

Active Measures, Quiet War and Two Socialist Revolutions



By Lawrence B. Sulc

The Nathan Hale Institute

“I wish to be useful, and every kind of service necessary to the public good becomes honorable by being necessary. If the exigencies of my country demand a peculiar service, its claims to perform that service are imperious.”

**—Capt. Nathan Hale
1755–1776**

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Lawrence B. Sulc served as an intelligence operations officer for the Central Intelligence Agency for more than twenty-three years, most of that time abroad. He later worked for six years on the staff of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. He has served as president of the Nathan Hale Foundation and the Nathan Hale Institute and is currently a deputy assistant secretary in the Department of State. The views expressed by Mr. Sulc herein are not necessarily those of any Government agency or department.

PART I

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CONTENTS

Preface

THE WAR WE FIGHT

World War III is Now
Soviet Objectives in World War III
A Petty Bourgeoise Prejudice
Caveat Emptor
World Domination and Mendacity
Protracted Conflict and Warfare on the Cheap
Communist Update

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES

Secret Political Action
The International Department
Power and Prestige
A Decisive Influence
A Unified Foreign Policy
Subtlety in the Art of War
Parties, Insurgents and Fronts
Soviet Front Groups Abroad
Transmission Belts
The Desire for Peace
Softening Up The Bourgeoisie
Agents of Influence
Terrorism As an Active Measure
Soviet Terrorism
Wet Affairs
Deception
Forgery
The Two Superpowers Theory
Gaining Credibility
Dangerous Reefs
"Maskirovka"
"Dezinformatsia"
Cultural Warfare
Foreign Broadcasting
Even Sports

THE WESTERN RESPONSE

The Ultimate Weapon
The Best Hope
To Prize Precaution - To Know

Preface

This is not a product of original research. It was not meant to be. It is a modest compilation of some important points from other more detailed works concerning the nature of the war the Soviet Union is waging against the West (principally the United States), its objectives in that war, and some of the means it is using to achieve its objectives. Among those means is the uniquely Soviet phenomenon, active measures, a kind of quiet war, if you will. The subject of active measures has only fairly recently begun to be examined in detail in unclassified sources. This study contains a brief summary of active measures contained in certain recent open sources; unfortunately, however, for lack of time and space, much good material could not be dealt with. No offense is intended toward those whose work has not been mentioned.

Soviet objectives in its self-appointed struggle with the West are not new. Like Hitler in Mein Kampf, Lenin carefully spelled out his plans for everyone to read well over half a century ago. Non-communists, however, are often amazed when exposed to Lenin's ideas for the first time and even anti-communists are often surprised at Lenin's brazen candor. This candor incidentally, is periodically candidly reaffirmed by ruling Soviet leaders.

It is worthwhile for those opposed to, or merely interested in, totalitarianism to be reminded from time to time of just what it is the West is up against in dealing with the Soviet variety. If now and then someone unfamiliar with the nature of Soviet thought and action acquires an awareness of them by means such as this publication, then so much the better.

I have not dealt here with the serious problem for the West, especially the United States, presented by Soviet espionage. Soviet intelligence collection per se is not within the scope of this study. Nonetheless, like most other things the Soviets undertake, intelligence is not an end in itself but contributes to the realization of important Soviet foreign policy goals. For example, the theft of technology by the Soviet Union is a particularly serious problem for the West. Science and technology in the Soviet Union and their maintenance by imports from abroad (legally or illegally) are integral aspects of economic warfare which, in turn, promotes Soviet economic, military and political objectives.

THE WAR WE FIGHT

World War Three is Now

James Burnham, in The Struggle for the World in 1947, fixed April 1944 as the beginning of the Third World War. The Communist-led mutiny of the Greek Navy in the harbor of Alexandria, Egypt, a year before the Second World War had even ended, was cited by Burnham as the beginning of the Third World War.¹ World War III was not, and is not, the nuclear war between East and West, so much feared by all. As Brian Crozier explains, in The Strategy for Survival, that war has not, and may never come. The real World War III was to be, and is, "a different kind of war." According to Crozier, that war is being "'fought' for the greater part with non-military techniques, such as subversion, disinformation, terrorism, psychological war and diplomatic negotiations, including conferences."²

According to Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, Russian born husband and wife and authors of Yuri Andropov: A Secret Passage Into the Kremlin, the point is whether the leaders and people of the U.S. "are capable of realizing that the war with Russia is already underway."³

Soviet Objectives in World War III

The Soviet world view is grounded in the principles of Marxism-Leninism, consistent to this day from the advent in Russia of the Bolshevik Revolution and the formation of the Soviet state.

Class differences, according to Communist doctrine, create tensions and contradictions from which class struggle emerges. The laws of class struggle affect not only a given society, the Communists hold, but differing social systems as well. Inevitably, in this conflict, international competition develops along with the struggle of ideas. The manifestation of this struggle, political warfare, happens spontaneously or else it develops as an instrument of policy. No matter what, it happens.

¹As quoted by Brian Crozier in Strategy of Survival (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1978), p. 10.

²Ibid., p. 11.

³Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, "Andropov Is Already Fighting the Big War", Wall Street Journal, October 21, 1983, p. 28.

Founded on the theories of Marx and Lenin, the Soviet world view holds that struggle is the natural order of things--political activity is conflict and war is normal. Whereas Clausewitz, the 19th century German military theorist, wrote that war was the continuation of politics by other means and Lenin himself publicly agreed, modern Soviet leaders conduct themselves as if they really believe the reverse to be nearer the truth, that politics is actually war on a different scale. It might be more accurate, as a matter of fact, to say that both politics and war, as viewed by Marxist-Leninists, are part of a continuum, that politics is war and war, politics.

The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union today is what it was six decades ago when the Communist International issued its "Program" in 1924.

The ultimate aim of the Communist leaders in Moscow, as set forth by the Communist International in 1924, is to replace the world capitalist economy by a world system of Communism.⁴ Every sacrifice must be made, in the Soviet view, and the greatest obstacles overcome, in order to carry on agitation and propaganda "perseveringly, persistently and patiently--even the most reactionary--in those institutions, societies and associations which proletarian or semi-proletarian masses are to be found."⁵ "...revolutionaries who are incapable of combining illegal forms of struggle with every form of legal struggle are poor revolutionaries indeed...", Lenin said.⁶

At the very end of its 1924 "Program," the Communist International reaffirms this statement of Karl Marx: "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their aims can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all the existing social conditions."⁷

A Petty Bourgeoisie Prejudice

According to the Institute for the Study of Conflict in London, the respected British "think tank," in late

⁴Programme of the Communist International (adopted at the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, September 1, 1928), (New York: Workers Library Publishers, December 1, 1929), particularly p. 25.

⁵V. Lenin, "Leftwing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," 1920, Collected Works, Vol. 31, (Moscow: Progress publishers, 1966), p. 53.

⁶Ibid., pp. 96-7.

⁷Programme of the Communist International, op. cit.

1920 or 1921, Lenin wrote a memorandum to Georgy Chicherin, Soviet foreign commissar from 1918 to 1930. In it the author was most succinct:

As the result of my own direct observation during the years I spent in emigration I must confess that the so-called cultured strata of Western Europe and America are incapable of understanding either the present position of things or the real state of relative power. These strata should be regarded as deaf mutes, and our behaviour towards them should be based on this assumption. Revolution never develops along a straight line or by uninterrupted growth, but forms a series of spurts and retreats, attacks and lulls, during which the power of revolution grows stronger and prepares for the final victory...taking into account the long process which the growth of the world socialist revolution involves, it is necessary to resort to special manoeuvres which can speed up our victory over the capitalist countries: [a] to announce, in order to pacify the deaf mutes the separation (fictitious!) of our government and government organs (the council of people's commissars etc.) from the party and the Politburo, and especially the Comintern. The latter must be declared to be independent political groupings tolerated on the territory of the Soviet Socialist Republics. The deaf mutes will believe this. [b] to express our wish to establish immediately diplomatic relations with the capitalist countries, on the basis of complete non-interference in their internal affairs. The deaf mutes will believe us again. They will even be delighted and will open their doors wide to us, and through these doors will speedily enter the emissaries of the Comintern and of our Party investigations organs in the guise of diplomatic, cultural and trade representatives. Speaking the truth is a petty, bourgeois prejudice. A lie, on the other hand, is often justified by the ends. The capitalists of the whole world and their governments will shut their eyes to the kind of activities on our side that I have referred to, and will in this manner become not only deaf mutes but blind as well. They will open up credits for us, which will serve us for the purpose of supporting Communist parties in their countries. They

will supply us with the materials and technology which we lack and will restore our military industry, which we need for our future victorious attacks upon our suppliers. In other words, they will work hard in order to prepare their own suicide.⁸

Caveat Emptor

It has been thirty-seven years since a certain "X" authored an absorbing article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in the prestigious quarterly magazine, Foreign Affairs. Later identified as Ambassador George Kennan, expert on Soviet relations, the author, "X," had some things to say about dealing with the Soviets that have been repeated often by others in the years since the article first appeared. They are worth repeating here:

It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet Government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical manoeuvre permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily

⁸Special Report, (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, Feb.-Mar. 1973), p. 73. The Institute says that, "(T)here is no shadow of suspicion that he [Lenin's confidant] might have forged the document, the authenticity of which, in style and content, is regarded as beyond doubt by leading scholars." It is from this document that the famous remark comes, attributed to Lenin, that the Capitalists will sell the Communists the rope which the latter will use to hang them.

into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that "the Russians have changed," and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such "changes." But we should not be misled by tactical manoeuvres. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.⁹

World Domination and Mendacity

Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, put it very simply when he said, "I think you have to go back to the original teachings that were published at the time the Soviet Union was founded and have never been disputed and have never been amended and that is world domination. It's that simple."¹⁰

"Mendacity is the immortal soul of communism," according to Leszek Kolakowski. "They cannot get rid of it. The gap between the reality and the facade is so enormous that the lie has become a normal and natural way of life."¹¹

In his book, "New Lies for Old," Anatoliy Golitsyn, a former KGB officer now in the West, described the efforts to update Communist doctrine and, at the same time, "de-Stalinize" the movement. Nikita Khrushchev, principal Soviet leader at the time, and other older Communist officials "wanted to purge themselves," he says, "of the taint of Stalinism and rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of history."¹² The Communist update, according to Golitsyn, was a reaffirmation of Lenin's dogma:

The Manifesto produced by the Eighty-one-party Congress (November 1960) clearly betrays the influence of Lenin's ideas and practice,

⁹George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Volume 25, Number 4, July 1947.

¹⁰Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, April 10, 1984, as quoted in The New York Post, April 11, 1984, p. 4.

¹¹Leszek Kolakowski, as quoted by Paul Henze, Survey, Autumn - Winter, 1983, p. 2.

¹²Anatoliy Golitsyn, New Lies for Old, (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1984), p. 85.

as does Khrushchev's follow-up speech of January 6, 1961. These two basic documents have continued to determine the course of communist policy to the present day. They explain in detail how the triumph of communism throughout the world is to be achieved through the consolidation of the economic, political, and military might of the communist world and the undermining of the unity and strength of the noncommunist world. The use by communist parties of a variety of violent and nonviolent tactics is specifically authorized. Peaceful coexistence is explicitly defined as "an intense form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism." The exploitation by world communism of economic, political, racial, and historical antagonisms between noncommunist countries is recommended. Support for "national liberation" movements throughout the Third World is reemphasized.¹³

Protracted Conflict and Warfare on the Cheap

The Soviet Union constantly expands its influence and power throughout the world, engaging only reluctantly in open conventional warfare. As a consequence, the world in this period of "protracted conflict," to use the term used by Mao Tze-tung,¹⁴ has entered a phase of unconventional, low intensity warfare or, as Ray Cline of Georgetown University calls it, "warfare on the cheap."

According to R. Judson Mitchell, the Soviets have maintained a "traditional preference for avoiding frontal conflict with the principal enemy and for the achievement of ends by flanking maneuvers and concentration on the fringes rather than the center of the opposing system."¹⁵ As pointed out by Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, however, "While Mitchell is correct, it is also the case...that the Soviets employ political

¹³Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁴The phrase, appearing originally in the military rhetoric of Mao Tse-tung, in 1959 became the title of the book, Protracted Conflict, by Robert Strausz-Hupe.

¹⁵R. Judson Mitchell, Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 57.

warfare measures directly against the center of the major opposing system." (emphasis added).¹⁶

¹⁶Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia, Active Measures in Soviet Strategy, (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), p. 40.

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES

"To the danger of espionage is added active measures," as President Ronald Reagan has said, "designed to subvert and deceive, to 'disinform' the public opinion upon which our democracies are built."¹

A number of books and articles have been published recently on Soviet active measures.² Active measures are an integral part of Soviet diplomatic, political, economic and military programs in every stage. They

¹President Ronald Reagan on May 23, 1984 at ceremonies at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. On that occasion the President said the following to the assembled employees of the CIA:

"...Without you, our Nation's safety would be more vulnerable and our security fragile and endangered. The work you do each day is essential to the survival and to the spread of human freedom. You remain the eyes and ears of the Free World, you are the tripwire over which the forces of totalitarian rule must stumble in their quest for global domination.

"Though it sometimes has been forgotten here in Washington, the American people know full well the importance of vital and energetic intelligence operations. From Nathan Hale's covert operation in the Revolutionary War to the breaking of the Japanese code at Midway in World War II, America's security and safety have relied directly on the courage and collective intellect of her intelligence personnel. Today, I want to stress to you again that the American people are thankful for your professionalism, for your dedication--and for the personal sacrifice each of you makes in carrying on your work.

"You are carrying on a great and noble tradition; and I believe you are adding a brilliant new chapter to the annals of America's intelligence services."

²The Soviets use the term "active measures" to describe overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behavior in, and the actions of, foreign societies. Richard A. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia, op. cit., p. 15. This book is an excellent study of the phenomenon. The authors' analysis of Soviet overt propaganda over a period of 20 years, against which Soviet covert activities and other overt activities can be compared, is especially useful.

are a part of Soviet doctrine, strategy and day-to-day operations as they are a fundamental part of Soviet foreign policy.³

An interagency group of the Executive Branch defined active measures as follows:

1. The Soviets use the term active measures (aktivnyye meroprivatiya) primarily in an intelligence context. Within that context, the term is used to refer to active operations intended to provide a policy effect, as distinct from espionage and counterintelligence. But the Soviets do not limit the concept of active measures to intelligence alone. Active measures are an unconventional adjunct to traditional diplomacy. They are quintessentially an offensive instrument of Soviet policy. Specifically, they are intended to influence the policies of foreign governments, disrupt relations between other nations, undermine confidence in foreign leaders and institutions, and discredit opponents. Active measures, thus, consist of a wide range of activities, both overt and covert, including:

Manipulation or control of the media.

Written or oral disinformation.

Use of foreign Communist parties and front organizations.

Manipulation of mass organizations.

Clandestine radiobroadcasting.

Economic activities.

Military operations.

Other political influence operations.

2. The range of activities included under active measures is broader than that covered by the U.S. term covert action. In American parlance, overt activities, such as officially sponsored propaganda, actions by accredited diplomatic and official representatives,

³As an illustration of the scope and variety of this incessant Soviet active measures program even in neutral, not totally unfriendly countries, such as Switzerland, is the fact that the Swiss Government felt constrained to use these terms, to describe Soviet activity when in 1983 it closed the Bern bureau of Novosti, the Soviet news agency: "disinformation, subversion and agitation."

and activities of friendship and cultural societies, are automatically excluded from the range of covert action.⁴

Secret Political Action

The purpose of secret political action, as in the case with overt propaganda, is to persuade, manipulate, mislead, and deceive. The two activities are closely related and overt propaganda themes are often promoted by covert means. Both overt and covert active measures are directly related to Soviet foreign policy objectives. While the Soviets engage in a variety of secret operations, to promote their foreign policy objectives, special emphasis is placed on international front organizations, agent-of-influence operations and forgeries. To understand what the United States is dealing with, it is essential to understand how Soviet foreign policy is made, how active measures fit in, and that the same people devise both. It is necessary, also, to understand the International Department.

The International Department

In "A Study of the International Department of the CPSU: Key to Soviet Policy," Leonard Shapiro, professor of political science, London School of Economics and Political Science, said:

One is, of course, used to these theories of conflicting groups inside the Soviet hierarchy, pulling in different directions. Journalists love them and academics are not always immune from their fatal charm. It is, however, alarming to find so erroneous a notion of how the Soviet Union conducts its foreign policy prevailing at what appears to be the highest government level. At the basis of this misconception, which could have serious consequences if it should become current among those who are responsible for the conduct of United States foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, lies the failure to understand

⁴Interagency Intelligence Study on Soviet Active Measures appeared in Soviet Active Measures, Hearings before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, July 13,14, 1982, p. 89.

the role played by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).^{5 6}

In his study, Shapiro traces the evolution of the International Department from the Foreign Affairs Department formed in the Central Committee after the demise in 1943 of the Comintern.⁷ In 1957, the Foreign Department was divided into three departments, one for Relations with Communist and Workers Parties of Socialist Countries, controlling the bloc; a second for Cadres Abroad, linked to the KGB, and responsible for instructing overseas cells of the CPSU (cells within missions abroad) and maintaining a register of members of the CPSU overseas, the latter being virtually an intelligence function; and, finally, the core of the Foreign Affairs Department, the present International Department. From the beginning to this day, this department has been headed by Boris N. Ponomarev, a former high official of the Comintern.⁸

Power and Prestige

The ID is powerful and prestigious and clearly more important than the other more routine, technical

⁵Leonard Shapiro, International Journal, (London: Institute of International Affairs, Winter 1976-1977), p. 42.

⁶Phil Nicolaides, editorial writer for the Washington Times, scores "the intellectual effort to deny the unpleasant reality of communist aims and ideology," the academic school that ascribes Soviet behavior to the "Russian temperament" and Czarist antecedents. "One suspects," he said, "that if Cuba had been the first communist state, these scholars would be tracing the sins of the Castro regime to the fierceness of the Caribs, the belligerence of the conquistadores, and the ruthlessness of the Spanish Inquisition.", Washington Times, April 19, 1984, p. 2C.

⁷The department of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC, CPSU), dedicated to agitation and propaganda and the corresponding activity carried out by it and by other communist parties worldwide was long known as "agitprop." This department was absorbed, as explained elsewhere herein, by the International Department of the CC, CPSU. "Agitprop" activities have likewise been largely incorporated into what the Soviets call "active measures."

⁸Shapiro, op. cit., p. 42.

departments of the Central Committee. It has considerable resources of its own and can and does draw on those of other departments as well and the research institutes attached to the Soviet Academy. It is responsible for, among other things, publishing Problems of Peace and Socialism, the English language edition of which is called World Marxist Review, official Soviet ideological publication for foreign instruction. It also controls the international Soviet front organizations.⁹

A Decisive Influence

The International Department surpasses in importance and authority the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, according to Shapiro, "has no muscle whatever." Shapiro goes on to say:

It may be added that it is normal Soviet practice to maintain in every branch or sphere of central government a system of dual control: an appropriate department of the Central Committee to co-ordinate intelligence and to brief the Politburo, and in general to exercise tutelage, if not authority, over the relevant ministry or government agency. The emergence in 1943 of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee was thus fully in accord with the established pattern of Soviet political practice.

It seems therefore beyond dispute that the International Department is the element in the Soviet decision-making process which gathers information on foreign policy, briefs the Politburo, and thereby exercises, subject to the Politburo, decisive influence on Soviet foreign policy. In fact, Ponomarev stated the position quite accurately when he said: "All the fundamental problems of foreign policy come under the scrutiny of the Central Committee of the CPSU and its leadership where they are examined and comprehensive decisions are taken--in the mainstream of the Leninist international strategy of the CPSU."¹⁰

⁹of which more below.

¹⁰Shapiro, op. cit., p. 44,45.

A Unified Foreign Policy

Shapiro sums up by saying, "that Soviet foreign policy, so far from being torn by party-state rivalry, is a unified, co-ordinated whole in which, after Brezhnev, the leading role belongs to the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which attempts to bring into line both state foreign policy and the part which foreign communist parties are expected to play in the policy as a whole."¹¹

Subtlety in the Art of War

It was Sun T'zu, the ancient Chinese strategist (and tactician) who said, "To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." "Be subtle!", Sun T'zu said, "Be subtle! and use your spies in every kind of business." The Soviets are known to be students of Sun T'zu; it is almost as if the Chinese genius, for his part, was talking about Soviet active measures twenty-five hundred years before their time.

James Clavell describes the views of his subject, Sun T'zu, as follows:

Sun T'zu believed that the moral strength and intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war, and that if these were properly applied war could be waged with certain success. Never to be undertaken thoughtlessly or recklessly, war was to be preceded by measures designed to make it easy to win. The master conqueror frustrated his enemy's plans and broke up his alliances. He created cleavages between sovereign and minister, superiors and inferiors, commanders and subordinates. His spies and agents were active everywhere, gathering information, sowing dissension, and nurturing subversion. The enemy was isolated and demoralized; his will to resist broken. Thus without battle his army was conquered, his cities taken and his state overthrown. Only when the enemy could not be overcome by these means was there recourse to armed force....¹²

¹¹Ibid., p. 55.

¹²James Clavell, Sun T'zu, The Art of War, (New York: Delacorte Press, 1983), p. 39.

According to Clavell, Sun T'zu himself put it this way:

The skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. With his forces intact he disputes the mastery of the empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph is complete.¹³

Parties, Insurgents and Fronts

In their study of that distinctly Soviet phenomenon--the International Department--Shultz and Godson say that, in addition to its other functions, the ID is responsible for "planning, coordinating, and conducting active measures." "The latter function," they point out, "includes administering, funding, and coordinating the activities of well over a dozen international front organizations." The ID also carries out active measures through its liaison with non-ruling Communist parties and revolutionary movements¹⁴ and the non-governmental organizations they, in turn, control. Through international meetings, representatives stationed abroad, and the monthly journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism, according to Shultz and Godson, the ID communicates official instructions and guidelines to foreign Communist parties, insurgent movements, and front organizations.¹⁵

Soviet Front Groups Abroad

The Soviet Union in conducting active measures abroad employs numerous mechanisms, one of the principal mechanisms being the international front group. The largest of these, as well as the most active, is the World Peace Council (WPC). Foreign communist parties, which are of course also directed by the ID, usually provide the cadres for the national sections of the

¹³Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁴"It [the Soviet Union] has consistently promoted widespread revolutionary violence even while taking care to project the illusory image that the Soviet Union was abiding by the spirit of peaceful coexistence." Cline and Alexander, op. cit., p. 55.

¹⁵Shultz and Godson, op. cit., p. 23.

international fronts. For example, the United States Peace Council (USPC), the American section of the WPC, is largely managed by the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). The ID thus runs multiple lines of control to carry out its policies, in this particular instance, that is to say, with the USPC, it does so (a) by means of its direction of the WPC, of which the USPC, is the U.S. section; (b) through its supervision of the CPUSA whose officials form the cadre of the USPC; and, finally, (c) via KGB clandestine contacts where secrecy is indicated or quite openly, for that matter, where the Soviets believe they can dispense with secrecy.¹⁶

"Soviet control of the World Peace Council and the other international Communist fronts is maintained both through the financing and the personnel of the organizations," according to Herbert Romerstein, a student of Soviet activities abroad.¹⁷ The KGB's support of active measures campaigns is part of the traditional Communist concept "to combine legal and illegal work" and at times KGB officers take active part, under cover, at open meetings of the fronts, as has been the case in recent "peace" conferences abroad manipulated by the Soviet Union.^{18 19 20}

¹⁶Theoretically the KGB is a governmental organization but is in effect a department of the CC, CPSU, working in close coordination with the ID and IID.

¹⁷Herbert Romerstein, The World Peace Council and Soviet 'Active Measures', (Washington, D.C.: The Hale Foundation, 1983), p. 25.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁹John Barron, in KGB Today, The Hidden Hand, (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1983), documents numerous Soviet intelligence operations and active measures in the world "peace" movement and U.S. "peace" movements. The book is an excellent study of Soviet intelligence, counterintelligence and active measures.

²⁰When American groups work with and jointly sponsor conferences with Soviet organizations, such as the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada (IUSAC), they are dealing with an entity charged by the CPSU with an active measures (as well as an intelligence) mission. The entity is closely associated with the KGB and directed by the ID. Two of the three directors of the IUSAC have intelligence backgrounds, one being a covert KGB officer and the other a military intelligence (GRU) officer. KGB and GRU officers attended the "peace" conference held in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in late May 1983.

Transmission Belts

Lenin was given to calling front groups "transmission belts" to the masses. Something other than what it appears to be, a front group, or "transmission belt," to use Lenin's jargon, joins together Communists and non-Communists, the former manipulating the latter, in an ostensibly non-Communist activity. Moreover, although millions of people are aware of Soviet control of certain front groups, many otherwise informed people apparently are not. Many apparently informed people on the other hand, aware of Soviet control of a given front, seem not to understand what that fact actually means or, if they do understand, seem not to be concerned. A case in point is the American "peace" movement, in which the USPC and CPUSA itself are deeply involved. On January 4, 1983, Bruce Kimmel, a member of the Communist Party, USA, wrote the following in the Daily World, the Party's newspaper:

The Communist Party has played and continues to play an active role in the U.S. peace movement. Right now Party members are active in literally hundreds of local peace organizations. The Communist Party USA--like Communist parties around the world--has always been and will continue to be an active fighter in the struggle for peace. My Party's peace activities have indeed served the interest of the Soviet people--because their desire for peace is identical to that of the U.S. people.²¹

The Desire for Peace

Much is said about the desire of the Soviet Union and its front groups for peace.

Lenin was quite candid when he wrote:

"Socialists cannot, without ceasing to be socialists, be opposed to all war...socialists have never been, nor can they ever be, opposed to revolutionary wars."²² "(T)he victory of socialism in one country does

²¹Daily World, newspaper of the CPUSA, New York, January 4, 1983.

²²V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Volume 23, August 1916 March 1917, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), p. 77.

not at one stroke eliminate all wars in general.
On the contrary, it presupposes wars."²³

Softening Up the Bourgeoisie

In 1922 Lenin was crystal clear when he wrote to Yuri Chicherin, his foreign commissar: "You and I have both fought against pacifism as a programme for the revolutionary proletarian party. That much is clear. But who has ever denied the use of pacifists by that party to soften up the enemy, the bourgeoisie?"²⁴... "we consider it our duty as businessmen to support (even if the odds are 10,000 to 1) the pacifists in the other, i.e., bourgeois camp..."²⁵

According to Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB active measures case officer now working against Communism in the West, "Soviet overt and covert propaganda organizations employ at least 15,000 people (in the Soviet Union alone)."²⁶ The funds available for active measures are enormous and not subjected to scrutiny by the Soviet parliament.²⁷ To implement Communist Party directives, according to Levchenko, the KGB recruits "agents of influence" in foreign countries, penetrating by this means foreign political parties, public organizations and the mass-media.²⁸

Agents of Influence

It is important to realize that, for purposes of description, aspects of Soviet active measures are treated separately here which in practice are closely

²³Ibid., p. 79.

²⁴Ibid., Volume 45, pp. 474, 5 (Letter dated February 16, 1922).

²⁵Ibid., p. 507 (Letter dated March 14, 1922).

²⁶Levchenko on May 16, 1984. Levchenko is engaged in an effort to educate Western media, academicians and the public about Soviet active measures, considering it his "moral obligation to the free world."

²⁷The not entirely unpopular "mirror image" concept, discussed elsewhere, would logically envisage parliamentary oversight of the KGB and GRU by the appropriate committees of the Supreme Soviet. Supreme Soviet control of these intelligence services would, of course, be exercised by means of the purse strings or the threat of exposure as in the U.S.

²⁸Stanislav Levchenko, speaking on May 16, 1984, at a conference on "Soviet Disinformation and the News," presented by the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.

linked in planning and execution. They encompass both overt and clandestine means. Agents of influence are one of these elements--a most important one in the active measures panoply. An agent of influence may or may not be a major source of intelligence--his main purpose is the manipulation of persons and events toward Soviet goals. Such "a person uses his or her position, influence, power, and credibility to promote the objectives of" his sponsor.²⁹ He may be a controlled agent, a "trusted contact" or one of a number of "unwitting but manipulated individuals."³⁰

"Moscow utilizes agents of influence," according to Godson and Shultz, "as one element of a carefully orchestrated effort"³¹ known as kombinatsia, combining various elements from its active measures arsenal. Kombinatsia combines "various agents of influence (at various times and in various places) with special operational undertakings, in such a way as to enhance effectiveness."³²

Terrorism as an Active Measure

The scope of the responsibilities of the International Department, as pointed out above, reaches across the spectrum from the development of international overt propaganda themes,³³ in close coordination with the International Information Department (IID), to building and guiding the operational network of what Cline and Alexander term the "international infrastructure of terrorism." "It has consistently promoted widespread revolutionary violence," they say, "even while taking care to project the illusory image that the Soviet Union was abiding by the spirit of peaceful coexistence."³⁴

In its efforts to expand its influence throughout the world, the Soviet Union undertakes still another active measure, its exploitation of terrorism, either by supporting independent movements or by initiating its own terrorist operations. Terrorism has "become

²⁹Godson and Shultz, op. cit., p. 193.

³⁰Ibid., p. 194.

³¹Godson and Shultz, op. cit., p. 64.

³²Ibid., p. 133.

³³"During the 1960-1980 period, Soviet overt propaganda directed against the United States and NATO...was characterized by consistency and intensity, and by increasing complexity, flexibility, and sophistication.", Godson and Shultz, op. cit., p. 100.

³⁴Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection, (New York: Crane Russack, 1984), p. 55.

an indispensable tactical and strategic tool in the Soviet struggles for power and influence."³⁵ Its aim seems to be to achieve strategic ends where the use of conventional armed forces is considered "inappropriate, ineffective, too risky or too difficult."³⁶

Cline and Alexander have this warning:

Unless Americans become more conscious of the broad strategic dangers implicit in the patterns of contemporary terrorism and become more skillful in deterring or countering terrorist operations, the next two decades in this century will be catastrophic for worldwide security interests of the United States and its friends and allies abroad. This subtle assault on the values and defensive strengths of our society is not well understood, and its strategic implications for liberal democracies are only beginning to be explored.³⁷

"Indeed," according to Darrell M. Trent, former Deputy Secretary of Transportation, "if we do not allow ourselves to think of our struggle against terrorism as warfare, we shall surely fail to meet one of the gravest challenges of this generation."³⁸ In the words of Susan Weaver, moreover, "the first political task at hand on the issue of terrorism is to cut the idea of terrorism loose from the connection it now has in many Western liberal minds with notions of national liberation and social justice; only then can terror be viewed plainly as a crime and a threat. But their second task is to establish another kind of connection and make people see terrorism not as just a random occurrence but as a tactic in the Soviet war against the West."³⁹

Yet, as Paul Henze, former National Security official, says, "It is in the nature of the operations that support terrorism that very little proof of their origin is going to be produced--all the more so when Soviet secret operatives are doing it. They are not only the world's most experienced in clandestine techniques; they work for a government which enjoys a complete lack of ac-

³⁵Ibid., p. 6.

³⁶Ibid., p. 8.

³⁷Cline and Alexander, op. cit., p. 8.

³⁸Darrell M. Trent, "The Deadly Game of Terrorism," The Stanford Magazine, Fall 1982, p. 33.

³⁹Susan Weaver, "The Political Uses of Terror," The Wall Street Journal, July 26, 1979.

countability to a legislature, a free press or any other form of public opinion...(t)he Soviets didn't invent terrorism any more than the Mafia invented crime. Both simply capitalize on their relationship in remarkably parallel ways."⁴⁰

Marx himself observed that "violence itself is an economic (form of) power."⁴¹ Active measures are thus usually but not always the "quiet war."

Soviet Terrorism

Terrorism was employed by the Russian Communists very early. During the Russian insurrection of 1905, Lenin instructed the Combat Committee of St. Petersburg Bolsheviks to provide "recipes for making bombs" and "begin military training"... "to kill a spy or blow up a police station...raid a bank" so that hundreds could be trained who tomorrow will "be leading hundreds of thousands."⁴² According to Romerstein, such "tactics were developed by both the Communists and the Nazis in Germany during the 1920s and early 1930s."⁴³ Each learned from and emulated the other. Both used terrorism as a means of seizing power and both "employed state terror as an instrument of their rule after coming to power."⁴⁴

Romerstein sums up as follows: "Thus for Communism no less than for Nazism, terrorism has long been accepted in ideology and practice as a central tactic of the struggle for power and an essential method of rule."⁴⁵

Wet Affairs

Assassination too is encompassed in the term active measures. Part of the broader concept of "wet affairs,"

⁴⁰ Paul B. Henze, "Soviets Are the Mafia of Terrorism," Wall Street Journal, June 15, 1984, p. 31.

⁴¹ Marx, Das Kapital, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1962), p. 779, as quoted by Cline and Alexander, *ibid*.

⁴² V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), Vol. 9, pp. 345-6, as quoted by Herbert Romerstein, Soviet Support for International Terrorism, (Washington, D.C.: The Foundation for Democratic Education, Inc., 1981), p. 7.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴⁴ See Part II of this study.

⁴⁵ The question of Soviet anti-Semitism and a specific example of a Soviet propaganda line supported by active measures tasking is treated in the second part of this study.

(mokeyye dela) to use the KGB term, whereby blood is shed as in sabotage, assassination often appears to fall into the province of Communist surrogates for carrying out the actual murders.⁴⁶ There is strong evidence, examined especially by Clair Sterling and Paul Henze, mentioned above, that the Bulgarian secret service plotted the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II. It is inconceivable, Western experts say, that the Bulgarian service could have entertained such a plan without at least the early knowledge and approval of its Soviet control mechanism.

Deception

The overall philosophy of deception is an important part of Soviet global strategy and it, too is incorporated into the active measures program.⁴⁷ "The number one theme of Soviet deception," according to John Lenczowski of the National Security Council staff, is that "the Soviets are not Communists anymore" that they do not, in fact, have unlimited objectives and that a "spheres-of-influence" arrangement is possible between the U.S. and the USSR. Soviet disinformation, he says, attempts to promote the impression that "hawks" and "doves" exist in the Kremlin--both ideologues and pragmatists.⁴⁸

⁴⁶An earlier "active measures" operation, although not known at that time by the name, was the Soviet assassination of Leon Trotsky in Mexico City. Soviet "wet affairs" are carried out by the 13th Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, the "executive action" component. It carries out joint operations with the 9th (or Soviet emigres) Department of the same directorate. "Wet Affairs," Survey, (London: London Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, Winter, 1983), p. 71.

⁴⁷"Deception is a singularly important aspect of Soviet strategy. It is also a national talent in the Soviet Union. It is an integral part of this planning process."-Samuel T. Cohen and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Selective Targeting and Soviet Deception," Armed Forces Journal International, September 1983, p. 101.

⁴⁸John Lenczowski, director of European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council, speaking on May 16, 1984, at a conference on "Soviet Disinformation and the News," presented by the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.

Forgery

The story of active measures would be woefully incomplete without mention of Soviet forgery operations. They too are an aspect of disinformation and deception. Forgeries, of course, are documents which, although false, are crafted by the KGB to appear genuine. They are often falsified or altered versions of U.S. official publications or communications; on occasion, they are totally fabricated.

Forgeries are usually intended for specific targets, such as a particular foreign government but often are directed at the people of an entire country or region. Forgeries, as with other classes of clandestine political warfare operations, are conducted by Service A, the First Chief Directorate of the KGB.

Fortunately, much of the effect of many Soviet forgeries has been neutralized by quick and efficient response by the CIA and FBI in informing the audience of the results of their analysis of the motivation for the operation and the errors of the forgery itself. Unfortunately, as with many Soviet operations, the truth has difficulty reaching all the recesses where the original Communist untruth has penetrated. The lie often outruns the truth.

Primary targets of Soviet forgeries are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S. itself. Third World countries are also targetted by the Soviets. The usual propaganda themes are the basis of the forgery motive: the United States is racist, a war monger, imperialist, and manipulative of Third World and NATO governments. The forgery is often accepted--although often, to their credit, not--by the target audiences, publicized locally and picked up and replayed by the Soviet media.

Although many Soviet forgeries show an increasing level of sophistication some forgery operations are poorly--or hastily--assembled and show carelessness. Nonetheless, forgeries are an especially pernicious and virulent form of Soviet active measures.⁴⁹

The Two Superpowers Theory

Soviet active measures, according to Lenczowski, follow the open propaganda theme of "the two superpowers."

⁴⁹Details of Soviet forgeries are contained in Congressional reports, including, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)," and HPSCI, "Soviet Active Measures."

Lenczowski is one of a number of observers of Soviet behavior to see a hidden meaning behind "the two superpowers" concept. This theme, in the terms of Soviet strategic deception, promotes the idea that the U.S. and the USSR are both "superpowers," the Soviet Union being placed at once on the same level of development as the United States, a primary goal of Soviet propaganda. This idea at the same time promotes the "mirror image" view of East-West relations (sometimes called the "Samantha" concept) that we, the people and leaders of the two countries, are really just the same after all. Logically if we find nuclear war "unthinkable," this theory holds, the Soviets also find it so when in fact the Soviets have developed over the years a complex doctrine on nuclear warfare including extensive and expensive civil defense planning. Plainly, rather than finding it unthinkable, they have given nuclear war a great deal of thought. Finally, the "two superpowers" idea morally equates the two countries and their systems, a perception which Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, finds so pernicious and the errors of which she has struggled against so tirelessly at the U.N. and elsewhere.

Gaining Credibility

Other observers see similar Soviet basic themes gaining credibility among analysts in the West. Although there may be some substance in these themes, these observers suspect they are the "product of a deliberate and persistent Soviet disinformation campaign," according to Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., a specialist on the subject of Soviet deception.⁵⁰ Prominent among these themes are:

- * The Soviet Union will change.
- * There are "differences" among Soviet leaders.
- * U.S.-Soviet "convergence" is possible.
- * No attention should be paid to official Communist ideology in the Soviet Union.--it is not relevant.
- * The Soviet Union is defense oriented and threatens no one; it does not seek strategic superiority nor does it want first strike capability.⁵¹

⁵⁰Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Soviet Disinformation," Strategic Review, Winter 1981.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 18, 19.

In an Interagency Intelligence Study the Executive Branch has identified the objectives of Soviet policy in promoting these themes as follows:

- * To confuse world public opinion regarding the aggressive nature of certain Soviet policies.
- * To create a favorable environment for the execution of Soviet foreign policy.
- * To influence both world and American public opinions against U.S. military and political policies and programs which are perceived as threatening by the Soviet Union.⁵²

Dangerous Reefs

No stranger to deception operations, himself, on April 5, 1940, Joseph Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda of Nazi Germany, gave a secret briefing to selected German journalists during which he is quoted as saying:

Up to now we have succeeded in leaving the enemy in the dark concerning Germany's real goal, just as before 1932 our domestic foes never saw where we were going or that our oath of legality was just a trick. We wanted to come to power legally, but we did not want to use power legally.... They could have suppressed us. They could have arrested a couple of us in 1925 and that would have been that, the end. No, they let us through the danger zone. That's exactly how it was in foreign policy too.... In 1933 a French premier ought to have said (and if I had been the French premier I would have said it): "The new Reich Chancellor is the man who wrote Mein Kampf, which says this and that. This man cannot be tolerated in our vicinity. Either he disappears or we march!" But they didn't do it. They left us alone and let us slip through the risky zone, and we were able to sail around all dangerous reefs. And when we were done, and well armed, better than they, then they started the war.⁵³

⁵²Soviet Active Measures, Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, July 13, 14, 1982.

⁵³As quoted by Paul Johnson, Modern Times, The World From the Twenties to the Eighties, (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), p. 341.

The valuable lesson, learned from World War II about the Nazis, unfortunately was lost with respect to the Soviets. The "risky zone" is long since past.⁵⁴

"Maskirovka"

Very little has been written about deception operations because they are among the most closely guarded secrets of intelligence services and general staffs. Since World War II the Soviets have, unheralded, developed a sophisticated and well coordinated system of military and political deception. The Russian word maskirovka includes not only military "camouflage and covert maneuvers, but also political deception designed to protect the secrecy of military operations..."⁵⁵ Jiri Valenta, a student of Soviet affairs, makes an interesting point with a certain irony when he writes that, "In the case of [the Soviet invasion of] Czechoslovakia, [Prime Minister Alexander] Dubcek admitted to being surprised and deceived. But this may have been due more to his, and some of his colleagues', political naivete and self-deception than to skillful Soviet strategem."⁵⁶ This observation could well apply to many cases of "successful" Soviet deception operations; naivete and self-deception play a very large role in Soviet schemes.

"Dezinformatsia"

As Lenin told Felix Dzerzhinsky, head of the Cheka, the then KGB, "Tell them what they want to hear."⁵⁷ Within the scope of strategic deception and important aspects of active measures are Soviet disinformation (dezinformatsia) operations. One of the many purposes of disinformation, of course, is to hide Soviet strategic intentions.⁵⁸

⁵⁴As has been pointed out elsewhere, the Communists and Nazis learned from and emulated each other.

⁵⁵Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Use of Surprise and Deception," Survival, Mar/Apr. 82, p. 51. Valenta is associate professor and coordinator of Soviet and East European Studies, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.

⁵⁶Valenta, op. cit., p. 59.

⁵⁷As quoted by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Soviet Disinformation," Strategic Review, Winter, 1981, p. 18.

⁵⁸A purpose clearly explained in the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia," according to Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Soviet Disinformation," Strategic Review, Winter, 1981, pp. 16-26.

Paul B. Henze, a former high government official and a longtime student of Soviet behavior has this to say about disinformation:

It is impossible to draw a clear boundary between misinformation and disinformation. The two categories are part of a continuum which in Soviet practice extends from distortion to total falsification, misrepresentation and forgery. All parts of this spectrum are interconnected and consciously manipulated to achieve desired results. Thus false information planted abroad and seemingly originating from sources that have no connection with the USSR or Eastern Europe is fed back into the Soviet propaganda system, cited in the Soviet press as authoritative confirmation of views which the CPSU propagandists want to spread, and then it is disgorged by TASS and Novosti in their international services. Thus spewed out again into international information channels, it becomes self-confirming. Sometimes the process goes through several cycles. Not only current news, but even scholarly research and intelligence are influenced.

To those familiar with Soviet techniques and objectives, such operations are relatively easy to identify, but often difficult to prove. To accomplish their purposes, Soviet propagandists and KGB operatives do not rely only on the credulity and predisposition to believe of Western and Third World journalists, writers and intellectuals. They exploit the readiness of reporters to accept cash or other favours in return for doing their bidding. In Soviet usage, dezinformatsiya means deliberately concocted, falsely attributed or distorted information brought to the surface through ostensibly non-Soviet channels or outlets. Of course, the more legitimate (and unwitting) these are, the better.⁵⁹

⁵⁹Paul B. Henze, Survey, Autumn-Winter, 1983, Vol. 27, pp. 118, 9. Henze has done much original work on Soviet involvement in the Bulgarian plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II.

Cultural Warfare

Soviet propaganda themes appear at increasing frequency in Western media, including those of the U.S., in print and on the screens of motion picture theaters and home television sets. This realm of activity is called by the Soviets "cultural warfare."

According to Michael Miklaucic, of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Soviets have by means of active measures gained the "higher moral ground" in the global ideological struggle.⁶⁰

The semantics question, which some even call the "semantics war," and which is closely related to the disinformation issue, encompasses the problem of the misuse of words and terms by the Western media, often spontaneously, often in response to Soviet guidance. "Peace" and "democracy" are words misappropriated by the Communists long ago. More recently, Afghan freedom fighters are termed "rebels," and terrorists are called members of "liberation movements." Murders are perpetrated by "right wing death squads" never by left-wing death squads, although sometimes by "guerrillas," and so forth. Some of these semantic twists are Soviet inspired, some possibly not but serve Soviet objectives nonetheless.

It is known that the Soviet intelligence services and their surrogate services in Communist countries devote considerable resources to the penetration of foreign media. Foreign nationals are recruited as "agents of influence," working clandestinely under Bloc direction or to serve as collaborators with Bloc guidance, to make things happen as the Soviets want them to happen.

In the last few years, such Soviet operations have surfaced in the press in a number of countries from Scandinavia, France and the Netherlands to Southeast Asia. It is presumed that others have not been publicized. The practice is widespread even if publicity of the practice is not. Nevertheless, numerous representatives of the American media have said publicly that for various reasons their own profession in the United States is free from such penetration. It is truly remarkable that the U.S. armed forces and intelligence services (again, based on public records) have been penetrated as have American high technology firms and other KGB/GRU targets, yet, although a target almost everywhere in the world and of unquestioned importance especially

⁶⁰Michael Miklaucic, "Soviet Active Measures and How to Cope," Washington Times, January 6, 1984, p. 20.

on the American scene, the media in this country have not been targetted by the Soviets. One can only ask why?

Foreign Broadcasting

While the IID directs Soviet overt propaganda abroad, including overt radio as well as press activities, the ID manages Soviet clandestine radio programming.⁶¹

To complement their overt foreign language international radio broadcasts, the Soviets maintain a significant clandestine broadcasting capability as well, still another aspect of active measures. For example, the National Voice of Iran, ostensibly broadcasting from within that country, is the official voice of the Tudeh, or Communist, Party of Iran and actually transmits from Radio Baku in the Soviet Caucasus. The same transmitters also broadcast official Soviet programs in Iranian languages. During the 1979-81 hostage crisis in Teheran, this clandestine Soviet radio station transmitted false information and inflammatory rhetoric in contrast to official Radio Moscow which was on occasion cautious in its coverage. The National Voice of Iran even replayed Soviet KGB-inspired disinformation from other countries.^{62 63}

Even Sports

The combined Olympic team fielded by the Soviet Union, when it attends the Olympics, is largely made up of professional sports organizations, the Dinamo Sporting Club and the Central Army Sports Club (ZSKA).

⁶¹"Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against NATO," U.S. Arms Control Agency, Al.

⁶²Soviet Active Measures Against the United States, (Alexandria, Virginia: Western Goals, 1984), p. 34.

⁶³Edward J. Derwinski, former Representative from Illinois, currently Counselor of the Department of State, described Radio Baku and other Soviet radio broadcasting efforts worldwide in an article "The Radio War," The Journal of Electronic Defense, March/April 1981, pp. 21-26. He also wrote of the electronic jamming of U.S. broadcasting to the East at a cost to the Soviets of twice what the U.S. spends on the programming. Amidst all the East-West "wars," there is this "radio war"--the struggle of the West to pierce the iron curtain electronically, to get the truth into the Soviet Bloc and the herculean efforts of the latter to obliterate the truth, quite literally.

The former belongs to the KGB. The latter, the ZSKA, is part of Soviet military intelligence (GRU), the military counterpart of the KGB. These two sports organizations are in strong competition, as indeed are their parent organizations, the KGB and GRU, themselves.

In the Soviet Union, sports and athletes are dedicated to the enhancement of the party and the state. Moreover, the special services of athletes and sportsmen are put to use extensively by the intelligence organizations, the KGB and GRU. The Spetsnaz, Soviet military special forces--the Soviet "Green Berets," if you will--provide the athletes for the ZSKA. The KGB has its own special forces, a counterpart to the Spetsnaz, which supplies athletes for the Dinamo Sporting Club.

These troops, the Spetsnaz and the KGB's own version, are an elite fighting force devoted in wartime to operations behind enemy lines, diversionary tactics and the assassination of foreign leaders. Their mission also embraces intelligence collection (including reconnaissance), deception, sabotage, terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The mission of the GRU is essentially military, while that of the KGB is political and economic. It is from these special forces that the Dinamo and ZSKA sports competitors come.

Personnel of these Soviet unconventional forces receive familiarization tours abroad as members of Soviet sports teams. Soviet athletes are not merely winning medals when competing abroad; they are preparing for clandestine activities or unconventional warfare roles; in effect, "casing" their target. It might be added that Soviet strategic plans include the employment of elements of "underground" Communist parties in the West in support of Soviet unconventional units in time of conflict.⁶⁴

Regarding athletes in the Spetsnaz, a former professional Soviet army officer had this to say:

The Soviet Union needs prestige, and one way of providing this is by winning Olympic medals. The country needs an organization with draconian discipline to squeeze the maximum effort out of the athletes. At the same time, the Spetsnaz needs athletes of the highest caliber who have the opportunity to visit areas in which they may have to operate in time of war.

⁶⁴Frederic N. Smith, Defense and Foreign Affairs, June 1983.

The athletes, for their part, need opportunities for training and need to belong to an organization that can reward them lavishly for athletic achievement, give them apartments and cars, award commissioned ranks in the forces and arrange trips outside the Soviet Union.

The Spetsnaz thus provides a focal point for the interests of state prestige, military intelligence and individuals who have dedicated themselves to sports.

The ZSKA sends its athletes all over the world, and the fact that these athletes have military ranks is not hidden. The KGB, which also has the role of assassinating enemy VIPs, has its own similar organization.... They are ordinary but carefully selected and trained soldiers, top-grade athletes, foreigners and, at the head of all of these, the professional intelligence men.⁶⁵

Soviet athletes are thus carefully selected and very well cared for. In a word, they are "special;" members of an elite service. Athletes too are elements in the overall scheme of Soviet active measures.

⁶⁵Victor Suvorov (a pseudonym), "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces," Military Review, March 1984.

THE WESTERN RESPONSE

The Ultimate Weapon

According to Sidney Hook, the philosopher:

(T)he ultimate weapon of the West is not the hydrogen bomb or any other super weapon but the passion for freedom and the willingness to die for it if necessary. Once the Kremlin is convinced that we will use this weapon to prevent it from subjugating the world to its will, we will have the best assurance of peace. Once the Kremlin believes that this willingness to fight for freedom at all costs is absent, that it has been eroded by neutralist fears and pacifist wishful thinking, it will blackmail the free countries of the world into capitulation and succeed where Hitler failed.¹

Our inability to comprehend Soviet strategy is connected to our misunderstanding of Soviet objectives. Sir James Goldsmith cites the Carthaginians of old who, although good warriors, were essentially a trading people. "They never understood the Romans," he says, "who were military and imperial." We too are a mercantile people, like the ancient Carthaginians, Sir James says, and we seem incapable of understanding the Soviets. To combat Soviet strategy, the disinformation content of Soviet active measures, according to Sir James, rather than restrictions and controls, "we need more information, more facts. We need better journalism," he says.² The light of truth, once again, is the best defense.

To quote Brian Crozier again, "The security of a nation-State or of an alliance is concerned with territorial integrity, national sovereignty and the defense of a way of life."³ He goes on to say:

It is not enough to know and understand:
it is also necessary to act. In a world
war fought largely by means other than military,

¹Sidney Hook, Political Power and Personal Freedom, (New York: Criterion Books, 1959), p. 426.

²Sir James Goldsmith, remarks before the Defense Strategy Forum sponsored by the National Strategy Information Center, in Washington, D.C., on May 22, 1984.

³Crozier, op. cit., p. 154.

the search for security cannot be confined to an analysis of military and weapons capabilities, useful though these may be in themselves. Nor is a purely defensive posture enough. Containment has brought us to the brink of defeat in World War Three. A more active policy is required if we are to survive.⁴

How can the West, especially the United States, deal with the Soviet active measures offensive? Our system is such that we cannot respond in like terms. According to Rett Ludwikowski:

Moscow has not attempted to abolish the Catholic Church or the relics of private ownership in Poland, aware of the Poles' strong attachment to these institutions. It is characteristic of Soviet Policy that (in both foreign and internal affairs) Russians try to insinuate themselves into places they find weak. But when they encounter strong opponents and the prospect of swift victory seems uncertain, they will withdraw.

Accordingly, the Russians will never attempt to attack the United States directly except in some tremendous crisis. Rather, they will endeavor to weaken America's international position, to assist America's opponents, to incite unrest among America's neighbors, and to spread communist ideas among Third World countries.⁵

The Best Hope

"The best hope that the free world remains free," according to M.R.D. Foot of the University of Manchester, "lies in an efficient, constitutional, freedom-loving--but adequately secret--CIA and FBI."⁶ Our intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities must be strengthened. Another important part of the answer is to continue to illuminate Soviet and Bloc activities in the West, to subject to the light of day the realm of Soviet active measures. In the East, again the prescription

⁴Crozier, op. cit., p. 155.

⁵Rett Ludwikowski, "Over There," Policy Review, No. 22, Fall 1982, p. 83.

⁶M.R.D. Foot, Professor of Modern History, University of Manchester, in The Economist, London, March 15, 1980, p. 58.

is the light of truth: to continue to reinforce the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty--and for Cuba, Radio Marti--to carry to the peoples of the Soviet system the facts of the world as it really is and the hope of eventual freedom.

To Prize Precaution - To Know

In the words of an ancient Chinese sage: "Now the way to make the country secure is to prize precaution. Now that you are aware of the dangers, misfortune is left at a distance."⁷ For first we must know. Then we must muster the will. And then we must act. But first we must know.

One final quotation: "The history of failure in war can be summed up in two words: Too late. Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in realizing the mortal danger; too

late in preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too late in standing with one's friends." -- General Douglas MacArthur.

⁷Wu Ch'i, as quoted in Sun T'zu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffin, (Oxford University Press,), p. 155.

PART II

TWO SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONS

TWO SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONS

by

Lawrence B. Sulc

CONTENTS

Preface

Of Lies and Myths

The Left and the Right

The Great Socialist Alliance

The Berlin-Moscow Axis and Its Socialist Revolutions

Totalitarian Socialism -- Emulation and Cooperation

National Socialism

Other Socialists, Other Fascists

Terrorism and State Terror

Class and Race

Liberalism

Conclusion

Preface

This small book is really two small books. In addition to an overview of Soviet active measures employed by the Soviets in the "quiet war" they are waging against the West--the first part of the book--a description is presented in this, the second part, of a Soviet propaganda theme that has found its way into Western thought. It is persistent and pernicious and has taken root deeply.

A number of prominent authors have explained the truth of the matter and some inklings have even emerged in the popular press. By and large, nonetheless, the myth--the lie--remains fixed in the minds of scholars and the general public alike.

Of Lies and Myths

President John Kennedy once said, "The great enemy of truth is very often not the lie--deliberate, contrived and dishonest, but the myth--persistent, persuasive and unrealistic."

To promote a myth--"persistent, persuasive and unrealistic"--in a "deliberate, contrived and dishonest" fashion, is of course a lie, as well, and a more dangerous lie at that. This is the way of the Soviet system.

The Left and The Right

For many decades, it has been an objective of communist propaganda to characterize communism and fascism, especially Nazism, the German variant, as at opposite ends of the political spectrum. The horrors of Nazism--totalitarianism, racism, armed aggression and the countless other evils associated with Hitler and an armed and rampaging Germany--are placed on the right. Socialism, peace, progress and social justice, embodied in the Soviet Union which fought and destroyed fascism, are on the left. "The myth of the left-right syndrome", according to Richard Vetterli and William E. Fort, "has helped to perpetuate the belief that communism and fascism are dissimilar."¹

This communist theme has been uncritically accepted by millions and given currency by huge quantities of unwitting assistance, especially by Western intellectuals. Its promoters, in communist circles, now in the second generation, can claim, fairly or not, fabulous success. They have created or helped to create this great myth, helpful to communism.

Although not a major Soviet propaganda theme, according to Stanislav Levchenko, a former Soviet intelligence officer who specialized in KGB "active measures" operations, the concept of a dichotomy along communist/Nazi, left/right lines has long been promoted by the CPSU. As such, Levchenko points out, the active measures apparatus of the Soviet party and government structure is tasked continuously to further propaganda themes. Levchenko, now working in the West to expose Soviet

¹Richard Vetterli and William E. Fort, Jr., The Socialist Revolution, (New York: Clute International Corporation, 1983), p. 5.

machinations, speaks frequently on the subject of Soviet propaganda and corresponding active measures operations.

There are, of course, advantages to the Soviets to this right/left placement. The horrors of the totalitarian right, according to this Communist theme, are thus distanced from the Socialist world on the left. The murder of much of Europe's Jewish community, for example, according to this Communist idea, was a unique phenomenon of the right. Jews, and others revolted by the Nazi persecution and death camps, are thus drawn--or driven--to the left, away from the right. Conservatives and many other anti-communists, being on the right of the political spectrum, find themselves perilously close to the fascists in the communist world view. Heed the conservatives, move to the right, the message reads, and at once you are associated with the worst aspects of Nazi totalitarianism; to the left, however, there resides peace and justice.

The tyrannies of communism and fascism are clones. The assignment of one to the left and the other to the right is immensely deceptive. Both are forms of revolutionary socialism. "(T)he collectionist systems of Communism and Fascism," as Vetterli and Fort point out, "belong not on the opposite extremes of the political spectrum, but, on the contrary, their characteristics demand that they share a position side by side on the far left."²

The Great Socialist Alliance

The Communists and the National Socialists were allies for a period from 1939 to 1941. In 1939 Poland was divided between them and Hitler was freed to attack in the West. By this pact World War II was thus allowed to begin. The short but decisive alliance between the two revolutionary socialist powers permitted Germany to concentrate its forces against the Western Allies. Large shipments of Soviet iron ore provided steel for, and Caucasian petroleum fueled, the Nazi panzer divisions. For its part, the Soviets absorbed the independent Baltic states (illegally occupied to this day) and struck at Finland.³

On October 31, 1939, V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, reported to the Supreme Soviet

²Vetterli and Fort, *ibid*, p. 2.

³The U.S. Government maintains diplomatic relations with the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian legations in Washington, D.C., and does not recognize the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states.

about the war, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact which had recently been signed, and about the Soviet Union's new ally, Germany, its enemy, Poland, and peace: "We have always held that a strong Germany is an indispensable condition for a durable peace in Europe," Molotov claimed magnanimously. "Today our relations with the German state", he said, "are based on our friendly relations, on our readiness to support Germany's efforts for peace and at the same time on a desire to contribute in every way to the development of Soviet-German economic relations to the mutual benefit of both states.

"One may accept or reject the ideology of Hitlerism as well as any other ideological system", the foreign commissar pointed out, in an expansive mood, nowhere demanding the usual ideological monopoly for Communist doctrine.

"Germany is in the position of a state which is striving for the earliest termination of the war and for peace," Molotov explained, "while Britain and France, which only yesterday were declaiming against aggression, are in favor of continuing the war and are opposed to the conclusion of peace." And with regard to Poland, Molotov said, "... one swift blow... first by the German army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty..."⁴

The Soviet Union got its strong Germany, so indispensable, in Molotov's thinking, for a durable peace. Indeed, the Soviet Union helped to make Germany strong and gave Hitler the free hand he needed to strike in the West--against neutral countries as well as the British and French. It got its friendly relations with Germany too, for a time. In fact, Stalin refused to believe it at first when Hitler broke their treaty in June 1941 and thrust into the Soviet Union itself.

The Berlin-Moscow Axis and Its Socialist Revolutions

In the eyes of "sincere Stalinist and Trotskyist partisans of the Berlin-Moscow axis," according to Sidney Hook, the American philosopher, Bolshevism had accomplished a 'social revolution'...the transfer of

⁴Molotov's Report to the Supreme Soviet, (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1939).

property in the basic instruments of production from the capitalist class to the party bureaucrats."^{5,6}

Totalitarian Socialism -- Emulation and Cooperation

Following the Bolshevik coup d'etat of 1917, the Communist party under Lenin and, subsequently under Stalin, himself, elaborated throughout the Soviet Union an immensely effective state control mechanism. The pervasive and efficient secret police and vast labor camp network of this control system had functioned in the USSR for 15 years before Hitler assumed power in Germany. The components of Soviet Communist totalitarianism--the party, the secret police, the prison camps--stood as remarkably effective models for the leaders of National Socialism in Germany. The identity of party and government, the interlocking mechanisms for restraint and manipulation--indeed, the use of terror for political control--were all functioning aspects for a decade and a half in the Soviet Union by the time the Nazi regime was put into place.

According to Adam Ulam, in writing about the Communist collectivization in the 1930s of Soviet agriculture,

The dimension of the holocaust which accompanied the forcible collectivization awed even its maker. In a conversation during World War II with Churchill, Stalin acknowledged that the ordeal surpassed in its severity even those disaster-filled first years of the Nazi invasion.

It was a demonstration, unique in recent history, of how much can be accomplished by force and violence. And this violence was not exerted against a foreign nation, an isolated class, a racial minority; it

⁵Sidney Hook, Political Power and Personal Freedom, (New York: Criterion Books, 1959), p. 378.

⁶This point is the key one to many economists and social scientists, not who owns the factors of production but who controls and benefits from them. Both under Nazism and under Communism the party elites controlled and benefited from the creation of wealth. Party membership rather than membership in the capitalist class is the key issue for party membership confers the requisite status and the resulting power. These conditions prevail in Communist countries today.

was directed against one's own people, with victims' sons and brothers serving as the instrument of their own oppression.⁷

Foreign Communists were not spared. Roy Medvedev, Soviet Marxist historian, is quoted by Paul Johnson, the British historian, as noting that,

"It is a terrible paradox that most European Communist leaders and activists who lived in the USSR perished, while most of those who were in prison in their native lands in 1937-8 survived."⁸ Stalin and the Nazis exchanged lists of "wanted" persons, as well, Johnson points out. In Soviet prisons, through which about ten percent of the Russian people passed, "torture was used," Johnson says, "on a scale which even the Nazis were later to find it difficult to match."⁹

The Nazis imported the Russian camp system, as well, Johnson explains, but there were always more Soviet camps, most of them larger than their Nazi counterparts and holding more prisoners. The total deaths caused by Stalin's policy during this period was about ten million, Medvedev claims, 4.5 million of them victims during the period 1936-9.¹⁰

Johnson also tells of Stalin's secret negotiations with Hitler to facilitate the former's purge of his army. In 1936, Stalin persuaded the Nazi government to provide forged evidence of secret Soviet-German military contacts. The Gestapo provided the information. Marshal Tukhachevsky, commander of the Red Army, and other senior officers were arrested and killed. Eventually 30,000 men, about half of the total Soviet officer corps, were executed. The purge then spread to the party and in the end about one million members in all were killed.¹¹

National Socialism

Hitler like Lenin began his political career as a socialist. He joined the German Workers Party in 1919. Changing its name to the National Socialist

⁷Adam B. Ulam, Stalin: The Man and His Era, (New York: The Viking Press, 1973) p. 290.

⁸Roy Medvedev, as quoted by Paul Johnson in Modern Times, The World from the Twenties to the Eighties, (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), p. 303.

⁹Ibid., p. 303.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 304.

¹¹Ibid., p. 391.

German Workers Party, the "Nazis" were joined by the German Socialist Party in 1922.

Hitler made it abundantly clear from the start that his was a socialist revolution. "I have learned a great deal from Marxism," Hitler told Hermann Rauschning. "The whole of National Socialism is based on it ... all these new methods of political struggle are essentially Marxist in origin. All I had to do was take over these methods and adapt them to our purpose."¹²

The German dictator also told Rauschning, according to the latter, that German socialism "does not change the external order of things, it orders solely the relationship of man to the state."¹³ "We are socializing the people.", Hitler said.¹⁴ An even more telling statement by Hitler was his comparison of Soviet socialism and German National Socialism. "It is not Germany that will turn Bolshevist, but Bolshevism that will become a sort of National Socialism," Hitler told Rauschning. "Besides, there is more that binds us to Bolshevism than separates us from it," Hitler explained. "There is, above all, genuine revolutionary feeling, which is alive everywhere in Russia except where there are Jewish Marxists. I have always made allowance for this circumstance," Hitler said, "and given orders that former Communists are to be admitted to the party at once."¹⁵ Josef Goebbels, Hitler's minister of propaganda, made the point in mystical terms. "To be a socialist," declared Goebbels, "is to submit the I to the thou; socialism is sacrificing the individual to the whole."¹⁶

According to Hanns Johst, Hitler once told him that "National Socialism derives...national resolution from the bourgeoisie tradition, vital creative socialism from the teachings of Marxism."¹⁷ Beyond "national resolution" what did National Socialism derive from

¹²Hermann Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), p. 186.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Paul Johnson, Modern Times, The World From the Twenties to the Eighties, (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), p. 293,

¹⁵Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction, (New York: G. P. Putnam, and Sons, 1939), p. 131.

¹⁶Eric Fromm, Escape from Freedom, p. 233, as quoted by Vetterli and Fort, op. cit., p. 32.

¹⁷David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution, (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), p. 61, quoting from an interview Hitler gave Hanns Johst, Frankfurter Volksbatt, January 27, 1934.

the bourgeoisie? Numerous observers have spoken of the cooperation of German capitalists with the Nazis. Hook cautioned as follows, however:

Nothing indicates so eloquently the sterility of Leninist theory as the view that fascism is the last phase of finance capitalism.... It assumes that the individual capitalist, who as a capitalist is interested only in profit, is willing to sacrifice himself for the interests of the capitalist class--in actuality, the interests of a few finance capitalists. Not only is this the sheerest mysticism, it is demonstrably false. Finance capitalists--insofar as any were left in Hitler's Germany--took their orders from the Nazi party and not vice versa. Nor is there any evidence that their counsel had greater weight in Nazi party circles than that of other social groups.¹⁸

Far from big business corrupting his socialism, it was the other way around," adds Paul Johnson, the British historian.¹⁹ "He had no intention, like Russia, of 'liquidating' the possessing class," Rauschning said of Hitler. "On the contrary, he would compel it to contribute by its abilities toward the building up of a new order."²⁰ According to Rauschning, Hitler explained to him thus: "Why need we trouble to socialize banks and factories? We socialize human beings."²¹

Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski concluded "from all the facts available...that fascist and communist totalitarian dictatorship are basically alike, or at any rate more nearly like each other than any other system of government, including earlier forms of autocracy."²² "It is only natural," they went on, "that the regimes, conceiving of themselves as bitter enemies, dedicated to the task of liquidating each other, should take the view that they have nothing in common. This has happened before in history. When the Protestants and Catholics were fighting each other in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they very commonly denied

¹⁸Hook, op. cit., p. 376.

¹⁹Johnson, op. cit., p. 294.

²⁰Rauschning, op. cit., p. 161.

²¹Ibid., p. 193.

²²Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 5.

to each other the name of 'Christians' and argued about each other that they were not 'true churches.'²³

While acknowledging important differences between the two forms of totalitarianism, Arthur Schlesinger, the American historian, for his part points out that, "the similarities are vastly more overpowering and significant than the differences."²⁴

Other Socialists, Other Fascists

Fascism in Italy, like Nazism in Germany, had its origins in socialism as well. Mussolini was probably Italy's foremost Socialist before he organized the Fascist Movement. Although not a "complete" Marxist, according to Torquato Nanni, his biographer and close friend, he was a Marxist none-the-less.²⁵ Mussolini, an "admirer of Lenin's brutal energy," left the Socialist Party, because of its lethargy. It was his intent to "modernize and revise" the socialist movement in Italy,, Ernst Nolte, the German chronicler of fascism, notes.²⁶ Revolutionary socialists were then, as they are today, interested in power even more than ideology.

In Britain, for its part, Sir Oswald Mosley, who founded the British Union of Fascists in 1933, also came from the Socialist Party. The youngest member of the Labor Party cabinet, Mosley was considered by many to be a future prime minister. The British left, like the left in other countries, could produce fascists as well as Marxists. Laval in France and Quisling in Norway, Friedrich Hayek notes, "began as socialists and ended as Fascists or Nazis."²⁷

Terrorism and State Terror

Always competitive, eventually Nazism and Communism broke, but the lessons of the Soviet secret police and labor camps, mass coercion and brutality, had been quickly--and thoroughly--learned by the National Social-

²³Ibid., p. 7.

²⁴Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Vital Center, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), p. 59.

²⁵Torquato Nanni as quoted by Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 489.

²⁶Nolte, *ibid.*, p. 489.

²⁷Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), pp. 28-29, as quoted by Vitterli and Fort, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98.

ists. It would be difficult to demonstrate that the latter were any worse than their mentors in the Soviet union. "Even Hitler's Gestapo lacked the sweeping powers of the KGB," according to Brian Crozier, the British student of totalitarianism.²⁸

Both ideologies, Communism and National Socialism, incorporated terrorism into their systems very early. Lenin's instructions on terrorism to the Bolsheviks of St. Petersburg were dated 1905.²⁹ Such "tactics were developed by both the Communists and the Nazis in Germany during the 1920s and 1930s," Herbert Romerstein points out. Each learned and emulated the other in terrorism, not to mention street fighting. The uniforms of the Nazi storm troopers (Stürmabteilung), the infamous "brown shirts," Romerstein observes in an aside, were even copied from those of the Communist League of Red Fighters (Rote Frontkämpferbund).³⁰ Both Soviet Communism and German National Socialism, those two forms of totalitarian socialism, used terrorism as a means of seizing power and both employed state terror to remain in power once there.

Class and Race

What distinguished the two totalitarian systems most was the foundation of Communism on class and of National Socialism on race. Even this distinction becomes blurred, however. Anti-Semitism, the hallmark of Nazism, has been an important part of Soviet ideology and practice for fifty years although in recent decades it has become more institutionalized. In 1971 the KGB formed a Jewish Department, John Barron reports, under its Fifth Chief Directorate, itself created in 1970, "to annihilate intellectual dissent, stop the upsurge of religious dissent, suppress nationalism."³¹ One need not be a Zionist to know what that means for Jews in the Soviet Union today. According to Ken Jacobson,

²⁸Brian Crozier, Strategy of Survival, (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1978), p. 133.

²⁹V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), Vol. 9, pp. 345-6, as quoted by Herbert Romerstein in Soviet Support for International Terrorism, (Washington, D.C.: The Foundation for Democratic Education, Inc., 1981), p. 7.

³⁰Ibid., p. 7.

³¹John Barron, KGB. The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents, (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), p. 22.

director of Middle East Affairs of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, "the Soviet Union is the center of anti-Semitism in the world today."³²

It is interesting--but not surprising--that the contemporary neo-Nazi movement in the U.S. and Europe shares with the Soviet Union its anti-Semitism and its admiration for the Palestine Liberation Organization. The September 1980 bombing at the Munich beer festival which killed 13 people and injured 212 has been linked by the German police to members of the neo-Nazi group called the "Military Sports Group Hoffman." According to the West German press, members of the Hoffman group trained with the PLO in Lebanon and had taken part in public meetings with the PLO. Early the following month, a bomb exploded outside a Paris synagogue killing three people and injuring 33. A neo-Nazi group claimed responsibility for that bombing, and the French press reported that French police linked the bombing to the Government of Libya.³³

There is evidence that the Soviets support, or even establish, "fascist" groups outside the bloc, to bring discredit on "the right." In early 1982, Gerhard Boeden, director of the West German Federal Criminal Police (BKA), reported "indications that bloc intelligence services and their German stooges are stooping," as he put it, "to founding 'national socialist groups' so as to be able to claim the danger of neo-Nazi activities in the FRG" (Federal Republic of Germany). Earlier, Radio Moscow, on January 15, 1982, Boeden went on, reported the founding of a "nationalist socialist" organization which "in fact did not take place until the following day and whose founder and secretary general is the known Communist Herbert Bormann."

Boeden charged the Soviet Union with aiding terrorism. The PLO, he claimed, supported by the Soviets, trained German terrorists--both leftists and rightists. As for the "peace" movement in West Germany, Boeden explained, "these peace demonstrations constitute a great success for the Soviet disinformation campaign and just as great a success for Communist alliance politics." Although the German Communist Party never wins as much as one percent of the vote in elections, Boeden pointed out, "it has in this manner, with its auxiliary and

³²Ken Jacobson, speaking on May 16, 1984, at a conference on "Soviet Disinformation and the News," The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.

³³Herbert Romerstein, Soviet Support for International Terrorism, (Washington, D.C.: The Foundation for Democratic Education, 1981), p. 8.

front organizations and with its mostly innocent 'allies,' managed to win great influence upon popular movements."³⁴

"What is not generally known," according to Vetterli and Fort, "is the fact that not only did much of practical and theoretical Nazism spring from socialist roots, but so too did much of German anti-Semitism. The Jews, having been denied membership in the early guilds and not having been allowed to own property," they explain, "quite naturally helped in the development of free enterprise. As a matter of fact, the Jews exerted a more or less consistent pressure directed toward the breakdown of feudalism and the emergence of free enterprise and the industrial system. Thus, they quite naturally incurred the enmity and wrath of early socialists. Too, socialist revolutionaries," the authors explain, "all over Europe contemptuously placed the Jew as an identifiable category of the upper-class establishment."³⁵

Liberalism

Liberalism in Germany, a potential obstacle to fascism and communism, was of little consequence in the developments of the 1920s and 1930s, as explained by Hayak:

In Germany before 1933, and in Italy before 1922, Communists and Nazis or Fascists clashed more frequently with each other than with other parties. They competed for support of the same type of mind and reserved for each other the hatred of the heretic. But their practice showed how closely they are related. To both...the man with whom they had nothing in common and with whom they could not hope to convince was the liberal of the old type. While to the Nazi the Communist, and to the Communist the Nazi, and to both the Socialist, are potential recruits who are made of the right timber.... They know that there can be no compromise between them and those who believe in individual freedom. [Hitler hated Liberalism of the old type]...this hatred had little occasion to show itself in practice merely because, by the time Hitler

³⁴Manfred Schell, Die Welt, Bonn, February 19, 1982.

³⁵Vetterli and Fort, op. cit., p. 108.

came to power, Liberalism was to all intents and purposes dead in Germany, And it was Socialism that had killed it."³⁶

It is put another way, by Fritz Stern, also a student of totalitarianism. Although he deplores the numerous reasons causing us, Stern says, "to distance ourselves from the once comforting view that only Germans or National Socialists could have committed so horrible a crime" [as the Nazi holocaust], he realizes that "Soviet terror has claimed even more lives than the Nazis."³⁷ There is a Russian proverb that says, "When the forest is being cut down, chips fly." The millions of people who died in the Soviet Union are still called "Stalin's chips."³⁸ Franz Borkenau, the German historian, for his part, maintains that since 1929 Russia has taken its place "among the totalitarian, fascist powers."³⁹ Susan Sontag, although of the left, was right in her trenchant assessment that "communism is in itself a variant, the most successful variant of fascism."⁴⁰

To repeat the words of Sidney Hook, cited earlier, "the German Fascists recapitulated the essential history of the Russian Revolution."⁴¹ "Culturally," he added, "Leninism must be regarded in the light of its development, as the first Fascist movement of the twentieth century."⁴²

Conclusion

There it is then--"Communism...the most successful variant of fascism." Of course, the Soviets would want to hide the fact--they have worked so hard to give fascism a bad name, and rightly so. They have worked even harder to plant the banner of fascism on the far right, but wrongly so. It doesn't belong

³⁶Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1944), pp. 28-29 as quoted by Yitterli and Fort, op. cit., p. 97, 98.

³⁷Fritz Stern, in a chapter entitled "The Burden of Success, Reflections on Germany Jewry," in Art, Politics and Will, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), p. 125.

³⁸Aleksei Myagkov, Inside the KGB, (New York: Arlington House, 1983), p. 47.

³⁹Fritz Borkenau, Der Europäische Kommunismus, (Munich: n.d.), p. 64, as quoted by Nolte, op. cit., p. 8.

⁴⁰Susan Sontag, as quoted in The Nation, February 27, 1982.

⁴¹Hook, op. cit., p. 379.

⁴²Ibid., p. 379.

there; it belongs on the far left of the political spectrum, next to Communism itself. Allowing for their differences, they were variants of the same awful thing: totalitarian revolutionary socialism.

Not only is Communism in the Soviet Union the most successful form of fascism, as Sontag says, but, according to Borkeenan and Hook, it was the first. It is painfully obvious, of course, that Communism still exists while the other forms have vanished.

How could the notion, that communism is something apart from fascism and that fascism did not emerge from the left but from the right, become so firmly implanted? Why so persistent? Moscow doubtless has a way with words.

The massacre by the Communist Party of millions in Ukraine in the 1930s is largely unknown in the West. Stalin simply said it never happened. He merely denied it repeatedly. This newer myth, this lie, however, required some positive effort to give it momentum. Eventually acquiring critical mass, as it were, it became self-sustaining.

Another question emerges: How has this myth--persistent, pervasive and unrealistic--this lie --deliberate, pervasive and unrealistic--affected history? How has this deflection of the thoughts of millions over scores of years skewed the perceptions and judgments of history? What will it take to put it all right?

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