

# EIR

Executive Intelligence Review

304 West 58th Street, New York, N.Y. 10019, (212) 247-8820  
1010 16th St. N.W. Washington, D.C. (202) 223-8300

## LaRouche Denounces TASS Release

*Sept. 5 (NSIPS)—The following statement was released today by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.*

There is strong circumstantial evidence to suspect that Soviet agents—perhaps the Soviet air command resident unit based in Anchorage, Alaska—caused the Korean Airlines flight 007 to stray into Soviet airspace, by tampering with the navigational instrument programming.

As the Soviet TASS statement of Sept. 4, 1983 stresses, the 747 does employ flight-programming devices consisting of one principal unit coupled to two back-up units. The programming is accomplished for each flight by aid of a magnetic tape reel inserted into the devices before the devices are emplaced prior to take-off.

I was briefed on this by experts at about the same time that Secretary Shultz was delivering his first statement on the incident. I obtained this information in response to my query: how was it possible that the first contact with the flight from Japan included a pilot's report of his plane's position nearly three hundred miles off its actual position? The pilot could make such an honest error only if he was deceived by errors in the programming of his navigational instruments.

As Admiral Bobby Inman has detailed the implications of such programming errors in his published interview in the Sept. 4 Washington Post, under such circumstances it is probable that a 747 flying over Soviet territory by night would not have known it was over Soviet territory.

There are two places a programming error for the second leg of the flight could have been accomplished. Either at the origin of the flight, in New York City, or in the stopover at Anchorage.

**QUESTION:** *Was the flight plan for the Anchorage to Seoul leg of the flight programmed in Anchorage?* This is verifiable. It is important this be investigated. If so, who had access to the programming in Anchorage? If not, who had access to the programming in New York?

**SECOND QUESTION:** *Who benefitted from the flight's entry into Soviet airspace?* Certainly not U.S. intelligence, which has access to better information from space than can be obtained from placing electronic eavesdropping equipment in a civilian airliner. Perhaps the KCIA wished information it is not listed to share from U.S. sources? That is at least an outside possibility. Soviet behavior during a span of slightly more than two and a half hours points strongly toward Soviet interest in having the overflight occur.

**FACT ONE:** There is no indication that the Soviet Union contacted either Tokyo or Washington through regularly available channels, to notify authorities of an overflight in progress—even though they had two and a half hours to do so. There is no cause for suspicion that the U.S.A. or Tokyo received such notification, since the Soviets, who are claiming every malfiance under the sun against the U.S.A. and Japan, have not claimed that such contact was attempted.

**FACT TWO:** *The Soviet command ordered its military aircraft to destroy a civilian airliner at the point the airliner was leaving the vicinity of Soviet airspace—not while the aircraft was entering Soviet airspace.* They waited two and a half hours to shoot down the airliner, after any damage which might allegedly have been done might have been prevented. Furthermore, clearance for this command came from Moscow command, and was not a local commander's initiative.

**CONCLUSION:** At the point the Soviet command ordered the plane shot down, they had a) taken no earlier action available to them to have the plane pulled out of overflight by radio from the U.S.A. or Japan, and thus prevented any remote possibility of electronic eavesdropping by the airliner over Sakhalin, but, instead b) shot down a civilian airliner cold-bloodedly as it was leaving the vicinity of Soviet airspace.

**ADDITIONALLY,** they never took any action, according to their own claims, appropriate to determining whether or not the pilot knew he was in an overflight.

**THEREFORE,** by the measure of their own actions and omissions of available courses of action, the Soviet command had no reasonable military reason for shooting down the airliner. **CONCLUSION:** *They shot it down because they wished to shoot it down as an act of terrorism, pure and simple.* This is an action out of Hitler's strategic policy of Schrecklichkeit, nothing different.

**QUESTION:** *Does this mean that the Soviet command wished to shoot down this airliner perhaps even before it entered Soviet airspace?* I strongly suspect that this is the case. Here are the immediate facts which point my suspicions in that direction.

**FIRST,** the action taken was an act of strategic Schrecklichkeit (terror), for reasons indicated above.

**FACT:** *The action occurred within hours of the anniversary of the outbreak of World War II and on the same day as the launching of the Soviet-directed hot autumn in*

*Western Europe.* This was also the eve of a new wave of adventures by Soviet puppet Qaddafi and by Soviet asset Jumblatt in Lebanon. It occurred following two major Soviet violations of treaty provisions concerning negotiation of indicated unlawful sites in the Soviet Union.

**DISCUSSION:** The Soviet command perpetrated a strategically significant action on a date of strategic significance. The question is, therefore, was the decision made entirely within the two-and-a-half-hour time frame allegedly the interval of the overflight, or had some section of the Soviet command made the decision before the airliner left Anchorage? Farfetched? Look more deeply.

**THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTION:** The action of destroying the airliner *at the point it was leaving the vicinity of Soviet airspace* had the pre-calculable effect of shooting down the peace movement internationally. Since the decision to shoot the airliner down was deliberated at the highest levels in Moscow before the command was executed, this pre-calculable implication was taken into account before the order to destroy was issued. *Would the Soviet command have wished to be placed in the position of making such a decision before the beginning of the two-and-a-half-hour interval?*

**HYPOTHESIS:** Suppose, in their view, the time had come to scrap the peace movement as having outlived its usefulness? That was implicitly the policy decision made in Moscow before the airliner was shot down. It was a decision to restrict the "peace movement's" activities to the capabilities of the hard-core terrorists, to dedicated fanatics allied to Moscow come what may.

**DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHESIS:** It is only a myth that the Soviet leadership viewed the hot autumn as preventing the installation of Pershing IIs in Germany. Soviet sources have repeatedly acknowledged that the hot autumn actions would tend to have exactly the opposite effect and that in any case, the demonstrations would have no effect on the placing of the missiles. The purpose of the hot autumn was solely to make Germany "ungovernable," and was never anything but that. Therefore, the peace movement was seen only as a short-lived weakening of the will of western governments and as a cover for building up capabilities of fanatics to be deployed even after the peace movement had been demoralized by Soviet aggressive action. If the Soviets, as of Sept. 1, 1983, were committed to unleashing some gross aggressive action, and were seeking an orchestrated confrontation about that time, this would be the time to scrap the mass-based peace movement. *Therefore, the hypothesis depends upon some Soviet action of strategic significance to occur shortly after the incident.* Where, then, is the next strategic blow intended to occur?

**RECIPROCAL HYPOTHESIS:** The importance of assessing whether or not the Soviets desired to have this incident, even before the beginning of the two-and-a-half-hour interval, is of determining whether or not they are about to unleash some major strategic incident—*whether to put the Atlantic alliance forces on a state of full alert.* In other words, the whole matter reeks of the Polish-German-Czech border during late August 1939.

*If a Soviet agent tampered with the navigational pro-*

*gramming in New York or Anchorage, Atlantic alliance forces must quickly go to a state of strategic alert.* We must assume, if the hypothesis is correct by this test or similar tests, that Moscow was not merely bluffing when it issued repeat threats of possible preemptive strike. Refusal of treaty meetings is indicative.

**CAPABILITIES:** Did the Soviets have the capabilities for altering the programming of the airliner in either New York or Anchorage? Flatly, yes. This sabotage capability is under the direction of the relevant sections of the Soviet air command. One such unit monitors every flight out of Anchorage. The Soviet command knew what aircraft was in the slot in question from the beginning of the two-and-a-half-hour segment and probably had also a complete passenger manifest as well.

**OTHER EVIDENCE:** The additional evidence which tilts my judgment to the indicated line of thinking about the stopover at Anchorage, is the content of the latest TASS release referencing the navigational programming of the flight. I have had personally some experience with political lying by agents of covert services, including behavior of "sleepers" controlled by such services planted into or recruited from my own circles. When such people lie, their very selection of lies sometimes gives away much more than the liars imagine they are revealing inadvertently. The principles applicable to such lying are most appropriate in the case of the indicated TASS release.

No liar makes up a fable entirely out of whole cloth. He fabricates from materials already in his own mind, using what is on his mind to compose the lie. Lies of that sort are usually intended to be diversionary by essence, and often project the liar's own motives upon the persons he accuses. The TASS statement in question reveals precisely such distinctive features.

**FACT:** It accuses the U.S. of pre-staging the incident as a provocation, and lays heavy emphasis on the infallibility of the flight recorder in the effort to prove this case. As we noted, it was the Soviet act of killing the passengers as the plane was leaving the vicinity of Soviet airspace—after a delay of two and a half hours—which was a deliberate act of strategic terror. They accuse the U.S. of not notifying the aircraft, when the crucial fact is that the Soviets did not notify the U.S. or Japan. *They raise the issue of premeditation.* Since their lies are probably projections of their own behavior, and therefore motives, upon the U.S. and Japan, *must we not also suspect the idea of premeditation has the same significance?* This is exactly what Hitler used to do under similar circumstances.

I have learned over years to know the Soviet mind in some respects better than it knows itself. I can see that mind ticking. I know in what direction they are presently thinking. I say, be fully alert. The other shoe, the big shoe, is about to be dropped somewhere. They are committed to a confrontation perhaps as big as the 1962 crisis. Be fully alert to this probability.

Meanwhile, find out quickly, who re-programmed the navigational instruments in New York, or probably Anchorage. If that question can be answered, the answer is implicitly a big one.

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## LaRouche on Qaddafi Interview

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

The political-intelligence specialist, and average citizen must study the Qaddafi interview in *Wir Selbst*—and Qaddafi's Hitler-like operations against the nations of Africa—as reflecting the mental state of Moscow's tool. We must judge the mental state of the presently ruling combination in Moscow from such actions as the brutal murder of 269 airliner passengers, and Moscow's choice of partners.

Qaddafi, like the forces behind the separatist and terrorist movements, is essentially a Nazi. He has certain resemblances to Adolf Hitler in the manner he conducts foreign policy, but he is not so much a Hitler follower as a Sufi variety of "national bolshevist," a follower of the cult of dionysian chaos of the ultra-fascist Friedrich Nietzsche. *The Conservative Revolution* of the Siemens Stiftung's Dr. Armin Mohler is the most compact reference-source available on the roots of both the Nazis and today's "universal fascists."

The Soviet leadership has no illusions about its Nazi International and similar qualities of allies today. Although Moscow continues, so far, to honor a special relationship to governments such as that of India, the general trend of the past fifteen years has been Soviet preference for allies from among those it itself earlier denounced as the most unspeakable scoundrels. This is the case in the Middle East, in Western continental Europe, and in the case of Qaddafi. This pattern of choice of allies is of one piece with the Moscow command's orders to destroy a civilian airliner over the Sea of Japan.

The significance of Qaddafi's interview in *Wir Selbst*, together with the destruction of the airliner, is that these reflect the political-philosophical outlook of the presently ruling combination in Moscow. True, Moscow played with the "national bolshevist" variety of fascist from the early 1920s, and was more deeply involved with use of Nazi and related instruments throughout the post-war period than most observers not intimately informed of the facts would wish to believe. That is nasty, but it is not the same thing as Moscow's openly associating itself with such forces as political allies, and using Moscow's own resources to build up the strength of Nazis and other sordid elements in the West and developing sector.

A very profound change in Moscow's political-philosophical outlook has occurred, most noticeably over the recent fifteen years. Three features of this process of change are broadly evident.

First, from about the middle 1960s, reliance upon Soviet Leninism as a guiding philosophical outlook for policy-making has vanished. Much of the vocabulary persisted, but the content was shifted to an increasingly pragmatic sort of cynical real-politiking. Essentially, from their vantage-point, "Leninism" had failed in both the industrialized and developing nations, and had degenerated to posturing by aging, increasingly corrupt bureaucrats inside the Soviet Union itself.

Second, this collapse of faith in Leninism was accompanied by a resurgence of old Russian culture from Czarist days, signalled by a resurgence of mass attendance at Russian churches and growing political power of the Russian Church apparatus within the Soviet domestic and foreign-policy apparatus.

Third, as I assessed the course this process was taking as early as 1972, the deepening of Soviet commitment to Nuclear Deterrence and Detente was reflected in shifts in Soviet foreign-policy posture, in the direction of building a Russian (Eastern) division of a Byzantine-like world-empire. This I described at the time as a "New Constantinople" perspective visible in Soviet foreign-policy. Criton Zoakos published a summary of the picture of this "New Constantinople" shift during 1973. I later discovered that this was precisely the policy agreed upon between certain Western and Soviet leaders through the Pugwash Conference back-channel beginning no later than 1958. The Willy Brandt Ostpolitik, the signing of SALT I, and the signing of the 1972 ABM treaty had consolidated this new, imperialist foreign-policy outlook in Soviet policy.

These three factors—cultural pessimism, reversion to old Raskolniki varieties of beliefs, and revival of Russian imperial perspectives modelled on the "Third Rome" tradition—produced in the Soviet leadership and elsewhere an emergence of what is best described as a **Soviet Dostoevskian mentality**.

It is early to say that the Soviet Union will become a full-fledged fascist state in the sense of Mussolini's Italy or Hitler's Germany, however, the tendency is present and pronounced. There are prominent, identifiable points of coincidence between the direction of political-philosophical developments in the Soviet leadership today and, most emphatically, the "national bolshevist" currents within German Nazism. The fact that the "Third Reich" ideology of the Nazis was copied directly from Dostoevsky's "Third Rome" ravings is one. When "solidarism" was adopted as the model of socio-economic policy by the Stras-

ser and Rosenberg currents of the Nazis, the argument was explicitly and emphatically made that German Nazi solidarism and the Tolstoyan solidarism of the Russian Mir were essentially identical. The German "blood and soil" doctrines of the Nazis and the Nazis' leading fascist competitors of that same period of German history were then explicitly represented as akin to the Russian "blood and soil" cultural model. Nazism was largely the introduction of Eastern values of this sort against the Judeo-Christian rationalism of Schiller's and Humboldt's Germany.

The Moscow clearance to order the shooting-down of the Korean airliner is a characteristic expression of a world-outlook akin to the Nazis' Nietzschean philosophy of the Triumph of the Will, the anti-rationalist conception of Will associated with William of Ockham, Bernard of Clairvaux, and others. To deal with the West by display of a terrifying exertion of the Russian Will, is the essence of the airliner incident.

It was a Hitler-like expression in foreign-policy, a characteristically brutal expression of a "Third Rome" state of mind.

It is the same state of mind which prompts the Soviet command to deem a beast as morally and mentally depraved as Khomeini to impose its "dark age" upon the people of Iran, to unleash Qaddafi against the nations and peoples of Africa. It is that same wicked state of mind which prompts the Soviet leadership to adopt the cause of the forces of a new dark age in Germany, the Green Party, and which brings Soviet asset Qaddafi, the Nazi-linked international separatist movement, and the Green Party into convergence within Germany today.

We must recognize this political-philosophical outlook in Moscow, not only as a matter of evaluation pertaining to our own practice in related matters. Unless the Soviet Union is confronted with our knowledge of the cultural degeneration in

progress in the Soviet leadership, men and women of conscience in the Soviet Union will not be encouraged to change the direction of things.

This is not to propose that Marxism and Soviet Marxism in particular are in any sense desirable ideals. I have dealt with these matters amply in numerous published locations, and do not propose to repeat that analysis here at this moment. The working-point here is that the formal commitment to technological progress, and to recognizing as "progressive" nations and political forces committed to delivering the benefits of rationality and technological progress as what the Soviets called "progressive forces" was a kind of morality, a morality which they have repudiated in their present foreign-policy and related practice.

We could have hoped to persuade them that our conceptions of the role of the individual in an environment of technological progress was superior in performance and implications to their own conception of this policy. This rabid, fanatically xenophobic disregard for the sanctity of life of defenseless airliner passengers, and the promotion of their asset Qaddafi, bespeaks an immoral irrationalism which is a thermonuclear menace to all civilized life.

They will clamor that we have influential and evil fellows in the West. Who could disagree with that honestly! Yet, the fellows who perpetrated the offenses to which Moscow will now point liberally, have been recently the Soviets' preferred political allies through such back-channels as Pugwash. In condemning the West for the wickedness of such fellows, the Soviets merely more completely condemn themselves. We know them by the company they keep.