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SECTION: U.S. NEWS; Pg. 18

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HEADLINE: WAITING FOR UNCLE SAM;
Why contras are failing on home front

BYLINE: by Carla Anne Robbins

DATELINE: Managua

BODY:

The vendors of the Mercado Oriental market here once risked their lives for the Sandinistas, hiding them in the maze of stalls from Anastasio Somoza's troops. But the Sandinistas are now the enemy, denounced by the stall keepers for betraying their own revolution.

These small merchants presumably should be supporters of the contras, the U.S.-supported forces in the remote North. Yet they emphatically are not flocking to the rebels' cause. Most are only dimly aware of the contras. Fewer still want to help. "Where are they -- why aren't they fighting here?" asks a vegetable peddler. "The Sandinistas are bastards. But who are the contras?"

In the nearly seven years it has been in power, the Sandinista regime has squandered most of its popular support. But the contras have picked up little of what the Sandinistas lost. Even the small but vocal opposition tolerated by the Sandinistas -- the "Democratic center" parties, unions and professional groups -- is divided as to whether the contras are advancing, or hurting, the anti-government cause.

Moreover, there has been no effort at all to organize an internal front to resist Marxist rule. There are no marches, no strikes, no sabotage, not even pro-contra scrawlings on Managua's graffiti-splashed walls. Today, just as it was three years ago when they began, the contras' popular base is limited to the illiterate and extremely conservative peasants in the isolated villages of rural Nicaragua.

In any case, building popular resistance is not easy. Veteran guerrillas, the Sandinistas know all the tricks and have preemptively closed off most avenues for dissent.

Since last October, almost all civil liberties have been suspended, including the right to strike, free expression and outdoor assembly. Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, the Sandinistas' most respected critic and primary target of the October restrictions, says Nicaragua is not "in the strict sense of the word" a totalitarian society. But he adds: "There are signs we are moving toward totalitarianism."

Nicaraguans are also restrained by a virtual blackout of critical news. Two of the three newspapers in Managua are government run. The third, La Prensa, is scissored daily by government censors vigilant to any perceived slights,

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whether speculation about President Daniel Ortega's latest trip to Cuba or a photo of poorly maintained water bicycles at a resort. In January, the regime closed the lone independent radio station -- the church-run Radio Catolica -- for failing to broadcast an Ortega speech.

Yet Sandinista control is, by official decision, not absolute. Opposition parties and organizations can keep offices, hold indoor meetings, even call press conferences, although they are unlikely to get more than a few paragraphs of coverage on the back page of La Prensa. And while opposition leaders have been jailed, it rarely has been for more than a few days. Few, if any, have disappeared or been murdered.

The contras themselves, and their supporters inside Nicaragua and in Washington, share responsibility for the absence of an internal-resistance front. Part of the problem is the contras' questionable credentials: Many of them are former Somoza guardsmen. Subsequent links to Argentine death squads and CIA contractors have made them easy targets for Sandinista propagandists.

The contras' failure, until just a few weeks ago, to come up with a coherent political program -- the result of infighting within the divided movement -- has also hampered their ability to rally internal support. Many Nicaraguans say that they bet on the Sandinistas without really knowing what they stood for. It is a mistake they will not make twice.

The internal opposition is also doing nothing to promote the contra cause. Luis H. Guzman, a Popular Social Christian delegate to the Sandinista-controlled National Assembly, says the contras only make the domestic opposition's job harder because the rebels are forcing the government to limit all dissent. "What else can a government at war do?" he says. "What [contra leader Adolfo] Calero and his friends are doing is easy. Inside, we're the ones who take the risks."

Erik Ramirez, head of the Social Christian Party, is less certain that the Sandinistas would restore full individual liberties even if the contras were to disappear. But he's willing to test them. "I don't trust anybody," he says. "But I'm willing to take the chance. If they don't comply, then the whole world will see that Reagan was right."

The contras do, however, have powerful political allies. The Sandinistas' strongest internal critics have banded together as the National Democratic Coordinator, which publicly denies links to the rebels, but in private is said to be supporting them. Among its members and allies are leading businessmen, two trade unions, several political parties ranging from centrist to extreme right wing, and La Prensa. The group, known as the Coordinadora, has done little internally for the rebels. Most of its efforts remain focused on drumming up U.S. backing.

Enrique Bolanos, who heads the country's largest business association, rejects any suggestion that his people should do more inside the country to undermine the Sandinista government. "I have a friend on Costa Rica who asked why we didn't strike," he says. "I told him he should come here and strike and that I'd stand right behind him. Corazon Aquino did what she did because it was possible. Here, it is not."

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Another explanation for the nonaction may be that the Coordinadora and the rest of the opposition are operating on the assumption that, sooner or later, a U.S. invasion will occur. "It's frustrating," says a State Department official in Washington. "But they're sitting on their hands, waiting for us to bail them out."

GRAPHIC: Picture 1, In Nicaragua, the Marxist Sandinista regime tolerates no criticism from the media. Here the respected newspaper La Prensa is being made up after the scissors of government censors have excised even the mildest suggestion of missteps by the Sandinistas, PAOLO BOSIO -- GAMMA/LIAISON FOR USN&WR; Picture 2, Nicaraguan Cardinal Obando y Bravo, a leading opposition figure, with parishioners. The Roman Catholic Church is among the most persistent Sandinista critics, PAOLO BOSIO -- GAMMA/LIAISON FOR USN&WR; Picture 3, A meeting of the opposition Social Christian Party in Managua. While political parties are allowed to function, media coverage is sharply restricted, PAOLO BASIO -- GAMMA/LIAISON FOR USN&WR

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SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 36

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HEADLINE: THE SPY FLIGHT THAT KILLED IKE'S DREAM

SERIES: THE U-2 CRISIS;
PART 1

HIGHLIGHT:

On May Day, 1960, two weeks before President Eisenhower was to meet Nikita Khrushchev at a Paris summit, the CIA's Francis Gary Powers flew a U-2 spy plane deep into the Soviet Union and crashed. This mysterious event caused one of the most serious confrontations of the cold war and may have changed the course of history. Historian Michael R. Beschloss has written an important new book on the U-2 crisis. Here is the first of two exclusive excerpts from Mayday, a Main Selection of the Book-of-the-Month Club. The book draws on interviews with key Eisenhower and CIA officials as well as private diaries, letters and heretofore-secret documents. Mayday will be published by Harper & Row, Publishers, on May 1.

BODY:

April 30, 1960. There was no premonition of disaster. On a tranquil Saturday like this, the President's day began in the First Lady's bedroom on the second floor of the White House, where the first beams of sunlight pushed through the floral draperies and fell across the sleeping man and woman.

In the absence of an urgent telephone call, Dwight David Eisenhower was awakened by his valet, a black sergeant named John Moaney who had laid out the General of the Army's clothes in Algiers, London, Frankfurt, New York and Paris. When Moaney knocked, the President usually cried, "O.K.!" and reached for a bathrobe, his cheeks pink and fringe of snowy hair ruffled from sleep. To

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avoid waking his wife, Eisenhower slipped into the adjoining President's bedroom, which he used for changing clothes and naps.

He ordinarily took his morning shower before stirring hot shaving foam in an old-fashioned mug and moving a safety razor up and down the most famous face in the Western World. In the spring of 1960, the image in the mirror looked firmer and graver than the face smiling from the "I LIKE IKE" banners of his first campaign, as if seven years in the White House had chastened and deepened him. But the actual reason was his diet.

Since his heart attack in 1955, the President had obeyed his doctor and forsworn the rich food he loved, to bring himself down to 173 pounds, his football weight at West Point in 1913. Stripped of the extra layer of fat, his features were at once more sensitive and more powerful. Years later, on first meeting Eisenhower, Henry Kissinger was not prepared for the "cold, deep-blue, extraordinarily penetrating eyes."

After he dressed and took breakfast, the President walked down the wide hall that served First Families as a private parlor and into the private elevator. Soon he entered his pale green Oval Office and sat down behind the rosewood desk.

Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, his staff secretary, walked in to deliver the morning intelligence briefing. He reminded the President of something so secret that it was known only to two other key members of the White House staff: In West Pakistan, a CIA pilot was waiting to fly for 9 hours to Norway across the forbidden territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Eisenhower had always been reluctant to violate Soviet airspace. He privately noted that "if they were to do this to us," it might start a nuclear war. But by 1959, CIA deputy director Richard Bissell, father of the U-2 program, reported that the black planes were fathering a large percentage of "our hard intelligence information about the Soviet Union."

This spring, the President had been more reluctant than ever. Four years into the program, there was not only greater risk of downing, but, two weeks from now, Eisenhower was scheduled to meet Nikita Khrushchev at the summit in Paris along with the leaders of Britain and France. In June, Eisenhower would go to the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev was planning an extravagant welcome.

Negotiators for both sides had drawn close to reaching a limited nuclear-test-ban treaty, which, if signed, would be the first major accord of the cold war. Privately, Eisenhower told aides that he was "determined" to achieve it. Since becoming President in 1953, his chief aspiration had been to create a lasting improvement in American-Soviet relations. He told French President Charles de Gaulle, "What a splendid exit it would be for me to end up . . . with an agreement between East and West!"

Nevertheless, on April 9, 1960, the President had sent the U-2 back into Russia. Then the CIA asked for still another flight. Eisenhower approved the mission but allowed only two weeks in which to fly: "We don't want that thing flying up there while the summit's on."

For two weeks, clouds and snowstorms condealed much of the route over the Soviet Union. Bissell pleaded for a few more days. Eisenhower agreed but

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specified that "no operation is to be carried out after May 1."

By this, the last day of April, the pilot and plane were still waiting in West Pakistan. If they could not fly tomorrow on May Day, there would be no mission at least until after the summit.

Saturday evening. Eisenhower joined his wife Mamie; his son John, who served as a Presidential aide; John's wife Barbara, and the four grandchildren for dinner at Camp David. After the meal, they watched "April Showers," starring Jack Carson and Ann Sothern, a sentimental tale made in 1948 about a vaudeville family's rise to Broadway.

As the 69-year-old President sat with his family in the darkened room, the changing brightness of the screen lighting their faces, he looked forward to nine final months in the White House that would be the capstone of his long career: A Soviet-American accord at Paris, the grand tour of Russia and, as he also expected, a Republican victory in November that would be a final ratification of his Presidency.

He could not know that these expectations largely rested on the fate of a young former Air Force lieutenant whose name he had never heard, who was tossing and turning on his cot in a noisy, steaming hangar in West Pakistan.

In South Asia, it was now Sunday, the first of May. Inside the pitch-dark hangar at Peshawar, 2 hours after midnight, Francis Gary Powers rose from his cot and braced himself for his mission -- 3,788 miles north to Bodo, Norway, bisecting the Soviet land mass at the Urals.

While squeezing into his flight suit, he was asked, "Do you want the silver dollar?" It looked like an ordinary coin with a loop attached for fastening onto a key chain. But inside the two halves of the coin was a tiny pin loaded with a lethal shellfish toxin perfected by the CIA at a reported cost of \$3 million.

As Richard Bissell later said, the U-2 pilots were "exhorted but not ordered" to kill themselves if caught by the Russians. If a plane went down and a U-2 pilot was captured, he might well prefer suicide to torture. Powers accepted the coin and dropped it into the pocket of his flight suit.

The CIA did not think there was much chance that a U-2 pilot would survive a mishap. The plane was so fragile that it would probably break up under assault. An escaping pilot could not survive at high altitude. An explosive was stowed behind the U-2 pilot's seat before each flight into Russia. Each pilot was informed that in an emergency he must set off the bomb before using his ejection seat and parachute. Pilots were told that after flipping the two switches, they would have 70 seconds to leave the plane before the bomb exploded.

Some wondered whether the explosive really had a shorter delay. Some suspected that there was no delay, and that when they flipped the second switch, the bomb would obliterate not only the plane and equipment but them too.

At 5:20 a.m., with a package of Kents in his pocket, Powers was strapped into the scorching cockpit of his plane. To keep the U-2 from being traced to the U.S. government, the plane's black skin and the pilot's silver suit were both unmarked.

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At 6:26 the signal came. He locked his plastic canopy from the inside. The ladder was pulled from his plane. He jerked the throttle. The engine screamed and the plane shot into the unforgettable parabola so steep that early U-2 pilots feared that their planes would overturn. To his east was China in the full brilliance of dawn; to the west, Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East were emerging from the night.

In to time, he was soaring over 60,000 feet. His underwear was still soaked from the Peshawar heat, but now he shivered. He switched on the autopilot and wrote in his flight log, "Delayed one-half hour."

Sixty minutes into his mission, he neared the air frontier of the Soviet Union. The radio could not be used to let colleagues in Pakistan know; that could alert the Russians. Instead he broadcasted two clicks. Peshawar sent back a single click: Proceed as planned.

Nikita Khrushchev was asleep. In the dark, workers in Moscow's Red Square were tacking up bunting and moving bleachers in preparation for the national celebration of May Day.

In Khrushchev's bedroom, the telephone rang. As he later recalled, at the other end of the line was his Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky. An unidentified plane had crossed the Afghan frontier into Soviet airspace. Both men knew who had sent the plane.

Khrushchev was furious: Bad enough to invade Soviet airspace, but on a national holiday -- and 15 days before the Paris summit! The plane must be shot down.

This was easier said than done. Both men knew that for nearly four years they had failed to strike the American intruder. But Malinovsky said he had already given the order: "If our antiaircraft units can just keep their eyes open and stop yawning long enough, I'm sure we'll knock the plane down."

Sealed inside his flight suit, a single soul over a ghostly and menacing land, Frank Powers gazed into the midnight-blue stratosphere that only a small brotherhood of pilots knew and switched his cameras on and off.

He swept on past the Aral Sea over the long route north to Chelyabinsk. At this instant, by his later recollection, the plane pitched nose-up; the autopilot had conked out. Soon it conked out again. If he proceeded, he would have to fly the airplane manually.

This could be treacherous: Should he turn back? By now he was roughly 1,300 miles inside Russia. He decided to "go on and accomplish what I had set out to do."

Next target was Sverdlovsk, which was defended by the Soviet Union's new SA-2 Guideline missiles. As Powers later said, he switched on cameras and other equipment, and turned 90 degrees, toward the southwestern edge of the city. Now he was more than halfway into his mission. In Washington, it was 1:53 on Sunday morning. Moscow time was 8:53 a.m.

He heard a dull "thump." The plane convulsed, and an orange flash lit the cockpit and sky. Knocked back in his seat, he cried, "My God, I've had it

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now!"

He seized the throttle with his left hand, keeping his right on the steering wheel. The aircraft's nose swung down; when he pulled on the wheel, he found that the plane had gone out of control. A violent movement shook the plane and flung him about the cockpit. Wings snapped off. With its nose to the heavens, the mangled fuselage spun toward earth.

The destructor switches. As he later recalled, he reached for them and then changed his mind; first he must position himself to eject. Powers was so sprawled that he feared that during ejection his legs might be sheared off by the metal canopy rails overhead. Nevertheless, he forced both heels into the stirrups of his seat. But he could not force his shoulders back. He was on the edge of panic when he realized that he could simply climb out of the cockpit. He reached up and unfastened the canopy; it sailed into space.

He later testified that he was planning to throw the destructor switches when centrifugal force threw him halfway out of the cockpit. His face plate frosted over. Still tied to the plane by oxygen hoses, by his account, he tried to climb back into the cockpit to set off the destruction device. But the G-force, the gravitational force, was overpowering. Unable to thrust his hand under the windscreen to reach the switches, he later recalled thinking, "I've just got to try to save myself now." Kicking and squirming, he must have broken the hoses because suddenly he was free.

The orange-and-white parachute bloomed overhead. He flicked off his face plate, and fresh air blasted his lungs. Fragments of his plane fell past him. What about the silver dollar? He unscrewed the tiny loop, tossed away the two halves of the coin and slipped the pin into his pocket, just in case.

Plunging fast now, he dropped fatally close to electric-power lines as the earth rushed up to greet him and his head slammed hard against the denied territory of the Soviet Union.

In Red Square, soldiers, students, farmers, athletes marched past the frieze of Soviet leaders standing atop the Lenin-Stalin Tomb. Marshal S. S. Biryuzov, chief commander of Soviet anti-aircraft forces, spoke into Khrushchev's ear: The intruder plane had been downed. The pilot had been captured alive and was being questioned. Khrushchev congratulated the Marshal on "this wonderful news."

Khrushchev's smile may have taxed his considerable dramatic skills, for this "wonderful news" was unlikely to help him. Despite Western references to the "absolute ruler of the Soviet Union," Khrushchev had actually almost been overthrown in 1957. Potential rivals remained, waiting for an opportunity.

Now, a fortnight before the summit he had sought for years, this pirate plane. And on May Day, no less!

Khrushchev knew that it would be almost impossible to conceal American wreckage and a live pilot, even if he wished. Once word spread through the party, the Army and the KGB, potential foes might seize the violation as evidence of how foolish Khrushchev had been, infatuated with Eisenhower and an Uncle Sam now revealed to be as warlike as ever. The "wonderful news," if not deftly managed, could throw Khrushchev into another struggle for his political life.

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At the Waldorf-Astoria in New York, Allen Dulles took Sunday breakfast with 2,500 members of the New York Police Department to be lauded for "distinguished government service and dedication to Christian ideals."

The CIA director did not know yet that the U-2 was down, but his people in Washington did. Professional eavesdroppers of the National Security Agency had followed the Powers plane as it soared up the Urals; from listening posts they heard the babble of frantic Soviet officers demanding its interception. CIA men at Bodo airfield in Norway flashed word to Washington that the plane was overdue.

Andrew Goodpaster was spending Sunday with his family in Alexandria when the CIA man called. Goodpaster called the President, who was skeet shooting at Camp David: "One of our reconnaissance planes on a scheduled flight is overdue and possibly lost" -- the news Eisenhower had feared since the start of the U-2 program.

The President boarded his helicopter. As it flew toward the White House, he looked down on the farms and tract houses of the Maryland countryside. He had once told his aides that "if one of these planes is shot down, this thing is going to be on my head. I'm going to catch hell. The world will be in a mess."

It would be embarrassing for the United States to rebut Russian charges of aerial espionage, but he had the satisfaction of knowing that his government could plausibly deny that the U-2 pilot had deliberately violated Soviet airspace. The CIA and Joint Chiefs had assured him that it would be "impossible" for the Soviets to capture a live pilot.

Eisenhower's chopper landed on the south grounds of the White House at 4:26 p.m. At the same hour, in his prison cell in Moscow, Francis Gary Powers fell asleep for the night.

Monday morning, May 2. Andrew Goodpaster went to the Oval Office and told the President that the U-2 pilot was still missing. A CIA man had brought over the agreed-upon draft of the cover story. It would say that a U-2 weather pilot in Turkey had been lost after reporting oxygen problems by radio.

The President read the document. For years, some of his lieutenants would deny that he had ever read or approved it. But, in fact, he nodded assent and handed the sheet back to Goodpaster for distribution by NASA.

At the CIA, a colleague heard Richard Bissell assure Allen Dulles and other top officials that it was "impossible" for the U-2 pilot to have survived a crash.

Wednesday, May 4. In Moscow, members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party wrangled in secret over how to handle the downing of the American plane.

For days, Khrushchev had been pondering his decision: Should he sweep the U-2 under the rug or reveal it in a propaganda assault that would stir up Soviet and world opinion against the United States?

If he swept the matter under the rug, the Paris summit and Eisenhower's trip to Russia might proceed. But this would give Khrushchev's enemies a powerful

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weapon. They would argue that Khrushchev was so timid that he was willing to tolerate even such a grave infraction.

Dramatic revelation of the U-2 downing and a propaganda attack on the United States would satisfy Khrushchev's critics and would put the Americans on the defensive. But the period of good feeling which began at Camp David would surely be over. The indignation of Soviet outer circles and the Soviet people might endanger the Paris summit and compel re-escalation of the cold war.

After Camp David, Khrushchev had extolled the American President and peaceful co-existence as no Soviet leader had before. Casting Eisenhower and the Americans as villains now would be a grandiose, humiliating public confession of how wrong he had been.

Khrushchev proposed a plan. Tomorrow the Supreme Soviet would convene in Moscow. He would inform the parliament's members that the United States had sent a spy plane into Soviet territory. He would reveal that the plane had been shot down, but not that the pilot had been captured alive.

Thursday morning, May 5. In the Great Kremlin Palace, Khrushchev's arrival on stage touched off resounding applause. The leader grinned, clapped his own fleshy hands and the room fell quiet: "Comrade deputies! This session of the Supreme Soviet has convened in the spring -- a wonderful time."

After 3 hours, he turned to the world scene: "As you know, on May 16, a meeting will take place in Paris involving the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France." Success was "essential if a solid basis is to be laid for peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems."

But there was cause for alarm. "Comrade deputies! On the instructions of the Soviet government, I must report to you on aggressive actions against the Soviet Union in the past few weeks by the United States of America.

"The United States has been sending aircraft that have crossed our state frontiers and intruded upon the airspace of the Soviet Union." The U.S. had sent such a plane on April 9, 1960. "The American military apparently found this impunity to their liking and decided to repeat their aggressive act. The day they chose for this was the most festive day for the working peoples of all countries -- May Day!

"On this day, early in the morning, at 5:36 Moscow time, an American plane crossed our frontier and continued its flight deep into Soviet territory. . . . The plane was shot down." Earsplitting applause from the audience. He twisted his neck to glare up at U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson: "What was this? A May Day greeting?" Delegates whooped and stamped their feet.

"The question then arises: Who sent this aircraft across the Soviet frontier? Was it the American Commander in Chief who, as everyone knows, is the President? Or was this aggressive act performed by Pentagon militarists without the President's knowledge?" Khrushchev charged that "American aggressive circles" were trying to "torpedo the Paris summit or, at any rate, prevent an agreement for which the whole world is waiting."

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Now he capped off the outrage he had so artfully whipped up. "We address the American people: In spite of these aggressive acts against our country, we have not forgotten the friendly encounters we had during our visit to America. Even now, I profoundly believe that the American people -- except for certain imperialist and monopolist circles -- want peace and friendship with the Soviet Union. . . . I do not doubt President Eisenhower's sincere desire for peace."

In Washington, it was 7 o'clock on Thursday morning. Members and staff of the National Security Council were rushing to helicopter pads in the District, Maryland and Virginia, part of a long-planned Doomsday rehearsal for the day Washington was destroyed by nuclear attack. They flew to High Point, a top-secret command post in Virginia's Blue Ridge.

There, two men gave a history of Soviet and American long-range missiles. As they spoke, Goodpaster was called to a secure telephone to talk to James Hagerty, the President's press secretary. Hagerty asked about Khrushchev's allegations; the White House press was already breaking down his door. What should he tell them? Goodpaster had a quiet word with the President and told Hagerty to stand by.

Eisenhower asked senior officials of State, Defense and CIA to join him in an adjoining lounge. Someone said they must refute Khrushchev's charges at once. The President disagreed; NASA's release had said enough. But others complained that silence might be taken as tacit admission that Khrushchev's charges were true. Eisenhower relented and asked Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon to draft a statement.

At 11:23, he returned to the White House. Hagerty walked into the Oval Office and crisply told Eisenhower and Goodpaster that Khrushchev's charges were such a major story that the President must speak to the press at once.

This raised Goodpaster's hackles: If the American government was going to hand out a deliberate lie, he wanted the President kept as far away from it as possible. But Goodpaster was handicapped from fully making his case; the U-2 was so secret that Hagerty was not cleared to know. Even at this crucial moment, as Goodpaster later recalled, he and Eisenhower did not tell him everything about the real mission of this flight. Hence, Hagerty persisted in arguing that the President be involved as much as possible with this story.

Eisenhower refused to meet the press but agreed to have both the State Department and NASA issue statements on the U-2.

On the fifth floor of the State Department, Douglas Dillon pressed the telephone receiver to his ear and scrawled on a pad. At the other end of the line was Allen Dulles at the CIA.

The two men felt that the less said, the better. When they finished writing, Dillon gave the finished draft to Lincoln White, the State Department spokesman. At 12:45 p.m., White met reporters and read it aloud:

"The Department has been informed by NASA that, as announced May 3, a U-2 weather-research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian, has been missing since May 1. . . . Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane has been shot down over the U.S.S.R. on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane."

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During the past two days, Richard Bissell had given NASA detailed cover information on the U-2 in question-and-answer form. Now Goodpaster called NASA's administrator, T. Keith Glennan: NASA should put some of Bissell's material in a written memorandum. Goodpaster thought a written statement by NASA would be better than "turning the press loose on them."

NASA spokesman Walter Bonney worked Bissell's material into a statement. At 1:30 he met the press. Dreading the prospect of lying to reporters who liked and trusted him, he drew a deep breath and read aloud:

"One of NASA's U-2 research airplanes, in use since 1956 in a continuing program to study gust-meteorological conditions found at high altitude, has been missing since about 9 Sunday morning, local time, when the pilot reported he was having oxygen difficulties over the Lake Van, Turkey, area." Planned route: 1,400 nautical miles. Flight time: 3 hours, 45 minutes. Pilot was last heard from flying northeast. Maximum altitude: 45,000 feet. Mission's purpose: Gathering information on "clear-air turbulence, convective clouds, wind shear, the jet stream and such widespread weather patterns as typhoons." Bonney continued with detail after detail.

When Douglas Dillon read the NASA announcement, he was appalled. He had known that NASA would be issuing a more detailed statement but had not expected that the statement would include so much information that the Russians could disprove: "This statement was absolutely crazy because we knew the Russians would jump us on it."

It was Thursday evening in Moscow. Ambassador Thompson was attending an Ethiopian Embassy reception at the Sovietskaya Hotel. Within his earshot, the Swedish ambassador asked Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik under which article of the U.N. Charter the Soviets would raise the plane incident.

Malik said they didn't know yet: They were still questioning the pilot.

Still questioning the pilot? Thompson rushed back to his embassy and sent a "MOST URGENT" cable to Dillon in Washington.

Malik's slip of the tongue was the first concrete indication that the Russians might have captured the U-2 pilot alive. Had Thompson's cable reached Washington in time, it might have kept the Americans from releasing the NASA statement that could be so damningly contradicted by a live U-2 pilot. But the cable arrived at 1:34 p.m. -- 4 minutes after Walter Bonney began reading his statement at NASA.

After sending his alert to Washington, Thompson sent another cable to dissuade colleagues at home from concluding that Khrushchev had given up on the Paris summit:

AS I LISTENED TO HIS REMARKS ON THE PLANE INCIDENT, IT APPEARED TO ME THAT THEY HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN ORDER NOT -- REPEAT NOT -- TO SLAM ANY DOORS.

That evening, John Eisenhower called his mother and asked how his father liked the news about the U-2. The President barked, "Do you think I ought to like it?"

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The next day, Dulles and Bissell wanted Eisenhower to confide "at least partly" in congressional leaders about the U-2, but he refused: "These congressional fellows will inevitably spill the beans."

Saturday, May 7. In Moscow, Khrushchev arrived to wind up the meeting of the Supreme Soviet: "Comrade deputies! The aggressive act committed by the U.S. Air Force against the Soviet Union has justifiably incensed deputies and all Soviet people." With a smirk, he read out the most tantalizing portions of the State Department and NASA announcements. Then he dropped his bombshell:

"Comrades, I must let you in on a secret. When I made my report two days ago, I deliberately refrained from mentioning that we have the remnants of the plane -- and we also have the pilot, who is quite alive and kicking!"

Thunderous applause and laughter.

"Just look how many silly things they have said: Lake Van, scientific research and so on. Now when they learn that the pilot is alive, they will have to think up something else. And they will!"

Hoots and more laughter. "First of all, I wish to announce that the pilot of the downed American plane is alive and in good health. He is now in Moscow. The pilot's name is Francis Gary Powers."

Khrushchev reported that Powers had testified that he had had "no dizziness" or faulty oxygen equipment. Following orders, he had been flying along an assigned route, switching on and off his apparatus for spying on the Soviet Union "until the very moment his pirate flight into this country was cut short."

Khrushchev pulled out large copies of aerial photographs and waved them. "Here are some of the pictures showing military airfields. Here -- look at this! Here are the airfields -- here! Fighters in position on the ground. Two little white strips. Here they are! Here they are!" More thunderous applause.

(The "U-2 photographs" Khrushchev held up were counterfeit. Having halted the mission, he was unwilling to allow even a small sample of its intelligence product to reach Washington.)

Khrushchev revealed that the pilot had also carried two gold watches and seven gold ladies' rings: "Perhaps he was supposed to have flown still higher, to Mars, and seduced the Martian ladies!" More laughter, and then the fun was over:

"From the lofty rostrum of the Supreme Soviet, we warn those countries that make their territory available for launching planes with anti-Soviet intentions: Do not play with fire, gentlemen! . . .

"I remember the talks I had with Americans. They impressed me very much. I still believe that those who met me want peace and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. But apparently the Pentagon militarists and their monopolist allies cannot halt their war efforts."

Once again Khrushchev divorced this military clique from Eisenhower: "I am quite willing to grant that the President knew nothing about the fact that such a plane was sent into the Soviet Union. . . . But this should put us even

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more on guard.

"When the military starts bossing the show, the results can be disastrous. Such a pirate, prone to dizziness, may in fact drop a hydrogen bomb on foreign soil. And this means that the peoples of the land where this pirate was born will unavoidably and immediately get a more destructive hydrogen bomb in return!"

From Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson cabled Washington:

KHRUSHCHEV HAS HIMSELF STATED THE DILEMMA WITH WHICH WE ARE FACED. SHOULD WE DENY THAT THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THIS ACTION?

Andrew Goodpaster called John Eisenhower at Gettysburg, where the President's son and his family lived a mile from the President's weekend and soon-to-be retirement home: "They've got the pilot alive."

John climbed into his car and drove to the rambling white house his parents had built over the frame of an old red farmhouse. He found his father standing in the glassed-in porch in the rear, looking out on the limegreen Civil War battlegrounds he cherished.

The President's reaction to the news: "Unbelievable." Now he knew that Khrushchev had irrefutable evidence that his administration had deliberately violated Soviet airspace, spied on the Soviet Union and several times lied about it to the world.

There must be some response to Khrushchev's speech -- especially Khrushchev's "willingness to grant" that the CIA and Pentagon had sent the U-2 into Russia without the President's knowledge. Evidently Khrushchev was offering him an escape hatch. If Eisenhower used it, maintaining this fiction, then the Paris summit might proceed.

But this would create other problems. What would the world think if the American President had so little control over his own government that minions could, without his knowledge, send planes into Russia that might conceivably start a war? And the escape hatch might turn out to be a trap: If Eisenhower shirked responsibility for the U-2, Khrushchev might then produce new evidence revealing the President personally to have lied.

Thus, he had the choice of presenting himself as a leader whose government was capable of accidental provocation -- or declaring in public that he was the man behind the U-2, the first time in history that an American President confessed that his government practiced espionage.

Repeatedly assured that he would never face such a dilemma, Eisenhower could fairly wonder how "this goddamned plane" had fallen in Russia and the pilot survived. Now he faced leaving the White House in the wake of perhaps the bitterest disappointment of his life, as if the gods who had always looked so kindly on him had suddenly decided to exact a price for their gifts of the past.

Tomorrow was the 15th anniversary of victory in Europe.

In Washington, Allen Dulles privately offered his resignation: The President could tell the world that his CIA director had been fired for exceeding his

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authority.

"That's the last thing the President would want," said Andrew Goodpaster. "The President isn't in the business of using scapegoats."

Secretary of State Christian Herter had just returned from Europe. Now that they knew the espionage equipment and U-2 pilot had survived the crash, "we had to make a decision," as Herter later said. "Were we going to keep on lying about this, or were we going to tell the truth?"

Herter suggested a statement that was half true, half false. It would admit that the United States had flown espionage missions for four years along the Soviet border and that a U-2 had "probably" flown into Soviet airspace, but deny that the incursion had been authorized in Washington. This might give Khrushchev the satisfaction he seemed to be asking for and still protect the President.

Informed at Gettysburg, Eisenhower thought this "might prove to be a mistake" but agreed that it was "worth a try." Shortly after 6 p.m., Lincoln White read the new statement to reporters at the State Department.

Sunday, May 8. The Sunday morning papers evinced astonishment and indignation. In the New York Herald Tribune, Walter Lippmann wrote, "Denying that it authorized the flight, the administration has entered a plea of incompetence."

At Gettysburg, Eisenhower was rebelling against the new statement. It galled him to keep silent while Khrushchev presented a "passionate but highly distorted presentation of one particular phase of international espionage."

He was not priggish about lying for his country. But Khrushchev might go on television again to raise irrefutable evidence that the President had indeed authorized the May Day mission. Some reporter might exploit a leak from someone who knew that the President had approved every single U-2 flight. Then Eisenhower's credibility would be lost forever.

His entire training suggested that the man at the top should take full responsibility. When Milton Eisenhower told his brother that he must not take the rap for the U-2, the President snapped that if he blamed a subordinate, he would have to fire him and he would not "be guilty of such hypocrisy." Not only would this be a "glaring and permanent injustice," but it would confirm that the President was not in control of his own government. People around the world would fear that a low-level U.S. officer could start World War III.

The President called Herter and told him to issue a new statement admitting that for four years the U-2 had been sent under a broad presidential order to get "adequate knowledge" of the Soviet military-industrial complex and protect the nation from surprise attack.

He was still not ready to tell the full truth. The statement should say that while the President knew that sometimes "unusual and unorthodox" means were required to do this, he had not been given the details of reconnaissance missions. He wanted "no specific tie" of the May Day flight to him.

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Monday, May 9. In Moscow, at a Czech Embassy reception, Khrushchev denounced the State Department's Saturday-night statement: "Here is how they explain the spy-plane affair -- it is impossible to admit but impossible to deny. It's like the famous anecdote about the spinster who isn't a spinster because she has a baby!" All laughed.

He said he did not want to "heat up passions" against the U.S. He swung his open hand in the direction of Llewellyn Thompson: "I respect the U.S. ambassador and am sure that he had nothing to do with this incursion."

Before Khrushchev left the party, he told Thompson, "I must talk with you," and took him into a side room. When the door closed, as Thompson recalled, Khrushchev said, "This U-2 thing has put me in a terrible spot. You have to get me off it."

Thompson pledged to do everything he could. But in Washington, the State Department made the announcement in Christian Herter's name that Eisenhower had personally authorized the U-2 flights. The statement implied that there might be more.

In Moscow, Khrushchev read this newest statement and he was apoplectic. He had gone out of his way not to accuse the President of sending the U-2 on May Day. Now this statement seemed "as though Eisenhower was boasting arrogantly about what the United States could do not would do."

Wednesday, May 11. At Gorky Park in Moscow, the Russians put the U-2's remains on display in a carnival of agitprop. At 4 o'clock, a black Chaika limousine pulled up. Khrushchev bounced out and bustled about the hall, examining the noiseless pistol, ejection seat and destructor unit.

A reporter asked whether the newest American statement changed Khrushchev's opinion of the President. "It has, of course. I was not aware that this plan was not the caprice of an irresponsible officer. I was horrified to learn that the President had endorsed the acts." Khrushchev spared Eisenhower but lambasted Herter. Shaking his fist, he cried, "Far from feeling guilty and ashamed of aggressive actions, he justifies them and says they will continue in the future! Only countries which are at war with each other can act this way!"

"Do you still want President Eisenhower to come to the Soviet Union?"

Khrushchev knitted his brow for 15 seconds: "What do you want me to say? Come up here and say it for me. . . . You know my attitude toward the President. I have often spoken about it. I am a human being, and I have human feelings. I had hopes and they were betrayed. . . . So how can I now ask our people to turn out and welcome the dear guest who is coming to us? They will say, 'Are you nuts? What kind of a dear guest allows a plane to fly over us to spy?'"

"Wouldn't you prefer President Eisenhower's visit to be postponed?"

"I do not want to answer this question in front of you journalists. I will discuss this with the President in Paris. We still want to find ways to improve relations with the U.S.A."

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At that very hour in Washington, the President held his Wednesday press conference. He had not yet seen the text of Khrushchev's comments at Gorky Park. Donning his spectacles, he read out a declaration that the Russians had inflated the U-2 incident beyond all proportion.

Thursday, May 12. Llewellyn Thompson cabled Washington that Khrushchev's Gorky Park fulminations sounded as if the cold war was on again:

ALL SIGNS NOW APPEAR TO POINT TO KHRUSHCHEV'S INTENTION OF TRYING TO EXTORT MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE FROM THE SUMMIT RATHER THAN ATTEMPT A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION.

That afternoon, Goodpaster brought Thompson's message to the Oval Office. The President read it, put on spiked shoes and whacked out golf balls on the south grounds of the White House. Then, as his secretary noted, he departed for the family quarters, "nervous, tense, said his blood pressure was high."

His showdown with Khrushchev in Paris was four days ahead.

GRAPHIC: Cover Insets 1 and 2, no caption, DOD, Eisenhower Library, AP, WBMG; Picture 1, MAY-DAY; Picture 2, no caption, DOD

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March 24, 1986

SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 36

LENGTH: 115 words

HEADLINE: SECRET MISSIONS OF THE BLACK PLANES

BODY:

In November, 1954, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to spend \$35 million to build a high-flying spy plane that could cross the Soviet Union without being shot down. From July, 1956, through May Day, 1960, he secretly ordered and oversaw each of the three or four dozen missions on which Francis Gary Powers and other CIA pilots flew into Russia.

From the program's start, Eisenhower had been worried that the Russians might misinterpret a U-2 flight as the forerunner of an American military invasion. Time and time again, he told his aides that ordering a plane to pierce Soviet airspace in peacetime was "one of the most soul-searching questions to come before a President."

GRAPHIC: Picture, no caption, AP

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SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 38

LENGTH: 92 words

HEADLINE: THE PILOT'S JAMES BOND KIT

BODY:

Francis Gary Powers considered himself a pilot, not a spy, but the CIA supplied him with emergency equipment suitable for the best-prepared James Bond -- not only the notorious suicide pin and destructor unit, but a hunting knife, a custom-made pistol with silencer, a life raft, clothing, water, food, a compass, signal flares, a first-aid kit, hunting gear and a large silk banner in 14 languages:

I BEAR NO MALICE TOWARD YOUR PEOPLE. IF YOU HELP ME, YOU WILL BE REWARDED.

The "rewards" included 7,500 rubles, ladies' rings and gold watches.

GRAPHIC: Pictures 1 through 3, no caption, NOVOSTI

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March 24, 1986

SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 38

LENGTH: 170 words

HEADLINE: FOREIGN PARTNERS IN ESPIONAGE

BODY:

CIA Director Allen Dulles once said that one thing he "never" discussed was the collaboration of friendly governments with the CIA. The U.S. secretly persuaded the leaders and intelligence officials of Norway, West Germany, Turkey, Pakistan and Japan to allow the U-2 to fly into Russia from their territory.

All did so at high risk. They knew that while the Russians might not retaliate against the U.S. for an aerial violation, they might strike back at a weaker U.S. ally. The CIA promised each government that if the spy flights were ever revealed to the world, the U.S. would claim that it had used its territory to wage spy flights into Russia without permission. After the U-2 fell on May Day, this promise was kept.

THE MISSION

Flight plan: Cross U.S.S.R. from Pakistan to Norway -- 3,788 miles in 9 hours.

Goals: Spy on Tyuratam, the Soviets' Cape Canaveral, and Plesetsk, suspected site of Soviets' first ICBM's. (Months later, U.S. spy satellite confirmed missiles in place at Plesetsk.)

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GRAPHIC: Map, no caption, USN&WR

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March 24, 1986

SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 44

LENGTH: 186 words

HEADLINE: IKE WAS READY TO SPY WITH "AIR FORCE ONE"

BODY:

In preparation for Eisenhower's planned trip to Russia in June, 1960, spying equipment was secretly mounted aboard "Air Force One."

In the fall of 1959, Eisenhower wrote Khrushchev asking to use his own plane inside Russia. Khrushchev told Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson that the Soviet military feared "Air Force One" might have "secret means of photographing Soviet territory." Thompson promised to allow a Soviet navigator to ride in the cockpit. Khrushchev wrote Eisenhower that he had "finally" overcome his generals' objections.

An air valve in the cockpit was evidently rigged to secretly turn spy equipment on and off. In an interview quoted in Mayday, CIA deputy director Richard Bissell told Beschloss, "I think Ike would have taken the position, 'All right, if you can put some equipment on my aircraft unobtrusively and take what you get, that's all right.' But I think he would have drawn the line at not altering the flight path in any shape or manner. . . . If would have been very unwise to let it be thought that his trip was being made or in any sense conditioned by intelligence."

GRAPHIC: Picture, no caption, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY

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March 24, 1986

SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 44

LENGTH: 236 words

HEADLINE: DID SECRETARY OF STATE HERTER PERJURE HIMSELF?

BODY:

In May and June, 1960, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigated the U-2 affair behind closed doors. Richard Helms, later CIA director (1966-73), attended the hearings as a CIA censor. In an interview with Beschloss quoted in Mayday, Helms charged that Secretary of State Christian Herter and other witnesses perjured themselves.

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Helms said: "They were all sworn. Knowing what they knew and what actually went on, if it isn't perjury, I don't understand the meaning of the word. And I'm not against it. I'm simply saying that it's not the first time officials have perjured themselves in the interest of protecting a President."

In 1977, Helms was himself convicted of perjury for lying to the same committee about CIA efforts to mount a Chilean military coup.

The full transcript of the secret U-2 hearings has only recently been unsealed. It shows that when Chairman J. William Fulbright asked whether there was "ever a time" when Eisenhower approved each U-2 flight, Herter replied, "It has never come up to the President."

But, in fact, since the start of the program, Eisenhower had approved the flights personally. Route maps were spread across his desk as a CIA man explained to him and the Secretary of State why national security depended on a new mission into Russia. After a flight, U-2 photographs were often brought to the White House for viewing by the President.

GRAPHIC: Picture, no caption, UPI/BETTMANN

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March 24, 1986

SECTION: VOICES OF AMERICA; Editorial Page; Pg. 84

LENGTH: 731 words

HEADLINE: LESS IS MORE

BYLINE: by MORTIMER B. ZUCKERMAN, Chairman and Editor-in-Chief of U.S. News & World Report

BODY:

On the very day in 1983 when our group arrived in Managua, the Sandinistas shut down the leading newspaper, La Prensa. Why? Because La Prensa carried a news story the Sandinistas wanted to cover up -- the harassment of Violeta Chamorro, a national heroine and widow of a martyr of the revolution, in retribution for her break with the Sandinistas to protest their subversion of revolutionary ideals. So much for freedom of the press. So much for democracy and tolerance.

Prior to that visit, my sympathies had been with the Sandinistas, who had fought bravely to rid Nicaragua of the despicable Somoza. But it became clear that Nicaragua is a revolution gone awry. The Sandinistas have systematically discarded all the promises made to their countrymen -- freedom, democracy, neutrality in foreign affairs and a pluralistic society.

Not only is democracy in Nicaragua at issue today. What is also at stake is the long-term potential for political freedom, and indeed prosperity, in Central America. Nicaragua represents another base, along with Cuba, from which Central American countries can be destabilized, witness El Salvador. Let's face it.

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For the most part, these countries have weak economies, low standards of living, wide disparities of wealth and a culture of violence. They are clearly susceptible to insurrection.

The Sandinistas have made no secret of their policy of exporting their brand of revolution -- what they have called "revolution without boundaries." This would produce a trauma for the American body politic. Nothing is more likely to lead to direct U.S. military involvement in the region than the emergence of a militaristic, anti-American (the Sandinista anthem goes "Down with the Yankees, the enemy of humanity"), aggressive, totalitarian regime in Nicaragua bouncing around Central America like a loose cannon. This is why the region is so critical to U.S. security.

We can't allow a second Cuba. So what can we do? We should both talk and carry a big stick -- what is called a two-track policy. During 1981-83, the Sandinistas rejected four U.S. proposals based on the principles of mutual nonintervention. Now, with the military-economic pressure from the contras preventing the consolidation of one-party rule at home, the Sandinistas are offering negotiation. We should test them by asking for a withdrawal from the Soviet sphere of influence and a commitment to peaceful coexistence evidenced by three things: The eviction of foreign military advisers and the severance of all other outside military links; a pledge of nonintervention in the affairs of other countries, and a commitment to the institutions of a pluralistic society within Nicaragua. The Sandinista record is one of broken promises. But this test is worth a try -- if only to demonstrate to doubters in our country and elsewhere the alien nature of the Sandinista regime.

In the meantime, we must support the contras. Less is more if applied early enough. Objections to that do not stand up. Many claim the contras are a CIA fabrication, not of democrats but of Somocistas, and that we are in danger of restoring a discredited dictatorship. Nobody can fault the political record of contra leaders Arturo Cruz or Alfonso Robelo, who opposed Somoza, but some of the contra military leadership fought under Somoza. Why this should disqualify the contras completely is puzzling. No insurgent army fighting and living in the hills of Nicaragua and Honduras is going to emerge entirely from the Boy Scouts. Whatever the concern about aspects of the contra campaign, it is not sufficient to shift the focus from the real problem -- the threat posed by Nicaragua to its own people and to its neighbors.

Congress should work with the administration on its request for increased military and economic aid to combat the Sandinistas. The administration cannot bludgeon Congress into giving it what it wants. But it has a compelling case that could be made more appealing to the House Democrats if military aid is tied to an attempt -- a last attempt -- to get the Sandinistas to retreat. The Democrats should think hard and long about what is at stake. It is more than simply a semblance of freedom in Nicaragua. It is peace and stability throughout Central America -- which after all lies in our own back yard.

GRAPHIC: Picture, no caption

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March 17, 1986

SECTION: CURRENTS; Washington Whispers; Pg. 13

LENGTH: 43 words

BODY:

Now coming out: The real reason influential members of Congress helped to push Ferdinand Marcos out of power is that the CIA warned lawmakers that, unless changes were made swiftly, the Philippines would fall to the Communist rebels within two years.

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March 17, 1986

SECTION: U.S. NEWS; Newsletter: Tomorrow; A Look Ahead from the Nation's Capital; Pg. 29

LENGTH: 1092 words

BYLINE: by Robert J. Shapiro

BODY:

DEFENSE BUDGET UP FOR GRABS

Budget brinkmanship is the name of the game in Washington. Everyone from the White House to Capitol Hill will be playing for months ahead.

At the White House--The President still insists that all cuts come from domestic programs and that Pentagon funds go up 8 percent over inflation, without a tax increase. He is hanging tough even though the GOP-run Senate Budget Committee March 6 rejected his 1987 budget. On Capitol Hill--Budget chairmen Domenici and Gray are convinced Congress won't buy the elimination of domestic programs such as Urban Development Action Grants or the soil-conservation service. There's plenty of evidence: Congress already has passed legislation protecting VA mortgage loans and dairy-price supports from the March 1 Gramm-Rudman budget cuts. Nearly a dozen more exemptions from 1986 reductions for social programs are pending in committees.

Behind the scenes, the Senate the House budget committees are cooperating--that's a first--to try to avoid a Gramm-Rudman vote set for just before the fall elections on cuts for 1987. Coming up fast: Bipartisan showdown with the President over Pentagon spending.

The Senate will probably settle on a defense hike just sufficient to offset inflation. The best the Pentagon can hope for from the House is a freeze with no adjustment for inflation. Either way or in between, the President will get billions less than he wants, and major weapons systems could face stretchouts. That won't shut off the Pentagon spigot: It has \$60 billion already appropriated but not yet spent.

UPROAR AT THE CIA

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The resignation of the CIA's No. 2 man, Deputy Director John McMahon, is just the overt side of the covert turmoil inside the agency. Intelligence insiders say McMahon was fired and that Director Casey was behind it. Administration aides accuse McMahon of leaking inside information to Congress and the press, but behind the accusations is McMahon's long resistance to Casey's plans for more covert aid. McMahon had hoped to survive as the agency's conscience, but that only put him at further odds with Casey. Casey's commitment to Reagan has offended CIA professionals dedicated to nonpartisanship, but it gave him the leverage to oust McMahon. The new deputy director, Soviet expert Robert Gates, is more enthusiastic about backing anti-Marxist "freedom fighters," but he will meet opposition from the agency pros. Many of them are now expected to leave "the company."

WELFARE REFORM IN TROUBLE

President Reagan's plans to revamp the welfare system, announced in his state-of-the-union address, are stalling. A task force, led by White House staff, is looking for ways to insure that the combined benefits from federal programs don't provide assistance exceeding the poverty level. That's aimed at the 40 percent of medicaid recipients and 27 percent of food-stamp households with incomes slightly above the poverty line. Little prospect there: Congress said so in the past and won't cut programs for the poor this year. A second task force, led by the Department of Education, is focusing on family arrangements among the poor and wants to expand its mandate to evaluate how hundreds of federal laws and programs affect the American family. That is leading them straight to social issues such as abortion and family planning that most Congressmen would rather avoid.

WORKFARE GAINS FAVOR

Agreement could come in one area--expanding work requirements for welfare recipients. Reagan, like Nixon, Ford and Carter before him, accepts the idea that the place for a poor mother with school-age children is no longer in the home, but out helping to support her family. The President wants rules requiring the poor to work in public jobs in exchange for benefits. Others say the jobs should provide salaries to supplement current welfare benefits.

Either way, mandatory-work requirements can be effective, according to a recent study. A demonstration program in San Diego cut welfare outlays 8 percent and raised the average earnings of participants by some \$700. But it doesn't work for everyone. In San Diego, for example, women in mandatory-work programs stayed employed once the program ended, but men didn't. A Gallup poll found that two thirds of Americans like the idea. The study showed that among those who participated in San Diego, 80 percent think the requirements are fair.

SUMMIT SCHEDULE SNAGS

Administration aides have been juggling schedules trying to arrange a 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev summit--preferably to announce real progress on arms control--but time is running out. In Geneva last November, the President asked the General Secretary to come to Washington in June. Soviet and U.S. negotiators will meet for a fifth round of talks in early May, and that's the last chance to set the stage for June.

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The Kremlin wants to wait until September, but White House aides worry that an election-eve agreement would look too political. Another serious concern: The budget battle in Congress could come to a head in September, and setbacks to the President's defense requests would create the wrong atmosphere for summit bargaining. August is out, with much of the country on vacation. So is early July. Nobody wants Gorbachev here during the centennial celebration for the Statue of Liberty. That leaves late July, but the Kremlin is resisting that date. Unless there's a breakthrough in the arms talks soon, the summit will wait until after the election--perhaps until 1987.

INSIDE THE BOARD ROOM

Women and minorities have stopped making gains on corporate boards for the first time in 13 years. According to a study by executive-search firm Korn/Ferry International, of 600 major companies, only 4 percent of directors are women. Only 3 percent come from minority groups. Still, 45 percent of the companies have at least one woman in the board room, and 25 percent of all boards have a minority member. One of five candidates for board membership turned down the invitation last year. One factor: Recent court decisions have made it easier for stockholders to hold directors personally liable for corporate decisions. Is the pay worth the risk? By most standards, the compensation is substantial. The average director spends 114 hours a year on the job, and gets \$19,500 a year. That's \$1,400 a day.

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March 17, 1986

SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 31

LENGTH: 1035 words

HEADLINE: Help for contras, Savimbi at issue as Congress eyes cuts in aid abroad;
Foreign-policy battles heat up

BYLINE: by Steve Huntley and Andy Plattner with James M. Hildreth and Kathryn Johnson

BODY:

His bid to win expanded aid for Nicaraguan contra rebels may be costing Ronald Reagan precious political capital needed in future foreign-policy fights with Congress.

An aggressive effort for the aid is bruising feelings even among Reagan backers. This could imperil three other items of equal importance -- selling missiles to Saudi Arabia, avoiding tough new sanctions against South Africa and continuing covert aid to Angolan rebels.

On each issue, Congress is showing new boldness in efforts to mold specific foreign policy, a field dominated by the President until the Vietnam War. In recent months the trend has become more obvious. Congress, for instance, turned out to be as instrumental as Reagan in the ouster of Philippine President

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Ferdinand Marcos.

The contra campaign appears, in any event, to be a losing gamble. The aid package was rejected by three House panels March 5-6 and was headed for probable defeat by the full House March 19. At best, Reagan can expect a compromise that will give him far less than the \$100 million he seeks.

Because time seems to be running out for the contras, the President decided on what an aide called a "full-court press." No aid means a contra defeat, which would produce "a second Cuba on the mainland of North America just two days' driving time from Harlingen, Tex.," Reagan said. "We send money and material now so we'll never have to send our own American boys."

As skirmishing continued in Congress, Reagan moved on March 7 to counter charges that he has forsaken diplomacy in favor of military action by detailing Philip Habib to seek a negotiated settlement in Nicaragua. But Reagan said the troubleshooter, whose latest mission was to the Philippines, must be supported with "an increasing level of pressure on the Nicaraguan Communists" from the contras.

Both sides in the debate launched furious drives for support. Three top contra leaders -- Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo -- flew into Washington for meetings with Reagan and key lawmakers to dramatize their appeal. Military pressure, they said, is the only way to force the Sandinistas to negotiate a more democratic society for Nicaragua.

On the other side, 167 Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish leaders charged that "exaggeration, misinformation and outright falsehood form the heart of the Reagan administration case."

House Democrats outlined their own plan urging Reagan to apply the kind of diplomacy that brought a bloodless resolution to the Philippines crisis. "He should practice the magic of Manila on Managua," said House Speaker Thomas "Tip" O'Neill (D-Mass.).

Capitol Hill observers are looking to Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to salvage the aid program. Frequently a compromise leader on foreign matters, Lugar helped broker \$27 million in humanitarian funding for the contras last year.

The likely outcome this year, insiders say, will be a compromise approving about half of the \$100 million Reagan wants but putting it on hold until the various contra factions formulate a united military and political agenda.

Still, compromise won't take away the bitterness left by the finger-pointing campaign urged on the President by White House Communications Director Patrick Buchanan. Reagan compared the contras with Hungarian freedom fighters and American revolutionaries at Valley Forge and said: "If the members of Congress hide their heads in the sand and pretend the strategic threat in Nicaragua will go away, they are courting disaster, and history will hold them accountable."

Democrats claimed to be unfazed. Representative Tony Coelho (D-Calif.), chairman of the House Democratic Campaign Committee, said the party could counter in 1986 congressional elections that it had helped prevent the U.S. from becoming mired in "another Vietnam."

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The White House suggestion that a "No" vote amounted to support for the Sandinistas angered many Republicans. An "emotional case doesn't help, and it could backfire," Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kans.) said. The approach, added Senator Dan Evans (R-Wash.), "could lead to bitter divisions" and cost Reagan support on domestic goals, such as tax reform, as well as foreign issues.

The administration originally wanted \$1 billion worth of military hardware, including missiles and F-15 fighters, for Saudi Arabia. The request it will send to Congress is being pared down to \$350 million worth of Stinger and Sidewinder missiles, and even that package is in trouble.

Some suggest that Reagan may have to give up the package just to keep Congress from blocking delivery this summer of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes committed to Saudi Arabia after a bitter 1981 Capitol Hill fight.

House hearings later in March on South Africa may cast further doubt on Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" as a means to force reforms on the white-minority government. Opponents of apartheid likely will push for strong sanctions, perhaps including a measure to ban U.S. investment in South Africa.

Also looming for Reagan is a showdown over \$15 million in covert aid he has approved for Angola's anti-Marxist rebels. Although his way was cleared by repeal of a curb on aid, opponents now insist on a new law to control the degree and nature of any involvement in an African state where the Central Intelligence Agency was accused of abuses a decade ago. Apart from strategic interests, the issue for Reagan and conservative supporters is his commitment to rolling back Soviet influence around the world.

Further confounding Reagan initiatives is growing sentiment to slash foreign aid generally. Lawmakers would like to relieve the political heat from domestic-spending cuts forced on them by the Gramm-Rudman deficit-reduction law.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee already has cut \$2.4 billion from Reagan's \$17.4 billion proposal, reducing aid to current levels. More trims are likely. Says Representative David Obey (D-Wis.), head of the Joint Economic Committee: "If the administration thinks otherwise, then they're smoking something that isn't legal."

GRAPHIC: Picture 1, no caption, RON KINNEY -- J. B. PICTURES; Picture 2, Contra chief Adolfo Calero, with his troops on Honduras border, met with Reagan as White House pushed for increased aid to anti-Sandinista forces, TIMOTHY A. MURPHY -- USN&WR; Picture 3, Jonas Savimbi, leader of Angolan guerrillas, is another who now has Reagan backing, CHICK HARRITY -- USN&WR

LEVEL 1 - 12 OF 25 STORIES

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March 10, 1986

SECTION: CURRENTS; Washington Whispers; Pg. 15

LENGTH: 31 words

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BODY:

What turned Reagan around so fast on the Philippines? Insiders say it was a report from the CIA, which closely monitored the vote and reported Marcos blatantly stole the election.

LEVEL 1 - 13 OF 25 STORIES

Copyright © 1986 U.S. News & World Report

March 3, 1986

SECTION: CURRENTS; People Making News; Pg. 7

LENGTH: 99 words

HEADLINE: DEATH OF A 'MOLE'

BODY:

The suicide of Larry Wu-Tai Chin wrote an end to a 30-year odyssey of espionage that provided China with important U.S. secrets and embarrassed the Central Intelligence Agency. Before his retirement in 1981, the Peking-born Chin smuggled papers from the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service and met Chinese agents abroad yet never came under suspicion until fingered by a defector. Convicted on February 7 and possibly facing two life terms, Chin was lodged at the county jail in Manassas, Va., awaiting sentencing. He was found dead on February 21 with a plastic bag over his head.

LEVEL 1 - 14 OF 25 STORIES

Copyright © 1986 U.S. News & World Report

February 24, 1986

SECTION: CURRENTS; Washington Whispers; Pg. 15

LENGTH: 51 words

BODY:

William Casey's foes inside the Central Intelligence Agency have thrown up their hands in surrender. Some veteran CIA officials complained that their boss is hurting the agency by alienating influential members of Congress, but the President refuses to hear any criticism of his old campaign chief.

LEVEL 1 - 15 OF 25 STORIES

Copyright © 1986 U.S. News & World Report

February 24, 1986

SECTION: U.S. NEWS; Miami; Pg. 21

LENGTH: 1621 words

HEADLINE: Miami tackles crime, money, racial woes;
The struggle to regain paradise lost

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BYLINE: by Stewart Powell

DATELINE: Miami

BODY:

Fighting back from hard times, Miami is taking on the future with the gusto of a city that in less than a century has endured more ups and downs than most communities twice its age.

What seemed like insoluble problems in the early 1980s finally are easing to enable some 380,500 Miamians to begin combatting the damaging image of a tattered tourist haven besieged by drug dealers, lawless immigrants and racial unrest.

"If you put everything Miami has been through in a textbook, you'd say, 'There ain't no way Miami can survive,'" comments Jesse McCrary, Jr., who served as Florida's first black assistant attorney general. "What makes me high on Miami is that we did."

While some residents see a Miami still plagued by the drug trade, ethnic frictions and uneven economic growth, many others are enthusiastic about the future. Progress is being made against the multibillion-dollar drug trade. The alarming number of murders has fallen to the lowest level in six years. Many of the 125,000 Cuban Marielitos who flooded into South Florida in 1980 have been here long enough to soon become U.S. citizens. Passions that twice sparked rioting in black neighborhoods since 1980 have cooled.

"Miami was becoming paradise lost," asserts developer Doran Jason. "Now, it's paradise found -- again."

A city once known only as a sunny if slightly stuffy tourist resort is being transformed into a cosmopolitan business and social crossroads for the Americans, an exotic blend of pastels and promise that serves as the glossy backdrop for television's popular "Miami Vice" police show. Whites and blacks, Cubans and Haitians, refugees from Nicaragua, El Salvador and elsewhere all are vying for a piece of the American dream. Not even a fresh police scandal has eclipsed the sense of recovery.

The turnabout is typical of a self-reliant boom town that fought the odds from the start. Pioneer Julia Tuttle transformed swampland into a fortune by enticing Henry Flagler into extending the East Coast Railroad south in 1896. Tourists, land speculators and immigrants have been flocking to the shores of Biscayne Bay ever since.

For the first time, however, immigrants are moving into the Establishment, replacing the Southern whites who once gathered at the exclusive Miami Club, called their hometown "Miamah" and thought their hold would last forever. In barely a generation, a tide of 650,000 Cuban refugees sweeping into South Florida has turned a sleepy tourist town that discriminated against Jews and blacks into a teeming metropolis with a Latin flavor that claims to have no time to discriminate against anyone.

Says Carlos Arboleya, who arrived with \$40 and now is vice chairman of the Barnett Bank of South Florida: "What we are achieving isn't integration; we are achieving joint success."

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Many of the 19,700 shops, restaurants and businesses run by Cuban Americans lure tens of thousands of Latin shoppers each year. Local banks are brimming with an estimated \$12 billion in foreign funds. Seventy-one foreign and U.S. banks operate overseas from here. The seaport and airport handle an estimated \$7.5 billion in Latin American trade annually, helping to drive the area's \$23.5 billion economy.

International intrigue adds to the allure, with everything from business deals to political coups hatched over coffee in cafes. The Central Intelligence Agency recruited here for the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. The Federal Bureau of Investigation cracked a plot against the President of Honduras.

"Miami -- the international city -- is a reality," declares J. L. Plummer, a funeral director and fifth-generation Floridian who has seen control of the city commission shift over from whites to Cuban Americans in 16 years. "There's concrete, brick and mortar going up out there to prove it."

Glass-and-steel office towers reach skyward to serve what city fathers ambitiously label "the New World Center." Construction worth \$4.7 billion over the past decade is providing a subway and 84 downtown projects.

The rebirth of Miami is matched, say many, with a no-nonsense pragmatism for dealing with ethnic and racial differences. Business executives learn Spanish and tailor their advertising to appeal to the multibillion-dollar Hispanic market. Typical is a television advertisement for Rose Auto Stores that features a black, a Hispanic and a blond saying: "I do it with Rose."

The city balances neighborhood jealousies by erecting comparable police substations in the black community of Liberty City and in Little Havana. The police department, now led by a black chief, has grown by half since 1979 to become 58 percent Hispanic and black. Such detailed records are kept by race that, says Lt. Bill O'Brien, "if someone had an inclination of favor one group, he couldn't get away with it."

Steps toward cooperation are expected to accelerate in the wake of last November's runoff victory by Xavier Suarez, 36, the city's first Cuban-born mayor. The Villanova and Harvard-educated lawyer already has symbolically reached out by backing the birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr., as a city holiday and joining Haitians to celebrate over reports of the downfall of the Duvalier family. "Suarez's election was a sea change for this community," says Heath Meriwether, executive editor of the Miami Herald. "He represents rejection of the divide-and-conquer politics of the past."

Suarez already sees progress in a city where politics was so divisive that, says one veteran, "if you had read the Bill of Rights, no one would have signed." Observes the mayor: "We've managed to bring dignity and decorum to city government. There is a perception that the community is under control."

The ascendancy of Hispanics has not been welcomed by all. Many longtime Miamians felt threatened by the surge in crime and gang wars that came after the 1980 arrival of the Marielitos, several thousand of whom Castro had released from mental institutions and prisons.

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Others grumble that the main retail artery of Flagler Street was turned into a seedy marketplace with bargaining for goods in the Latin manner.

An estimated 17,000 Anglos moved to the suburbs in the first two years after the boatlift -- adding to 23,000 who had left since 1975. And after years of growing bilingualism, a citizens' group rebelled in 1981 to pass a referendum establishing English as the lone official language in local government. "A multiplicity of tongues may add to our cosmopolitan ambiance," writes Sylvan Meyer in the Miami/South Florida Magazine. "It does not add to the comfort and security of the natives." Nor has "Latinization" done much for an increasingly isolated black community that has never recovered the tourist-industry jobs lost to more-skilled Cuban refugees in the 1960s. Unemployment among black youths nears 50 percent, with little hope for school dropouts to break into the service-oriented economy. Problems are doubly acute for the area's estimated 100,000 Creole-speaking Haitians, who face language barriers on top of poverty. Laments Miller Dawkins, vice mayor and the only black on the city commission: "Blacks are no better off than during segregation."

As frustration among blacks mounts, fears rise that racial unrest may one day erode the image of recovery. "Everyone is moving on," says Garth Reeves, Sr., editor of the Miami Times, a weekly newspaper that has served Liberty City since 1923. "And here we are standing on the corner watching the parade go by."

Problems beyond Miami's control also pose worries. Political instability in Haiti and Central America has driven as many as 200,000 illegal immigrants into Dade County.

Drug smuggling continues despite a crackdown that has pushed operations north and crowded the waterfront here with vessels displaying the U.S. Customs Service's orange-red seizure stickers. Miami's murder rate has dropped, but 137 killings were still recorded in 1985. Estimates are that cocaine with a street value of \$27 billion was landed in South Florida in 1985. Notes U.S. Attorney Leon Kellner: "The area remains the Wall Street of drug trafficking."

Hundreds of millions in illicit money passes through -- to be laundered, shipped abroad or pumped into the local economy. Almost \$12 million in cash was seized February 7 in an operation against a Venezuelan-run laundering activity. Real-estate values are inflated. Porsches, BMW's and Ferraris with smoked-glass windows are nearly as common on the streets as standard Japanese imports.

The appeal of easy money allegedly has penetrated the city police force. Eight officers face charges in connection with the theft of money or the skimming of cocaine in drug-arrest cases. Three of them are charged with murder in the drowning of three drug dealers. Vows Chief Clarence Dixon: "We will wipe out corruption where we find it."

Prospects for a durable upturn in the Miami economy depend on developments elsewhere. Tourism is down from 1980 levels. Shopping sprees by Latin visitors are impeded by currency-exporting restrictions in their debt-ridden nations. Some 25,000 condominiums go unsold. The area's largest employer, Eastern Air Lines, is fighting threatened bankruptcy by laying off many of its 30,000 local employees and cutting pay.

Yet true to its comeback tradition, Miami is buoyed by confidence. "Here, it is like Chicago at the turn of the century," says Bernardo Fort-Brescia, 34,

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founder of Arquitectonica, the firm that designed the dramatic building seen in the opening minutes of TV's "Miami Vice." "You feel you can help the place become something special instead of just building on others' foundations."

GRAPHIC: Picture 1, Changing skyline underscores Miami's role as commercial crossroads of Americas, REBECCA LOVELESS FOR USN&WR; Picture 2, Born in Cuba, Suarez now leads city, REBECCA LOVELESS FOR USN&WR; Chart, ETHNIC MIAMI, THEN AND NOW, USN&WR -- Basic data: City of Miami, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Florida Bureau of Business and Economic Research; Picture 3, Latin flavor is widely evident, particularly in Little Havana, RANDY TAYLOR -- SYGMA; Picture 4, Children of Haitian immigrants now attend school that once was for whites, REBECCA LOVELESS FOR USN&WR

LEVEL 1 - 16 OF 25 STORIES

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February 24, 1986

SECTION: COVER STORY - EXCLUSIVE; Pg. 30

LENGTH: 4139 words

HEADLINE: An Appeal in his wife's behalf

BYLINE: English translation by Nicholas Bethell and Richard Lourie

BODY:

Anatoly Alexandrov, President, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences
Members of the Presidium, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences

Dear Anatoly Petrovich:

I appeal to you at the most tragic moment of my life. I ask you to support my wife Yelena Bonner's request for permission to travel abroad to visit her mother, her children and her grandchildren and to receive medical treatment for her eyes and her heart. I shall explain why this trip has become an absolute necessity for us. Our unprecedented situation, our isolation, the lies and slander regarding us compel me to write in detail. Please forgive me for the length of this letter.

The authorities have been greatly annoyed by my public activities -- my defense of prisoners of conscience and my articles and books on peace, the open society and human rights. (My fundamental ideas are contained in Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom, 1968; My Country and the World, 1975, and "The Danger of Thermonuclear War," 1983.)

"The KGB adopted a sly and cruel plan"

I do not intend to defend or explain my position here. What I wish to make clear is that I alone am responsible for all my actions, which are the result of convictions formed over a lifetime. As soon as Yelena Bonner married me in 1971, the KGB adopted a sly and cruel plan to solve the "Sakharov problem." They have tried to shift responsibility for my actions onto her, to destroy her morally and physically. They hope to break and bridle me, while portraying me

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as the innocent victim of the intrigues of my wife -- a "CIA agent," a "Zionist," a "mercenary adventuress," etc. Any remaining doubts about this have been dispelled by the mass campaign of slander mounted against my wife in 1983 (attacks against her were printed in publications with a circulation of 11 million copies); by the two 1984 articles about her in Izvestia, and especially by two 1984 articles about her in Izvestia, and especially by the KGB's treatment of us in 1984, which I describe below.

My wife Yelena Bonner was born in 1923. Her parents, who were active participants in the Revolution and the civil war, became victims of repression in 1937. Her father, the first secretary of the Armenian Bolshevik Party's central committee and a member of the Comintern's executive committee, perished. Her mother spent many years in labor camps and in exile as a "relative of a traitor to the motherland."

My wife served in the armed forces from the outbreak of World War II until August, 1945. She began as a first-aid instructor. After she was wounded and suffered a concussion, she became the head nurse on a hospital train. The concussion severely damaged her eyes. My wife is classified as a disabled veteran because of her loss of vision. She has been seriously ill ever since the war, but she has managed to lead a productive life -- first studying, then working as a physician and teacher, raising a family, helping friends and strangers in need, sustaining her associates with respect and affection.

Her situation changed drastically after our paths merged. Tatiana and Alexei, my wife's children -- whom I consider my own -- and our grandchildren were forced to emigrate to the United States in 1977 and 1978 after five years of harassment and death threats. They had in fact become hostages. The pain of this tragic separation has been compounded by the absence of normal mail, cable and phone communications. My wife's 84-year-old mother has been living in the United States since 1980. It is the inalienable right of all human beings to see their families -- and that includes my wife!

As long ago as 1974 many events convinced us that no effective medical treatment was possible for my wife in the U.S.S.R. and, moreover, that such treatment would be dangerous because of inevitable KGB interference. Now the organized campaign of slander against her is an added complication. These misgivings relate to my wife's medical treatment and not to my own, but they were reinforced by what physicians under KGB command did to me during my four-month confinement in a Gorky hospital. More about this later.

In 1975, with the support of world public opinion (and I assume on Brezhnev's order), my wife was allowed to travel to Italy to receive treatment for her eyes. My wife visited Italy in 1975, 1977 and 1979 for eye care. In Siena, Dr. Frezotti twice operated on her for glaucoma, which could not be controlled by medication. Naturally, the same doctor should continue to treat her. Another visit became necessary in 1982. She submitted her application in September, 1982. Such applications are reviewed within five months -- and usually within a few weeks. Two years have passed, and my wife is still waiting for a reply.

In April, 1983, my wife Yelena Bonner suffered a massive heart attack, as confirmed by a report of the academy's medical department issued in response to an inquiry from the procurator's office. Her condition has not yet returned to normal. She has had recurrent attacks. (Some of these attacks have been confirmed by academy physicians who have examined her; one examination took

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place in March, 1984.) Her most recent major attack occurred in August, 1984.

"I began the hunger strike"

In November, 1983, I addressed an appeal to Comrade Yuri Andropov [General Secretary, 1982 to Feb. 9, 1984], and I addressed a similar appeal to Comrade Konstantin Chernenko [General Secretary at the time this letter was written] in February, 1984. I asked them to issue instructions permitting my wife to travel. I wrote: "A trip . . . to see her mother, children and grandchildren and . . . to receive medical treatment has become a matter of life and death for us. The trip has no other purpose. I assure you of that."

By September, 1983, I realized that the question of my wife's trip would be resolved only if I conducted a hunger strike (as in the earlier case of our daughter-in-law Liza Alexeeva's departure to join Alexei). My wife understood how difficult it was for me to do nothing. Nevertheless, she kept putting off the hunger strike. And, in point of fact, I began the hunger strike only in direct response to actions of the authorities.

On March 30, 1984, I was summoned to the Gorky province visa office. A representative there announced: "On behalf of the visa department of the U.S.S.R., I inform you that your statement is under consideration. The reply will be communicated to you after May 1."

My wife was to fly to Moscow on May 2. I watched through the airport window as she was detained by the aircraft and taken away in a police car. I immediately returned to the apartment and took a laxative, thereby beginning my hunger strike for my wife to be allowed to travel.

Two hours later my wife returned, accompanied by the KGB province chief, who delivered a threatening speech in the course of which he called my wife a CIA agent. My wife had been subjected to a body search at the airport and charged under Article 190-1 [of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR) Criminal Code]. They also made her sign a promise not to leave the city. So this was my promised reply to my declaration about my wife's trip abroad.

Exile "was camouflaged murder"

During the months that followed, my wife was called in for interrogation three or four times a week. She was tried on August 9-10 and sentenced to five years' exile. On September 7 a picked group from the RSFSR Supreme Court made a special trip to Gorky to hear her appeal. They confirmed the sentence. Gorky was designated her place of exile so that she could remain with me, thereby creating a semblance of humanity. In fact, however, it was camouflaged murder.

The KGB managed the whole enterprise -- from the charges to the sentence -- on order to block my wife's travel abroad. The indictment and the verdict are typical for Article 190-1 cases, although particularly flagrant examples of the arbitrariness and injustice involved. Article 190-1 makes it a crime to disseminate slanderous fabrications known to be false that defame the Soviet state and social system. (Article 190-1 refers to statements that the defendant knows are false. In my experience, and that includes my wife's case, the defendants believed their statements to be true beyond a doubt. The real issue was their opinions.)

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Most of the eight counts in my wife's indictment involve her repetition of statements made by me. (To make matters worse, they have been taken out of context.) All the statements concern secondary issues. For example, in *My Country and the World*, I explain what "certificates" are, noting that two or more types of money exist in the U.S.S.R. My wife repeated this indisputable statement at a press conference in Italy in 1975, and she was charged with slander because of it. I -- and not my wife -- should be charged with statements made by me. My wife acted as my representative in keeping with her own beliefs.

"They are trying to kill us"

One charge in the indictment exploits an emotional outburst of my wife during the unexpected visit of a French correspondent on May 18, 1983, three days after her massive myocardial infarct had been diagnosed. (As you know, in 1983 we requested, without success, that we be admitted together to the academy's hospital.) The correspondent asked, "What will happen to you?" My wife exclaimed: "I don't know. I think they are trying to kill us." She was clearly not referring to being killed by a pistol or knife. But she had more than enough grounds to speak of indirect murder (at least of herself).

My wife's alleged drafting and circulation of a Moscow Helsinki Group document was a key point in the indictment. It was based on patently false testimony and was completely refuted by defense counsel's examination of the chronology of events. A witness testified at the trial that he had been told by a member of the Helsinki Group that my wife had taken one of the group's documents with her when she left the country in 1977. But the witness had been arrested on Aug. 16, 1977, and my wife left for Italy on September 5. Thus he could not have met anyone "from outside" after my wife's departure. Under questioning, the witness replied that he had learned of the document's being carried out of the country in July or August -- that is, before my wife's trip.

Moreover, no proof that the document had been written prior to my wife's departure was presented in the indictment or during the trial. (The document was undated. That alone was enough to deprive it of any juridical significance.)

The only "evidence" corroborating the witness's unsubstantiated allegation was the statement of a person who had emigrated in 1977. In defiance of logic this count was included in the verdict and in the decision of the appellate proceeding. If the appellate court had eliminated that count, it would have had to annul the verdict -- in part because the only directly incriminating testimony would be lost, in part because of the dated and inconsequential nature of the 1975 episode. Most important of all, none of the charges bore the slightest juridical relation to Article 190-1, which presupposes intentional slander.

In practice my wife's exile has led to restrictions much more severe than those stipulated in the law. The loss of all communication with her mother and children; complete isolation from her friends; still less opportunity for medical care; the virtual confiscation of property left in our Moscow apartment -- which is now inaccessible to us -- and the potential loss of the apartment itself. (The apartment was given to my wife's mother in 1956 after she was rehabilitated and after her husband was rehabilitated posthumously.)

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"Simply slander for public consumption"

There was no mention during my wife's trial of the accusations made in the press -- her alleged past crimes, her "immoral character," her "links" with foreign intelligence agencies. That is all simply slander for public consumption -- for the "sheep" held in such contempt by the KGB directors of the campaign. The most recent article of this sort appeared in Izvestia on May 21. The article pushes the idea that my wife has always wanted to leave the U.S.S.R., "even over her husband's dead body." The article claims that as long ago as 1979 she wanted to remain in the United States but had been persuaded to leave. (The context implies that American intelligence agents did the persuading.)

My wife's tragic and heroic life with me, which has brought her so much suffering, refutes this insinuation. Before marrying me, my wife made several trips abroad. She worked for a year in Iraq on a vaccination project. She visited Poland and France. The idea of defecting never entered her mind. It is the KGB that wants my wife to abandon me: It would provide the best demonstration that their slander had been true. But they were hardly hoping for that. They are "psychologists." They carefully hid the May 21 [Izvestia] article from me. They did not want to strengthen my resolve to win my goal before seeing my wife. I wanted to protect her from responsibility for my hunger strike.

For four months -- from May 7 to September 8 -- my wife and I were separated from each other and completely isolated from the outside world. My wife was alone in our apartment. Her "guards" were increased. Apart from the usual policeman at the entrance to our apartment, observation posts operated around the clock, and a van with KGB agents on duty was parked beneath our terrace. Outside the house she was followed by two cars of KGB agents who prevented the most innocent contact with anyone. She was not allowed into the regional hospital when I was confined there.

On May 7, while accompanying my wife to the prosecutor's office for her next bout of questioning, I was seized by KGB men disguised in doctors' white coats. They took me by force to Gorky Regional Hospital, kept me there by force and tormented me for four months. My attempts to flee the hospital were always blocked by KGB men, who were on duty round-the-clock to bar all means of escape.

An "excruciating process"

From May 11 to May 27 I was subjected to the excruciating and degrading process of force-feeding. The doctors hypocritically called it "saving my life," but in fact they were acting under orders from the KGB to create conditions in which my demand for my wife to be allowed to travel would not have to be fulfilled. They kept changing the method of force-feeding. They wanted to maximize my distress in order to make me give up the hunger strike.

From May 11 to May 15 intravenous feeding was tried. Orderlies would throw me onto the bed, tie my hands and feet and then hold my shoulders down while the needle was inserted into a vein. On May 11, the first day this was attempted, one of the hospital aides sat on my legs while some substance was injected with a small syringe. I passed out and involuntarily urinated. When I came to, the orderlies had left my bedside. Their bodies seemed strangely distorted as on a television screen affected by strong interference. I found out later that

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this sort of optical illusion is symptomatic of a spasm in a cerebral hemorrhage or stroke.

I have retained drafts of the letters I wrote to my wife from the hospital. (Hardly any of the letters, apart from those that were quite empty of information, were actually delivered to my wife. The same is true with respect to the notes and books she sent me.)

In my first letter written (May 20) after force-feeding began and in another draft written at that time, my writing wavers and is remarkably deformed. Letters are repeated two or three times in many words (mainly vowels, as in "haaand"). This is another typical symptom of a cerebral spasm or stroke and can be used as objective, documentary evidence in attempting a diagnosis. The repetition of letters does not occur in later drafts, but the symptoms of trembling persist. My letter of May 10 (the ninth day of my hunger strike but prior to force-feeding) is entirely normal. My recollections from the period of force-feeding are confused, in contrast to my memory of events from May 2 to May 10. My letter dated May 20 states: "I can barely walk. I am trying to learn." The spasm or stroke I suffered on May 11 was not an accident; it was a direct result of the medical measures taken in my case on orders from the KGB.

From May 16 to May 24 a new means of force-feeding was employed: A tube was inserted through my nose. This was discontinued on May 25, supposedly because sores were developing along the nasal passages and esophagus. I believe it was stopped because this method is bearable, if painful. In labor camps it is used for months -- even years -- at a time.

"My jaws were pried open"

From May 25 to May 27 the most excruciating, degrading and barbarous method was used. I was again pushed down onto the bed without a pillow, and my hands and feet were tied. A tight clamp was placed on my nose so that I could breathe only through my mouth. Whenever I opened my mouth to take a breath, a spoonful of nutriment or a broth containing strained meat would be poured into my mouth. Sometimes my jaws were pried open by a lever. They would hold my mouth shut until I swallowed so that I could not spit out the food. When I managed to do so, it only prolonged the agony. I experienced a continuing feeling of suffocation, aggravated by the position of my body and head. I had to gasp for breath. I could feel the veins bulging on my forehead. They seemed on the verge of bursting.

On May 27 I asked that the clamp be removed. I promised to swallow voluntarily. Unfortunately this meant that my hunger strike was over, although I did not realize it at the time. I intended to resume my hunger strike some time later -- in July or August -- but kept postponing it. It was psychologically difficult to condemn myself to another indefinite period of torture by suffocation. It is easier to continue the struggle than to resume it.

Much of my strength that summer was dissipated in tedious and futile "discussions" with other patients in the semiprivate room where I was never left alone. This, too, was part of the KGB's elaborate tactics. Different patients occupied the other bed, but each of them tried to convince me what a naive fool I am -- a political ignoramus -- although they flattered my scientific ability.

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I suffered terrible insomnia from the overstimulation of these conversations, from my realization of our tragic situation, from self-reproach for my mistakes and weakness and from anxiety for my seriously ill wife, who was alone and, by ordinary standards, bedridden or almost bedridden much of the time. In June and July, after the spasm or stroke, I experienced severe headaches.

I could not bring myself to resume the hunger strike, partly from fear that I would be unable to bring it to a victorious conclusion and would only delay seeing my wife again. I never would have believed that our separation would last four months, in any case.

In June I noticed that my hands were trembling severely. A neurologist told me that it was Parkinson's disease. The doctors tried to convince me that if I resumed my hunger strike there would be a rapid and catastrophic development of Parkinson's disease. A doctor gave me a book containing a clinical description of the disease's final stages. This, too, was a method of exerting psychological pressure on me. The head doctor, O. A. Obukhov, explained: "We won't allow you to die. I'll get the women's team out again to feed you with the clamp. We've got another method up our sleeve as well. However, you will become a helpless invalid." Another doctor added by way of explanation, "You'll be incapable of putting on your own trousers." Obukhov intimated that this would suit the KGB, since it would escape all blame: Parkinson's disease cannot be artificially induced.

What happened to me in a Gorky hospital in the summer of 1984 is strikingly reminiscent of Orwell's famous anti-Utopian novel, even down to the remarkable coincidence of the book's title -- 1984. In the novel and in real life the torturers sought to make a man betray the woman he loves. The part played by the threat of the cage full of rats in Orwell's book was played for me in real life by Parkinson's disease.

"Her death would be mine as well"

I was able to bring myself to resume the hunger strike only on September 7. On September 8 I was hastily discharged from the hospital. I was faced with a difficult choice: End the hunger strike in order to see my wife after a four-month separation or continue for as long as my strength held out, thereby indefinitely prolonging our separation and our complete ignorance of each other's fate. I could not continue.

Now, however, I am tormented by the thought that I may have lost a chance to save my wife. It was only after our reunion that I first learned about her trial and she learned about my painful force-feeding.

I am very concerned about my wife's health. I believe that a timely trip abroad is the only chance of saving her life. Her death would be mine as well.

I hope for your help, for your appeal to the highest levels seeking permission for my wife's trip. I am asking for help from the presidium of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and from you personally, as president of the academy and as a man who has known me for many years.

Since my wife has been sentenced to exile, her trip will probably require a decree of the Supreme Soviet's Presidium suspending her sentence for the period of her travel. (Precedents for this exist both in Poland and, quite recently,

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in the U.S.S.R.) The Supreme Soviet's Presidium or another body could repeal her sentence altogether on the grounds that my wife is a disabled veteran of World War II, that she recently suffered a massive myocardial infarct, that she has no prior convictions and that she has an irreproachable work record of 32 years. Those arguments should suffice for the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. I will add, for your information, that my wife was unjustly and illegally convicted even from a purely formal point of view. In reality she was convicted for being my wife and to prevent her from traveling abroad.

I repeat my assurance that her trip has no purpose other than to seek medical treatment and to visit her mother, children and grandchildren; it is not intended to effect any change in my situation. My wife can supply the appropriate pledges herself. She may also pledge not to disclose the details of my confinement in the hospital if that is made a condition for her departure.

"My situation is unbearable"

I am the only academician in the history of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and Russia whose wife has been convicted as a criminal, subjected to a malicious, vile campaign of public slander and deprived of all communication with her mother, children and grandchildren. I am the only academician whose responsibility for his actions and opinions has been shifted onto his wife. That is my situation, and it is unbearable for me. I hope you will help.

If you and the academy's presidium do not find it possible to support me in this tragic matter, which is so vital for me, or if your intervention and other efforts do not lead to resolution of the problem before March 1, 1985, I ask that this letter be regarded as my resignation from the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. I will renounce my title of full member of the academy -- a proud title for me in other circumstances. I will renounce all my rights and privileges connected with that title, including my salary as an academician -- a significant step since I have no savings.

If my wife is not allowed to travel abroad, I cannot remain a member of the Academy of Sciences. I will not and should not participate in a great international deceit in which my academy membership would play a part.

I repeat: I am counting on your help.

Oct. 15, 1984

Gorky

Respectfully,

A. Sakharov

P.S. If this letter is intercepted by the KGB, I will still resign from the academy and the KGB will be responsible. I should mention that I sent you four telegrams and a letter during my hunger strike. [He did not resign.]

P.P.S. This letter is written by hand since my typewriter (together with books, diaries, manuscripts, cameras, a tape recorder and a radio) was seized during a search.

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P.P.P.S. I ask you to confirm receipt of this letter.

GRAPHIC: Picture 1, An appeal in his wife's behalf; Picture 2, Together in 1985: Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner; Picture 3, The false witness; Picture 4, Sakharov: With family photos, SIPA -- PRESS; Picture 5, Gasping for breath; Picture 6, Bonner as photographed by Sakharov in the Gorky apartment, SIPA -- PRESS; Picture 7, no caption

LEVEL 1 - 17 OF 25 STORIES

Copyright © 1986 U.S. News & World Report

February 17, 1986

SECTION: CURRENTS; Pg. 9

LENGTH: 294 words

HEADLINE: CHINESE SPY AT CIA;
Confessions of a 'mole'

BODY:

Another accused double agent stood in the dock, detailing just how easy he found it to steal and sell the nation's secrets throughout a long career.

Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a retired Central Intelligence Agency analyst, admitted passing classified documents to China. "He has confessed that, in essence, he was a mole for 30 years," said prosecutor Joseph Aronica.

An Alexandria, Va., jury took less than 4 hours on February 7 to convict the Peking-born Chin on all 17 counts of espionage and banking violations. He could face two life sentences and fines of more than \$3 million.

Chin testified that he smuggled papers home from his job at the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service, where he worked for 11 years. One of the most important items Chin sold was a private 1970 memo from President Nixon -- a longtime critic of Communist rule in China -- telling congressmen that he wanted to improve U.S.-Chinese relations. "I thought if that information could be brought to the attention of the Chinese leadership it might break the ice," Chin said. He copied the Nixon memo and passed it to a Chinese agent.

Chin often traveled abroad to meet Chinese agents, but somehow never aroused the suspicions of his superiors. Chin told interrogators he was asked to take a CIA polygraph test only once and passed it because the questions were "vague and not in Chinese" -- his native language. It is believed that a Chinese defector unmasked Chin.

In his defense, Chin argued that "legally I was wrong, but morally, I was right." He insisted that he spied not for profit but to soothe relations between Washington and Peking. Yet he admitted receiving about \$150,000 for his work as a mole, and experts think his take may have exceeded \$1 million.

GRAPHIC: Picture, Chin at time of his arrest, CHARLES TASNADI -- AP

LEVEL 1 - 18 OF 25 STORIES

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February 10, 1986

SECTION: CURRENTS; Notes Of The Week; Pg. 5

LENGTH: 444 words

HEADLINE: Spy-spooked on the Potomac

BODY:

Official Washington loves nothing so much as a spy story -- and in late January there surfaced a new one to chew on, a story that U.S. government spokesmen called fiction and U.S. News & World Report and the New York Times called fact. A miniwar of denials and confirmations ensued --

January 25: The news media receive the February 3 issue of U.S. News, which reports that the U.S. helicoptered a high-level Soviet intelligence agent out of East Germany last spring, hid him at a U.S. base to prevent the upstaging of the Geneva summit and then brought the defector to America in late November. The story says the CIA wants to keep secret the defection of a fifth top Soviet-bloc spy in 1985. The defector wants it that way, the CIA is under fire for mishandling defectors and "another Yurchenko" is feared. KGB Col. Vitaly Yurchenko fled to the U.S. last year, then redefected.

January 26: The Sunday New York Times says on its front page that sources in Congress confirm the U.S. News account and that the defector "may be the most valuable . . . in recent years." News agencies say unnamed CIA officials scoffed at the report.

January 27: The New York Times quotes Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) of the Senate Intelligence Committee: "I have been told by the CIA that no such defector exists. If you asked me whether I believe that, I would say, in light of [CIA Director William Casey's] public statement of reluctance to follow the procedures of oversight, then I will have no comment." At the White House, Larry Speakes says accounts of a fifth defector are "baseless." Asked whether he denies all or part of the story, he replies, "The whole story."

January 28: The New York Times says again that its "congressional sources confirm the reports" of the defection. The Washington Post quotes a spokesman for U.S. News: "We reported the story from multiple sources over several weeks. Based on the reputations and numbers of these sources, we believe our story is correct. We were warned by more than one of our sources that we could expect denials from the CIA and possibly other government agencies."

The Washington Times quotes Senator Chic Hecht (R-Nev.), an Intelligence Committee member: "Where there's smoke, there's fire. . . . There's been too many leaks and here's another." He says the defector accounts are correct. The senator later repeats this to U.S. News, which did not interview him for its original article. As to the denials, he declares: "Of course they're denying it. What did you expect them to do?" The same afternoon, the White House again denies the story.

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February 10, 1986

SECTION: CURRENTS; Current Profile; Pg. 11

LENGTH: 553 words

HEADLINE: JONAS SAVIMBI;
Angola's resilient rebel

BODY:

It is said that you know a man by the company he keeps. Then what manner of man is it whose mentors have included not only Mao Tse-tung but also Senator Jesse Helms -- not only Marxist Che Guevara but also South African President P. W. Botha?

Jonas Savimbi, in 25 years of armed struggle aimed at becoming the leader of Angola and a major force shaping Africa's future, has accepted a wide range of political bedfellows. Once a fierce critic of the United States, the burly, soft-spoken warrior began a two-week visit to the U.S. on January 28. His goal: To win military aid for a guerrilla movement that seeks to share power with Angola's Soviet and Cuban-backed Marxist government -- and perhaps to overthrow it.

Prospects were good as he met with President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz. "We want to be very supportive," Reagan told Savimbi. "We're seeking a way to be of help." The administration reportedly hopes to channel at least \$10 million to him through the Central Intelligence Agency.

Both Savimbi's friends and foes say the 51-year-old revolutionary's persuasive powers should not be underestimated. "He's very charismatic, he's dynamic, he exudes confidence and power," remarks James Lucier, chief legislative assistant to Helms, a North Carolina Republican.

"He is one of the most impressive demagogues to come along in decades," says a critic, Gerald Bender, professor of international relations at the University of Southern California. "He may woo the Americans to his cause as he wooed others in the past."

Born into the Ovimbundu tribe, Savimbi first impressed Protestant missionaries, who sent him to Portugal for schooling. After studying at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland in the 1960s, he joined the drive to oust Portugal from Angola. Forming his own faction, Savimbi found an ally in Mao Tse-tung, who trained the young rebel in guerrilla warfare.

After a rival Marxist group and its Cuban allies took over Angola in 1975 and his ties with China crumbled, Savimbi turned to South Africa, which is still a major source of money and equipment. Dismissing the paradox of a black nationalist taking aid from an apartheid regime, he declares: "Of course I detest apartheid, but it is no threat to neighboring countries."

It is through neighboring Namibia, controlled by South Africa, that Savimbi receives most of his supplies. At present, the 30,000 troops of his National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) control most of

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southeastern Angola.

Though Savimbi's loyalties have often shifted, consistency is seen by John Marcum, professor of politics at the University of California at Santa Cruz: "He is the quintessential survivalist whose purpose is still political power against those he sees as having usurped it."

The country at a glance

Population. 7.9 million.

Language. Portuguese (official) and Bantu languages.

Area. 481,353 sq. mi., more than California and Texas combined.

Literacy rate. 20 percent.

Chief products. Petroleum, diamonds, coffee, bananas, alcohol, cotton goods, fish meal, shoes, paper, palm oil.

Per capita income. \$500.

Politics. Governed from Luanda by a one-party Marxist regime. The UNITA insurgents, headquartered in Jamba, control southeastern part of the country.

GRAPHIC: Picture, 'I detest apartheid, but it is no threat to neighboring countries', CHICK HARRITY -- USN&WR; Map, ANGOLA, USN&WR

LEVEL 1 - 20 OF 25 STORIES

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February 10, 1986

SECTION: CURRENTS; Washington Whispers; Pg. 13

LENGTH: 50 words

BODY:

William Casey is on speaking terms with Congress again. The crusty director of the Central Intelligence Agency, without apologizing for accusing lawmakers of leaking classified data, has quietly reopened lines of communication with Capitol Hill and is again listening to advice from key members.

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February 10, 1986

SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 29

LENGTH: 1954 words

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HEADLINE: Philippines: U.S. at risk;
Business, bases, role in Pacific in balance as islands vote

BYLINE: by Robert A. Manning with Robert Kaylor in Manila and Robert A. Kittle in Washington

DATELINE: Manila

BODY:

As Washington surveys bleak prospects for the postelection Philippines, it can find at best continued instability, at worst grave damage to American interests in the Pacific.

For most of this century, the U.S. viewed the Philippines as a secure outpost, bought with the blood of American troops during the Spanish-American War and World War II. Now, with its society in crisis, the island nation poses strategic problems to the U.S. potentially as great as those presented by the fall of the Shah of Iran and the government of South Vietnam.

President Ferdinand Marcos, ill and losing control of the political tide, is besieged by enemies and a growing Communist insurgency. Events unleashed by the political storm could lead to the loss of American installations at Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, largest in the world. Marcos's opponent, Corazon Aquino, calls, as Marcos does, for renegotiation of the bases agreement with the U.S. when it expires in 1991. The greatest long-term danger, however, stems from uncertainty whether either Marcos or Aquino could control the insurgency after the February 7 voting. American analysts set out three scenarios for the future --

- * In the most optimistic projection, Aquino wins and begins economic and military reforms. Business confidence is restored and, with the economy improving, the insurgency dies. Stability is restored, and U.S. bases are no longer threatened.
- * Less desirable would be a victory by Marcos coupled with the election of opposition vice-presidential candidate Salvador Laurel, a parlay possible under the law. If Marcos died, Laurel would serve out his term, pursuing reforms urged by America.
- * In the worst case, which the odds now favor, Marcos wins through election fraud and rejects reforms. The insurgency might with time topple his government and install a Communist regime.

The Reagan administration has tried to avoid public favoritism, saying it could work with whoever is the victor. But some officials in fact have a preference. They believe U.S. interests would be best served by an Aquino victory that might restore credibility to the government, undercut the insurgency and revive business confidence. Other Americans assume that a change in the Presidency would simply put another self-serving wing of the Philippine elite in power. But, for the time being, Washington is content to lengthen its distance from Marcos.

The administration argues that Marcos cannot be brought to heel by using U.S. aid as a club, although even some Republicans disagree. Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.) insists that Washington should withhold some of the \$267 million it provides annually. Meanwhile, no one has emerged, apart from Aquino, as a rallying point for opponents. And within five years, the rebels could well be more than a match for government forces.

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Historical comparisons are rarely precise. But the position of Marcos is close enough to that of the ailing and authoritarian Shah to be haunting. Marcos's government, oblivious to history, plunges ahead on the same uncompromising course that doomed U.S. interests in South Vietnam.

As in Iran and Vietnam, visible alternatives for the U.S. are unappealing. Marcos faces a genuine threat in the candidacy of Aquino, widow and political heiress of Benigno Aquino, the opposition leader murdered at Manila's airport in 1983. While she remains an underdog, Aquino's exuberant campaign receptions hint that the well-oiled Marcos machine is vulnerable. Crowds of more than 200,000 have turned out to cheer her. Marcos's rallies, by contrast, have been smaller and often stocked with government workers. Spectators at one rally in Manila's port area claimed they were paid to attend.

The end of pro-Western government in Manila -- and the loss of U.S. bases -- would shift traumatically American military deployment in the Western Pacific. In the last two decades, the Soviet fleet has become capable of projecting its power around the globe, not least in the Pacific. Airfields and port facilities at Vietnam's Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay have given Moscow an important strategic toehold in Southeast Asia.

For the U.S. and its allies, alternatives to the bases in the Philippines leave much to be desired. Thailand, where America already has a limited military presence, is judged unsuitable for a greater one, partly because of its location, partly because of the risks of repeating the Philippine experience. The islands of Saipan, Tinian and Guam, U.S. controlled, lie 1,500 miles east of the Philippines. Even less attractive for a major installation is the Micronesian state of Palau, where the U.S. has signed a new agreement providing access for its military forces. Political considerations rule out expansion of U.S. bases in Japan or building of new ones in Australia, and the cost to American taxpayers would be billions.

The political cost could be even greater. Across East Asia, U.S. allies view the drama here as a test of the limits of American power. Japan, central to U.S. interests, looks to the U.S. to guard the strait through which most of its raw materials flow. Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) maneuver to contain Vietnamese -- and thus Soviet -- influence in the region while depending on the U.S. for strategic protection.

There is no talk yet about the collapse of new Asian dominoes beyond the danger to the Philippines itself. But that idea alone embraces the thought of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay possibly ending up as Soviet bases, just as the U.S. bases in Vietnam are now in Soviet hands. So far, there is little evidence of Soviet support for the NPA. But even the lesser trauma of the U.S. exit from the Philippines, apart from a soviet role, would be viewed worldwide as a colossal American failure. And in these matters, the perception of failure is reality.

It cannot be said for sure when things began to go wrong for the U.S. in the former colony that it made independent on July 4, 1946. But some analysts argue that any hope for creating a model of decolonialization was doomed by American mismanagement. Long before Marcos arrived on the scene, the United States conferred power on a corrupt elite rather than creating a broad democratic foundation.

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When Ferdinand Marcos entered Malacanang Palace in 1965, he was hailed as an Asian John F. Kennedy. A bold social reformer, he undertook to modernize the Philippines through an ambitious public-works program.

But as he destroyed the old elite, he began to create a new one in his drive to consolidate power. His base of support shifted from the masses that chose him to a network of cronies whom he rewarded with government jobs and lucrative business monopolies. Democratic institutions were reshaped to his own design. That produced in turn a clamor among radical youth for a turn to the left, leading to bloody street riots and inevitable clashes with police. Terrorism rose.

Marcos responded in 1972 by imposing martial law and refusing to step down, claiming a national emergency, when his term ended. Burdened by chronic mismanagement, debt and recession, combined with a stifling concentration of political power, the Philippines was sinking deeper into crisis as President Reagan took office in 1981.

But unlike many previous crises around the world -- most notably in Iran -- Washington saw this one coming and tried to adjust its course. Reagan's Asia hands recognized quickly that the murder of opposition leader Aquino in August, 1983, marked the beginning of the end for a once stable, though harsh, allied regime. That one act came to symbolize all the abuses, human-rights violations and unaccountability associated with almost two decades of Marcos's rule. It also got the attention of the U.S. Congress, an institution acutely sensitive to any involvement that could tempt a President to use American troops. With that, any hope within the administration of treating the Philippines as business as usual evaporated.

As the political fabric of the islands continued to unravel, a steady flow of high-level U.S. visitors -- including CIA Director William Casey and Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.) -- delivered repeated warnings to Marcos. The message: Make sweeping economic, military and political reforms or face ultimate rejection. There was no direct threat to cut American support or void the mutual-security treaty that binds the two countries -- at least, Marcos says there was none. President Reagan kept his distance personally, avoiding mistakes such as Vice President Bush's overexuberant praise for Philippine democracy in 1983. The U.S. guiding theory now seems to be that, if Marcos falls, the United States must be in a position to do business with his successor.

For his part, Marcos has spurned U.S. advice, clinging to his old ways and making no more than cosmetic changes. Typical of his unyielding behavior was his handling of the Aquino affair. The outcry at home and abroad finally led him to appoint an independent commission to investigate the murder. The panel concluded that Aquino's death resulted from a high-level military conspiracy. But Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fabian Ver and 25 other soldiers were all acquitted after key evidence was excluded from their trial. Ignoring U.S. pressure, Marcos reinstated Ver, his cousin and former driver, as chief of staff.

Economic conditions alone in the Philippines would be enough to sink most free-world leaders. Nearly half the country's 56.8 million people live in poverty. A high birth rate generates 700,000 more potential workers each year for an economy already beset by massive unemployment. Philippine productivity

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has fallen 10 percent in just two years, in part because of competition-stifling sugar and coconut monopolies that Marcos awarded to friends. These two key industries employ half the Philippine work force.

The sugar industry has been controlled by Roberto Benedicto, a former fraternity brother of the President's. The "Coconut King" is Eduardo Cojuangco, godfather of Marcos's son.

At the heart of the problem, says Asia scholar Lucian Pye, is that unlike other authoritarian leaders in East Asia, such as those in Indonesia and South Korea, "Marcos didn't create the sort of institutions that would make the economy work. He only built a patronage system."

The resulting disaffection of professionals, including top businessmen and military officers, may have been Marcos's undoing. Laments Jaime Ongpin, head of the nation's biggest mining-and-construction conglomerate, "Marcos destroyed all the checks and balances. He mangled the Constitution, and he's got the legislature and Supreme Court in his pocket." Ongpin, whose brother Roberto is Marcos's Minister of Trade and Industry, has become, along with a number of other business leaders, a top adviser to Corazon Aquino.

The hope of U.S. officials is that such disaffection someday will congeal into a third force with the potential to undercut the Marcos system on the one hand and the Communist guerrillas on the other.

Elections here tend to be decided by what the capital's cynics call the "three G's" -- guns, goons and gold. The old "vote early and vote often" axiom advocated in U.S. machine-style politics may be an ironic part of America's legacy in the Philippines. For Marcos, that legacy may provide one more victory. But the political tides -- and even his failing health -- now run against the old strong man. Even if he wins at the polls, Marcos will have lost his countrymen and, perhaps, his alliance with Washington, at great cost to everyone concerned.

GRAPHIC: Picture 1, Anti-Marcos demonstrators in Manila, a sign of the times as popular unrest, insurgency grow in the islands, EVRARD -- SIPA/SPECIAL FEATURES; Picture 2, Campaigning, Marcos seems ill, gets smaller crowds; Aquino's are livelier, PIERS CAVENDISH -- REFLEX; Picture 3, Campaigning, Marcos seems ill, gets smaller crowds; Aquino's are livelier, CHRISTOPHER BROWN; Picture 4, The dancing goes on even while close to half of Filipinos live in poverty, TOM HALEY -- SIPA/SPECIAL FEATURES

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February 10, 1986

SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 33

LENGTH: 598 words

HEADLINE: A SINKING ECONOMY;
Why American companies worry

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DATELINE: Manila

BODY:

Once a place where quick riches were to be made, the Philippine Islands these days are a source of high anxiety for many of the American firms that do everything from packing pineapples to assembling autos.

Although most U.S. companies are trying to ride out the storm, several major industries have either cut back or folded in the gloom enveloping Manila. "The economy is going to hell," is the blunt assessment offered by former CIA Director Richard Helms.

Money is still to be made here because, on the whole, Filipinos like American products. But the market is deteriorating rapidly, and a Marcos victory could spell even harder times ahead. He shows no inclination to make the reforms that are badly needed to revive a moribund economy. For that reason, leading businessmen openly oppose his re-election.

Private enterprise is stifled in part because President Ferdinand Marcos has given friends and political allies monopolies in most major industries, including sugar and coconut production. One prominent American banker with long experience in the Philippines comments: "There's also a videocassette monopoly, a cigarette monopoly, an almost-everything monopoly. The result is economic gridlock."

Many experts suspect a wholesale defection would occur were it not for a thicket of government rules that make it hard for foreign companies to move cash out of the Philippines. If the bad times worsen, however, many may pull out no matter what the cost. As it is, more than 500 U.S. companies remain, partly because capital risks are low in this laborintensive country. U.S. investment is about \$1.1 billion, less than that in most other Southeast Asian nations and only 6 percent of U.S. investment in the Pacific.

The U.S. Embassy, a popular first contact for businesses sizing up Philippine opportunities, now has few requests for information. "The current crisis -- political and economic -- dampens anyone's interest in setting up shop in the Philippines," says one U.S. official. The figures bear him out. In 1985, government-approved equity investments fell 27 percent from the previous year to \$223.6 million, lowest in five years.

After a plunge in auto and truck sales, Ford decided to cut its losses -- \$25 million over a five-year period -- and pulled out in 1984, dismissing 1,400 workers. General Motors, eyeing a loss as high as \$30 million, shut down plants last August and is negotiating a takeover by its Japanese partner, Isuzu. Toyota withdrew in 1984 because its licensee went bankrupt.

Three U.S. drug companies also have thrown in the towel, including recent arrival Baxter Travenol, besieged by labor problems.

Many companies are surviving by sharply trimming labor forces. Further economies have been made by postponing long-planned investments unless they are vital or will produce quick profits. Others are diversifying in an attempt to shore up profits. A foreign combine that includes B. F. Goodrich, for example, decided to spend \$5 million on cocoa plantations after seeing tire sales in the islands drop a ruinous 30 percent in two years.

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U.S. fruit growers Dole and Del Monte operate amid risks on southern Mindanao island, an insurgency hot spot where Philippine-owned plantations are the target of guerrilla extortion demands. American companies, preferred as employers by Filipinos, refuse to make shakedown payments.

Says one plantation owner: "We tell the rebels that the government will throw us out if we do pay, and then the guerrillas would have to answer to the people for the loss of jobs."

GRAPHIC: Picture, Manila's Firestone plant continues to produce, but some U.S. firms give up on the economy, PIERS CAVENDISH -- REFLEX FOR USN&WR

LEVEL 1 - 23 OF 25 STORIES

Copyright © 1986 U.S. News & World Report

February 3, 1986

SECTION: CURRENTS; Pg. 6

LENGTH: 796 words

HEADLINE: Defectors: The 'fifth man' is here

BYLINE: by Charles Fenyvesi and Kathryn Johnson

BODY:

The Central Intelligence Agency faced twin challenges in late January: Keeping secret the existence of a fifth high-ranking Soviet-bloc intelligence agent who defected in 1985 and staving off a drive to strip the CIA of the duty of caring for defectors.

In addition to the four spies that the government acknowledges fled to the West, a KGB major general -- the highest ranking defector of them all -- was brought to the U.S. last year, well-informed American intelligence sources told U.S. News & World Report.

The CIA, stung by last November's redefection to Moscow of KGB Col. Vitaly Yurchenko, is working behind the scenes to ward off charges that it has bungled its role as provider and friend to defectors. The White House is considering a plan to give the job to a rival, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The CIA refused as a matter of policy to comment on the latest disclosed defection, and the Kremlin has never acknowledged it.

"Extremely valuable" is how one source termed the Soviet officer, who was feeding secrets to the U.S. even before he defected. The major general, a professional with technical expertise, is described as a middle-age Russian who often traveled to Soviet-bloc countries. He was smuggled out of East Germany in late April or early May by helicopter and debriefed at a U.S. base in West Germany. He was hidden to prevent press leaks that might have upstaged the Geneva summit in November. After the summit, he was flown to the U.S. and, because of the Yurchenko fiasco, settled in the Midwest.

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Yurchenko left his CIA handler behind in a Washington restaurant and went to the Soviet Embassy to redefect.

The newly revealed defector is said to be unlike Yurchenko, who seemed erratic. The CIA's prize is termed a "strong and steady" personality. One CIA agent called him a "top-notch guy."

The "fifth man" was among the earliest, if not the first, of 1985's defectors. Milan Svec, No. 2 officer at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington, defected on May 14; Sergei Bokhan, first secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Athens, went over to the West on May 25; Oleg Gardievsky, KGB station chief in London, changed sides in July or August, and Yurchenko defected in Rome in July.

Although those four became known, U.S. authorities kept the fifth secret. His disclosure now carries no apparent national-security risk, but it may deepen the CIA's woes. For one thing, the major general wants to remain anonymous -- and is being given a new identity. Also, the CIA has clamped down on and talk of defectors, partly from fear of another Yurchenko case and partly to quiet critics who say it can't keep a secret.

Harsh criticism of the agency came from the Jamestown Foundation, a private group set up to work with high-level defectors. After the Yurchenko affair, it was asked by the White House to assess CIA defector practices.

Jamestown said most defectors it spoke to complained that they were assigned to "low-level, insensitive, untrained, frequently rotated officers who did not speak their language. . . . Some say the treatment was so bad that they considered suicide" or redefection.

Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), a former Intelligence Committee member, said the CIA shows "repetitious hamhandedness," adding that "after the CIA debriefs a defector, he shouldn't be dropped into a hole."

A tour of duty resettling defectors is not likely to advance a CIA agent's career, the Jamestown report said. By contrast, defectors speak highly of FBI agents, who are seen as unpretentious, friendly and sensitive, according to the study.

The fear is that shoddy treatment of Yurchenko and others may discourage Eastern officials from fleeing. The foundation's No. 1 proposal is to create an interagency team led by the FBI rather than the CIA to resettle defectors.

"I'm not sure yet which would be the better agency," said Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) of the Senate Intelligence Committee. "I've asked for a through review of Yurchenko, and also one other defector that has not been made public, to get a better view."

Other foundation recommendations:

* The U.S. guarantee defectors incomes equivalent to the government's GS-11 salary -- ranging from \$26,381 to \$34,292 -- so that money worries don't add to the strain of abandoning home.

* The law be changed so that defectors can become U.S. citizens in two years, rather than the current five to 10.

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* An institute staffed by defector scholars be set up as a pool of "ideas and insights" about the Soviet bloc.

Wallop, who backs the proposals, said: "Defectors have much to offer and their experiences should be shared in the classroom, on the speech circuit. They should serve as useful beacons for future defectors."

GRAPHIC: Picture, Vitaly Yurchenko, AP; Symbol, no caption

LEVEL 1 - 24 OF 25 STORIES

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January 27, 1986

SECTION: CURRENTS; Washington Whispers; Pg. 12

LENGTH: 59 words

BODY:

Conservatives are laying on a hearty welcome in late January for Jonas Savimbi, leader of rebels fighting the Marxist government of Angola. Arrangements are being made for Savimbi to meet Reagan and perhaps CIA Director William Casey. Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Ambassador to the United Nations, will introduce the guerrilla fighter at a luncheon.

LEVEL 1 - 25 OF 25 STORIES

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SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 27

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HEADLINE: 'Reagan doctrine' stirs argument at home, battles abroad; Now it's U.S. backing rebels

BYLINE: by Robert A. Manning with Maureen Santini, Carla Anne Robbins and Melissa Healy

BODY:

An emerging "Reagan doctrine" of aid to anti-Soviet guerrillas has set off bitter debate in every corner of the Washington political arena.

At the heart of the issue: The President's growing support for rebels against pro-Soviet governments around the world. U.S. funds already support guerrillas in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. In his budget on February 3, Reagan will ask for some \$70 million in military aid for the contras in Nicaragua. Still under debate within the administration are terms of aid to insurgents in Angola.

The controversy is developing as a key one between Reagan and Congress.

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White House officials rule out commitments that might lead to direct U.S. military involvement. Even so, many lawmakers in both parties fear that the administration might let itself be drawn into conflict.

Lines of dispute do not follow the usual pattern of liberals vs. conservatives. In fact, the administration, while encouraging Kampuchean insurgents, resists giving them money advocated by Democrats.

There are divisions even within the administration. Secretary of State George Shultz, hawkish on behalf of rebels in Afghanistan and Nicaragua, is opposed to aid for those in Angola. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger insists that the U.S. support anti-Communist forces but cautions against anything that might lead to military involvement. CIA chief William Casey and Patrick Buchanan, the leading conservative in the White House, have fewer reservations about covert action.

Last year Lewis Lehrman, a conservative drugstore-chain magnate, underscored hardline pressure on Reagan by sponsoring a meeting of rebel factions in Angola. Later this month, conservatives are bringing Jonas Savimbi, the Angolan rebel leader, to Washington.

The President seems inclined to pursue, but cautiously, a doctrine spawned by a curious twist of political fates. Only a decade ago, support for guerrilla movements was the near exclusive province of the Soviets. But the very success of Soviet clients, leading them to power in several countries, has reversed superpower roles. The Reagan doctrine aims to recover lost ground and expand American influence in the Third World.

"We can hardly turn on those who have lost their freedom," Weinberger said in a January 14 speech detailing America's interests at a conference on low-intensity warfare -- jargon that embraces guerrilla wars.

Although the doctrine's most dramatic manifestation is support for armed insurgents, U.S. officials emphasize its peaceful aspect as well. Washington remains committed, they say, to developing economies and democratic institutions in troubled countries. The impulse for the doctrine appears rooted in Reagan's stated sense of moral obligation to export democracy and free enterprise and his resolve to roll back Soviet advances where possible. Yet the realities of limited resources, world opinion and internal debate work against outright success. Divisions within rebel groups, the ineffectiveness of some and the suspect politics of others have fueled the U.S. argument over who is worthy of support and the form it should take.

Four places where his doctrine already is at work, or could be soon --

ANGOLA

A clear test of Reagan's commitment is Angola, where South African-backed insurgents of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA have fought the Soviet-and-Cuban-backed regime for more than a decade.

The administration voices sympathy for Savimbi, but has opposed legislation to grant open military or humanitarian aid. Instead, Reagan is leaning toward a request for some \$15 million in covert aid. His concern is that overt support would doom U.S. efforts to negotiate removal of 30,000 Cuban troops in return

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for a South African withdrawal from Namibia.

Critics such as Representative Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.) question Savimbi's democratic credentials and argue that American intervention would only "enhance Soviet interests in the region and encourage increased dependence by the Angolan government on the Cuban troops."

Others fear that aiding UNITA would put the United States on the side of South Africa and discredit U.S. policy in the eyes of black Africa. While the U.S. debates, the Soviets are steadily increasing military support to the Angolan government.

American officials say that over the past 18 months the Soviets have delivered at least \$2 billion in additional military hardware. While such military power is unlikely to eliminate UNITA, it does indicate that the best Savimbi can possibly hope for is a political settlement and shared power with the Marxists.

The question is whether a limited victory would justify the risks inherent in U.S. backing for Savimbi. The Reagan doctrine says the answer is yes -- but a carefully qualified yes.

AFGHANISTAN

In sharp contrast to Angola, even liberal Democrats support large-scale covert aid to Moslem rebels fighting some 115,000 Soviet troops who occupy Afghanistan. It was the Soviet invasion that chilled the promise of U.S.-Soviet detente in 1979 and inspired U.S. determination to raise the cost of Soviet expansionism.

The case of Afghanistan differs in two key respects from Nicaragua and other instances of U.S. backing for anti-Soviet rebels. First, the scale of U.S. aid -- more than \$1 billion since 1979 -- dwarfs all other such efforts. Second, the United States in this case has wide, diffuse support, including that of China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan.

Afghanistan also underscores how criteria for aid can shift according to circumstances. In political outlook, the rebels are much closer to the fundamentalist ways of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini than to the democratic principles of America. As with Savimbi in Angola, the Afghans offer the primary virtue of opposing the Soviets in a part of the world that is strategically significant for the U.S.

Afghanistan also dramatizes the cost of Soviet expansion. U.S. officials estimate the price of Soviet occupation at over \$6 billion a year and Soviet casualties at some 30,000. American officials do not expect the rebels to gain military victory, even with increased aid.

But by raising the cost, Washington hopes that Mikhail Gorbachev may ultimately agree to a political settlement to cut Moscow's losses.

KAMPUCHEA

As for Kampuchea, Democrats -- not Republicans -- have led the campaign for aid to the non-Communist guerrillas of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Son Sann

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against the Vietnam-backed Heng Samrin regime. Although Congress approved up to \$5 million worth of aid in 1985, the Reagan administration thus far has been willing to spend only \$3.5 million.

The Kampuchean conflict is complicated by the alliance of the non-Communist groups with the notorious Khmer Rouge guerrillas, who under Pol Pot were accused of murdering tens of thousands of ordinary civilians. In the present conflict, the Khmer Rouge forces have done much of the fighting. The administration wants to see the current regime fall, but it does not want to be in the position of supporting the Khmer Rouge. Few experts doubt that if the Vietnamese are forced to withdraw, Pol Pot's old rebels would quickly try to return to power.

The government of Vietnam has committed some 150,000 well-armed troops to keep its client regime in power. Their continued presence in the country would seem to assure Vietnam's dominance. "I must confess," concedes Representative Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), who led the campaign to aid Kampuchean rebels, "I am not overly optimistic about the prospects for success of the Kampuchean resistance."

As in Afghanistan, the conflict is bleeding the Soviets. But beyond that, it is unclear even to Washington what goals are attainable.

NICARAGUA

Much closer to home, the administration plans to ask Congress for more aid to the contra rebels who have taken up arms against the Sandinista government. Washington's interest in the rebellion is obvious. Nicaragua sits at the back door of the United States and has forged ties with both Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Yet Congress is still of two minds about the guerrillas -- eager to see the Sandinistas ousted but deeply worried about the prospect of America's becoming so heavily involved that it would feel obliged eventually to commit U.S. forces.

These mixed feelings led lawmakers to cut off aid abruptly last spring. Despite a major White House lobbying effort, Reagan was able to obtain only a \$27 million "humanitarian aid" package, which expires in March.

The ups and downs of U.S. covert aid to the rebels since it began in 1981 highlight a key problem: For American support to have any real impact, there must be a wholehearted, sustained commitment. The sporadic nature of U.S. aid, say some analysts, has badly undercut contra efforts and morale.

On the battleground, the Sandinistas now clearly hold the upper hand, battering the outgunned rebels with newly acquired Soviet helicopter gunships. The rebels maintain that they need \$100 million in U.S. assistance if they are ever to have any chance of prevailing -- about \$30 million more than Reagan is prepared to seek from a still wary Congress.

Increasingly heavy-handed Sandinista policies may end up clinching the argument for American military aid. Meantime, the contras are not helping their own case with Washington. Lawmakers are increasingly disturbed by reports of contra human-rights violations, drug smuggling and internal conflicts. So far, exercise of the Reagan doctrine in Nicaragua has cost Americans at least \$130 million.

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All this adds up to an uncertain future for a doctrine whose results have been, at best, mixed. But what seems most likely are marginal aid increases that will keep the policy alive but prevent it from taking on a new life as a bellicose expression of U.S. will.

GRAPHIC: Illustration, no caption, HAROLD SMELCER -- USN&WR; Map 1, Luanda; Picture, Conservative leader Lehrman, and anti-Communist rebels, BLACK STAR; Map 2, Kabul; Map 3, Phnompenh; Map 4, Managua