



PERISCOPE

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Will Warns of "Bumpy" Four Years for Nation

An overflow crowd, the largest attendance of any in AFIO's history, greeted guest speaker George F. Will for the winter luncheon, December 7th.

The noted political analyst and commentator, fresh from a White House news conference, was primed with facts and figures for the group assembled at the Bolling AFB Officers Club, as he warned that "America, as a society, is undertaxed." "Until we come to realize that," he continued, "we are going to find that something near and dear to the hearts of everyone here, the national security, particularly the defense budget, of the United States is going to come increasingly under attack as the target of opportunity of those bent on regressive reductions."

Will explained that the Reagan Administration seeks to reduce the deficit without new taxes and without touching social security or defense. "And, you don't touch interest," he added in explaining that the total of those items constitutes 64% of the present budget. Thus, he explained, the goal must be met in the remaining 300 billion dollars, of which 110 billion is budgeted for Medicare and Medicaid, also untouchable areas.

Cuts in defense spending aren't an easy solution either, the speaker noted. "An aircraft carrier is not made in one state, it's made in 30 states, and you have sixty senators ready to do the right thing." That means, he said, there is nothing left to cut but middle class programs. "Given that the choice is to cut middle class programs or cut the defense budget, you can see the way we are going to go," Will said.

Will pointed out that the President currently is considering a nine-page, single-spaced list of programs "to be cut, or in most cases, eliminated." The problem can't be shunted to the Congress, he suggested, because 40% of the Republican senators are up for reelection in 1986, and can't afford to incur the wrath of middle class voters. "When you cut a welfare mother's food stamps, she doesn't turn to her secretary and say 'take a letter'." If you move against the middle class, "you get very finely written and typed letters on embossed stationery. That is what the government is beginning to face," Will said.

"The easy part is over," the speaker stated, "Ronald Reagan's message in the 1980 campaign was to 'Be brave and accept a tax cut.'" Will predicted that the nation is in for a bumpy four years. "We'll see how good



George F. Will

a communicator he is telling them to cut their middle class subsidies and pay more for Johnny's tuition at Brown and Sally's at Stanford." He found comparison in the situation in Britain, where the Thatcher government moved against middle-class programs. There, he recalled, he saw eight thousand middle class students rioting in protest, with lawlessness that saw a hundred arrested.

He saw little hope in the Grace Commission report intended to reduce waste, fraud and abuse. "The Grace Commission was waste, fraud and abuse," he charged in pointing out that the 47-volume, two million page study contained such recommendations as cutting federal pensions. "Why didn't anyone think of that before," he joked.

"Put simply," said Will, "the sound in our ears today is the sound of chickens coming home to roost." The nation, he said, has been living beyond its means, unwilling to pay for its standard of living, and the test is to find out if the nation has the will and the means to do something about it. "How do you pay for it, how do you preserve it," he asked. "In the next four years we are going to find out the extent we are a grown up people."

National Intelligence Symposium Cancelled

Because of scheduling problems,
the National Intelligence Symposium
Announced for February 25, 1985
at Naples, Florida
Has Been Cancelled



General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.
USMC-Ret

Former AFIO President Robert Cushman Dies

General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. (USMC-Ret), President of AFIO 1978-79 and a member of the Board of Directors until 1982, died January 2nd at his home in Fort Washington, Maryland.

General Cushman, one of the most highly decorated combat veterans of WWII, spent forty years on active duty culminating from 1972 to 1975 as Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Born December 24, 1914, in St. Paul, Cushman graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1935. As a second lieutenant he won his first campaign ribbon during the Sino-Japanese hostilities while serving as a platoon leader with the 4th Marines at Shanghai, China; six years later he was commissioned a lieutenant colonel. When Pearl Harbor was attacked, he was commander of the Marine detachment aboard the battleship *Pennsylvania*. His ship out of action because of the attack, Cushman returned for a tour of duty on the mainland before embarking for the Pacific Theater as commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, 3rd Marine Division. During the next two years he led his men through some of the toughest fighting in the Pacific, including Bougainville and Iwo Jima.

Cushman was awarded the Navy Cross during the recapture of Guam where, in the words of the citation, he "directed the attacks of his battalion and the repulse of numerous Japanese counterattacks, fearlessly exposing himself to hostile rifle, machine gun and mortar fire in order to remain in the front lines and obtain firsthand knowledge of the enemy situation. Following three days of bitter fighting culminating in a heavy Japanese counterattack, which pushed back the flank of his battalion, he personally led a platoon into the gap and, placing it for defense, repelled the hostile force. He contributed to the annihilation of one enemy battalion and the rout of another."

Following the war, Cushman held a range of assignments including service as an instructor at the Armed Services Staff College and the Command and Staff School. He also headed the amphibious warfare branch of the Naval Research Office, and from 1949-51 served a tour with the CIA. From 1957 to 1960, Cushman was assistant for national security affairs to Vice President Nixon. In 1962, he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, a post in which he served until 1964 when appointed Base Commander and Commanding General, 5th Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California. In 1967, he embarked for Vietnam where he developed a reputation for independence, integrity and tactical innovation, as Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force.

He returned to the United States in 1969 and appointment as the Deputy Director, Central Intelligence. In 1972, he was named Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.

General Cushman is survived by his wife, Audrey, of Fort Washington; a son, Robert E. III, of Arlington; and a daughter, Roberta Lind Cauley of Charlottesville.

In Memorium

Mr. Obie Brown
Tavares, FL

Gen. Robert E. Cushman, USMC-Ret
Fort Washington, MD

Dr. Henry W. Forbes
Falls Church, VA

Mr. Donald C. Hays
New York, NY

Mr. Frederick L. Hetter
San Diego, CA

Maj. Clinton M. Hoose, USA-Ret
Falls Church, Va

Mary S. Moses
(Mrs. E. R. Moses, Jr.)
Prescott Valley, AZ

Lillian B. Noel
(Mrs. James A. Noel)
San Diego, CA

Mr. George A. Owens
Kalispell, MT

Mr. Ralph L. Seger
Alexandria, VA

Mr. Alfonso Spera
Bethesda, MD

Mr. Ross H. Taylor
San Antonio, TX

May 1st Is Deadline For Board Nominations

New election procedures, adopted at the 1984 Convention, will govern the election of members of AFIO's Board of Directors, resulting in a deadline of May 1, 1985 for the submission of nominations to National. Nominees must be full members in good standing and are required to submit a written statement indicating willingness to serve, if elected. In addition, the nominee is asked to furnish a biographic statement and black and white photograph to be published with the ballot.

Under the new rules, voting will be by mail only, with results announced at the annual convention. No nominations will be accepted from the floor of the convention, nor may ballots be cast at that time. Ballots will be mailed with the Summer issue of *Periscope*, and must be returned with a postmark of no later than September 15th to be counted and verified.

Named by AFIO's president to serve as a nominating committee are Mr. Samuel Halpern, Chairman; Miss Ann Caracristi; and Captain Robert A. Dowd, USN-Ret. Mr. Halpern's telephone number is (703) 765-1388, should further information be desired. There can be no extension of the May 1, 1985 deadline for nominations, however.

Members of the Board whose term of office will expire in October 1985 are: Captain Richard W. Bates, USN-Ret; Mr. John F. Blake; Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN-Ret; Mr. George Scatterday; Major General Jack E. Thomas, USAF-Ret; and Colonel George R. Weinbrenner, USAF-Ret.

Notes from the Boardroom

The Board of Directors met on December 7, 1984, at the Bolling Air Force Base Officers Club, at 1410 hours, with Chairman, Major General Jack E. Thomas, USA-Ret, presiding. There were fourteen members present and four members absent, two of whom were represented by proxy.

Col. Bruce Baumgardner, USAF-Ret, chairman of the 1984 Convention Committee, gave a wrap-up report on the Convention and was presented by the Chairman with a letter of commendation. Mr. Greaney reported that AFIO has received a 3/4 inch video tape of the film *The KGB Connection* which will be made available to the chapters for showing at meetings. Mr. Greaney also reported on plans, approved by the Executive Committee, to visit chapters in Florida in February 1985 for discussion of future chapter plans and any problems. He will also discuss the possibility of the Florida chapters hosting the 1986 Convention.

Mr. Sam Halpern was approved by the Board to be a member of the Executive Committee, raising that body to six members.

The meeting was adjourned at 1450 hours. Submitted by Charlotta Engrav, Secretary.

From the Executive Director

I am sure you will be pleased with the 1985 AFIO Directory just off the press. Be reminded that some of our members, at their request, have not been included. These individuals are maintained in a restricted category by National, and it is only on receipt of written notification that we change the listing. As mentioned in the last issue, the cut-off date for information in the new directory was December 31, 1984; any changes of address received after that date were not included in it.

We are anxious to keep our mailing list current. With the ten percent increase in Third Class mail up to 22 cents on February 17, 1985, it is essential that our organization make full use of our Third Class mail privileges. However, the Postal Service will not forward Third Class, so we ask that you notify us of changes as early as possible.

The response has been quite good to the new lapel pins at \$5.00 each, and we have not had any complaints, as in years past, about the pins breaking in the mail. We now ship them to you in a plastic box.

We are anxious to get more information from our chapters in order to include this information in the *Periscope*. To be included in the next issue we will need information (preferably in press-release format) and black and white photos by March 1st. The deadlines for the remainder of the year are June 1st and October 1st. It has also been suggested that if chapters can schedule their elections to permit the results to reach Headquarters by the end of December, the new rosters can be included in the annual Directory.

I again ask all AFIO members to get a friend to join our organization. We feel that current members are the best sales representatives for AFIO. We want to grow. We would also like to suggest that our current members consider converting to a Life Membership with a one-time payment of \$250.00 or, if they choose, the payment can be made in installments so long as the entire amount is paid within twelve months.

1985 Convention Set For October 4-5

Plans are already underway for the 1985 Annual Convention, to be held during the first weekend in October. The Holiday Inn Crowne Plaza in Rockville, Md., has been selected.

John H. Waller, who retired as CIA's Inspector General in 1980, has agreed to serve as chairman of the event, to be held October 4-5. Local members who would like to assist him with arrangements are encouraged to notify National.

The hotel, scene of the successful 1984 Convention, will continue to offer AFIO the special room rate of \$55 per night. An added convenience will be the new Twinbrook Metro Station (Red Line) located to the rear of the hotel. Attendees arriving at National Airport, for example, can take the Metro all the way to the convention with only one transfer enroute.

On the Intelligence Bookshelf . . .

Current books of interest to intelligence buffs and watchers of the world scene. All reviews are by AFIO members except when otherwise noted.

Secrets That Won't Stay Buried

Too Secret, Too Long, by Chapman Pincher, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984, \$19.95.

The case of Cock Robin's wrongful death (said to have occurred in the late 14th century) is still under active discussion in nurseries throughout the world. Despite a full and direct confession by the sparrow, reinforced by a display of the murder weapon, the corpus delicti, eye-witness testimony from the fly and corroborative statements by the beetle and others, the motive was never clearly established and the sparrow, we are told, went unpunished.

Considering the impressive array of "evidence," a conspiracist might speculate that the case was dropped because there was no desire on the part of the "establishment" to bring the sparrow to the bar.

The case of the late Roger Hollis, former director of Britain's Security Service, is another anomaly, at least in the mind of Chapman Pincher who has detailed his very pertinent views in a 638 page account of Hollis' alleged treachery.

It seems inappropriate to dismiss Pincher's considerable efforts (as has been done by Robert Cecil in the *London Times*, 11/22/84, and Phillip Knightley in the *Sunday Times*, 11/11/84) by merely suggesting that his version of the case contains little new information, no new "evidence" and that it is inexcusably tendentious and above all else, too long.

The critics make much of the point that if "Pincher and his sources were to present their evidence in a British court of law they would not get beyond their opening address before the judge showed them the door" (Knightley). Robert Cecil assures the reader that "Mr. Pincher's heart is in the right place; it is his head that I worry about." Knightley seems to wonder if these events of forty years ago have any relevance today.

Perhaps it is useful to suggest that what Pincher has attempted is the construction of a counter-intelligence analysis and not an indictment intended for the courts. On the presumption that officers serving in sensitive intelligence positions have a special and peculiar obligation to serve the public trust, any suggestion or even suspicion of possible treachery must therefore form the basis for immediate and direct action. All of the salient service personalities in Pincher's account were under oath to discharge their respective duties in the "defense of the realm" and by the execution of the oath, accepted the special and peculiar obligations of public trust.

"Evidence" of the variety required to secure a conviction in a court of law is seldom available to counter-intelligence officers. If, indeed, proofs are in hand, a question relating to the government's willingness to disclose sources and methods almost invariably arises. The fact that counter-intelligence officers are paid and trained to view the world (and each other) through a glass darkly seems at odds with the Knightley thesis (attributed to Admiral Stansfield Turner) that intelligence officers are victims of the "clandestine mentality," an "illness (that) manifests itself most often in alcoholism and divorce but as it progresses it develops paranoid symptoms: a free-floating suspicion, the belief that outsiders are intent on penetrating the secret family to destroy it from within."

Too Secret, Too Long is based on Pincher's posit that the Security Service suffered too many casualties, too many "case-deaths" and too many failures than are supportable by the arithmetic of chance. Thus, these adverse events, all of which are claimed to have aided the Soviets, were allowed, caused or prompted by the intervention of a penetration within the Service.

Pincher's position appears to have many supporters among ex-Security Service officers who are not, as Knightley suggests, "disgruntled former officers, whose spokesman is Peter Wright, once a senior MI5 officer, now in retirement in Australia beyond the jurisdiction of the Official Secrets Act, (who) have worked consistently for vindication and revenge." Vindication is indeed an objective of these men who seek another extended examination of the Hollis case, this time using data which was not previously considered and that which

has become available since the last review. Mr. Knightley depreciates the former serving officers by ad hominum and ascribes "revenge" as a collective motive. The men who were for the longest time most directly involved in the internal investigation of Hollis, who had years of experience in sensitive and responsible positions within the Service are dismissed as "being behind the spy fever in recent years, the apparently endless exposures of often old and insignificant men for services performed for the Soviet Union decades ago." As the *Sunday Times'* "expert" in these matters, Knightley sees Pincher's work as a greater menace than the aggregate effect of "old and insignificant men" like John Cairncross, Leo Long, Alister Watson, Paddy Costello, E. Herbert Norman and a number of others.

Pincher, unlike most of his critics, has made a genuine effort to distinguish GRU operations from those of the KGB and its predecessor organizations. Further, instead of accepting the immaculate conception notion favored by some, Pincher makes the point that prospective Soviet agents, however identified, are recruited eventually by Soviet officers and do not occur as a consequence of being chatted up by some unidentified don at Oxbridge. Where possible, Pincher identifies the actors by name instead of the customary discreet allusions. He also seems to believe that cases have beginnings, middles and ends which conviction led him to develop his hypothesis that Hollis was recruited to the GRU while employed in China by the British-American Tobacco Company in the early thirties.

Whatever the reader's opinion of the case, Pincher's arguments deserve careful consideration. There are a number of less than consequential errors but, since many of the facts are unknowable and the main characters mostly dead, defected, in foreign exile or under punitive restraints, the case depends heavily on circumstantial evidence. Pincher concludes that Hollis was either astonishingly incompetent or a Soviet agent. His personal disposition strongly favors the latter verdict.

A major point which requires restatement is that Roger Hollis was the Director-General of the Security Service and not an ordinary citizen-ratepayer who had come under suspicion. Robert Cecil who concedes to having been deceived personally (and subsequently) by Burgess, MacLean and Philby, seems to find the possibility of a fourth betrayal ("et to, Roger?") unacceptable.

The current Prime Minister has not been anxious to accede to Mr. Pincher's demand for yet another examination of the case. The Conservatives, since the "Zinoviev Letter" of 1924, have had mixed results from "intelligence" related official enquiries.

Pincher is an advocate of oversight and seems to believe that the U.S. process is effective and, perhaps, forms a useful model for Britain. In the U.S., public awareness of the workings of the Congressional committees has been focused on various covert action programs and the estimative processes. The history of most oversight bodies confirms that they tend to be ill-equipped and usually lack both the competence and continuity essential to deal effectively with counter-intelligence matters.

The index of *Too Secret, Too Long* is comprehensive and a number of interesting photographs put faces on some of the more obscure players. Readers familiar with Pincher's earlier efforts in this case (*Their Trade is Treachery*) will have another, engaging opportunity to test their biases and, perhaps, flex a few fixed opinions.

[Robert T. Crowley is the co-author of *The New KGB: Engine of Soviet Power*, published by William Morrow and Company, New York.]

An Overt Attack on Covert Action

Reagan's Secret Wars: CNSS Report No. 108 by Jay Peterzell, Washington, D.C.: Center for National Security Studies, 1984

This study deals with known or purported covert actions which by the author's claim were initiated or expanded by the Reagan administration. The countries involved are Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Iran, Libya and Nicaragua. Let it be said at the very outset that this reviewer will be guided in his comments now, as he has in the past, by two general, self-imposed rules. The first concerns the proper role in any general debate on covert operations of those currently or previously involved intimately in intelligence and national security matters.

Simply stated, it is the reviewer's belief that such individuals should not be the theoretical advocates, the spokesmen if you will, on the *desirability* of having the U.S. undertake such operations. Too often intelligence veterans assume this role and become the point men supporting covert action; in other instances, they do not take sufficient care to avoid sounding like advocates when merely explaining the concept to the public. The result, unhappily, is that the intelligence profession frequently gives the impression of being just another lobbying interest defending its turf, and its views are discounted accordingly. Better advised are the professionals who confine themselves to clarifying what the proper role of intelligence should be: to advise the political leadership which makes the final decision whether to have covert action as a weapon in the nation's intelligence arsenal or to use it in specific instances, solely on the technical, professional and feasibility aspects involved.

In line with this view, the reviewer will not comment on what he discerns as Mr. Peterzell's underlying tone and attitude toward U.S. covert operations in general beyond saying there is a visceral and philosophical opposition to them. This comes through even when disguised by him as being judged under the more practical considerations of whether they are effective and serve our long-term interests. The second rule is that it is obviously not the role of anyone who is or has been privy to privileged information to take it upon himself or herself to use that knowledge to comment publicly on what are alleged to be current operations. The fact that the reviewer possesses limited information about on-going operations does not alter his determination to stick to the rule.

This much said, what general comments can still be made within these guidelines about *Reagan's Secret Wars*? First of all, let it be noted that of the six cases he discusses, two that hardly fit the description "secret" in his title comprise almost 40% of the work—Afghanistan and Nicaragua. The author himself states that no covert action has been more public than Nicaragua and believes the only remaining secret is its purpose. Of Afghanistan, he concludes from the lengthy list of past exposés that "It is remarkable that U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was still a secret from most of the American public when ABC exposed the operation in a major story in June 1981." His treatment of Cambodia takes up another quarter of the book and ends with the thoughtful and cautious remark that "a conclusive judgment on the extent of covert U.S. involvement in Cambodia cannot be made from the information currently available." Thus two-thirds of his effort and presentation is devoted to covert operations which in my view have either been acknowledged or the existence of which he admits is uncertain.

Questions then naturally arise as to Mr. Peterzell's purpose in producing this work, the validity of his supporting analyses and evidence, and finally, the political and attitudinal approaches to the task he set for himself. According to his charge, the Reagan Administration has expanded the use of covert operations while "severely limiting the role in reviewing them of officials outside the intelligence community." One takes this to mean that Congressional oversight has been severely limited and consequentially, the duty of the author and others of like mind is to see that public awareness and discussion serve as the ultimate oversight and a spur to Congress to recapture its abdicated obligations. He neglects, however, any investigation into the oversight and appropriations role of Congress in the cases discussed and one searches in vain for convincing proof of his contention of Congress' "severely limited" role. One can imagine the furor that would have been caused by the Congress if the author's claims of U.S. covert activities in Chad, Iran, Libya and Cambodia were true and undertaken without legislative knowledge! Any analysis of post-1975 operations, such as that by Peterzell, that fails to examine the role of Congress is incomplete. The author's neglect in this regard when combined with the title gives the work a tone and a motivating flavor of the pamphleteering writings of the 70s when attacks against "unsupervised" covert actions and headbashing of the intelligence community were in vogue.

Then there are certain themes that run like threads through the essays which need to be commented on. One is that the conduct of American adversaries may have been provoked by the actions of the U.S. and its allies. This reviewer must confess that he found the author's explanations and his concern for the sensitivities of the Russians in Afghanistan, the Libyans in Chad or the Indochinese in Cambodia as excessively solicitous. Indeed, one can identify a danger that lurks in this type of exegesis when combined with another common thread in his analysis, the undeviating doubt regarding the wisdom and the efficacy of the American actions on which he focuses his attention. By concentrating on what he regards as the errors of American judgment and conduct, and their conse-

quences, he neglects to discuss the motives and the miserable conduct and records of such stalwarts of internal and international conduct as, say, Qaddafi and the ayatollahs of Iran or the measures and depredations of the Soviets in Afghanistan. This imbalance of treatment results in making us, not them, the heavy. Works such as this—that mute criticism of these worthies in an eagerness to prove something against us and our allies—unintentionally become grist for our adversaries' propaganda mills.

To these major, general observations and criticisms must be added one more: the heavy use of media sources as evidence. This reliance on and elevation of such sources to authoritative status on the operations he discusses contradict his own caveat that "press accounts are not necessarily evidence." True, and they result, oddly enough, in a product that can be used for purposes the author never intended. The long record of exposés of U.S. covert operations by the media he has assembled makes this a handy reference for those who wish to show how the U.S. has failed, despite a decade of deliberation, to solve the question of the security of its covert operations. Note, too, that there are other more specific or minor shortcomings in his presentation. One good example is his chaste version of the Sandanista treatment of the Miskito Indians. This is contrary to the evidence and the conclusions of many other accounts available, including those of Berkeley professor and Nicaraguan Indian expert Bernard Nietschmann and Miguel Bolanos Hunter, a former CI officer in Sandanista State Security.

The question may fairly be asked whether this reviewer would be happy with any work that treats in a more satisfying manner what are said to be on-going U.S. operations. The answer is a frank and emphatic "no." Quality works that claim to reveal classified, current and properly-approved and implemented operations do not serve the national interest any more than those of lesser standards. This view is probably shared by most with similar background and experience as those of the reviewer. Mr. Peterzell should bear in mind that though there has never been any overwhelming consensus in this group on all aspects of covert operations and their use, there is definitely much greater agreement that they need protection against unwarranted disclosure.

George C. Constantinides

[George Constantinides is the author of the award-winning *Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography*, published in 1983. Presently he is a consultant to the BDM Corporation. He is not a member of AFIO.]

A Guide to the Intelligence Profession

Careers in Secret Operations: How to be a Federal Intelligence Officer, by David Atlee Phillips. Bethesda, MD: Stone Trail Press, 1984 (Paper, \$9.00); Frederick, MD: University Publications, 1984 (Cloth, \$15.00)

Dave Phillips has come up with an excellent solution to a problem that has long plagued present and former intelligence officers—what can one say when asked by young people about the profession. We've all been through it. One stumbles and stammers, hesitating on almost every word for fear of divulging what should be protected. It usually sums up: "I can't tell you much about it, but I know you would find it challenging profession." Then, the follow-on questions get difficult. What does one answer when asked about security processing and the polygraph, retirement program, salary, equal opportunity advantages, service abroad and the like? And, if the young person's interest is still sparked despite the dissembling, where does one say to write or phone for more information?

The author has produced a career counselor's friend covering the full spectrum of the Intelligence Community, with detailed descriptions of what each agency or department does in the intelligence arena and what they seek from candidates. The internal organizational descriptions of CIA, for example, are far more complete than I have ever seen in any of that agency's public affairs and recruiting materials, particularly when reference is made, if at all, to the clandestine services. After reading this guide, a potential applicant should have little difficulty in understanding the intelligence maze and where to find out more about entering it.

Unlike most counseling books of this type, it does not read like the work of a committee. It is sprinkled throughout with Phillips'

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AFIO Chapter Activities

Arizona

Arizona Chapter. The chapter met October 27th at Monti's Restaurant for a luncheon, business meeting and informative session. George Wiggins, chapter vice president, presided over the thirteen persons present, and was saluted for his election as national Vice President.

An interesting video tape was presented by Ms. Alice Smith, president of the local chapter of Arizonans for National Security. The tape featured an interview with Captain Willi Lollis, leader of the Blue Berets, a paramilitary organization in Costa Rica that trains the country's youth to defend their way of life against the communist threat and aggression.

The chapter's December 8th luncheon at the Ramada Inn in Tucson was deemed a large success, with twenty-six persons in attendance.

Ed Barley was elected President, Bob Moy was named Vice President and Bob Nugent was elected Secretary-Treasurer.

Captain Oliver Lorenz, USAF, presented a film and led a discussion on the attributes and capabilities of the A-10 ground attack aircraft.

The chapter's next meeting was announced for February 9th in Sierra Vista.

California

San Diego Chapter. Forty-seven members and guests met at the Admiral Kidd Officers Club on November 16th to hear Roger S. Young, a former Assistant Director of the FBI and newly-appointed Executive Director of the San Diego Crime Commission, describe the Commission's efforts in carrying out a continuous and comprehensive program of public education and information about the causes and prevention of crimes. The speaker noted the program ranges from border crime to investment and small business fraud, and is particularly active with young people and the drug problem. Mr. Young, who spent 23 years with the FBI, ten of which were in the area of foreign counter-intelligence, also gave his thoughts about recent FBI internal problems concerning foreign counterintelligence.

The chapter's December meeting was held December 12th aboard the ferry boat *Berkeley*, with a full Christmas dinner, music by Charlie Chancer at the piano, and a fund-raising "white elephant" auction gaveled by Don Perry (described as the "32nd fastest auctioneer west of Chula Vista."). Special guests at the function were local members of the Air Force Association.

The chapter met at the Admiral Kidd Officer's Club on January 25th to hear B.F. "Sandy" Coggen, a corporate executive, discuss "Some Technical Geo-Political Fall-Out from the U.S. Space Programs."

San Francisco Bay Area Chapter. A very well attended September 19th meeting opened at the Marine Memorial Club with the Pledge of Allegiance and a toast, in Russian, to the guest speaker, Consul General Anatoly Myshkov and his wife, Natasha. The toast was

proposed by chapter Vice President Edward Rudka and translated by chapter President McCarthy. Rudka introduced the speaker as a 1950 graduate of the Institute for International Affairs in Moscow and a diplomat with twenty years of knowledge and observation of the United States. Myshkov, he said, has served in the Soviet Embassy in Washington and the consulates in New York and San Francisco.

Myshkov thanked the chapter for inviting him and affording the opportunity to share his views on Soviet-American relations. Never before, he said, had he seen so many U.S. intelligence officers in one place.

He reviewed the fruitful diplomatic relations of the past, dating from the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1933, but noted that today relations between the two nations are very tense. This, he said, is a result of security considerations, nuclear disarmament and the arms race.

The West's emplacement of weapons in Western Europe, pointed toward the Soviet Union, has led the Soviets to find further negotiations impossible, Myshkov claimed. There can be no "business as usual" between his country and this because those missiles are pointed at Russian cities and the Warsaw Pact nations. Missiles, he said, could be launched and land in Russian cities in eight minutes. Eight minutes, he noted, that separate peace from nuclear annihilation. What can be done in eight minutes, he posed. Use the hot line? Hold congressional hearings? The USSR is not going to attack the United States, he declared, and he hopes the U.S. will not attack his country. Yet, he said, we cannot overrule an accident.

The Consul General blamed the United States for the failure of his country's 1984 proposal of a moratorium on weapons in outer space. The meetings never materialized, he said, because the U.S. refused to consider the topic separate from general nuclear disarmament. He urged the use of diplomacy recognizing equality and equal opportunity. Both nations live on the same planet, he said, noting that if they can't live together, they will die together.

Myshkov called for understanding, stabilizing the situation and opening a dialogue between the two nations. He said he does not expect miracles, but hoped the nations would work together, accepting compromise and looking for openings.

He observed that security in a nuclear age is indivisible, and that both countries must realize it. His experience in the United States, he said, has taught him that there are no issues that cannot be resolved with good will, mutual understanding, and more trust between nations. Nuclear power, he observed, is a common enemy.

Myshkov concluded by suggesting the two nations talk in the language of culture, trade and education, including student exchange. In 1933, he recalled, the founders of the USSR exchanged official notes with the U.S. on the opening of diplomatic relations. Both sides expressed hope that relations between the two peoples would remain forever friendly. That, he said, is also his hope.

The speaker answered questions, previously submitted in writing, for more than a half hour after concluding his presentation.

South Bay Chapter. The chapter will meet February 20th at the Proud Bird Restaurant, Los Angeles, to hear LG Daniel O. Graham (USA-Ret), former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, speak of the "High Frontier" program committed to defensive technology in space. The chapter will host several other military service support organizations, and the program will be cablecast live. For more information call (213) 831-4958 or (213) 641-3292.

Florida

Satellite Chapter. Sixty-eight members and guests attended the chapter's October luncheon meeting at the Suntree Country Club. The guest speaker was Thomas Polgar, a veteran of over forty years in intelligence. Since retirement from the CIA in 1981, Polgar has served as a consultant to the DOD and as a writer for the *Miami Herald*. The speaker offered his observations on the present status of U.S. intelligence, with comments on issues in Central and South America.

The chapter's meeting was dedicated to the memory of its former President, James Griffin, who died in September.

The chapter has announced that its speaker for the February 8th meeting is Jerry Parr, Assistant Director, Office of Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service, speaking on terrorist activities. Parr was in charge of the Secret Service detail during the assassination attempt on the life of President Reagan. Parr pushed the President to the floor and instructed the driver to proceed directly to the hospital, a decision believed to have saved the President's life.

Suncoast Chapter. Forty-seven members and guests met at the MacDill Air Force Base Officer's Club for the chapter's October 10th meeting. Lieutenant Colonel Wesley J. McMillen, USA, recently returned from a tour of duty in Saudi Arabia, spoke on the "Nation of Islam." He described life "in and out of the compound," protocol, and the religion and culture of the country.

The chapter's January 17th meeting, held at the Breckenridge Resort Hotel at St. Petersburg Beach, featured the Air University national security briefing team detailing the complexity of national security issues and intelligence.

The chapter is pleased to announce that it enrolled twenty-four new members during 1984.

Montana

Western Montana Chapter. The chapter's fall meeting was held November 16th at the Missoula Country Club. Eight AFIO members hosted the special guests, members of the Western Montana Military Officers Association.


Mrs. Ruth J. Patrick, Dean of Library Services of the Mansfield Library, University of Montana, accepted eight volumes from the chapter for deposit with the library. In addition to the Constantinides *Bibliography* and a copy of the late Charles Simpson's *Inside the Green Berets*, the library was presented with a six volume antiquarian set in French dealing with the life of George Washington.

The chapter invites potential speakers who will be visiting or passing through the Big Sky Country to let them know. "We can round-up AFIO members on short notice," says Richard A. Grant, AFIO chairman for Montana.

New York

Greater New York Chapter. Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey was guest of honor and featured speaker at the chapter's autumn meeting, held November 2nd at the University Club in midtown Manhattan. Noting the size of the crowd, which included not only AFIO members but also guests from the Veterans of OSS, the DCI did not offer a briefing on current geopolitics. (Casey told the crowd at the outset, "You can't have an off-the-record briefing with two hundred people in the room.") Instead, he presented a progress report on the rebuilding of American intelligence capabilities in the first term of the Reagan Administration.

Saying the U.S. intelligence community has "never been in better shape," the DCI recounted the goals set forth by President Reagan four years ago: the reestablishment of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the enactment of legislation imposing criminal penalties against those who disclose the identities of U.S. intelligence agents, restrictions on the use of the Freedom of Information Act to obtain CIA operational files, and a general rehabilitation of the intelligence community following the devastating cuts of the 1970s. All those goals, Casey reminded the audience, have been met. And, the DCI said, a substantial part of the credit goes to the strong support and public education efforts of AFIO.



Lee E. Echols with a group of servicemen who heard his presentation on AFIO, why it was established and its accomplishments and goals. Echols gave a series of talks at the University of California and National University, both at San Diego.

Intelligence Issues . . .

Balanced Estimates

To many in intelligence, the collegial method of refining estimates requires excessive compromise and concession; Frequently, individual views, although noted, fail in the process. A CIA veteran, John Horton, has taken serious issue with the system as he claims to have experienced it during recent service with the Central Intelligence Agency. In public speeches, articles and published letters, he has raised charges, heard before in other Administrations, that intelligence estimates have been corrupted to conform to the views of senior policy makers. In a rare public comment, the DCI responded to the allegations in a letter to the Washington Post, which also published Horton's rebuttal. Since both men are held in respect by many members of AFIO, Periscope asked CIA's Office of Public Affairs for any additional information which might be made available to shed light on the controversy. We are indebted to the director of that office for the previously unpublished text of a statement distributed to employees of the agency, which is offered below along with the DCI's letter and Horton's response.

"To the Editor:

"In a January 2 Op-Ed article, John Horton stated that he 'quit the CIA' because pressure was put on him to come up with an estimate that would satisfy the Director of Central Intelligence. It is not entirely clear what Mr. Horton means by this. As National Intelligence Estimates are issued by the Director and are traditionally regarded as his estimates, it is hardly surprising that, after hearing the views of all agencies representing the Intelligence Community, the Director should want to be satisfied that the estimate is accurate and that it fully conveys what the users should know.

"If Mr. Horton means that he was required to suppress or distort evidence available to the Intelligence Community, it is a very serious charge which needs to be addressed on the record. The first obligation of the Director of Central Intelligence is to produce intelligence estimates and reports that are as accurate, comprehensive and objective as possible and which appropriately reflect the diverse and often conflicting views of the various components of the Intelligence Community. Improving the estimating process was my primary concern when I assumed office in 1981. Procedures were instituted to encourage a broad range of views. The chiefs of every component of the American Intelligence Community are responsible for putting forward at the meetings of the National Foreign Intelligence Board the information and judgments developed in his organization. These procedures were carefully followed in the estimate addressed in Mr. Horton's article.

"Concern over developments had led to the initiation of a new estimate of the prospects of serious instability in a particular country. This issue was controversial within the Intelligence Community. There were disagreements between the drafting analyst and Mr. Horton over deletions made by the latter and I insisted that at least some of the information and challenges to conventional wisdom present in the analyst's original draft be restored to the estimate so that the range of views existing in the Intelligence Community would be available to policymakers. The full range of the judgments that came out of the process were clearly and prominently stated on the first page of the estimate.

"Finally, I would bring to your attention that the House of Representatives Committee on Intelligence reviewed this matter and stated in its annual report just issued this week that: 'The Committee examined the earlier drafts and the final version of that particular NIE and found that dissenting views were printed at the very beginning of the study, a practice the committee applauds.'

Sincerely,

William J. Casey"

"To the Editor:

"The intent of my op-ed piece was to bring attention to the problem of policy makers' rejecting intelligence judgments that displease them. The letter from William Casey did not address that point.

"Instead, he discussed the estimate on which we disagreed, repeating in short form what the two of us discussed in correspondence several months ago. In reply to two letters, I put in what I assume

to be the official record a more complete account of what seems to be the differences between Mr. Casey and me on that question.

"The question of general interest is not who was right or wrong about that estimate, but how we are to ensure that the intelligence that goes to the president is not diluted on the way by the passions of the moment.

"The question may be put to one side; we must not pretend that it is either irrelevant or unimportant.

John Horton"

[To employees of the CIA:]

"Our obligations too frequently require that we suffer in silence when faced with allegations about our work. We do speak out to deny violations of law. Similarly, any charge or implications that information is suppressed or slanted goes to the heart of our work and cannot be allowed to go unanswered. That is why I wrote the attached letter which appeared in last Sunday's *Washington Post* and which I would like to share with you.

"Inside the organization, I'd like also to have it known that the estimate was drafted by an analyst with 20 years of experience who made two trips to the country in question and visited areas which had long been neglected. His original draft offered interesting new insights and, in some areas, challenged conventional wisdom. The National Intelligence Officer chairing the estimate deleted much of this material, in my judgment excessively weakening a legitimate and important view on the controversial issue. I had some of the data and judgments which had been taken out of the analyst's draft restored in order to discharge my responsibility to provide policymakers with the full range of substantiated information and judgments prevailing in the Intelligence Community.

"As the House Intelligence Committee said in its report on this matter:

'Several Directors of Central Intelligence, including the current DCI, have taken the position that NIEs should represent their own views and that any views that differ should be included so that the policymaker can have the benefit of differing analysis. The Committee examined the earlier drafts and the final version of that particular NIE and found that dissenting views were printed at the very beginning of the study, a practice the Committee applauds.'

William J. Casey

Director of Central Intelligence"

Disinformation

*In his favorable review of *Espionage Techniques and Countermeasures* in the last issue of Periscope, Norman L. Smith differed with the authors on the meaning of the term "disinformation." The authors viewed it as "a propaganda attack based on lies, false accusations and doctored facts." Smith countered with an intelligence definition "of or about or concerning information," with no inherent implication of false or mis-information. He reminded readers:*

"The technique is the reverse of propaganda, which proceeds from a point source to a broad target. Disinformation operations proceed from a broad base against a single or small target, such as a prime minister or his cabinet. The technique involves providing the target with the same theme or 'facts' from as many and as varied sources as possible using both witting and unwitting agents of influence. The idea is to convince the target to take some action favorable to the operator by control or manipulation of his data base. There is not requirement that the themes be false or deceptive per se. They can be, but they also may be true. If we persist in limiting our concept of disinformation to crude forgeries we risk failing to recognize and counter some of the truly sophisticated disinformation."

Here are two additional comments, the first by AFIO member Leo D. Carl, the second from a published interview of Roy Godson, co-author of a recent book on the topic.

"I find Mr. Smith's argument with respect to the disinformation technique more persuasive, but here, again, I do not agree with him entirely. While it is true that disinformation themes need not be false or deceptive, *per se*, that they may be true, *per se*, they are *always* used in a distorted manner to mislead or deceive. I do agree, however, that disinformation operations are not limited to crude, or for that matter sophisticated, forgeries.

"From my knowledge of Soviet Government/Party/KGB usage, I prefer to place *disinformation* into two separate categories:

"(1) Any information fabricated or distorted by one government on a non-attributable or falsely attributable basis for the purpose of influencing the actions of one or more governments, international organizations, officials, individuals, public or private entities in a manner to further the political, economic or military objectives of the former

"(2) In double-agent or wartime deception operations, all "fed" information, whether true (to "build up" the doubled agent in the eyes of the opposition) or fabricated.

"I am aware that the first definition is more usually applied than the second, given the nature of counterespionage operations, but a moment's reflection should prove the validity of the second definition within the parameters of its specialized usage.

Leo D. Carl
Lt. Colonel, USAF (Ret)

In a recent press interview, Roy Godson, director of the Washington office of the National Strategy Information Center, provided two convenient definitions explaining the difference between the terms "disinformation" and "propaganda" as practiced by the Soviet Union.

"Propaganda," he said, "has many different meanings and people use it in different ways, but the essence of propaganda is to tell the truth as one sees it. It is to project one's views in a favorable way, and to show how the other side or other point of view or other product is not as good as yours."

"Disinformation," today called "active measures," says Godson, "is the use of overt and covert techniques to influence, deceive and mislead the target. The intention is to affect his behavior, to get him to act in a way that is detrimental to his own interest and, at the same time, to act in a way favorable to Soviet interests."

He explained that "Disinformation uses a combination of truth and falsehood. Sometimes you use more truth, and other times more false information. In addition, propaganda is used to affect people's attitudes with the hope they will act a particular way. But disinformation is designed to lead to specific actions." Godson, co-author with Richard Shultz of the book "Dezinformatsia," notes that there are approximately 2,200 Soviet and bloc officials now serving in the United States, with about 30 to 40 percent being intelligence officers. He estimates that approximately half of these Soviet intelligence agents are engaged in political intelligence—collecting political information and engaging in "active measures." He suggests that the largest segment of Bloc intelligence agents here is engaged in political matters, active measures and disinformation.

Phillips' Guide is Worthy Chapter Project

(continued from page 5)

personal experiences and comments about the intelligence profession, and includes a frank chapter on the issue of ethics, morality and secret operations. A few pages are devoted to a narrative description, complete with tradecraft terminology, of the duties of a typical case officer serving abroad. The only weakness of the work is in the chapter on what one interested in the profession should read to gain a fuller understanding. The books suggested are good ones, but the list is far from complete for the young person who needs to make that final crucial decision, whether to go with the intelligence profession or Sears Roebuck. The military intelligence elements should receive equal time in future editions.

Yes, I recommend the book be read by serving and former intelligence professionals, henceforth there will be little need to stumble and stammer. But I see a greater obligation for those who have left the quiet service. This guide to our profession should be in every university library and on the desk of every career counselor. Either individually, or as a chapter project, donating copies where they are most needed should become one of our priorities. [The paperback edition may be ordered from Stone Trail Press, P.O. Box 17320, Bethesda, MD 20817; the hardback may be ordered from University Publications, 44 North Market Street, Frederick, MD 21701.]

[Edward F. Sayle, former Curator, Historical Intelligence, CIA, is the editor of *Periscope*.]

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The following members have generously contributed an amount equal to or exceeding one year's annual dues.

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500 H Street S.W.
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AFIO SPRING LUNCHEON

Friday, April 12, 1985
Bolling AFB Officers Club
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OFF THE WIRE: News in Brief

OSS Officer Appears to Be First Viet War Casualty

Col. Thomas F. Lancer (USA-Ret) reports that during his nostalgic return to the Normandy beachhead to recall D-Day, 1944, he observed a commemorative plaque on a side altar of the Cathedral of Bayeux which read: "Lieutenant-Colonel A. Peter DEWEY, Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur, Croix de Guerre avec Palmes, Parachutist de l'Infanterie de l'Armee des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, ne a Chicago le 8 Octobre 1917, Mort a l'Ennemi le 26 Septembre 1945 a Saigon, Indo-Chine, Priez Pour Lui."

Col. Lancer's research has determined that Col. Dewey commanded a unit called DETACHMENT that was dispatched by OSS Detachment 404 in Ceylon to accompany British forces into Saigon. The OSS unit's mission was to locate and assist Allied prisoners-of-war, track down war criminals and confiscate or microfilm all Japanese documents and code books. Among other assignments was reporting postwar political trends, including actions by anti-Allied or pro-Japanese groups. The POW evacuation team parachuted into Saigon on September 1, 1944; Dewey and the rest of the unit arrived three days later.

On the day after their arrival they saw a peaceful parade manipulated by extremists into an attack on the French residents of the city; dozens of French men and women were beaten, thrown in jail and their homes looted. The EMBANKMENT team commandeered a hotel as a refuge for the French civilians, using Japanese to guard it against attacks by the Vietnamese. The team found the revolutionary government naturally prone to violence and disorder, engaging in actions that "appeared crazy and unexplainable."

To develop sources, Dewey—who spoke fluent French and had served with OSS in France and North Africa—established close contact with leaders of the independence movement. Officers of the Anglo-French occupying forces accused by him of exceeding his authority; They claimed his actions would be interpreted by the Vietnamese revolutionary government as evidence of official American support for the independence movement. The matter came to a head on September 14th, when the occupying commander ordered EMBANKMENT to cease all intelligence activities until its mission could be "clarified."

Dewey complained bitterly to OSS headquarters, and continued his intelligence activities pending U.S. instructions to the contrary. On September 24th, a member of the unit, Capt. Joseph Coolidge was ambushed and seriously wounded. Two days later, while Dewey and his executive officer, Capt. Herbert J. Bluechel were riding in a jeep, they were fired on without warning by a group of Vietnamese. Dewey was killed instantly but Bluechel, though wounded, fought his way back to the nearby villa that housed the OSS unit. There, he, Capt. Frank White and Sgt. George Wickes held off the Vietnamese attackers until help arrived from a nearby British post. Col. Dewey's body was never recovered.

In 1981, a Vietnamese refugee in France told DoD officials that the attack had been carried out by a Viet Minh front group. The jeep was burned, he said, and after taking Dewey's pistol, the attackers dumped the body in a well. According to the refugee source, the two leaders of the attack were killed later fighting the French.

ABC Settles Libel Action Brought by U.S. Marshal

The ABC television network, while admitting no wrongdoing, has agreed to settle a libel suit filed three years ago by the head of the Justice Department's Federal Witness Protection Program.

The broadcast at issue, an investigative report entitled "Hostages of Fear" on the program "20/20," alleged that Howard Safir, head of the witness protection program for the U.S. Marshal's Service, had been "badly misinformed or intentionally lying" about a number of witnesses who might have been murdered while under the protection of the Government.

In his complaint, Safir charged that correspondent Geraldo Rivera and two ABC producers deliberately edited out a portion of his on-camera response, intentionally distorting his answer. Sources at ABC said the network settled for about \$235,000 immediately prior to the trial.

Scholar Questions Status of Counterintelligence

Arnold Beichman, a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution, has raised serious questions about the state of U.S. counterintelligence. He concluded the study with these remarks:

"Richard Helms, CIA director from 1966-1972, has said, 'Counterintelligence is terribly important because without an effective counterintelligence program—both in the CIA and the FBI—the problem of double agents and infiltrators is insurmountable.'

"Over the last decade, U.S. intelligence agencies have been weakened, first, because of their own free-wheeling misbehavior and, second, because of understandable congressional investigations into this misbehavior. The late Sen. Frank Church, who chaired one of the investigations, once said in a fit of exasperation, 'I wonder if we are competent to manage an intelligence-gathering program on anything.' In any case the congressional probes, particularly of the counterintelligence function, weakened U.S. intelligence to an alarming degree.

"The question today is whether or not the CIA or FBI have an effective counterintelligence capability. In 1981, Newton S. Miler, former chief of operations in the CIA counterintelligence staff under the controversial James Angleton, told a conference of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence that such a CI capability was then lacking. Neither the CIA nor the FBI, he said, was neutralizing Soviet and Soviet-bloc activity in the United States, the KGB's No. 1 target. Whether there has been any improvement in the situation since the Reagan administration took over is unknown to the writer.

"However, what is known is that for some years after these congressional investigations and Justice Department actions restricting intelligence activities, the training and recruiting of counterintelligence personnel was inadequate, according to Kenneth deGraffenreid, now on the National Security Council Staff and earlier on the Senate Select Committee. Thus, the apprehension, however admirable, of an FBI counterintelligence operative raises anew troubling questions about U.S. counterespionage capability and therefore of U.S. intelligence in toto.

"To put it simply, the crisis of U.S. intelligence is a crisis in counterintelligence."

Quis Tells Rotarians Of Terrorist Threat

Col. Francis R. Quis (AUS-Ret), a member of AFIO, made a telling point in a recent talk before the Rotary Club of Statesville, NC. After describing the impact of terrorism on the United States and how small nations without large armies and nuclear weapons have learned to grab the headlines through acts of violence, he had a word for apologists who doubt the hand of the Soviet intelligence services: "In the last ten years when the USA has been the focus of terrible attacks, the Russians have not been attacked by the terrorists."

New Laws Return to Stalinism Says Department of State

The Department of State has published a Foreign Affairs Note indicating that "Recent changes in Soviet criminal law have further restricted the rights of Soviet citizens, increased penalties for offenses and tightened state controls." Some of the new legal provisions, states the Note, "open the door to revival of Stalinist practices."

The new laws strengthen and broaden laws dealing with sabotage, treason, anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and transmitting work-related secrets and economic data to foreigners. According to the Department, one provision threatens those who receive funds or goods from abroad, be it royalty payments to writers or gift parcels from western organizations or individuals. Another could make it a violation of the law to tell a foreigner where one worked and another includes "acts threatening state security" as treason. For those already in the KGB's camps, a new law makes it a criminal offense to engage in "malicious disobedience" (infractions of labor camp regulations).

The new laws are seen as an effort to disrupt contact between activists/refuseniks and foreigners.

Former RCMP Security Chief Assesses Canada's Vulnerability

"Successful [Canadian] governments have never learned the knack of using effectively the information derived from various intelligence and security services," says John Starnes, the first civilian Director-General of the RCMP Security Service, who served from 1970-73. According to Starnes, "In particular they have often failed to take sufficient account of such information in the formulation of foreign, defense, trade and security policies."

Speaking at York University earlier this year, the former security services chief focused on the problem: "Many Canadians apparently are unwilling to believe that anyone would wish to carry out such unfriendly activities against them. This is partly because we tend to think that we are universally liked and that others perceive us as we see ourselves—peace-loving, honest brokers filled with goodwill towards everyone. What secrets do we possess that could possibly interest the Russians or anyone else? I recall a senior and influential Cabinet minister arguing exactly in that vein, I believe with genuine conviction."

To emphasize the vulnerability, Starnes noted that "Soviet bloc intelligence activities rarely are taken into account at the official and ministerial level when policies and strategies are being formulated for the conduct of our overall relationships with the Soviet Union."

This is in conflict, he said, with "the never-ending attempt by the KGB and others to compromise Canadians through blackmail, entrapment and coercion." "To my personal knowledge," he added, "there have been literally scores of such attempts in the past 25 years and probably the numbers are greater, since it must be assumed there are some such attempts which go unreported and thus are unknown to the authorities. The victims have included officials, journalists, politicians, diplomats, cypher clerks, businessmen, academics, tourists and sportsmen—the KGB's tastes are eclectic. The unsavory methods are designed to take advantage of the human frailties of individuals they consider some day may be of use to them."

The Soviets have meddled in Canadian internal affairs as well. According to the former security chief, the Soviets have harassed ethnic groups for political and other purposes; have created agents of influence who, consciously or unconsciously, serve some Soviet purpose; have provided clandestine financial support for causes and political groups serving Soviet interests; and have provided ideological and military instruction for groups and individuals whose avowed aim is the destruction of Canadian institutions and those of its allies.

The Russians and their satellites, including Cuba, says Starnes, have stepped up their espionage and disinformation activities recently. He suggests that this "more aggressive stance being displayed by the KGB and the GRU . . . raises some very serious questions in terms of our future relations with the Soviet Union, how we manage those relations and what it may reveal about Soviet intentions."

Challenge Elects New Officers

A significant number of AFIO members were among those elected as officers of Challenge, Inc, a legal action fund for intelligence officers.

Elected were: President, J.E. "Ned" Dolan; Vice President, William Tyng; Treasurer, Charles Claxon. Alfonso Spera, reelected as Secretary, subsequently passed away. Newly elected to the group's Board are Col. John V. Lanterman (USA-Ret) and Col. Mary Thompson (USA-Ret). W. Raymond Wannall has joined Challenge's Board of Advisors.

Report Suggests Goals For Next Four Years

In 1980, the Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based study group, proposed an agenda for the Reagan Administration; Much of what was proposed was implemented. Recently the Foundation presented a model agenda for the next four years. Among its suggestions is a section on national intelligence, the key elements of which are:

"While the Reagan Administration has sought to improve intelligence capabilities, the results have been mixed. Morale within the

intelligence community, and respect for and confidence in the capabilities of the intelligence agencies at home and abroad are vastly improved. Yet American intelligence continues to fall short of the extensive improvements envisioned by the Reagan Administration in 1981. At least part of the reason for this is that the administration made only a handful of political appointments to the CIA, not nearly enough to re-invigorate or re-orient the agency. Problems persist."

Initiatives for 1985: "Educate the public; improve Intelligence Community leadership; grant the Defense Intelligence Agency director hiring direction; tighten the focus of technical intelligence; improve human collection techniques; allow the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board presidential access; and establish competitive analysis."

The Next Four Years: "Long range objectives should focus on five major areas: Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection; technical collection; counterintelligence (CI); covert action; and analysis and intelligence estimates."

Senator John Chafee on the "Quiet Service"

The nature of intelligence activities requires that success be secret. On the other hand, the nature of our society is such that controversy in intelligence activities will often lead to public debate based on speculation. I suppose President Eisenhower summed it up best when he said of intelligence:

"Success cannot be advertised; failure cannot be explained. In the work of intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism—their reward can be little except the conviction that they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country, and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts."

As one who served on the Intelligence Committee, I want to emphasize that there is much to be proud of in our Nation's intelligence effort. There are many "quiet successes." One of the things that has struck me in my service on the committee is the sacrifice we demand of the men and women in the intelligence profession who are responsible for these "quiet successes." They constitute the Nation's first line of defense, and their contributions are critically important to our national security. Yet, there can be no public acclaim or recognition of their accomplishments, dedication, professionalism, or bravery.

On the wall in the entrance foyer to the CIA headquarters building in Virginia, you will find a star for each of those officers who have given their lives while in "quiet" service to their country. The names of some of these individuals are noted, but the names of others, given the nature of their work, cannot be revealed to the public. The number of those stars has, unfortunately, been increasing in recent years. I can think of no more poignant symbol of quiet service to the Nation than those stars associated with names that must remain secret.

I think we would all do well to reflect on this aspect of the intelligence profession whenever we debate or consider a matter of controversy in U.S. intelligence. We as a nation owe a debt of gratitude to people in the Intelligence Community that we cannot name, for accomplishments that cannot be trumpeted. I salute the men and women of our Intelligence Community—those who have served, those who are presently serving, and those yet to come—and thank them for their unique sacrifice.

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From the President 's Desk

1985 promises to bring many challenges to the U.S. Intelligence Community, and every member of AFIO has an important role to play in assisting the nation in fulfilling its responsibilities.

We are in a position to comment with knowledge and objectivity on matters relating to intelligence which face the nation. Obviously the most important issue that will be before us for the foreseeable future is reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union that will insure peaceful solutions of the many vital issues that separate these two great nations.

Make no mistake about it: this is a very serious problem. It is not a case of our being the good guys and the Russians being the force of evil. Each nation has determined attitudes toward the requirements for national security. Aside from a small group of scholars and public officials in each nation, there is very limited understanding in each of the motives and guiding forces in the other.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States are newcomers as great powers, even though both considered themselves as such long before emerging as the most powerful: the United States during World War II; the Russians more recently.

Historical factors have been important in the rise to great power by each. The Americans shocked the European powers in the eighteenth century when they fought and defeated what was then one of the most powerful powers on this planet: Great Britain. Not many Europeans, including the Russian Imperial Court, thought that the fragile new republic in the Western Hemisphere would survive. Likewise, the Russian Revolution of 1917 brought forth a new regime which had to struggle many years before its survival was insured. Many of us consider the Russians paranoid, which may well be true, but the Bolsheviks' fight for survival may well have added a considerable sense of insecurity. Their attitude toward us may well be affected by U.S. hostility during the post-revolutionary period and our non-recognition of the Soviet Union until 1933.

We are so blessed by our geography that it is not surprising we tend to forget that other nations may not be so fortunate. Although we have fought in more than our share of wars, one every quarter of a century if we include the war for independence and the Civil War, we consider ourselves peace-loving and not warriors. Regardless of how we consider ourselves, we maintain military forces on a permanent basis to meet every contingency and think of such futures as "Star Wars."

It seems unnecessary to say to AFIO members and friends that our national experience dictates the necessity of maintaining the most effective intelligence service in the world, not solely because of the possibility that we may have to fight another war—which all of us fervently want to avoid—but to graphically indicate to the world the high price of aggression. While we never asked to be keeper of the peace, we are the only power on earth that can do so.

This awesome responsibility requires not only that we maintain our place as the most powerful nation militarily, that we are in the forefront in science and tech-



Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
President of AFIO

nology, that we constantly strive to make ours a better society for all who live here, but that we have genuine concern for all others. We are alumni of intelligence services which must be the best in their specialties in the world. These services provide the government with the information it needs to be effective in the world arena. As an organization devoted to supporting the intelligence services in the public arena, we must exert constant and effective efforts to shed the "cloaks" and get rid of the "daggers" that so many word-merchants use as nameplates for activities about which they know little or nothing. If the truth shall make us free, then we should be freedom fighters in spreading the truth about our former profession.

I want to stress that I am not suggesting that AFIO become a strident, raucous voice in the political arena. There are a number of these, and while their impact may be noisy, their long-range influence is limited. AFIO has acquired a reputation as a responsible organization which sponsors carefully prepared proposals formulated with the nation's needs in mind.

AFIO must continue to build its strength and membership as representative of *all* the departments and agencies in the intelligence community. We should also intensify our efforts to become truly national in scope. Perhaps it is too much to look forward to the day when a couple of wranglers meet on the range in Wyoming and part with the comment: "See you at the next AFIO meeting!" But surely it should be our objective to be nationwide in our membership so that every community in the United States will be within reach of an AFIO chapter on which they can call for speakers and reference material.

And now is the time to put on your calendar the next AFIO convention: Friday and Saturday, October 4th and 5th, at the Crowne Plaza in Rockville, Md. This convention site is within about 30 minutes of downtown Washington, D.C. via Metro's rapid transit, and a reasonable commute by private automobile. This year we plan to make an intensive effort to have as many members of Congress as possible at the convention. Plan to come and bring one (or both) of your Senators and your representatives in the House. It will give them something of unusual interest to report to their constituents.