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# Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy For Fighting a Long Nuclear War

## 5-Year Overall Plan Gives Insight Into Thinking Of Administration's Senior Defense Officials

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WASHINGTON, May 29 — Defense Department policy-makers, in a new five-year defense plan, have accepted the premise that nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union could be protracted and have drawn up their first strategy for fighting such a war.

In what Pentagon officials term the "first complete defense guidance of this Administration," drafted for Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger's signature, the armed forces are ordered to prepare for nuclear counterattacks against the Soviet Union "over a protracted period."

The guidance document, drawn up in the Pentagon and reflecting its views, will form the basis for the Defense Department's budget requests for the next five fiscal years. The document was also a basic source for a recent strategic study done by the National Security Council, according to Defense Department officials. That study is the foundation of the Administration's overall strategic position.

### Debate on Nuclear War

The nature of nuclear war has been a subject of intense debate among political leaders, defense specialists and military officers. Some assert that there would be only one all-out mutually destructive exchange. Others argue that a nuclear war, with many exchanges could be fought over days and weeks.

The outcome of the debate will shape the weapons, communications and strategy for nuclear forces. The civilian and military planners, having decided that protracted war is possible, say that American nuclear forces "must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States." The Pentagon considers a "protracted" war anything beyond a single exchange of nuclear weapons.

Those views on nuclear war are expressed in a 125-page unpublished document that outlines the Pentagon's military strategy in detail for the next five years and generally for the next decade. Providing the most authoritative

insight to date into the military thinking of the Reagan Administration's senior defense strategists, it instructs the armed forces to devise plans for defeating the Soviet Union at any level of conflict from insurgencies to nuclear war.

### Other Main Points

The document makes explicit a strategy under which the military forces would be prepared to strike the Soviet homeland and Soviet allies such as Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea in the event of a long conventional war with the Soviet Union.

The guidance document makes these other main points:

¶ Nuclear war strategy would be based on what is known as decapitation, meaning strikes at Soviet political and military leadership and communications lines.

¶ Conventional war strategy would give priority to defense of the American homeland, then to Western Europe and the oil resources of the Persian Gulf. Defense of Asia ranks lower, and forces may be shifted from the Western Pacific to other regions if needed.

¶ In peacetime competition with the Soviet Union, the West's trade policies would put as much pressure as possible on a Soviet economy already burdened with military spending.

¶ Measured military assistance would be given to China in an effort to keep Soviet forces along the Chinese border tied down.

¶ Special operations, meaning guerrilla warfare, sabotage and psychological warfare, would have to be improved. Space would have to be exploited for American military needs.

¶ Readiness of existing forces and building ammunition and other stockpiles to sustain those forces in battle would be given priority over buying new weapons and equipment. The American defense industry would have to be modernized.

¶ A lack of funds means that the five-year goal will probably not be reached, so strategy and forces would have to be as flexible as possible to meet a wide range of threats.

### Plans for Simultaneous Operations

In a conventional war, the document says, "United States forces might be required simultaneously in geographically separated theaters," such as Europe, Southwest Asia, and Korea. In particular, the document says, "it is essential that the Soviet Union be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict should it seek to reach the oil resources of the Persian Gulf."

It emphasizes the threat of simultaneous war in different parts of the world. President Reagan's national security adviser, William P. Clark, said last week that highly mobile American forces would not strike everywhere at once but in sequence from one target to another.

As a peacetime complement to military strategy, the guidance document asserts that the United States and its allies should, in effect, declare economic and technical war on the Soviet Union.

It says that the United States should develop weapons that "are difficult for the Soviets to counter, impose disproportionate costs, open up new areas of major military competition and obsolesce previous Soviet investment."

### A More Detailed Plan

Despite its sometimes arcane language, the document, called "Fiscal Year 1984-1988 Defense Guidance," provides a better understanding of the thinking of military planners in the Reagan Administration than earlier documents, which were either routine public statements or revisions of the Carter Administration's strategy.

In many parts of this document, the Reagan military planners started with a blank sheet of paper. Their views on the possibility of protracted nuclear war differ from those of the Carter Administration's military thinkers, as do their views on global conventional war and particularly on putting economic pressure on the Soviet Union.

The guidance paper represents the basic views of Mr. Weinberger and his deputy, Frank C. Carlucci, as well as those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior field commanders, civilian policy planners and technical specialists.

The document was a basic source for the recent strategic study done by the

National Security Council, according to Defense Department officials. The study was the foundation of the Administration's overall strategy as described by Mr. Clark in a speech May 21. But the tone of his address was more restrained than the guidance document.

#### How Paper Will Be Used

In the Defense Department, the document will provide the overall strategy for proposed programs in the military budget, such as procurement of weapons, operations and maintenance and the size of the armed services for the five years beginning Oct. 1, 1984.

Those programs will be scrutinized by the Office of Management and Budget, then by the President before they are sent to Congress for debate and appropriation of funds. The President, of course, could reduce any of them if the United States negotiated an arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union.

The wide-ranging document directs the armed forces to open up new areas of weaponry, particularly in space, where it proposes the "prototype development of space-based weapons systems," including weapons to destroy Soviet satellites.

At the other end of the scale, the plan says that "we must revitalize and enhance special-operations forces to project United States power where the use of conventional forces would be premature, inappropriate or infeasible," particularly in Eastern Europe. Special operations is a euphemism for guerrillas, saboteurs, commandos and similar unconventional forces.

#### Priorities in the Document

The paper asserts that American forces need better communications and intelligence. It prepares for Mr. Weinberger orders for a variety of new communications systems and says "the services should program resources to insure that intelligence support is adequate."

The document says that "meeting our planning goal during this five-year program period is probably infeasible" because of overall budget restraints, the long time it takes to produce weapons and the urgent need to improve the readiness of current forces.

It therefore sets priority on recruiting and training, acquiring arms for existing forces and building stocks of ammunition and other expendable items to a minimum of a 60-day supply. There is now less than 20 days' supply of many items.

Beyond the concepts, the document is laced with new directives on specific items:

Deployment of the advanced Trident II, or D5, ballistic missile to be launched from submarines would be moved up a year to 1988. That could bring into question the development of the MX missile, since it would become available at best only two years earlier.

The Rapid Deployment Force, whose mission would be to defend United States oil sources around the Persian Gulf, would have up to five Army divisions, two Marine divisions and air wings, 10 Air Force tactical fighter wings and two B-52 wings, and three Navy aircraft carriers and escorts, a force considerably larger than previously contemplated.

United States forces would improve their "capability to assist friendly oil-producing nations in the repair, restoration or defense of their oilfields and producing facilities."

The Navy and Air Force would work together in new operations to defend sea lanes and to fight Soviet ships, with the Air Force providing intelligence from Awacs radar aircraft and flying bombers armed with antiship missiles.

The Marine Corps would experiment with arming Harriers, the planes that are the aerial mainstay of the British forces around the Falklands, with nuclear weapons.

A new emphasis would be placed on military aid to friendly nations. A Special Defense Acquisition Fund would be established to order and stock weapons, including aircraft, that could be sent to troubled allies or other friendly nations in an emergency.

#### A Long Nuclear War

In developing a strategy for fighting a protracted nuclear war, Mr. Weinberger's policy planners went beyond President Carter's Presidential Directive 59, which focused American nuclear strategy on attacks on specific military and political targets.

The new nuclear strategy calls on American forces to be able to "render ineffective the total Soviet (and Soviet-allied) military and political power structure." But it goes on to require the assured destruction of "nuclear and conventional military forces and industry critical to military power." Those forces must be able to maintain, "through a protracted conflict period and afterward, the capability to inflict very high levels of damage" on Soviet industry.

The nuclear strategy emphasizes communications, so the President and his senior military advisers could control a nuclear exchange and not be limited to one all-out response to Soviet attack.

Communications systems "must provide the capability to execute ad hoc

plans, even subsequent to repeated attacks," the document says. "In particular, these systems should support the reconstitution and execution of strategic reserve forces, specifically full communications with our strategic submarines." Communications with submarines today are considered slow and cumbersome.

#### Concerns About the Sea

The guidance plan provides refinements in nuclear doctrine. It says that nuclear weapons intended for strategic strikes at the Soviet homeland might be used for attacking targets, such as military bases, in areas such as Eastern Europe. That appears to be an allusion to cruise missiles launched from submarines.

Moreover, the document says, the Soviet Union might be tempted to start a nuclear attack on the United States Navy in the belief that the conflict could be limited to the sea. "Therefore," it says, "it will be United States policy that a nuclear war beginning with Soviet attacks at sea will not necessarily remain limited to the sea."

The military plan says that development of ballistic missile defense systems to defend the United States against Soviet nuclear attack would be accelerated. It also says that the United States might seek a revision in the anti-ballistic missile treaty if deployment of the MX intercontinental missile required it.

In conventional arms, the document says that "United States conventional forces, in conjunction with those of our allies, should be capable of putting at risk Soviet interests, including the Soviet homeland."

The armed forces are directed to prepare specific strategies for meeting Soviet aggression. In Western Europe, it says, "First priority will be to stop the initial Warsaw Pact thrust with minimal loss of territory." That rejects a strategy of trading space for time to permit allied forces to build up for a counterattack.

The paper calls for sea and air transport capable of lifting six Army divisions, half of a Marine division and air wing and 60 Air Force tactical fighter squadrons to Europe within 10 days. That would be impossible with current transport.

Moreover, the document says, "emphasis will be given to offensive moves against Warsaw Pact flanks to force diversion of Pact resources from the central front." The northern flank rests on Norway, the southern on Turkey.

Further, "to exploit political, economic and military weaknesses within the Warsaw Pact and to disrupt enemy rear operations, special-operations forces will conduct operations in Eastern Europe and in the northern and southern NATO regions," the document says. Particular attention would be given to eroding support within the Soviet sphere of Eastern Europe.

#### Persian Gulf Strategy

As outlined in the paper, the strategy for Southwest Asia, including the Persian Gulf, directs American forces to be ready to force their way in, if necessary, and not to wait for an invitation from a friendly government, which has been the publicly stated policy.

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It also shows that the primary objective of American military power in that region would be to stop Soviet infiltration or invasion, and not necessarily to head off the invasion of one nation by another in the region, as has occasionally been officially suggested.

Reducing Soviet access to technology from the United States and other non-Communist countries has long been among Mr. Weinberger's keenest objectives and the Pentagon plan reflects that. It also reflects an intention to execute a technical strategy designed to erode Soviet economic strength.

That strategy, the plan says, should focus "investment on weapons systems that render the accumulated Soviet equipment stocks obsolescent." It should impose "costs on the Soviets by raising uncertainty regarding their ability to accomplish some of their higher-priority missions."