to get mad and start howling.

KING: All right, Bob, how -- and by the way, for our viewing audience, we're going to be taking your phone calls. And I might remind you that Bob Woodward is going to be our guest tonight on radio for two hours, as well. So if you don't get in here, you can join us later there.

How should we -- there are no footnotes. You don't tell

us who was your source here and who was your source there. How, then, should we read it? Is this history? Is this journalism? Is this a Woodward retrospective? How do we read this book?

WOODWARD: Good question. As I say in the beginning, I think it's closer to journalism to history, because it's done so rapidly. But remember, everyone in there is named, situations, meetings in the White House Situation Room, top secret documents, secret documents, national intelligence estimates, Casey's unpublished writings, airplane rides with Casey, dinner with Casey, and so forth. It's all documented.

No one -- people are trying to say, "How do we get at this? How do we establish" -- you know, how do we say, "Gee, it wasn't this bad," are looking for inroads, but they really aren't finding them.

Mrs. Casey came out and challenged me and said, "You couldn't have been in the hospital room." She was not there when I was there. She then, on one television program, said I had never, never been in the house.

And gently I said, "Don't you remember the time you served us breakfast?"

And she said, "Oh, yes. I do remember that."

She became, in a way, my best witness.

KING: Do you think she read the book?

WOODWARD: I don't. And I hope she does, because I think she'd realize, as Bill Safire said, this is a fair portrait of Bill Casey. It includes all of the dimensions of that very, very complicated man.

KING: Do you think a lot of the jumping on you is jealousy?

WOODWARD: No, no. I don't think so. I think I have to be tested. I go around and work three years on a project like this and say, "We're going to test the CIA and the government." I'm going to say, "I found this out." People are perfectly fair to come at me and say, "Hey, what about this? What about that?"

The people who are in the book, who are alive now, are coming out and saying, "Yes, that's true."

KING: Stansfield Turner said he was one of your sources.

WOODWARD: He did? I don't know what he said.

KING: He has admitted that. But obviously he was. He said it himself.

WOODWARD: Lots of people are saying, "Hey, that's absolutely right." Some people are even saying that it's eerie. Al Haig, who was the Secretary of State for Reagan, said on the issue of how ill Reagan was after the assassination attempt in '81 -- I write that Reagan for a few days was really in bad shape. And the people in the White House thought they were going to be a team of Mrs. Wilsons, taking care of this President. And Al Haig -- no friend of mine, believe me -- got up and New Hampshire and said, "If you knew the real story, your hair would stand on end."

KING: The hospital scene. Much has been paid to it. They said the reason you had to do it was you had to have something on the Iran-Contra from Casey. And that, I guess, those critics are saying that it was fabricated because you won't say anything about the room. You won't say what color pajamas he was wearing. And one criticism I read today was, "Who are you protecting in not saying that?"

WOODWARD: Look, I'm protecting hundreds of sources in this book. And I'm just not going to go beyond the book.

Anyone I have talked to who has read the book to its conclusion, seen the cumulative portrait of Casey, the Administration, the tensions, the fire fights that went on within the CIA, within the White House, read through the nature of my relationship with Casey have said of course they understand the last scene in the book.

Of course I had to include it. It's got it ambiguity. Personally, to me, it meant a great deal. But he deserved the last word, and I let him have it.

KING: Any immorality in sneaking into a hospital room that's not supposed...

WOODWARD: I didn't sneak in. Somebody helped me.

KING: Helped you sneak in.

WOODWARD: No. I did not sneak in. I just didn't.

KING: In other words, the person who helped you had admittance.

WOODWARD: Somebody helped me get in there. I did not disguise myself. I did not misrepresent myself. I was always a gentleman. And I did my job.

Look, I had worked for the Washington Post for precisely eleven days -- this was before Watergate, in 1971 -- when I made my first hospital visit to somebody. It is something a reporter does. It's difficult. You have to be a gentleman. You have to go very, very carefully. But sometimes the answers to things are in hospitals.

KING: Is there ever a morality question to yourself? Here is a sick man, not supposed to have visitors, brain tumor. And I'm sneaking in to get an answer.

WOODWARD: Well, I'm not sneaking in. You keep going back to that. I did not sneak in. If he had said, "Leave." If I couldn't get in -- I did go one time earlier, as I report in the book, and they said, "No."

I just -- I think it's, you know, again it's that issue of let people talk and let people have their say.

If you'd been there you would have said I was doing my job. I was gentle about it. I -- you know, that's just the nature of the business. Reporters have to go all kinds of strange places.

KING: The picture in Newsweek that has Casey sitting up, and you did not describe him as sitting up on a chair. Newsweek, I think, has a drawing of him.

WOODWARD: Yes. Some artist did a drawing.

KING: Was that their mistake?

WOODWARD: I don't know. I mean I am not an artist. I did not do the drawing or talk to the artist.

KING: Because they say they got it from you that he was sitting up.

WOODWARD: No. They said they talked to somebody in my office, and I don't know who they talked to in my office.

KING: But you never described him as sitting up.

WOODWARD: That's correct. That's correct. I didn't.

KING: Our guest is Rob Woodward. The book is "VEIL." This Sunday it'll be number one on the New York Times best seller list. The subtitle is "The Secret Wars of the CIA." The publisher is Simon and Schuster.

Back after this.

10

*

*

*

PRESIDENT REAGAN: I think that there's an awful lot of fiction about a man who was unable to communicate at all and is now being quoted as if he was doing nothing but talk his head off.

HELEN THOMAS: Well, did you sign a directive that led to a massacre in Beirut?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: No. And I have a copy of the measure that I signed.

THOMAS: Can we see it?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: It was -- it was nothing but that we were all approving a plan requested of us by the government of Beirut, of Lebanon, I should say, to help them in counter-terrorism. Never would I sign anything that would authorize an assassination. I never have and I never will, and I didn't.

KING: That's Ronald Reagan saying, first, fabrications in the book of a man who can't answer; and two, he never authorized an assassination, he never signed anything authorizing an assassination.

WOODWARD: Okay, take the first thing. It's well known that Casey...

KING: He called you a liar.

WOODWARD: Casey could talk during this period. Senior officials have been to the Washington Post, said to dozens of editors and reporters there that Casey was lucid. Time magazine last week quoted a monsignor by name who visited Casey twice a week saying Casey could talk. No question that Casey could talk.

The issue of an assassination. I don't say in the book that the President authorized assassination. Again, something like this tends to hang on the detail and the specificity. I say that the President, as he acknowledged in that interview, signed a top secret order saying that the United States would train preemptive counterterrorist hit teams. This was rescinded, as the book reports.

And I think probably the most important disclosure in the book is that Casey, on his own, frustrated with the terrorists, saying, "We've got to fight and hit back," went to the Saudis and got them to set up an assassination, in which 80 innocent people were killed. That's murder. That's assassination. It's wrong. And it's against the law of this country.

11

KING: Was Casey remorseful?

WOODWARD: I don't know. I think he -- the frustration, and the book really shows how it mounted over the years. You remember the Marine bombing when 241 servicemen were killed in Beirut. It was like a mini-Pearl Harbor in this country. Casey knew the political ramifications of that. It was an intelligence failure. He could not stop it.

KING: Do you think Reagan read the book?

WOODWARD: I'm sure he didn't.

KING: Sure he didn't.

WOODWARD: I mean I don't know he didn't. I wish he would, because I think he might learn about what went wrong. And it really can't be escaped. And certainly the Iran-Contra affair demonstrates this. I think the book demonstrates that in many different additional ways things went wrong. Things happened in this country. Deception in the whole Contra operation. It wasn't what they said it was initially. Provocation of Qaddafi. Horrendously inconsistent policies toward Iran.

KING: It should be understood, Bob, as I know you, you are not a critique of intelligence, are you?

WOODWARD: No. No. We need the CIA. We've got to have a strong CIA. We now have a CIA Director, William Webster, who says we can conduct intelligence operations on the books, according to the law, according to the principles and values of this country.

KING: Weren't you in naval intelligence?

WOODWARD: No. I was in naval communications, never did intelligence work in the Navy.

KING: Would you have liked to?

WOODWARD: Yes, I would. I would have loved to have seen those reports. I did not.

KING: Were you ever asked to do anything for the CIA?

WOODWARD: No, never.

KING: Do you think a journalist every should?

WOODWARD: No, I don't.

KING: Not ever, not under any circumstances.

WOODWARD: No. No. I describe an incident in the book when somebody out at the CIA tried to get me to ask in an interview I was supposed to have with Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, to ask him a question about not sleeping. And I thin they were trying to get my questions to provoke Qaddafi.

KING: I want to ask you about Casey the man in a moment. But let's get some calls in.

Houston, Texas for Bob Woodward. Hello.

MAN: ...Why didn't you ask Reagan -- excuse me. Why didn't you ask Casey, rather than Casey knowing, if Reagan knew about the funds diversion?

Second of all, do you think Reagan knew about the funds diversion?

And third, will we ever find out who Deep Throat is?

WOODWARD: Okay. As the book describes it, after Casey said he believed, he fell asleep. And there was no opportunity to ask him the question about the President or to ask the other hundred or two hundred questions I had.

KING: Do you believe the President knew?

WOODWARD: I don't know the answer to that. I think you can make a strong argument that Casey would have beat a path over to the Oval Office to tell him about this great thing, as Ollie North put it, that we're getting the Ayatollah to give money to the Contras. I think you can also make an argument that Casey believed in insulation and deniability, and he wouldn't tell the President.

KING: When Deep Throat dies, will we know who Deep Throat is?

WOODWARD: Yes, you will.

KING: You will tell us?

WOODWARD: Yes.

KING: Is Deep Throat older than you?

WOODWARD: [Laughter] I'm just going to leave it undescribed.

KING: Is Deep Throat in good health, to your knowledge?

WOODWARD: [Laughter] Is he in the hospital, and would

I visit him in the hospital? The answer is yes.

KING: Woodland Hills, California. Hello.

MAN: I'm wondering if Mr. Woodward has found any evidence, as has been alleged, of cocaine trafficking or smuggling, or funding for the Contra efforts in Nicaragua.

WOODWARD: It's a good question. And I have asked about it, and in fact asked Casey about it, and he denied it. And others have denied it. I don't have a final answer on that. But no evidence at this point.

KING: Why would Casey tell you the truth if he did do that?

WOODWARD: One of the things Casey found in dealing with me, when I called him up or went to see him and had some questions about something, generally I had most of the story. For example, in "VEIL" I describe, in 1985, when I learned about the covert operation to undermine the Libyan government. We were going to run that story on Sunday. Saturday afternoon I called Casey and I said, "We're running this story. We're not going to give operational details. We're running it because we think it's important. As you know, we're going" -- we cover the CIA. There was a big struggle within the Administration, within the Senate and House Intelligence Committees about whether this would work, about whether it would be assassination, whether we were really trying to kill Qaddafi, which again is against the President's executive order.

He said, "Oh, some others wouldn't run it."

And I said, "We feel we have to."

He made a few points. He said, "We're not trying to kill Qaddafi. We're trying to stop terrorism."

So, I included that in the story. I just, you know, dealt with him that way: Hey, we're going to do this, we're going to do that. Or what about this?

KING: Has anyone -- Charlie Wick was Casey's best friend.

WOODWARD: One of his good friends.

KING: Has anyone asked Charlie Wick about this?

WOODWARD: I haven't heard. I haven't heard.

KING: ...call Charlie Wick and say -- you know, Wick

14

would have been aware all the time of your talking to Casey, because Casey would have told him that.

WOODWARD: Well, you ought to go around, or somebody might want to go around and ask all the people who Casey called up, or when they called Casey, and said, "Oh, yeah. Talk to Woodward."

KING: To Ruidoso, New Mexico for Bob Woodward. The book is "VEIL." Hello.

MAN: ...Mr. Woodward could increase his credibility with me and a lot of other people if he'd take a lie-detector test on your show in front of his peers. Number one, would he agree to this? And if he wouldn't, why not agree to it? I got a hunch he would've blown it up tonight.

WOODWARD: Other people have asked that question. I'd just -- there's too much evidence that lie-detector tests don't work, one way or the other. And I really think if anyone reads this book to the end, they will be able to form their own judgment. And I've not found anyone who's read it to the end who doesn't say...

KING: How about a top guy like Warren Holmes in Miami, a famous lie-detector guy who courts trust and everybody trusts, and is a guy who, you know, they claim both sides in cases always agree upon? If Holmes says it, it's a given.

WOODWARD: But as you know, there's so much evidence and information that they don't work.

KING: He did me on television. It worked with me.

WOODWARD: But that was a gag.

KING: Well, no. He asked me certain questions. I answered. He told me when I was lying.

But you don't have to, Bob.

By the way, movie rights sold for a million dollars today?

WOODWARD: I guess so. Yes.

KING: That was reported today.

WOODWARD: Yes.

KING: They're going to make a movie of this.

15

WOODWARD: They're going to make a miniseries, apparently eight hours, MGM/United Artists.

KING: Who's going to play Casey?

WOODWARD: Don't know. But what I think they will do is they see from reading the book -- and when they do one of these miniseries, they kind of take it apart in the scenes, in the evolution, and they will show Casey as an American George Smylie, to a certain extent.

KING: We'll pick that up in a moment.

*

*

*

KING: Our guest is Bob Woodward. The book is "VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA." This Sunday it'll be number one on the New York Times best seller list. We'll continue with your phone calls. We're also going to talk about Bill Casey.

Did you like him?

WOODWARD: In many ways, I did. Yes. And you had to have a certain respect for him. He taught me some things. One of the things he taught me, which I kind of new as a reporter, was go to the scene. Don't sit in the office and phone people up. Get out there and talk to him.

In the book describe in some detail trips he made to Central America, to Africa, to the Middle East, to Asia.

KING: He wasn't a desk man.

WOODWARD: He was not a desk man. He was get out there, shake ever operations officer's hand, ask him a question. If somebody asked him a question or he wanted to pursue what -- you know, it wasn't pro forma. He would sit and look people in the eye.

KING: But as your title states, he was running secret wars. You're not supposed to do that.

WOODWARD: Well, some of the secret wars were authorized. Some of them were not. Some of them were done by the rules. Some of them were done off the books.

But the significance of it, I think, is when you look back at the whole six-year period, you will see that he was one of the primary makers of foreign policy. And there are a lot of really experienced, dedicated CIA intelligence people, State Department people who say the CIA shouldn't make policy.

16

KING: He must have been a thorn to the Shultzes and the Weinbergers, the Shultzes especially. He didn't like Shultz.

WOODWARD: I think they were friends initially, but then I think Shultz came to realize -- I know Shultz came to realize that Casey was stealing the thunder. They had some very, very bad face-offs. And at one point, finally, Casey wrote the President a letter and said, "You've got to get rid of George Shultz."

KING: His biggest weakness?

WOODWARD: His biggest weakness was that he was sure he was right. One of the things Casey said to me a number of times -- I'd say, "Well, now wait a minute. Let's look at the Contra war. Let's look at the Cuban menace in the Caribbean. What's the evidence?" And we would go through some evidence.

And he would say, "Well, the Soviets are putting four billion dollars a year into the Caribbean. And we, the United States -- it's our hemisphere -- we're putting in much less."

I'd say, "Well, four billion dollars, I'd say, "Well, that number's flakey. It's an estimate. It's a guess."

And then you would kind of go along with him, and he would say, "But you have to make a judgment. You have to decide. You've got this and you've got this. And if you sit on the fence, you will not be a man of action."

KING: He couldn't have been a fan of Stansfield Turner, could he?

WOODWARD: No. I think he felt that Turner -- too much hand-wringing, too much doubt, too much hesitation.

Casey's philosophy was -- and he finally wrote it in a credo that he put out, like a little brochure, handed out to everyone at the CIA, called "The CIA Credo." He said, "We must have a propensity for action." What did that mean? If in doubt about doing something or nothing, do it. And his philosophy was you're going to take some hits, you're going to make some mistakes. There are going to be some bad things. You're going to have -- somebody with lots of ideas is going to have some good ones and some bad ones. He was willing to deal with the mistakes and the bad.

KING: When Judge Sporkin left as his attorney to become -- to be appointed to the federal bench, and then eventually to get on to the bench, I went to the ceremonies in which Mr. Sporkin left. And this is a guess now. I don't know if it's

your guess. I guessed from that that Casey, who presided over a wonderful breakfast for about a hundred people, was very popular inside that building.

WOODWARD: Oh, yeah. And the book shows that. I mean they absolutely loved him. When Reagan won the election in 1980, beat Carter, which would mean that Turner was out, it was like Liberation Day in Paris. People were almost hanging out the windows.

KING: But Casey especially. They liked Casey.

WOODWARD: Sure. Because Casey will go around and say, "Do it. Take chances."

In doing the research on this book, in going through all the interviews and the documents, really going into this dark, hidden world, I developed a lot of respect for intelligence officers. Your job is easy, my job is easy compared to what they do. Their life is on the line.

KING: No credit.

WOODWARD: Frequently they don't get credit. And you're dealing, as people have said, in a world of smoke and mirrors. But I think it's even worse. I think it's a world of darkness. I think it's off in a world of absolute contradiction.

KING: Meaning?

WOODWARD: Meaning that you've got a pile of evidence over here that says this and a pile of evidence over here that says that.

Example: One of the most crucial issues of our time, arms control. Are the Soviets sincere or are they cheaters? Casey believed that the Soviets are cheaters. When you put the evidence on the table to the professional analysts, a lot of them will say they really aren't cheating in a serious way, that the Soviet policy is not to cheat. Others will say but there's this and there's that.

When they issue a formal report in the intelligence agencies, it's called a couple of things: an NIE, National Intelligence Estimate; or a SNIE, S-N-I-E, Special National Intelligence Estimate. Estimate. That means they don't know. To a certain extent, it's a guess.

KING: Is LeCarre right? Is a lot of it spies who came in from the cold, too?

WOODWARD: Yeah. And it's a hard life. It's a dirty

life. And, you know, we hire those people and we pay them to do our dirty work.

KING: And then we don't want to know about it.

WOODWARD: Well, I think we've got to know about it.

KING: Nashville -- yeah, I know what you mean.

Nashville, Tennessee, with Bob Woodward. The book is "VEIL." Hello.

MAN: ...I'm just curious about one thing, Mr. Woodward. How far do you feel that investigative reporters, such as yourself, should go in withholding information so as maybe to exploit it for your own personal gain? And exactly what degree of responsibility do you have to report news as it happens? Or are you, yourself, one of the great manipulators?

KING: You mean like in holding it for the book.

WOODWARD: I think that's in question. I think we have an obligation to publish as soon as we can. At the same time, some things belong in books. And some of the important stories in this book were not really confirmed until this summer. And Simon and Schuster published this book -- you know, from writing books -- on really a miracle schedule. I finished it in August. It was published in September.

When did you finish your book and when was it published?

KING: I finished my book Labor Day. It will be published April 15th.

WOODWARD: So mean this...

KING: That's about six months, is fast.

WOODWARD: Six months is fast. Four months is almost unheard of. One month, I don't think it's ever been duplicated. And they said, "We need to get this out."

To answer the caller's question, I don't think there's ever a justification for withholding information. And this has not been any attempt to exploit it or hold things back.

KING: But The Post did not print the hospital story. Right?

WOODWARD: It certainly did, as one of the excerpts that we printed from the book.

KING: But they didn't the day it happened.

WOODWARD: That's right, for this chief reason: I hoped to go back. There were lots of questions I wanted to ask Casey. It was a period when he was getting better. He did not get better. He took several turns for the worse, and eventually died in May.

KING: Our guest is Bob Woodward. The book is "VEIL." Back with more calls after these words.

* * *

KING: Our guest is Bob Woodward, and the book is "VEIL." And we go to Woodland Hills, California.

MAN: ...Your guest this evening must think that your viewers are stupid. To suggest that William Casey, the Director of the CIA for the United States, is going to sit down with him and discuss the Contra affair or discuss affairs of critical interest to the United States, does he expect us to take him seriously?

WOODWARD: The answer is yes. And look, it's a matter of record. No one is, when you really get down to this, disputing it. Even people in the CIA who are the angriest at me say the only way to get to the number of 48 meetings I had with Casey is to include some discussions at cocktail parties. I specifically say in the book that some of those meetings were at cocktail parties in the corner.

And you know from your experience, sometimes you can have the best discussions with people at a cocktail party. It's just a matter of...

KING: If you ask the right question, you can learn more.

WOODWARD: Much more. It's not a matter of that being the truth in Washington, that's the truth everywhere in the country, everywhere in the world.

They have said, Mrs. Casey said there are six documented meetings at the CIA Headquarters in his office.

KING: Based on the tenor of the last caller, why do you think people are so mad at you? Why are we mad at the messenger?

WOODWARD: Well, I think there's a tendency to do that, and I can understand that. I also think that there are a lot of people who don't want to face what went on, that we've had a difficult period in this country: Vietnam, Watergate, the first

CIA investigations of the '70s, the Iran-Contra affair now, that all raise very fundamental questions about: Is our government honest? Are they doing what they say? Are they explaining themselves in a straightforward way? And every time you come around and peel a little bit of the layer away and say, "Here we go again," I think the average citizen's first reaction is going to be, "Oh, God. Tell me, somehow, that it's not true."

The problem is that it is true. And the problem is that we do have to face it.

KING: Sarasota, Florida for Bob Woodward. Hello.

WOMAN: ...I'm so honored to be able to have the opportunity to ask a question of Bob Woodward. First I'd like to say all the fiction seems to me to have already occurred under the current Administration. I also want to say that Bob Woodward is a great writer, a tribute to journalism, and surely a friend to the American people.

KING: I didn't know your mother lived in Sarasota.

Go ahead, ma'am.

WOMAN: My question is, what ever happened, indeed, to that ten million dollars that got switched around by Ollie North?

KING: Yeah. Where is that money?

WOODWARD: That's a good question.

KING: Great question.

WOODWARD: And what the Iran-Contra Committees established is that it got into the wrong bank account, and apparently it was just sitting there.

KING: In somebody's -- whose...

WOODWARD: And they hope to get some of this money back.

KING: I mean that's a nice error.

WOODWARD: Yes, that is a nice error. Like Monopoly, bank error in your favor, ten million dollars. But it was some unknown business.

KING: And it's there now?

WOODWARD: But the important issue here is when you take all the meticulous work that those committees did and you look at

it, you find out that in the Iran arms sales, there was eight million dollars left over in their own bank account that didn't go to the Contras, that didn't go to some of these other off-the-books operations.

Now think about it. Step back for a minute. What the hell is our government, people on the White House staff in charge of a slush fund of eight million dollars in a Swiss bank account?

I remember Watergate in great detail. In the safe in Rose Mary Woods' office, in the other slush funds that they had in the Nixon reelection committee, they never had eight million dollars. And if you remember back in the '70s, there was a feeling when we first wrote those stories, "Oh, come on. That can't be true. No one would" -- you know, "This is the government." But it's all true. And now we have an eight million dollar slush fund.

KING: New Orleans. Hello.

WOMAN: Mr. Woodward, I wonder if you intended for this to topple the government, as Watergate did.

And in reference to withholding information, as we understand it down here, you withheld information in reference to Gary Hart. Would you please expand on it?

And I thank you.

KING: Okay.

WOODWARD: To deal with the issue of Gary Hart. I never withheld any information on Gary Hart at all.

KING: He lived at your place for a while.

WOODWARD: Well, before...

KING: That was generally known.

WOODWARD: Yes, it was well known. And the editors at The Post knew it. In the late '70s, I believe it was 1979, while he was a senator, way before he was running for President, he called me up one day, a man in distress, and said, "I need a place to stay."

I was a bachelor at the time, have a big house here in Washington. I talked to the editor at The Post. I said, "What do I do?"

And he said, "Well, you know, you kind of have to extend a hand to people."

22

KING: And he was separated from his wife at the time.

WOODWARD: Separating from his wife. He stayed there longer than he intended, and he came back a second time.

But I never withheld any information. That's just not true.

KING: Were you out to topple the Reagan Administration with this book?

WOODWARD: No. Absolutely not.

KING: If you read the book, you know it's not.

WOODWARD: In fact, you know, it is, to a certain extent -- it's not the opposite, but it is to say, "Hey, look. Here it is. Here is what went off the track."

KING: It's no big anti-CIA book, though.

WOODWARD: No, not at all. I don't think so.

KING: There are a lot of conservative or right-wing element in this country jumping on you before the fact here.

WOODWARD: And then some...

KING: They haven't read it.

WOODWARD: And then some of the right-wing -- Edward J. Epstein just came out with a piece saying this is an incredibly important book, that it shows about the political struggle for intelligence operations that was going on, and that that is a very, very important struggle.

KING: In a moment we'll discuss, maybe, the unanswerable, the "What's it all about, Alfie" vis-a-vis the guy on the street, the bus driver in Hialeah. What does this mean to him?

Our guest, Bob Woodward. The book, "VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA."

*

*

*

KING: Our guest, Bob Woodward. He'll be with us in a little over an hour on the radio tonight.

Springfield, Massachusetts. Hello.

WOMAN: What I'd like to know is why didn't Mr. Woodward

inform the Iran-Contra Committee members that he had this information from Casey in January? Because Casey didn't die till May.

WOODWARD: First of all, a reporters job is not to work for a congressional investigating committee. Those investigating committees are still in operation. They have not finished their report. We got the book out.

KING: I want to ask you that question. Let me get one more call.

Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Last call. Hello.

MAN: ...I have not heard about how Mr. Casey's brain tumor affected him. Can you give any evidence, have you talked with any medical authorities how this affected him in recent years, as your interviews with him?

KING: Good question.

WOODWARD: I'm not a doctor. I have talked to some people about this. The conversation we had before the hospital visit, in December of 1986, which was before his brain tumor, before he had this seizure in mid-December, he was very, very lucid. I called him up at the CIA. I think this is the time he was eating lunch when we were talking, and I was asking him some tough questions about this. And he finally said to me -- and this is what made me think that he was quite well and in control of what was going on. He said, "I wouldn't have your job for all the money in the world. You're destined to only be right some of the time."

KING: What do we make of it? What effect on us, as a citizen?

WOODWARD: I think one of the things that -- if you look at what people are interested in, just the average person on the streets in some city, they are interested in economic well-being, some spiritual well-being, a good life, and also peace, that we're not at war, covertly or overtly. And the CIA is the ears and eyes and the thinker, the thinkers of our national security apparatus. They're out there to stop war, to give us warning of it's going to happen, to give the President...

KING: Are you saying, "Sleep well tonight. The CIA is out there"?

WOODWARD: Well, I'm saying that...

KING: That's what we want.

WOODWARD: The CIA can also get us in real big trouble if they're wrong, if there's a political spin on what they're doing, if they're not up to the task, if they don't realize that the chickens come home to roost in this country; that if you break the law and break the rules or say, "To hell with the Constitution," that the people are not going to tolerate that.

The point is, you want the CIA watched, like you want the State Department watched, like you want the Congress watched, like you want the press watched. We're watched all the time, and we should be. You want the CIA watched. We can't kind of walk away from it and say, "Better not to know."

KING: That's a big mistake.

WOODWARD: Terrible mistake.

KING: We're always better served knowing.

WOODWARD: Yeah. And we can fix things. We can fix things quite fast in this country.

KING: Working on another book?

WOODWARD: Not yet.

KING: You going to take a little back from this.
Right?

WOODWARD: Take a little?

KING: Step back a little.

WOODWARD: Well, no. I'm sure I'll be working on another book soon. But it's all selecting the topic. And in selecting the topic on this, I got onto it early, really, in '84, after some meetings and discussions with Casey, discussions with other people. And it was obvious that this guy was head and shoulders above everyone else in the Administration.

KING: See you in an hour.

WOODWARD: Thanks.

KING: Bob Woodward. He'll be with us in one hour on the Larry King Show on Mutual Radio.