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COUNTERSpy

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Feb.- April 1982



"WELL YES, THE C.I.A. DID PLOT ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS ON VARIOUS POLITICAL LEADERS, BUT THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO HARM INTENDED!"

COLLEGE MEDIA SERVICES

XIV CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN ARMIES

THREATENING THE SANDINISTAS

AMNESTY FAULTS FBI

LIBYAN WITCH-HUNT: THE WAR AT HOME

INSIDE BOSS: SOUTH AFRICA'S SECRET POLICE

BRITISH RIGHT CENSORS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

GREECE: THE LONG ROAD TO FREEDOM

TURKISH FASCISM AS NATO DEMOCRACY

INDIA: UNDER THE IMF'S THUMB

GEN. HAIG'S YELLOW RAIN

Editorial

As a member of the Rockefeller Commission to investigate the CIA (set up by President Gerald Ford), Ronald Reagan joined in its unanimous recommendation that: "Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to perform what are essentially internal security tasks. The CIA should resist any efforts, whatever their origin, to involve it again in such improper activities." The Commission, which included CIA collaborators, was only asking the President and the CIA to abide by the National Security Act of 1947. The Act prohibits the CIA from having "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions."

On December 4, 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12333 which, while purportedly in accord with the National Security Act of 1947, allows the CIA to engage in police functions and domestic covert operations. Aptly described by the New York Times as the "Son of Operation CHAOS," the Executive Order was denounced by former FBI agent, Representative Don Edwards (D.-Ca.): "It still puts the CIA smack into secretly operating within the United States... it permits them to enter into arrangements with state and local police... and Americans overseas are wide open to surveillance, regardless of any connections to foreign governments or criminal activity."

In addition to this major enhancement of CIA powers, the administration has initiated measures severely restricting news-gathering about government operations. According to the International Press Institute, these restrictions pose a "potentially serious loss of public accountability." More recently, it has been reported that Reagan is set to sign an executive order on the Freedom of Information Act which would all but exempt the CIA from compliance with requests for information.

Certainly these measures undermine U.S. democracy, but the full import of Reagan's CIA actions can perhaps best be understood by looking at recent history. In 1947, a millionaire Wall Street investment banker

and Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, one of the creators of the CIA, told Congress under oath that "the purposes of the Central Intelligence Authority are limited definitely to purposes outside of this country...." At almost the same time, Forrestal secretly initiated a massive illegal domestic monitoring program, Operation Shamrock, which eventually was run by the CIA and the National Security Agency. Forrestal, who received journalistic training at Princeton University, also called in the publishers and editors of major U.S. publications and asked them to voluntarily submit to government censorship.

Forrestal took these actions as part of his preparations to open the covert front of the first Cold War - which was quite hot for the Third World, thanks to the CIA. Then, as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal asked for, and the CIA conducted, covert political and paramilitary operations, despite the opinions of the CIA Director and General Counsel that the CIA had no such authorization.

Beginning with the Forrestal-initiated covert intervention in the Italian elections after World War II, CIA covert operations have culminated in coups in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Indonesia (1965); a mass murder program, Operation Phoenix, in Vietnam; support for counter-revolution in Angola; and destabilization efforts in Afghanistan. And at home, Operation CHAOS violated the rights of millions of U.S. citizens.

As Ronald Reagan sets in motion Cold War II, he undoubtedly wants to be unhindered by democratic opposition and publicity. Hence, the flurry of executive orders which sidestep even the compliant Congress. For the rest of the world, this means more Operation Phoenix programs - and worse. For the U.S., it could mean the realization of the fear expressed by then-Representative Clare L. Hoffman regarding the pending National Security Act of 1947: "The possibilities of dictatorship by the military are in this legislation."

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News NOT in the News

New Assignment

The Senate Intelligence Committee continues to make a charade of CIA "oversight" by such actions as the recent appointment of 38-year-old Robert Ruhl Simmons to be staff director. According to government-released information, Simmons is a 10-year veteran of the CIA's operations directorate - "dirty tricks" - which he joined after serving with Army intelligence in Vietnam (1965-68). Simmons has been serving on the intelligence committee staff as the representative of conservative Senator John H. Chafee. He is replacing John F. Blake, a 32-year CIA veteran and former president of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers who left "to take advantage of a forthcoming opportunity," according to committee chairperson, Senator Barry Goldwater.

Exotic Languages

In October, a House post-secondary education committee unanimously approved an \$87 million-a-year program to encourage the teaching of foreign languages in schools and colleges. This action does not signal a sudden Congressional interest in promoting understanding between the U.S. and citizens of other countries. According to committee chairperson, Paul Simon (D.-Ill.), the program is intended to enhance the capabilities of the defense department and intelligence agencies and improve the U.S.'s position in international trade. Simon said he expects to win approval for the bill by focusing on its potential to aid national security. "Where there is a national need, we have to meet it," he said in a Washington Post (10/10/81) interview.

CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman testified in a July subcommittee hearing, even though the CIA is prohibited from promoting legislation. Inman bemoaned that the nation's "rapidly deteriorating" foreign

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language capability was having an "adverse impact" on intelligence. "We are especially vulnerable when it comes to the more exotic languages, such as Urdu, Arabic and Farsi." These three languages are spoken in areas of the world where the CIA, the Pentagon and the multinational corporations are facing increasing resistance to their penetration, manipulation and exploitation.

Casey's Sudan Emergency

Some eight years ago, CIA Director William Casey's brother-in-law was killed in a bizarre accident involving a riding lawn mower owned by Casey. The brother-in-law's family filed a damage suit for alleged negligent maintenance of the lawn mower. Eight years later, they were having difficulty getting Casey to court. On October 20, 1981, Casey was scheduled to appear for trial. A few days before, Casey's lawyer Robert C. Minion told Judge Howard E. Levitt that Casey had to be in London on October 20 to direct the CIA response to the "Sudan emergency." On October 20, CIA spokesperson Dale Peterson said: "He's still here." (Washington Post, 10/26/81). Asked if Minion had told the judge October 20, Peterson added: "That may not be exactly accurate, but it's pretty close." Actually, Casey was scheduled to be in London on October 23, to address a fraternal organization of special forces soldiers.

Aid for Terrorists

In spite of repeated attempts at unification, the Afghan "rebel" groups are as divided as ever. Infighting was pushed to a new peak recently by Sayed Ahmad Gailani, the head of the "National Islamic Front of Afghanistan." Gailani confirmed statements made by the Afghan government, when he told a press conference in London, England in early November 1981 that it is "incomprehensible and unforgiveable" that the West is aiding certain rebel groups who are "terrorizing the Afghan population." Gailani, who likes to style himself as a moderate and who is asking for Western aid himself, singled out Gulbuddin

Hekmatyar's Islamic Party which has "shot villagers who had refused to pay them taxes, and sometimes burnt down villages which supported other resistance groups." Hekmatyar received U.S. and Pakistani support as early as 1973 when Pakistan clandestinely trained some 5,000 Afghan "rebels" to destabilize the government of Muhammad Daoud. (For a detailed description of the various rebel groups, see Mohammed Sarkash, Seamus O'Faolain, "Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Prospects for Peace," CounterSpy, vol.5, no.3, pp.24-33).

Amnesty Faults FBI

On October 13, 1981, Amnesty International (AI), after studying thousands of pages of official transcripts and documents, called on the U.S. government to set up an independent commission of inquiry into the influence of the FBI on the criminal justice system. "Amnesty International," the 144-page report says, "does not have any views about the need for any particular domestic intelligence investigation, but it wonders what conclusion should be drawn when a federal government agency [the FBI] conducts such an investigation and at the same time appears willing to fabricate evidence against its 'targets' and to withhold information which, according to law, should have been disclosed."

Entitled, Proposal for a Commission of Inquiry into the Effect of Domestic Intelligence Activities on Criminal Trials in the United States of America, the report does not comment on juries' decisions or call for the automatic acquittal of defendants in cases involving FBI misconduct. "But," says AI, "there comes a point when the number or type of measures taken against members of a political group suggest that it may be impossible to decide whether a particular case has been affected by law enforcement misconduct without the conducting of a comprehensive inquiry into whether or not the individual measures form part of a pattern."

Commenting on the FBI's COINTELPRO abuses - which, AI charges, continued long after the program's official termination - the report says that: "Undoubtedly there is a clear distinction between the 'chill-

ing' of constitutional rights and the imprisonment of individuals on political grounds. One object of an inquiry would be to ascertain whether COINTELPRO, which certainly did the former, also resulted in the latter."

In short, the report maintains that the FBI has violated the legal and political rights of U.S. citizens. Indeed, it quotes the point-blank assessment of COINTELPRO by a U.S. Senate committee: "Domestic intelligence activity has threatened and undermined constitutional rights of Americans to free speech, association and privacy." What needs to be determined now, according to AI, is whether the FBI continued its violations against defendants, thus sabotaging the basis of a fair trial. The report documents the FBI's production of false evidence, lies about FBI actions, harassment, infiltration of legal defense teams by FBI informants and failure to make available information which the defense could have used to win acquittal.

Two cases highlighted by the report are those of Elmer Pratt of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and Richard Marshall of the American Indian Movement (AIM) - both convicted of murder after being targeted by the FBI. Pratt, according to FBI documents, was targeted for "neutralization" under COINTELPRO. The report attempts to answer the separate question of whether this "neutralization" continued after Pratt's arrest. The answer appears to be "yes." FBI documents say that arrests and prosecutions are neutralization techniques.

As a COINTELPRO target, Pratt was under constant FBI surveillance. Ironically, this surveillance could have proved Pratt's innocence. His defense attorneys argued that FBI surveillance records would have shown Pratt to be in Oakland on December 18, 1968, the day he allegedly murdered someone in Santa Monica. At first, the FBI said that it had no information about Pratt before 1969. Subsequently-released documents showed FBI surveillance of BPP leaders during 1968. The FBI then told an appeals judge that "the transcripts of the conversations recorded by these telephone taps have been lost or destroyed."

During Pratt's trial, the FBI planted informants into his defense team and did not disclose that the chief prosecution witness, Julius Butler, was an FBI "pro-

bationary racial informant." Even before the trial, according to an FBI document, the FBI had passed information to the Los Angeles police identifying an alleged second suspect in the murder. This piece of information was withheld from the defense. Finally, Pratt's lawyers contend that the jury should have heard evidence showing that a witness who identified Pratt at the trial apparently identified someone else earlier as the murderer.

Similar documented FBI misconduct occurred in the case of Richard Marshall. At his trial, Myrtle Poor Bear testified that Marshall had confessed the murder to her. According to the Chief Justice of the South Dakota Supreme Court (which refused to grant a retrial), Marshall's defense was not informed of her "apparently false affidavits;" her "true relationship with the FBI;" nor that her medical history "would probably have had a substantial effect on her credibility." Medical records as well as her family's testimony, he said, "indicate that Poor Bear is a seriously disturbed young woman who often fantasizes and tells stories and lies." Myrtle Poor Bear has since sworn that her testimony against Marshall was false and was given only after the FBI threatened her life and that of her daughter.

The U.S. government's admission of Poor Bear's lack of credibility was confirmed when the prosecution failed to call her as a witness against Leonard Peltier, even though her testimony had been used by the FBI to extradite Peltier from Canada. Commenting on Peltier's extradition, a U.S. appeals court admitted that: "What happened happened in such a way that it gives some credence to the claim of the... Indian people that the United States is willing to resort to any tactic in order to bring somebody back to the United States from Canada.... And if they are willing to do that, they must be willing to fabricate other evidence. And it's no wonder that [Indian people] are unhappy and disbelieve the things that happened in our courts when things like this happen."

The Amnesty International report makes the following recommendations:

"1) Amnesty International recommends that the United States Government establish an independent commission of inquiry to examine thoroughly and impartially the matters raised in this report.

2) The commission of inquiry should ex-
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amine the effect of the FBI's domestic intelligence program 'COINTELPRO' on criminal prosecutions of persons who were 'targeted' under it. Amnesty International considers that the case of Elmer Pratt, including the role and conduct of the FBI, should form part of the material studied by the commission of inquiry.

3) The commission of inquiry should consider the conjunction of FBI domestic intelligence investigation of members of the American Indian Movement with the irregular and inappropriate FBI conduct in prosecutions against them. Amnesty International considers that the case of Richard Marshall, including the role and conduct of the FBI, should form part of the material studied by the commission of inquiry.

4) The commission of inquiry should consider whether the political views of any citizens, or the FBI's attitude toward those views, have been a factor in prosecutions or the preparations of cases against them and, if so, seek ways of preventing this from occurring in the future."

To date, the U.S. government has failed to respond to AI's recommendations. At the same time, the Reagan administration is moving to weaken the Freedom of Information Act which made it possible to document FBI and COINTELPRO violations, and Reagan has signed a new Executive Order on intelligence activities which institutionalizes FBI abuses. - by John Kelly -

General Haig's Yellow Rain

Against a backdrop of mounting European opposition to the military policy of the Reagan administration, Secretary of State Alexander Haig declared on September 13, 1981 in West Berlin that he has "firm evidence" of the Soviet use of biological warfare agents ("yellow rain") in Southeast Asia. The State Department said the next day that the administration believes it has "good evidence that... three potent mycotoxins of the trichothecene group" have been used. These mycotoxins, according to the Department's fact sheet, "do not occur naturally in Southeast Asia." Therefore, they must have been applied to the single leaf sample (allegedly from the "Thai-Cambodian border") upon which the State Department based its

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charges. (U.S. officials won't say exactly where the leaf comes from, who obtained it, and who analyzed the sample.)

In a detailed article, Science magazine came to a different conclusion. (10/2/81) It says that the three mycotoxins are naturally "produced by some but not all species of Fusarium, an extremely common fungus." Science contacted two Fusarium experts who "expressed surprise" at the State Department's conclusion: "Fusarium is found almost everywhere," and therefore, there is a very great likelihood that Fusarium member species which produce the mycotoxins would be found almost everywhere, as well - including Southeast Asia. When Science asked Frederick Cecil of the State Department's Office of Theater Military Policy about the Department's claim that the mycotoxins don't occur in Southeast Asia, he replied that "a search of 3,000 literature references to mycotoxins revealed that none had been reported from Southeast Asia." Commented Science: "The failure to find any literature references is obviously a less than conclusive basis for asserting that 'mycotoxins do not occur naturally in Southeast Asia.'"

The "less than firm" evidence did not deter many U.S. newspapers as well as TV and radio stations from running stories on the Soviet use of "yellow rain." Newsweek magazine, for example, was quick to repeat State Department assertions that trichothecene is "produced by fungi that don't grow in Southeast Asia," while the poison "is common in the Soviet Union." (9/28/81)

On November 10, the State Department announced it had obtained several more samples of material from Southeast Asia to prove that "yellow rain" was indeed being used in Southeast Asia. The New York Times was one of the few media outlets that dared to question the government's story: "There's a serious gap between the weight of the evidence and the weight of the charges made by the State Department in the 'yellow rain' affair.... On the basis of four samples the State Department is accusing Moscow, through its Vietnamese allies, of using Southeast Asia as a testing ground and thus cheating on international treaties." The State Department admits that it received one of the samples from the mercenary magazine Soldier of Fortune. Another sample, according to the Times, "is said to have been furnished by

the Cambodian Communists [apparently the Pol Pot forces fighting in Cambodia with Chinese aid]. What company is the department keeping? With what certainty can it assure the public that its samples are genuine?"

The Times pointed out other State Department inconsistencies. "It told a Senate committee that the symptoms caused by trichothecenes in animals match perfectly those reported by the victims of yellow rain. But they apparently do not. The department has said yellow rain is so named because it patters on rooftops; yet it does not explain how particles large enough to patter are also small enough to breathe." Not surprisingly, the Times urged a continuing investigation but concluded that statements such as, "We now have the smoking gun," are inappropriate. "Jumping the gun is more like it." (11/17/81).

The yellow rain issue is also being examined by a United Nations panel of four experts from Egypt, Peru, Kenya and the Philippines - all close U.S. allies. The panel submitted its report in late November 1981 saying that "there was no conclusive evidence to support United States charges that Soviet-made chemical and biological weapons had been used in Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan." (Charges of Soviet use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan date back to the Carter administration; see "Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan," CounterSpy, vol.5 no.1, pp.17-22). Nevertheless, the U.N. General Assembly voted on December 9 that the panel should continue its investigation.

Ironically, the biological and chemical warfare propaganda campaign was launched by General Haig. The same Haig was serving in the U.S. Army in Southeast Asia in the 1960s when the U.S. was dumping close to 100,000 tons of chemicals such as Agent Orange, on Vietnam - the only documented use of chemical warfare in Southeast Asia. Even before that, there was another disturbing chapter in Haig's career, linked to biological and chemical warfare. After graduating from West Point in 1947, Haig was assigned administrative assistant and aide to General Douglas MacArthur in Japan. MacArthur's staff at the time was involved in what probably is history's biggest cover-up of biological and chemical warfare atrocities. The Japanese army, under Lt. Gen. Ishii Shiro, had developed

a vast arsenal of chemical and biological weapons - and actually used them against China and the Soviet Union. Knowledge about the way these weapons worked was obtained from human experiments. Some of Ishii's victims, who were killed in the experiments, were U.S. POWs.

The Soviet Union demanded that Ishii be brought to trial for his war crimes. MacArthur and his staff stalled. Ishii had told them he would work with the U.S., further developing his chemical and biological weapons, in exchange for immunity. A memo prepared for the State Department in 1947 argued that "the value to U.S. of Japanese BW [Biological Weapons] data is of such importance to national security as to far outweigh the value accruing from war crimes prosecution." Another memo by Dr. Edwin Hill of Camp Detrick, Maryland praised the Japanese research and stated that their "information could not be obtained in our own laboratories because of scruples attached to human experimentation."

Ishii Shiro never went to trial. His scientific data on biological and chemical warfare - considered to be "extremely valuable" military information - was sent to Fort Detrick, the U.S. Army's center for biological warfare. The Japanese and the U.S. governments, including General Haig, have covered up this incident since World War II. (For a detailed description of this cover-up, and subsequent U.S. biological and chemical warfare efforts, see John W. Powell, "Japan's Germ Warfare: The U.S. Cover-up of a War Crime," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol.12, no.4, 1980, pp.2-17.) *- by Konrad Ege -*

Closer to Censorship

Less than four hours before the Senate packed up for its long holiday recess at 10:30 pm on December 16, the so-called Intelligence Identities Protection Act was brought to the floor. It was only stopped when several Senators threatened to filibuster, urging that the bill be considered at greater length in the second session beginning January 25, 1982. Reproduced below is HR4, the version of the Act already passed by the House of Representatives on September 23, 1981. The Senate version is very similar.

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H.R. 4

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Identities Protection Act".

SEC. 2. (a) The National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new title:

"TITLE VI—PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

"DISCLOSURE OF IDENTITIES OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES UNDERCOVER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS, INFORMANTS, AND SOURCES

"Sec. 601. (a) Whoever, having or having had authorized access to classified information that identifies a covert agent, intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not more than \$50,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

"(b) Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to classified information, learns the identity of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not more than \$25,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"(c) Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, discloses any information that identifies an individual as a covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such individual and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such individual's classified intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not more than \$15,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."

"DEFENSES AND EXCEPTIONS

"Sec. 602. (a) It is a defense to a prosecution under section 601 that before the commission of the offense with which the defendant is charged, the United States had publicly acknowledged or revealed the intelligence relationship to the United States of the individual the disclosure of whose intelligence relationship to the United States is the basis for the prosecution.

"(b)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), no person other than a person committing an offense under section 601 shall be subject to prosecution under such section by virtue of section 2 or 4 of title 18, United States Code, or shall be subject to prosecution for conspiracy to commit an offense under such section.

"(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply (A) in the case of a person who acted in the course

of an effort to identify and expose covert agents with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States by the fact of such identification and exposure, or (B) in the case of a person who has authorized access to classified information.

"(c) It shall not be an offense under section 601 to transmit information described in such section directly to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

"PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING COVER FOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

Sec. 603. (a) The President shall establish procedures to ensure that any individual who is an officer or employee of an intelligence agency, or a member of the Armed Forces assigned to duty with an intelligence agency, whose identity as such an officer, employee, or member is classified information and which the United States takes affirmative measures to conceal is afforded all appropriate assistance to ensure that the identity of such individual as such an officer, employee, or member is effectively concealed. Such procedures shall provide that any department or agency designated by the President for the purposes of this section shall provide such assistance as may be determined by the President to be necessary in order to establish and effectively maintain the secrecy of the identity of such individual as such an officer, employee, or member.

"(b) Procedures established by the President pursuant to subsection (a) shall be exempt from any requirement for publication or disclosure.

"EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

"Sec. 604. There is jurisdiction over an offense under section 601 committed outside the United States if the individual committing the offense is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence (as defined in section 101(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act).

"PROVIDING INFORMATION TO CONGRESS

"Sec. 605. Nothing in this title shall be construed as authority to withhold information from Congress or from a committee of either House of Congress.

"DEFINITIONS

"Sec. 606. For the purposes of this title:

"(1) The term 'classified information' means information or material designated and clearly marked or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or Executive order (or a regulation or order issued pursuant to a statute or Executive order), as requiring a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security.

"(2) The term 'authorized', when used with respect to access to classified information, means having authority, right, or permission pursuant to the provisions of a statute, Executive order, directive of the head of any department of agency engaged in foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, order of a United States court, or provisions of any Rule of the House of Representatives or resolution of the Senate which assigns responsibility within the re-

spective House of Congress for the oversight of intelligence activities.

"(3) The term 'disclose' means to communicate, provide, impart, transmit, transfer, convey, publish, or otherwise make available.

"(4) The term 'covert agent' means—

"(A) a present or former officer or employee of an intelligence agency, or a present or former member of the Armed Forces who is or was assigned to duty with an intelligence agency—

"(i) whose past or present identity as such an officer, employee, or member is classified information, and

"(ii) who is serving outside the United States or has within the last five years served outside the United States;

"(B) a United States citizen whose past or present intelligence relationship to the United States is classified information and—

"(i) who resides and acts outside the United States (or who resided and acted outside the United States) as an agent of, or informant or source of operational assistance to, an intelligence agency, or

"(ii) who at the time of the disclosure is or was at any time acting as an agent of, or informant to, the foreign counterintelligence or foreign counterterrorism components of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; or

"(C) an individual, other than a United States citizen, whose past or present intelligence relationship to the United States is classified and who is a present or former agent of, or a present or former informant or source of operational assistance to, an intelligence agency.

"(5) The term 'intelligence agency' means the Central Intelligence Agency, the foreign intelligence components of the Department of Defense, or the foreign counterintelligence or foreign counterterrorism components of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"(6) The term 'informant' means any individual who furnishes information to an intelligence agency in the course of a confidential relationship protecting the identity of such individual from public disclosure.

"(7) The terms 'officer' and 'employee' have the meanings given such terms by sections 2104 and 2105, respectively, of title 5, United States Code.

"(8) The term 'Armed Forces' means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

"(9) The term 'United States', when used in a geographic sense, means all areas under the territorial sovereignty of the United States and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands."

(b) The table of contents at the beginning of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"TITLE VI—PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

"Sec. 601. Disclosure of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources.

"Sec. 602. Defenses and exceptions.

"Sec. 603. Procedures for establishing cover for intelligence officers and employees.

"Sec. 604. Extraterritorial jurisdiction.

"Sec. 605. Providing information to Congress.

"Sec. 606. Definitions."

Numerous constitutional scholars including Stephen Saltzberg of the University of Virginia Law School and Philip Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School have said that the Act passed by the House is

unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment. The "Intelligence Identities Protection Act" presents an obvious danger to - it in fact censors - publications such as CounterSpy. But it does

more. A careful reading of HR4 shows that the law doesn't stop at preventing "literary hitmen" - as some Congresspersons described journalists who identify CIA officers - from writing. It can be used against any journalist, U.S. citizen and foreigners working in the U.S. alike, who writes critically about U.S. intelligence activities.

Indeed, HR4 does more than criminalize the actual naming of CIA names. The key phrase is "Whoever... discloses... any information that identifies a covert agent." Note that it does not say "whoever names a covert agent," but whoever discloses any information that identifies an agent. Thus a story about any CIA operation could be deemed illegal if the information printed allows some readers to draw conclusions about the identities of CIA agents. For example, the story of CIA aid to the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio to help destabilize the Allende government would be illegal since a reader might conclude that its editor knew of the payments and therefore, would have been a "source of operational assistance" (one of the definitions of covert agent) to the CIA, protected from identification by the bill.

A little-publicized aspect of HR4 is that it also illegalizes the identification of FBI agents and informers engaged

in "foreign counterintelligence" operations inside the U.S. As absurd as it might sound, this means that if a member of a legal political group in the U.S. discovers that an FBI informant has penetrated the organization and reveals that information to other members, he or she could be committing a crime. The FBI can simply maintain that the informer was engaged in a "foreign counterintelligence" operation.

These two examples, touching only a few aspects of the "Intelligence Identities Protection Act," show how widely the government would be able to stretch that law. As California Representative Edwards said, I believe this bill is dangerous not only for what it forbids directly but also for the precedent it creates. Today we ban the disclosure of identities. Tomorrow there will be talk of banning disclosures of covert actions themselves ... If the American people are denied information, they are denied the power that the Constitution says resides with them. Preventing that is what the first amendment is all about."

Edwards concluded that the "Intelligence Identities Protection Act" creates an "unprecedented dilution of the notion of what constitutes freedom of speech and the press."

XIV Conference of American Armies: Preparing for Intervention

by Konrad Ege

Immediately after taking office, the Reagan administration began to study the feasibility of U.S. military actions in Central America and the Caribbean (see Washington Post, 11/13/81). Secretary of State Alexander Haig has repeatedly accused Nicaragua of becoming a "totalitarian" state, and of funneling Cuban weapons to the Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Movement. Cuba is described as "the source" of unrest in Central America, and is said to be playing a crucial role in aiding the Salvadoran guerrillas. The

(Konrad Ege is co-editor of CounterSpy and a freelance journalist.)

Reagan administration also charges that Grenada is about to become another center of "Cuban subversion," and has taken drastic steps to destabilize Grenada's economy. The U.S. is aggressively lobbying against International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Economic Community loans to Grenada. In addition, the Grenadan government says that the August 1981 U.S. maneuvers in the Caribbean warn of possible U.S. military actions against Grenada.

As with Grenada, the U.S. has been waging a two-sided war against Cuba and Nicaragua - with words, and with actions. At the December 1981 Organization of American

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States meeting, Haig called on the OAS member nations to take "collective action" against "threats to peace and security from Cuba and Nicaragua." The Washington Post quoted an unnamed State Department official as saying that "joint contingency planning" by the U.S. and some of its "hemispheric allies" might be an aim of future OAS meetings. "Hemispheric allies" are presumably Latin America's dictatorships in Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, Uruguay, and El Salvador along with Honduras (now "democratic"), Edward Seaga's Jamaica and the Christian Democratic Venezuela.

There are very strong indications that in the case of Cuba the war of words has already been transformed into a secret actual war with biological warfare operations against Cuba. (See "U.S. Biological Warfare Against Cuba," CounterSpy, vol.6, no.1). The Pentagon has been studying a number of options to be used against Cuba, including large naval exercises, obstruction of weapons shipments to Cuba, or a complete blockade of Cuba (an act of war), as well as "an invasion by American and possibly Latin American forces." According to a New York Times article, several Latin American countries have been contacted "at high levels in government and the military and asked if they might join in any kind of military operations."

The Reagan administration's campaign against Nicaragua, with General Haig in the forefront, has been especially volatile. In a November 12 Congressional hearing, Haig explicitly refused to rule out the use of U.S. military force to defeat the Nicaraguan revolution. Already, in violation of U.S. neutrality laws (even according to the State Department), Nicaraguan exiles are training in Florida for a possible invasion of Nicaragua, and the Reagan administration is doing its best to destabilize the country economically. Haig's comments led Rep. Michael Barnes (D-Md.) to say: "Based on your responses, if I were a Nicaraguan, I'd be building my bomb shelter." The Nicaraguans are not building bomb shelters; instead they are building up a large army and peoples' militia, actions which Haig calls signs of Nicaraguan aggression. Reportedly, the Reagan administration is considering a naval blockade of Nicaragua, allegedly to stop the flow of arms to the FMLN in El Salvador. Salvadoran Defense Minister Jose Guillermo Garcia predicted in early Novem-

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ber that such a blockade would "neutralize" the guerrillas, but, he said, El Salvador is not asking for a blockade. Instead, he said, the decision is up to the Reagan administration.

Due to public opposition in the U.S. and warnings by countries such as Mexico, the Reagan administration appears to be hesitant to take military steps against any country unilaterally. As mentioned, efforts are being made to bring other Latin

XIV
CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN ARMIES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

ATTENDEES

ARGENTINA	LTG Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri
BARBADOS	COL Rudyard C. Lewis
BOLIVIA	BG Angel Mariscal Gomez
BRAZIL	GEN Antonio Ferreira Marques
CHILE	LTG Washington Carrasco Fernandez
COLOMBIA	GEN Fernando Landazabal Reyes
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	MG Manuel A. Lachapelle Suero
ECUADOR	MG Medardo Rodrigo Salazar Navas
EL SALVADOR	COL Jose Guillermo Garcia
GUATEMALA	COL Elio Cabrera Padilla
HAITI	BG Henri Namphy
HONDURAS	BG Mario E. Chinchilla Carcamo
JAMAICA	BG Robert J. Neish
PANAMA	COL Florencio Florez
PARAGUAY	MG Andres Rodriguez
PERU	LTG Otto Elespuru Revoredo
SURINAM	MAJ Henk Fernandes
URUGUAY	LTG Luis V. Queirolo
VENEZUELA	MG Vincente Luis Narvaez Churion

OBSERVERS

CANADA	MG P. J. Mitchell
CONDECA	BG Luis Rene Mendoza Palomo
COPECOMI	COL Elbio Encarnacion Ojeda
COSTA RICA	COL Alvaro Sanchez Monestel
MEXICO	LTG Hector Portillo Jurado

American governments into the anti-Cuba and anti-Nicaragua crusades. The strongest indication that some sort of joint operation might be in the offing came when the Pentagon hosted the 14th Conference of American Armies at Fort Lesley J. McNair, in Washington, D.C. from November 3 to 5, 1981. The conference, which was attended by military and intelligence officers from 20 countries (Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, the United States, and Venezuela; observers came from Canada, Costa Rica and Mexico) was held in "strict privacy."

Speeches delivered by U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and El Salvador's Jose Garcia were not released to the press because of "the classified nature of the issues to be addressed." The Nicaraguan government had requested an invitation to the conference, but conference secretary U.S. General Peter Dawkins stated that Nicaragua could not attend because "the attendees must share common perspectives on security and defense issues of mutual interest within the boundaries of the American hemisphere." One conference participant stated it more bluntly: "Nicaragua is no more an ally, but a Russian surrogate." He also requested that Nicaragua be excluded from the Interamerican Defense Board.

CounterSpy has learned that the issue of Cuba and Nicaragua being "Russian surrogates" was indeed the main topic of the conference. The conference began with a speech by General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Meyer has been Chief since June 22, 1979 after serving in Korea and in Vietnam as Division Chief of Staff of the 1st Cavalry Division. According to his official biography, Meyer is a former Deputy Commander of the Army War College, and, while Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Europe, he "was involved in Army actions related to the Arab-Israeli conflict." Meyer introduced the subject of the gathering: "To study how to fight the Cuban-Soviet invasion of the Americas." Secretary of Defense Weinberger followed that up with his theory about Soviet military intentions: he said that Soviet weapons are not only a psychological warfare tool but exist to be used; herefore, "if it is necessary, we will

use weapons before they do."

Conference participants agreed that they had to use all their possibilities "to combat communism." There was much discussion about whether "communism" was a good term to use. The conclusion was that the expression "Marxist subversion" was better; no mention should be made of "revolutionaries," all are to be called "terrorists."

Chilean Defense Minister General Washington Carrasco Fernandez told his fellow generals that they should combat one ideology with another: "So far we've used force only, and it has not worked. To kill them is no use, for two arise in the place of one. What works is to penetrate the people, to organize courses, to improve the living conditions of the poor so that they become deaf with regard to 'subversives.'" He followed that up with a concrete example: "Our wives are working voluntarily with communities, teaching women how to read, how to sow, and how to take care of their children." Carrasco said that the idea is to "give," for example, land to landless peasants, so that "the communists" can no longer force people to "earn" with their labor.

General Antonio Ferreira Marques read a secret document which described how the Brazilian security forces were able to eliminate the communist threat through infiltration, dismantling of "subversive nuclei," and imprisonment. The general said that they lost many battles with the guerrillas because they didn't do enough to separate the population and the guerrilla. But, he continued, by now Brazil has learned to infiltrate the groups and use local people who know the region, and, he claimed, thus has destroyed the guerrilla movements. He stressed continuously that the crucial tactic was to infiltrate political groups, thereby reducing the use of violence to a minimum, and, the general added, in order to counter the guerrilla, the government has to improve the income distribution in the country.

Conference participants repeated concerns about alleged communist infiltration of various organizations. They said that the World Council of Churches, the Jesuit Order, Amnesty International, grassroots Christian communities and barrio associations were already infiltrated by Marxist subversives. Salvadoran Defense Minister Garcia also accused the "communists" of

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being responsible for the massacre during the funeral of Archbishop Oscar Romero. Other generals at the meeting voiced their sympathy with the Salvadoran military and promised that they would not let El Salvador "succumb" into "disgrace."

A number of decisions were made during the conference: A permanent headquarters of the Conference of American Armies is to be set up as a clearinghouse and a center will be organized to process data and improve communications between certain armies of the Americas. One of the center's aims is to make it more difficult for "subversives" to seek refuge in other countries. (One intelligence officer at the conference also asked that the govern-

ment pass laws to make what he called "terrorism" a common, and not a political, crime.

In addition, the conference participants decided that the Interamerican Police Academy should be moved from Panama to Honduras. The next Conference of American Armies is scheduled to be held in Brazil in 1983. In the meantime, the Reagan administration is using other forums - such as the December OAS meeting and the Fifth Annual Conference on Caribbean Trade, Investment and Development in Miami in late November, as well as high-level bilateral governmental and military contacts, to promote the "anti-subversive" unity of the American armies.

Threatening the Sandinistas

The Reagan administration is conducting a massive campaign against Nicaragua which, while not an open military or paramilitary attack, could be almost as dangerous. Public resistance in the U.S. to overt action has forced the administration to authorize the use of covert actions, supplemented by massive propaganda and a battery of threats. William Beecher reported in the Boston Globe that the National Security Council (NSC) has decided to "press covert action in Nicaragua and El Salvador to infiltrate hostile elements both to gain intelligence and try to destabilize their effectiveness." NSC officials did not want to talk about details, but, ironically, pointed out that "one of the lessons of Vietnam was that the Viet Cong thoroughly infiltrated the South Vietnamese government and armed forces and were able to exploit their inside knowledge and positions."¹

After the Chilean experience in the early 1970s, it is highly appropriate to examine what types of covert actions the U.S. might use against Nicaragua. Given the pluralism of the Nicaraguan government and the tensions within it, it is easy to imagine various CIA contacts, recruitments and payoffs. CIA contacts with Nicaraguan opposition groups to coordinate strategy for action are likely. The Chilean operation, it should be recalled, featured payoffs, subsidies of friendly newspapers,

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and disruptions by unions affiliated with the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). Despite being discredited for its CIA connections, AIFLD still maintains a presence in Nicaragua. Ex-CIA agent Richard Martinez, who was a labor organizer for AIFLD and the CIA in the early 1960s, mostly in Brazil, recently identified one AIFLD representative in Nicaragua as "a conscious agent" of the CIA.² Nicaraguan unions which were founded with the assistance of AIFLD have gone out on strike, prompting the government to prohibit strikes. Also, several journalists might be counted on to cooperate with the CIA, but Nicaraguan officials, aware of the events in Chile, have made plain their willingness to close down such newspapers.

In November 1981, Managua newspapers published 13 names of U.S. Embassy personnel, identifying them as CIA officers. The Reagan administration protested and called it an "act of provocation," but did not deny the charges. At about the same time, Martinez, former CIA officer Philip Agee and filmmaker Alan Francovich toured Nicaragua at the government's invitation to educate Nicaraguans about potential U.S. intervention techniques. In Francovich's words, they stressed "how important the internal front is: that an invasion could not succeed without manipulating the internal situation." Francovich showed his

documentary film about the CIA, "On Company Business" throughout the country.

The London Times later wrote that the "Agee visit features on a long list of incidents American officials reel off to show that the Nicaraguans have only themselves to blame for the latest series of attacks by senior members of the Reagan administration.... The list also includes the repeated closing of the opposition newspaper, La Prensa; the jailing of four prominent businessmen...; the banning from radio and television of sermons by... Archbishop Obando y Bravo; and the curbs placed on the Free Labor Movement." Correctly, the Times added, "the fact that Sandinist police have also been rounding up members of the Nicaraguan Communist Party at the same time as arresting businessmen is not mentioned...."⁴ The article fails to note that U.S. pressures on Nicaragua and the danger of foreign subversion have forced these actions.

THE ENDERS PROPOSAL

Still, Thomas Enders, in charge of Latin American affairs at the State Department made a set of proposals to Nicaragua in August as a basis for better relations. The U.S. offered to enter into a non-aggression pact and to assure "control over Nicaraguan exile groups in Florida" in return for "a change in the Sandinist regime's behavior and orientation."⁵ (Enders' proposal is remarkable given the administration's public position that it had no jurisdiction over the exile training camps.) The Nicaraguans responded by unilaterally vowing not to attack the U.S.,⁶ but this was not enough for Washington. The Reagan administration reserved the right to attack Nicaragua and to loosen the reins on Nicaraguan exiles unless the government's "behavior and orientation" changed.⁷

Planning for an invasion of Nicaragua - at least a violation of the U.S. Neutrality Act - is quite public at a Nicaraguan exile camp called Campamento Libertad near Miami, for example. Hector Fabian, the public information officer at the camp, stated: "You could say these camps have been one of the biggest helps given the Nicaraguans now fighting for their country. They've prepared here, they've trained here and now they've gone on to fight from third countries and also from Nicara-

gua." Moreover, several Americans, "whom Fabian later identified as former Green Berets, were assisting in the training."⁸

Washington Post writer Don Oberdorfer reported that the Nicaraguan leadership took the U.S. pledge to "vigorously enforce" its neutrality laws in relation to these camps as "a dud." From the Nicaraguan point of view, the U.S. "was merely promising to do what it should be doing already - enforce its law to stop the paramilitary training of exile groups.... Earlier in the year, Managua had complained about the exiles and received a cable from Haig citing some of the same U.S. laws. But nothing was done about the exiles."

According to the Boston Globe, among the actions against Nicaragua approved by the NSC was a plan to intensify "public relations efforts at home and abroad to provide hitherto classified details on what the Soviets, Cubans and Nicaraguans are doing in Central America to create a climate of opinion in which stern action might be supported." U.S. intelligence reports of the extension of three Nicaraguan airfield runways, of the training of pilots in Bulgaria, of upcoming shipments of 24 MIGs from Cuba and the creation of a 50,000-person military and a 200,000 person militia are being widely publicized by the administration.

MILITARY OPTIONS

The U.S. is clearly also keeping the military option open. Through diplomatic channels the U.S. is cautioning the Nicaraguans that they are "playing with fire," much as Haig did in his December meeting with Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto. At the same time, the NSC has told the Pentagon "to work up very specific contingency plans on such things as quarantines, blockades and military exercises in the event future events - such as the shipment of combat jets [or tanks] to Nicaragua - might call for consideration of a military response."

Unilateral blockades and arms quarantines are thought to be impossible to execute successfully. What is worse for military planners, they are acts of war. A more likely possibility is said by Beecher's sources to be a quarantine of "something vital to Nicaragua's economic and military operations, such as petro-

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leum. That would be easier to police and potentially more effective. But it would require solid support in the United States and in the hemisphere and perhaps would include the ships of other Latin nations."

A vote at the OAS meeting of early December provided a measure of the support that might be available for U.S. sanctions against Nicaragua. The U.S. persuaded 22 of the 29 states voting (four abstained, and Mexico, Nicaragua and Grenada opposed the measure) to back the plan for elections in El Salvador in March 1982 - implicitly endorsing U.S. support for the Duarte regime.⁹ The NSC hopes to make it possible for Latin American states to represent Nicaragua as a danger to the hemisphere and thus join in future U.S. sanctions. However, memories of Cyrus Vance's June 1979 proposal that an OAS "peacekeeping force" intervene in Nicaragua against the imminent Sandinista victory over Somoza probably remain strong and continue to produce conflicting sentiments. Thus U.S. officials speak of the need for "multilateral" action rather than "OAS action" against Nicaragua.


REGIONAL COOPERATION

Already there is regional military cooperation among Nicaragua's Central American neighbors. There have been numerous reports of joint Salvadoran-Honduran operations along their common border, and Salvadoran refugees in Honduras are continually harassed by Salvadoran and Honduran troops. In late October the Guatemalan President and the Honduran Army Chief of Staff visited San Salvador on the same day. Although the resulting communique did not mention cooperation, a few days before the meeting "the Army staff chiefs of El Salvador and Guatemala publicly called for military 'coordination' among the three countries." Guatemala's General Benedicto Lucas, the president's brother, "urged a formal fusion of the three armed forces

'to prevent a communist takeover of Central America.'" U.S. representatives are said to have been absent from the meeting, but "Latin diplomatic sources" are reported to "point out that the United States has been closely involved in the recent past in efforts at coordination...." Among these efforts was U.S. pressure behind the Salvadoran-Honduran peace treaty concluded in December 1980, which ended a decade-long technical state of war and makes joint operations possible, and U.S.-Honduran cooperation to practice sealing off the Salvadoran border.¹⁰

As for Nicaragua, thousands of former soldiers of Somoza's National Guard now live in Honduras. The Honduran government has done little to stop their raids into Nicaragua, and the exiles have publicly expressed their hope for covert military support from Nicaragua's three neighbors.¹¹ At the same time, verbal attacks from the three countries have intensified. Reports of U.S. proposals to Nicaragua have included no guarantees to Nicaragua against attacks from its neighbors or from exiles, although this is the most likely kind of U.S.-sponsored military action. The U.S. is insisting that Nicaragua's military buildup would not be effective against the United States and will only alarm Nicaragua's neighbors,¹² but this position ignores the threat posed by its neighbors with U.S. backing. Meanwhile, the U.S. has also placed various economic pressures on Nicaragua, but Libya and a number of other nations have offered large loans on generous terms to help with the reconstruction.

The Sandinista government appears ready for the U.S. campaign against Nicaragua and able to anticipate overt and covert actions that will be used against it. Its confidence that it will succeed in fighting these pressures has kept Nicaragua from submitting to ultimatums like the one Enders reportedly delivered in August: "There is a fork in the road. One way

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leads to accomodation, the other to separation. We are afraid you may be too far advanced on the wrong road." As junta leader Daniel Ortega told the State Legislative Council in Nicaragua on December 6: "We do not accept the door that the Americans are opening for us because [it] is too small... so small that in order to pass through it, we would have to do it on our knees and we are not going to do that." 13

- J.K. and J.M. -

FOOTNOTES

- 1) Boston Globe, 12/4/81, p.11.
- 2) The Guardian (New York), 12/2/81, p.13.

- 3) *ibid.*
- 4) The Times (London), 11/26/81, p.10.
- 5) *ibid.*
- 6) ABC News Nightline, 12/4/81.
- 7) For a summary of private U.S.-Nicaraguan talks during September and October 1981 see Washington Post (WP), 12/10/81, pp.A-1, A-12.
- 8) Ronnie Lovler, "Training for the Counterrevolution," The Nation, 9/26/81, pp.265-268.
- 9) WP, 12/9/81, p.A-18.
- 10) WP, 10/27/81, p.A-11; see also New York Times (NYT), 10/2/81, p.A-5; 10/8/81, p.A-8; 10/11/81, p.A-5.
- 11) NYT, 4/2/81, p.A-3.
- 12) *cf supra*, #7.
- 13) *ibid.*

Greece: The Long Road to Freedom

by Alexis Serreas

The October 18, 1981 parliamentary elections in Greece represent more than a routine change in government: they open the prospects for deep political and social change. The elections gave the Socialist Party, PASOK, 48 percent of the vote, and the Communist Party, KKE, 11 percent, and left the former governing, rightwing party "New Democracy," with only 35 percent. This sweeping electoral victory of the Left, wishfully branded "surprising" by the mainstream media in the U.S., was all but expected in Greece.

THE LEGACY OF U.S. INTERVENTION

It is impossible to understand Greek politics without taking into consideration a long history of U.S. intervention in Greece. In fact, this intervention has been the decisive factor in post-World War II Greece. The military defeat of the Left in the Greek Civil War (1945 to 1949) can be attributed directly to a massive infusion of U.S. economic and military aid under the Truman Doctrine in 1947. This doctrine, which in fact institutionalized U.S. intervention, was promulgated by President Harry Truman even though he admitted that the Greek regime receiving U.S. aid was repressive.

The role of the U.S. in the defeat of the Left was described with cynical candor by an U.S. apologist: "The nature

of Greek society and the shortcomings of the Greek government, together with the constellation of international relations in 1946 and 1947, made Communist revolution possible, indeed probable. But the injection of a massive new force, United States aid, changed the direction of events and prevented that consumation."¹ From then on, successive U.S. governments have intervened unscrupulously in Greece whenever they saw their interests threatened in any way. The new Greek government of Andreas Papandreou has to confront this legacy, and, it appears, is moving carefully in order to avoid a recurrence of the defeat of a progressive movement.

Greece has been a NATO member since 1952, and in 1953 the U.S. and Greece signed the "Agreement Between the U.S. and the Kingdom of Greece Concerning Military Facilities." This neo-colonial agreement and its amendments allowed the U.S. government to establish military bases on Greek territory at its discretion, to use Greek resources (such as communications and transportation facilities) to support these bases, and to station U.S. military and technical personnel there who enjoy extensive privileges such as tax exemptions, jurisdictional immunity from the Greek legal system, etc.²

(Alexis Serreas is a Greek living in the U.S.)

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In 1963, the Center Union (EK) party, led by George Papandreou (father of the present Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou) won 42 percent of the vote, in spite of widespread electoral fraud and rightwing terror. New elections were held the following year, and EK won 53 percent and the absolute majority in the Parliament. Upon assuming office, the Papandreou government attempted certain liberal reforms which did not challenge U.S. military and economic interests. The EK didn't even address the question of Greece leaving NATO or U.S. bases being closed. Nevertheless, the prime minister's attempt to entrust the Ministry of Defense to a person of his choice moved the U.S. to initiate destabilization of the centrist government.

In 1965, CIA Chief of Station in Greece, John Maury became "directly involved in Greek politics. He was reported to have helped King Constantine buy Deputies of the Greek Center Union Party, thus bringing about the downfall of the Government of George Papandreou" in 1965.³ (Maury is now president of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers and one of the main promoters of the so-called Intelligence Identities Protection Act. In fact, Maury's conduct in Greece demonstrates why the Act should not be made law.) A chain of King-appointed, short-lived governments was broken by the military-fascist coup of April 21, 1967. The direct role of the U.S. in the establishment and support of the Greek junta is well-documented. The dictatorship finally collapsed during the 1974 Cyprus crisis, but only after eight years of bloody and repressive rule.

"New Democracy," the rightwing party that controlled an absolute majority in the Parliament from 1974 to 1981, proved incapable of solving the tremendous problems plaguing the working people of Greece. This is not surprising, as subservience to NATO and U.S. corporate interests - the very causes of such problems - was the essence of that party's policy. "Greece belongs to the West," declared then-Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, the leader of "New Democracy," in his address to the Parliament on October 16, 1975.⁴ With the defeat of "New Democracy," this submission is now being challenged.

Three main tasks confront the new government and the Greek Left: the pursuit of a genuinely independent foreign policy,

fundamental changes in the economic structure designed to benefit the working people of the country, and the democratization of social life. Of course, these three tasks cannot be achieved in isolation from each other. Meaningful economic changes are inconceivable so long as Greece remains attached to the economic and strategic role assigned to it by NATO and the European Common Market. Nor are such economic changes attainable without the active participation and involvement of the working people, i.e. without democratization of social life.

The first and foremost step in the pursuit of an independent foreign policy is the withdrawal of Greece from NATO and the dismantling of U.S. military bases. Greece has been a most "loyal" NATO member until 1974, when troops of Turkey, another NATO member, invaded the Republic of Cyprus, occupying almost half of its territory. (80 percent of the people on Cyprus are Greek, 20 percent Turkish.) Even the staunchest Western apologists could not explain to the Greek people what kind of "protection" NATO offered their fellow Greeks in Cyprus. Hence, the rightwing civilian government that took office immediately after the collapse of the military junta in 1974 was forced to announce the withdrawal of Greece from the military wing of NATO. Greece never withdrew, however, from the political wing of NATO, and the Greek army continued to participate in NATO exercises.

In 1980 Greece resumed its previous "normal" relationship with NATO, formally rejoining the military wing. Pretenses aside, the hastiness with which this deal, the "Rogers Plan," was arranged, the secrecy of the terms, and its timing - shortly before the elections - suggest that it was designed to present the next government (whose character was anticipated) with a set situation and to raise obstacles to total withdrawal of Greece from NATO.

Although PASOK has in the past called for the withdrawal of Greece from NATO, the government program presented to the Parliament by Papandreou on November 22 contained no such call. The program denounced the Rogers Plan as "harmful to [the] national interests" of Greece and added that the government would reject that Plan.⁵ This statement, however, is quite vague as it rejects the specific

conditions of the Rogers Plan but does not preclude the acceptance of some other plan. Finally, it does not address Greek participation in the political wing of NATO. Because of this, KKE abstained from the vote on the government program.

Papandreou's actions at a NATO defense ministers' meeting in Brussels in early December were equally ambiguous. On one hand, Papandreou blocked the issuing of a final communique - usually a routine event - demanding that NATO guarantee the safety of Greek borders against fellow NATO member Turkey. Not surprisingly, the ministers refused to go along with that demand. On the other hand, Papandreou's announcement of Greece's "partial suspension" of NATO commitments at the meeting was vague, so vague that some NATO officials apparently dismissed it as "diplomatic grandstanding." Meanwhile, almost half a million people demonstrated in Greece for disarmament and against U.S. bases in the country on December 6.

REMOVE THE BASES

Papandreou's plans to remove U.S. military bases are likely to encounter great obstacles. Most of these are not directly related to NATO but stem from bilateral U.S.-Greek agreements. The removal of the bases will have to be negotiated separately from Greece's withdrawal from NATO. Among the numerous U.S. bases in Greece are: 1) a naval base in Eleusis (Piraeus) near Athens; 2) Souda Naval Base on Crete; "a large and convenient anchorage [which] allows the United States to project the Sixth Fleet far into the eastern Mediterranean." The Souda base "would be difficult to replace," and includes a missile firing installation used by NATO. Nuclear weapons are also stored at Souda; 3) Hellenikon Air Base, also on Crete, which serves as a base for U.S. intelligence surveillance in the eastern Mediterranean; 4) Iraklion Air Station, a "major electronic surveillance station;" and 5) the Fleet Communication System Center at Nea Makri, especially important for the Sixth Fleet. According to the Athens daily Ta Nea (February 22 to 24, 1978), the CIA has also been using Nea Makri as a base of operations.⁶

The existence of U.S. bases constitutes a danger to the Greek people for a number of reasons. These bases were used by the

MAJOR U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GREECE (Source: Congressional Research Service)



U.S. to intervene in the October 1973 war in the Middle East. According to a conservative Greek newspaper, the Greek government "imperiled the good relations between Greece and the Arabs, by secretly allowing the Americans to use... bases in Greece for transporting equipment to Israel during the Arab-Israeli war.... Greece also allowed U.S. intelligence to use a communications station outside Athens in order to tap Soviet and Arab radio broadcasts."⁷ The bases make the country a military target even in a conflict in which Greece is not directly involved. Their existence also requires a Greek government friendly toward the U.S. Therefore, the bases might pose a threat to a government such as PASOK. Finally, they are sources of social pollution. The areas where the bases are located have become centers of corruption, characterized by a rising crime rate, increased prostitution, drug traffic etc., involving U.S. military personnel.

Prime Minister Papandreou announced that base negotiations will begin early in 1982. He said that the negotiations will set a timetable for the removal of the bases, but he did not name a deadline. He added that until the bases are removed, they will operate under the following restrictions:

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a) [Greek] control and supervision of their activities.

b) Yearly revision and potential termination of the relevant agreements, so that the national interests of Greece are guaranteed.

c) Suspension of the bases' activity when the security of Greece or the country's relations with other friendly countries in the region is at stake.⁸

These are certainly positive measures, but they are somewhat vague and, most importantly, their implementation is yet to be seen. How the Greek government will be able to control, let alone to suspend, the activities of the bases is not at all clear, and Papandreou's speech shed no light on the question. At the same time, concrete statements have been made. "Removal of nuclear weapons will be one of our first demands in the talks on the U.S. bases," said Dimitri Maroudas, a PASOK spokesperson in a press conference on November 11. He also indicated that the Greek government favors the idea of nuclear-free Balkans. This statement came shortly after Bulgaria's President Todor Zhivkov proposed a Balkan summit on the issue, a proposal that now has some chances of being implemented.

CYPRUS

Another major foreign policy question is the issue of Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus, a sovereign state since it gained its independence from Britain in 1953, has been an active member of the non-aligned movement. The island of Cyprus, strategically situated at the conjunction of Europe, Asia and Africa, is an ideal location to base U.S. forces policing the Middle East. The political orientation of that country, however, ruled out this possibility. The U.S. and NATO goal is to partition the island between Greece and Turkey. Both of these countries are NATO members and have agreements with the U.S. allowing the establishment of military bases on their territory. Both Greek and Turkish rightwing terrorists, in line with this U.S. and NATO policy, have been trying for over twenty years, by-and-large unsuccessfully, to divide the two ethnic communities of the island.

In July 1974, a coup inspired, plotted, and executed by the Greek military junta, attempted to murder the president of Cy-

prus, Archbishop Makarios, and to overthrow the legitimate government. Under the pretext of "restoring the legal order," the Turkish army invaded the island, occupying about 40 percent of the land and forcing 200,000 Greek Cypriots (almost 40 percent of the island's population) into refugee camps in the southern, unoccupied part of the country. Following the collapse of the junta in Greece and their puppets in Cyprus, the legitimate government of Cyprus was restored, but the Turkish army still controls 40 percent of the island. It seems clear that the objective of the U.S. and NATO militarists is the de facto partitioning of Cyprus by the institutionalization of the Turkish military presence.

The former Greek government dealt with this issue as an internal NATO "family" dispute, diminishing the role of the United Nations in its solution and essentially refusing to use the support offered by the socialist and non-aligned countries in resolving the Cyprus problem. The main ingredients of the solution are: recognition of the central government as the legitimate political power in Cyprus; withdrawal of all foreign troops; and return of the refugees to their homes. These aims were adopted in the PASOK government program presented to the Parliament on November 22, 1981.

GREECE AND EUROPE

Another critical foreign policy issue, directly affecting domestic economic policy, is the question of the relations of Greece to the European Economic Community (EEC), an organization "uniting" the Western European industrial countries. When the economic crisis of the mid-1970s hit the capitalist European countries, the EEC changed its exclusionist policy. The new strategy - designed to mellow down the crisis for the industrially advanced countries by shifting part of the burden to others - was to bring in the less developed capitalist countries: Greece, Turkey, Spain and Portugal. Greece was the first (and so far the only) to join, becoming the tenth member of the EEC in 1980. The consequences of that move, even in the short time that has elapsed, have been devastating. Greek industry cannot compete with the much more developed Western European countries within the framework of the

EEC. Agriculture is in a state of chaos as Greek peasants are forced to abandon traditional crops to conform to the stipulations of the "Common Agricultural Policy" dictated by the EEC.

Both major Left parties, PASOK and KKE, are opposed to the participation of Greece in the EEC and campaigned on anti-EEC platforms in the recent elections. In his pronouncement of the government program, Papandreou stated: "Our goal is to hold a referendum... for the Greek people to decide on this serious issue."⁹ He pointed out, however, that calling for a referendum lies within the power of the president of the country, a position held by the leader of "New Democracy," Karamanlis. The president of Greece, an office endowed with extraordinary constitutional and law-making powers, is not elected by direct vote, but through the Parliament. Karamanlis was elected president in 1980 for a five-year term. It is highly unlikely that Karamanlis - the architect of the previous government's pro-EEC policy - would call a referendum.

Greece is facing a critical period. The electoral victory of the Left and the formation of a progressive government by PASOK, may be the seeds of much-needed political and social change that would end

Western domination and create a society catering to the needs of the Greek people and not the greed of multinational corporations or the strategic interests of the U.S. and NATO. The meaning of the vote cast on October 18 is that the Greek people desire, indeed demand, a progressive reorientation of their country. The military coup of 1967 and CIA activities to destabilize the liberal government of Andreas Papandreou's father demonstrate that PASOK's task is enormous.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) W. H. McNeill, Greece: American Aid in Action 1947-1949, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1957, p.32.
- 2) The full text of these agreements can be found in: T. A. Coulombis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences, Yale University Press, 1966, Appendix C, pp.222-227.
- 3) R. F. Grimmett, Reported Foreign and Domestic Covert Operations of the United States Central Intelligence Agency: 1950-1974, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2/18/75, p.9.
- 4) Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, November 1975, p.73.
- 5) Ta Nea, 11/23/81.
- 6) Turkey, Greece and NATO: The Strained Alliance, A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, March 1980, p.9. See also M. Argyris, "The Bases of Death," Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, January 1975, pp.5-12.
- 7) Akropolis, 8/27/74.
- 8) Ta Nea, 11/23/81.
- 9) ibid.

Jürgen Roth Interview

Turkish Fascism as NATO Democracy

The September 12, 1980 military coup in NATO member country Turkey, led by General Kenan Evren got, as the Wall Street Journal commented, "relatively good" press coverage in the U.S. and in Western Europe. The Economist, mouthpiece of European capital, grudgingly conceded that the coup may be "regrettable" because NATO is "morally weakened when the democratically elected government of a member country is forcibly overthrown," but then praised the Generals for moving to eliminate "terrorism," and giving the country one more chance to become stable. Newsweek introduced the Generals as "benevolent despots" and labeled Evren "Turkey's Father Figure." Such uncritical coverage by the

Western media is hardly a new phenomenon. It closely resembles press treatment of Turkey's two previous coups in 1960 and 1971.

Reality for many Turkish people, as described in the following interview with West German journalist, Jürgen Roth, is quite different, and has been for some time. The first military takeover, led by General Cemal Gürsel on May 27, 1960, followed a wave of student unrest and economic instability, partly caused by the devaluation of the Turkish lira. One of Gürsel's first post-coup actions was to dispatch a colonel to U.S. Ambassador Warren Fletcher with the assurance that he intended "to build a Turkey on the model

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of the U.S." (A secret 1961 State Department report had characterized Gürsel as "strongly pro-Western.")

The Turkish Generals instituted a new and relatively liberal constitution, but at the same time, on U.S. advice, they founded the Mutual Aid Society (OYAK). OYAK began as an inconspicuous society, financed by officers' salaries, popular "donations" and, at times, the U.S. government. It has now developed into one of Turkey's largest holding companies, tying the military firmly to the corporate rich and foreign multinationals. Today, OYAK controls virtually the entire insurance sector and much of the armaments and auto industries. (It owns 42 percent of Renault Turkey and 87 percent of International Harvester Co. in Turkey.)

The late 1960s saw an upsurge of opposition to an economic policy which left basic needs of many workers and peasants unmet, and to Turkey's dependence on NATO. Protests were countered with government repression and terror from the Right. During this time, the MHP (see glossary) founded the first training camps for its commandos - the Grey Wolves - while the CIA and the U.S. Green Berets began to train the Counter-Guerrilla, a secret terror organization consisting of members of the military, police and MIT. The Counter-Guerrilla was headquartered in Ankara in the same building that housed the U.S. military mission.

In collaboration with the Grey Wolves, the Counter-Guerrilla was responsible for numerous acts of terrorism which preceded the March 12, 1971 military takeover. This coup, accompanied by mass arrests and torture, was directed against the left movement which had voiced strong opposition both to an economic policy devastating for workers and to the ruling AP's threats to scuttle certain liberal sections of the constitution. The coup, which according to Roth was "basically... planned by the intelligence agencies CIA and MIT," was to prevent the Left from taking power.

The 1973 elections, after two years of military rule, brought the CHP to power in a coalition government. Bülent Ecevit's rule was short-lived. He called for new elections in 1975 and lost, largely due to his inability to deliver on economic promises. A National Front (NF) coalition government, led by the AP and MHP, came to

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GLOSSARY

CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People's Party. Originally a party of landowners, government employees and local bourgeoisie, but since 1967 open to the Left. Member of Socialist International; promotes modified capitalism; favors NATO with reservations; party base more militant than leadership. President: Bülent Ecevit.

AP Adalet Partisi, Justice Party. Party of large landowners; represents interests of rural and urban bourgeoisie. Favors foreign investment, NATO membership and free enterprise; calls on all "nationalists" to work against the Left; before coup advocated stronger "security measures" and special courts. President: Süleyman Demirel.

MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Nationalist Movement Party. Nazi-type fascist party. Members come from the petit bourgeoisie, some landless peasants, some unemployed. Managed to infiltrate many members into government posts and security services in the 1970s; controls organized death squads (Grey Wolves) and militant "Idealist Youth." Advocates "reunification of all Turks" from Saloniki to Western China. Leader: Alparslan Türkeş.

DISK Confederation of Revolutionary Unions. Founded in 1967; close to CHP; influenced by Communist Party (illegal) and other left organizations. Approximately one million members.

TÜRK-İS Confederation of Labor Unions. Founded in 1952 with guidance from American Federation of Labor official and CIA agent, Irving Brown; strong ties with Asian-American Free Labor Institute. Was not outlawed after coup. Approximately 1.5 million members.

MISK Confederation of Nationalist Labor Unions. Controlled by MHP; less than 100,000 members.

MIT Milli İstihbarat Teskilati. Turkish Intelligence Agency.

power with Süleyman Demirel as Prime Minister and Alparslan Türkeş as his deputy. They ruled until June 1977. In those two years, the government openly sanctioned the terror of the Grey Wolves and suppressed the left opposition. Türkeş used his post to infiltrate many MHP members into high positions in the security services and the military.

When it became apparent that the NF government was unable to improve the living conditions in Turkey (foreign debt in 1977 was \$15 billion, unemployment 20 percent, and inflation around 70 percent), and therefore would fall sooner or later, the MHP changed its tactics. The Grey Wolves had previously concentrated their terror on their political opponents. Now they determined to create a civil war-type situation which would allow the military to seize power again. Ecevit, reelected in 1978, could not stop the wave of indiscriminate terror, and the number of people killed rose from 30 per month in 1977 to 70 per month in 1978.

After the by-elections in October 1979, Demirel was in again. His leadership was backed by the MHP, and he "cleaned out" the government, removing suspected leftists from their posts. He worked with the Grey Wolves to suppress a rising workers' movement led by DISK, and bowed to International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressure in shaping his economic policy. However, it soon became apparent that popular resistance would not allow Demirel to push through his cutthroat IMF-required program: cuts in social spending, devaluation of the lira (which in itself created a 50 percent inflation rate), elimination of subsidies to small enterprises, opening the country to foreign investment, and massive layoffs in government-owned factories.

To institute his economic program, Demirel would have to crush all opposition. And that could only be done if another military coup was staged to transform Turkey into a country ruled by fascism. This coup took place on September 12, 1980, and since then Turkey has been ruled by a military dictatorship.

CounterSpy interviewed Jürgen Roth in Frankfurt in early November 1981. Roth is an independent journalist who has written two books on Turkey: Partner Türkei oder Foltern für die Freiheit des Westens [Our Partner Turkey, or Torture for the Freedom

of the West], coauthored by Brigitte Heinrich, (Reinbek, West Germany: Rororo Verlag, 1973) and Die Türkei - Republik unter Wölfen [Turkey - A Republic Ruled by Wolves], coauthored by Kamil Taylan (Bornheim, West Germany: Lamuv Verlag, 1981). The Turkish daily Cumhuriyet has described Roth as the "person most knowledgeable about Turkish politics." His coauthor, Taylan, formerly worked for the Turkish daily, Demokrat, which has been outlawed since the 1980 coup. The sidebars in the interview are translated excerpts from Die Türkei - Republik unter Wölfen.

CounterSpy: It's been more than a year since the military coup in Turkey. What has it meant for the everyday lives of the people?

Jürgen Roth: One change has been that the so-called "terrorism" has actually all but stopped. However, what the Turkish Generals call terrorism is not what people in other countries would label terrorism. It is not limited to violent actions by politically motivated, isolated individuals, but includes, for example, distributing leaflets, putting up posters, participating in demonstrations and strikes, or advocating self-determination for the Kurds. After the military coup all such "terrorist" activities were outlawed, and I think that's the way things will stay for many years to come. If there is a return to democracy as promised by the Generals, it will be a very autocratic "democracy" with at best two political parties who are in basic agreement with the Generals. Opposition to the capitalist economic system in Turkey and to Turkey's close alliance with the United States will remain illegal. The Constitutional Assembly, founded in October 1981, is a good example of the type of "democracy" Turkish people will be allowed to have. It consists of politicians and technocrats whose political ideology, without exception, is right-of-center. And right-of-center in Turkey would be considered extreme-right in Western Europe.


Other regressive changes made possible by the military coup are in the economic field. Presently, the economic model of Milton Friedman is being adopted by Turkey. Without the coup this economic model could never have been forced upon the country. That was acknowledged even by the OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-

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tion and Development] officer in charge of Europe.

Whose interests does the present government represent?

The Generals are not, as is often said, politically independent. Instead, they are tied to the capitalist system. The Generals are representatives of monopoly capitalism, the faction of capitalists in Turkey which works closely with multinational corporations, especially from West Germany, the U.S., and Switzerland. Because of that they have a strong self-interest in



General Kenan Evren

the execution of the Milton Friedman economic program in spite of the fact that it benefits only a miniscule sector of society.

Why did the coup take place in September 1980? Are there reasons why it came at that specific time?

The official reason given by the Generals is known: rising terrorism. It's obvious that the military felt threatened by a rising leftist movement, and they felt they couldn't wait much longer. For instance, the Turkish labor federation DISK was planning a general strike at the time of the coup, and this strike was a political one, directed against political repression by the Demirel government and against high inflation and social injustice.

At the same time there were external
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factors. One of them, naturally, was Afghanistan and another was Iran, where an important Western stronghold had fallen. Turkey, with its geostrategic position, has been one of the few countries which is able to represent U.S. and NATO interests in Third World countries, especially in the Middle East. The very unstable internal situation in Turkey presented a problem for NATO in that respect. Even before the coup, NATO could no longer count on Turkey as a reliable ally. A military intervention had become necessary to stabilize the country in the interests of Western imperialism.

Are there any indications that NATO countries were directly involved in the coup?

There was certainly an indirect involvement, but it is hard to prove that they intervened directly in the coup itself. However, I don't think it is a coincidence that a high-ranking State Department officer, John Williams, (whom I met in Brussels at a conference of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation) was in Ankara at the time of the coup. Before that, he just happened to be in Athens at the time of the military coup there, and in Turkey at the time of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. More important, however, is the fact that the U.S. played a key role in the creation of a climate that allowed the coup to take place.

How was that climate created?

Terrorism in Turkey before the coup was mainly the work of the extreme right and the so-called Counter-Guerrilla, a military organization trained by CIA officers. This Counter-Guerrilla created instability, and the Generals, likewise trained in the U.S., used that terrorism as a reason for staging a coup.

Actually, it all began well over ten years ago. There was a military coup in 1971 which had a structure very similar to the 1980 coup. At that time leading politicians declared that it had been led by the CIA. There is the statement by a former Turkish foreign minister, and even the former Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, said that "foreign powers" played a role in the coup. The foreign power in Turkey at the time was, of course, the United States.

The preparation for the 1980 coup began way back in 1974 and utilized two tools.

Counter-Guerrilla

The Counter-Guerrilla originated in the Department of Special Warfare of the Turkish General Staff. Only very loyal officers belong to this department. Their training generally begins in the U.S. and then continues inside Turkey under the direction of CIA officers and military "advisors." From 1968 to 1971, U.S. Green Berets trained members of the Counter-Guerrilla in the wooded mountain region of Bolu. The Kurds in the eastern provinces were the first victims of these U.S.-trained commandos. During the early 1970s, "special commandos" attacked Kurdish villages in remote mountain regions ... with increasing frequency. Commandos searched houses, frequently tortured their inhabitants and then moved on.

One of the most important educational materials for Counter-Guerrilla training is a book written by CIA officer David Gallula, Repression of Popular Uprisings, Theory and Praxis. It was translated by the Turkish General Staff in 1965, printed with a press run of 1,750 copies and distributed within the military. In this CIA book, Gallula writes [retranslation into English]: "Our security isn't threatened just by external attacks. In addition, there are other threats which are much more dangerous. These threats

are attempts at reform within the country. These camouflaged attacks... are at times civil wars, at times uprisings, but also democratic and reformist movements. It is our intention to prevent the rise of these movements.... For our security and the security of other non-communist countries, we have to support friendly governments... through armed actions." (D. Gallula, as quoted in Emin Deger, CIA Konter-Gerilla ve Türkiye, Ankara, 1977, p.595.)

Another important training document was drafted by Cahit Vural, a member of the Ankara Counter-Guerrilla and a leading theoretician... His publication, Introduction to the Guerrilla, is being used as a guide by the Turkish General Staff ... and includes the following chapters: Destruction and Propaganda, Agents, Agent Provocateurs, Production of Bombs, Guerrilla in the Countryside, Interrogation and Infiltration of a Guerrilla Organization.... The book is marked, "For Official Use Only" and claims that the use of armed provocateurs grew out of experience with the urban guerrilla all over the world. "In large cities agent provocateurs are used in the universities, factories, educational centers and in industrial production.... These agents use destruction, provocations, even assassinations and robberies as tools to achieve their goals."

One was the Counter-Guerrilla which carried out terrorist actions that were then blamed on the left. I don't want to exclude that ultra-left factions were carrying out terrorist acts too, but often when bombings and shootings were blamed on the left, it was in reality the Counter-Guerrilla that was responsible.

The second tool was the assistance given to the extreme right movement, the MHP of Alparslan Türkeş. It is known that leading MHP members regularly visited the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, and a number of Turkish newspapers reported that CIA officers took part in terrorist activities. The MHP, a fascist organization with death squads, was the most important factor in the creation of the civil war-type atmosphere before the coup. This rightwing terrorism was destined to crush the anti-imperialist movement, or - as the MHP and the Generals say - communism. It was in the interests of NATO and the U.S. to prevent the left

from reaching power by any means. They used the death squads - the arrowhead of rightwing reaction - the Counter-Guerrilla, and finally repression carried out by the government of Demirel who is known as a close friend of the West.

But now, at least officially, the military government is moving against the right as well as the left. Alparslan Türkeş himself is on trial.

It is true that for foreign consumption the military is moving against both the right and the left. However, according to the communiques of the military commanders in all cities, about eighty percent of all actions are against the left. The simple reason for that is that many of the goals of the rightwing MHP and the military are the same. Before the coup it was Türkeş' greatest desire to establish a military government to fight "communism." Now that is exactly what the Generals did, but, un-
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MHP

The MHP's philosophy is illustrated best by this excerpt from their party organ, Orta Dogu: "... We want Turkey to be a country cured from all diseases, a country whose people are increasing in number, and a country with improved morale and industry. We want to save the brothers of our race abroad. The reunion of the Turkish Nation with its glorious history... is frightening to many other countries, because this rebuilding is opposed not only by small nations which will have to disappear, but also by the large economic powers. Those who want to live a life without danger should commit suicide. ... A nation needs national goals. It is not a herd of cattle. Only with a purpose does it become a nation. So, must we risk war in order to save the parts of our nation that have been torn apart from us? Yes, that is what we must do." ...

The Turkish intelligence agency, MIT, was already following the activities of the Grey Wolves back in the late 1960s. They wanted to find out whether the commandos of the MHP presented a danger to democracy or whether they were to be seen as agents of U.S. interests. ... A police report about the investigation by the MIT, leaked to Aydinlik [the paper of the Peking-oriented Workers' and Peasants' Party] in November 1978 by an MIT agent,

... describes the ideology of the MHP and its commandos: "National Socialism, whose realization [the MHP] promotes under the cover of Turkism, aims to eliminate democracy. The Turkish National Socialists (Turanists) are intensifying their activities in our country daily.... The real aims of the Turanists can be summed up in three points: 1) to wear out the government, using commandos and armed youth organizations as well as propaganda campaigns, and then to take power as the Nazis did in Germany; 2) to introduce National Socialist ideology to Turkey after taking power, by using various methods of oppression; 3) after installing a National Socialist government in Turkey, to reunite all Turks in the world in one area. ... The Turanists plan to remove the minorities [Kurds, Greeks, Armenians, Arabs, Bulgarians] from the country...."

The MHP's racism is also evident in the writings of one of its ideologues, Nihal Atsiz, who had accompanied Turkes from the 1940s on: "If you Kurds continue to talk in your primitive language..., you will be exterminated by the Turks in the very same way they eradicated the Georgians, the Armenians and the Greeks in Turkey. And even if you constituted 100 percent of the population, they would kick you out. You can ask the U.N. to give you a home in Africa, otherwise the patient Turkish race will turn into a roaring lion that no one can stop."

fortunately for Turkes, they also moved to eliminate their rivals on the right, particularly Turkes who had been trying to style himself as the great leader of Turkey.

The Generals around Evren had a number of reasons for moving against Turkes. For one, it was discovered that, in order to eliminate what the MHP perceived as their rivals, they were planning to kill some high military officials. And Evren's name was at the very top of the list of people to be killed found in MHP headquarters. There is also an economic rivalry between Evren and Turkes. They represent different factions of capitalism - Evren monopoly capitalism, especially in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir; Turkes the small merchants, the petit bourgeoisie, most of whom live in Central Anatolia. Naturally, their economic interests are somewhat different.

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Another contradiction between Evren and Turkes was that over the last months before the coup, Turkes began to say that people in Turkey had to fight both U.S. and Soviet imperialism. He realized that foreign corporations, mainly U.S. and Western European, were hurting the small merchants who were his main backers.

What kind of relations do NATO countries have with the military government now?

Actually, there are conflicts between the United States and Western European countries as to how to relate to the military government. The U.S. is giving massive military aid, while Western Europe, most notably the Federal Republic of Germany, is giving military and police aid, but focusing much more on economic aid. This economic aid is not tied to specific projects which might benefit the general

population. Rather, it is given simply as grants to the government which is free to decide how to use it. Recently it has become quite clear how it is being used: the government is rapidly enlarging its facilities for production of heavy armaments and weapons, mainly for export to Islamic markets in the Middle East. For the pro-Western Islamic countries it's much easier to buy weapons from Turkey than the U.S. since Turkey is a "fellow Islamic" country.

It has become obvious that neither the economic nor the military aid is improving the Turkish economy. On the contrary, the number of bankruptcies of small and medium

size businesses is rising fast. The only sector that is benefiting from the economic aid is the big corporations. In addition, strikes are illegal which means that the workers aren't even able to fight for adjustment of their wages to inflation. That, in turn, leads to a drastic increase in poverty which could not have taken place without the change from democracy - as limited as it was - to a military dictatorship. The military is able to suppress protests and perhaps in one or two years that will create the impression for outsiders that economic and social stability has finally arrived in Turkey. You can be sure the Western media won't mention

Operation DEV-KURT

There are many documents which prove that the 1971 coup was a well-prepared action carried out by the Counter-Guerrilla, the CIA, the Turkish military, and the MIT. As former foreign minister, Caglayangil commented about the 1971 events: "You should know, America isn't interested in whether we have a democratic-chauvinist or a fascist government in this country.... At the time the CIA was solely interested in protecting American interests. What else should we expect, anyway? Things like that don't happen in the open. ... It was shortly before March 12, I was informed that there would be a movement in politics. My information came from the American ambassador. One evening he called and asked to come over to have a drink. After we exchanged pleasant remarks and so on, he said, 'Mr. Caglayangil, we as a nation tolerate development in Turkey, but not everything. Some people in our government cannot tolerate what is happening right now.' That was clear enough. The CIA had its fingers in a number of events before March 12, and it is generally said that the two intelligence agencies [MIT and CIA] were collaborating closely."

In fact, the CIA assisted the MIT, back in the 1960s, in drafting plans for the mass arrests of opposition figures, following the pattern of CIA-directed events in Thailand, Indonesia and Greece. The Greek plan had been code-named "Prometheus;" in Turkey it was "DEV-KURT" (Action to Save the Nation). The wave of mass arrests [after the 1971 coup] was

the initial stage of these plans. In a single night the Generals ordered 4,000 professors, students, teachers and retired officers arrested. In the days following, they were tortured in the Counter-Guerrilla offices and then sentenced in mass trials by military judges.

DEV-KURT was headed by General Necip Yusufoglu. First he was responsible for the Istanbul MIT, then he headed MIT in Ankara. Until his retirement soon after the coup, he had been one of the most important Counter-Guerrilla officers. Another was Nuri Gündes. He was in a leading MIT position in Istanbul up to 1980. ... One of his protégés within the Counter-Guerrilla was his MIT colleague, Mahir Kaynak. He is a well-known agent provocateur responsible for many actions in Istanbul which at first were blamed on leftists.

Finally, one of the chief Counter-Guerrilla leaders in Istanbul was Necdet Kücüktaskiner. In the months after March 12, 1971, he was responsible for "interrogation of opponents of the government," which is the same as brutal torture. He continued his activities throughout the 1970s. Fifteen days before the May 1, 1977 massacre [34 people were killed when gunmen opened fire on a May Day demonstration of some 500,000], the personnel chief of MIT wrote Kücüktaskiner a check for TL8.15 million without any indication for what it was to be used. This money, the purpose of which was declared "Secret," was in payment of Kücüktaskiner's services to the MIT for the three and a half months before May 1. Such a sum of money far exceeds anything an MIT officer normally would receive.

that this "stability" was achieved only because the workers and peasants are being suppressed with Western-supplied weapons.

The Generals are now facing some protests from Western Europe because they outlawed all political parties. Almost all parties in Europe are advocating that aid to Turkey should be halted if the Generals continue that policy. The only resistance, internationally, is coming from Europe and not the U.S.*

However, I think that to demand a return to democracy is somewhat illusionary. It is all too obvious that the political parties are not able to solve the country's social and economic problems. There are strong indications that there's a sizable revolutionary movement in Turkey, but what that's going to achieve one cannot predict. There are two currents: What happened in Iran might also happen in Turkey. At the same time, the left might decide that things cannot be changed by working toward the re-introduction of the parliamentary system. Their conclusion could only be to create an armed liberation movement. And as I see it, that's exactly what is happening now.

What do the Generals want for Turkey?

They say they want stability, but they haven't explained what that means. Stability, above all, requires more social justice, and the Generals haven't shown any interest in passing laws that would enhance social justice. Most importantly, they would have to institute a land reform, and there are no signs of that whatsoever. In rural Turkey today, there is a very small sector of large landowners on one side, and a huge sector of landless peasants, often even serfs, on the other side. This feudal system, especially in eastern Anatolia, is a natural breeding-ground for the liberation movements.

To come back to an issue you raised be-

*This difference between the U.S. and Western European attitudes toward Turkey became even more obvious in early December 1981: All European Economic Community (EEC) countries suspended aid to Turkey in response to General Evren's imprisonment of Bülent Ecevit. The EEC is openly critical of Evren's disbanding of all political parties and his failure to set a timetable for elections. Not so the Reagan administration. On the very day Ecevit was imprisoned, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger went to Turkey. He announced that the U.S. and Turkey were setting up a Joint Defense Group to improve military cooperation between the two coun-

fore, Turkey is of great importance for NATO and the U.S. as a country that belongs to the Third World, a country with a large percentage of the population being Muslim and at the same time a country that is part of NATO.

The strategic importance of Turkey is obvious. There are countless U.S. and NATO military facilities, especially in the eastern part of the country. It is not just radar facilities, but military facilities which can be used against Third World countries. And that is very attractive for the U.S. The Rapid Deployment Force is using bases in Turkey, and the nuclear depots in Turkey are not there to counter the danger of a Soviet invasion - which is all but nonexistent anyway - but primarily against the liberation movements in Africa and Asia. These movements are already being suppressed from Turkey, a prime example is the Kurds, and we'll see it in North Africa.

NATO needs Turkey. I was told by a U.S. professor, Lawrence Whetten, who identified himself as a policy advisor of the U.S. government, that if Turkey wants to become independent, the U.S. will punish it. And I don't think there is a better expression for what is happening in Turkey right now.

You mentioned the so-called Kurdish problem. How has the military coup affected the lives of the people in Turkish Kurdistan?

First of all, the coup has had the same effects on the Kurds as on all the other people. But they got it worse. The Kurdish area in eastern Anatolia is very rugged and much more isolated than the rest of the country, and guerrilla movements have been organizing there for a long time. In the past they were able to move freely across the borders to Iran and Iraq and, to a certain extent, presented a military threat to Turkey as a NATO country. Unlike

tries. This strategic partnership appears to go far beyond the two countries' NATO membership. Commented the New York Times: "Not since the heyday of the Baghdad Pact nearly a quarter of a century ago has there been such a public effusion of warmth and understanding between Washington and Ankara." U.S. aid to the Turkish junta will be stepped up. Presently, Turkey receives some \$700 million in U.S. military and economic aid for the fiscal year that began on October 1, 1981. For the next year, the Generals are requesting \$900 million in military aid alone.

the rest of the country, the guerrilla movement in Kurdistan is very strong. It is a national liberation movement with two basic demands: End the feudal system, and freedom for Kurdistan. So on one side it is the struggle for social justice, on the other the struggle for independence or at least self-determination.

After the military coup the Kurds began to be oppressed in a way that is almost unimaginable. The military and elite units raided whole villages and tortured everybody collectively - men, women and children. The military conducted aerial bombings of regions where they thought guerrillas might be hiding. Three divisions of the Turkish army were stationed in Kurdistan. For all practical purposes, Kurdistan is an occupied country.

In addition to the occupation and collective torture, everyone who is arrested or taken in for questioning is tortured. Torture is conducted by specially trained units - it has become very sophisticated. The military also conducts mass trials against suspected members of Kurdish organizations, at times as many as 2,000 people are tried simultaneously by the same judge. Naturally, there are no democratic rights whatsoever and no effective defense.

The number of "indirect death sentences" is also on the rise. That means people are not sentenced to death by a judge; they're simply gunned down in the streets. All these things are hardly known in Western Europe and in the United States, but the only comparison one can make is to the brutal methods of fascist dictatorships in Latin America.

The Turkish military is a member of NATO and NATO officers are stationed in Turkey. Has the brutality of the Turkish military brought about any change in the collaboration of NATO officers with them?


I don't think so. Last fall there were large NATO maneuvers in eastern Anatolia, and that's a strong symbol for the population. They see that it is not only the Turkish military that is oppressing them, but it is done with the presence and, at the very least, the acquiescence of the foreign troops in the country.

Some people compare Turkey today to Chile; what are the similarities?

Structurally, the two countries are very

Police

Maps such as this one listing special police telephone numbers for informants to call were published in Turkish newspapers after the September 1980 coup.



The Turkish police can proudly proclaim to have one of the highest rates of solved crimes compared to other countries. The reason for that, however, is not a sophisticated crime-solving technique. An anecdote told in Ankara gives a hint: Some NATO officers are debating the best way to hunt bears. Each of them describes his method, and then the Turkish officer says: "If I want to hunt a bear, I catch a rabbit." Surprise all around, "A rabbit?" "Yes, a rabbit, and then I beat it as long as it takes to make it confess that it is a bear."

The basis for policework... is a generous reward system for usable tips. Spying, especially by conservatives and fascists, leads regularly to mass arrests. After September 12, the Ankara military announced a phone number to be called for anonymous tips. However, the opposition thwarted that plan when they distributed handbills listing the same number as one which people could call to get information about cheap housing. ...

Since September 12, anyone can be detained without charge for 90 days. As a rule, the imprisoned are held incommunicado, and are completely at the disposal and mercy of the police or military officers. Torture and beatings during these days, no matter what the allegation is, are commonplace. In espionage cases, treason, or political crimes, the MIT takes over. The MIT has unlimited powers. People arrested by the MIT are not taken to the police station, they disappear, and their relatives don't know where to. The MIT has farms and country houses in remote areas which have been transformed into prisons and are heavily guarded. ...

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similar. One can say that Turkey is Europe's Chile in the sense that a military coup was used in both countries to push through a certain economic model, the model of Milton Friedman. There are no differences between the two countries as far as that is concerned, and there are only a few differences regarding the persecution of the opposition. There are not the massacres we saw in the first weeks after the 1973 coup in Chile. In that sense one might say that the "European Chile" is a

little more moderate than the "American Chile."

There are no differences between the two countries regarding the possibility of a return to democracy. In the near future there is no chance of that - even if the two countries were to have bourgeois parliaments, they would be parliaments controlled by the military. One important difference between Chile and Turkey is that the latter has a strategic significance that goes far beyond Chile's.

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Turkish Kurdistan and NATO

by Mehmet Mardinli

The situation of the Kurds may aptly be compared with that of the Basques in Spain and France, the Baluchis in Iran and Pakistan, and, certainly, the Indians of North and South America. They are all indigenous peoples who have been arbitrarily divided and displaced by the artificial boundaries of colonialist powers. Yet, these peoples have each retained a national identity, language and culture.

Invariably, the colonial governments label the national movements of these peoples as "subversive," "separatist," "communist," or - the pet phrase of the Reagan administration - "terrorist."

The Kurdish people have been living in the same area for millenia. The first partitioning of their homeland, Kurdistan, was between the Ottoman Turks and the Safavid Persians in 1639. A second parti-

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tioning, between the newly-established Turkish Republic and Great Britain, occurred in the wake of World War I, and led to revolts in 1925, 1927, and 1936. These two partitionings left Kurdistan divided among what came to be today's Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria (see map).

The national movement of the Kurdish people has brought them into conflict with the governments of each of these countries. In Iran, the Kurds have been putting up a stiff resistance against the Iranian Army and Phalangist guards unleashed by the clergy in a fight for basic political and economic rights. In Iraq, since the demise of a fourteen-year revolt in 1975, nearly 300,000 Kurds have

(Mehmet Mardinli is a Kurd from Turkey presently living in the U.S.)

been deported to southern Iraq. An equal number are refugees in Iran. At present, the Kurdish armed resistance movement in Iraq is growing again, this time under the control of progressive and democratic forces. The Kurds in Syria make up ten percent of the population, yet their existence as a distinct people is denied, and thousands of them have been uprooted from their land.

The Kurds in Turkey are the most oppressed of the four Kurdish populations. Kurdish language and culture has been banned since the early 1920s. Kurds cannot even openly declare that they are Kurds; the Turkish government calls them "Mountain Turks."

Since the military takeover of September 1980, the repression has reached unbearable proportions. The Generals have imprisoned more than 17,000 Kurds.¹ The slightest sign of dissent is punished with harsh prison terms. For example, Serafettin Elci, a former Minister of Public Works, was imprisoned for stating that there are Kurds in Turkey and that he himself is a Kurd.²

At first glance, it seems that the Kurds in Turkey have suffered primarily from the colonial policies of the Turkish government. This observation is true but incomplete, since the U.S. and other NATO countries are also responsible for the repression of the Kurds. Turkish Kurdistan is replete with U.S. and NATO military bases, intelligence facilities, nuclear storage sites, logistics depots and military airports. The largest conglomeration of such

facilities is in Diyarbakir, the cultural center of Turkish Kurdistan. It consists of a NATO Air Defense Ground Environment Station, a U.S. intelligence facility, and a U.S. military airbase.³

Similar U.S. and NATO facilities, as well as nuclear missile storage sites, are located in other cities of Kurdistan such as Mardin, Erhac, Malatya and Erzurum.⁴ In addition, there are unmanned early-warning stations on numerous Kurdish mountains.⁵ From these facilities even the walkie-talkies of the Soviet Army can be intercepted,⁶ and the troop movements of the Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian armies can be tracked.


NATO TRAINING FOR REPRESSION

Since the early 1950s, the armed forces of Turkey have been trained by U.S. "advisors." More sophisticated training is done in the U.S. and Panama. According to Pentagon statistics, 3,527 Turkish officers were trained in the U.S. between 1970 and 1979.⁷ Turkey has received close to \$4 billion in military aid in the last two decades.⁸ After the U.S., West Germany is the largest contributor to the Turkish armed forces, with German military aid averaging \$20 million annually since 1964.⁹

For the Kurds, the most damaging aspect of U.S. training of the Turkish military has been the development of the Gendarmerie, a branch of the armed forces primarily deployed to check the border areas (not to be confused with the police function of the Gendarmerie in other countries, e.g. France). Thanks to the U.S. and NATO, the Gendarmerie is today a force of 120,000 men equipped with helicopters, armored vehicles, and complex communication systems. Four of its district commands are located in Turkish Kurdistan.¹⁰ Gendarmerie forces have raided Kurdish villages and terrorized people again and again. Three infantry brigades are devoted to this specific purpose. Kurds know them as the "Blue Berets" or "commandos": they were trained by the U.S. Green Berets.¹¹

In addition to the armed forces, several types of police and the Counter-Guerrilla (see Jürgen Roth interview in this issue) are deployed in Kurdistan. Political police, trained and equipped by West Germany and Britain, specialize in tracking down and defusing "subversive" movements.¹² The

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Deutsche Volkszeitung map

mob-control police, as the name suggests, are designed to break up mass demonstrations and strikes. Special armored vehicles with water, paint and rubber bullet spraying devices have been provided by West Germany for that purpose.¹³

The Counter-Guerrilla can easily cross official national boundaries to attack Kurdish rebels. On February 12, 1980, for example, three mobile teams attacked Qamishi, a Kurdish town inside Syrian Kurdistan, killing fifteen people, three of them children.¹⁴ Mobile team operations are backed up by the infamous Blue Berets and the Turkish National Intelligence Agency, MIT, which works closely with the CIA. Most of the MIT's activities are directed against the progressive forces in the region. The MIT closely collaborated with SAVAK before the fall of the Shah of Iran, and with the Mukhabarat, the secret police of Iraq.

THE CIA AND THE KURDS

The CIA itself has committed atrocities against the Kurdish autonomy movement. As will be remembered, Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan waged a guerrilla struggle against the Ba'ath regime from 1960 to 1975. By the early 1970s, the number of Kurdish fighters reached 100,000. The Shah of Iran, involved in a border dispute with Iraq, sought to aid the Kurdish rebels to create trouble for the Ba'ath government. Kurdish rebel leader Mustafa Barzani, a feudal chief, lacked confidence in the Shah, but was willing to accept the offer if the U.S. could guarantee the future flow of aid. Following a private meeting between Henry Kissinger and the Shah, U.S. aid amounting to \$16 million began. Details of this operation, carried out by the CIA, were released in the Pike Report to the House of Representatives, which was reproduced in the February 23, 1976 Village Voice, almost a year after Barzani's movement was defeated.

From the very beginning, "neither the Shah nor... Dr. Kissinger desired victory" for the Kurds. "They merely hoped to insure that the insurgents would be capable of sustaining a high level of hostility, just high enough to sap [Iraq's] resources." The plan proceeded nicely along these lines. The feudal leader obtained some out-of-date anti-aircraft guns and low-power artillery, and launched a con-

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ventional war in which the Kurds were no match for the sophisticated weaponry of the Iraqi army. Moreover, the CIA "had long-standing information indicating that [the Shah] would abandon [the Kurds] the moment he reached an agreement with his enemy [Iraq]."¹⁵

That moment arrived on March 6, 1975, when the Shah and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein embraced during the OPEC conference in Algiers. The Shah made a deal with Hussein to settle the border conflict and ordered the Iranian army to cut the supply lines of the Kurdish fighters. According to Kurdish refugees, the Iranian army actually started to bomb some of the Kurdish positions. Barzani was forced to order his guerrillas to pull back from the front lines. An Iraqi offensive caught the Kurds very badly off guard in one of the coldest months of the year. The human cost of the war was very high. Close to 700,000 people were either displaced, killed, or deported to forced settlements guarded by Iraqi soldiers, where many remain to this day.

This is not the first tragedy the U.S. government has set up in the Middle East. The Palestinian revolution received a similar blow from the Jordanian-CIA joint operation in September 1970. The liberation war of the Dhofari people in Oman was set back by the massive invasion of the Shah's troops backed by the U.S. fleet in the Indian Ocean. In Pakistan, the Baluchi uprising of 1973-77 was put down in a similar manner.

Nevertheless, things are changing. Kurds, Palestinians, Dhofaris and Baluchis are increasingly questioning the acts and intentions of the "bastion of freedom" - the U.S.A. These days one can hear people saying: "If America is for freedom, then how come it helps these corrupt occupiers kill our children?" They know that the bullets and the M-16 rifles carried by the Blue Berets are made in the U.S.A. The Voice of America radio distributes chills, not smiles. From a distance, the land of the oppressed seems to lie under snow and frost. But does not spring follow winter?

FOOTNOTES

- 1) Calculated from News from Turkey, no.1-10, 1980-81; Turkey Information, Hamburg, no.1-6; and Cumhuriyet, Oct.1980-Aug.1981.
 - 2) New York Times, 3/27/81.
 - 3) CounterSpy, vol.4 no.3, pp.22-25.
 - 4) *ibid.*
- (cont. on pg.59)

Libyan Witch-Hunt: The War at Home

by Jeff McConnell

On December 18, 1981, Attorney General William French Smith addressed the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on the need to rebuild U.S. intelligence agencies to counter the "threat to our government and its citizens from hostile intelligence services and international terrorist groups." Although he concentrated on what he said was the growing number of Soviet spies in the U.S. he remarked that the most serious threat is international terrorism. "As all of you know from press reports, the threat is real today. Libya's capability of sponsoring an effort to assassinate high U.S. government officials provides a sobering example."

It was to counter this threat and the one from the Soviet Union, Smith said, that President Reagan had signed Executive Order 12333, legalizing domestic operations by the CIA for the first time, and has supported legislation to increase government secrecy by restricting the Freedom of Information Act and criminalizing the disclosure of the names of CIA agents. The executive order, Smith said, does not authorize the surveillance of "purely domestic dissent groups." But where there is a "foreign connection," he went on, "efforts to gather information and affect the activities of domestic dissident groups" can proceed without a court order and with only the authorization of the Attorney General. Already, Smith said, he had made a number of such authorizations.¹

On the very day Smith asserted that these extraordinary measures were needed to counter the "Libyan threat," CBS correspondent Fred Graham reported that federal investigators had become increasingly skeptical about the story of their informant concerning the Libyan "hit squads," because the informant "kept adding to his story."² Meanwhile, Philip Taubman of the New York Times reported that a "senior Administration official" had told him that the administration "was trying to exploit" the Libyan "hit squad" stories to "lay the groundwork for imposing sanctions against Libya."³

Every war needs an enemy within. Ameri-

cans are reluctant to let their presidents go to war, even after massive campaigns such as the fairly successful one waged by the Carter administration to create hysteria against Iran for fourteen months. However, the campaign against "international terrorism" and the effort to build a "strategic consensus" in the Middle East, which both center on Libya, must, if they are to succeed, enlist the loyalties of individual Americans. During the hostage affair, the Carter administration did this in part by manipulating concern over threats to the safety of the hostages, and in part by mobilizing public anger against Iranians living in the U.S. So far, the Reagan administration has limited itself to the first kind of effort, portraying Reagan as a "hostage" to the threat of Libyan "hit squads" - unable even to leave the White House to light the Christmas tree. This has been a moderately successful effort, apparently assisted and perhaps orchestrated by the CIA and MOSSAD (Israeli intelligence). Now the second kind of effort may be just around the corner.

AN IMPORTANT PRECEDENT: ORCHESTRATING HYSTERIA AGAINST IRANIANS

One of the "lessons of Iran" was that outrageous actions by the U.S. are more acceptable to the American public if they can be framed as "humanitarian." Jimmy Carter learned early on to manipulate concern for the safety of the hostages. Whatever policies the government had actually adopted, the way to sell them to the public was to portray them as reactions to some threat menacing the hostages. On each of the three occasions that the U.S. increased its military presence in the Persian-Arabian Gulf area during this period - late 1979, April 1980, and September 1980 - Carter falsely represented the hos-

(Jeff McConnell is a political activist living in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He is the author of "Libya: U.S. Propaganda and Covert Operations," published in the last issue of CounterSpy.)

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tages as being in increasing physical danger.

At the same time, and for the first time since the 1972 crackdown on Arabs living in the U.S. and the 1973 oil embargo, the U.S. government had a chance to "personalize" an international campaign, to involve the public at large in its costs and execution. On the one hand, the hostages and their families were the objects of great sympathy. On the other hand, Iranians living in the U.S. were the objects of great anger. Many were intimidated into silence, while others were physically and verbally assaulted. One episode provides an important example of how the media and the government cooperated to exploit this hysteria. On July 27, 1980, during demonstrations by both pro- and anti-Khomeini groups in Washington, D.C., 192 Iranians of the pro-Khomeini group were arrested. The arrests provoked a chorus of international indignation. News footage shot by local D.C. television stations clearly showed police brutality against the demonstrators.⁴ Between 35 and 50 Iranians were hurt badly enough to require hospitalization while only two policemen were slightly injured.⁵

For several days after the demonstrations, the press and government officials engaged in rather incredible speculation that the Iranians themselves had conspired to create an international incident by provoking a confrontation with the police. One report stated: "The Administration has no proof that the Iranian demonstrators were directed from Teheran, but several officials said circumstantial evidence suggested that the Iranians were highly disciplined and that their refusal at first to identify themselves and the decision of some of them to begin a hunger strike seemed to be coordinated."⁶

Then on August 7, just after the Iranians had been released, the Washington Post claimed to have evidence "beyond any reasonable doubt" to back up the speculation. "Law enforcement investigators," the Post reported, "say at least \$5 million has been funneled into the United States from Iran to support Iranian Moslem revolutionary protest and propaganda efforts here.... The money sent from Iran is part of an effort to export Ayatollah... Khomeini's revolutionary Islamic ideology to other Moslems, defend Khomeini's regime and embarrass his critics, such as the

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U.S. government, sources said."⁷ Not to be outdone, the New York Times ran the even more sensational story the next day that the money was to help "foment civil disturbances and recruit imprisoned American Muslims as members of terrorist squads."⁸

Aside from the suspicious timing of these articles, and the curious shift of blame away from the police and onto the injured Iranians, the reports are problematic on other grounds. It is well-known that substantial Iranian government money was already in the U.S. to finance legal efforts to regain the impounded Iranian assets, the operations of Iran Times, cultural activities, and so forth. It is hard to see why more money would need to be brought into the U.S. if the Iranian government were intent on financing demonstrations here. Moreover, most Iranians in the U.S. did not need to be given travel expenses out of such a clandestine fund to entice them to take part in demonstrations. This is evidenced by the fact that the anti-Khomeini Marxist Iranian Students Association (ISA) outnumbered the pro-Khomeini demonstrators two-to-one during the July 27 demonstrations, although ISA members clearly did not receive money from Khomeini's government.

Both the Post and the Times subsequently printed interviews with Iranians in which some of these points were made.⁹ Still, both papers concealed what was perhaps the most contrary piece of evidence - an explicit denial by State Department spokesman David Passage: "We've gone about as far and wide as we can and we have nothing to substantiate it."¹⁰ But the damage was done. One U.S. Representative asked for hearings to investigate "possible subversive actions" by Iranian students.¹¹ And the Post editorially parroted its reporters: "For many Americans - maybe all of us - outrage will be the immediate response to any suggestion of Iranian-directed spying, 'destabilization' and murder. Fine. But outrage can hardly be the only response.... What should be done? The answer is diligent, effective counterintelligence and police work within the framework of the law. Our sense... is that at various levels the U.S. government has been slow to credit the possibility that the ayatollah may be cranking up something devious and nasty inside the United States.... The resources of government... have to be con-

centrated and focused in particular on the thousands of Iranians... who are in this country as aliens, and on certain naturalized Americans of Iranian origin...."¹²

LIBYAN WITCH-HUNT

Recall that the story of the government's informant on the Libyan "hit squads" was that they were trained inside Libya and would attempt to infiltrate into the U.S. through Canada or Mexico. The day before it reported the growing skepticism toward the informant's story, CBS reported that since no "hit men" had been seen entering the U.S. and there in fact was not even any concrete evidence that they existed, the investigation was changing gears on the assumption that Qaddafi might be considering using persons already living in the U.S. Thus, said CBS, the investigation was now centering on Qaddafi supporters in the U.S., radical Palestinians, and radical Islamic groups.¹³

Already before this CBS report there were many indications that a "witch-hunt" might be underway. Sources told the New York Post in early December that the "hit squad" investigation focused on "radical elements in the Libyan student community here" and claimed that a "well-orchestrated" plan was being carried out involving not just the "hit teams" but "mysterious 'support teams' as well."¹⁴ Similarly, the Hartford Courant reported in late November that "law enforcement officials said the [Libyan] agents could count on substantial assistance from Libyans already in this country. There is a particularly large Libyan community in the District of Columbia and, during the past week, D.C. police have increased their surveillance of suspected [Qaddafi] supporters in the nation's capital, according to police sources." [Emphasis added.]¹⁵ (A high-ranking police officer, though, had said of a recent similar investigation that: "I am not going to talk about intelligence gathering when we're not supposed to do it."¹⁶)

Richard Shadyac, a lawyer for Libyan students in the U.S., claimed that many Libyans have had their phones bugged since early November 1981. He also said that many Libyan students are being approached by law enforcement officials for questioning. Asked if he thinks these officials are after specific information, Shadyac

said that they are "fishing."

Shadyac suspects that a Libyan task force has been formed in the federal government, and that it has been actively monitoring Libyans in the U.S. since early November, long before the December hysteria over the alleged "hit squads." ABC News reported on December 4 the existence of such a "secret federal task force." Among the techniques being used by this task force, according to ABC, are mail openings, vehicle tracking, physical searches, and the use of closed-circuit cameras in buildings.¹⁷ The New York Post wrote that this task force is a "rare joint operation of CIA, FBI and Secret Service agents."¹⁸ The ABC report came the same day that Reagan signed Executive Order 12333, which Smith later praised in Los Angeles. Whether the new order was signed at this time to facilitate particular operations of the task force, or to capitalize on the press hysteria over Libya, or whether this was all coincidence is not clear. But an interview with H. Stuart Knight, retiring director of the Secret Service, in which he stated that legal limitations on the FBI had reduced "the amount of intelligence we'd like to see vis-a-vis domestic security," had received some publicity the week before.

U.S. citizens are also targeted by the investigation. "Top federal law-enforcement officials" told the New York Times that the "nationwide manhunt" was directed both at "the potential assassins" and at "Americans to whom they might turn for assistance." "Intelligence sources" said their informant told the U.S. that the "hit squads" may "try to recruit Americans to help them." FBI officials stated that federal agents had been sent out to find and question "Americans who have past links to Libya," including former Green Berets who have worked for Edwin Wilson and "other military veterans who had worked overseas in mercenary operations and were skilled in the handling of weapons and explosives."¹⁹ One report, carried on CBS, stated (rather incredibly) that there was already evidence that "the potential assassins" had turned to the (now defunct) Weather Underground for assistance. CBS credited this information to "congressional sources" citing "intelligence sources."²⁰

The Reagan administration is now also interfering with free movement between the
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U.S. and Libya in much the same way the Carter administration did last year with travel into and out of Iran. In an effort to force Americans working for oil companies in Libya to return to the U.S., the administration invalidated passports for travel to Libya. Deputy Secretary of State William Clark, making the announcement, said there was "an imminent danger to the physical safety of Americans,"²¹ echoing the words of the Carter administration to justify its ban on travel to Iran several weeks prior to the unsuccessful military raid into Iran. Despite Clark's words, however, many Americans leaving Libya bitterly said they felt safer in Libya than in the U.S.

At the same time, Libyan nationals in the U.S. are increasingly having immigration problems, and it has been reported that one of the options actively considered against Libya during the NSC deliberations on Libya in early December was the expulsion of all Libyan nationals from the U.S. A strong argument against this action reportedly grew out of concern for anti-Qaddafi Libyans among them. It is probably true that there is reason to worry about the freedom and safety of some Libyans if they were forced back to Libya.²² But there is also an awareness that these Libyans are a group that the U.S. government can work with in overthrowing Qaddafi. Qaddafi, in fact, recently accused the CIA of recruiting thirty Libyan students to return home to spy for the U.S.²³ The CIA has been doing exactly that with foreign student groups in the U.S. since its inception.

Many Arab-Americans are convinced that the "hit squad" stories, like the "big Red scare" of the 1950s, could "turn into a witch-hunt - and that it could be directed against them. From Los Angeles to Detroit to Washington, Arab-Americans [in mid-December] were accusing the Reagan Administration of cynically creating a climate of fear that could only increase the isolation felt by many immigrants and Americans of Middle Eastern descent." One man interviewed, head of a community center in Michigan, said that the "hit squad" stories would cause "real problems" in the Arab-American community: "It strengthens the preconception that all Arabs are terrorists." Arab-American organizations have long charged that manipulation of that preconception as well as harassment from

the FBI and the INS, have been used to stifle opposition from Arab-Americans to U.S. policies in the Middle East.²⁴

There has also been speculation that the "hit squad" stories are being exploited to justify the gathering of intelligence against Arab groups in the U.S. for use at a later time. Military action by the U.S. against Libya, for example, could provoke strong opposition in the U.S. It would not be surprising that American officials, if they are contemplating military action, would want to be well prepared on the home front, just as Clark's statement that Americans are not safe in Libya indicates a concern for the foreign front.²⁵

Memories linger among Arab-Americans of the "anti-terrorist" campaign ordered by Richard Nixon in late 1972 in the aftermath of the seizure of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics by a Black September unit and the failed attempt by Israelis and Germans to rescue them by killing their captors. The Nixon administration established a cabinet-level committee on terrorism, including the directors of the CIA and the FBI. Nixon also issued an executive order which included five "anti-terrorist" measures. The first was "Operation Boulder," according to scholar Mohammed Shadid, ordering "the CIA to carry out a security check on any Arab traveling to the United States," leading to "weeks and months of delay for those seeking visas." The other four measures were: "Special postal checks of mail from suspect areas, tightening of the anti-hijacking program..., doubling of the number of wiretaps, and a nationwide surveillance and investigation campaign of politically active Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular."

Describing activities that bear some resemblance to those endured by Iranians after November 1979, Shadid wrote: "The FBI and immigration officials frequently abused, intimidated and harassed individuals investigated.... During the first two months of this investigating campaign," Shadid said, "125 Arab students were deported, most of them without due process. About seventy students were arrested, but they were later released and acquitted of all charges."²⁶ It remains to be seen if the present campaign now, or at some future time, will take on the dimensions of the domestic campaign against Iranians throughout 1980. There is concern among

some Arab-Americans and Arab nationals in the U.S. that it will.

PLOTS AND COUNTERPLOTS

There has been great concern inside Libya over possible plots by Western powers for a number of months. On several occasions, the Free Unionist Officers (the progressive group in the military that overthrew the monarchy in 1969 and brought Qaddafi to power) in Libya issued threats that Reagan would be killed if the CIA caused Qaddafi's death. It is conceivable that the reports presently circulating reflect preparations by Libya for this contingency. The Free Unionist Officers made their first counterthreat just after Newsweek's report in July 1981 that the CIA's Max Hugel had briefed the Senate Intelligence Committee on a plot to assassinate Qaddafi. The White House quickly denied that there was a direct assassination plot but remained silent about the rest of the story - that the CIA planned to destabilize Libya and ultimately to overthrow Qaddafi with the help of Libyan exiles and Egypt. A Daily News article of May had earlier reported that "senior Administration officials" were saying that the U.S. would "encourage" conservative Arab states that feel threatened by Qaddafi, "most notably Egypt, to take action of their own, either through direct invasion or sponsorship of a coup."²⁷ The Daily News item appeared ten days after the State Department ordered Libyan diplomats out of the U.S. and asked Americans to leave Libya for the first time, and about a week before Libya arrested a group it claimed was planning a coup. Journalist Claudia Wright later noted that the U.S. secretly lent Anwar Sadat an AWACS plane about this time and speculated that the U.S. might have done so in order to watch for possible Soviet and Syrian military moves to save Qaddafi from a coup attempt against him.²⁸

During August 1980, French intelligence allegedly cooperated with Egypt and the CIA in an unsuccessful plot to overthrow Qaddafi.²⁹ This failure and the upcoming French elections supposedly kept former French President Giscard from opposing Libya militarily when it aided the government of Chad in late 1980. Giscard reportedly ordered a battery of sanctions against Libya after the assistance; and

now it has been disclosed that "a high-ranking French official" also "brought an assassination plan to the Reagan Administration last February [1981]." The official is said to have been present at a White House meeting with Richard Allen and assistant secretaries of state Nicholas Veliotes and Chester Crocker. The French official reportedly "proposed that the killing be done by a group of Libyan exiles and controlled by the French," and asked for a "general expression of administration support for the venture and assistance in the aftermath of the coup. Specifically, he wanted the U.S. to give quick diplomatic recognition to [Qaddafi's] successor. He also sought assurances that the U.S. would be prepared to interdict Libyan harbors and airfields in the event of a move by Moscow to protect the vast supply of Soviet weapons in the country." The scheme, the official explained, would have to await the anticipated re-election of Giscard in May, "but he suggested that the planning begin. ... U.S. officials agreed to keep the talks going. The venture came to an abrupt halt when Giscard was unexpectedly defeated at the polls by... Mitterrand."³⁰

Mitterrand's inauguration occurred at about the same time that the alleged plotters were arrested in Libya, and French intelligence has since reportedly maintained a policy toward Libya at odds with the Mitterrand government. These differences came to a head in late October when, unknown to Mitterrand, French intelligence, in an effort perhaps to provoke a French-Libyan confrontation, fed AFP the false report that Libya was staging a coup in Chad. The report was publicized worldwide and caused some of France's 1,700 troops stationed in the Central African Republic to go on alert.³¹

The recent U.S. "Bright Star" military maneuvers in Egypt have caused considerable alarm in Libya as well. An indication of the extent of concern was a Voice of Arab Homeland broadcast of November 3. It cited information from diplomatic circles that an offensive against Libya, to begin with B-52 raids into Libya, would be mounted at the same time as the Bright Star maneuvers. The plan was said to be aimed at Qaddafi, targeting "all the places where the leader of the revolution is believed to be."³² More credible and more frightening is a recent Washington

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Post report that Reagan has given Egypt assurances that the U.S. would block Soviet involvement if Egypt should attack Libya.³³ The Soviet Union in the meantime is planning maneuvers off Libya to practice protecting Libya from external attack.³⁴ Even Washington's denials have a disturbing sound to them. One report is that although officials assert that it would be illegal for the U.S. directly to assassinate Qaddafi, they "openly admit that they would be delighted if someone else killed [him] - and at least one Administration insider has been in direct contact with Libyan exiles in Western Europe who are determined to oust" him.³⁵ There is evidence of other contacts as well, and Haig has called Qaddafi "a cancer that has to be removed."³⁶


ALLEGATIONS ABOUT LIBYAN PLOTS AGAINST U.S. OFFICIALS

Since Sadat's assassination on October 6, there has been an intensive U.S. effort to pin assassinations and assassination attempts on Qaddafi. The morning after Sadat was killed, Henry Kissinger said that "if Libya had been taken care of two years ago, last year, this year, Sadat would probably be alive today."³⁷ General Haig told a closed briefing that the promptness and intensity of reaction by Radio Tripoli after Sadat was shot indicated that Libya at least had advance warning.³⁸ (One report even claimed that Hosni Mubarak three days before had "warned the White House of what he feared was a Libyan-financed, Soviet-backed plot" against Sadat.³⁹) Along with increased military readiness for U.S. forces in the region, it was announced that Reagan had responded immediately with "heavier security... on U.S. diplomats in the region."⁴⁰

Despite extensive efforts, the U.S. could find no Libyan link to the assassination. Egypt, too, later exonerated "outside powers." On October 9, however, in the midst of the tensions on Egypt's borders after Sadat's death and the propaganda campaign against Libya, NBC reported that the FBI and Secret Service were investigating the possibility that "hit squads," trained and manned by ex-Green Berets and hired by Libya, were plotting to kill Reagan, and that for that reason Reagan did not attend Sadat's funeral.⁴¹

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However, the report was denied by a Secret Service spokesperson.⁴² On October 19, Newsweek reported that after the Gulf of Sidra incident, "U.S. intelligence... picked up evidence that [Qaddafi] had hatched yet another assassination plot - this time against President Reagan."⁴³ This "plot" was perhaps the one reported by Jack Anderson on October 13. He alleged that in a telephone conversation between Qaddafi and Ethiopian leader Mengistu, purportedly intercepted by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) the weekend following the Gulf of Sidra incident, "Qaddafi vowed that he would go ahead with



plans to have Reagan assassinated." (Anderson said he had been given the translation by the NSA,⁴⁴ but he did not explain under what conditions he got it.)

In its report, Newsweek stated further that Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Italy, was also the target of a Libyan plot - "a plot that was aborted when Italian police deported ten suspected Libyan hit men."⁴⁵ Nearly two weeks later, the New York Times reported that Rabb was hastily flown out of Italy October 21 after the discovery of "a Libyan plot to assassinate him," according to "a diplomatic source" (presumably in Washington). The plot allegedly emerged while Rabb was visiting Milan; "a heavy cordon of police protection" was promptly thrown around him, and he was "put on an early flight to Washington.... The source said that about ten people, including some top Libyan intelligence officers, were implicated in the plot and that several had been expelled from Italy as a result."⁴⁶

On October 26, however, the Washington Post reported that Rabb had had lunch with Senator Larry Pressler in Washington on October 15, and had been there at least

since that time. State Department sources reportedly "confirmed" they had reports of a threat against Rabb, but said "the principle reasons for his return were a combination of personal business and use of his assistance in lobbying" for approval of the AWACS sale. These Department sources said the "Newsweek report was the object of extensive attention in the Italian press" and believed that this was the basis of the rumors. They did say, however, that the rumors "were being pursued" by Italian authorities and that Rabb's trip home "was arranged partly as a precautionary measure."⁴⁷ But Newsweek earlier had reported that a number of Libyans had already been deported, and in another article, that the plotters had been "intercepted" in September.⁴⁸

A careful analysis of the reporting on the threat against Rabb shows - in addition to numerous contradictions - that all the articles on the issue, even those in the Italian press, only repeated Newsweek's original story, adding very little new information.⁴⁹ Later recapitulations of this story during the period of media hysteria about "hit squads" in the U.S. continued to be mutually inconsistent on the crucial points: when Rabb returned to the U.S.; when and if any Libyan plotters were picked up or deported from Italy; the order of these events; and the strength of the evidence that there was a plot against Rabb.⁵⁰ Moreover, as of December 22, the State Department still declined to confirm that there actually had been a Libyan plot against Rabb. An official stated that so far as the Department was concerned the reports about the plot were "just rumors."

A week after the October 25 Times article, a new "threat" report surfaced. "U.S. intelligence," said Newsweek, believes that [Qaddafi] is planning terrorist attacks on four American embassies in Western Europe.... [Qaddafi] wants to avenge the Gulf of Sidra incident, say senior Washington officials, and they claim to have 'credible evidence' that his new targets are not individual ambassadors but the American diplomatic compounds in London, Paris, Vienna and Rome."⁵¹ Then, on November 12, a gunman reportedly fired six or seven shots in the vicinity of charge d'affaires Christian Chapman as he was leaving his home in Paris. Alexander Haig reported that he had been told that the gunman was "a young man in his early 30s, bearded

and of Middle Eastern origin," and went on: "We have no other information, except to underline once again that we do have repeated reports that come to us from reliable sources that Mr. Qaddafi has been funding, sponsoring, training, harboring terrorist groups who conduct activities against the lives and well-being of American diplomats."⁵²

As with the Rabb story, the details of this episode are contradictory. Chapman claims that he saw the man approach as he left his home. He heard shots, ran to the back of his car and ducked down. Investigators later found that three bullets had entered the rear end of the car. The Post report stated that "the gunman appeared to have drawn his weapon and started firing before he got close enough to be sure of hitting his target.... The gunman's action seemed to suggest a lack of professionalism or training...."⁵³ Richard Eder of the New York Times was even more skeptical: "The fact that the assailant was alone, was armed only with a pistol, began firing at perhaps 30 to 40 feet away and had no escape vehicle" - witnesses, in fact, say he "walked off" - led to "suggestions that something less than an organized assassination attempt might have been involved."⁵⁴

The French Foreign Ministry said that Chapman had "informed the government of a threat against U.S. diplomats in Paris." His fears allegedly grew from "U.S. intelligence reports that Libyan agents were planning attacks on American diplomats" in Europe to avenge the Gulf of Sidra incident. The credibility of Chapman's report, however, was somewhat undermined by his failure to take up the police protection offered him; protection the former U.S. ambassador had had until his departure.⁵⁵

The day after the Chapman episode, one network reported that customs agents had been alerted to watch for Libyan "hit men" trying to enter the U.S.⁵⁶ Just over a week later, Newsweek reiterated the October 9 NBC report about a threat to Reagan with slightly different details.⁵⁷ When the report surfaced on ABC⁵⁸ and in the Hartford Courant⁵⁹ several days later, a period of hysteria started that has led to the present U.S. campaign against Libya. A number of assassins trained in Libya - variously reported as from five to around fifteen - were said to be either inside the U.S. or waiting in Canada, Switzerland

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or Mexico to enter the U.S. Their object was to kill Reagan or, if not him, other important members of the administration. The information was said to come from an informant who had heard Qaddafi give the order to kill the officials and later "defected" to authorities outside the U.S. - the informant that the FBI has reportedly come to doubt. Soon, names and composite photos of the alleged assassins were posted at ports of entry into the U.S. and President Reagan was saying, "We have the evidence...."

MOSSAD PROPAGANDA AND OTHER LEAKS

There is much speculation that the leaks about "hit squads" have been orchestrated by the government, as if, in the words of Washington Post columnist Haynes Johnson, "public opinion were being prepared for dramatic action - say a strike against Libya or Qaddafi."⁶⁰ White House communications director David Gergen, responding to Haynes Johnson and others, stated that he found it "astonishing that people think we somehow would go through this exercise unless we took it seriously...." He added: "The White House has made it very clear to the various departments that the president condemns these leaks."⁶¹ It was not clear whether this was a signal for some orchestrated campaign to cease (perhaps it was becoming counterproductive) or whether the leaks were actually outside the control of the White House.

One "senior White House aide" told the Los Angeles Times concerning the leaked

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information that "we don't know where it came from first - the FBI or the CIA."⁶² But it appears that most of the substantive leaks originated with intelligence officials. The October 9 report on NBC was not attributed, but the Newsweek article several days later said that "U.S. intelligence" had picked up a plot against Reagan; Jack Anderson stated specifically that his information came from the NSA. It was "Washington officials" who talked about the Rabb affair to Newsweek. "State Department sources" on October 25 confirmed reports of a threat to Rabb but refused comment on Libyan involvement; only in mid-November did a "U.S. embassy official" in Rome allege "evidence" of Libyan involvement,⁶³ and only in early December did "senior intelligence officials" claim it true without caveat.⁶⁴

The campaign against U.S. embassies reported in Newsweek in early November was a "belief" of "U.S. intelligence" and was described by "senior Administration officials." Haig himself insinuated Libya's involvement in the attack on Chapman. Ten days later, Newsweek reported "intelligence officials" confident that Qaddafi was behind the attack. Moreover, it was at this time that "U.S. intelligence sources" also were responsible for reviving talk about a plot against Reagan for Newsweek, and "senior American officials" added Bush, Weinberger and Haig to the hit list.

There appears also to be a MOSSAD (Israeli intelligence) connection to the reports. The Los Angeles Times wrote on December 12 that MOSSAD was the major source of several "dramatic" reports about the "hit squads."⁶⁵ On December 8, the New York Daily News reported that the ominous Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, known as "Carlos" was leading one of the "hit squads." On December 9, CBS reported that the "hit squads" were waiting in Mexico, and the Los Angeles Times said that "one investigative source identified the Israelis as the distributor of the Carlos story." The Los Angeles Times also reported that Israel was cited as the source for reports about the "hit squads" being in Mexico.⁶⁶ Earlier, it had written that a "government source" had called the CBS report "whole cloth."⁶⁷ Soon an INS message to Mexican border agents warning of Carlos' possible presence and of the possibility that the "hit squads" might be illegally smuggled into the U.S. became widely publicized.

About this time, Uri Dan reported from Jerusalem that MOSSAD agents said that former CIA officers Wilson and Terpil had trained the "hit squads and that Qaddafi had recruited them because of their knowledge of Western security procedures.⁶⁸ The Los Angeles Times was told by an "informed source" that Israel has "wanted an excuse to go in and bash Libya for a long time," and other sources said that Israel "might be trying to build public support in the United States for a strike" against Libya.

The Hartford Courant's U.S. "intelligence sources" also leaked rather sensational stories. They said that all U.S.-Canadian border agents had been alerted, that Qaddafi was responsible for plots in Rome and Paris, and that the American plot was aimed at Reagan, Bush, Haig and Weinberger. A "ranking intelligence expert with a background in terrorist tactics" said: "This would not be a lone gunman-style assault, the kind we're used to [sic] in this country. We're talking about an all-out attack by people who don't care if they get away." A "high-ranking CIA official directly involved with intelligence on international terrorism" said: "There is a very strong feeling that [Qaddafi] would like to strike before the end of the year, during the holidays. In his mind, assassinating a U.S. leader during the Thanksgiving-Christmas season would give it maximum impact." Two "ranking intelligence officials" said there was already "substantial" evidence that "up to six Libyans" had entered the U.S. One of these officials said: "We're fairly certain that [the assassins] are here, but we haven't been able to pick up their trail."⁶⁹ The New York Times, however, claimed a week later that officials were still skeptically debriefing their informant.

It is unclear how much mere publicity there is here and how much outright disinformation. In September, Jack Anderson reported that the CIA was preparing a campaign to discredit Qaddafi through disinformation. Anderson also reported a plan that sounded rather unlikely at the time but sounds less so in light of subsequent events: "The agency has even considered arranging the disappearance of a moderate Moslem leader after a visit to Libya. This could revive the outrage against Qaddafi in the Moslem world that followed the disappearance of a holy man, Mousa Sadr. He

never returned from Libya after a set-to with [Qaddafi]."⁷⁰ On December 7, in the midst of the hysteria over the Libyan "hit squads," three men who claimed to be members of the Amal Movement, a Shi'a group, hijacked a Boeing 727 en route to Tripoli from Zurich, demanding an investigation into the disappearance of Mousa Sadr. The timing of the hijacking and a denial by Nabih Birri, leader of the Amal Movement, that it was involved⁷¹ along with the Anderson report, at least make for an interesting coincidence. Libya denounced the hijacking as a terrorist act of the CIA.

THE CREDIBILITY OF THE "HIT SQUAD" STORY


The sources of the reports; the inconsistencies among them; and the increasing doubts about them among federal investigators; all of these undermine the credibility of the "hit squad" stories. There are also pieces of counterevidence, although these are not always made available to the U.S. public. On December 4, for example, a UPI story from Beirut quoted "Lebanese security forces" reporting that U.S. envoy Philip Habib was being stalked by "hit squads." The report was printed throughout the U.S.⁷² What was not reported, however, was the denial of the report by Lebanese Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan, in his capacity as interior minister.⁷³ Similar allegations of Libyan plots in Turkey⁷⁴ and Greece⁷⁵ cannot be confirmed.

As for the stories about the "hit squads" allegedly stalking Reagan, there have been reasons for skepticism from the very beginning. Many FBI agents assigned to the case were skeptical even early on about the "hit squads,"⁷⁶ and customs officers at many border crossings treated the matter in a very low-key fashion.⁷⁷ Canadian Immigration Minister Lloyd Axworthy said that in late November, at the time when the U.S. press was reporting increased vigilance along the U.S.-Canadian border,⁷⁸ he had not received any notification of concern from the U.S. government.⁷⁹

The Washington Post wrote on December 7, 1981 that there were even doubts "within the global U.S. intelligence and security network: "some analysts" doubt that Qaddafi "would put his name to an assassination plan which, whether [successful or not], could lead to an incendiary aftermath." If such an assassination plan "ac-

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tually were in effect, it likely would be a most closely guarded secret, and the ability of an informant to obtain the kind of detailed information on each squad member, as is now circulating, is viewed as highly unlikely." Some specialists believe the reported ten-man squad is too large and doubt that the team members were trained in Eastern Europe because of the "volatility of the mission and the feeling that no nation in Eastern Europe would take a chance on being associated with it."



THE SPECTRE OF TERRORISM

The attempt by the administration to bring the campaign against Libya home to Americans has not been a huge success as of late December 1981. Skepticism grows and the "hit squads" remain as elusive as ever. Still, the Reagan administration has obviously exploited the public hue and cry to take certain actions against Libya and its opponents here at home. "One senior White House aide" admitted to Time that the publicity led the government to "speed up" its deliberations about sanctions against Libya.⁸⁰ It is generally believed that economic sanctions will follow the withdrawal of Americans from Libya. Monthly U.S. oil purchases from Libya were halved from April to August, contributing to the havoc threatening the Libyan economy; the hope is that this disruption can be increased. The possibility of freezing Libyan assets in the U.S. has been explored, but Libya, it was discovered, keeps little money in U.S. banks.⁸¹ Further military pressures are also under consideration. More maneuvers off the Gulf of Sidra are likely for early 1982, perhaps as soon as February.⁸²

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On the home front, intelligence gathering on Libyans and others in the U.S. continues. Executive Order 12333, unleashing the CIA domestically, was signed with very little public reaction. And the spectre of terrorism in the U.S. has been created. In the long run, it could be this spectre that most benefits Reagan administration plans. The terrorism threat can be manipulated in a variety of ways to intensify repression at home and militarism abroad. Only by fighting the administration's plans on both fronts can this spectre be destroyed.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) New York Times (NYT), 12/19/81, p.A-32.
- 2) CBS Evening News, 12/18/81.
- 3) NYT, 12/18/81, p.B-7.
- 4) Washington Post (WP), 7/30/80, p.B-1.
- 5) WP, 7/28/80, p.A-1; and Events Stemming from Iranian Students Demonstrations in Washington, D.C., July 27-August 8, 1980, Coalition for U.S.-Iran Understanding, Minneapolis.
- 6) NYT, 8/7/80, p.A-3.
- 7) WP, 8/7/80, p.A-1.
- 8) NYT, 8/8/80, p.A-1.
- 9) WP, 8/10/80, p.A-18; NYT, 8/10/80, p.A-16.
- 10) Los Angeles Times (LAT), 8/8/80, p.8.
- 11) NYT, 8/10/80, p.E-3.
- 12) WP, 8/10/80, p.C-6.
- 13) CBS Evening News, 12/17/81.
- 14) New York Post, 12/5/81, p.2.
- 15) Hartford Courant, 11/27/81, p.1.
- 16) WP, 7/27/80, p.B-1.
- 17) World News Tonight (ABC), 12/4/81.
- 18) cf supra, #14.
- 19) NYT, 12/4/81, pp.A-1, A-27.
- 20) CBS Evening News, 12/9/81. Boston Globe (BG), 12/10/81, p.18.
- 21) NYT, 12/11/81, p.A-12.
- 22) Chicago Tribune (CT), 12/10/81, p.4; 12/13/81, p.13.
- 23) Boston Herald American, 12/7/81, p.3.
- 24) Philadelphia Inquirer (PI), 12/13/81, pp.A-1, A-19.
- 25) Similar concerns were registered in the planning before the August 1981 Gulf of Sidra maneuvers; WP, 8/20/81, p.A-16.
- 26) M. Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians, New York, 1981, pp.124-125.
- 27) New York Daily News, 5/17/81, p.2.
- 28) The Middle East, September 1981, p.16.
- 29) The Middle East, August 1981, pp.34-36.
- 30) Time, 11/23/81, p.51.
- 31) 8 Days, 12/5/81, pp.18-19; Le Monde, 11/18/81, p.36; Economist, 9/19/81, p.44.
- 32) Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 11/4/81, p.Q-1.
- 33) WP, 11/8/81, pp.A-1, A-4.
- 34) San Francisco Examiner (SFE), 12/10/81, p.10.
- 35) Newsweek, 11/30/81, p.51.
- 36) New Statesman, 8/28/81, p.11.
- 37) Good Morning America (ABC), 10/7/81; BG, 10/7/81, p.1.
- 38) *ibid.*
- 39) Boston Herald American, 10/7/81, p.4.
- 40) New York Post, 10/7/81, p.3.
- 41) NBC Magazine, 10/9/81.
- 42) BG, 10/10/81, p.12.
- 43) Newsweek, 10/19/81, p.43.
- 44) WP, 10/13/81, p.D-17.
- 45) cf supra, #43.

- 46) NYT, 10/25/81, p.A-1.
 47) WP, 10/26/81, p.A-5
 48) cf supra, #43; and cf supra, #35.
 49) Corriere della Sera, 10/12/81, p.1; 10/13/81, p.1.
 50) cf supra #15; #19; #30.
 51) Newsweek, 11/19/81, p.29.
 52) NYT, 11/13/81, p.3.
 53) WP, 11/13/81.
 54) cf supra, #52.
 55) cf supra, #53.
 56) PI, 12/13/81.
 57) cf supra, #35,
 58) World News Tonight (ABC), 11/26/81; UPI dispatch, Portland Herald, 11/27/81, p.1.
 59) cf supra, #15.
 60) WP, 12/8/81, p.A-15.
 61) WP, 12/9/81, p.A-6.
 62) LAT, 12/10/81, p.1.
 63) cf supra, #30.
 64) cf supra, #19.
- 65) LAT, 12/12/81, p.1
 66) ibid.
 67) cf supra, #62.
 68) New York Post, 12/10/81, p.1.
 69) cf supra, #15.
 70) WP, 9/22/81, p.B-17.
 71) see FBIS, 12/9/81, p.G-1.
 72) BC, 12/5/81, p.1.
 73) see FBIS, 12/7/81, p.G-1.
 74) LAT, 12/6/81, p.1.
 75) Time, 12/21/81, p.18.
 76) cf supra, #24; NYT, 12/8/81, p.A-7.
 77) Burlington Free Press, 11/28/81, p.1A, 2A.
 78) Dallas Morning Herald, 11/28/81, p.A-1.
 79) The Gazette (Montreal), 11/28/81, p.1; Globe and Mail (Toronto) 11/28/81, p.1.
 80) cf supra, #75.
 81) cf supra, #22.
 82) Chicago Tribune, 12/13/81, p.1.

Book Review

Inside BOSS

Gordon Winter, Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England (or 2801 John St., Markham, Ont., Canada), 1981, 640 pages, index; £3.95 (England); \$8.95 (Canada).

"If only a quarter of the facts alleged in this book are shown to be true a most grave state of affairs is revealed."

Former British Prime Minister
 Harold Wilson, The Sunday Times,
 London, June 7, 1981

"They say once you have dined with the devil it is difficult to leave the banquet. My answer to that is that it's not hard when the people at the table start to make you vomit. That is how I feel about South Africa." With these words, Gordon Winter begins the story of his service with South African intelligence from 1963 to 1979. From the very beginning, he anguishes over important questions: Why did he defect from BOSS (Bureau of State Security) at the height of his spying career? Why should we believe him now after a life of crime, betrayal, lies and spying? Winter answers that he was disgusted with himself, his work, and with the South African apartheid regime. This, he states,

is why he left and wrote Inside BOSS. But why didn't he leave earlier?

Some aspects of these questions may remain unanswered. To his credit, however, Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police does not spare Winter (unlike books and articles by some former U.S. government and intelligence officials who wrote about their careers). He takes personal responsibility for monstrous actions, for betrayals, and for his spying on hundreds of opponents of the apartheid regime which led to their arrests, torture, and in some cases deaths. Winter does not gloss over his atrocities. Clearly, Inside BOSS is not a self-serving book. It gives astounding insights into the workings of South African intelligence: its methods, its infiltration techniques, its successes and failures. Winter also describes BOSS's close collaboration with the CIA in spite of some tactical differences. For these reasons, Inside BOSS should be read by opponents of apartheid and other progressive activists. The BOSS described in Winter's book is vicious and frighteningly resourceful, but not invincible, as evidenced by Winter's defection itself.

Gordon Winter, a British citizen, went to South Africa in January 1960 after a short career as a petty thief (in 1955 he was sentenced to 22 months in prison) and

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arms smuggler. As he tells it, he wanted to start a new life and became a crime reporter for the anti-apartheid Johannesburg Sunday Express. Winter's opportunism ("All I really care about is making top contacts in government that I can get good stories....") was clear from the means he used to make inroads into South Africa's Justice Department. He informed on a young couple - he Black, she White. The fact that they were in love constituted a crime in racist South Africa. The two were arrested, but both managed to jump bail. To cover up his role in the arrests, Winter put out the story that his own woman friend had informed on the two. He then wrote a sympathetic story about their escape to enhance his liberal credentials.

His betrayal of that couple, Winter writes, "certainly helped to convince senior police officers that I was a valuable informer who was 'well in' with Blacks and liberals. That is how I first made top-level contacts at Police Headquarters in Pretoria - which started me on the path towards becoming a full time spy for South African intelligence." Winter also managed to build up a close relationship with then Minister of Justice John Vorster: the Minister gave Winter valuable tips, and in exchange the Sunday Express, usually critical of the government, built up Vorster as a competent man. Winter was hired by South Africa's Security Police in 1963 after he informed Vorster about explosives belonging to the African National Congress (ANC). Vorster was so excited about the information that he told Winter he had to meet the "Tall Man" - Hendrik J. van den Bergh, the head of the Security Police.

In June 1963, van den Bergh was preparing to create a top secret special intelligence force, Republican Intelligence (RI). Its specific aim, according to Winter, was to enlist journalists as secret agents. Preferably, these journalists were to have liberal credentials. They would write anti-apartheid articles to build their credibility and to obtain access to progressive movements. Van den Bergh and Winter agreed, though, that Winter was to have a slightly different cover - becoming known as a liberal but at the same time keeping his reputation as an opportunist ready to use Vorster's tips. This van den Bergh plan allowed Winter to be used as a propagandist. Indeed, Winter did occasional propaganda stories through-

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out his career which were intended to counter anti-apartheid articles, to praise foreign supporters of South Africa, to create mistrust among opponents of the regime, or to take the heat off the South African government when it found itself attacked by the media.

(Even though Winter wrote these propaganda stories carefully to avoid tarnishing his liberal image, his dual role prevented him from carrying out his spy assignment to the fullest. For example, during his stay in London he refused to infiltrate the South African Communist Party (SACP) there. "The SACP is the oldest and most important Communist Party in the whole of Africa. ... They were far too disciplined and security conscious for me. ... I accidentally discovered that the SACP subscribed to all major newspapers in South Africa and made a careful analysis of every political story in them. Clearly, then, they would have noticed some of the cunningly angled stories I had written for John Vorster and H.J. van den Bergh and drawn their own conclusions.")

Winter writes that RI was a great success. At first, RI hired only White journalists since van den Bergh considered all Blacks to be "very unreliable and mostly inveterate liars." Out of necessity, however, RI was soon forced to hire Blacks as well. It was Winter's special assignment to "vet Blacks who were being considered for recruitment." The method was simple. A uniformed Security Police officer would approach the person to be recruited and ask him or her to become a spy. Often the officer would give the recruitee a few days to think about it. Here is where Winter says he came in: "Off I would go and interview the man under the pretext that I was a journalist compiling a big story which would expose the fact that the Security Police were trying to recruit Black spies and informers. Explaining that the editor of my anti-apartheid newspaper was full of indignation about this, I would ask the man if he knew any Blacks who had been approached and asked to spy. I would... promise that his name would not be published in the paper."

If the person did not tell Winter that they had just been approached by Security Police, he or she was considered trustworthy. If the recruitee informed Winter about the recruitment effort by the uniformed Security Police officer, the person

would be dropped or, in many cases, van den Bergh would switch tactics, as in the case of Richard Triegaardt.

Triegaardt told Winter that the Security Police was trying to recruit him. Winter informed van den Bergh, and soon afterwards, Triegaardt was served with a 24-hour house arrest order. Another person van den Bergh tried to recruit was William Letlalo, an old ANC activist who lived in a tiny house in Soweto. Letlalo's only comment was: "They must be mad." He told Winter, and in return was placed under house arrest; after eight years of living in such a confined area he lost the ability to use his legs.

Between 1963 and 1966, Winter checked out about 30 such Black recruits. To maintain his liberal credentials, he aided families of persons who had been arrested (sometimes after he had informed on them); helped one young Black man escape from South Africa (with van den Bergh's aid); and wrote anti-apartheid articles. By leading this double life, Winter developed his usefulness as a spy and retained the trust of anti-apartheid activists, including even Winnie Mandela. Mandela's husband - ANC leader Nelson Mandela - is serving life plus five years on Robben Island, one of South Africa's most notorious prisons. In fact, Winter writes, he got so close to Winnie Mandela that he was able to gather information that led to show trials against her and some twenty others in May 1969 and then again in August 1970. All of the defendants were seriously tortured; two of them, Caleb Mayekiso and Michael Shivute, died under torture. One of Winnie Mandela's associates, Paulus Mashaba, cracked under torture and signed a statement incriminating her. Despite this "confession," all of the accused had to be acquitted in both trials. Mashaba subsequently had a complete nervous breakdown as an aftereffect of torture, and has since been unable to speak coherently.

Shortly afterwards, however, the government placed most of the acquitted under house arrest or banning orders. In addition, van den Bergh unleashed the dirty tricks department against Mandela. A rumor was planted that she was an agent since she had gotten off twice, Security Police visited her employer, and BOSS launched terror attacks against her. A petrol bomb was thrown into her apartment, "someone" broke into her home, her car was stolen,

and three men attempted to strangle her. Eventually, Winnie Mandela was exiled to the town of Brandfort, which is a five mile drive from Johannesburg, to live in a small concrete house without water or electricity.

Winter describes all these events in a cold tone - what he did, what van den Bergh did, and what happened to people on whom he spied. As Winter writes it, he was never committed to the cause of the South African regime. His motivations appear to have been opportunism and ambition. Nothing could stop him, even what he calls "friendship" between himself and his targets. He says he "liked" Winnie Mandela,



ISSA

or in another instance writes: "I ... found out that Peter Magubane, one of South Africa's famous Black photographers, was helping [Mandela] in her secret anti-apartheid activities. I knew Peter quite well and liked him. But that didn't stop me betraying him to Pretoria. He spent a total of 586 days in detention, much of it in solitary confinement."

Eventually, to preserve Winter's cover as a liberal, van den Bergh arranged his imprisonment (Winter had gotten into a sticky situation anyway when his gun was used in a murder) and subsequent deportation to England in 1966. His cover there was that of a "freelance journalist specializing in South African affairs" and "Black affairs in Britain." His intelligence contact was Piet Schoeman, "who posed as a First Secretary [in the Embassy] but in fact was the head of South Africa's intelligence network in Britain." Another contact was Charlotte Hamilton who was officially listed as Schoeman's secretary.

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(Inside BOSS gives the names of several other South African intelligence officers hiding under diplomatic cover: J. Fourie (in London in 1976), A.H. "Alf" Bouwer, one of Winter's superiors in London (today he is the head of BOSS in the Transkei), Marie Joubert (now married, Moshoff), Brian Campbell, Vlok Delpont (worked closely with BOSS as Chief Information Officer at the South African Embassy in London), Chris van der Walt, "a BOSS propagandist based at the South African Embassy [in London] as its press attache," and Carl Noffke, BOSS "resident propaganda man in Washington under cover of being an information counsellor at the... Embassy there in 1978.")

While in London, among other things, Winter became a regular contributor to Forum World Features (FWF), a CIA front headed by Cecil Eprile. Winter is certain that Eprile knew he was a South African agent. FWF's chairperson was Brian Crozier who, Winter was told by van den Bergh, "was a member of British intelligence." Winter's description of FWF is interesting. "A lot of nonsense was published about Forum World Features" when it was uncovered as a CIA front in 1975. "One famous newspaper claimed that it had been set up solely to place 'rightwing propaganda' all over the world. Nothing could be further from the truth. Such activity would have immediately raised suspicion from the left and Forum's credibility would have dropped to zero. On the contrary, Forum had sense enough to recruit dozens of well-known left-wingers... as regular specialist writers, who gave Forum a balanced image." According to Winter, the CIA used FWF once in a while for anti-Soviet propaganda, or for "articles designed to test the attitudes and reactions of governments in various parts of the world." Primarily, FWF was formed "to act as an information-gathering network for the CIA and act as a conduit which laundered money paid to the CIA's journalist spies.... Forum was also useful when the CIA needed to get its top operatives to political hot-spots in a hurry with a temporary cover."

Winter's task in London was to infiltrate the anti-apartheid movement and try to find information embarrassing to South Africa's opponents. "While in London from 1966 to February 1974 I attended every major demo and submitted at least 4,000 neg-

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atives to Pretoria." He also spied on journalists who were about to travel to South Africa and informed van den Bergh about their politics. A number of them were then barred from entering South Africa.

One of the organizations Winter was instructed not to spy on was Amnesty International (AI). Van den Bergh told him that BOSS's "American friends know most of Amnesty's secrets.... If you think about it, the CIA would be stupid if they didn't take advantage of an organization like Amnesty." Through van den Bergh, Winter regularly received information on AI that the CIA was sharing with BOSS. Some of it included "photocopies of documents which had clearly been taken from Amnesty's files in London."

BOSS was not officially founded until May 1969. However, Winter writes, from the beginning it was "just the old Republican Intelligence network given a new name and legalized by parliament." For Winter and the other RI agents, the creation of BOSS didn't change much of their work. As in his "journalistic" career in South Africa, Winter quickly got to know many anti-apartheid activists and South African exiles in London. He sent hundreds of reports to van den Bergh. One of the movements he reported on was the "Stop the Seventy Tour" (STST), an organization set up to stop South Africa's Springboks rugby team from playing in England. It was led by Peter Hain, a member of Britain's Young Liberal Movement, and, as Winter describes it, it was a "phenomenal success" in spite of a disinformation campaign well orchestrated by BOSS. Winter, who emphasizes the tremendous importance White South Africans give to events like the Springboks tour, went to all the rugby games to take pictures of the demonstrators. To cover up his own work, Winter told British newspapers that British intelligence was taking pictures, thus creating a national outcry against these police state measures.

Winter drafted a 60-page report on STST and Peter Hain for BOSS. Partly due to Winter's efforts, Hain was brought to trial in Britain for organizing a disruption of the Springboks games, but was acquitted. Later on, BOSS managed to have him arrested on a framed-up bank robbery charge. According to Winter, South African intelligence also used rightwing Britons in their propaganda work, including MPs

Enoch Powell, Harold Soref, John Biggs-Davidson, and Patrick Wall, and secretly funded pro-South Africa groups such as the Anti-Communist Movement and the Christian League of Southern Africa.

Winter's biggest exploit described in Inside BOSS was the Jeremy Thorpe affair. Thorpe was the leader of the Liberal Party - hated by the South African regime. Winter ruined Thorpe's career by exposing his love affair with male model Norman Scott. Winter first passed the information to BOSS, and after several months leaked it to the British media. The story had wide reverberations, and Winter's work for BOSS was exposed during the revelations in 1974. Winter had to go back to South Africa.

In 1976, he joined The Citizen, a daily created and owned by BOSS. "I was Pretoria's number one hatchetman; a character assassin.... Not that I had to write lies all the time when BOSS instructed me to smash or smear anyone. The unscrupulous journalist... can pervert the truth by concentrating on the negative and diminishing the positive." Smearing people, says Winter, isn't very hard. For example, if you want to do in an author of a book critical of South Africa: "There are so many ways a hatchetman can attack a book. If the author had written anything unkind or controversial about anybody I telephoned them and got them to call him a liar. If the author had used unassailable facts I attacked his grammar to suggest he was uneducated.... If the author used damaging statistics to prove his case convincingly, I pulled out the old cliché that statistics can be made to lie.... If the book was written in a racy style I called him a crude person.... If the book was neither vulgar, sexy or racy then it was stodgy and heavy to plough through.... If he took a reasonable stance on Russia ... he was a crypto-Communist. That meant: 'He's a Communist but I can't prove it.' Any opponent of apartheid who was obviously not a Communist could be tagged 'a Communist dupe.'" Winter became a propaganda master who, as he had done as a spy, damaged the lives of numerous people.

At the end of Inside BOSS, Winter describes two events that he says made him leave BOSS. He claims his turnaround began when his son Guy was born in July 1976. Holding his newborn son, he suddenly thought, "Blacks have babies too." F

says he started to become aware of the living conditions of Blacks. It was a devastating experience. Winter's relationship with BOSS came to an end when the daughter of his maid was arrested. Winter claims he called the Security Police right away and was assured the woman would not be tortured. After she was released, Winter learned that she had been brutally tortured - at the very same time Winter was being assured that she would be well treated.

That was the last straw, says Winter. He was going to defect. However, he almost changed his mind about leaving ("Being the kind of opportunist that I am...") when he got a chance to enter into a very promising publishing venture, but his wife told him: "Money will never buy you self respect. If you stay, I go." So they left. Winter managed to smuggle out eight large filing cabinets with all his notebooks, a card index of persons he had spied on, and dozens of secret BOSS documents. He settled in Ireland and began to write Inside BOSS.

By detailing his career and activities, Winter illustrates the workings of BOSS as a whole. But he does more. Inside BOSS includes chapters on the CIA, conditions in South African prisons, torture, Military Intelligence, and BOSS's "Z" Squad, founded in the late 1960s for assassinations. ("Z" assassinated Abraham Tiro and "Boy" Mvemve, among others.)

In his chapter on Military Intelligence Winter writes that South Africa has sent "demolition experts" into Zambia; in collaboration with the CIA, then-Defense Minister P. W. Botha sent 200 troops to fight in the Biafra civil war in 1976; General Magnus Malan (now Defense Minister) set up a fake "liberation" movement in Mozambique; and South Africa is deeply involved in aiding Jonas Savimbi in Angola. (After the defeat of South African troops in Angola, military intelligence quickly produced a "pathetic documentary film" to show that, of course, South Africa would have defeated the MPLA if the U.S. had not ended its cooperation. According to Winter, this film, "The Angola File," was written mainly by Brian Crozier.)

Winter also describes relations between BOSS (now renamed Department of National Security) and British intelligence. The CIA's working relationship with BOSS (as evidenced by, for example, their sharing

Terrorism and Lies

The Mozambican Resistance Movement (MRM) set up by South African and Rhodesian intelligence to fight the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) is still active today. However, it has not acquired a popular base and depends solely on support from South Africa and wealthy Portuguese who left Mozambique after the FRELIMO victory, and on assistance from remnants of the Portuguese intelligence agency PIDE. Gordon Winter thinks the MRM is the "most successful clandestine operation ever mounted" by the South African government: "I know all about this movement because I was its number one propagandist from the start.... When I first started glorifying its exploits in July 1977 it existed in name only. The sabotage acts it was supposed to have made inside Mozambique were secretly carried out by the South African Army's 'Reconnaissance Commando,' a crack unit of... specially trained commandos."

These commandos carried out hit-and-run terrorist actions inside Mozambique and Winter then propagandized that the MRM "consisted of many small pockets of six or seven men who operated from secret... camps in remote areas deep in the Mozambican bush." Winter also wrote that the MRM had "hundreds of members" who were part of an "ever growing feeling of rebellion against President Samora Machel.... That gave the impression that there was widespread discontent amongst the Black civilian population." To explain where the MRM got their weapons, Winter told his readers that they used "Russian AK47 machine guns and Chinese rocket launchers stolen during hit-and-run attacks on FRELIMO soldiers." The BOSS-run newspaper Winter worked for, The Citizen, also published photos of the MRM "training in Mozambique" which in reality were taken by South African intelligence a few miles outside Pretoria.

Eventually, MRM was extended to include discontented Mozambicans, former PIDE members and people opposed to the revolution. MRM was also actively supported by Rhodesia's Ian Smith and Abel Muzorewa, and had training camps inside Rhodesia. With the defeat of the White minority rule in Zimbabwe, things began to look worse for the

MRM. On June 3, 1980, in a joint operation by Zimbabwean and Mozambican security forces in the Province of Manica (in Mozambique, 30 miles from the Zimbabwean border) MRM headquarters in Mozambique was destroyed and some 600 MRM supporters were either captured or killed in the battle.

There are strong indications that South African aid to the MRM was stepped up after this defeat. MRM training camps and its radio transmitter were moved into South Africa, and the MRM obviously has no shortage of weapons. It is sabotaging power lines and port facilities, but its activities are largely limited to the southernmost part of Manica province, where it is supplied by South Africa from the air. MRM's terrorism is often aimed at communal villages because these villages are creating a new society and eradicating the remnants of the old colonialist power structure. MRM assassinates and mutilates FRELIMO supporters and tries to "enforce a complete separation between the local population and the state trading circuits." For example, "use of salt and sugar in cooking is punished because these products can only be obtained through government channels." (Africa Now, Oct. 1981) This is the very same tactic used by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in southern Angola.

South African units still apparently take part in some MRM operations inside Mozambique. On October 14, 1981, for example, Mozambican armed forces killed three South African soldiers along with what Mozambique radio described as "three... armed bandits" who were trying to sabotage a railway line in Manica. The South African government denies that its troops are involved in sabotage and terrorism in Mozambique, but at the same time South African aggression, such as the raid into Maputo in January 1981, is a matter of public record.

To counter this aggression, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have signed a security pact and announced that "an attack on Mozambique shall be an attack on Zimbabwe and vice versa." At the same time, FRELIMO is training a people's militia as its most important weapon against foreign subversion.

or information about Amnesty International) is a close one, but at the same time their strategies are somewhat different, as van den Bergh explained to Winter. BOSS is absolutely committed to the apartheid system and White minority rule, while "the CIA backs all the dark horses in the race so that, whichever mount wins, America will have a share of the prize money - our strategic mineral deposits and, almost as important, our vast and cheap Black labor force."

"The only language the moneybags in the West understand," van den Bergh continued, is for the South African government to propagandize about the country's mineral wealth being threatened by Communist insurgency. Therefore, van den Bergh says, the "moneybags" are trying hard to get the South African government to change its policy on apartheid "as they could not be seen to be investing in a country which insisted on continuing such a policy. 'But they are hypocrites. They don't give a fig about apartheid or the so-called plight of the Blacks. All they care about is ensuring political stability in South Africa, the land of milk and honey as far as their

investments are concerned.'" And this is where the CIA and BOSS part company: "To ensure there will always be their kind of stability, [the CIA has] tried to bring the government down in a variety of ways - mainly by building up Black leaders in South Africa who will toe the Washington line should they come to power."

The CIA tactic, writes Winter, has had limited success due to the fact that almost all opponents of apartheid refuse to have anything to do with the U.S. So as of now, the BOSS strategy of brutal repression is the "going strategy" in South Africa. And this is where Gordon Winter has performed an important service. As an insider, he has exposed BOSS and South African repression as never before.

At the end of Inside BOSS, Winter raises an obvious question: Are the CIA and other intelligence agencies "up to the same kind of tricks, smear techniques, lies, distortions, disinformation, and deceit as those used by BOSS?" Winter answers that with the favorite saying of his former "spy-master and mentor," General H. J. van den Bergh. "They'd be stupid if they didn't."

- K.E. -

British Right Censors for South Africa

by M. Richard Shaw

At a time when the U.S. Congress is passing the so-called Intelligence Identities Protection Act to suppress revelations of U.S. intelligence operations, it is of interest to observe how similar, politically "unpalatable" items are suppressed in Britain. British censorship takes several forms. The chief means to be examined in this article are "D" Notices ("D" stands for Defense), the Official Secrets Act; and libel laws. In addition, CounterSpy is printing excerpts from Beyond the Pale by Derrick Knight,¹ a book about South African ties to the British Right, which was censored because of a

(Mark Richard Shaw is a freelance journalist in Britain. Special thanks to him also for his assistance in preparing the book review of Inside BOSS.)

threatened libel suit.

"D" NOTICES

"D" Notices were established in 1912 to "guide" the press away from the pitfalls of the new Official Secrets Act, but they carry no legal force whatsoever. The program is run by a committee of newspaper editors and civil servants (from Ministries connected with defense) out of Room 6370, Ministry of Defense, Whitehall, London.² A "D" Notice begins by covering the distinction between D.I.5 and D.I.6, two British intelligence agencies. (D.I.5 deals with "internal subversion" and "state security;" D.I.6 with "foreign subversion.") The Notice continues:

Attempts are made by foreign powers to plant stories in the British Press. A variation of this technique, which must be

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taken into account where the activities of foreign intelligence services are concerned, is the planting in an overseas newspaper or other publication of a piece of information about British Intelligence matters with an eye to stimulating the British Press not only to republish (sic) the story but also expand on it. You are requested not to publish anything about:

a) secret activities of the British intelligence or counter-intelligence services undertaken inside or outside the UK for the purposes of national security;

b) identities, whereabouts and tasks of persons of whatever status or rank who are or have been employed by either Service;

c) addresses and telephone numbers used by either Service;

d) organisational structures, communications networks, numerical strength, secret methods and training techniques of either Service;

e) details of assistance given by the police forces in Security Service operations;

f) details of the manner in which well-known intelligence methods (e.g. telephone tapping) are actually applied or of their targets and purposes where these concern national security. Reference in general terms to well-known intelligence methods is not precluded by this sub-paragraph;

g) technical advances by the British Services in relation to their intelligence and counter-intelligence methods whether the basic methods are well-known or not.

You are also requested to use extreme discretion in reporting any apparent disclosures of information published (sic) abroad purporting to come from members or former employees of either Service. If you are in any doubt please consult the Secretary.

You are also requested not to elaborate on any information which may be published abroad about British intelligence. On all these limitations some relaxation may be possible; please consult the Secretary.

When Granada Television produced a documentary about the Official Secrets Act, the "D" Notice Committee requested that the address and function of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ, roughly equivalent to the U.S. National Security Agency) be deleted from the film, as this revelation was a breach of "D" Notice No. 11, information regarding "Cyphers and Communication." (Other sections include information on nuclear weapons, British intelligence services, radio and radar transmissions, defense plans, weapons systems and aircraft engines). Granada refused and pointed out that the GCHQ's address was publicly available in Whitaker's Almanac. Then the British Independent Broadcasting Authority - which monitors all TV and radio programs, and allocates

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Independent Television franchises - learned about the matter. It ordered Granada to cut the reference out.⁴

THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT

The Act functions both as a powerful deterrent to investigations of the security services, and as a threat to those employed within the services who could possibly reveal information about their work. After all, in order to get a job, all civil servants have to sign the Act.

The first Official Secrets Act, in 1889, dealt with people who passed on State secrets, yet at the same time - unaccountably - imposed no penalties on anyone who received them. The 1911 Act - rushed through Parliament during a bout of spy fever in the run-up to World War I - blocked that loophole and did more besides. The Act prohibits any unofficial disclosure of information about the workings of central government. Both the suppliers and the recipients of such information are liable to prosecution under Section 2 and face up to two years in prison. Section 1, normally called the "spying" clause, forbids the disclosure of information which "might be, directly or indirectly, useful to an enemy"⁵ and provides any lawbreaker with a penalty of up to fourteen years in jail.

An "official secret" need have no military connection, need not be of interest to a foreign power, need not even be particularly secret - just as long as it is official information. Anyone holding an office under the Crown, whether a soldier, sailor, Cabinet Minister, Social Security official, policeman or postman, could be prosecuted for revealing information discovered in the course of his or her work to anyone else - unless specifically authorized to do so. (This also applies to former government employees, no matter how long ago they left their jobs, and to employees of any company that has a contract with any government department).

In Britain, it could be a crime for a journalist to receive - or try to receive - information about river pollution, safety checks, equipment costs, prison conditions or the amount of tea drunk at the Foreign Office, just to give a few examples of information that is officially secret. To quote a former head of D.I.5, "It is an official secret if it's in an

official file."⁶

If an item is not covered by a "D" Notice or the Official Secrets Act, there are "other means" by which censorship can be effected: articles by investigative journalists can be suppressed; courageous editors can be leaned on by management, or threatened by the local government, police and companies and promised a future full of non-cooperation; and management can be threatened by the government with curtailment of lucrative government advertising. These "other means" have even included the threat and actualization of physical violence.⁷

LIBEL LAWS

Libel laws are intended to protect the innocent from inaccurate coverage in the media and to provide for redress in a court of law. Something quite different occurred in the case of Derrick Knight and his book, Beyond the Pale, about links between South Africa and rightwing groups in Britain. In this case the supposedly "innocent" party was the Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC - a rightwing think tank with intelligence links, comparable to the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies in the U.S.).⁸

Knight, an employee of the London-based

Christian Aid, completed his book in early 1981. A couple of days prior to publication, his publishers, Kogan Page, received six legal letters. The one from the ISC threatened a legal restraining order. It charged that Knight's chapter on ISC was libelous, and initiated a protracted process to stop publication of the material. All copies of the book were withdrawn from circulation pending receipt of a writ, which was served on July 6, 1981.

Ironically, the text of the writ provided a highly accurate description of the ISC. It accused Knight of implying that the ISC is "a covert political organization merely masquerading as an objective and impartial body of educational research, in contravention to the laws of England and Wales relating to charitable trusts." (The ISC registered as a charitable trust in 1970, and not as a political group.) In addition, Knight had, they claimed, called the ISC "extreme rightwing and politically subversive" and "directly or indirectly a tool of the South African government and the CIA." According to Knight, the ISC "did not object to the quotations and references used...but to the overall implication of the ISC being a 'political body,'" and not a charitable trust.

Here are excerpts from the material which the ISC charged was libelous:

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT

The Institute for the Study of Conflict was founded in 1970 by Brian Crozier. It maintains a small staff and office at 12 Golden Square in London's West End. Its main work is the preparation of research projects and seminars, the publication of a monthly journal, and the occasional commission and publishing of special reports called 'conflict studies'.

ISC traces its ancestry to the Congress for Cultural Freedom which began in 1949 and was the US Central Intelligence Agency's major Cold War cultural effort. The Congress was a grouping of mainly European intellectuals which the CIA managed to dominate through its American Foundation's generous budgets. The literary magazine Encounter (not to be confused with the CLSA Encounter) was the focus of the Congress's activities in Britain. Encounter also ran a small feature service called the Forum Service. In 1965 this became Forum World Features and Brian*

Crozier, an Australian journalist who had worked for Reuters, the News Chronicle and for the Economist's confidential Economic Report, was appointed to run it. FWF, as it became known, grew into a large and highly professional news service which became an accepted news source, especially for material on Third World countries. FWF also sponsored books, one of which was Chile's Marxist Experiment by Robert Moss, an outright condemnation of the elected government of President Allende.

The nominal owners of Forum were Kern House Enterprises in the United States whose chairmanship devolved on Richard Mellon Scaife in 1973. He is an American oil and banking magnate, heir to the Gulf Oil family income, director of the Mellon National Bank in Pittsburgh and thus an ideal figure to lend financial respectability to Forum. He made reassuring announcements about Forum's profitable future but in 1975 suddenly closed it down. The links between the CIA and the Congress for Cultural Freedom had been revealed by the American magazine Ramparts in 1967. After that several journalists started probing FWF and it was only a matter of time before its cover was blown. Scaife appears later in another role, this time as partner to John McGoff in a South-Africa-financed attempt to buy the American

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* Christian League of Southern Africa, a propaganda organization funded by the South African government and, according to Gordon Winter in Inside BOSS (see book review in this issue), a front for South African military intelligence.


newspaper Sacramento Union to give the Nationalist government a voice in the United States press....

GORDON WINTER - SPY AND REPORTER FOR FWF

Before leaving the subject of FWF, Gordon Winter should be mentioned. He worked for Forum for seven years during which time he was, as he has subsequently confessed, an intelligence agent for South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS). Winter first went to South Africa in 1960 and got a job as crime reporter on the Johannesburg Sunday Express. In an interview on television in 1979 he said that the country was good to him and he wanted to do something in return. He became a spy. He was deported from South Africa in somewhat mysterious circumstances and worked as a freelance journalist, which work included assignments for FWF. He specialized in stories about South African exiles and attended many anti-apartheid meetings. He was a familiar and unwelcome figure. His camera recorded all personalities attending such meetings and, while suspected of being a South African agent, no one had proof. As part of his journalistic work he became membership secretary of the National Union of Journalists' London freelance branch and as a result had access to the files and address lists of well known opponents of apartheid.

One of Winter's tasks was to discredit such people and especially the Liberal Party whose members at the time (1969/70) were dramatically involved in the boycott of sporting links with South Africa and other anti-apartheid campaigns. It was Winter who, in 1971, somehow got hold of the story about Jeremy Thorpe's relationship with Norman Scott and tried, unsuccessfully, to sell it to Fleet Street. The South African covert operation against the Liberals intensified during the run-up to the 1974 election. There were suspicions that the arrest of Peter Hain for an alleged bank robbery was an attempted frame-up to undermine the work of the Young Liberals.* There was also a broadsheet called The Hidden Face of the Liberal Party which was widely distributed in a number of constituencies, including that of the Bodmin Liberal Paul Tyler.¹ Tyler said that there was a lot of speculation at the time as to how the addresses were obtained. This broadsheet was published by Geoffrey Stewart-Smith's Foreign Affairs Publishing Co.² Its content was mainly concerned with identifying the Liberals with various forms of political violence and terrorism and proving that the driving forces behind the party were politically ultra-left-wing and not the moderate ones the Liberal manifesto was promoting.

Gordon Winter returned to South Africa the day before the 1974 British General Election. The circumstances were as strange as those surrounding his deportation from that country in the 1960s. For a time he worked again on the Johannesburg Sunday Express and then left to join The Citizen, the paper created and funded covertly by



the Department of Information. In the wake of Muldergate, he fled South Africa and went into hiding. In a television interview on London Weekend TV on 29 June 1979 he told part of his story and hinted at more to come.

LINKS BETWEEN THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT AND FWF

The links between the new Institute for the Study of Conflict and the old Forum World Features were strong ones. Not only Brian Crozier but Forum's managing director Iain Hamilton left to become ISC's Director of Studies and the Forum Library went with them. ISC has a 10-man Council which includes Sir Robert Thompson, the counter-insurgency expert, Vice-Admiral Louis de Bailly, former Director-General of Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence 1972-1975, Sir Edward Peck, former chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and Professors Max Beloff and Leonard Schapiro. The Institute's full-time fund-raiser is another general who is described as a Defence Services Consultant. He is Major-General Ling, who has been on the staff since the early days. According to a background paper prepared by State Research in October 1977, the ISC operates by offering its 'technical expertise' on 'subversion' and on 'communist influence' to official bodies - including the military, the police, other government bodies and business. Its contacts in the public service and business have helped it recruit the 2,000 or so subscribers who make up the bulk of the £30,000-plus annual budget which it uses. However, ISC's technical expertise brings with it, says State Research, a highly political line. Its anti-communism extends not only to socialists and radicals, but to all social democrats and liberals. Those who favour progressive changes or seem to be 'soft' on 'communism' are in their eyes fellow-travellers. In its own prospectus the jargon used is 'the defence of free industrial societies against totalitarian encroachments' and the field covered includes 'subversion, particularly in industry and all systematic attempts to undermine society, in the universities, Parliament, government and other fields'.

One of the ISC's conflict studies in 1979 was called 'World Council of Churches Programme to Combat Racism'. It was commissioned from Canon George Austin, a member of the Church of England General Synod since 1970. He has made at least two visits to South Africa as an official guest

* According to Winter, Hain was indeed framed by South Africa's intelligence agency BOSS.

of the government, as he freely admits. In his essay on the WCC he demands that 'it must turn with some urgency away from the path of conflict, confrontation and non-acceptance of dissent and renew its...ministry of reconciliation'. Canon Austin's analysis seems to have fallen on deaf ears. It raised no significant debate and its conclusions have been overtaken by events.

'Conflict Studies' are significant in that virtually a whole edition will find its way onto the files of dozens of board rooms, ministries and information-gathering organizations, becoming perhaps the only reference work consulted. Thus a set of ready-made opinions or prejudices are conveniently at hand for future decision-makers. The four-figure print run of each paper is automatically distributed by subscription.

THE FREEDOM ASSOCIATION

The ISC has close ties with the Freedom Association. Brian Crozier was one of the people who signed the National Association of Freedom (its former name) articles of association when it was founded and he and Sir Robert Thompson are members of their Council. Robert Moss, a former director of NAF, is a close associate of Crozier. Moss wrote recently in Free Nation that the ISC was 'the most valuable research centre on subversion and communism in Western Europe'. Crozier writes regularly for The Free Nation. Both organizations maintain links with other similar-minded bodies such as Aims for Freedom and Enterprise - now Aims,³ the Economic League and Common Cause.

The Freedom Association is a pressure group which sets out to campaign on a non-party political basis for the 'preservation of freedom in the United Kingdom' but in effect plays exclusively on the instruments and with the tunes of the ultra-right. Its monthly (once fortnightly) paper The Free Nation carries a regular feature Pulpit Watch and in the issue of 25 May 1979 carried a mud-slinging article attacking Christian Aid, echoing the phraseology and arguments of the Christian Affirmation Campaign.

The Free Nation has more than once carried advertisements for the Christian League of Southern Africa and these adverts have been photostatted by the CLSA and circulated in their own mailings as warranty of their acceptability in respectable political circles. Earlier issues of The Free Nation contained articles attacking the World Council of Churches. The December 1978 issue, for instance, included selected extracts from the General Synod of the Church of England headed 'The Church is Condoning Murder'. There was also a review of The Bear at the Back Door, one of the publications of the Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., an article on the 'leftwards leaning' charity War on Want and a puff for the 1979 BBC Reith lectures by Edward Norman which attacked the politics of compassion.

Previous director of the NAF was Robert Moss, who has spoken frequently in favour of authoritarian dictatorship in Britain,⁴ is a staunch supporter of the Chilean Junta led by General Pinochet and a former speech writer for Margaret

Thatcher. He has written several books with anti-communist themes and contributed 'conflict studies' for fellow Australian Brian Crozier's ISC. As a journalist he writes 'Foreign Report' for the prestigious Economist and also contributes a Monday morning column to the Daily Telegraph. Moss and Crozier are members of what the press have come to regard as the New Right, along with



Bill Kocher

Edward Norman and other academics of the Peterhouse Set - the group of Cambridge scholars who urge the virtues of possessive individualism and the gospel of anti-collectivism across a range of disciplines, and the Milton Friedman school of economists known as the Chicago Boys, whose monetary theories General Pinochet applied like a scourge to the problems of post-Allende Chile and which are now, in an adapted form, being applied to Britain.

Another former director of the Freedom Association was John Gouriet who, apart from supporting the management of Grunwick in its struggle with the unions had previously challenged, in the courts, a boycott of the South African regime by the British Postal Workers Union. On 8 February 1977, in the midst of this controversy, the Club of Ten, a mysterious group of South African businessmen, placed a quarter-page advertisement in the London Daily Telegraph which challenged Tom Jackson, the secretary of the Postal Workers Union, to announce a boycott of postal and telegraphic services to the Soviet Union, East Germany and Angola. The Club of Ten, which was later revealed as a front organization of the South African Government, occupied a suite of offices (Suite 66) in the same building as the NAF (Suite 63).

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION (FARI)

Both the Institute for the Study of Conflict and the Freedom Association have links with the Foreign Affairs Research Institute (FARI). This is the body founded by Geoffrey Stewart-Smith in

1976 with an office at No. 27, Whitehall. Both Brian Crozier and Robert Moss are board members and FARI's chairman is Sir Frederic Bennett, the Conservative MP who was host at the 1977 Bilderberg Conference in Torquay. Council members include several other stalwarts from the right wing of the Conservative Party such as Julian Amery, a former junior Minister of Defence and outspoken supporter of the South African status quo.

FARI, like the other Stewart-Smith interests, aims 'to inform cabinet ministers, leading politicians, senior civil servants and other persons of influence' about the dangers to the West. It mainly publishes abstracts, book reviews and short papers related to this theme.

FARI has in the past arranged several visits of prominent people to South Africa on behalf of the South Africa Freedom Foundation or the Foreign Affairs Association. According to the Sunday Telegraph, 25 March 1979, Lord Chalfont was one of them. Sir Frederic Bennett, talking to Guardian journalists David Pallister and David Beresford, 24 March 1979, said he had been asked many times by the South African Government to suggest names of MPs who might want to go to South Africa. He mentioned Dr. Denys Rhoodie as one of his contacts, and Professor Nic Rhoodie, who had invited him to lecture in South Africa at a conference. Both the South African Foreign Affairs Association and the South Africa Freedom Association were closed down when they were revealed as the recipients of Department of Infor-

mation slush funds in the wake of the Muldergate Scandals.

In the Sunday Telegraph, 25 March 1979, Stewart-Smith said that FARI 'was in contact with many similar institutes in other countries' and added: 'Many of the institutes we deal with are government financed, and you can draw what conclusions you like from that. We do not object to it.'

A conference arranged by the Foreign Affairs Association of South Africa on the strategic role of minerals in Southern Africa was held in Swaziland in June 1976. Speakers included Peter Janke of the ISC and the conference's principal speeches were published in London by FARI.

THE BRIGHTON CONFERENCE, JUNE 1978

Another and important piece of collaboration was the conference held at Brighton in June 1978 jointly sponsored by the ISC, FARI, Aims for Freedom and Enterprise and the American National Strategy Information Centre. The South African director of the Foreign Affairs Association, C.F. de Villiers, was present, as was Admiral James Johnson, a former head of the South African Navy, plastic surgeon Dr. Jack Penn and Gideon Roos of the South African Institute of International Affairs. Another important guest was Richard Mellon Scaife.

One of the main subjects of the Brighton Conference was a plan to set up a world anti-commu-

Reagan and FARI

The Reagan administration has fairly close ties to the Foreign Affairs Research Institute. When FARI held its "First Annual World Balance of Power Conference" in Kent, England from July 30 to August 2, 1981, it received a "message of good will" from President Reagan himself. The conference was sponsored by several "strategic studies institutes" including the Heritage Foundation and the National Strategy Information Center which are both close to the administration.

According to a memorandum written by FARI Director Geoffrey Stewart-Smith and obtained by CounterSpy, the conference participants from 26 countries met "to consider the need of the entire non-communist world to respond to the Soviet global political and military threat." Midge Decter of the New York-based Committee for the Free World, the conference's "only lady speaker," warned that "if the Soviets should ever succeed in their openly declared intention to subjugate the world... for which read: to bring to an end for a millennium the possibility of political liberty... if the Soviets should ever succeed in what would

inevitably mean the barbarization of the planet, it will be [the] Western campaign of self-deception and evasion that will more than anything else have contributed to that... outcome." Numerous other speakers, according to the memo, argued for stepped-up efforts to counter Soviet propaganda, and called on the Reagan administration to take the lead.

Three representatives of the administration were in attendance: Richard Pipes of the National Security Council (he proclaimed that the Soviet Union is a "misbegotten experiment based on 19th century ideas"), J. William Middendorf, U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States (who gave a "very authoritative statement on the U.S. Government's policy towards its dependence upon external mineral and energy resources"), and Reagan's troubleshooter General Daniel Graham, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Stewart-Smith's memo concludes: "The... Conference certainly played a useful part in starting to try and formulate a global collective security alliance adequate to withstand the power of the largest military war machine the world had ever seen."

nist organization to be financed by private companies. The strong participation of the South Africans and their backing of at least one of the conference sponsors was aimed at influencing NATO military personnel and governments to stand by South Africa and harden their line on the Soviet Union. In an attempt to make the occasion an historic one, the conference issued The Brighton Declaration, which stated: 'The destruction of the CIA and other assaults on Western intelligence sources make it imperative that the US and its allies should again take the initiative on intelligence, information and counter-intelligence.'

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTRE

The American sponsor of the Conference, the National Strategy Information Centre (NSIC),* has since its foundation in 1962 been a key cold war institution. It has supplied money and expertise to the extreme right in Britain. For instance, it provided money to enable the ISC to publish its Annual of Power and Conflict. In addition, the minutes of the ISC's council meeting of 21 January 1972 noted that the NSIC was covering the salary of a research assistant plus advertising and printing costs of the Annual.

The NSIC committee is closely linked to the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD),** an American group of prominent supporters of an interventionist US foreign policy which became active very soon after President Carter's election in 1976. The CPD has strong affiliations with American trade unions of the AFL-CIO persuasion, whose record is one of collaboration with the CIA in the development of trade unionism, in the third world especially, which would co-operate with capital and provide a stable context for American investment. Both the CPD and the NSIC promote a tougher US stance towards the Soviet Union, and lobby for the build-up of military forces and the rapid development of new arms systems.

* CIA Director William Casey is one of NSIC's founders.

** Paul Nitze, a prominent CPD member is now head of the U.S. disarmament negotiation team in Geneva.

After reading these excerpts one is left with the impression that this chapter is quite mild, particularly compared to mid-1970s revelations about the ISC's South African and intelligence connections in Time Out, Searchlight, and The Guardian. Journalists Andy Weir, Jonathan Bloch, and Mike Rossiter revealed that their compilation of the Guardian articles on the ISC had been "considerably aided" by "less reactionary members of the Conservative Party who [were] anxious to see Mrs. Thatcher distance herself from the councils of the extreme right [e.g., the ISC]...." Surprisingly, the ISC took no legal action.

A background paper titled 'Labour's Transatlantic Links' in State Research Bulletin No.16, February 1980, shows that these influences have now been brought to bear on the right wing of the British Labour Party, as part of a widespread covert campaign for greater arms spending and militant anti-communism. One of the chosen vehicles for this is a monthly newsletter, the Labour and Trade Union Press (LTUPS) which is seen as continuing the old CIA-backed Congress of Cultural Freedom and the work of the Forum World Features in the 1960s.

When State Research wrote its paper on the ISC in 1978 it concluded that it was easy to over-estimate the significance of the ISC since they were only a small group of individuals, though with good connections. 'It is also easy', the paper continued, 'to dismiss them simply because they are not part of the mainstream of the state and the economy. The ISC is important because of the present political context. The liberalization of the sixties has now been overtaken by a general swing to the right, most clearly visible in the Conservative Party. The politics of the ISC, which would have been considered as extreme ten years ago, today find a receptive ear.'

In 1980, however, it is clear that organizations such as the NSIC in America and the people associated with it can no longer be treated as a fringe. They play a major role in American politics and would like to extend their influence to Britain. The swing to the right has brought them once more to the centre of power.

REFERENCES

- 1) Paul Tyler in correspondence with the author.
- 2) See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the Foreign Affairs Publishing Co.
- 3) AIMS, founded in 1942, is a pressure group which organizes press campaigns on behalf of free enterprise, makes awards for 'services to freedom and enterprise' and is also an information gathering centre. It is funded by block grants from industry, and individual businessmen. Its director Michael Ivens is active in many of the related groups of the political right.
- 4) See The Collapse of Democracy by Robert Moss, Temple-Smith, 1976.

By the time the Knight book was ready for publication, the ISC apparently had had enough. In an attempt to salvage what was left of an already tarnished reputation, the ISC swiftly took action against Knight. Knight wanted to take the case to court, where he planned to provide his own defense. He thought he could win, and hoped that publicity about the case would prompt an investigation of ISC's charity status. Knight estimates that dozens of "charitable" schemes are killed off every year following complaints that they are actually political.⁹ However, his publishers, faced with sky-high legal fees,

called a halt and settled out of court. The ISC initially wanted £3,500 plus costs but eventually they settled for £1,500. Even though he "lost" the case, Knight is determined to continue to challenge the charitable status of the ISC, with or without mass media assistance.¹⁰

Had the case gone to court, the ISC could have counted on bad publicity and possibly a consequent effect on their funding. No doubt the ISC is highly pleased with the outcome. It is a result that affects all investigative journalists: even if they write fully factual, referenced articles, an overall article could be deemed libelous. Such an inhibition is of great use to rightwing bodies who want to stifle unfavorable articles without attracting unwanted publicity.

FOOTNOTES

1) Derrick Knight is a researcher and writer for Christian Aid in London. He has produced films for the National Film Board of Canada, the BBC and the United Nations. He is the co-author of A Long Look at Short Films (Pergamon Press, 1967), and wrote Gentlemen of Fortune (F. Muller, 1978), a history of the exploitation of the West Indies. Beyond the

Pale is now being published by Caraf Publications.
2) See "The 'D' Notice Quagmire," New Statesman, 4/14/80, pp.502-503.
3) Brian Whitaker, News Ltd., Minority Press Group Series, No.5, 1981, London, pp.70-71.
4) Ibid.
5) Quoted by Crispin Aubrey, Who's Watching You?, Penguin Books, London, 1981, p.19.
6) Ibid. See also cf supra, #3, pp.66-69.
7) See Geoff Robertson, Reluctant Judas, Temple Smith, London, 1976; and Geoff Robertson, "Lennon: A Case to Answer," New Statesman, Nov. 1974, pp. 690-693. Kenneth Lennon had been employed by the Special Branch as an agent provocateur who tried to recruit members for a new Provisional Irish Republican Army cell, offered to sell arms to local Republicans, and encouraged Sinn Fein members to join a plot to spring the "Luton Three" from jail. Two days after Lennon's confession to the National Council for Civil Liberties he was murdered under "mysterious circumstances." His murderer(s) was/were never apprehended by the police.
8) See M. Richard Shaw, "The British Right and Intelligence," CounterSpy, vol.6, no.1, pp.55-59.
9) The Leveller, 8/21-9/3/81, p.3.
10) Only one article of any substance appeared in the British mass media (David Pallister, "Charities' Role Before Courts Again," The Guardian, 8/21/81, p.3). Even then, the journalist, David Pallister, had been highly circumscribed in terms of what he could write. The legal department of The Guardian would not allow the ISC writ to be quoted, according to Pallister. (Conversation with the author.)

India: Under the IMF's Thumb

by Robin Broad

John Foster Dulles's cold war maneuvers of the 1950s are being replayed by the Reagan administration on several levels: loud threats of armed intervention, even louder denunciations of any and all popular movements as Soviet-inspired, domestic witchhunts against leftists, and warm embraces for friendly dictators. Behind the frontlines of the reemerging cold war rages a more subtle economic war -- a war fought to subjugate Third World countries even more deeply to Western economic and transnational corporate interests. The recently approved, but hotly debated, International Monetary Fund (IMF) superloan of \$5.7 billion for India - the largest loan in IMF history - is part of this second war. The loan will cost India dearly: its hefty price tag includes economic surrender to transnational capital.

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The IMF and the World Bank, created from the rubble of World War II, serve transnational interests by convincing - often coercing - developing country elites to enact anti-labor, anti-protectionist and pro-corporate legislation. Historically, the World Bank has accomplished this by advising national economic planners, contributing to actual development plans and financing projects which create business

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for transnational corporations (TNCs). Its twin institution, the IMF, has exerted its pressure through a more short-term role of providing emergency loans to countries suffering balance of payments deficits - loans contingent on enactment of pro-TNC "reforms." In recent years, the roles of the two have increasingly overlapped and merged, with both offering badly-needed loans in exchange for economic dependency.

Among developing countries, India's World Bank-IMF dependency is one of the longest. "India will... little tolerate blackmail," screamed Indian newspapers back in 1956, the heart of the cold war. Nor, the papers continued, would it accept "hidden threats" and "humiliating conditions" attached to international development loans. The outcry was provoked when a letter to the Indian finance minister from the World Bank president, critically assessing India's industrial policies, was leaked.

Once again, I wish to emphasize my conviction that India's interest lies in giving private enterprise, both Indian and foreign, every encouragement.... I have the distinct impression that the potentialities of private enterprise are commonly underestimated in India and that its operations are subjected to unnecessary restrictions.... [T]he respective roles of public and private enterprise should not be fixed... not by any theoretical concept of the role that each should play.¹

Replete with the World Bank president's private directives for erasing any socialist tendencies within the Indian economy, the communication earned the finance minister the epitaph of "India's public enemy number one."

Twenty-five years have passed since that outbreak. But India's current struggle with Western-dominated international institutions reveals that little has changed. Now, India is suffocating under a current account deficit expected to top \$4 billion in 1981. This time the loan comes from the coffers of the IMF. But even this switch in chief disciplinarian from the Bank to the Fund tends to fade into irrelevance on deeper analysis. As in almost all major current loans, there are strong indications of World Bank-IMF collaboration, and even stronger indications that these days it matters little which of the twins is the actual donor. Whichever has

most recently incurred public wrath in a given country can defer to the other.² Both have evolved to the point where their loans are accompanied by mirror-like conditions to straitjacket a developing country.

Capitalizing on its role as donor and bestower of the good-housekeeping seal of approval, without which India would be virtually ineligible for Western private bank loans, the IMF does not give its \$5.7 billion lightly. Indeed, the loan comes replete with all the major caveats of the transnational corporate-led, export-oriented development recipe that the IMF and World Bank dish out to their clients. Paramount among these is that India's strict curbs on foreign investments and monopolies must end, opening the way for plunder of the economy by large, powerful corporate forces, both foreign and domestic. Subsidies on vital foodstuffs, principally aiding the urban poor (indeed, keeping many from starving) will be liquidated. Accompanying these will be a shift towards export-led growth, sending the benefits of India's development to Western TNCs and consumers. These are all part of the U.S.-dominated institution's rules for how to remake a borrower into a better client state.

This time, however, the game had a new twist: in the final moments before the loan's approval, the United States played dumb and took the opportunity of the well-attended and just as well publicized IMF-World Bank annual meeting in October to register shock over the proposed Indian loan, calling for tighter conditions. This was clearly a political ploy; a media event set up to intimidate India's Indira Gandhi. It was little more than a warning of what would ensue should India edge closer to the Soviet Union and socialism, and a bit of blackmail to keep Gandhi's new international economic order demands muted at global meetings.

The Reagan attack was transparent. To begin with, the U.S. government through its representative on the IMF board, had seen the strict loan conditions long before. Indeed, the U.S. had a full six months before the annual meeting to study the loan, as well as to register any protests.

Moreover, the U.S. government knows well that these days the more controversial conditions - such as currency devaluation

or lowering of domestic industries' tariff protection - are seldom explicitly written into World Bank or IMF loan contracts. Rather, compliance with such verbally negotiated (but unwritten) conditions before the final loan agreement is even signed has become pro forma now for obvious reasons. It enables the recipient government to display a facade of independence, and avoid domestic protests about external control of the economy. At the same time, it lets the IMF or World Bank keep its hands unsoiled while pulling the purse strings even tighter; there is less opportunity for a developing country to receive the money and then renege on the promised policy changes. So, for instance, one is left to conjecture about the coincidence of an 18 percent devaluation in the rupee-dollar exchange rate during the period when the IMF was weighing India's loan application. Likewise, the mid-1981 clamp-down on strikes was carefully set up to give the illusion of a policy implemented on India's own initiative.

Continuing its charade of displeasure over the proposed loan up to the last moments of IMF deliberations, the U.S. abstained on the final vote. Abstinance, however, holds little more than symbolic value; only a veto has teeth. But the veto was avoided since the American rumblings over the loan were staged to generate smoke, not fire. While certain Western TNCs might have preferred a larger share of India's deficit met by private bank borrowing, U.S. state and corporate interests were uniformly behind the conditions imposed via the IMF loan.

Some twenty-odd years ago, Time magazine observed that the World Bank had proven itself one of the most effective weapons of the cold war. History has demonstrated that the Bank's usefulness, and that of the Fund, outlived the cold war as the two institutions flourished in the 1960s and 1970s. Now, as Reagan beats the old drum of anti-communism, attention should not be diverted from the economic subterfuge of the Bank and the Fund. They are as vital to larger U.S. corporate interests as the billions of dollars of defense contracts that fuel the cold war.

FOOTNOTES

1) Quoted in Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1973, p.372.

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2) In the Philippines and most other developing countries, it is the IMF which has a history of domestic intervention. In these countries, the World Bank, capitalizing on its widely perceived clean slate, has recently assumed the dominant role. India's case, with the IMF the less sullied of the twins, is somewhat unique.

IMF Destabilizes

Following his participation in the annual International Monetary Fund/World Bank conference in October 1981, Zimbabwean Finance Minister Enos Nkala accused the Reagan administration of trying to "dictate" internal economic policies of other countries through the IMF and the World Bank. "In many areas, the ugly American hand is being seen as threatening to destroy the viability of the Third World economies and their political institutions," he said.¹ The IMF's destabilizing power was attested to by Nkala's Pakistani counterpart, Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan. He told the Wall Street Journal that if certain conditions had been placed on a recent IMF loan to Pakistan, there would have been political turmoil. "This government - or, at least, I - wouldn't have been here," said Ishaq.² Even officials generally supportive of the IMF told the Journal that IMF-imposed conditions could "cause so much turmoil they might knock a government out of power."³

From the other side of the globe, the president of the Bank of Mexico, Gustavo Romero Kolbeck said that the IMF/World Bank conference was a "tremendous disappointment." "Steps forward at the IMF are seldom large,... but from the perspective of the developing countries, this meeting represented a retreat," he told the New York Times. Moreover, "at the Fund meeting it became clear that terms of loan conditions [to Third World countries] will increase in severity."⁴

The remarks of Nkala and Kolbeck suggest that the IMF has responded to the ballyhooed Reagan administration charge that the IMF had become "seriously deficient" in its loan requirements. Just before the IMF/World Bank conference, Beryl W. Sprinkel, U.S. Under-Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs told the Wall Street Journal: "For various reasons, there has been slippage in recent years. We want to push the IMF's conditionality

back to where it was. ("Where it was," according to the Journal, was demanding "economy-wrenching prescriptions" before helping countries finance their import bills.⁵) Around the same time, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan told reporters that the IMF should "be a little more strict"⁶ in its lending policy. (Both Sprinkel and Regan have also criticized World Bank policies.) IMF chief executive Jacques de Larosier disagreed: "Rubbish... if anything, the situation is getting tougher, and our programs reflect this. Even Donald Regan later said that the IMF had recently tightened its lending conditions.

The reason the Reagan administration is badgering the World Bank and the IMF does not indicate a conflict of interests. It stems from the administration's drive for even more political adherence from all international financial institutions (IFIs) to U.S. foreign policy goals. For instance, the World Bank has suspended all new loans to El Salvador, and the IMF has indefinitely postponed a \$110 million standby arrangement request from El Salvador because of its war-like condition. Despite these decisions, the administration got the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to lend \$30.8 million to the Salvadoran junta to improve some 200 kilometers of roads in the northwest, an area of extensive guerrilla activity.* At the same time, the administration pressured Nicaragua into withdrawing its \$30 million loan request for a fisheries development project.

Most telling of the administration's drive to harness the IFIs to its policies were its actions around a recent IDB loan to Guatemala. Because of a 1976 U.S. law requiring abstentions or "no" votes on non-basic human needs loans to consistent human rights violators, U.S. executive director Jose Casanova, under orders from General Haig, abstained in the voting on a \$45 million loan for Guatemala. Prior to the vote, the U.S. organized support for the loan which was approved on November 11, 1981. Subsequently, the administration cited its abstention vote to prove its

*In addition, the IDB is presently considering a special loan to the Salvadoran junta for reconstruction of the Golden Bridge which was destroyed by the liberation forces in fall 1981.

"good faith" on human rights policy in an attempt to gain Congressional approval for a \$2.5 million sale of helicopter spare parts sought by the Guatemalan military. On November 13, the IMF approved a \$110 million loan to Guatemala without any administration criticism about its conditions. - by John Kelly -

FOOTNOTES

- 1) As quoted in Washington Post (WP), 10/10/81, p.A-19.
- 2) As quoted in Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 9/21/81, p.1.
- 3) *ibid.*, p.16.
- 4) New York Times (NYT), 10/6/81, p.D-30.
- 5) *cf supra*, #2.
- 6) As quoted in WP, 9/24/81, p.D-3.
- 7) *cf supra*, #2, p.16.
- 8) *cf supra*, #6.

VOA: Short of Hitler

"He can have any ideas he wants short of being Hitler," said Voice of America Director James B. Conkling of his appointee Philip Nicolaides, who recently complained that "only about 45 original minutes of [VOA] programming to the U.S.S.R. is religious in nature and content - and a lopsided one-third of that is Jewish."¹ Nicolaides is the new deputy program director for VOA's commentary and news analysis section. A former writer for both the ultra-right Human Events and Conservative Digest, Nicolaides recommended the following in a September 21, 1981 memo to Conkling:

In our recent discussions you reviewed a number of problems at VOA and asked me to come up with some considered recommendations. That is a tall order on a basis of my sketchy knowledge of VOA.... We must portray the Soviet Union as the last great predatory empire on earth.... We must strive to "destabilize" the Soviet Union and its satellites by promoting disaffection between peoples and rulers, underscoring the likes and denials of rights, inefficient management of the economy, suppression of cultural diversity, religious persecution, etc.²

In summary, Nicolaides said that "we are - as all the world understands - a propaganda agency. Propaganda is a species of the genus advertising."³

Conkling responded to a Washington Post

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reporter's questions about the memo by saying that VOA is "not a propaganda agency."⁴ The day after this denial, however, Conkling stated that he was considering "a certain relaxation, or enhancement, of the foreign speaking activities, so that they [VOA broadcasters] may have a little more freedom to reach the people they understand in selecting the items they want to talk with them about and in 'transculturing' the way they talk with them."⁵ Conkling was advocating a return to the practice of allowing broadcasters - particularly Eastern European exiles - to infuse their broadcasts with their own strident, adversary attitudes. It was precisely to curtail this practice that Congress legislated in 1976 that the VOA was required to broadcast "accurate, objective and comprehensive" news.

Conkling sought to minimize the importance of the Nicolaidis memo, telling the Post that: "I didn't buy any of that... that is not the reason I hired him."⁶ Yet, it is clear from the memo that Conkling solicited the recommendations from Nicolaidis, and Conkling did appoint Nicolaidis after receiving and filing the memo. Conkling also said that the memo was "stolen" from his office - reflecting the prevalent attitude in the Reagan administration that government information is private property.

VOA employees are now circulating a petition asking Conkling to disassociate himself from Nicolaidis' views and to cancel his appointment. Recently-fired VOA Deputy Director William Haratunian circulated a farewell memo saying that "the absence of mutual trust between political appointees and professional broadcasters has created an adverse atmosphere at VOA. This risks damaging VOA's credibility, and therefore its ability to serve as a truly national voice of our country."⁷

Haratunian is being replaced by Conkling-appointee Terrence Catherman, a National War College graduate who served with the U.S. Information Agency (now the International Communication Agency) at the height of its Cold War propagandizing. Another USIA careerist, Charles Courtney, has been appointed to the newly-created post of Deputy Director for Policy and Programs. Courtney's role, according to Conkling, is to "judiciously apply the policy that obviously goes with our program." The recently announced plan to change the name

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of VOA's parent agency from International Communication Agency back to its Cold War name, the United States Information Agency, provides a telling symbol of the VOA's current reversion to its hard-line past.

Equally telling is the recent creation of the New Directions Advisory Committee by ICA Director Charles Wick (whose office employed Nicolaidis just before he went to VOA). The new Committee is in addition to the statutory advisory panel, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. Wick did not consult with the Advisory Commission before creating the new Committee.⁸ Its members are: Norman Podhoretz, editor of Commentary magazine; Gertrude Himmelfarb, Commentary contributor whose husband Irving Kristol is also a Commentary contributor; Evron Kirkpatrick, resident fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute and husband of Jeane Kirkpatrick; Robert Nisbet; Bayard Rustin; and Edwin J. Feulner Jr., president of the ultra-right Heritage Foundation. All Committee members share a staunch anti-communism and Podhoretz, Kirkpatrick, and Rustin, willingly or unwittingly, were involved in CIA-connected propaganda and labor operations. Podhoretz and Kirkpatrick have been recipients of CIA money and Kirkpatrick's Operations Policy Research, Inc. was involved in the improper domestic dissemination (through USIA) of CIA-connected publications. Podhoretz, Rustin and Kirkpatrick have never disavowed or disassociated themselves from this operation. The purpose of the new Committee, according to Wick, is to "identify worldwide intellectual trends" and to evaluate private research on "long-term intellectual currents in the world."⁹

FOOTNOTES

- 1) New York Times (NYT), 11/14/81, p.5.
- 2) Washington Post (WP), 11/13/81, p.A-2; and NYT, 11/14/81, p.5.
- 3) WP, 11/13/81, p.A-2.
- 4) *ibid.*
- 5) *cf supra*, #1.
- 6) *cf supra*, #3.
- 7) *cf supra*, #1. Clyde G. Hess, a public relations consultant and former chief of VOA's news and current affairs division when he retired in 1973 after twenty years of service also charged that VOA has gone "strident" and implied that it was returning to its McCarthy era format.
- 8) WP, 12/10/81, p.A-29.
- 9) *ibid.*

- by John Kelly -

(cont. from pg.30)

- 5) Richard F. Nyrop, Turkey: A Country Study, Department of Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1980, p.276.
- 6) Ihsan Gurkan, NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank: A Mideast Perspective, National Strategy Information Center, New York, 1980, pp.13,14.
- 7) The Comptroller General. Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Statistical Data on Department of Defense Training of Foreign Military Personnel, U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., 1980, p.85.
- 8) cf supra, #5, p.275.
- 9) *ibid.*, p.280.
- 10) *ibid.*, p.288.
- 11) *ibid.*, p.289.
- 12) *ibid.*, p.286.
- 13) *ibid.*, pp.287-288.
- 14) Rizgariya Kurdistan (Liberation of Kurdistan), No.13, June 1981.
- 15) Gerard Chaliand, People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, Zed Press, London, 1980, p.186.

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