ADDENDUM TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reporting the Floor discussion on
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
in the House
19 July 1947 and 25 July 1947

ADDENDUM NO. 3 to VOLUME I

[redacted]

[illegible] spend, spend, spend. Something is going to happen, and it is going to happen next year when the people realize what has been going on. They should and will elect a Republican President if it not be stopped.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICH. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. HOFFMAN. He cannot spend anything unless the Congress appropriates it.

Mr. RICH. Well, we are cutting down on the spending in the departments of Government. If we had the aid of the executive department, we could do a real job. Be wise and economize.

PERMISSION TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks and include a newspaper article.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?

There was no objection.

[Mr. RANKIN addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

STANDARD NEWSPRINT PAPER

Mr. KNUTSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of H. J. Res. 238.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Minnesota?

Mr. RAYBURN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, I think I shall object hereafter when the gentleman asks unanimous consent to take up "H. J. Res." There is no such thing.

Mr. KNUTSON. "House joint resolution"; I beg the gentleman's pardon.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Minnesota?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the joint resolution, as follows:

Resolved, etc., That paragraph 1772 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"PAR. 1772. Standard newsprint paper: For the purposes of this paragraph paper which is in rolls not less than 15 inches in width shall be deemed to be standard newsprint paper insofar as width of rolls is concerned."

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a tird time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA APPROPRIATION BILL, 1948

Mr. HORAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H. R. 4106) making [illegible]riations for the government of the District of Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of such District for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, and for other purposes, with Senate amendments thereto, disagree to the Senate amendments and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none, and appoints the following conferees: Messrs. HORAN, STEFAN, CHURCH, STOCKMAN, ANDREWS of Alabama, BATES of Kentucky, and FOGARTY.

COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES

Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries may sit during the day during general debate.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Obviously a quorum is not present.

Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 123]

Allen, Ill.	Goff	Morton
Bell	Gossett	Muhlenberg
Bennett, Mich.	Granger	Murray, Wis.
Bland	Gross	Norton
Bloom	Gwynne, Iowa	O'Hara
Boggs, La.	Hall, Edwin Arthur	O'Toole
Bonner	Hall, Leonard W.	Pace
Boykin	Harrison	Patman
Buckley	Hartley	Patterson
Byrne, N. Y.	Havenner	Pfeifer
Camp	Hays	Ploeser
Celler	Hébert	Powell
Chapman	Hendricks	Rabin
Clements	Hope	Reed, Ill.
Cole, Mo.	Jennings	Richards
Colmer	Johnson, Tex.	Riley
Cooley	Jones, Ala.	Rivers
Cotton	Kee	Sabath
Coudert	Keefe	Schwabe, Mo.
Cox	Kelley	Sheppard
Cravens	Kennedy	Smith, Ohio
Davis, Tenn.	Keogh	Smith, Va.
Dawson, Ill.	Kilday	Somers
Dingell	Kirwan	Stockman
Dirksen	Klein	Thomas, Tex.
Domengeaux	Lea	Thomason
Douglas	Lesinski	Tollefson
Eaton	Ludlow	Van Zandt
Feighan	Marcantonio	Vinson
Fellows	Mason	West
Flannagan	Meade, Ky.	Whitten
Fuller	Miller, Md.	Wilson, Tex.
Gallagher	Morrison	Zimmerman
Gifford		
Gillie		

The SPEAKER. On this roll call 320 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY

Mr. WOLCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Banking and Currency may sit while the House is in session during general debate today.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. DOLLIVER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the RECORD and include a statement by R. K. Bliss, of the extension service, Iowa State College.

Mr. HORAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the RECORD and include a news letter.

Mr. BENDER and Mr. FORAND asked and were given permission to extend their remarks in the RECORD.

Mr. MILLER of California asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the RECORD and include an editorial.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the RECORD and include a letter from the mayor of Lovejoy, Ill.

Mr. KEFAUVER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the RECORD and include an editorial.

Mr. LODGE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the RECORD and include a letter and an article.

START

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 4214) to promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security; and pending that, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all those who may speak on the bill may include in their remarks any relevant material, and that all Members who so desire may have five legislative days in which to extend their remarks in the RECORD on this subject.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker, on Wednesday last, the majority leader sought the unanimous consent of the House for the consideration of this bill at any time after the presentation of that request early on Wednesday. Objection was made by me to that request for the reason that the bill was not then available to the Members of the House. After consultation with the majority leader the request was subsequently made that the bill should be called up any time after Friday. The basis for the alteration in the request was that at least a day would intervene between the time the bill became available and the time the bill was called up. I am advised that this bill has not been available to the Members until 9:30 this morning. My parliamentary inquiry is whether it

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would be in order at this time to make a point of order against the motion upon the ground that at least 24 hours have not intervened between the time the bill was available and the time the bill was called up.

The SPEAKER. In reply to the inquiry of the gentleman from New York, the Chair would say that under the unanimous-consent agreement which was reached on July 16, appearing in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at page 9270, all points of order against the bill were waived.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker, a further parliamentary inquiry. I am further advised that although the bill is available this morning, the report accompanying the bill is not. Would it be in order to raise a point of order against the motion of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] upon the ground that the report is not now available?

The SPEAKER. It would not be in order because the same ruling would apply. All points of order were waived under the unanimous-consent agreement.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker, a further parliamentary inquiry. I am informed that the report does not comply with the rules of the House in that it does not set forth the alterations proposed by the bill to existing law. My inquiry is whether the request of the gentleman from Indiana, the majority leader, that points of order against the bill be waived also carried with it the waiving of points of order against the report which is supposed to accompany the bill.

The SPEAKER. The Chair is compelled to make the same ruling in this instance also. All points of order were waived under the unanimous-consent agreement and, therefore, the raising of that point of order at this time would not be in order.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker, without undertaking to dispute the decision, I call you attention to the fact that the request for waiving points of order was directed to the bill itself. Does the Speaker rule that the waiving of points of order against the bill carried with it the waiving of points of order against the report?

The SPEAKER. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, would not the recourse of the gentleman from New York be to vote down the motion to go into the Committee of Whole?

The SPEAKER. That is a matter for the House to decide.

Mr. RICH. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. RICH. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] asked unanimous consent that all Members might extend their remarks and include extraneous matter in reference to this bill.

The SPEAKER. Yes; and that request was granted.

Mr. RICH. Mr. Speaker, that seems to be a very broad request.

The SPEAKER. The House has already passed on that and granted the unanimous-consent request of the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. RICH. Mr. Speaker, I did not hear the gentleman exactly when he made that request. It is a dangerous precedent.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] asked unanimous consent that Members might be permitted to so extend their remarks. The question was put before the House, and the House granted the request.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker, a further parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker, would it be a proper course of action for the Members to pursue who feel that they should be given an opportunity to study the bill before consideration is given to the bill by the House in Committee of the Whole to vote against the motion offered by the gentleman from Michigan?

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from New York does not state a parliamentary inquiry. The House, of course, can vote as it pleases on all subjects.

The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN].

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill H. R. 4214, with Mr. CASE of South Dakota in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, general debate will continue not to exceed 5 hours, to be confined to the bill, and the time to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN].

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH].

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, at last we have come to the consideration of the bill known generally as the unification bill, H. R. 4214. It may not be a matter of surprise to many members of this committee that I rise in support of the measure. Having been concerned about the problems of our national defense for something like 25 or 30 years, I welcome this opportunity to support a measure which I am convinced will make this Nation stronger, that will achieve its strength with efficiency, and ultimately with marked economy. It is not my purpose at this time to engage in a general discussion, much less to attempt any oratory, with respect to the defense of our country and the present condition of the world, but rather I thought I would impose upon your patience in an attempt to describe to you as best I may the organizational set-up proposed by this so-called unification bill. It is for that reason I have had this chart prepared. Unfortunately, some of the print will be difficult for you to read, but I hope, in an informal fashion, to describe just what this whole thing is.

We all know that under the Constitution of the United States the President, in addition to his duty to execute the laws, performs two other very, very important functions. One, he conducts the foreign relations of the United States; and, two, he is Commander in Chief of the armed forces.

In this bill we attempt to set up an organization which will assist the President in the performance of those two special functions, the conduct of foreign relations, and his function as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. I, therefore, call your attention to the fact that at the top of this chart there is depicted the organization which is to assist the President in the performance of those functions. He is Commander in Chief, as the chart indicates, of course; and there is organized under the provisions of this bill a National Security Council which is to consist of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Defense, whose position and functions I will come to later, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Resources Board. That is the National Security Council, and the President is a member of it and, if he so desires, may preside over it.

The National Executive Council is to have but one executive officer, the Executive Director, who might be described as office manager, and he must be a civilian. It is to be noted that all of the members of the Executive Council are civilians, and by reason of their respective offices each one of them must be confirmed by the Senate.

The Executive Council cannot do its work effectively unless it has assistance, and one source of assistance must be a study to be made of the resources of this country. The President must have the advantage of a continued study of the resources of the country as well as a complete understanding of its military strength in order that he may conduct the foreign relations of the United States in a proper fashion.

The presence of the Secretary of State upon the Council is significant. For the first time in our history we propose that the statutes shall provide that the conduct of foreign relations shall be recognized as an exceedingly important part of our general behavior before the world; and the Resources Board is to make continuous study of the resources of America, its natural resources, its manpower, anything of importance which relates to the strength of this country or its potential strength: Oil, iron ore, electric power, food, coal, any number of things that are part of the natural resources of the United States. The Resources Board is to make a continuous study of that part of the problem and make recom-

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Arkansas.

Mr. HARRIS. I understand the Secretaries of the various services do not have Cabinet status.

Mr. WADSWORTH. The Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force do not.

Mr. HARRIS. Are they appointed by the Secretary of Defense or the President of the United States?

Mr. WADSWORTH. By the President of the United States.

Mr. HARRIS. Is this bill similar to the bill that was passed recently by the Senate, or are there marked changes?

Mr. WADSWORTH. It is very, very similar. In fundamentals it does not differ, in my judgment, from the Senate bill. There are certain changes which our committee has made which are important in themselves, but they do not change this set-up at all.

Mr. JARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. JARMAN. Am I correct in the assumption that these Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Corps are civilians under this bill?

Mr. WADSWORTH. They are civilians.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. COLE of New York. On the question of whether or not the Secretaries of the three departments should have Cabinet status, to which the gentleman replied that they would not, is it not correct that the bill is silent in that respect?

Mr. WADSWORTH. The bill is silent in that respect, because no act of Congress has ever been passed and probably never will be passed defining a Cabinet officer.

Mr. COLE of New York. That is correct. My point is that it is entirely possible in the future for any one or all of these Secretaries of the three departments to sit in the Cabinet if the President requests them to.

Mr. WADSWORTH. There is nothing to prevent it, and I do not believe the Congress has the power to tell the President who shall be a member of his Cabinet. A custom has grown up, of course, with which we are all familiar, but there is no statute on that subject.

Mr. HOBBS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. HOBBS. Would the gentleman be kind enough to explain to us what happens to the Marine Corps?

Mr. WADSWORTH. The Marine Corps under this bill is certainly amply protected.

Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff have executive authority, or are they under the control of the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. WADSWORTH. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not have executive authority. It may be said that they have a certain degree of military authority. For example, if the joint Chiefs of Staff propose a certain strategic operation in time of war and come to a decision or suggest that such an operation should be engaged in, if the President approves it, then the joint Chiefs of Staff through military channels put it into effect.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. With further reference to the question propounded by the gentleman from New York about the Cabinet status of the various Secretaries, I should like to point out that there is a statute, probably the only one on the books, which refers to the Cabinet members of the President. That is the statute which fixes the salaries of members of the President's Cabinet at $15,000 per year.

Having that in mind, the committee wrote into this bill the salaries of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, at $14,500.

Mr. WADSWORTH. That was to make a little distinction there.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. And we provided for the Secretary of Defense the salary paid to Cabinet members.

Mr. WADSWORTH. That is right.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.

Mr. VORYS. The gentleman has mentioned the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I find nothing in the bill which provides whether their action must be unanimous as was the case during the war and which caused considerable difficulty—or whether they can function through a majority vote or something like that.

Mr. WADSWORTH. There is nothing in the bill to the effect that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reaching a military decision must act unanimously. It would be a reckless thing for the Congress to put any such imposition upon them.

Mr. VORYS. However, it is the purpose of this new arrangement to provide for machinery so that action can be taken even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not unanimous in their decision?

Mr. WADSWORTH. That would be up to the President as Commander in Chief.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has again expired.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman five additional minutes.

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. OWENS. Inasmuch as this is a new law which might require action by the Congress at some future time, would there be any objection to a provision therein which would require that the Council immediately give a copy of its recommendations and reports to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate as well as to the President?

Mr. WADSWORTH. Does the gentleman refer to the Security Council?

Mr. OWENS. Yes.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Does the gentleman mean that the Security Council shall report upon all its findings and recommendations directly to the Congress?

Mr. OWENS. Yes.

Mr. WADSWORTH. If you do that, then you will be reporting to the entire world.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Occupying a rather unique question as a member of both the Army and Navy Subcommittee on Appropriations, even though I have not had time to study the bill in detail or see the report, a cursory study on the basis of your remarks would indicate that possibly at the outset there might not be economies accomplished by the bill. But from your explanation I would understand that there should eventually be great economies in procurement and research, and in development, and much of the work now being carried on which is separated in the various branches of the military services.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I am thoroughly convinced of that. Permit me to make this observation. When this bill becomes law, the man who is appointed to the position of Secretary of Defense cannot be expected to achieve millions of dollars in savings in a week or two or a month or two or perhaps even a year. He will have a big job on his hands. He will have to work on this thing day after day in consultation with others as they report and recommend to him. He will have his own ideas, of course, but step by step I am convinced that large sums of money will be saved and better work will be done.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Thus, you will avoid, in the case of another emergency coming up, the competition, you might say, between the branches of the service in trying to obtain certain materials and equipment.

Mr. WADSWORTH. That would be his job—to prevent that competition—and the bill, in effect, says so.

Mr. JENKINS of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, a member of the committee.

Mr. JENKINS of Pennsylvania. Is it not a fact, in answer to the statement by the gentleman from Kansas, that the bill provides the Secretary of Defense shall coordinate the budget requirements of the three military departments, which is the first time, as the testimony indicated, in our national history that any one person has ever been in a position to oversee the preparation and presentation of these budgets to the Congress, and, therefore, that in and of itself will lead to a tendency to avoid duplication and cross-procurement, and so on?

Mr. WADSWORTH. Let me say that for the first time in our history the House

Committee on Appropriations will get an over-all view of the budget of our national defense.

Mr. LYLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. LYLE. Would the gentleman take a minute to explain the possibilities under this measure for joint training and joint use of facilities so that we will not have overlapping?

Mr. WADSWORTH. Under the provisions of this bill, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to plan for joint training and joint education in the military service. If their plan is approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President, it goes into effect.

Mr. LYLE. This bill, as I understand your explanation, will give us and give America for the first time an opportunity to have a military policy consistent with our responsibilities and our resources.

Mr. WADSWORTH. This links the military policy with foreign policy, all measured by our resources and the potentialities of other people.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Would the gentleman explain a little more about the National Securities Board? Is that only a planning board, or is the law so written that in the event of an emergency they can set up these various agencies?

Mr. WADSWORTH. To which board does the gentleman refer?

Mr. JOHNSON of California. The National Security Resources Board.

Mr. WADSWORTH. That is purely advisory.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. In the event of an emergency, we would have to pass legislation to implement what they recommend?

Mr. WADSWORTH. No. The legislation is already set up. The Munitions Board will plan the industrial mobilization and advise the Secretary of Defense and President, and it will be put into effect. These are boards of students as it were to study our resources and make recommendations, but not to administer.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Under an act which we passed several years ago, the Munitions Board was simply empowered to create a stock pile.

Mr. WADSWORTH. They may recommend the creation of a stock pile, and urge it, but they do not have the power to establish it. However, it can be very influential with the Secretary of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] has again expired.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman five additional minutes.

Mr. JACKSON of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON of California. Would the gentleman comment on the Joint Staff as to their functions under the Joint Chiefs of Staff? The Joint Staff has caused some concern to some of us.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have at all times what might be termed a staff to help them. It has not been a super staff, like that of the Germans; not a super general staff. Those four men on the Joint Chiefs of Staff must have assistants. If they come to a decision with respect to a strategic operation, which is planned probably months in advance, to put it into operation they must have the help of men who will develop the orders that go down through the military channels, and their staff is solely for that purpose, just as it was during the war. It does not supplant the Bureau of Naval Operations in the Navy Department or the General Staff in the War Department.

Mr. JACKSON of California. Would the gentleman have any objection to a provision in the act which might limit the tenure of officers serving upon the Joint Staff? Not upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the Joint Staff—the body which acts now as a sort of secretariat. I think the principal matter of concern among people who have come to know the military is that once an officer becomes ensconced in a swivel chair it is sometimes difficult to get him out.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Well, you may remember that under the law, at least as it applies to the Army, a man may not serve on the Staff more than 4 years. Then he must go back to troops or other stations for a period, before he can resume his place.

Mr. JACKSON of California. I agree that is an excellent provision, but would there be any great objection to making such a provision in this measure?

Mr. WADSWORTH. That is existing law and applies to this personnel just the same.

Mr. JACKSON of California. It would apply to the Navy and the Army under this bill?

Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes. That is my understanding. That law is already on the statute books.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.

Mr. VORYS. Coming back to the Munitions Board, the gentleman said it was advisory. It seems to me it would have administrative and executive functions similar to the War Production Board. Under the Secretary of Defense, is it not proposed that the Munitions Board will be the agency which will conduct allocations of priorities and do other things which we had a lot of boards trying to do in this past war?

Mr. WADSWORTH. That is true. That is the way it will evolve. They plan these things. For example, they would coordinate the appropriate activities within the National Military Establishment with regard to industrial matters, including the procurement, production, and distribution plans of the departments and agencies comprising the establishment; they would plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization; they would recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities among the several military services, and plan for standardization of specifications and for the greatest practicable allocation of purchase authority of technical equipment; they would prepare estimates of potential production; they would determine relative priorities; they would make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve existing interservice agencies; they would maintain liaison with other departments and agencies for the proper correlation of military requirements within a civilian economy, and so forth; but they do not take into their hands the actual execution of those things; the Secretary of Defense does that.

Mr. KERSTEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.

Mr. KERSTEN of Wisconsin. It seems to me from what the gentleman has said that the Central Intelligence Agency is one of the very important parts of this entire set-up. I wish to ask the gentleman if there is a definite coordination provided for between that Agency and, say, the Department of State? For I feel that certain information of the Agency would affect the activities of the entire system.

Mr. WADSWORTH. The gentleman is correct. May I point out that under the provisions of the bill the Central Intelligence Agency in effect must cooperate with all the agencies of the Government, including the State Department. It is the gathering point of information that may come in from any department of the Government with respect to the foreign field, including the State Department, of course; including the War Department, through G–2; including the Navy Department, through ONI. That information is gathered into the central agency to be evaluated by Central Intelligence and then disseminated to those agencies of Government that may be interested in some portion of it.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has again expired.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments started hearings on the so-called unification bill on April 2 of this year. We have been charged by some people with hurrying this legislation through without giving proper consideration to it. In the Seventy-eighth Congress, the Woodrum committee of the House held extensive hearings on the necessity of merging our armed forces. Last year two Senate committees held extensive hearings on the question. Our committee—as you can see from the size of the printed hearings held many days of hearings.

Some people from the Navy have accused our committee of cutting them off. We have been accused of trying to stifle the Navy. The record will show, however, that we heard more Navy representatives than we did from any other service. I believe several members of the committee who heard some of the testimony from representatives giving the Navy view on this question were almost convinced before the hearings were over that we should have an absolute

merger instead of a so-called unification bill. It was disturbing to hear some of the testimony and read it in the hearings of the jealousies, the bickerings, the back-biting that evidently is going on now between members of our armed forces. If a complete merger would eliminate that fighting among the services, bring about a spirit of cooperation, bring about a spirit and a will to be on one team and fight for the best interests of America instead of the selfish interests of a few individuals, I would vote today, if some one offers an amendment, for an out and out merger of our armed forces. I think we could save millions of dollars, yes, billions of dollars, if we were to have an out and out merger. I am frank to say that when I was chairman of this committee last year and the bill was referred to us, I did not have any hearings because I was opposed to it; but the hearings this year have changed my mind.

If you will read the hearings you will find that our committee has tried to be fair with everybody. There was some charge we were trying to destroy the Marine Corps. No member of our committee, no Members of this House, who can recall the gallant efforts of the Marines in Guadalcanal, the islands of the Southwest Pacific, Tarawa, the Marianas, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa would consent to see that great corps destroyed or its efficiency in any way affected.

There have been charges we are trying to destroy naval aviation. Any person who will read the questions asked by members of this committee, who will read the results of our deliberations as found on pages 16 and 17 of this bill, must surely know that the members of this committee can never forget what we owe to those men in the Naval Air Forces who gave their lives in the battles of Midway, the Coral Sea, the Philippine seas, and the seas around Japan itself would want to destroy or impair naval aviation.

There were some charges made that if this bill is enacted into law it will bring about a military dictatorship in this country. That is the lowest type of attack on the bill. The only way, in my opinion, that we will ever have a military dictatorship, or any other kind of dictatorship, in this country, is when the American people themselves deteriorate to such an extent that they lose their desire to fight for their own liberty; then we will have a dictatorship, and it will not make any difference whether it is a military, Fascist, communistic, or any other kind of a dictatorship. That is the only way a dictatorship will ever come to this country. As long as the elected representatives of the people have control of the purse strings and carry out their duties in an effort to preserve our system of government, we will not have a military dictatorship. There has never been a dictatorship established in a country where the majority of the people fought, bled, and died to keep any kind of dictatorship down. You may read the history of Germany, Italy, Spain, many of the South American countries, as well as that of the Soviet Union, and I think you will agree with that conclusion.

It is true that the passage of this bill may not immediately reflect any savings.

The primary objective of the legislation, of course, is to strengthen our national defense and make it possible for us to more successfully prosecute a war in case we are ever engaged in another war. But we should at all times have economies in mind because our Nation cannot continue to spend more money than it takes in and pay out enormous sums of interest to retire the obligations that we owe to our people without running the risk of destruction from within. We have many stations throughout the United States, some of them in your district, and, of course, if an effort were made to close one of them because we have another station adequate to take care of our needs, you would be coming in here trying to keep that station from being closed.

As an illustration, we have warehouses for the three services side by side in many port areas of the country. We have airfields side by side, and I have heard it said lots of times that it was not quite a good idea for the planes of one service to land on the fields of another. That should not be. It should be possible to eliminate thousands and thousands of dollars' worth of annual expenditures for warehouses alone. It will take some time for these economies to be reflected, but they will come.

Of course, you will have some people say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will become similar to the old German Junker's military staff. As long as we have Committees on the Armed Forces, whose duty it will be to spell out the functions and the duties of our armed forces, I have no fear of any Junker system coming to this country.

Mr. Chairman, for many months we have listened to arguments for and against unification of the armed services. The controversy has been long and bitter but it has served a most useful purpose in that it has given many of us a better insight into problems surrounding national security.

Although the Secretaries of War and Navy, and their principal military and civilian officials, have reached an agreement on the terms of this legislation, opposition still arises from the rank and file of the United States Navy.

Mr. Chairman, in considering this far-reaching piece of legislation, it is important that we understand the background of fundamental issues involved in order that arguments pro and con will fall into their proper perspective.

As I see it, Mr. Chairman, true unification as proposed under the compromise plan agreed on by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, will result in the creation of one security organization composed of three coordinate fighting components; our land, sea, and air forces. Each of these components will be organized and trained to carry out its part of our over-all military strategy. No one of these fighting components will be capable of operating independently of the others. On the contrary, each will rely on the others and together they will form one dynamic fighting organization.

Why do we need unification? At present, Mr. Chairman, there are two separate and distinct defense departments each striving to become capable of independent military action. In each department we have land, sea, and air elements. Consequently, there exists a vast amount of unnecessary duplication. Cooperation between these two departments is almost entirely a matter of voluntary agreement rather than procedure.

Opponents of unification support the philosophy of maintaining two or more each competing for money, manpower, and matériel. This policy is directly opposed to the real objective of unification and, if pursued, can only result in continued wasteful inefficiency and the resultant weakening of our national security.

Mr. Chairman, it is important that we keep in mind the objective of this bill and the tactics employed by the opposition to prevent it from becoming an effective instrument of constructive military reorganization.

First, the opposition centered its attack upon the powers of the proposed Secretary of Defense, seeking to prevent the establishment of effective centralized civilian control and direction of our security forces in order to perpetuate the independent departmental status enjoyed during past years. This independence has permitted our services to decide their own programs, build their own forces, prepare and defend their own budgets, irrespective of the over-all objective. Mr. Chairman, the authority proposed for the Secretary of Defense is the very cornerstone of future unification and we must be on guard against any move to reduce this man to a mere figurehead.

Failing in this first objective to destroy the authority of the proposed Secretary of Defense, the opposition has directed its attack against the creation of a coequal Department of Air. The reason back of this is more subtle and should be examined with great care.

Air power has now become a controlling force in modern warfare and no military campaign, whether it be on land or sea, can be successful until the air war has first been won. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, opponents of unification are seeking to prevent the consolidation of our Air Force by parceling it among the surface components. This move, if successful, will perpetuate the present independent status of our forces rather than integrate their common efforts. Furthermore, it will vitiate the future military potentiality of American air power.

Under the terms of the compromise plan agreed to by the War and Navy Secretaries, naval aviation is left with the Navy and marine aviation is left with the Marines. In the interest of interservice harmony, I agree with this feature of the bill. However, any further spreading of our Air Forces among surface components will defeat the purpose of this bill and may prove disastrous in the event of future war.

If we are faced with a war in the future, it is altogether probable that military operations during the first year will be predominantly air action. If our available air resources are divided between surface components, the striking power and flexibility of future American air power will be lost. In fact, we may never, under such circumstances, be able to launch a surface operation because the air phase of the war would be lost.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that any bill designed to unify our armed forces must incorporate two basic features.

First, it must establish a responsible civilian head over our armed forces with necessary authority to unify their common efforts.

Second, it must create one military organization composed of three coequal fighting components; land, sea, and air. If these two fundamental features are not incorporated in the bill, unification of our armed forces will exist merely in name rather than in fact.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that further deliberations on this measure and further amendments submitted will be considered in the light of these facts.

(Mr. MANASCO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BENDER].

(Mr. BENDER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BENDER. Mr. Chairman, on July 11 a local newspaper carried an editorial, and among other things it said:

> Now that unification has reached the halfway mark, it is to be hoped that the Senate's statesmanship will be duplicated by the House. There, unforunately, the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, which never should have received the bill in the first place, is still sitting tight on it. The attitude expressed by Committee Chairman CLARE HOFFMAN is far from encouraging. Mr. HOFFMAN has been quoted as saying that his committee will write its own bill.

I want to stop there for a moment to say this: Of course, this editor was not elected to Congress and I don't think he attended any of the hearings on this bill. His representative might have been there a time or two. When the editor asks this body to abdicate to the other body, he is wholly out of order, and I am sure our chairman is correct, if he is quoted correctly here, in taking the attitude that this committee should write its own bill. That is as it should be. We are not rubber stamps for the other body. We used our own judgment. We acted after due deliberation. Every possible opportunity was given to those who wanted to be heard on the bill. As a matter of fact, during the time I have been here, I have never known a committee that has acted more deliberately, that has considered a bill more fully than this committee has considered this legislation.

Mr. ELSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENDER. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. ELSTON. Since the committee did write its own bill, and I am sure it has a reason for every provision in the bill, may I ask the gentleman why there is a separate department for the Army Air Forces and no provision has been made for a separate department for the Navy Air Forces?

Mr. BENDER. Since the bill was reported out the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] has requested that the committee hold a session, and he asked to appear. I am sure the amendment he will offer will be supported by an overwhelming majority of the committee, confining the Naval Air Force to the Navy. The Naval Air Force will not come under the provisions for unification of all the air forces and under the Department of Air. That is the situation as far as the gentleman's question is concerned.

This bill came to us from the President asking that there be unification. Frankly, many members of the committee had grave misgivings about this bill's creating a military dictatorship in this country. Time and again this phrase was used during consideration of this legislation. Your committee has endeavored to write into this bill provisions that would guarantee that this not be a military dictatorship, that we not create a military dictatorship through Army and Navy unification, as we understand it. However, we have no assurance or guarantee regarding the administration of this bill. There is a lot of faith, hope, and charity, regarding what will happen. How can we tell how this bill will be interpreted or administered? Many of us on the committee still have grave apprehensions about the bill. We hope it will work, and we want it to work. Every member of this committee hopes and prays that this will accomplish what the President had in mind.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENDER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Is it not true that there wil be constant surveillance over the functions of this bill by the proper committees of the Congress, and of course by the Appropriations Committee?

Mr. BENDER. I trust that will be true, and I believe there will be such observation by the Congress and by the appropriate agencies.

In this editorial it is further stated:

> The only possible result of such unnecessary recapitulation would be delay—

That is, there were certain items referred to in the statement of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] regarding this bill—

> delay that becomes ominous with Mr. HOFFMAN's denial that unification is considered a Republican "must."

Let me say regarding this being a Republican "must" bill that this was not, as I understand, on the Republican "must" list early in the session. But it is today. In recent weeks we have been told, that is, those of us on the Republican side, that our leadership considers this a Republican "must" bill. Under the circumstances, we went along and tried to write the best bill that we knew how since the Republican leadership of the House has joined with the Administration in supporting the measure.

The charge that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] has in any way delayed the consideration of this bill is wholly without foundation. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] has cooperated fully.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENDER. I yield.

Mr. McCORMACK. I think that is very clear. The Republican and Democratic members of the committee, if I might use a strong word without being unkind to the editor or writer of that article, repudiated any such charge as that. The gentleman from Michigan has cooperated. He has been frank in the expression of his views, and he has never done anything other than cooperate with the committee in trying to have the hearings expedited, and then in executive session trying to get the marking up of the bill completed as quickly as possible.

Mr. BENDER. Mr. Chairman, since the gentleman from Massachusetts the minority whip [Mr. McCORMACK] is a member of our committee, I am sure that he is informed as to what the situation was in committee. He is absolutely correct in his appraisal of the chairman's work and the chairman's diligence in seeing to it that this bill was reported out.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENDER. I yield.

Mr. MANASCO. I want to say that the chairman of the committee has not been using dilatory tactics. I happen to have had the same charges made against me last year. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] has done everything in his power to get the hearings printed on time. It was not his fault that the members of the committee did not return the copy of the transcript which they had in their offices for the purposes of correction. That is one of the reasons why the hearings are not available to everybody today. You can not get those hearings ready in a minute. The chairman even wanted to hold night sessions to expedite the consideration of this bill. He has done everything possible in the matter.

Mr. BENDER. I thank the gentleman for his testimony. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] has been most diligent and most painstaking in reporting this bill out as quickly as was humanly possible. As a matter of fact, if any charge could be leveled against him, it would be that he was so agreeable that he permitted it to come out too soon.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENDER. I yield.

Mr. JUDD. I would like to advise the committee that the hearings have been here from the beginning and that the reports are now here. They were delayed in delivery from the Printing Office, but they are now available.

Mr. BENDER. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. BATES of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENDER. I yield.

Mr. BATES of Massachusetts. I think we can agree with the gentleman from Ohio, who is now addressing the Committee, that there has been a good deal of apprehension about this bill. I think it is only because we got off on the wrong foot by statements which were made particularly with reference to the Marine Corps that the objective of the original bill was to reduce the Marine Corps to the status of a police force. That is one of the things that got us off on the wrong foot. Personally, I feel that while the leadership of the House has had its way in the matter, it might have been better if this bill had been referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the House, as it was in the other body, and then we might have been able to get a little better action on it.

Mr. BENDER. Of course, the bill was referred to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments because its primary purpose is to create greater efficiency and bring about greater economies in the armed services. We do not know about economies, but we trust that greater efficiencies will be accomplished as a result of the passage of this bill.

I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. BARDEN].

Mr. BARDEN. I would like to ask the gentleman what newspaper printed that article.

Mr. BENDER. This is from the Washington Post.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENDER. I yield.

Mr. VORYS. Referring to that editorial, which speaks of this as an administration "must" bill, and referring to the gentleman's remarks that the Republican leadership has made this a "must" bill, I want to say that I am one Republican who has been for some form of unification for 30 years, since the time when I was attached to the Royal Naval Air Force when it went into the RAF. I am proud that this task, which is a difficult one, which the administration failed to accomplish when they had control of Congress, is being carried through to a conclusion under Republican leadership and in a Republican Congress.

Mr. BENDER. I thank the gentleman. I will say this regarding the chairman of this committee and his effort to produce a good bill, he has made every possible effort to do so. He has done every conceivable thing, even though he had grave apprehensions about this bill.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENDER. Not at this time. The gentleman from Michigan is too modest.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the debate must be confined to the bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENDER. I yield to the gentleman from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH], in response to a question by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBBS], stated that the Marine Corps was amply provided for. I would like to ask the gentleman if, under this new reorganization and unification, the strength of the Marine Corps will be maintained at approximately 20 percent of that of the Navy.

Mr. BENDER. I trust it will. I am sure the Marine Corps and the leadership of the Marine Corps is satisfied with what is done in this bill. As a matter of fact, they are amply protected and their interests are protected.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am worried at the statement contained in the hearings, containing letters from General Eisenhower, General Spaatz, and the remarks of General Armstrong of the Air Force, that the Marine Corps is to be reduced to a very minute part of the Navy.

Mr. BENDER. General Eisenhower and General Spaatz did not write this bill. The committee wrote it, and I can say, with absolute knowledge as to the provisions in this bill, that the Marine Corps is satisfied with what is written into this bill.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENDER. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina, a member of the committee.

Mr. DORN. As far as the Marine Corps is concerned, on page 17 of the bill, paragraph (C), there is a page and a half; more than General Vandegrift, Commander of the United States Marine Corps, even asked for. It is right here in the bill, page 17 of the bill.

Mr. BENDER. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. BREHM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENDER. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. BREHM. Who is responsible for putting these designs up on the trestle board?

Mr. BENDER. Just what does the gentleman mean by that?

Mr. BREHM. Who started the idea or the plan, as depicted by the drawings on the easel back of the gentleman?

Mr. BENDER. Frankly, I have not studied that chart.

Mr. BREHM. Where did the idea of a merger first originate?

Mr. BENDER. It originated in the minds of the people generally that there is need for unification. They do not like Army, Navy, and Marine Corps bickering.

Mr. BREHM. You mean that the general public started this idea of merging our armed forces?

Mr. BENDER. Not this particular idea.

Mr. BREHM. I just wanted to know who "we" constitute. Various previous speakers have said "we this," and "we that," and I was simply trying to pin it down and find out who the speakers are speaking for.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has again expired.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. LANHAM].

Mr. LANHAM. Mr. Chairman, as a freshman Member of this House, I have had very little to say at this session of the Congress, not because anyone has imposed any degree of silence upon me, but because I think it is probably better for a new Member to get acquainted and take it a little slowly.

I would not rise this morning except for the fact that I do want to say a word of praise for the chairman of this committee and for the subcommittee that drafted this bill. I do not suppose there is a man in the House that I differ with more in political philosophy than the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN], but I have come to respect and admire him a great deal for his convictions, because he has the courage of his convictions, because he sticks to those convictions, because he had tenacity of purpose. I admire him also for his sense of humor. He never does take himself too seriously and he does not permit any member of this committee to take himself too seriously. As a matter of fact, because of his wit there has never been a dull moment on the committee. I want to say that I admire him most of all because of his fairness and especially his fairness to the freshman members of the committee and particularly to the members on the minority side. We had a lot of "big brass" before this committee, and I say that with all respect. We had all of the great generals and admirals and we had Dr. Vannevar Bush, one of the most interesting men who appeared before our committee. The gentleman from Michigan, instead of beginning the questioning with the high-ranking men on the Republican side, invariably began questioning, or permitted first the lowest-ranking member on the minority side, to begin the questioning of those witnesses. He was always patient with us and he went from the lowest-ranking man on the minority side to the lowest-ranking man on the majority side. I just wanted to say that in praise of the gentleman from Michigan, for the way he conducted those hearings. They were most interesting.

I want to say the same, too, of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BENDER] and the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. JUDD] who, when they presided, did the same thing and were just as courteous and kindly to members of the committee as they could be.

Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LANHAM. I yield.

Mr. BURLESON. I would just like to observe that I am fully convinced by the members of this Committee that it is a good committee.

Mr. LANHAM. I did not mean to make this a mutual admiration society, but I do want to say for the members of the Committee that we have gotten along famously together; and, frankly, I think we have done a good job. As a matter of fact we admit we have a great committee. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. BURLESON] will not have to prove it. I think the subcommittee that drafted this bill has done a fine job. There were criticisms of the bill when we first began hearings, but frankly I think this bill the subcommittee has reported out is much superior to the bill that first came before the committee and is better

than the Senate bill. I am sure it is going to mean for us a more effective military establishment and, in the end, that it will mean economy.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. BUSBEY].

Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Chairman, today we are being asked to take one of the most important steps that any Congress has undertaken. This bill provides for the most drastic departure in the history of our country from any previous position on national defense.

I do not think we should be under a wrong impression as to the purpose of this bill. Although it is called the unification bill, it reminds me somewhat of the time in the Seventy-eighth Congress when we had before us the Smith-Connally so-called antistrike bill. Everybody thought that just because it was called an antistrike bill it was going to stop strikes. It increased strikes over 400 percent. I think our majority leader, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HALLECK] referred to it quite correctly the other day when he asked unanimous consent for this bill to come up today. On page 9225 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of July 16 the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HALLECK] in response to a question from the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE], as to the title of the bill replied:

This is the so-called unification or merger bill.

This is neither a merger nor a unification bill. We already have a War Department and a Navy Department and if the Congress passes this bill we will still have the War Department and the Navy Department. In addition, we will have a new department known as the Department of the Air Force. How can there be a merger or unification of something by adding one additional department? True, under the Research and Development Board and the Munitions Board it is hoped we will accomplish a little economy, but under this superstructure of the National Security Council and the new Secretary of Defense, as he is called in this bill, we are going to add millions and millions of dollars of expense.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUSBEY. Just briefly.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. The gentleman made the statement that this is going to add millions and millions of dollars to the cost of the defense establishment. I take issue with the gentleman on that and I would like to have him explain why he has arrived at such a conclusion.

Mr. BUSBEY. I will be happy to reply to the gentleman. Even though I am a member of the committee I have not had a chance to read the hearings. I did not receive a copy of the hearings until late yesterday afternoon. I think it is a shame that any bill should come to the floor of the House unless the Members have had an opportunity to read the hearings and the report. I am sure that the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HARNESS] some place in the hearings will find testimony to the effect that it is estimated something like $600,000,000 will be required in appropriations for this new national security set-up. I am sorry I do not have the page reference before me. If I am in error I would like to have some one correct me.

Mr. Chairman, I am particularly interested in the Central Intelligence Agency feature of this bill. That is going to be a very, very important agency and I trust when certain amendments are offered under the 5-minute rule the committee will consider them deliberately.

On page 11 of the bill I especially call your attention to this language in line 16:

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence operations of the departments and other agencies of the Government as relate to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the FBI, is certainly an agency of our Government which relates to our national security. Inasmuch as the Central Intelligence Agency deals with intelligence outside the United States, I hope that particular section will be amended to eliminate the possibility of its going into the records and books of the FBI because the FBI does not go outside the United States. It is only concerned with internal intelligence and investigations in the United States.

Another feature I have been concerned about is the authority given the Central Intelligence Agency in this bill. In addition to evaluating, correlating and disseminating intelligence, it is given authority to collect intelligence. On May 21, 1947, there appeared an article in the New York Times entitled "Army's World Intelligence Ring Reported Halted By New Agency."

I have studied the directive of President Truman of February 5, 1946, under which the Central Intelligence Agency was set up and is now functioning, and I find no authority whatever for this agency to go out and collect intelligence. It has not only dissolved the Secret Intelligence Department of our War Department which was built up over the past 5 years, but it has assumed the authority to collect intelligence.

Under section 3 (a) of the Presidential Directive setting up the Central Intelligence Agency, there appears the following:

Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your departments.

Last year the Committee on Military Affairs went into the subject of whether the Central Intelligence Agency should collect intelligence. I will read you their conclusions from their report of December 17, 1946:

It is specifically understood that the Director of Central Intelligence shall not undertake operations for the collection of intelligence.

I am fearful that if we permit this Central Intelligence Agency to go out and collect intelligence as well as evaluating intelligence, we will run into such situations as those which occurred during the war in Yugoslavia, when the War Department sent a commission into Yugoslavia with General Mihailovich's forces. They sent out reports, and because the reports went into another branch known as the OSS, and the men at the head of the OSS did not agree with the principles of Mihailovich but were favoring the principles of Tito, the Communist dictator of Yugoslavia today, the reports of the War Department Intelligence were disregarded entirely.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman two additional minutes.

Mr. BUSBEY. That is what you run into, gentlemen, where you have an agency of intelligence—collecting intelligence and then evaluating its own conclusions. I might say I spent some time in intelligence myself, and can cite numerous and specific instances. It is the same situation we have had with the National Labor Relations Board, where they were prosecutor, jury, and judge.

I hope that we will consider very seriously amending that particular section so that we will not permit collection in this superintelligence agency. I also hope we will protect the status of the FBI so that there will definitely be no authority for Central Intelligence to go into their records and books.

Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUSBEY. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. I had some part in writing the report that the gentleman just quoted from, and I would like to ask the gentleman whether he feels that the provisions for Central Intelligence in the bill now before the House needs amendment to bring it in line with that recommendation?

Mr. BUSBEY. I certainly do. I am not opposed to a central intelligence agency, for coordinating, disseminating, and evaluating intelligence from the various departments. You remember what happened at Pearl Harbor. They had intelligence, but it was not correlated and evaluated correctly. I hope consideration will be given to that provision when we consider the bill under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HARDY].

(Mr. HARDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count. [After counting.] Seventy-nine Members are present, not a quorum.

The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 124]

Allen, Ill.	Gallagher	Lynch
Anderson, Calif.	Gifford	Mason
Battle	Gore	Meade, Ky.
Bennett, Mich.	Granger	Miller, Md.
Bland	Gwynne, Iowa	Morrison
Bolton	Hall,	Morton
Bonner	Edwin Arthur	Muhlenberg
Buckley	Harris	Murray, Tenn.
Byrne, N. Y.	Harrison	Norton
Carroll	Hartley	O'Hara
Case, N. J.	Hays	Patman
Celler	Hébert	Pfeifer
Chapman	Hinshaw	Ploeser
Chiperfield	Hope	Powell
Clements	Jackson, Calif.	Rabin
Cole, Mo.	Johnson, Tex.	Riley
Courtney	Kee	Rivers
Davis, Tenn.	Kelley	Sanborn
D'Ewart	Kennedy	Sheppard
Dingell	Keogh	Smith, Ohio
Domengeaux	Kilburn	Smith, Va.
Eaton	Kirwan	Thomas, N. J.
Fellows	Klein	Tollefson
Fletcher	Lea	Van Zandt
Fogarty	Lodge	Vinson
Fuller	Ludlow	

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. CASE of South Dakota, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill H. R. 4214, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 345 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal.

The SPEAKER. The Committee will resume its sitting.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, we are considering today a very important piece of legislation. We are considering a very important step involving the security of our country. I have the pleasure of being a member of your committee which has had this legislation under consideration. Being a freshman in Congress, and not having had a background of previous contact with this problem, I have attended practically every hearing in a diligent effort to learn as much as I could about the problem, and to dig out the facts. These hearings began in April and ended in the first week of July.

In passing, I should like to point out that all of the proponents of this legislation had plenty of time to prepare their statements and present them to the committee. It was not until the very last week of the hearings that those persons in one branch of our military organization who were opposed to this legislation had the freedom to come forward and state their views. Time and again in the course of the hearings, I asked the Secretaries of War and Navy or their representatives, why it was that in their huge departments there were no officers or officials presenting to the committee any views in opposition to this legislation. All I ever received were evasive answers.

After considerable effort the committee learned that articles 94 and 95 of naval regulations prevented naval officers from appearing before our committee to express their honest and genuine views concerning this far-reaching proposal. It was not until the very last week of the hearings that the Secretary of the Navy released a communication to all Navy personnel permitting them to freely testify. I did not learn of this action by the Secretary until after the committee had voted to close hearings on July 1, only 3 or 4 days later. Then there was an avalanche of naval officers eager to testify, but time was short and there was not sufficient opportunity for them to adequately present their views. I never did learn whether the War Department had any regulations similar to those prohibitions imposed upon Navy people, but I discussed certain provisions of the bill with several ground force officers whose views were in conflict with those expressed by War Department representatives. I suggested that they testify, and in each case they were unwilling to do so for fear of jeopardizing their future in the service.

This subject of merger or unification of the military forces is not new. It has reared its head in the congressional chambers from time to time during the last 20 years. During the last 3 years it has been under more or less constant consideration. At no time during this long history has there been any real agreement between the respective services. This current legislation—this National Security Act of 1947—is reputed to be, and was sent to Congress as, a compromise agreement between the different elements making up the military services. Everyone agreed it was a compromise. The leaders in authority in the respective departments who owe their jobs to appointments got together and reached an agreement, but all the testimony indicates that the agreement they made—the so-called compromise they achieved—failed to represent the thought of officers and men of the Regular services, as well as the officers and men of the Reserves. From my personal contacts, supported by testimony of various witnesses, it is clear that a large majority of the Regular officers of the Navy and of the Army ground forces opposed certain features of this legislation, and believe they are contrary to the best interest of national security.

During the course of the hearings, I attempted to find out just what was involved in this compromise. The results of these efforts were not too satisfactory, but one thing that was clear to me was that the only service group of consequence supporting a separate air force was the Army Air Forces itself.

In any drastic remolding of our military organization, there is danger of losing gains already won and coming out with an organization that will not stand the supreme test of war. Our present military establishment, composed of the Army and the Navy and their component parts, provided this Nation with a flexibility and a freedom of action of its armed forces capable of achieving overwhelming victories in two major wars. When we entered World War II, of course we had to make adjustments, but the very flexibility of our Military Establishment was conducive to unifying command operations under the War Powers Acts. Undoubtedly, we have learned much from our experience in the last war. We must utilize every bit of that experience, and in the light of changes which took place in the conduct of warfare between World War I and World War II, peacetime planning of our Military Establishment should assure the maintenance of a flexibility which will readily permit adjustments to keep pace with scientific developments.

In the recasting of our military organization, we should have our sights and attention focused on the future. What will the future war be like: What will it involve? How will it be fought? What form of weapons will be used? Where will the fighting take place? What are the objectives? What type of organization will insure victory?

These are some of the questions which should control the thought and action of every person directly concerned with this problem. They should control our thughts and action here in this House this afternoon. It is useless and idle folly to spend time trying to improve our armed forces and national security based upon World War II methods. For, we have already won that war—we have already jumped that hurdle with the Military Organization we possess at this very moment.

The important consideration facing us is national security. The question before this House is whether or not the legislation that we are now considering will improve the national security. This is the fundamental question we must determine. The future of our country, and the future of the world, depends upon the right answer. I say to you, we must have the right answer. Our country cannot afford the luxury of "a wrong decision."

Mr. Chairman, in the most major respects I think your committee has done a splendid job on this bill. It has worked hard and carefully weighed the testimony of the witnesses who have appeared. There have been differences of opinion on many major questions, but there has been genuine sincerity of purpose. I think the bill before you now is a vast improvement over the original bill, H. R. 2319, and a vast improvement over S. 758. There are certain parts of it—major parts—which are good, and I believe essential, and should be enacted into law. Everyone is in agreement regarding such essential improvements as the National Security Council, the Research and Development Board, the National Security Resources Board, the Munitions Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the effort and intent to integrate all of the departments and agencies of Government that are involved in national security. These are forward steps. They will prove beneficial. They will increase effciency and they need our immediate attention.

I cannot concur in that portion of the committe's report which recommends the establishment and creation of a separate and independent Air Force. I find nowhere in the testimony real justification for providing completely independent departmental status for the avia-

tion arm of the Ground Forces of the United States Army.

At present the Air Force enjoys a high degree of autonomy within the War Department. In none of the testimony do I find any basis for a contention that the efficiency of our fighting force can be improved by further separation of the Air Corps from the surface forces. It has been conceded by every witness that the air arm of the Navy is an integral part of the Navy and must remain so. The reasons supporting this contention appear to be logical, and it seems to me that the same reasoning applies with respect to the Army Air Force as related to the Army Ground Forces.

The only substantial argument for a further separation of the Army Air Corps into departmental status has to do with the morale of Air Corps personnel. If there is one branch of our military establishment which has the least need for improved morale, I believe it is the Air Corps. Various witnesses have testified that the conversion of the Army Air Forces into a separate department of air would tend to weaken the morale of naval aviation personnel.

The three departmental organization as proposed in this legislation is organizationally unsound as it would freeze the services into the pattern of World War II at a time when every prospect of the future indicates a necessity for a simplified and more closely integrated structure. It establishes an organization which multiplies complications and provides for many additional administrative brass hats. Money badly needed for real military purposes will be used for a greatly enlarged departmental structure and overhead.

Future developments may necessitate closer integration of air activities with surface activities. The three-department proposals provided in this bill would make closer integration more difficult. Let us preserve the present status of autonomy of the Air Corps, but I believe it unwise to provide further separation at a time when future requirements cannot be foreseen.

I strongly believe that no Department of National Defense should in essence be built around any specific weapon. If we should proceed contrary to this principle, we should be equally justified in a Department of Submarines, Field Artillery, Guided Missiles, and so forth. While the airplane is unquestionably one of our most dominant weapons today, there is no way to know whether it may be replaced with a more effective weapon in the near future.

Witnesses told your committee that the strategic bomber is not obsolete as of today, but that it is obsolescent as a type. We were also told that air warfare of the future will bear little or no resemblance to the air warfare of World War II.

It is my belief that our better course would embrace a coordinated two-department establishment with adequate and positive safeguards for the Air Forces of each department. Such an organization is relatively simple and far more economical. It would also have the major advantage of maintaining within the Ground Army and the surface Navy the air-mind spirit which is so essential to each at this time.

As I have said earlier, there are many things in this bill that I consider are essential. I shall support the bill. If an amendment is offered to eliminate those provisions with respect to a separate Department of Air I shall support that amendment. All through the period of consideration it has been my purpose to try to improve this legislation. That is still my purpose.

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARDY. I yield.

Mr. KEARNEY. Is there anything in this bill that could not be authorized under Executive order of the President?

Mr. HARDY. Does the gentleman mean with respect to the Air Forces?

Mr. KEARNEY. I mean with respect to the entire set-up so far as it goes.

Mr. HARDY. Under Executive order much of what this chart shows has already been accomplished. We now have something of a committee system for doing some of the same things the bill provides. We want to get away from Executive orders if we can, and we have attempted to write in this legislation the basic provisions of existing Executive orders so that they will have a basis in legislation rather than merely in Executive orders issued by the President.

Mr. ENGLE of California. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from California [Mr. SHEPPARD] may be permitted to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. SHEPPARD. Mr. Chairman, as we are about to consider the so-called military unification bill, I acquired some information which I consider is quite pertinent relative to Navy's air record during the war. This information was compiled by Mr. Stuart B. Barber, resident of Alexandria, Va., and the material was taken from the report of the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee whose duty it was to assign credit among the several military services for the destruction of all Japanese naval and merchant vessels sunk during the war:

The Pacific war was a sea and air war. The major Japanese strategic target was the shipping on which the empire depended for its industrial life. It is highly relevant, therefore, to a study of the relative effectiveness of the various services' weapons in strategic warfare to study their relative achievements in the war against Japanese shipping.

The United States Navy sank 78 percent of all Japanese ship tonnage lost, the Army Air Forces, 15 percent. The Navy sank 87 percent of all the Japanese warship tonnage lost, the Army Air Forces 6 percent. The Navy sank 87 percent of all Japanese tanker tonnage lost, the Air Forces 7 percent. Forty-five percent of all Air Force merchantship sinkings were in the last 6 months of the war, after the Jap merchant fleet, largely destroyed by the Navy, had already been forced back to its home waters. Most of the Air Force tanker sinkings were in the last few months of the war when the Japanese no longer had access to their oil fields.

Most of the Navy sinkings were by submarines, which accounted for over half of the Jap tankers and other merchant ships sunk, plus 70 percent of the warships, or specifically for over 5,000,000 tons of Japanese vessels; it should not be necessary to labor further the submarine contribution to the war; sinking ships was their job, and they did it magnificently with a relative handful of men. What is more important is to compare the respective contributions of naval aviation and the Army Air Forces, to see what lessons may be found therein.

Carrier aircraft sank, single-handed, 40 percent of the Japanese Navy's tonnage. Combined with other forces they sank about 875,000 tons of Japanese warships, or 48 percent of the total lost. Carrier aircraft were in on the sinking of 6 battleships, 13 cruisers, 13 carriers, 29 destroyers, and 13 submarines. Of these 79 major vessels the carrier planes polished off 62 without assistance, including 5 battleships, 10 cruisers, and 10 carriers.

Army aircraft were credited with a full or partial share in the destruction of only 22 vessels of the same classes; in only 8 of these cases were they unassisted, and all 8 of these were destroyers, the smallest of these classes of vessels. Army aircraft did not strike the major blow that sank a single enemy battleship, cruiser, or carrier (as against 25 for our carrier planes), though they assisted in 5 of the sinkings of these heavy ships. Even the Navy and Marine land-based planes had as good a record against warships as Army planes; they sank four destroyers and four submarines unassisted, and were a major factor in the sinking of four battleships and cruisers.

United States Navy carrier aircraft sank 76 Japanese tankers, amounting to nearly 400,000 tons. Army aircraft sank less than one-fourth this tonnage. The carrier sinkings, furthermore, were concentrated in the period from February 1944 to January 1945, and thus exerted maximum effect on curtailing the Japanese fuel supply at the time most critical for Japan. During this period carrier planes sank 15 times the tanker tonnage destroyed by Air Force planes.

It was during this same period that the Japanese merchant marine as a whole was taken off the high seas. It was the cumulative injury suffered during this period that induced thoughtful Japanese leaders to begin work for surrender before the B–29 raids first began—because they saw that with their shipping reduced to a fraction their military and industrial machine was already crippled beyond hope of recovery. This is attested by reports of the strategic bomb survey.

In this important 12-month period the Army Air Forces accounted for only 300,000 tons of Japanese merchant vessels, or one-thirteenth of the total sunk by all forces. Carrier aircraft sank 191,000 tons in 2 days at Truk, and 100,000 tons at Palau 6 weeks later, to equal the Air Forces year total during the first 2 months of the 12.

It is commonly regarded that the capture of the Philippines marked the complete military and strategic defeat of the Japanese. This campaign lasted from September 1944 through January 1945. During this period 1,975,000 tons of Japanese merchant shipping were sunk, but only 8 percent of this by the Air Forces.

During this same 5-month period carrier planes, alone or in cooperation with surface ships, sank 787,500 tons of merchant shipping in the Philippines, against 105,000 tons by Far East Air Force; 322,000 tons of enemy warships against 32,000 tons by FEAF. The carrier forces sank over 100,000 tons of shipping at Manila on September 21–22 alone, the same amount again on November 13–14, and 158,000 tons in the China Sea on January 12 alone. The most credited to the Far East Air Forces in any entire month is 57,000 tons of merchant and naval vessels.

It is from the Far East Air Forces, led during the war by General Kenney, that have

come the most strident claims of air-force superiority in the war at sea. Let us examine the record. From the beginning of the war through January 1945—38 months—the Far East Air Forces were credited with sinking only 330,000 tons of merchant shipping unassisted, plus some 40,000 tons with the assistance of other forces. This total was far exceeded by the carrier forces in the 3 months of September to November 1944 alone.

The Far East Air Force record against major Japanese warships is negligible—four destroyers sunk unassisted, seven with the help of other forces, plus air-force assists in the sinking of two light cruisers damaged in the Leyte battle, and a host of small patrol craft, but no submarines.

The principal FEAF claim to fame was the attack on the convoy off Lae in March 1943. The whole available air force was thrown into this battle against approximately 25 ships, most or all of which the air force claimed to have sunk. This tonnage was far exceeded by naval aircraft on each of over 20 different days during the war.

The lessons to be drawn from the foregoing are these:

1. Army Air Forces claims and statements may generally be taken with a large grain of salt.

2. Navy claims, particularly aviation claims made through the lackadaisical surface-minded Navy public-relations organization, can safely be considered conservative.

3. Naval carrier forces, being highly mobile, can penetrate deep into enemy territory to seek out the most important and vulnerable targets. Air Forces planes are tied to land bases, which can be moved forward only very slowly and with difficulty. A major reason for the Army Air Force failure to destroy much shipping, particularly tankers, was the inability of Air Force planes—other than heavy bombers, whose accuracy was seldom adequate to hit targets as small as ships—to reach this shipping. This was particularly true in the Philippines campaign, when Far East Air Force immobility was embarrassing. The carrier force had repeatedly to attack Japanese reinforcements en route to Leyte, with which the Air Force could not cope from its limited bases ashore. This resulted in delaying for 3 months the first Navy attacks on Tokyo.

4. Naval carrier planes are capable of attacking small, fast-moving targets such as ships with great accuracy and efficiency. This efficiency was so great that naval aviation's successful campaign against Japanese warhips and major merchant vessels required only 10 percent of the total attacks made by naval planes.

5. These factors of mobility and accuracy are applicable not only to attacks on shipping but to attacks on all types of small land targets located on or near coasts, including vital strategic targets such as bridges, power stations, rocket launching sites, and camouflaged or partly buried factories, which cannot be seen or hit accurately by high-altitude Army long-range bombers. These are the targets of tomorrow's war.

6. These facts are pertinent to the unification controversy, and to the struggle over methods of warfare which will continue even under unification. It is no secret that the Air Forces wish and intend to restrict the development and employment of naval aircraft, by one means or another, in directions that will prevent the full application of their potentialities to the strategic and atomic air warfare needs of the future.

For many purposes naval planes and methods are superior for strategic attack to those of Air Forces bombers. Naval aviators fear, the Air Force enthusiasm in behalf of unification confirms, and the private statements of Army airmen illuminate the intent, that the present unification bill is designed as a major means of facilitating this restriction. Army airmen generally affect contempt for naval aviation. The figures quoted herein suggest that this affected contempt may well be sired by an Air Force feeling of inferiority to naval aviation in some of the more important aspects of air warfare, or by an equally dangerous ignorance of the comparative capabilities of the two air services.

The reason I am presenting the above data is predicated upon the fact there has been considerable activity, to say the least, upon the part of some members of the Army Air Corps to minimize the necessity for a Navy and especially its air component; for example, such as the statements made by Big. Gen. Frank Armstrong, on December 11, 1946, at the Princess Anne Country Club, Virginia Beach, Va., at a chamber of commerce-military luncheon. There have been many other instances in which members of the Air Corps and the Army have gone to great length through their propaganda to impress the people of this Nation and the Members of Congress with the necessity for a unification bill and autonomy for the Army Air Corps. In so doing, in many instances, they have by direct expression or innuendo indicated the Navy was no longer a military necessity in our national-defense program.

I feel the branches of our military service are like a three-legged stood—all three legs must be equal to support the load the stool may be called upon to carry. If one leg of the stool is weakened, then the load is thrown off balance and ceases to be effective. I borrowed this description from an officer who has had long and successful military experience—Admiral Nimitz.

I feel this report of Navy's activities is definitely indicative of the necessity of Navy being maintained as an integral part of our military requirements if we are to preserve our form of government and way of living. I would not under any circumstances detract from the respective abilities of all of our military forces in this last war, but I do feel some of the Army Air Corps members have gone far beyond the acceptable in their method of procedure attempting to gain autonomy through the unification proposal.

The proponents of the bill have stated it would save money; that declaration still remains to be proved and, personally, I do not feel the enactment of this unification bill will serve the best interests of our Nation's defense requirements and I am not going to support its enactment.

Mr. BENDER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. ANDREWS].

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. Mr. Chairman, from the standpoint of national security there is under consideration by the House today the most important piece of legislation that has required our attention since the cessation of hostilities.

In these uncertain times of international unrest and readjustment, it is vital that we be realistic in our approach to the postwar world. In a word, we must keep our powder dry.

We are all justly proud of the splendid record of victorious achievement of our armed forces during World War II, but we would not be realistic if we did not recognize that the experience of war has indicated avenues for improvement which it would be foolhardy to ignore.

It takes no argument at this point to convince the most skeptical of our fellow countrymen that the waging of modern triphibious war is costly, complete, and calamatous to the loser. There is a limit beyond which our Nation cannot go in the matter of cost of military preparedness. In my opinion, the cost of the war just past in both human and material loss has lowered the limit of our capacity as a nation to carry the cost of national security. It would, of course, be gratifying to any potential aggressor if because of the element of cost—and I am speaking again in terms of men as well as material wealth—we were unable to maintain an adequate protective system for the country. They would do well to lend support to those who stand in the way of an efficient and economical system of national security.

Mr. Chairman, the founding fathers of our country saw fit to charge the Congress of the United States with the responsibility of providing for the common defense, and never in our history has this been a heavier and more awful responsibility than it is today. We cannot continue to survive in the modern world with an outmoded system of national security any more than we can survive if we fail to heed the advance of science in our every day domestic peacetime lives.

The patchwork of piecemeal military legislation which has characterized our country or the last 25 years, and the makeshift and temporary expedients to which we resorted to prepare or war are not geared to the atomic-powered jet-propelled future.

The day or change is at hand and that change must spell unity of effort, efficiency, and economy.

There are many of our fellow citizens who fail to realize the complexity of our Military and Naval Establishments or who know about the changes that have taken place within them as a result of the war. Victory has obscured the defects that defeat would have made grotesquely clear.

But there are those who from the hard experience of war have learned where these defects in our armor lie. Some of them are from military life, some are civilian officials in executive and administrative positions of the Government, and some, I am glad to say, are Members of the Eightieth Congress.

Among and between this composite group of informed citizens a firm resolve has taken form. A resolve to rectify now, before the lessons of the war are forgotten, the deficiencies of our national protective system.

For many months the legislation which is before you today has been given careful study by committees of the Congress. Every shade of opinion has been expressed. The whole subject has been argued pro and con in the press and on the public rostrum.

I would not presume upon the time of the Members of the House to discuss in any detail the study and the thought that

has been given to the subject of unification of the armed forces or to review in detail the provisions of the bill before you today.

I would like to speak briefly about the basic principles involved in any sound American plan for national security and why I believe this bill will put them into practice.

First, modern management requires a focus of control. Ultimately that focus narrows down to someone who will point the way to go. Where that direction is indicated it should be because the director has chosen it after receiving the soundest possible advice from experts in every field of endeavor involved.

The direction should be down the path that costs the least and gains the most. Most important, all following the direction should take the same path.

Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, I shall be accused of oversimplification, but I feel certain that these are sound principles for our armed forces and all the other agencies of government associated with them in the problem of providing for the common defense.

It was these same principles that the framers of the Constitution must have had in mind when they made provision for the President to be Commander in Chief of our armed forces.

The principles of direction and control under our form of government are no different today than they were 170 years ago. The difference lies in the complexity and magnitude of what must be directed.

The bill before you, Mr. Chairman, fully recognizes these principles. It provides a Secretary of National Security as the focus of management and control of our National Military Establishment, one who, as the full-time delegate of an overburdened President, will supply the management the President does not have time to exercise himself.

Expert advice is furnished the management on strategy and command by provision for the war-proven agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Expert advice on broad policies affecting the armed forces is furnished through the War Council. Expert advice on munitions of war and assignment of procurement and logistic responsibilities is furnished by the Munitions Board. Expert advice on scientific research and development, a twentieth-century must, is afforded by the Research and Development Board.

With such management acting upon sound advice, the armed forces will be organized for the first time, outside of combat theaters of World War II, into a team of land, sea, and air components with purposeful unanimity designed to carry out unified plans and programs.

On the next level above the National Military Establishment, there is provided the National Security Council with the President as chairman, which will effectively coordinate our domestic and foreign policies in the light of sound information furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency, and with the knowledge of our manpower and material capabilities derived from the National Security Resources Board.

Thus, our human and material resources can be accurately appraised and weighed against our commitments and our military policy and strength adjusted to keep them in balance.

Who is there to say that the application of such modern management methods will not bring economy and efficiency, or that adapting them to one of the most important government functions, national defense, is un-American? I say it is a typically American solution. All over the world we are known for our efficiency and progressiveness in business and industry. We should be known for efficiency and progressiveness in defense as well.

One principal military lesson that was taught by the recent war was that wars of the present and of the future can no longer be neatly compartmented into ground wars and sea wars. Wars of the future will be total wars. No land force, and no sea force can fight and win a war alone, and even the power of an air force is limited by the bases from which it operates and the protection and maintenance of its supply lines, which must be provided by either land or sea power or more probably at present by a combination of the two.

The fallacy of a divided command in the field, so vividly demonstrated at Pearl Harbor, was recognized early in the past war and improvised unified field commands established in all theaters of war. No responsible military or naval expert in the country questions the absolute necessity of establishment of such commands in the event of war or international emergency.

Unification of the defense establishment of our country on a national scale is a matter of even more importance than the creation of unified field commands in the event of emergency. The presently developed atom bomb, which can be delivered to targets many thousands of miles from the base of the carrying aircraft within only a few hours after the decision is reached to bomb the target, is but the forerunner of even more fearsome weapons that will be delivered to targets at greater distances and at greater speeds than anything now contemplated by man.

This matter of dispatching aimed projectiles to far parts of the earth, replaces the mile and a half range of cannon in 1861–65, the few miles of World War I, and the hundreds of miles of World War II and the thousands of miles that now can be covered by airborne ground troops in a day replaces the few miles that could be marched in a day by soldiers of only a few years ago. Where it was necessary for Generals Lee and Meade to have full command of their respective forces at Gettysburg; for General Pershing to command all American ground forces in France; for General Eisenhower to command all land, sea, and air forces in Europe; even so in the future it will be necessary to have some over-all controlling authority to supervise the operations of the armed forces of our country throughout the entire world. The battle lines of the future may well be drawn in the air above the industrial centers of the world, including those of our own country. The distance across the seas will no longer afford us the protection to which we have been accustomed in the past.

A matter of prime importance in the preparation for war is the joint training of units for participation in triphibious operatons and in mutual support and assistance in campaigns. Such training under a divided orgaization can be accomplished only at the times and in the degree that can be agreed upon between the separate ground and sea components. A unified defense establishment would have a primary responsibility to see that sufficient training was held to insure proper coordination of effort in future operations.

Joint training alone will produce the teamwork that is required for victorious action in the field against a major foe. In football the training of backs, ends, and linemen in the specialties of their own position is necessary in order to produce the basic skills for the particular position of the player, but the training of the team as a whole is just as important. Both are essential to victory. This is even more true in the serious business of war. The special training of the ground, sea, and air troops, and in fact of the specialists in each group is vital to the program, but the coordinated training of the entire defense establishment is just as important. As in football, both types of training are essential. A unified organization will insure such training.

The spirit of cooperation and teamwork is an item of great importance. Unification of the services at the top will dramatize the fact to the men in the field that they are all members of one team, regardless of the type of uniform they wear and the particular name of the service of which they are members. They will, of course, continue to regard themselves as primarily artillerymen, or marines, or airmen, or members of some other great organization, but will consider themselves also as teammates and not as competitors of their brothers in the other services.

There are those who say do not break up a winning team. To them I reply that the only way we can keep our winning team together—keep it from being dismembered by outmoded peacetime laws—is start now with this bill to build unity and teamwork into our ground, sea, and air forces on a permanent basis.

All of us who have studied this bill know that it is not perfect. No successful business venture is perfect at the start. Success and full realization is an evolutionary process, which the Congress is charged by law to see continued in our national security establishment. But there can be no evolution and no development unless we make a start, and the time to start is now.

This is a good bill, forged out of the best suggestions made by a host of witnesses. It reflects war experience and the experience of peace. It recognizes the emergence of air power as a powerful partner of land and sea power. It takes into consideration the continuing ad-

vance of science and its application to national protection. It looks toward unity of purpose and unity of action. It frowns on duplication, overlapping, and waste. It preserves and husbands that which is useful and effective and eliminates those practices which are costly and dangerous to our security.

I urge its prompt passage so that we may gain its undoubted advantages without delay.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I yield.

Mr. MANASCO. There has been some suggestion that we should limit the tenure of office of the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Is that not a matter that the Armed Services Committee itself will consider at a subsequent date? The Armed Services Committee should consider the limitation of tenure of office of the armed forces, and not the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. Is the gentleman asking about the tenure of office of Admiral Nimitz?

Mr. MANASCO. No. There has been a suggestion on the floor that we should in this bill limit the tenure of office of members of the Joint Staff. Personally, I think that is a matter for the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I agree with the gentleman. Not speaking as chairman of the committee, I think the Armed Services Committee is very much in favor of the continuance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an entity.

Mr. MANASCO. I am talking about the limitation of the tenure of office of the individual members of the staff.

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. Obviously, that is a matter for the Armed Services Committee to pass upon in the proper provisions of a bill.

Mr. MANASCO. I agree with the gentleman.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I yield.

Mr. McCORMACK. The committee that reported this bill out had in mind that enabling legislation will have to follow the establishing of organic law, in many respects, and we were very careful not to trespass upon the jurisdiction of standing committees to which that legislation would be referred. I think that is a proper policy for the committee to have adopted.

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. Yes.

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I yield.

Mr. PHILBIN. Can the gentleman inform the House how, if at all, this measure affects the present status of the Marine Corps; whether or not it cripples or impairs the Marine Corps as to personnel or functions?

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. As far as I can see, from my reading of the new amendment of the House, and the Senate bill—and I appeared before the Senate committee—the Marine Corps is amply protected for the future, not only in this bill but through the action of the Armed Services Committee, in increased rank permanently.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I yield.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. As a matter of fact, we wrote into the bill on page 17 additional safeguards for the Marine Corps, over and above what General Vandegrift asked.

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. That is right.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I yield.

Mr. WALTER. Will the gentleman explain what effect the enactment of this legislation will have on the functions of naval aviation?

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. In my opinion it will not destroy naval aviation as I see it.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I yield.

Mr. McCORMACK. In that connection I might advise the gentleman from Pennsylvania that it is expected that the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] will offer an amendment on that subject. I do not know of any member of the committee who is opposed to the amendment. I know it is very acceptable to me.

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. The members of the committee know my views.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. As a matter of fact I withdraw my remarks and ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD in a somewhat more formal statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York yields back 2 minutes.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. KEEFE].

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I was privileged to spend some 6 months of hard, intensive work and study as a member of the Pearl Harbor investigating committee. I think it can fairly be stated that the committee was unanimous in concluding that the evidence revealed the complete inadequacy of command by mutual cooperation where decisive action is of the essence.

Both the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii failed to coordinate and integrate their combined facilities of defense in the crucial days between November 27 and December 7, 1941. While they had been able over a period of time to conceive admirable plans for the defense of the Hawaiian coast, with the system of mutual cooperation, when the time came for the implementation of these plans, they remained hollow and empty contracts that were never executed.

The tendency of let George do it and to assume that the other fellow will take care of the situation is an inseparable part of command by mutual cooperation. The conduct of operations in which a state of joint oblivion was clearly manifest was possible in a command by mutual cooperation. None of these faults and unwarranted assumptions clearly described in the testimony could have happened under the unity of command.

Under the latter system, a single commander would have been charged with complete responsibility. All of the warnings and orders would have been his to interpret, estimate, and implement. In a command by mutual cooperation there is the unfailing likelihood of conflicting and overlapping prerogatives. The completely ineffective liaison between the Army and the Navy at Hawaii at a time when the fullest exchange of intelligence was absolutely imperative dictated that military and Navy intelligence particularly must be consolidated. Any fair consideration of the evidence adduced at that inquiry should convince any thinking person that if we are to have a proper state of military and naval protection, there must be unification of command.

It is my considered opinion that the security of this Nation demands the immediate passage of this unification bill. We of the Congress will have failed the trust which the people have placed in our hands if we do not adopt the measure so vital to the security of our Nation. Tying together our armed forces into a single team is only a small part of what we must do to remain adequately prepared and to meet our responsibilities. Being prepared in this atomic age requires a national war plan for the mustering of the entire country for the common defense. Obviously, national war plans will cut across the responsibilities of many Government agencies and many walks of life. These plans cannot be undertaken unless there are agencies to develop them. However, today there is no machinery to even examine the tremendous riddles posed by the need to be ready for total war. If we continue without unification, one aspect or another of our preparedness will suffer and leave us vulnerable—unready.

Prior to Pearl Harbor we had cooperative command, which failed. It was only by unity of command that we finally succeeded in the late war. There is no simple scheme which in itself will give this country the best security program possible; rather the solution of the problem of proper national defense must be found in the answers to a series of very fundamental questions. Let me pose these questions as an indication of the complexity of this problem:

First. Is the Government of the United States, acting through the legislative and executive branches, organizing the total human and material resources of the Nation to provide national security against total war?

Second. Does the Government of the United States possess conclusions which are at one and the same time authoritative, impartial, comprehensive, and up-to date regarding the effect of modern science on national security in the light of the facts of the world situation and of the capacity of our economy?

Third. Are these conclusions sufficiently firm to enable the American peo-

ple to tell what are the just demands to be made on their money and their manpower?

Fourth. Do these conclusions include definite information on the following points:

(a) The effect of recent scientific developments and future scientific probabilities on the nature of air, ground, and sea warfare.

(b) The most effective method for allocating manpower as between industry, labor, agriculture, essential scientific research, and other civilian occupations on the one hand and the armed services on the other.

(c) The method for allocating manpower between air, ground, and sea forces.

(d) The length of service for air, ground, and sea forces.

(e) The most effective way to procure needed manpower.

(f) The probable importance of fifth-column activity, psychological and biological warfare in any future war.

(g) The need for underground installations.

Fifth. What is the present ability of the United States?

(a) To hold strategic air, ground, and sea bases.

(b) To provide immediate defense against air and surface attacks.

(c) To undertake counteroffensive action of all types.

(d) To discharge our immediate responsibilities, viz, the occupation of Germany and Japan, the provision of military forces for the United Nations, the support of American foreign policy in the Orient and Europe, and the maintenance of communications to overseas bases.

(e) To mobilize rapidly.

(f) To eliminate efficiently the deadwood in the personnel of the regular air, ground and sea services.

(g) To get quick decisions on matters affecting the air, ground, and sea services.

Sixth. What is the present degree of American supremacy in scientific research and development?

Seventh. What should be done to provide for adequate civil defense of the United States?

I know that it will alarm Members of Congress as it should alarm every thoughtful citizen to know that these questions have not been satisfactorily answered. And why not. Because no agency of the Government is charged with over-all responsibility. Surely the Army and Navy cannot answer these questions unilaterally for they pose problems which cut across the functions of almost every other Government organization and which dip into every phase of American life. I do know that the War and Navy Departments each are seeking solutions to these questions—solutions which are naturally at variance. The Army Air Forces is developing another set of answers, a third plan for national security. There may be many others. But such variegated plans can never be completed under existing conditions because the author of one depends upon the author of the others for vital phases of any program he tries to develop. Each has something worth while to offer—each has a partial answer to the plaguing questions which must be answered. These many solutions have never been brought together in a common harvest, never had the chaff sifted out, and had the good remaining grain cooked into the whole bread of an adequate program.

Without unification, the country gets none of the benefit of these multiple, incomplete plans. In short, the country gets no adequate security.

With this in mind, Mr. Chairman, I recommend prompt passage of H. R. 4214.

[Mr. JUDD addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WILLIAMS].

(Mr. WILLIAMS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I would support this bill if for no other reason than that it gives long overdue recognition to the contributions of air power to the preservation of our Nation and democratic way of life. The creation of a separate air arm on a par with our older established military units is a step which sooner or later had to come about, and I am glad to be able to be a party to making it a reality.

I am delighted that this bill has finally been presented to the floor of this House for passage. The provisions contained in this measure will fulfill a long standing need of our armed services, and will work toward a better coordination of our military efforts in the event of another war.

The advent of the atomic bomb and the development of long range aircraft have so revolutionized the art of modern warfare as to render the weapons of early World War II practically impotent. The recognition of air power today as—not only our first line of defense—but also our chief striking force—is mandatory if we are to survive another armed conflict such as the recent conflagration.

My only regret is that the man who sacrificed most that this might come about—General Billy Mitchell—could not be here today to experience the culmination of his dreams and to enjoy the vindication which will be his today through the passage of this bill.

Not all of the combined brass hats and gold braid of the old school can refute the undeniable fact that this baby of modern warfare—the airplane—has grown to manhood, and must along with their respective orders stand as a definite unit and full fledged member of our military combine. Recent history attests this assertion. Schweinfurt, Berlin, Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagaski firmly substantiate the demands for individual sovereignty proposed by students of aviation and modern warfare.

The atomic bomb—the most devastating and powerful instrument of destruction ever devised by the mind of man—can avail us nothing without a means of transporting it speedily to where it will strike the most effective blow against the enemy. The airplane is the only effective means of transporting this bomb, and men well versed in the use of air power should supervise that operation. An officer of the Air Corps whose entire course of military study had been concentrated upon the use of the airplane as an instrument of war would be highly pretentious in attempting to tell an infantry officer how to deploy his men for ground action against a landed enemy, or to tell a naval commander how to align his fleet for a sea engagement. By the same token Army and Navy officers are in no way qualified to direct the actions of the air arm.

Prior to World War II, the airplane was a supporting unit for the operations of the Army and Navy. It came into its own in World War II as a unit equal in strength and fighting potential to our land and sea forces. In the next war, air power will be the chief weapon, and the Army and Navy will have become supporting units. This, as I have stated before, is an undeniable fact.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. Would not the gentleman say, however, that with respect to naval aviation, the officers of the Navy who are in that field would be competent to run the naval aviation?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Certainly, to run the naval aviation, but if the gentleman will read Major de Servesky's book, "Victory Through Air Power," he will get my views as well as Major de Servesky's on land-based, long-range air power.

Mr. LODGE. I just wanted to make that one qualification to the statement the gentleman made.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I thank the gentleman.

My contention that the Air Force should be placed on a par with the Army and Navy is further substantiated by statistics which were made public during the war, showing that Army Air Forces personnel was greater than that of the entire Navy.

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope that this bill will be passed and proper official recognition given to our Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HARNESS].

(Mr. HARNESS of Indiana asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I feel that this legislation merits the support of every Member of the Congress who is interested in efficiency and economy. As Members who preceded me have so well pointed out, we learned, more than a quarter of a century ago, the absolute necessity of a single command in the field. That was demonstrated even more dramatically in the last war than in World War I.

To ignore this obvious fact and to do nothing toward correcting our old system would be a tragic mistake. I served for 8 years, from 1939 until the begin-

ning of this Congress, on the House Committee on Military Affairs. I went through that period with the committee when we were preparing for the late war and while we were fighting. I saw something of the heartbreaking waste, duplication, and extravagance resulting from the inadequacy or total absence of coordination of the armed services. As merely one among hundreds of examples of duplication and waste, we have had all during and since the war two air transport organizations, in many instances paralleling each other, the Army Air Transport Command running all over the world, and the Naval Air Transport Service, as I said, in many instances paralleling the Army Air Transport Command. That is a senseless waste of equipment, manpower, and taxpayers' money.

This proposed unification will put an end to such things as happened in the Pacific, where the Army had control of one side of an island and the Navy the other side, and neither service could borrow or use equipment and supplies of the other. This plan will bring about a better relationship between the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces. It will end the unthinkable procurement methods under which each service designs its ordnance and ammunition so that it can rarely, if ever, be used interchangeably by the other.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I yield.

Mr. SHORT. And we will not have the Army on Okinawa with surplus of supplies shipping them to China instead of letting the Navy have them to fill their needs.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. That is right. I understand there were numerous instances in which one or the other service transported supplies long distances from rear areas when the other service had ample reserves of the same or equivalent supplies in the immediate area, or conveniently near by. That sort of dangerous waste and delay need not and will not happen with the coordination proposed here.

Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I yield.

Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. I wonder why we could not go further and put them all in the same uniform, have the same ranks, grades, and standards? Why could we not standardize that phase of Army life as well as their equipment?

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. There are some who would like to do that but that would be a mistake at the moment.

Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. Why?

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Because that is an unnecessary departure from the traditions of our defense forces. As we get into this thing perhaps eventually we will come to that but I think the first step must be toward basic efficiency and economy through coordination.

Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. I agree that it is a step in the right direction, but they are all engaged in the same purpose. If standardization is going to help one phase of our defense why should it not help all phases?

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I do not think we ought to take the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces bump their heads together and say "You are going to wear the same uniform whether you like it or not." If we accomplish the important basic goals, the formal refinements you suggest may naturally follow.

Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. If we did that the bill would not be before us; the Army and Navy would object too strenuously.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I do not think we would get anywhere.

Mr. MILLER of Nebraska. But does not Congress have control over these defense powers? Unless this bill provides so much militarism that they are going to take over the country.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Congress still has that control; and I believe it will preserve it.

Mr. STEFAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I yield.

Mr. STEFAN. Where is the section regarding procurement?

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I do not have the bill before me, but I think the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] sitting beside you, can point it out to you.

Some fears and apprehensions have been expressed by some members of the Navy and the Marine Corps about this legislation with particular reference to naval aviation. The committee spent a good deal of time in considering the objections raised to the original legislation by members of the Navy, especially the naval air force. It wrote into this bill provisions which should allay any fears that the sea-air force will suffer if this bill is enacted.

Now, a word about the Central Intelligence Agency. When such an organization was first proposed I confess I had some fear and doubt about it. Along with other members of the committee, I insisted that the scope and authority of this agency be carefully defined and limited. Please bear in mind that this is a bold departure from American tradition. This country has never before officially resorted to the collection of secret and strategic information in time of peace as an announced and fixed policy. Now, however, I am convinced that such an agency as we are now considering is essential to our national security.

There has been insistence that the director of this agency be a civilian. I believe we should eventually place such a restriction upon the authority we are proposing to create here, although I say frankly that I am not convinced of the wisdom of such a restriction at the outset.

Prolonged hearings and executive sessions of the committee behind closed doors lead me to wonder if we have any single career civilian available for this job as a few men who might be drafted from the services for it. Understand, please, that I want to protect this very influential post against the undue military influence which might make of this agency an American Gestapo. If we can find a well qualified civilian career man able and willing to handle this post, I would readily accede to this limitation. Let me repeat, however, that this Nation is without extended experience in this field; and that we actually have comparatively few men qualified by experience to head this agency. Most of these few qualified men have gained their experience in the Army and Navy, and are still in service. Before we deny ourselves of the service such military men may be able to render the country in this capacity, let us be very sure that there are civilian candidates qualified by training and experience available to serve us equally well, or better.

Again let me say that I have no objection to a restriction in this measure which will require a civilian head in this agency. I merely want reasonable assurance that such a restriction will not deny us of the services now of the best available man if this plan becomes operative. It wrote into the bill provisions that should allay any of their suspicions or fears as to what might happen if this bill is enacted into law. I feel their apprehensions are without foundation.

Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. BUSBEY. The present Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is Admiral Hillenkoetter; the former head of the agency was General Vandenberg. They are both very splendid men and have a wonderful record in their field. But was there any testimony anywhere as to their experience and qualification in intelligence work?

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I doubt if you could pick out any individual, civilian or military, who has made a career of this work. There is no such available American, because we have never engaged in this type of activity before. In 150 years the United States has said, "We are going to keep out of other people's business. We are not going to engage in secret intelligence." Therefore, we have no experience in it, we have no single career man who knows all of the problems. We are approaching this thing more or less as an experiment in the present instance.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana has expired.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 2 additional minutes.

Mr. BUSBEY. I want to make the observation that we have had an intelligence service in our War Department and also in our Navy Department for a great many years.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Yes, both military and naval intelligence have served proficiently within their limited scope.

Mr. BUSBEY. We have had secret intelligence in the War Department that we have built up over the past 5 years also.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. True, but what is contemplated here different in scope and character?

There has been much objection to the establishment of an air force separate from and independent of the regular land and sea forces. Such objections spring, in my opinion, from the outmoded

conception of air power as a minor auxiliary of the land and sea forces. In strategic and tactical importance, as well as in actual size, the air arm in the recent war proved its right to the status this plan proposes for it. There simply is no arguing the fact that warefare has moved into a third dimension. There is, in fact, no sound reason that I can conceive to doubt that air power will be a more decisive element in any future war than in the last.

It has been argued that instead of unifying two services, this plan complicates the problem by splitting two services into three. That might be true if each service were permitted to go its separate and independent way, as in the past. But the spirit and entire purpose of this proposal is a close coordination of all elements of our Military Establishment. There is no good reason to believe that three coequal forces cannot be closely coordinated just as well as effectively as two. I think the Air Forces justly should be given a separate department, as this bill provides.

Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. Admiral Hillenkoetter's name has been mentioned. I think in justice to him, and to keep the record straight, it ought to be said that Admiral Hillenkoetter has had perhaps as much experience in intelligence as almost any officer of the Navy, having served in the Office of Naval Intelligence and as naval attaché in Paris. He was the man who was responsible for our intelligence over there during the war and afterwards, and he has had a great deal of experience along those lines. I do not want to go into the merits at all, but I want the RECORD to show that.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. As I said a moment ago, really the most experienced people we have seen to be the men who served in the Army and the Navy, and to shut them out and not permit them to serve in this capacity now I think might be a mistake.

Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. I entirely agree with the gentleman on the point he just made.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I hope this legislation will be accepted by the Congress and that the bill will pass.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WILSON].

Mr. WILSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, before I came to Congress in January I was unalterably opposed to a merger of the armed forces as we had formerly thought about it, having the idea that there would be a great danger due to the esprit de corps and the jealousies and one thing or another between the services; that there would be a great deal of danger in having a man appointed at the head of it who would tend to submerge one or the other services. I was appointed on this committee. This bill was referred to it, and we had hearings for about 2 months, and I have changed my mind. I am for this bill.

While this is not a merger bill in any sense of the [illegible] more properly denominated a bill of coordination rather than of unification, in my mind. It is a bill that requires of its terms the coordination of our armed services to the end, first, that we may get greater efficiency and with the hope and expectancy that we may get greater economy. I agree with practically all of the witnesses who testified, General Eisenhower, the two Secretaries, of the War and of the Navy, Forrestal and Patterson, that in peacetime you could not say that a certain number of dollars and cents would be saved immediately, but they both said, as well as other witnesses who claimed to know anything about it, that during wartime billions of dollars would be saved, and I think that is true. This bill requires the Secretary of Defense to coordinate the activities, for instance, of the Department of Procurement for the various services.

This bill has been written carefully, I think, with every member of the committee, including the chairman, being intensely interested and being very deliberate, even at the expense of being accused of trying to hold up the bill. Of course, the trouble is that a good many folks think that you can write a bill of this character and of this enormity by calling in a couple of experts and then reporting a bill out. That is because they do not know the process of this great constitutional Government. Every man in it has a right to his say, has the right to say whether he is for or against, and why. We have heard these witnesses and have heard them carefully, as you will note from the record of the hearings.

There were those, not coming principally from any one of the services, but some from the Navy who had the idea that the Marine Corps would be destroyed or would be relegated to service as MP's aboard ship. That is impossible and foolish. Under the terms of this bill as written now the Marine Corps, with its long history of heroism, its usefulness and its importance to the armed services of this country, is absolutely protected. I for one do not believe that any one branch of the service won this war. I think it was the coordinated efforts of every branch of the service and the coordinated efforts of every civilian at home that won this war. Therefore, I cannot subscribe to the testimony given before the committee by a few Air Corps officers who said we need no Navy, we need no Army, because the next war will be a pushbutton affair. The men who know about those matters say that is foolish in the extreme. We have not reached the stage in the history of this country where we can sit here in Washington and push a button and fight a war. The infantry, the Navy, the Naval Air Corps, the Marines, the Army, strategic bombing, and all other kinds of bombing would be absolutely necessary if we entered a war within the next 5 or 10 years or in the foreseeable future. So these folks who write in the newspapers that the next war will be a very simple matter of pushing a button do not know the facts.

This bill, I think, amply protects the Navy and amply protects the Army by preserving their status.

Some of the witnesses before the committee who opposed the bill upon cross-examination said they wanted one uniform and one service and a total, absolute merger. I am unalterably opposed to that, just as I said I was when I came here. I do not believe that kind of system would work. I believe the coordination that is set up in this bill and the power that is given the Secretary of Defense under the direction of the President, just as in provided by the Constitution of this country, is necessary. This bill is not a departure from constitutional methods, it merely recognizes the fact that we must bring ourselves up to date.

It has been said here that this is a piece of "must" legislation for both the Democrats and the Republicans. I say you can just leave out "Democrats" and "Republicans" and say that this is a piece of "must" legislation for America and for its future.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILSON of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. DORN. Is it not a fact that the words "Republican" and "Democrat" were never mentioned in all the hearings before this committee?

Mr. WILSON of Texas. This is absolutely a nonpartisan measure, in my estimation. It is to protect the future of this country so that those who are in authority to provide the national defense of this country, our homes, our country, and our lives, shall have the proper authority to do a good job.

There is nothing new about this bill. This coordination was used during the war, and all through the war, by executive order. These folks were given the same power to coordinate and unify and have unified commands in certain territory, on land, on the sea, and in the air. These Presidential powers, of course, have lapsed. That is the reason it is important that this bill be passed.

Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. BURLESON. I do not see anything in the bill that has to do with the centralized purchasing power of the armed forces. I wonder if the gentleman can tell us the reason behind the committee's action.

Mr. WILSON of Texas. The testimony before the committee by almost all of the witnesses was—and the bill provides, I think, plainly—that the Secretary of Defense shall coordinate the procurement of common-use items for the Army and Navy, Air Corps, and all the rest.

Mr. BURLESON. Is that item 3 in section 106?

Mr. WILSON of Texas. I believe that is right but I would not be positive. I do not have the bill before me.

Mr. BURLESON. That is the National Resources Board?

Mr. WILSON of Texas. I would not be absolutely sure of it.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think the gentleman will find that on page 6, commencing at line 5.

Mr. WILSON of Texas. It has been demonstrated, and I add to what my good friend the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HARNESS] said with regard to the number of men who constituted the Air Corps that the Air Corps of the Army gets 65 percent of the Army's appropriation—that is 65 percent of the money spent by this Government on the Army. So, I say, nobody wants to put the Air Corps above the other services, but the Air Corps in its importance in this last war and the importance it will have in the future in any possible conflict that this country might get into has attained a position of importance equal to the other two services. That alone, I say, is sufficient reason for the legislation. The Secretary of Defense shall have the right and power to coordinate the branches of the military service and yet leave those three services to maintain their esprit de corps in the future just as they have in the past with certain limitations.

Mr. STEFAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. STEFAN. Referring to the gentleman's statement that 65 percent of the appropriations for the Army goes to the Air Corps, I believe the gentleman may be in error. I think it is 56 instead of 65. The gentleman may be right or I may be wrong.

Mr. WILSON of Texas. I said that I would not be absolutely sure of that, but, as I remember, it was 64 percent or 65 percent.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. I think you will find that as near as it can be figured out it is 56 percent. But that does not include a number of items probably that are in common use in the Air Corps as well as in the other services. It might run to 65 percent or even more.

Mr. STEFAN. It might be even more, but I think we ought to have the figure in the RECORD.

Mr. WILSON of Texas. I would like to have the correct figure in the RECORD, but I believe it is around 65 percent.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER].

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, for the first 10 years that it was my privilege to serve in the House of Representatives I was a member of the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Navy. For the last 4 of those 10 years I also served upon the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Army. With the exception of such work as might have been done in the Subcommittee on Deficiency Appropriations, I think I am the onlyy one in the Congress who has seen service on both committees simultaneously.

This year it was my privilege to assign the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. SCRIVNER] to both subcommittees. He has been serving upon both those committees. I felt, as did Martin Madden, who was chairman of the Committee on Appropriations at the time I was assigned to both committees, that it was very desirable to coordinate the work between the two departments. For my own part, I would like to see that done, and I wish this legislation would accomplish it. But this is what bothers me:

Section 307, on page 35, supersedes the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which was designed to coordinate the financial operations of the Government. Section 201 thereof provided that the estimates for expenditures and appropriations should be submitted by the President without submitting what the department or agency submitted to him. The practice has always been that the President would submit these budget estimates when the Congress met, and the Congress would consider them on their merits. Section 307 of this bill amends that law and provides that there shall be submitted to the Congress, first, what the President in his budget shall submit; second, what the Secretary of Defense may submit; and, third, what the heads of the three departments themselves should submit.

Mr. REED of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TABER. I yield.

Mr. REED of New York. What on earth happens to your budget system with that set-up?

Mr. TABER. Your budget system is dead.

Mr. REED of New York. Certainly.

Mr. TABER. There is no budget system. Now, what will result from this will be that instead of having a coordinated budget you will have all sorts of wild items submitted by each unit concerned. Instead of having any screening whatever or any protection to national defense, everything will run wild, and instead of this being a forward step, with this section, it is a backward step.

Mr. REED of New York. And that is exactly what the military wants.

Mr. TABER. Well, I hope not. If we are going to have any benefit out of this consolidation—and, frankly, I am in favor of a consolidation if it can be constructive and forward looking—but if there is to be any benefit from it you utterly destroy what you have set up by this language, and you make the situation worse than it ever was.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TABER. Yes; I yield.

Mr. HOFFMAN. As I understand your objection, it is to the provision which permits the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Air to present to Congress or the Appropriations Committee their views of what they need? You want that all channeled through the Secretary of Defense, do you not?

Mr. TABER. I want it all channeled through the budget to the President, and by the President to the Congress of the United States. Unless it is, all coordination is gone.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. TABER. Yes; I yield.

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is undoubtedly correct, but if you adopt that policy, then you put the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force—you close the door to them; you put them under this centralized authority, and how are they going to know their needs? You will not have it either way.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TABER. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Is that not precisely what the situation is today? The Army and the Navy must now go to the President of the United States who sends the budget here?

Mr. TABER. That is exactly correct.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. What difference would there be if each of the departments, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Air Force were to do just exactly what they do now?

Mr. TABER. It would be a great deal better and there would be some protection for the people of the United States. Let me tell you what this will result in. It will result in scattering fire. Instead of having a coordinated program, a program under which you can get some benefit to the country itself, this section 307 could utterly destroy the benefits of this legislation and leave the situation where you are scattering fire all over the lot and getting nowhere. Your items for national defense will not be effective. All sorts of things will be brought in here by individual secretaries which would not stand analysis by an impartial analyzer, and we would have the entire burden of analysis thrown on us here in the Congress.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question for information?

Mr. TABER. I yield.

Mr. HOFFMAN. As chairman of the Appropriations Committee, does the gentleman prefer that these departments—for example, the Army and the Navy and the Air Corps—should not be permitted to express their desires and their needs to the Appropriations Committee? I am just asking for information.

Mr. TABER. In the committees there is no trouble about the Army or the Navy getting an opportunity to express their desires on anything they really need to express them on, but this provision would leave the thing wide open; you would have all sorts of things presented all at once, regardless of whether there was any need for them or not. I have seen this done so many times over in the other body, just this same performance, where they have scattered their fire all over the lot; and if this House had agreed to the provisions that they presented, there would be no national defense, but we would have scattered our fire; we would get nowhere at all.

I want to see an effective, efficient Department of National Defense. I want to see it effective and efficient. I want to see it in such shape that only the things that they really need will be crowded up in front. I do not want to see the whole picture presented here on an agitator's proposition but on a basis

of need and real demands of national defense.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TABER. I yield.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I would hesitate to argue with the gentleman on methods of appropriation, because I have a great deal of respect for his experience and ability; but I may say that the purpose of this Committee in this section was to have the President submit to the Appropriations Subcommittee his recommended budget and also include in that budget such items as the Secretary of National Defense might submit and such additional items as might be recommended by any of the other military establishments for the Committee's protection and consideration in order that certain departments might not be denied funds or minimized by this Secretary of National Defense in their functions. That was the purpose of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman one additional minute.

Mr. TABER. If they do that the result is going to be that you get them in a position where they will submit all sorts of things that they do not need and you will have your whole national defense picture jumbled up and not be able to get any coordinated operation of it. You will not have as good national defense and they will not have as good an opportunity to present their case as they would the other way.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We feel that if all the information is in the Appropriations Committee they are adequately able to take care of any supplemental requests of these departments.

Mr. TABER. We have trouble enough without having this. We would not have all the information, it would be covered up.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has again expired.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SIKES].

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, a great deal of credit is due to the committee in [illegible] busy time for completing the consideration of this meritorious legislation and bringing it to the floor.

AGAINST A SECOND BEST ARMY

Mr. Chairman, it has been said that there is little actual need for this legislation, that coordination of plans already has been achieved, and that things are working as well as could be desired. This is true only in part. It is like having the second best army, or the second best poker hand. It is good only as far as it goes. And it may not go far enough to win wars in a new age when war moves with terrific, hitherto unknown speed.

If we are to have an army, a navy, and an air force, and if we are to marshal the Nation's potential behind these armed forces, our organization and our national effort should be as efficient as it can possibly be made.

This is not our present condition. There is much about the armed forces that is splendidly efficient. But as a whole they are far less efficient than they can and ought to be. It is true that our signal victory in the last war attests to the capabilities of our leaders and the magnificent records made by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. But a navy second to none, or an army with the latest in mobile transport and mechanization, or an air force with jet- and rocket-propelled aircraft cannot alone nor separately make an efficient national defense—nor offensively can they with certainty and with a minimum loss of life project the necessary force for speedy victory under the military system as it now is devised.

They must be developed within themselves, each a vital and integral part of the whole, and unified under a single authority which will direct their efforts with a single purpose, coordinate their capabilities toward a common end, wisely selected and clearly seen. Here is the first point at which we are lacking. There is today no over-all command which unifies our total military effort. We are lacking in that harmonious composition of the entire Military Establishment which is needed to give every element of it the support that it needs from other elements to make it a symmetrical and well-balanced whole.

Let us think back to the very fresh memories of the last war. Let us think of the delays, the mistakes, the troops who trained with wooden guns, the ships sunk off our shores, the early defeats, the long, hard uphill pull before we were safely on the road to victory. What enormous advantages could have been obtained on the governmental, industrial, economical, and civilian side of the war effort had we then been prepared with plans and programs of national defense which this bill makes possible. Under it the entire national potential, with its great capacity to produce and support the war effort, can be brought together in a common effort for a common purpose.

During the intervening years between wars we have never had a proper balance between our foreign and military policies. Each being closely related to the other they have never been correlated nor have the military services and other agencies of the Government cooperated fully in matters involving national security. We have never been fully informed of the capabilities, potential, or intent of likely enemies, nor did we have effective plans for use in time of war of the Nation's natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs. This is another time when we can well say, "Remember Pearl Harbor."

We have been sadly lacking, Mr. Chairman, in some things. And I believe that these considerations have been brought into focus within the provisions of this bill for national security. I am strongly convinced that the bill does meet the needs of the country for an effective, efficient, and economical Military Establishment and that it does coordinate the activities of the National Security Organization with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security.

Mr. Chairman, I give it as my sincere opinion that time is of the utmost importance where the enactment of this legislation is concerned. We have already delayed too long. It may be that time is running out on us and we are again too late. Our military picture is a sad spectacle compared to that magnificent fighting machine we had at the close of the war. Our occupation forces are not equal to any demand of offensive strength if called upon to support this country's policies or enforce its will in a foreign land. Our domestic forces are only a shadow which would be another sacrifice if launched in the defense of any kind of determined immediate effort by a hostile force. A large proportion of the greatest fleet in the world is bottled up and inactive, and the Air Forces which reduced the mighty German war industries to rubble and swept the German Air Force from the skies have been reduced to a few groups of largely obsolescent machines.

What price victory, Mr. Chairman, if all we have accomplished goes for naught? An effective step can be taken here to help preserve our national life and keep America strong through the enactment of the National Security Act. On this number one piece of must legislation largely depends the true development of a properly integrated and effective national-security program. Until the services are unified no well balanced military plans can be assured. Neither the Army, the Navy, nor the Air Force can develop their specialized efforts to its most effective degree; nor can these great services be brought under single direction for the best coordinated and most useful application of their potentialities. And until the enactment by the Congress of this National Security Act we cannot be sure of regaining for our national-defense program those advances in civilian, industrial, economic, and diplomatic cooperation and efficiency which were accomplished during the war.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. LATHAM].

Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Chairman, this is a matter which has been long in dispute. I can recall that for many years past many of our leaders of military thought in this country were unalterably opposed to a merger bill. I recall that the Secretary of the Navy was opposed to it very strenuously in principle, and I do not think that the principles have changed very much. But, the time came when the leaders, of our military organizations in this country, came into agreement, and they decided that they were going to split up the military organization of this country into three parts, and they sat down and they wrote a bill.

The first bill, I believe, was written by an admiral and a general, very able men, and they wrote H. R. 2319, and they brought this bill into the Congress and they said, "Gentlemen, here is our agreement. This is a sacred document. You

cannot change a single word in this document." The balance of the agreement was so delicate that they said, "This must not be touched."

But the Senate of the United States had other ideas on the subject. They thought that perhaps Congress had a right and duty to write its own legislation, so they took the structure which was set forth in the agreement and they wrote Senate bill 758, and they passed that bill, and it came over to the House and the House took a passing look at the original bill written by the military, and then they discarded it and started to work from the Senate bill, and they improved that measure very greatly.

The bill the Senate wrote was a vast improvement over the measure which the military wrote, and the bill which the House committee has reported out is, in my humble opinion, a vast improvement over the bill which the Senate wrote. I hope that today, in the normal course of the Democratic legislative process, that this bill will be further improved.

Now, there is much good that is provided in this bill: The National Security Council, National Resources Board, Joint Chiefs of Staff, War Council, Munitions Board, and Central Intelligence. Nobody quarrels with any of these provisions.

Mr. REED of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LATHAM. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. REED of New York. I have listened to the gentleman with a great deal of interest, but it is very hard to keep my seat when some of these things are brought out. Do I understand that the military wrote a bill and sent it to Congress and said that it should not be changed?

Mr. LATHAM. In substance, yes.

Mr. REED of New York. We are coming to a pretty pass in militarism and their power over the civilian population of this country when they have such arrogance and effrontery to write a bill and send it up to the Congress and say it must be passed without change.

Mr. LATHAM. Fortunately the Congress of the United States ignored that position.

Mr. HAND. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LATHAM. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. HAND. One thing in the bill which disturbs me is the Secretary of National Defense and his apparently limited powers. I listened quite attentively to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] this morning in the opening debate. I am afraid from what he said that the Secretary could not interfere with the internal affairs of the three separate departments under him, and further, if he attempted to make a coordinating order, if that were objected to, he still could not do anything about it except refer it to the President. I make that observation to get further clarification of the question, because it seems to me that the Secretary of Defense does not have as much power as he should have to coordinate the defense of the country.

Mr. LATHAM. I would say in answer to the gentleman that one of the chief objections to this bill was that he had too much power.

Mr. HAND. Well, I do not think he has enough.

Mr. LATHAM. You will find in the provisions relating to the Secretary of Defense that he has the power to exercise general direction, authority, and control, and he could not have any greater power.

Mr. HAND. Is it not true that he must, if there is objection, refer the whole matter to the President?

Mr. LATHAM. If there were any important decision in dispute, I would assume that he would, but he has the authority and the power under this bill. There is no question about it. As I say, there is much that is good in this bill. I do not intend to speak about the very substantial objections that were made to it. It is, of course, a measure of compromise. I do not think there was anyone who was more vigorous than I in his opposition to certain portions of this bill. I opposed them not because I am against unification. I am not, but because it is a little difficult for me to assimilate the idea that when you take an organization composed of two parts and break it down into an organization composed of four parts, that is unification.

Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LATHAM. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. Could not the bill more properly be called a quadruplication bill rather than a unification bill?

Mr. LATHAM. There is no question that there is unity at the top. The Secretary of National Defense does establish unity of control. But at the bottom there is disunification, multiplication, and complexity written into the military organization. Obviously when you take two groups and break them down into four that does not simplify them.

The committee had certain fears about the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is amply protected in this bill, under section 203, on page 17.

I think it is a fair statement also to say that the committee intended to protect naval aviation. Unfortunately, because of a change at the later stages of the negotiations on this bill, naval aviation was not amply protected, in my opinion. An amendment will be offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] which has, I believe, committee support, which will eliminate that defect. This is a measure which, if the Cole amendment is written into it, I will support, because of the fact that it is a measure of compromise and in spite of the fact that I do not agree with all of its provisions.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT].

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, it was my privilege to serve with the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] and others on the special select committee headed by our former colleague from Virginia, Mr. Woodrum, which considered our postwar military policy. After several weeks of intensive hearings that committee reached the almost unanimous conclusion that unification legislation was not merely desirable but was necessary. For several months the old House Committee on Military Affairs, of which I have been a member for many years now, considered this same subject. We reached the same conclusion.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHORT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. COLE of New York. I dislike to interrupt the gentleman, but I think, if he will recall correctly, the Woodrum committee did not make any recommendations on the question of unification although it did conduct hearings on it.

Mr. SHORT. I say that that committee, though, was almost unanimously of the opinion that some legislation similar to this was not only desirable but even necessary.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHORT. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. HOFFMAN. But your committee did not report out any legislation, did it?

Mr. SHORT. No, the committee did not. It was only a policy committee. We could not.

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is what I thought.

Mr. SHORT. That is perhaps the reason this legislation was presented to the gentleman's Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department. It should have been sent to our committee.

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is what I understand. They could not shove it through the Committee on Armed Services so they put it over in our committee.

Mr. SHORT. The gentleman does not know whether they could shove it through the Committee on Armed Services because it was never given to us. It was sent to the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Not this last time, but it was submitted to the Committee on Military Affairs before, and then when the Committee on Naval Affairs came with you, they thought they could not get it through there, so they handed it to us.

Mr. SHORT. Maybe they handed you a hot potato. But our committee is for this and watch the roll call.

Originally I opposed this legislation, I was against it, but after months of hearings I learned a little. Even Douglas MacArthur can learn a little, because as Chief of Staff several years ago he opposed this legislation, but he is very much in favor of it now, because if this recent global conflict in which we were engaged taught us one lesson it was the absolute necessity of a unified, coordinated, coherent, cohesive armed force to strike quickly on land and sea and in the air. A unified command is essential. A divided command is fatal. There is strength in unity, weakness in division.

The Nazis taught us a lot in the early days of the war, but we taught them a few things before it was over. I remember in Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, where we threw everything in the world at those Japs except the kitchen sink, and it was only because of the umbrella by the air armada, our bombers, together with the Navy with every type of vessel conceivable, that volleys of rockets were sent in, as well as the Marines, 5,000 of whom were killed on Iwo Jima, that we were able to really take those islands.

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHORT. I yield.

Mr. KEARNEY. I want to recall to the gentleman that I served on that committee with the distinguished gentleman from Missouri, and he will recall that that committee was not supposed to report out legislation.

Mr. SHORT. That is correct. It was simply a study of policy that was being made by the committee. The committee was not a legislative one. It was a special select standing committee on postwar military policy.

Mr. BATES of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHORT. I yield.

Mr. BATES of Massachusetts. I happened to be a member of that committee myself, and I might say also that the committee made no effort to report out this unification bill or any other bill.

Mr. SHORT. I know that the gentleman from Massachusetts has been opposed in the past to this, but I do not know how he will vote on this particular bill. I will continue to love him regardless of how he votes.

Mr. KARSTEN of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHORT. I yield to my friend the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. KARSTEN of Missouri. That particular committee had no power to report legislation, but only had the power to recommend legislation.

Mr. SHORT. That is right.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHORT. I yield.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Has General MacArthur made any statement to the effect that he is for this bill?

Mr. SHORT. Yes. I do not know about this particular bill but he is for unification of the armed services.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot yield any further, because I have something to say here that I want to bring out for the edification and benefit of my good friend, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN].

Mr. Chairman, although I strongly urge the immediate passage of unification legislation, I do not at this time intend to discuss detailed provisions of the pending bill.

I have before me a book entitled "The Lost War" which give a Japanese reporter's story of the war as he viewed it from Japan. The author, Masuo Kato, a reporter for the Domei News Agency, was closely associated with many high government officials of the Japanese Government and he has recorded what is truly an inside story.

Mr. Chairman, certain passages of this book are so closely related to the problem facing us today that I will read them at this time:

Friction between the Japanese Army and Navy, over both strategy and division of available material supplies, became intense. In the fall of 1943 the Ministry of Munitions was established in an effort to end competition between the two services for materials, but the army and navy had been traditional rivals and their mutual distrust had its roots in history. Even when they appeared to have buried the hatchet during the early victories, the army was building its own shipyards and producing its own cargo ships and even cargo submarines. The navy, on the other hand, proceeded to establish its own motor corps for land transport. Each service sought to have key factories designated as its own so that they might count on 100 percent of the output instead of making a division in accordance with need. The army and navy even maintained separate weather observatories, and the civilian Government a third.

As a result of differences in strategy, there was no unified command either in battle zones or in occupied areas. Particular zones were marked out for army command, and the navy was given the others. The navy defense area included half of New Guinea, the Solomons, the Celebes, and the mandated islands.

There is no doubt that a major portion of the responsibility for Japan's failure at Guadalcanal, Bougainville, the Gilbert Islands, and later at all-important Saipan may be traced to the failure of the army and navy to set aside their differences when the future of the nation was at stake. Japanese marines were insufficient in number to defend the area assigned to the navy, and the support given by the arm was in each case inadequate and half-hearted.

The most serious friction between the services arose over the allocation of aircraft and materials for aircraft manufacture. The traditional procedure had been to divide the output of combat planes equally between the two services irrespective of the strategic or tactical situation, but when the allied attack was threatening to break through in the central Pacific, and the powerful Truk base was threatened, the Navy asked for a greater share, contending that the central Pacific battles would decide the war and that Japan should concentrate her total air strength in that area. The army insisted that its campaigns in Burma, with Imphal as the objective, and in China with the purpose of linking Canton and Hankow, were equally important.

* * * * *

In defending Saipan the navy called for army support, which materialized in disappointing quantity. In my presence a high naval officer angrily remarked that the navy would handle the job by itself and that Saipan would become a navy victory.

The senior statesmen had been watching the army-navy friction and the succession of defeats with growing anxiety, but they were like a group of court nobles who lacked the military strength to bring about a forcible change in the situation.

Mr. Chairman, two glaring deficiencies existed in the Japanese military organization. First, there was no unity of command either in Japan or in her several theaters of operations. Second, Japanese air power was divided between two uncooperating surface forces which prevented the concentration of this air power during critical phases of the Pacific war.

The author's vivid description of the interservice rivalry and lack of unity between the Japanese army and navy aptly describes the condition existing today in the armed forces of the United States.

We are all familiar with the dissension among the components of our armed forces. We deplore this condition. Disagreements not only involve matters of organization but even extend into the field of military strategy. This condition to my mind, Mr. Speaker, constitutes a danger to the security of this Nation and is in itself a most compelling argument in favor of unification.

I do not contend that Japan would have won the war had her military establishment been unified. I do contend, however, that her meager resources would have been better employed, and her military losses reduced through unified direction of her armed forces.

It is wise, Mr. Chairman, that we examine the Japanese military organization since a system operating under the extreme pressure of total war is more likely to expose its basic deficiencies than one which is subjected to a lesser degree of pressure. In defeat, the glaring defects of the Japanese system loom large before us, whereas the corresponding weaknesses of our system have been obscured by victory.

Although the United States had a better appreciation of the proper employment of air power than the Japanese, we had in effect the same general type of military organization. Our victory was gained not so much through the efficient use of our resources, but by virtue of the fact that we were eventually able to overwhelm a nation possessing only one-tenth of our resources.

Opponents of unification are today seeking to perpetuate the independent status now enjoyed by our separate defense departments at the cost of the American taxpayer and at the risk of our national security. It is our responsibility, Mr. Chairman, to prevent tradition and our past great victory from obscuring the need for constructive military reorganization offered by the pending legislation.

Mr. Chairman, no chain is stronger than its weakest link. No one branch of our armed services won this war. All of them did an excellent job and there is enough credit and renown to go to each one of them. We should not fail to see the forest because of the trees. For our future defense I think we should place the greatest emphasis upon the most important branches.

Mr. Chairman, on every score and by every count, we should vote adequate funds for our Air Corps, for our Central Intelligence—which has been lamentably weak—and for scientific research and technological development. These are the things above all others which will guarantee our security.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. JENKINS].

Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that there is not a quorum present. This is important legislation and the Members should be here to listen to this debate.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count. [After counting.] One hundred and nineteen Members are present, a quorum.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. JENKINS] is recognized.

Mr. JENKINS of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, a good many years ago as a small boy I remember reading in the first Jungle Book by Kipling, the so-called Maxims of Baloo. One of those maxims, if my memory serves me correctly, went something like this:

"There is none like to me," saith the cub
In the pride of his earliest kill,
But the jungle is large,
And the cub, he is small;
Let him think, and be still.

In my rather brief experience as a junior Member of this House I have tried to bear in mind that maxim and avoid talking about things about which I knew nothing and with which I had no experience. With respect, however, to the bill now pending before this House I think I have some little experience gained as a result of 22 years in the armed services in one form or another, some 5 of them in the last engagement, a year and a half of which was spent abroad. As a result of that experience I have become so thoroughly convinced of the need for unification of the armed services that as a member of this committee, and as a Member of this House, I want to add my voice to the voices of all the other people who have spoken, to urge the House with all the sincerity and force at my command to enact this legislation.

I said I had had some experience. There are many in this House who have had longer and broader experience than I, but I believe most of them are united upon the general proposition that there must be unity of command in our armed forces if victory is to be won in the case of any other war in which we may unhappily have to engage.

Much has been said, in the words of some of the distinguished gentlemen who have preceded me, of the necessity for unified command in the field, and of the lessons of World War I and World War II. We did not have unification and coordination to begin with. The memory of Pearl Harbor and what happened there is still fresh and green in our minds. But memories, as men grow older, have a tendency to fade away, to dim out; and the memory of Pearl Harbor, and the cause of the disaster of Pearl Harbor and the compelling urgency that was there shown for the kind of unification of our armed services that is embodied in this bill may likewise have a tendency to fade away. We human beings have a tendency to put off doing the thing we recognize as necessary until a more propitious day. There will never be a more propitious day to do the thing that has to be done now, than today, when the memory of all that has happened is still with us and when the reasons for what has to be done are still with us. Every one who has taken part in the operation of this or any other conflict, particularly this last one, recognizes the fact war and combat are no longer confined to the sea or the land or the air, but that war has become a tridimensial matter. It requires the coordination of all three of those elements of our armed forces and the use of all three of those media of combat, land, sea and air.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the passage of this bill at this time, as I have said, with all the force which I can bring to it.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has expired.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. DORN].

Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, we have spent a considerable time and a lot of effort on this bill. May I pay tribute to the chairman of the committee and to those in charge of the hearings for giving the younger and the freshmen members of the committee every opportunity to express themselves on this bill. We have had that opportunity, and for my part I certainly appreciate it. The bill while not exactly perfect is a forward step in the right direction in connection with the unification of our armed services.

Mr. Chairman, I hope you will pardon a personal reference when I say my mother had more sons in the service at one time than any woman in South Carolina in World War II. They served in most every branch of the service. It was my privilege to be at the headquarters in London before the invasion of Europe, also at General Bradley's headquarters in northern France, the headquarters of the Ninth Army. I saw unification in operation there, and it worked beautifully. Unification of operation in Europe was one of the first and most essential things that General Eisenhower and those in command realized was necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. That was true not only in Europe but in the Pacific as well.

To those who have made the charge here today of dictatorship, I would like to say and remind the committee that never in the history of the world has a man maintained a successful dictatorship over any country without substantial backing from the people. The only danger under our American form of government for a dictatorship, and I believe it is the only danger, is through the President of the United States. That has been at times and might be in the future a real potential danger; but never from a Secretary of National Defense as created under this bill. He has no right, under this bill, to go out and build up a propaganda machine throughout the country and solicit popular support.

Mr. Chairman, one of the most important features of this bill is the Central Intelligence Agency. I would like for you to turn back with me this afternoon to the most terrible period preceding World War II. Why, you had most of the newspapers and people in this country thinking that Adolf Hitler was a comic character, that a war in Europe could not last through the winter—I remember those editorials quite well—that Germany would not last through the winter of 1939. I remember officers of the Navy coming back from observation posts in the Pacific and saying that the Japanese could not last 3 weeks in a war with America. The Government in Washington was stunned and shocked beyond belief when it suddenly realized that Paris and France would fall.

An important Member of the other body, who is still serving in that body, said that a few bombs on Tokyo would knock them out of the war. What a woeful lack of intelligence as to the potential power of our enemies. People were saying that Mussolini would not attack; that he was only bluffing. Around the world there was a total lack of knowledge of those forces that were marshalling to destroy American democracy. I tell you gentlemen of the committee that your central intelligence agency is a very important part of this bill.

Let me say a few words about planning, development, and research. As long as America stays ahead of any potential enemy in the field of development and research, then you are that much removed from the danger of a future war. No nation will attack this country if they know we are ahead of them in the field of research and development of military equipment and future devices to be used by our armed forces. Then, gentlemen of the committee, what about the Air Force? Let me say this to you, that General Koller, the deputy commander of the air force of Germany, after the defeat of Germany, made this most significant statement. He said that the nation of the future that has the greatest air force in the world will dominate the seas of the world, will dominate the land of the world, will dominate the air over the world; yes, he said that the nation with the greatest air force will dominate the world. He said, "We are decimated and eliminated, but it will be interesting to watch the power politics of the future among the great powers to see if the old mistake will be made over and over again." I think that is a very significant statement and one that the gentlemen of this Congress might heed in any future policy toward our Military Establishment. Gentlemen of the committee, the Air Force is charged with the defense of this country; on land and sea and the air. If they are charged with that responsibility, then why not give them the authority to do it? This bill does not set up a separate air force. It only creates an air force on a parity with your Army and your Navy. What man in this committee today knows but what tonight or any night in the future there might come out of the mist of the North Sea, the North Atlantic, or over the North Pole, where there are no railroads, where there are no sea lanes, an attack against our country? What defense have we got against that attack? Only an air force on a parity with your other branches of the national defense, one that can meet the responsibility. Give them the authority, gentlemen of the committee—today.

I need not go into the situation in Europe and the Pacific during the war; that is history with which you are well acquainted, but I will say this, that if General Eisenhower, as he testified before the committee, had to go to the

Third Army and beg General Patton for the use of his air corps, if he had to beg General Simpson for the use of his airplanes, if he had to go to the Seventh or First Army, if he had to go into the other army groups and collect his air force, he never could have stopped the German drive during the Battle of the Bulge. As authority for that, go to General von Runstedt, the commander of the German forces. He said that the air force by its concentration of power in so short a while on our forces and communications during the Battle of the Bulge was the cause of our defeat in that great battle. So, you see the importance of an independent air force. An airplane in 1938, or thereabouts, flew from Japan, nonstop, to San Francisco, a distance of over 5,000 miles. Why could they not do it during the war? Because their Air Force had become subordinated to their Navy and their ground force, and they could not even bomb the Mariannas, which were nearby Japan, much less San Francisco, which was 5,000 miles off. That shows what subordination of the Air Force to the other branches of the service can mean. I need not mention how our Air Force was subordinated before the beginning of World War II.

Yes, Mr. Chairman, if we are going to prepare for the future we have to do it now. Very frankly, I have to live in the future. My life is not behind me but before me. I am speaking for the youth of the United States today. We want adequate national defense. We demand it of this Congress. We solicit and earnestly hope for your cooperation in protecting the welfare and security of the people of this great country. The best way to do it is through this unification bill. That is one step in the right direction. There are many other measures of national defense that I advocate, but I will not mention them at this time. This one bill that is before this committee today is a step in the right direction toward defending this country.

The industry of America is concentrated mostly in nine cities or thereabout. Are you going to throw those nine cities open to a surprise attack from the north or from somewhere else, someday, and put America at a disadvantage? Let no one kid you, if Japan had had the same war potential that America had, we would have lost the war in 30 minutes at Pearl Harbor. If they had had the same industrial output, they could have followed up that initial advantage, and we would have been defeated. In the next war we will not have that added advantage of time and distance.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE].

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, during the nearly 15 years in which I have served here no problem has caused me greater concern than this whole question of merger, unification, and consolidation of our Military Establishment, as it has raged throughout our country for the last 3 or 4 years. I am happy to observe the continued and progressive improvement of the approach to a proper solution which will give to the country the degree of security which we all hope to achieve.

My views on the subject of unification are more fully set forth in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for June 30 under the remarks of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN].

You will recall last summer the President recommended a merger of the armed services by way of a single Department of National Defense. Substantial objection was made to that by a large segment of our people and a large portion of our Military Establishment, principally the Navy and the Marine Corps. Subsequently an agreement was reached between the leading officials, both civil and military, of the two interested Departments and the three interested services—air, land, and naval. That agreement was submitted to the Congress by way of a draft of legislation to enact into law the terms of the agreement. The agreement was a vast improvement over the recommendation of the President as Commander in Chief a year ago.

After consideration by the Senate the bill representing the agreement of the services was adopted in a modified form. As adopted by that body, it, too, represented, in my opinion, a substantial improvement over the agreement. Eventually the bill, at least the subject matter, came up for consideration by the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments in the House. The bill which that committee has recommended for our consideration today is, in my opinion, a vast improvement over the bill as passed by the other body.

So, in the progressive evolution of the legislative processes, the people are gradually exercising their will over this vital matter. I would remind you that the responsibility for the organization and maintenance of our Army and Navy is not one which the Constitution places upon the Commander in Chief. It is one which is imposed upon the Congress, and the changes which have been made by the Senate in the agreement as established by the representatives of the Commander in Chief and the changes that have been recommended to the House by this committee are in the proper exercise of the constitutional responsibility of the representatives in Congress to organize, maintain, support, and provide for an army and navy.

Little did I think 6 months ago that it would be possible for me to stand here in speaking on this subject to say that I could say "amen" to everything which my distinguished colleague the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] has said on the subject today. However, as I listened to him very closely in his opening statement, I am frank to confess to you that everything he said could be reiterated by myself with complete sincerity.

Unfortunately, the bill as it is submitted does not expressly state the interpretation which the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] has placed upon the authority of the Secretary of National Defense. If the bill did state that and if it wrote into statutory form the interpretation which he has placed upon it, I am confident that the substantial fears and apprehensions which the people possess, whether justified or not, would be removed.

I would call to your attention on page 6 where the authority of the Secretary of National Defense is delineated it categorically states that he shall exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies.

In an interpretation of that authority, the gentleman from New York says that he shall have the power "to direct proper coordination" between the branches of the services.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

I just want to call attention to the first part of the sentence which controls this grant of power on the proceding page.

Mr. COLE of New York. It is true that except in two instances, which I hope to point out, it is apparently the philosophy of the committee recommending the bill that this Secretary of Defense shall be an umpire, a man to view the whole problem, to resolve differences and disputes and rivalries and duplications, and all that sort of thing. With that, nobody can disagree. But a strict interpretation of the authority contained on page 6, line 3, together with another one which I will point out in a moment, destroys that interpretation.

The gentleman from New York, whom I regard and I am sure all regard as the last word on this problem has, as he stated, wrestled with military problems for many years, probably for as long or nearly as long as I have lived, which is quite some time. He speaks as an authority in the interpretation of this bill. He said that this Secretary of Defense should "bring about a certain degree of coordination." Again he said the Defense Secretary should "bring about coordination." If that is what is intended, why not write it in the book?

He pointed out that the bill gives to the three individual departments authority to run their own show. He said the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, and the Secretary of Air Force have complete control over the personnel of their own departments; that they "have the right to hire and fire." If that were true, nobody could take exception, but, unfortunately, the bill does not say that. On page 7, at the bottom of the page, it says that the Secretary of Defense is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such other civilian personnel as may be necessary for the performance of the functions of the National Military Establishment.

The bill later on sets up the National Military Establishment as being those three departments, plus the other agencies, the Munitions Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Research and Development Board, War Council, and so forth. Those are all parts of the National Military Establishment over which, as this paragraph which I have just read, the Secretary of Defense is given authority to appoint the personnel.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.

Mr. WADSWORTH. The gentleman brings up an interesting point with reference to the bottom of page 7. It was not the intention of the authors of this section of our committee to give any such power to the Secretary of Defense. It was intended that this power to appoint personnel meant personnel in his own office. If there is any uncertainty about the language as presently in the bill, I might suggest that the gentleman offer an amendment to strike out the words "National Military Establishment" and insert "functions of his office." That is what the committee intended.

Mr. COLE of New York. Again I am compelled to recognize the fairness of the judgment of the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] in his interpretation of the functions of this Secretary of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] has expired.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman five additional minutes.

Mr. COLE of New York. Much as I approve the pattern of unification under the Secretary of Defense as it has been explained by those in support of it, I cannot let this opportunity pass without expressing rather briefly and hurriedly my deep feeling on the question of the advisability of establishing a separate Department of Air. I doubt very much if anybody will argue that a new civil department of government will result in any economy. Whether or not economies are effected, to my mind, is secondary in importance. It would be worth while to spend that extra money if by having another department our military efficiency could thereby be enhanced, because the goal that we all seek is the absolute security of our country. However, to my mind, our security is seriously jeopardized when we set up this new Department of Air.

It was not until this last war that the use of air in military operations established itself. I think we all agree now, at least it is my view, that of the three elements of the earth—land, water, and air—air is the most effective and potent for use in military operations. Yet here we are taking away from our land forces and our naval forces the use of that element of the earth, the use of the air, in carrying out military operations, and are setting it off on the side as an independent function of the military. The proper way to do it, in my opinion, would be to have both the land forces and the water forces have available to themselves the complete and unrestricted use of air in their military operations. The use of air should dominate our land forces. The use of air should predominate our naval forces. Our land forces in the future will be supplementary to air force as will the use of naval forces. Our land and naval forces will be used to support and supplement what is done in the air. The theory of this bill in taking away from our land and naval forces the use of air and establishing an air force off by itself is a tragic mistake.

Then again, from a practical standpoint, what are we going to do with the people who operate the planes of this independent department of air, this independent air force? It is well known that when an aviator reaches the age of 30 or 32 his usefulness as an active aviator is terminated. Where are we going to put them? They cannot all be majors, colonels, or generals; they cannot all sit around the council table making policies. It must inevitably mean that when these men reach the age of 30 or 35 they are going to have to be turned back to civil life either on the pension rolls of the Government or with a bonus of some sort to permit them to adjust themselves into civil life.

The same thing can be accomplished by giving recognition to the Air Force which its importance justifies—by welding into our land forces the use of air the same as the Navy has welded into its operations the use of air during naval operations. I recognize, however, the futility of trying to persuade this Congress of the inadvisability of creating a new department of the air. Recognizing that futility, I have then set about to preserve, if I could, to the naval forces the use of air in all aspects of naval operations. After consultation with the members of the committee, they have agreed that the Navy shall retain the right to use the air in all its naval aspects and an appropriate amendment has been prepared which will be offered for adoption at the proper time.

Furthermore, I am impelled to state my conviction that the creation of a separate department of air and a separate air force as a part of the Military Establishment of the Government is without authority under the Constitution. Time does not permit an amplification of that position at this time, but a reference to my statement before the Committee on Expenditures on June 30 discloses the reasons for my firm belief that the portion of this bill relating to an independent air force is unconstitutional.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from New York [Mr. CHURCH].

[Mr. CHURCH addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. CHURCH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PRICE].

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, among the arguments that have been advanced by opponents of the proposed National Security Act of 1947, no argument is based on so great a misunderstanding of the act itself or of modern warfare as the argument that the establishment of a coequal Air Force means disunification. It is the contention of those, who advance this argument, that the establishment of another department, the United States Air Forces, would remove from the Army a well coordinated and integrated unit of the Army.

Under this bill, we have a splendid team consisting of a Navy, an Army, and an Air Force. Each of these forces fight in a different medium, the Army on the ground, the Navy in the sea, and the Air Forces in the air. The Air Forces has won its "place in the sun," and it must not be denied its proper recognition; back in World War I, when military aviation was a part of the Signal Corps, it was used primarily for reconnaissance. At that time, it was argued, and with some reason, that air power must be coordinated with and integrated into our Army Establishment. At that time, military aviation was looked on as a "number of airplanes." Later development proved that aviation was a force and it justly took its place with the other forces—ground forces and sea forces. Today, no one who has studied the matter would contend that the air should be integrated into the Army Establishment. This does not apply to naval aviation. The Navy wants and should have its carrier borne aviation. It is a part of a very important part of the fleet.

On the eve of World War II, it was a proper understanding of air power that caused our military leaders to establish the Army Air Forces as a single command. This action reconciled the differences between the General Headquarters Air Forces and the Air Corps; that is, between the combat and the administrative branches of our air arm as it then existed. It was an understanding of air power that led the War Department to state as a primary principle that—

> The Army Air Forces must be provided with the maximum degree of autonomy permitted by law without permitting the creation of unwarranted duplication in the functions of service, supply, and administration.

The proposed National Security Act of 1947 assures autonomy that is authorized by law and is itself designed as a law that recognizes the needs of the National Defense Establishment in this air age.

An air force is not one branch of aviation, but many. It consists of strategic units, tactical Air Force units, reconnaissance, troop-carrier units, and air-transportation units. The section of the National Security Act of 1947, which establishes the United States Air Forces does not bring to an end the excellent cooperation between the Army and the Air Forces. It establishes an air force as an organization, coordinate and coequal with the land and naval forces.

In the European theater, General Eisenhower had Ground Force commanders and Air Force commanders. In that theater, there actually existed coequal land and Air Forces. As he testified before the committee, this was an ideal arrangement. He did not want the air units integrated into the various ground commands. He wanted to us all the Air Forces, both English and American, in one place at one time when the situation called for that use.

Three jobs are always present for the Air Forces in a theater, one the destruction or neutralization of hostile air. The destruction will give freedom of movement to our Ground and Air Forces.

The second is the disruption of hostile lines of communication, such as railroads. This disruption of lines of communication is not in direct support of the Ground Forces, but if the enemy runs out of food and ammunition, he is no longer a first-class enemy. The third is air action in the battle proper; immediate and in close cooperation with the Ground Forces.

During the invasion of Normandy, there was splendid coordination with ground, air, and sea power.

During that same invasion air power was also used in coordination with ground and sea power. Our Allied air power had driven the German Air Force from the skies, and achieved mastery of the air over England, over the English Channel, and over France. We could concentrate troops and supplies in England, and ships in English ports, without fear of having them attacked and destroyed by German air power. Our Allied air power flew protective cover over the invasion armadas that crossed the Channel, and over the ground forces that stormed the beaches. And I would add here that the success of that tripartite operation was made possible because the principle of unification was recognized when the direction of the over-all operation was placed in the hands of one man, that great general, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Air power was used many times during World War II in support of ground operations. On D-day plus 48, when the spectacular break-through at St. Lo tore a great hole in the German defenses, and General Patton's Third Army plunged through the gap and started its drive to the west wall, the break-through was covered by air power—tactical Air Force operations—which prevented the development of serious opposition to the progress of the armored columns, which protected the long, exposed flank of the Third Army, and which assisted the advance of the ground forces by direct cooperation. When the German Army was caught in the Falaise pocket, it was splendid air and ground cooperation that took that army apart. True, some troops escaped, but they lost all their equipment and most of the units lost their fighting efficiency.

Anyone who recalls the victories of our armies in World War II can cite numerous other instances of the tactical use of air power, in employment with ground power and naval power, in covering invasions, covering advances, and softening up enemy opposition.

But it is not such tactical use of air power that makes air power a unique weapon, new to military warfare and new to history, and that justifies the plea of air leaders for an autonomous air force. The use of air power that is unique is the strategic use, in which air power operates alone, without ground or naval support, and beyond these areas in which ground or sea forces can operate.

When our Eighth Air Force bombed Berlin from bases in England, when our Twentieth Air Force burned Tokyo and dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki from planes based in the distant Marianas, air power was employed strategically in a way in which no other power has ever been used.

Today we face the possibility of attack by long-range bombers, carrying atomic weapons from bases in Europe or Asia across the Arctic regions and the North Pole. The routes from such bases to the industrial centers of the United States lead across the Arctic regions because those are the shortest routes. But those are routes closed to land vehicles or sea vehicles. And they lead across regions in which, if only air power can attack us, it follows that only air power can defend us.

Strategic bombardment by air power is the most powerful weapon of war thus far produced because it operates with freedom and with economy of force impossible to any other weapon. Air power can focus its total strength, which may be based over a wide area, with a speed and an ease impossible to any other force. Air power can select for destruction those targets most vital to the enemy's war economy, no matter where located. To air power the perimeter defenses of a nation are as nothing, and are to be bypassed or ignored, as the tactical situation warrants. Strategic air power, striking at the very heart of an enemy land and at the war industry of an enemy country, does not seek to destroy an enemy's armed forces, or to capture enemy territory, so much as it seeks to paralyze the enemy. That is why air power could so reduce the industrial potential of Japan that she surrendered unconditionally with her armies undefeated in major engagements and in control of nearly 3,000,000 square miles of land populated by 500,000,000 people. Here was a defeat unparalleled in history, and for the first time in history an invading army possessed a conquered land without firing a shot.

The United States Air Force which the National Security Act of 1947 would establish is an organization to employ air power as only air power can be employed.

Some opponents of the legislation now under consideration raise the question of the constitutionality of a separate Air Force pointing out that the Constitution defines Congress' power to "raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a Navy."

If the framers of the Constitution of the United States did not provide for such an Air Force, surely they are not to be blamed for lack of prophetic vision, but why should their descendant be penalized because their forefathers lacked it? The National Security Act of 1947 seeks to give us an Air Force worthy to employ the great air power that we have developed.

The Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable James Forrestal, and the Secretary of War, the Honorable Robert P. Patterson, in indicating their joint endorsement of the proposed legislation, submitted to the President a mutually agreed draft of an executive order to be issued concurrently with executive approval of the proposed legislation, if and when passed by Congress. The proposed executive order defines affirmatively the intention of our military leaders to continue the employment of air power in ground and naval operations. Of the functions of the United States Army the proposed Executive order says specifically:

> The United States Army includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein.

Of the functions of the United States Navy the proposed Executive order says specifically:

> The United States Navy includes naval combat and service forces, naval aviation, and the United States Marine Corps.

And of the United States Air Force the same order says:

> The United States Air Force includes all military aviation forces, both combat and service, not otherwise specifically assigned.

The proposed Executive order states explicitly what is implicit in the National Security Act. Aviation is not removed from the Navy, but an Air Force is established to employ air power in those ways in which only an Air Force can use it.

Many times in recent years we have heard the phrase "one world" and as we have watched the development of aviation make that world seem smaller, and transportation about it grow increasingly easy, rapid, and frequent, we must have been struck by the fact that military action in that world—if it still be needed—must be conducted by one, not by three armed forces.

World War II was the first war in history to be a global war; it was fought in Alaska and in Australia, in Europe and in Africa, in the Atlantic as in the Pacific; and but for certain happenings most favorable to our interests, it might well have been fought in the United States.

As a global war, fought on land, on the sea, and in the air, that war was won by unified command in the theaters of operations. Sometimes the theater commander was an Army general, sometimes a Navy admiral, sometimes an Air general. Sometimes the commander was British, sometimes American. But whoever he was, whatever he was, supreme command was his, and there was coordination of operations.

What the National Security Act of 1947 seeks to insure is administrative unity of direction, at the seat of our Government, comparable to the unity of direction, in the theaters of operation, that was necessary for the successful conclusion of the war.

As such, it is administrative unity, in the interest of coordinating the total war effort of the Nation, because in addition to putting an Army, a Navy and an Air Force under the direction of a single administrative Secretary of Defense, it places a War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, a Research and Development Board, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other such departments in the National Defense Establishment.

Such an act as this under consideration will result in a definite, well thought-out procedure for the allocation of our available supply of military manpower and military material. It will produce economy, in that it will eliminate dupli-

cation of facilities. And it will establish an intelligent policy with respect to our diminishing reserves of raw materials of all kinds.

Such an act abolishes nothing in our military establishment, because the purpose of the act is not a negative one, but a positive one. It guarantees the continuation of the Navy, and of naval aviation, and of the Marine Corps. It preserves the historic services, including the United States Coast Guard, with all the healthy rivalry that creates the "esprit de corps" that is the life of any service. In one sense the proposed act does not so much create an air force as to establish by congressional act the air force that already exists—thanks to a patchwork of previous congressional action, Executive Order, and War Department Circulars.

Finally, the proposed act recognizes the principle of management control that is essential in the operation of any successful modern business. Surely in this war-weary world there is no business of greater importance to the welfare of all of us than the maintenance of an efficient military organization that will be strong enough to guarantee our national security, and to preserve the peace.

It is to increase the efficiency of the military organization which we now have that the National Security Act of 1947 has been proposed.

Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional. (*McCulloch* v. *Maryland* (4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579).)

In *United States* v. *Stephens* (245 Fed. 956; affirmed in 247 U. S. 504, 62 L. ed. 1239, 38 S. Ct. 579), the court said:

The power of Congress to raise armies, like the power to declare war, is unconditional, unqualified and absolute; and Congress is the exclusive judge of the necessity for the exercise of the power and of the powers and of the means and manner prescribed by it for its exercise.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Massachusetts [Mrs. ROGERS].

(Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, we have before us a bill to promote the national security of the United States. We all wonder today whether this bill will promote the security of the United States. I have carefully listened to the debate today. I have followed the debate somewhat in the Senate, as well as in the committees of both bodies, but, Mr. Chairman, unless the bill is changed, I cannot vote for it. I speak as one, Mr. Chairman, who has been in Washington since 1913. I have followed legislation for national defense during all those years, and after coming to Congress in 1925, Mr. Chairman, I have voted for every measure that I thought would promote national defense. All during that time, Mr. Chairman, I have always analyzed why measures are brought to the House. I have always analyzed in what way they are presented to the committees and to the House.

I remember that some 20 years ago a merger bill was passed in the Senate but defeated in the House. Last year a merger bill was introduced but not brought to action in the House. What is the difference, Mr. Chairman, between a merger bill and a unification bill? The dictionary says that to merge is to unite, and to unite is to merge.

Why has the Navy changed its mind?

Mr. Chairman, last year the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal, was against the merger bill. Admiral Nimitz was also against the merger bill, I recollect. Why this change of mind and thought and heart?

There was a conference—I do not remember the exact date—and the Army, the Navy, and the State Department got together. There was a compromise, and we know that in the House when you have a compromise, somebody always loses. In this instance it was the Navy that lost. It was the Navy that surrendered. The Navy saved nothing. I venture to say that today many in the Navy do not want this unification bill. To the Navy, it is the same bill that was called the merger bill last year. Changing the name does not change the nature of the bill.

Let us go back into the past history of our country and the glorious battles that our Navy has won. It never has lost. It never surrendered. We do not want it to lose a battle ever. The House knows as well as I do that no nation that has a defense plan such as is before us in this bill or a similar mode of procedure has ever won a war, and the United States has never lost a war. The Navy has always been our pride. It is one great asset we have today. No other country has a great navy. Russia has a great army—millions of men. Russia has no navy. Our Navy must not be weakened as it will be under this unification. In all its glorious history our Navy has never surrendered. In this bill our Navy has surrendered. Last Wednesday the New York Times Anthony Leviero wrote that reliable reports state that Secretary of War Patterson will resign and Mr. Kenneth Royall will be made Secretary of War under the new bill. Mr. Forrestal, he prophesies, will be made Secretary of National Security and Mr. Stuart Symington would be made the head of the Department of Air Force. All these men testified and insisted that the unification be passed.

Today comes the announcement of Mr. Patterson's resignation as Secretary of War and Mr. Royall's appointment to that position—apparently, the first step in the proposed unification set-up.

The article in the New York Times is as follows:

PATTERSON REPORTED QUITTING, FORRESTAL DUE TO RULE ARMS—WAR CHIEF IS SLATED TO GO AFTER UNIFYING OF FORCES—NAVY HEAD'S APPOINTMENT AS SECURITY SECRETARY PREDICTED

(By Anthony Leviero)

WASHINGTON, July 15.—Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson was reported today to have submitted his resignation to President Truman, to become effective as soon as possible after unification of the armed forces becomes a fact.

Other reliable reports carried assurances that Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal would be elevated to Secretary of National Security, the powerful new position which would give him control not only of the armed forces but of all the other war-making agencies and potentials of the country.

Unification of the Army and Navy and a new Department of the Air Force are now accepted as foregone conclusions by the end of this month, and it was reported that the shuffling of key personnel was about complete.

W. Stuart Symington, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, was said to be slated to head the Department of the Air Force. Thus he would have a status equal to the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Navy, as those posts are designated in the unification bill recently passed by the Senate.

John L. Sullivan, the Under Secretary of the Navy, is slated to succeed Mr. Forrestal, and it was said that Kenneth C. Royall, the Under Secretary of War, would move into Mr. Patterson's position.

The Army Air Forces emancipated as an independent unit equivalent to the Army and Navy, would be renamed the United States Air Force under the bill, with Gen. Carl Spaatz, remaining at the top.

It was said that other candidates besides Mr. Forrestal had been recommended to President Truman for the top position in the unified defense establishment. Two of these were Dr. Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and wartime coordinator of this country's scientific efforts, including development of the atomic bomb; and Representative JAMES WADSWORTH, of New York, a man held in high regard in all quarters for his statesmanlike qualities and for his intense interest in national-defense problems.

Nevertheless there was no indication that Mr. Forrestal intended to resign after 7 years of tenure during which he has served as Assistant Secretary, Under Secretary, and Secretary of the Navy. This was accepted as additional evidence that he was the leading candidate for the high post.

NAVY CIRCLES BACK CHIEF

The appointment of Mr. Forrestal is especially desired by those who still harbor fears that the Navy might be relegated to a subordinate status in the radical reorganization of the defense system.

Mr. Forrestal resolutely opposed unification legislation which the Army sponsored last year and which critics denounced as a measure which would give the Army predominant influence. That bill would have provided for a single Chief of Staff over all three of the armed forces, and one Secretary.

Mr. Forrestal and other high Navy officials agreed to the new compromise unification measure as one that would achieve coordination in the higher policy and military levels without destroying the administrative and operating autonomy of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces.

It was reported that Secretary Patterson, still called "judge" by his friends, eventually would receive one of the higher positions in the Federal judiciary, perhaps on the bench of the United States Supreme Court when a vacancy occurs.

PATTERSON FORMER JURIST

A Republican appointed and promoted in the Federal judiciary by the late President Roosevelt, Mr. Patterson held an eminent position on the bench of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in New York City. He was called from that position 7 years ago by Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War, to become Assistant Secretary of War.

When the changes become effective the new Secretary of War would have to fill the position of Assistant Secretary of War, which will be vacated by Howard C. Petersen on

July 31. Mr. Petersen, who has supervised Army occupation policy in enemy countries, announced his resignation yesterday, setting in motion the changes which will occur when the unification bill, reported out today by the House Expenditures Committee, becomes law.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. KARSTEN].

Mr. KARSTEN of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, the question of unification of the Army and Navy is not new. Various merger and unification bills have been before the Congress for many years and the subject has been studied from time to time. Since the conclusion of World War II, the matter has received most serious consideration by several of the committees of Congress.

Perhaps many may have wondered why a bill of this nature was considered by the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments rather than the Committee on Armed Forces. Under the Legislative Reorganization Act the specific jurisdiction of the Expenditures Committee includes matters relating to reorganizations in the executive branch of the Government and the committee has the further duty, among other things, to study the operation of Government activities at all levels with a view to determining economy and efficiency.

For over 12 years I have been associated with the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. In the many hearings and studies that have been conducted by this committee through the years, few measures have been so thoroughly discussed and debated as the legislation we are now considering. In preparing this bill we have had the benefit of hearings held by various other committees and also the advantage of studying the bills that have heretofore been presented.

Our hearings brought out three great military lessons we learned from the recent war:

First. No offensive operation, land, sea, or air, can be effectively and efficiently carried out without first neutralizing or destroying the air operations of the enemy.

Second. There must be unity of command.

Third. Modern warfare moves at tremendously high speeds. It is not static.

In dealing with these conditions it is to our advantage to have a military organization of the greatest possible flexibility. Our present two-department system did not lend itself to the offensive and defensive operations of the recent war without substantial changes. One of the first things we found out was that in the execution of our military strategy the success of a campaign can best be accomplished where our forces are grouped under one commander who has the responsibility for that particular operation. At the outset of the war, we had two independent organizations.

As the war progressed we became increasingly aware of the necessity of combining the operations of both branches to make an efficient fighting team. This was done by a system of Army and Navy coordinating committees. This structure, at best, was a makeshift one but the success of its operation pointed out clearly that a central command is much better than diversified and independent control.

The bill before us calls for the unification of our armed services under one Cabinet officer who will be known as the Secretary of Defense. He will have assistants in charge of air, sea, and land forces. The most revolutionary step in this proposal, and perhaps the most controversial, is the establishment of an Air Force as a Division in our Military Establishment on an equal footing with the two other branches, the Army and Navy.

Modern warfare takes place in three elements, the land, the sea, and the air. Air is an element just as much as the sea or the land.

Before the development of air power we had an Army for land operations and a Navy for sea operations. Each organization operated in its respective element. Each became specialists of military science as applied to that element.

I believe most of us will concede that the airplane itself is a weapon. So is a battleship. But each operates in different elements. In the development of our Navy, it certainly cannot be contended that we built that branch of the service around a weapon. The same is true of the Air Force.

The establishment of an Air Force is simply the recognition that military operations in modern warfare operate in three elements instead of two. It also recognizes that the branches of the service operating in these elements should be specialists of the highest order.

It has been contended that this is not a unification bill because it provides for three fighting units to operate within the three elements. No legislation we might write can dissolve the functions of these three groups into one. Our objective in this legislation is to tie together the component units of our land, sea, and air forces into an efficient fighting combination under the direction of a single coordinating head.

Arguments have been advanced that the Secretary of Defense will have more power than has ever been given to an elected individual.

At the present time, we have 10 executive departments, each headed by a Cabinet officer. Our Military and Naval Establishments have two Cabinet officers. To my mind, it would be just as logical to have two Secretaries representing the Interior Department or the Agriculture Department in the President's Cabinet. It takes no immigration to realize the confusion that would cause.

The President is the Commander in Chief of our armed forces. The defense of our country is only one of the many of his duties. The duty of the Secretary of Defense will be to take over some of the President's work and give him more time to spend on other obligations. The power and duties of the Secretary of Defense are clearly defined in the bill. He will be primarily responsible to the President, the same as any other member of the Cabinet.

It is my opinion that this bill will result in substantial savings and bring about efficiency in the operation of our defense establishment. It is true the initial installation of this system will involve some expenditures. According to computations I have made, the annual additional salaries will roughly amount to a figure below a million dollars. It would be impossible to say exacly because there will be variation in organization which will determine that. Let us say that housing will cost an additional million dollars. Roughly, this would increase our military budget by $2,000,000 for the first year of operation.

The military budget for the current year is approximately $10,000,000,000. Two million dollars is two one-hundredths of 1 percent of that budget. If we can save 1 percent on the over-all budget, and I believe the legislation will accomplish much more than that, we will save about $100,000,000, which is fifty times the initial cost.

Economies can be effected in many ways. We can begin with the elimination of waste and the duplication of functions which exist all through the service. Great economy can be brought about through uniformity of equipment. Savings can be brought about in procurement, maintenance, supply and operations. Further and perhaps more important, substantial economies can be effected by assuring that expenditures of funds are for the most modern and effective types of equipment and by the financing of each branch of the service according to its value as an offensive or defensive agency.

Many will say that it is not economy we are looking for but that it is national security. That, I agree, is the primary consideration but we can hardly have an effective and efficient military organization without naturally bringing about economies. Economy is an incidental objective but is one that we should not overlook.

In support of this bill there has been an imposing array of Government officials and organizations, including the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant and Under Secretaries of War and Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, the Compton Commission, the Strategic Bombing Survey, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff special committee to study this problem.

The bill before us is a good one. While it is perhaps not the last word, I honestly feel it will give us the greatest possible offensive and defensive military power per dollar spent. It is a definite step in the right direction and I hope it will be passed without weakening alterations.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. CROW].

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. HALE). The Chair will count.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. CROW] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CROW. Mr. Chairman, I wish to go on record in favor of the unification of the armed forces bill, H. R. 4214, as reported out of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. I have had an opportunity to read over the Senate bill 758 which provides for the same unification and I believe that the committee of the House has prepared a better bill and we of the House should pass House bill 4214.

I served in the Army during the last war and had the opportunity to observe the need for such legislation by being overseas early in the war and seeing with my own eyes the lack of cooperation between the services. I arrived in the Pacific area on March 14, 1942, about 3 months after Pearl Harbor and I served in that area until the conclusion of the war. Admiral Nimitz was assigned to the Pacific in command of the Navy and General Richardson was assigned in command of the Army. The Navy had four stars and the Army only three stars and therefore the Navy was in command of the operations in the Pacific area. There was a great amount of jealousy of command in the Pacific and the same will continue to exist unless legislation of this type is adopted.

Mr. Chairman, although I was not present in the Pacific at the time of Pearl Harbor, I am sure that if we had been organized as set out in the unification bill the losses at Pearl Harbor would not have been so great. From information received I learned that the Navy and Army commanders were not working together and information available to one was not conveyed to the other branch. The Army at the time was working under an alert that was only to take precautions against sabotage and they were guarding their vital installations. The fault of the error has not been definitely placed but I am sure that had we had a joint staff in command of the Pacific area, as is provided for in this legislation, the information would have been properly distributed so that a proper defense could have been made.

I do not see any place in this legislation that would cause anyone to fear that the Navy Department will be delegated to a place of unimportance or will in any way lose their identity as the United States Navy. I also believe that the marines are properly and adequately provided for so that they cannot be taken over by the Army or eliminated as a part of the Navy as some people seem to fear.

Mr. Chairman, I know from experience that the unified command was of utmost importance in the winning of the last Great War and I am sure that the unified command will work just as well during peacetime as it did during the war. I am not sure that any savings will be made by the unification of the armed forces during peacetime—in fact it may cost a little more—but the savings that will be occasioned by the reorganization being set up in case of another war will more than offset the added expense at this time. We are more interested in a strong national defense than we are of saving a few dollars at this time.

I hope that the Members of the House will consider this bill carefully and observe the advantages that will be derived from the same. I urge the Members to support this bill.

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CROW. I gladly yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KEARNEY. I call the gentleman's attention to section 203, the Department of the Navy, subparagraph (c) pertaining to the United States Marine Corps. I was not a marine and I think I can ask this question in all fairness to that great organization: Is there anything in this bill that could eventually allow the Secretary for Defense to reduce the Marine Corps to a skeleton or token force, a regiment or battalion, regardless of the fact that under the law the Marine Corps has a permanent four-star general?

Mr. CROW. Personally, I do not see anything in this legislation that would authorize that. What may happen in the future I think none of us can absolutely tell. I believe the general law protects the existence of the Marines in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has expired.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. DURHAM].

Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman, I rise particularly at this time to pay tribute to a man who I believe had as much to do with winning this war as any one individual in America. On yesterday we received notice through the press that he was leaving his post and going back into civilian life.

For 7½ years I had the pleasure of working with Judge Patterson as we met him in the Committee on Military Affairs. I have never in my life known any man who took his job more seriously, a man who devoted himself so entirely to what he believed to be the defense of his country.

He has my best wishes, and I believe the best wishes of the whole committee. He will be long remembered by the men who struggled with him in the days that were not so bright. The man to assume his duties, Hon. Kenneth Royall, nomination has been sent to the Senate, a man whom I have known all my life is equally as well-qualified and capable of carrying out the responsibilities placed on him.

Mr. Chairman, in regard to the pending legislation I have felt since the last World War that some plan should be evolved that would unify the forces and make for a more efficient national defense. The idea started in the committee during the recent war by a group that was interested in unifying the armed forces.

We had the experience of traveling throughout the country to the various installations and we also had the experience of seeing these thrown together at a time when we were faced with danger. We were fully aware of the expense and unnecessary waste that came about. It is therefore proper for this Congress to begin thinking about trying to solve those problems in a way that will not be as wasteful as during World War II days.

I have always felt that national defense should be handled under a single head. As far as I can determine, the fear that has been expressed here today by some that this measure will destroy or will to some extent destroy certain of our heretofore considered arms of our national defense is without foundation. I have no such fears. It is a complicated organization and one that it is impossible for any committee to write the details of so far as all of its functions are concerned.

My personal opinion is that this committee has rendered a very fine service to the country in trying to place together and unify our armed services. They have done an excellent job in setting up the Central Intelligence Agency, also the Army and Navy Munitions Board provision in the bill, section 302. That is the one part, in my opinion, that would do more to save and stop the unnecessary waste that went on during World War II. The provisions of this measure setting up a separate Air Corps is, in my opinion, long overdue and I believe this to be a wise decision. It being generally agreed now that air power is our first line of defense, in which I concur. It is proper and fitting that we fully recognize this by setting up a separate Air Department.

(Mr. DURHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BATES].

Mr. BATES of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, in the closing moments of this discussion of what I consider to be one of the most important pieces of legislation that has come before the Congress over a period of years, I wish to express my opinion as to some features of the bill in light of the many years experience I have had on the Naval Affairs Committee of the House and from my general observation of things in respect to the operation of the armed forces.

The questions of the merger of our armed forces is not a new one so far as Congress is concerned. About 15 years ago the Congress had a bill before it, the objective of which was to unify both the Army and the Navy into a single operating force. It is interesting to observe, as a prelude of what I am going to say, what the attitude of General MacArthur was at that time and his comments on the then pending legislation for merging both the Army and the Navy. Gen. Douglas MacArthur expressed his opinion on the measure then under consideration by the Congress in the following clear, unmistakable, and emphatic terms:

> No other measure proposed in recent years seems to me to be fraught with such potential possibilities of disaster for the United States as is this one.
>
> Not only the military history of this country but of every country gives indisputable proof of the advantages of maintaining in time of war the integral control of the two great branches of national defense—the Army and the Navy.

I know of no responsible soldier or sailor in the whole gamut of history who has advocated such a plan as is now proposed.

* * * such an amalgamation as proposed would endanger victory for the United States in case of war.

The super-Cabinet officer at its head could not fail to be acquisitor of one of the largest and undoubtedly the most powerful governmental organizations the United States has ever known. * * * Rather than economy this amalgamation would, in my opinion, represent one of the greatest debauches of extravagance that any nation has ever known.

This bill would run counter to the experience of the world.

The pending bill provides, however, that a separate army and navy be maintained, and provides also for a new Department of the Air Force. It also provides for the continuance of naval air, and the Marine Corps as they are presently constituted. The objective, however, that was originally back of the bill was to provide for the merger as set forth in the bill years ago.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the provisions of this bill are far from being what they were intended to be when the so-called merger bill was under discussion a year ago and again this year. We can get some idea of what the purpose of the original bill was when we read some of the testimony and read in the papers the articles that were given by some of the high officials in the military forces of the country, particularly with respect to the Marine Corps. I have a high regard for the Marine Corps, but no higher than I have for the ground forces or the air forces or the naval forces. We all have followed with a great deal of interest and with great concern the tremendous work that all branches of our military organizations have carried on in the conflict during this terrible period that has just gone by. We followed with grave concern the advent of the marines and the Navy in the South Pacific in the early summer of 1942 and then, of course, the landings in Africa and then in the channel ports, and so on. We have a high regard and cannot help but have that high regard for the tremendous job that the air forces of all branches of the service did in this great conflict, but it was the objective, and we know it now, on the part of some of those high in the military organization of this country to positively destroy one of the greatest fighting organizations that this world has ever known, and by that I mean the United States Marine Corps.

I am glad to know that within the provisions of this bill the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments has seen to it that the language that was recommended by General Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps, was actually put into this bill so that there would be no question in the future as to where the Marine Corps would stand in respect to the part that they play within the military organization of this country. Of course, there has been much said about unification, but here we have a bill that instead of unifying, we are, in another sense of the word, decentralizing; we are establishing a new corps, the Air Corps. It is my personal opinion, Mr. Chairman, that the elimination of the Naval Air Corps from the Navy would be an unwise thing, and I believe the elimination of the Air Corps from the ground forces of the Army under the provisions of this bill will be an unwise thing from the standpoint of the security of this Nation and the effectiveness of our war effort.

The Army—and I mean by that the air forces and the ground forces—should be under one command the same as are the activities in the Navy, namely, surface ships, air forces, and submarines, all of them being under one directing head. Then you will have real unity of command; then you will have an effective fighting organization, with all of their activities coordinated under one director or command. The trouble in the past, I feel, is due in a large measure to the lack of proper recognition to the importance of the Air Corps of the Army, but I feel that by placing men in control with an aviation background much of this friction of the past will be eliminated. The Navy recognized this years ago, and as a result officers with naval aviation background have been promoted to the highest rank within the naval organization; therefore, there does not exist in the Navy the feeling that we find in the air forces and the ground forces of the Army.

[Mr. LYLE addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. MARTIN].

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield three additional minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. MARTIN].

Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time being yielded to me from both sides because what I have to say now on this bill is not of a partisan nature. I want to speak particularly regarding the so-called threat of the General Staff and any drift into overcentralization of control.

UNIFICATION—THREAT OF GENERAL STAFF

Mr. Chairman, several of the opponents to H. R. 4214, including Rear Admiral Zacharias and several of my colleagues, have alleged that this pending unification bill will permit military domination of the United States. To me such a fear is pure rubbish. I have never been able to understand just how this domination by the military is supposed to come about. This bill provides for an increase in civilian control of the military rather than the diminution thereof.

Opponents to unification have drawn a comparison between the notorious German General Staff and that of our own Army, creating the impression by innuendo and inference that the present War Department General Staff is behind a plot to take control of the United States Government. With all due respects to these opponents of unification, I say that this is absurd. The War Department General Staff is nothing more than a planning policy group for the Army. The Navy has a similar group. So do the other executive departments of the Government. So does every large industrial and business organization in the country. The General Staff is merely a helper to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War.

What is so ominous about that? What less should a military staff be required to do for its country than plan for its protection?

Now, I am sure that every member of the Armed Services Committee and the House itself will join me in my desire to protect our form of government. I thing this bill protects our form of government both from within and without. It retains civilian control over the military and thus preserves a traditional principle of this country while at the same time it strengthens our military posture toward the rest of the world.

A brief review of the development of our War Department General Staff is highly pertinent at this time.

The general staff was formed under the impetus of Secretary of War Elihu Root by act of Congress in 1903. It was formed because prior to that time there was no agency in our Army to bring into common effort the manifold details of supply, administration, communication, transportation, and the like, which went to make up the operations of even the Army of that day. The realization of the need for a general staff came from the horrible fiasco of the Spanish-American War, which relatively minor undertaking was marked with the failures and misgivings of a War Department which had no coordinating staff element but was a conglomeration of antiquated independent bureaus. It is interesting to recall that the commanding general of the Army, Lieutenant General Miles, violently opposed the formation of a general staff ostensibly on the grounds that it was revolutionary and would lead to a military dictatorship but actually because it would mean to General Miles that his position of complete independence would be altered and he would be placed under the Secretary of War.

It should also be remembered that after World War I the War Department was reorganized over protests of the old diehards who were fearful of losses and prestige similar to that of General Miles. The War Department, nevertheless, was reorganized, reaffirming the principle that the general staff would be a planning and policy group for coordinating the over-all operations of the Army. Senator WADSWORTH well remembers the cries of "militarism" showered on his National Defense Act, without which we might indeed have lost World War II.

The point is that in any reorganization there are bound to be people whose personal positions will be effected. In the case of the founding and continuation of the War Department General Staff, however, it is significant to note that in its 44 years of existence, the United States has not yet fallen victim to the danger which the General Staff's opponents have repeatedly expressed.

The Joint Staff provided for by the bill probably will become a national general staff composed of Army, Navy, and Air officers. If this is an objection, I cannot see upon what grounds it is made.

The Joint Staff is nothing more than a working group for the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose need no one seems to deny. I have never heard a single man disagree that there should be a joint body to develop plans and exercise strategic direction over the balanced armed forces of the United States. One of the major aims of unification is to insure the integrated employment of our armed forces. All this bill does is to put the existing Joint Chiefs of Staff and their working group into the law so that it may effectively prepare for any future emergency.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, let me implore my colleagues to cast aside any doubts about H. R. 4214 and vote in its favor without delay.

We have a very good illustration of the effectiveness of merging our interests in this field of national defense, and I want to especially commend the Committee on Armed Services for the vastly improved caliber of legislation that has come from that committee over the efforts we made in a divided jurisdiction in the preceding Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. MARTIN] has expired.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, if there is one question there is practically unanimous opinion on, it is the prime and vital importance of air power. There are few persons who will deny that under present conditions and as far as we can look into the future, that control of air in war is essential to ultimate victory.

The weapons of World War I were outmoded when World War II came. In World War I, air power played a minor role, but the part it did play was sufficient to show its future possibilities. In World War II it was realized to a dominant degree.

Having in mind the part air power played in the last war, it is safe to predict that in event of future hostilities it will play even a more important part. Experience in World War II has clearly demonstrated that air power is now a controlling and dominant force in modern war. The Air Force must assume a great responsibility to the Nation in order to discharge this responsibility.

The question then comes as to the best means to develop and use our air power to the maximum effectiveness and whether or not a separate and independent air department, as provided in this bill, constitutes that means. I strongly believe that it does.

It is essential that the Air Force be on a coequal status organizationally with the Army and Navy. It is unthinkable that the service responsible for the maintenance for this air power would be subordinate to any other service.

In the joint planning for the national security, the Air Forces must have a voice coequal to that of the other services. Unless the Air Forces have coequal status in the military structure, it cannot enjoy the position in the joint planning councils to which it is entitled.

Military leaders agree that the initial phase of any future war will be an air war, because, obviously the surface forces cannot go into action until control of the air has been won. To place control of the air for this war, to develop the proper air weapons, and to command the combat forces during the actual conflict, the Air Force must be on an equal footing with surface forces. Otherwise it will never be able to secure the necessary priorities in personnel, equipment, and facilities during peacetime to go into action at the very start of hostilities.

If American air-power is retained under the surface forces its ability to concentrate maximum force when and where needed will be lost. As an illustration, Japan had no coequal air force, its available air strength being divided between her army and navy. Critical battles were lost to Japan because she could not bring her full air power to bear on us at the right time. This was due to the fact that the army and navy could not agree on the relative importance of military campaigns. Since air power has become a controlling military force, we must concentrate, rather than spread, its striking power.

One of the main reasons why I am supporting this bill is because of its provisions providing for an independent Air Force.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I want to pay tribute at this time to the chairman of our committee, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] whose fairness and impartiality through all of these hearings has been commented upon by several members of this committee. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] and I stand together on the roll call. He precedes me and usually votes "aye" and I vote "no." Or if he votes "no" I vote "aye." So our political philosophy happens to be somewhat different, but I want to say this in all sincerity, that in the 5 years I have been here I have never served under a fairer and more impartial chairman than the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN]. Whether he votes for this bill or not, I would like those remarks to stand.

I want to read to you some of the conclusions of the Pearl Harbor Committee, as follows. Their conclusions were:

That the Hawaiian Command failed to discharge their responsibility in the light of the warnings received from Washington, and other information possessed by them and the principal command by mutual cooperation.

(B) They failed to integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense, to alert properly the Army and Navy Establishments in Hawaii, particularly in the line of warning and intelligence available to them during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941.

They failed to effect liaison on a basis adequately designed to acquaint each of them with the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security, and to exchange fully all significanct intelligence, and they also failed to appreciate and evaluate the significance of the intelligence and other information available to them.

To put it shortly, the purpose of this bill is to prevent another Pearl Harbor—another uncoordinated mess like we had at that particular time. I think it is a tribute to the members of this committee on both sides of the aisle that the speeches you have heard today from both sides of the aisle have been predominantly in favor of this legislation.

There has been a little minor criticism, no major criticism, and I think even the criticisms made by the gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER], and the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE], and possibly one other, will be met by amendments that will be satisfactory to the committee, and I think this will receive almost unanimous consent of the Members of the House when they pass it.

I want to refer to one or two things that have been said in the way of minor criticism: The use of the word "merger" in reference to this bill. What does "merger" mean? Merger means "to cause to be swallowed up, to immerse, or to sink, to cause to be absorbed, sunk, or extinguished." This very definitely is not that kind of bill. This is a unification bill.

What does "unification" mean? It means "the act, or process, or result of unifying; to cause to be one; to make into a unit; to unify in a certain course of action."

That is what we want. We want the military arm of our defense unified and coordinated for the one purpose of national defense. We believe this is the first step in that direction but not the final step.

The gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] said in his speech that this bill was a "vast improvement over the bill from the other body." He said that it showed "evolutionary development and protection of the different component arms of our defense." I might say that evolutionary development or improvement will not stop with the passage of this bill, it will be a continuing process under the surveillance of this committee and the Committee on Armed Services which will have the tremendous job of passing enabling legislation which will cause this particular bill to function. This merely establishes the organization set-up. They will have to make it function. Enabling acts will have to be passed by the Committee on Armed Services and, of course, we are glad to yield to them that jurisdiction.

Some concern has been expressed here with respect to a separate Air Corps. I think the statement was made that a separate Air Corps was part of this evolutionary development. It has commanded the recognition of Members of this Congress and the people at large by dominance of offense and defense in World War II. It made us realize that strategic bombardment was carried forward far inland ahead of the ground troops and in the case of water far inland away from the range of the heaviest naval guns. The Army Air Force bombed the cities in the interior of Europe, and as far as Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki in Japan. In other words, this parity of power, this parity of authority, this parity of prestige has been won in the bloody crucible of war. They have won their right to equal parity in war through their striking power, and I want to point out that the activities of the Air Force were coordinated with the Navy and with the Army in war time—World War II—and that this is only putting into basic legislation that coordination of action and of offense and de-

ditional arms of service due to the exigencies of war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made them into a coordinated unit and sent them forth upon their mission. Now we are not leaving it up to the whim of a future unification to coordinate, but we are writing into basic law that there shall be coordination. During wartime there were divisions, there were jealousies. They were partly settled by the General Staff. Those are done away with by this bill. Questions of jurisdiction are settled. We are now saying that in peacetime also we are going to have these arms of military offense and defense coordinated. We have written into the bill certain functions which will be based on this act, taken from a proposed Executive order, certain safeguards in the functions of the Marine Corps, in the functions of naval aviation, to guard against the disintegration of the Marine Corps and the elimination of naval aviation. I realize that a Navy or ground force without air support, without air coverage over them, would be a helpless arm to defend us.

We had testimony from Admiral Bogan, who is in command of the Atlantic Air Force, in which he admitted the obsolescence of surface naval vessels as far as their ability to defend themselves is concerned. He rightly expressed the concern that naval aviation, which might be integrated into naval action, should be left intact, and the Members who believed in a separate Air Force agreed with him that he should have a naval aviation which was actually an integrated part of naval operation. So we provided for a strengthening of that section to the satisfaction of those who had had doubts in regard to the Navy.

Mr. Chairman, this debate has demonstrated that the Congress of the United States is going to ask for a better functioning national defense in the future than we have had in the past. We are going to write this into basic legislation and make an improvement in the organizational set-up.

We are going to give it a trial. We are going to call these people before us as the years go by and we are going to ask them, What have you done in regard to the elimination of duplication and in line with the overlapping functions of the department and expenses?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself two additional minutes.

Mr. Chairman, we are going to say to them that there is one thing that is dominant to the American citizen and that is the defense of his Nation, not the dominance of the Navy, not the dominance of the Air Force, not the dominance of the Army Ground Force, but the dominance of the defense of this Nation. We as Members are going to see that this function of defense is properly integrated and coordinated. We are also going to see, and we have written in the bill this section which is an improvement over the bill that passed the other body, a directive to the Secretary of National Defense that he shall eliminate overlapping and duplicating functions, and he shall perfect certain economies, and he will be called before this committee at the proper time to give an answer as to what he has done along this line.

I wish I had a little more time to go into the Central Intelligence Agency. A fear was expressed on the floor today. Let me say that if there is any man on the floor who is afraid of a military dictatorship more than I am I do not know who he is. I am very zealous, as I have said time and again, of the civil liberties of our people, but I believe this agency has had written around it, proper protections against the invasion of the police and the subpena powers of a domestic police force. I want to impress upon the minds of the Members that the work of this Central Intelligence Agency, as far as the collection of evidence is concerned, is strictly in the field of secret foreign intelligence,, what is known as clandestine intelligence. They have no right in the domestic field to collect information of a clandestine military nature. They can evaluate it; yes.

THE JOB OF SECRETARY OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN REGARD TO CONCENTRATION OF POWER—MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

There have been objections raised to the proposed unification bill because it is alleged to concentrate in one office powers too great for any man to hold. Some objectors to the principle of unification, who still have faith in the democratic processes of government, merely express the objection that the job of Secretary of National Defense, as proposed, is too big for any man. Certain alarmists, however, have expressed the apprehension that a bill which vests in one man practically unlimited military authority and power is a bill which must inevitably negate the Constitution of the United States and prepare the way for the advent of a dictator, who would seize control of the entire Federal Establishment.

To the first class of objectors I would make the answer that in no office in our Federal Establishment are greater powers concentrated than in the office of President of the United States. Yet no less than 40 different times the American people have found a man who in their opinion was qualified to perform the duties of that high office, and no less than 32 different men have so served. I have misread American history if any one of these 32 men has proved so incapable in office, so negligent of duty, or so contemptuous of responsibility as to have behaved in a way to jeopardize the security of the United States or the high position that the United States holds in the council of nations.

To these same sincere but fearful objectors I would also point out that, as a matter of fact, the proposed unification of our armed services would not create a job too big for any man to hold but would, on the contrary, establish an office the incumbent of which would relieve the President, as Commander in Chief of our armed forces, of the job of resolving the differences and disputes between the services. The proposed Secretary of National Defense, who, according to the proposed legislation, would be charged with the establishment "under the direction of the President" of policies and programs for the National Military Establishment, would be an administrative officer of our Government so placed as to render the President the most helpful service, while being at the same time fully responsible to him, as to the other body, by and with the advice and consent of which he would be appointed.

No job so far created in our Federal establishment is too big for a capable, qualified, conscientious American to fill. In our Government of the people, the people have created only jobs that representatives of the people could fill. They have created no jobs that call for supermen.

But to the second class of objectors who view with apprehension and alarm the creation of an office which would serve—almost automatically these objectors seem to believe—as a board to spring the incumbent of the office into a position of supreme military dictatorship, I would say that never, in the 171 years of our country, has the more powerful office of the President ever served as such a springboard. Nor is it conceivable that so long as the people accept the responsibility of constitutional government, and insure the continuation of government by the people, that the office of the President or any other office in our American Government ever will so serve as a springboard for dictatorship.

I am amused to realize that the founding fathers in writing that section of our Constitution which establishes the qualifications for the office of President, were less fearful of the future, uncertain as it then seemed, and less distrustful of the people, inexperienced in self-government as they then were, than the alarmists of today who decry all progress as change and all change as bad. "No person except a natural born citizen shall be eligible to the office of the President" the framers of our Constitution wrote, adding only that he must have attained to the age of 35 years and have been for 14 years a resident within the United States. Those who established our Government set forth no job description against which to check the qualifications of a Presidential nominee, no list of specific qualifications to look for in the candidate, no system of checks and hedges to insure his performance of his duties according to the letter rather than the spirit of the law. The oath they prescribed for him requires him only to execute faithfully the office of the President of the United States and to the best of his ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. I repeat one phrase from that oath—"to the best of my ability." In the oath not one word is said about what that ability should consist of.

The drafters of the proposed National Security Act have been specific, however, in establishing that the person appointed to be Secretary of National Defense will be chosen with greater attention to qualifications than the President of the United States is chosen, and that he will hold office subject certainly to as many checks and as much scrutiny, if not a great deal more.

In the first place, the proposed act provides that "the Secretary of National Security shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Members of this Congress have seen other Presidential nominees for Cabinet or other high Government rank investigated by the Senate of the United States. They have seen nominees rejected. And they should know that though the President nominates, it is the Senate that confirms. I for one do not believe that the Senate of the United States would ever be so blind or deceived as to confirm in office one whose character or whose record would suggest the possibility of his desiring to become a military dictator, bent on destroying our democracy.

The proposed Secretary of National Defense would serve under the direction of the President. Our American history is not without instances of the removal of a Cabinet officer whose service is not acceptable to the President. Furthermore, the proposed Secretary of National Defense would be no super-Secretary, as some fear and assert, because that section of the act establishing the office specifically states that the separate departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force "shall be administered as individual units by their respective Secretaries." The Secretary of National Security is in the end no super-Secretary, no commander in chief possessed of operational control of all our armed forces, but merely an administrative head serving under the President.

Finally, this same section of the proposed act provides that the Secretary of National Defense "shall submit written reports to the President and the Congress covering expenditures, work, and accomplishments of the National Defense Establishment." So long as the Secretary is appointed with the consent of the Senate and makes annual reports to the Congress, I cannot foresee the possibility of his establishing a dictatorship—except with the consent and approval of a vacillating and subservient Congress.

One further guaranty against dictatorship has, however, been written into the National Security Act. The Secretary of National Defense is expressly forbidden to establish a military staff. He can have an office force but not a formal military staff.

A civilian holding office at the discretion of the President, with the consent of the Senate, subject to the scrutiny of Congress, and without military staff, is hardly a person in whom is vested so much power that he might, at his will, become the military dictator of this democratic Nation. If the Secretary of National Defense would be such, then to what miracle or act of providence do we owe our past escape from a dictatorship established by any one of the 32 different Presidents who, in turn, have exercised powers granted them by the Constitution as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy?

But I, for one, have too much faith in the American people and in their devotion to democratic ways—too much trust in the President and the Members of Congress whom the people elect—to fear the establishment of a dictatorship in this country by a Secretary of National Defense or by anyone else, in or out of office.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has again expired.

(Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given premission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. OWENS].

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman who just preceded me mentioned that we need have no fear of a military dictator, and one of the gentlemen who preceded him also said it would be more or less ridiculous to say the same, because of the fact that we shall have civilian personnel on the board. Well, we all know that a spider can draw many files into its web, and you know exactly what happens; also, that bees can create a queen bee, and she will do the rest. But, I am not standing here opposing the bill at this time. I am merely doing so to offer a suggestion.

I feel that even though we do not have to fear a military dictatorship because of the passage of a bill of this type and the creation of a council of this kind that we should, at least, throw every safeguard possible around the people so that that contingency might arise. I have at least one little suggestion that might help with respect thereto. As a matter of fact, during the discussion on this bill before the committee I understand that it was suggested that one or more Members of Congress be made members of this National Security Council so that the Congress would be apprised of the action of the Council at all times. I understand also that that idea was abandoned because of fear that the Council might dominate the Congress or might affect the action of the Congress when matters were brought before it concerning appropriations. Just a few days ago I read an article which was given great circulation throughout the Nation which called attention to the fact that the Speaker of the House once had a great deal of power and that it helped the people; that it aided the common people, who were close to the House of Representatives and to its Speaker. That article pointed out that the power of the Speaker had gradually waned and was only revived when the succession bill was recently passed by the House. My thought in regard to that matter is along the same line. This bill does cover quite a number of references to civilian affairs.

On page 13 it mentions policies to secure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war.

On page 14 it speaks about the strategic location of industries, services, government, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's security.

On page 36 it refers to the fact that this council can come directly to Congress and obtain appropriations which the President might not otherwise recommend.

On page 5 it says that—

> The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.

It is my thought, Mr. Chairman, that we should add to this paragraph the suggestion that the same recommendations and reports that are made to the President be given to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate and that such reports shall be confidential and not be the subject of public record. I believe then that the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, who are close to the people, would be able to judge for themselves what move might be taken, if it is in time of peace, or when Congress adjourns they can judge what steps would have to be taken, should they feel that it was serious enough for them to offer suggestions. If it were in time of war, the Congress would be in session, and they, as the elected representatives of the people, should be apprised of the same fact, just as well as the President.

It appears to me that inasmuch as we are creating a council, such as that which is advocated, that we are deviating from a policy to which we have adhered for the last 160 years or more; that we should be mighty careful, and I believe that we should, at least, effect that one safeguard for the people of our Nation.

For that reason I am going to suggest that amendment when the time for amendment comes, and I hope you will give it some consideration in the meantime.

(Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from New York [Mr. BUCK].

(Mr. BUCK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BUCK. Mr. Chairman, I favor this legislation, and, under permission granted me, I include the following resolution of the National Aeronautic Association and brief of Lowell H. Swenson, its executive vice president:

RESOLUTION 1 ADOPTED BY THE ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL AERONAUTIC ASSOCIATION JUNE 4, 1947

Whereas it is the belief of the delegates to the 1947 annual convention of the National Aeronautic Association that in our national self-interest, as well as in the interest of world peace, our defenses should always be maintained at a level substantially higher than those of any other nation; and

Whereas in order to attain this objective with maximum efficiency and at a minimum of expense it is necessary that our armed forces be organized into a single Department of Defense with co-equal status for air, ground, and sea forces: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the delegates of the National Aeronautic Association in its 1947 annual convention assembled, That this association recommend passage during this session of the Congress of legislation to create a single Department of Defense with a coequal status for our Air, Ground, and Sea Forces.

BRIEF OF LOWELL H. SWENSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AERONAUTICAL ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

JULY 1, 1947.

I feel somewhat like an old family friend at a baptismal ceremony when I come up here today to express our organization's support of this bill. The National Aeronautic Association was the first national organization to go on record in favor of unification of the armed forces. That was in 1941. NAA, as you probably know, is made up of air-minded citizens all over the country. It isn't necessarily a flyers' organization—in fact, most of the members are not flyers. They are civic leaders of their communities. Year after year, these members, just plain, every-day American citizens, have gone on record favoring the principle proposed in this bill. I can truly say that the members of NAA are happy to see the unification thinking progress this far and that they hope this bill will be enacted.

As an aviation organization we naturally favor this bill because it gives an opportunity for greater development of military and naval aviation along the lines believed best by military and naval airmen. While it is always distasteful to stir up dead ashes, I believe it nevertheless relevant to point out that at the present the Army Air Forces is only one part of the War Department; and that the Bureau of Aeronautics is only one part of the Department of the Navy. And in the past, neither has always been permitted to seek funds, nor to do the things it believed necessary for the defense of this country. Therefore, one reason we favor this bill is because it will put the Air Services on the same high level as the other branches of the armed forces.

I am aware that at previous sessions of this hearing, the opinion has been voiced that the Army Air Forces is well on the way to becoming the top service within the War Department. As a strong exponent of air power, I am gratified to hear that. But I do not believe that developing situation makes this bill unnecessary. On the contrary, it high lights the need for this bill. I am no military expert. I am just the working head of an organization of American citizens who, through their membership in NAA, have had a better than average opportunity to be made aware of the importance of military aviation. But we do not feel that this country necessarily needs more of an Air Force than an Army or Navy. We don't know about that. We are convinced that we cannot afford to let anything stand in the way of the fullest development of military aviation. You gentlemen have already been told by General Eisenhower that there is no such thing as a separate land, sea, or air war. Only by developing all of our armed forces to their maximum usefulness can we have an effective national defense. But certainly no one service can develop its maximum usefulness without regard to the missions and capabilities of the other services. To preserve a proper balance and at the same time determine the maximum usefulness of each service requires an arbiter—the Secretary of National Defense provided for in this bill.

A striking example is at hand. The files of your Legislative Reference Service contain documents submitted by the War and Navy Departments, details of which have been carried in the press. The way I read these published accounts, the War and Navy Department are each planning a different kind of war, if war again becomes necessary. The greatest difference of opinion, apparently, is in the employment of aviation. Now, to me, a layman representing other laymen, that just doesn't make sense. Somebody has to determine which way it's going to be.

NAA also supports this bill on the basis of economy, and sound business principles. I keep emphasizing [illegible] I think is my greatest reason for being here, that the National Aeronautic Association is composed of average citizens. As such, we are taxpayers. And we want to see the part of our taxes going into national defense buy a full measure. A certain amount of competition between the services is healthy. But we don't think that duplicate hospitals, duplicate transportation systems, duplicate warehouses, and so on down the line, is competition. That's just waste. And there is the terrifically important matter of procurement. In either this time of peace or in war, the armed services are the biggest buyers in the country. They are buying for the same over-all purpose, defense or war, and in many instances buying the same item from the same supplier. Yet, the Army makes one contract, the Navy another, the Air Forces a third. They compete with each other. I am not in the circle, so to speak, yet even I have heard of Navy having to wait until a contractor finished an Air Force order, or vice versa. Each service, naturally, thought its requirements were more pressing.

I am aware that this bill, as it stands, does not specifically unify procurement. But the bill is a start, it at least sets up a framework within which unified procurement can be detailed later for your approval. At present, not even the framework exists.

Economy, naturally, does not apply only to wise use of money. After all, there must be a limit to our scientific and industrial resources. Just as in the procurement of goods, we cannot afford to be wasteful in the procurement under contract of scientific or industrial know-how. Right now, in certain fields of military research, there is a shortage of research facilities and personnel. The Joint Research and Development Board of the Army and Navy has been able, I understand, to effect a certain amount of coordination in the placing of experimental and research contracts. But the Board can only request. Army and Navy acquiescence is only voluntary. The Research and Development Board responsible only to the Secretary of National Defense, as provided in your bill, seems to us the only way to assure that all services get their most pressing research needs taken care of.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from New York [Mr. JAVITS].

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I shall vote for this bill. From my own military experience I consider this legislation essential to the coordination of our military establishment, and to the performance of our national responsibilities in foreign affairs.

During World War II, I was for some years as an Army officer on duty as the secretary of the joint United States Army, Navy, and Air Forces committee to coordinate our chemical warfare effort with that of our allies. I worked in an area exactly in line with that sought to be covered by this bill. The coordination contemplated by this bill was attempted during the war, it worked well enough to win, but I felt on many occasions the need for a statutory basis for the boards and staffs engaged. This bill will give background and substance to the joint and combined efforts which were responsible for our winning the war.

One further point needs to be emphasized. The tempo of a future war will be so highly accelerated that we must be completely ready with the right organization from the start. The peacetime creation, functioning, and experience of a War Council; a Joint Chiefs of Staff to deal with strategic plans; a Munitions Board to coordinate production and procurement; a National Security Resource Board to plan for industrial and civilian mobilization; and a Research and Development Board to provide integrated programs for research and development for military purposes gives us realistic implementation of a policy of national security and for the discharge of our international responsibilities.

(Mr. JAVITS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BENDER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of the time to the chairman of the committee and the author of the bill, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN].

(Mr. HOFFMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have been told throughout the hearings and the debate that some bill giving unification is a necessity, that we must coordinate. The first speaker on the majority side, the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH], who has been fighting for legislation of this nature since 1920, beginning in the Senate and continuing right on down to the present moment, told us that the legislation would keep in force our wartime boards of coordination. I think he is right about that. That is one of my objections to legislation of this kind. Even though it may be necessary in wartime, when defeat threatens, I abhor regimentation and dictatorship in peacetime.

That there may be no misunderstanding and no charges of, shall I say, duplicity, let me state now that having no choice about the matter, no opportunity to prevent what I consider unsound legislation, I will not oppose this bill. An attempt will be made to point out some of the dangers which it carries.

You may think my lack of opposition strange, but as some other Members have said, having "slept with this matter" over the years since I have been here, I am afraid not of Russia, not of other nations across the seas, but I am afraid of what may develop here in America.

I am afraid not only of those who deliberately would destroy constitutional government, but of those who unwittingly, by creating fear or themselves being afraid, insist upon legislation which will throw open the door to a policy which in the end will destroy our liberty and freedom and with it our ability to defend ourselves. I am afraid of a dictatorship, a military dictatorship.

My reason for supporting this bill is that I know the House intends to pass, under leadership drive and the pressure of a desire for adjournment not later than Monday and probably tonight, a bill of some kind giving us some sort of unification. In my humble judgment, H. R. 4214, worked out by a subcommittee, adopted by the full committee, not a bill drawn by either the Navy or the Army or any combination of those two services, not a bill handed to the commit-

tee or the subcommittee by any one Member, but a bill thought out first and drawn, put into words by the subcommittee and the full committee, is the best bill we can get at this time. It is either H. R. 4214 or something like S. 758—something more harmful.

We have had unification throughout the war. They said it was necessary then, and no doubt it was. No doubt unification of command in the field will always be necessary in every war if we are to win, just the same as every football, basketball, or baseball team must have a guiding head on the field, otherwise they lose.

Sure, we must have coordination, but, in my humble judgment, that coordination which we have had during the war could be continued if the Army and the Navy and the Air Force desired. But human nature being what it is, and there being those jealousies, which are natural, and the ambition for one's service or one's family or ones ideas being what it is, apparently it is necessary for the Congress, then, speaking figuratively, to take the high command of these departments and bump their heads together and, by law, compel them to coordinate.

Strange indeed is it that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Army should come to the Congress and, admitting that they, under the President's direction, have the power to unify and coordinate and that they did that very thing during the war, yet now in peacetime, knowing unification and coordination to be essential—and they say it is—they refuse to do it, ask the Congress to write a law compelling them to do the things they say are essential if our future welfare is to be made secure.

That inconsistency raises in my mind a doubt as to whether they are asking for economy and efficiency, for unification, or whether they are asking for authority—the authority given by the Constitution to the Congress.

There is a need for this kind of legislation and a unified centralized command if the President will not order it—if the heads of the departments will not willingly practice it. But what has been the history of other nations where they have had it? What has been the result in Germany, in Italy, what has been the history in Russia?

Our forefathers came here, we were told, to escape burdensome taxation—nothing political intended in that remark—to escape the destruction of their personal and religious liberties. They came here for freedom. They established here a Government which we know now, which all the world ought to know, is the best that has ever been devised. Because of it we stand at the top in everything, in military might and power, in production, in creative genius, in liberty, prosperity, and happiness.

How did we get that way? By a centralized command, through a dictatorship, through regimentation? No. We got that way because our people were independent, and we had individualists all working toward the same end—the welfare of our country.

After we demonstrated the superiority of our system, our way of doing things, we come victorious, to the end of the second great World War, the most powerful Nation in all the world, the Santa Claus of the world, and we are told that we must ditch it. We must discard it. Throw it away. Accept centralized overall command by the military forces. A bad second best whenever, wherever it has come to a show down with our young men and women.

Perhaps they are right. But history does not give us that conclusion. Nor is that all the story. The gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] came in with this chart. At the top you see the President of the United States; then, the Secretary of Defense, and so on down through. He showed to his own satisfaction, and, no doubt, to the satisfaction of many Members of the House, how this power was distributed and how the various boards and agencies were going to do these different things. Very well.

But you can read the chart the other way. You can read it from the bottom up and see where all the power that belongs in the hands of civilians is concentrated and finally centered, not in the President, because he cannot grasp and use it, but in the Secretary of Defense. And the Secretary of Defense will be, if not the unconscious tool, at least the agent, of the military staff. Which opens the door to what? To control. By whom?

And he stresses the fact that civilians are at the top in all of these agencies but one. Ah, yes. But where do the civilians get their advice? Where do they get their information? They get it only as it seeps up to them through the subordinate boards over which the military will have control.

What do these boards and these agencies do? Any one of them, each of them, all of them—what do they do? They coordinate and they plan. As the gentleman from New York said, for the first time you will have our foreign policy formulated by the military and the State Department. The President and the Senate are, under the Constitution, charged with the duty and the responsibility of planning foreign policy.

I had always supposed that under the Constitution, which, after all, has given us all that we have—I had always supposed that it was the duty of the Congress to provide for national defense—not the duty of the Secretary of Defense—not the duty of various boards and agencies down below—but the duty of the Congress. And here we are today shirking our responsibility and turning over the performance of our duty to a superorganization, if you please, which is to provide a policy for us, to "provide for the national defense."

Then comes the argument, as it has always come in the subcommittee and always in the committee, "No; they have no authority to do anything; all they do is plan." Well, most of us have been here long enough to know and realize that the planning agency is the agency which finally makes our policy.

Let the bureaucrats in the State Department, the career men, feted and flattered by princes and lords, their brains befuddled by high living and the champagne and wines they drink, plan our foreign policy, and we will always be entangled in the affairs of other nations; we will always be giving away the substance of our citizenry.

Let the bureaucrats plan our domestic affairs, our economy, our production; let them dissipate our resources, and there will always be waste and extravagance and finally an impoverished nation; always will we be committed to this, that, or the other, and the Congress will be charged with a lack of patriotism if it fails to follow the false teachings of the over-educated, un-Americanized bureaucrats, social climbers, international financiers, and internationalists.

Recent examples: The Truman policy of giving to foreign nations millions in order to do this, that, and the other thing. I am not discussing the merits or the demerits of that proposition at all because throughout the hearings and in the deliberations of the subcommittee and the full committee there has never been any discussion on the basis of political expediency.

The proposed legislation has in the committee been considered on its merits, and, while I do not know what has happened in other committees, I can say I do not believe there has ever been a committee where the chairman has had more consistent, faithful, and intelligent cooperation—yes; and may I add been more dependent upon, has to any greater extent relied upon, the help given by the members of the committee—than has the chairman of this particular committee. There has been no unpleasant disagreement of any kind—personal, political, or otherwise.

So we will have these boards planning to give us a policy. When they give us a policy, a complacent Congress, if the record of the past 14 years is a guide, will follow it. That is the easy way.

I was talking about the Truman policy. I could add to that the Marshall policy. I could go back of that and refer to the policy promulgated by the distinguished gentleman from Michigan who serves in the other body and to that of certain of his colleagues. They brought it out and we followed it—a bipartisan foreign policy.

We have given billions upon billions of dollars in furtherance of that policy. We gave this money because we were told time and time again that we must support the policy of our leaders, and only a few of us—well, maybe I speak only for myself—ignorant and dumb and stubborn—have failed to go along.

And at last, having learned that there is no end to that road—that the more we give the more we will be asked to give—even those who advocated it most enthusiastically, those who described it as a "great speculation," come now, as they were forced to do, to the conclusion that our resources are not inexhaustible—yes; and they now propose that we take an inventory—a thing which many of us advocated when the policy was first proposed—which was the only sound, sensible thing to do.

What is the net result? Billions upon billions poured into other lands—money which we might well have used to build up our Army and Navy and our Air Force—dissipated, wasted abroad. And what have they to offer by way of ac-

complishment, what have we in return? What can the advocates of that policy lay on the line? All you can say is, "Well, if we had not done it the situation might have been worse." Perhaps so. No one can answer that argument. Of one thing we can be certain, we have weakened ourselves, we have aided, are aiding, potential enemies.

When you get to these boards each and every one of them has the power to formulate a policy. Over what? If it applied only to the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force I would say "Amen. You are right." Unfortunately, they step down into industrial activities, into production. They want the power to plan priorities, to regiment industrial production.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will advise the gentleman he has consumed 10 minutes.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I will yield the gentleman part of my time.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I will try not to detain you.

They go down into our civilian activities. The history of the last war—in my extension of my remarks I will try to point out some examples—shows what? It shows that no matter how courageous—they are on top when it comes to courage and determination and ability to fight and win—no matter how supreme they are in possessing those qualities, when it comes to industrial production neither the Army nor the Navy nor the Air Force knows how.

It is the industrial leaders, the farmers, everyone in our country who works and produces when danger threatens us, and under our independent system; not under the regimented system as it is in Germany and in Russia and in Britain who make the fighting and running of wars possible. Oh, no. Under the independence which we exercise we produce until the regimented peoples fade out of the picture. When our—as we are told—untrained fighting men meet the disciplined, machine-like soldiers of the centralized command, who wins?

Then, why not leave to the Congress of the United States the duty to provide for national defense? The Constitution says that the Congress shall provide for an Army and limit its appropriations to 2 years. The Constitution says that the Congress shall provide for a Navy. It says nothing about an Air Force. I do not mean that we have no authority to provide an Air Force. Of course we have. But is there anyone so dumb as to believe for a moment that the Air Force can fight and win a war alone? That the Army and the Navy can do without the Air Force?

As I said to the gentleman previously on the floor, I agree to what we have written into this bill—and we have written in provisions to protect the naval aviation of the Navy—I agree in what we wrote in there to protect the integrity of the Army, the Navy, the marines.

But if and when we have a war, which God forbid, we will find these services—the Air Force—still with the Army and still with the Navy, because they must be there, just the same as the guns must be with the Army, the ships must be with the Navy.

When you talk about unification, no. You have two Departments now. This bill adds a third, the Air Force. They are all one great team. Separate them by law if you wish, you cannot break them up.

We have one-hundred-and-seventy-odd committees, joint committees, of Army and Navy now trying to coordinate, trying to unify, trying to get away from waste and extravagance which is always present in war and which is inevitable when either the Army or the Navy plans a war. No one criticizes them for it. For myself, if they ask for $5, and I am assured that $2 of it would be wasted, nevertheless I would vote for the five, and so would the other Members of this Congress, because we do not dare take a chance, and we do not know the exact amount they may need.

Economy? Read the record from cover to cover, as they say, and you will not find in it one single word which promises any present economy. It is all a hope.

Talk about unification! You still retain the Army and the Navy, and you have added to it another department, an Air Force, and over all a super superduper structure, a Secretary of Defense. And every Member here knows that means a new department—additional agencies, a host of additional employees.

The Government now gets one-third of the taxpayer's dollar. The Government now takes, if a man works 6 days a week—and few do—2 days of that work. And of the Nation's spending dollar, the armed forces now take a third.

Permit me to thank you for the attention you have given. As stated in the beginning my vote will be cast for the bill H. R. 4214 because as I understand it only two bills will be up, the bill from the other body S. 758 and the bill from the House; and when we come to the opportune time I shall ask that we strike out all after the enacting clause of the Senate bill and substitute the House bill.

It is my hope that, when conferees are appointed, they will insist upon the House bill which, as far as language and law can do it, does provide for the protection of the Marines, the Navy, and naval aviation.

At the risk of repeating the thought which has already been expressed, permit me to enlarge upon the subject.

The present unification controversy is not new. It is but the continuation and, if the present legislation is adopted, the culmination of over 25 years of effort by military elements to gain greater power within the Government. During the past 25 years over 50 legislative proposals relating to the unification of the armed forces have been introduced have been introduced—page 184, Report of Secretary of the Navy on Unification, by Ferdinand Eberstadt, Government Printing Office, October 22, 1945.

The unification battle last year was characterized by vigorous and effective Navy opposition. This year there was official acceptance by Secretary Forrestal and Vice Admiral Sherman. The attitude of the remainder of the Navy was one of glum silence—for the Navy was gagged by articles 94 and 95 of Navy Regulations. This gag was not lifted until June 23, when steps had already been taken to close hearings before the Expenditures Committee.

On January 16, 1947, the White House announced the so-called agreement between the Army and Navy relative to unification. On February 28 I introduced, as an administrative function of the chairman of the Expenditures in Executive Departments Committee, the administration's unification bill, H. R. 2319. In the Senate the proposal became S. 758.

The course which postwar legislation is now following is the same pattern that it followed after World War I. Now, as then, there is a determined effort to perpetuate in peace the great powers the military enjoyed in war.

In 1919 the War Department's bill—S. 2715—for reorganization of the Army met immediate and outspoken opposition in Congress and the press, where it was characterized as a preposterous scheme of the military to perpetuate the present absolute control of the General Staff over all functions of the Military Establishment and to Prussianize the military system of the United States.

The War Department bill was killed in committee during the first session of the Sixty-sixth Congress but its philosophy reappeared again in 1920 in greatly diluted form, as S. 3792, sponsored by Senator WADSWORTH.

Although passed by the Senate over a strong minority report of its military affairs committee, this bill never became law. The House had initiated its own bill, a strong but liberal redrafting of the principles embodied in the National Defense Act of 1916. The House bill, with minor changes, was enacted into law as the National Defense Act of 1920.

MANY PARALLELS ARE IMMEDIATELY APPARENT BETWEEN THE 1919 CONTROVERSY AND THE PROBLEM NOW BEFORE CONGRESS

The most objectionable section of the 1919 bill was as follows:

> The President shall merge as expeditiously as possible after the approval of this act all now existing departments, bureaus, and offices of the War Department into the organization herein prescribed or authorized; and shall have authority to make such distribution or redistribution of the duties, powers, functions, records, property, and personnel of such previously existing department bureaus, and offices as he may deem necessary for the efficiency of the military service, and authority to prescribe the duties, powers, and functions of officers of the service, units, and organizations herein authorized or prescribed. (From Annual Report of the War Department 1919, vol. 1, pt. 1.)

The scope and intent of the paragraph quoted above is apparent at the first reading. It sought to have Congress relinquish its traditional authority to state the purpose for which it created and supported elements of the armed services. It was but an early aspect of the "roles and missions" controversy which for the past 2 years has raged over the status of the Marine Corps and naval aviation, and which will be discussed later in more detail. But note the effort to have Congress relinquish its authority over such large segments of military legislation.

As was so apparent to Congress and to several leading editors the proposed bill would have enacted as peacetime legislation powers granted to

the President by the Overman Act. The obvious intent of the bill was well summarized as follows in the recent book, National Security and the General Staff, page 277, written by the youthful general staff publicist, Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr.:

> Needless to say the War Department had enjoyed the provisions of the Overman Act, which had given the President authority to make such organizational changes in the administrative set-up as the war demanded. This was the War Department's first big taste of administrative discretion and the General Staff wanted more of it.

Again note the similarity of that post-World War I bill and the present bill. The present bill originated in the War Department. The big difference between now and then is that instead of just being restricted to relinquishing authority over the Army, this year's bill, H. R. 2319, was a total abdication by Congress of its authority over the armed forces.

Senator Chamberlain led the fight against the War Department's 1919 defense bill. He sensed the basic dangers of what was transpiring and analyzed that bill with great accuracy; his description of the 1919 bill applies with equal accuracy to H. R. 2319. Following is his prophetic statement—These extracts are from his Analytical and Explanatory Statement as printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs by the Government Printing Office, 1919:

> This bill was framed by military advisers of the Secretary of War. * * * Inasmuch as many of these proposals are radical and even revolutionary in their nature, and, if rejected now, are likely again to be urged upon Congress, possibly in other forms, it seems advisable now to examine all of them very thoroughly. The comments made herein with regard to them will apply to them equally as well whenever and however they shall appear in the future.

In 1919, as now, the congressional committees were handicapped in their attempt to secure information necessary for the drafting of an adequate bill for national defense in two ways:

First, the reluctance of witnesses to testify freely concerning matters relating to the reorganization of the Army.

Second, the plea of military secrecy—present example JCS 1478 papers—used by the War Department to suppress and withhold information bearing directly upon the proposed legislation.

The General Staff was accused, by ex-Speaker Clark on the floor of the House, of maintaining a powerful national lobby. Congressman Clark's remarks are reported in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of May 19, 1920, volume IX, part 7.

Mr. Clark said, quoting from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

> I have no objection to the General Staff either, except I think they ought to attend to their business and let Congress attend to its business. [Applause.] They get up every one of these Army bills substantially. It is the second strongest lobby that has been around here since I have been in Congress. I think the Anti-Saloon League leads the list in strength of the lobby and the Regular Army officers come second. [Applause.]

The passage of the National Defense Act of 1920 brought to a close the great controversy which had raged through two sessions of Congress. This act has been recognized as an outstanding example of well-written defense legislation and was lauded by every successive Chief of Staff thereafter from 1922 to 1939 as a model statute—reference, Annual Reports of Secretary of War.

Now, as in 1919, the War Department General Staff is seeking again to project into peacetime, emergency controls of war. The parallel is clear. The following quotation from Senator Chamberlain's statement is as true today as it was in 1919 and 1920:

> The method adopted by the framers of the bill in order to conceal this scheme and its true inwardness, and thus to secure its adoption by an unsuspecting Congress, was somewhat complicated. The whole of it is not to be found in any one section of the bill or in plain language anywhere. But it is all there, nevertheless, and it can be discovered readily enough by assembling its ingeniously scattered parts.

The War Department General Staff's scheme, so thoroughly repudiated in 1920, appears again on a vastly enlarged scale in the present unification bill. Recent witnesses before congressional committees have scoffed and belittled the dangers of military ambition in high places, taking the position that in the 45 years of its existence the General Staff has never challenged the power of Congress. A true statement of the case would be that the General Staff has never, at least until the present, successfully challenged the power of Congress.

There is no reason why Congress, particularly the House, should have an inferiority complex in matters of defense legislation. There is no more reason why this House of Representatives should now blindly accept a military-written bill for national defense than it did in 1920. There is no apparent reason why the present Members of the House are not just as capable of enacting good strong defense legislation as were our 1920 predecessors. There is no indication that we are not as fully capable as our predecessors to pass on requests for military legislation. Above all, when passing on such requests we are no less able to give the country a bill that provides for the organization of the Nation's war power, but which keeps military power in harmony with our traditions of democracy.

Ever since the 1932 defeat of unification by the Senate—until the present—Congress had seemed to heed the advice of one of the Nation's greatest soldiers and statesmen, General of the Armies Douglas MacArthur, who in 1932 stated his opinion of unification. General MacArthur said:

> No other measure proposed in recent years seems to me to be fraught with such potential possibility of disaster for the United States as in this one. * * * Not only the military history of this country, but of every country, gives indisputable proof of the advantages of maintaining in time of war the integral control of two great branches of national defense—the Army and the Navy. Each must be free to perform its mission unhindered by any centralized and ponderous bureaucratic control. * * * Pass this bill and every potential enemy of the United States will rejoice.

So far I have spoken of the history of unification and the similarity between the present merger proposals and the previous proposals which were so decisively defeated whenever they arose. Let us now look more closely at the proposals as were embraced by H. R. 2319 and S. 758, its Senate counterpart.

The present discussions of unification, merger, or whatever name is given to the reorganization of the armed forces, can never be complete until thorough and exhausting consideration is given to the question—who should manage the conduct of a war?

The question of responsibility for war management is one whose answer may determine the life or death of a nation.

To many the obvious answer is—the military.

This same too obvious answer is the one reached by the military men who drew up the prewar industrial mobilization plan. This plan, drawn up during the years of peace by uniformed military men, placed on paper a scheme for an industrial czar with enormous powers. This czar would have headed a machine whose controls were in the hands of the military.

The official Government—Bureau of the Budget—report on war administration, The United States at War, criticizes the plan as scarcely meriting the build-up it had been given; it was a document dealing only in generalities with the problem of governmental organization for war and it was formulated for conditions unlike those which actually arose. Further it would have constituted virtual abdication by the President and would have made it difficult for the President to control the board strategy of defense preparation and foreign economic policy. Moreover the plan carried with it potentialities of far greater military influence in the management of governmental affairs than appeared either desirable or politic.

The document is prima facie evidence of charges made by Donald M. Nelson in his book, Arsenal of Democracy, that top echelon of our military men had a lack of understanding of our national economy and psychology. It might even be considered to show a studied disregard for our constitutional form of government.

Even a casual reading of the official report on war administration, The United States at War, reveals that military management of the late war would have been a hideous blunder, and further that our prior defense planning would have been more realistic if the plans prepared by the military had had civilian criticism and supervision. Indeed, there was great truth in Clemenceau's statement that war is too important a matter to be left to the military.

War extends from the sowing of seed, the growing of crops on up through a thousand operations to the finished supply item and weapons, and the military mind is not trained to grasp and solve the problems.

The record is plain for all to see. War is too important a matter to be left to the military. No other interpretation can be made by anyone interested in pre-

serving the Nation and its democratic form of government. The complex machinery of our industrial economy, the delicate negotiations of foreign policy, the abstruse maneuverings of international finance and economic warfare, must be left to those competent to understand them, to those with experience, the civilians, and the military confined to their narrow technical field, the preparation for, and the conduct of battle.

At the same time, the record clearly shows that the military must advise the civilian rulers as to the technical requirements and capabilities of the armed forces, while the civilians must keep the military plans within the bounds of our national resources.

And, finally, it is crystal clear that the military monkey wrench must be kept out of the national war machine in whatever design of governmental organization for war management is adopted. For to permit immediate or gradual growth of military control of war management is to follow the path of militarism—to disaster.

HOW THE MILITARY INFLUENCE IS EXERTED IN THE CURRENT MERGER PROPOSALS

While there are innumerable devices planted throughout H. R. 2319 and S. 758, and to a lesser extent in H. R. 4214, for the exercise of military influence in the management of the Nation, two of them deserve special mention: First, the device of the interlocking directorate; and second, studied provisions whereby boards which are nominally civilian in character are required to rely upon subordinate bodies which are military in character.

The interlocking-directorate device appears throughout H. R. 2319, S. 758, and H. R. 4214. By this device the higher level supposedly civilian agencies such as the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board can be swayed by the preponderant and continuous influence of the War Council and Munitions Board, their lesser military counterparts. This effect is much more obvious in the National Security Council and may be shown as follows:

The Secretaries of National Security, Army, Navy, and Air are on the War Council. There, in a military atmosphere, assisted with their military advisers, they could come to conclusions on industry, foreign affairs, labor and manpower, education, and public information. These conclusions could reflect purely the military viewpoint. Then as members of the National Security Council, the four military Secretaries would have a preponderant voice, as they would hold four out of seven votes.

This preponderance, it is true, could be ignored by the President when his views coincided with the minority representing purely the civilian side of government. The decision in any event is the President's. But he could not consistently ignore the views of the majority of the Council that would represent the military. This is the basis of the unfavorable comment made by the Christian Science Monitor when its editorial of May 26 objected to the military domination of the National Security Council.

These objections cannot be brushed aside by the mere statement that the men selected for these important positions would be unlikely to form such a cabal. Democratic governments of and by civilians are not wise to set up machinery which would permit and assist the use of such devices. The historical fact remains that men have done such things.

The interlocking directorate is less apparent in the bill's provisions for the National Security Resources Board. But it is there, and probably of greater potential danger because of the devious approach.

These bills fail to specify the congressional intention as to the minimum membership on the Security Resources Board of interested departments and agencies. This leaves the way open for intrigue as to members to be named. Certainly it would be possible to name as members of the Security Resources Board the same Under or Assistant Secretaries who are the prescribed members of the Munitions Board. It is significant to note that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Kenney, has publicly expressed an opinion that there are times when it would be desirable "to have the same individual serve as chairman of both boards." Thus the preponderant military voice in the National Security Council would be duplicated in the National Security Resources Board.

The dangers of this interlocking directorate influence upon the National Security Resources Board should be obvious. The raw resources and the industry of a nation are the measures of its war-making potential.

Senator Chamberlain's prophecy that the objectives and devices of the War Department's 1919 bill "will appear in the future," has come true. The same objectives are being sought by the same devious means, and they are still as objectionable from either the viewpoint of maintaining democratic government or of assuring an understanding and efficient mobilization of a nation's resources for war.

This issue of military control over civilian economy was well summarized by the editorial More Than a Merger, appearing in the May 26, 1947, Christian Science Monitor. It is printed herewith, marked exhibit A as is an editorial on H. R. 4214:

But if history teaches anything at all, it teaches that the military do not understand the workings of industry nor the needs of civilian economy. It teaches that the direction of top national policy must be wholly free from military domination.

The other major device by which the military will exert its influence over the management of national affairs, particularly the national economy, is the carefully planned reliance which the National Security Resources Board is required to place upon the Munitions Board.

While H. R. 4214 does make some provision for a staff for the Resources Board, it makes no provision, or even a mention of any civilian counterparts of the Munitions Board. It leaves a complete vacuum to offset the military influence of the Munitions Board.

THE JOINT STAFF

The provision for a Joint Staff is a crucial portion of H. R. 2319, S. 758, and—I am sorry to say—H. R. 4214, for it marks a departure from congressional precedent. In 1916 and 1920 Congress prescribed definite restrictions on the War Department General Staff. The argument may come up that this Joint Staff is not a National General Staff. The fact is that it can be a National General Staff in all but name, and the Director can become a National Chief of Staff. Since a National General Staff was the goal of the War Department's high command in supporting last year's merger bill, it would not be realistic to believe that the War Department General Staff will not take full advantage of the blank-check provisions of this section pertaining to the Joint Staff.

If the history of militarism teaches anything it is that militaristic forces within a great nation are dynamic, and military elements will take not only what powers as are given, but will seize or usurp whatever additional power that is not prohibited to them by positive law or action.

The dangers of the Joint Staff are not mere imagination. General Edson felt so strongly on this issue of militarism that he risked the ire of his superiors to speak upon this matter. Said General Edson, one of our Nation's most distinguished soldiers and holder of the Congressional Medal of Honor for heroism on the field of battle:

In my opinion, one of the most dangerous and least understood provisions in this entire legislation is that which sets up the Joint Staff. It must be understood from the outset that regardless of what it is called, this Joint Staff is in fact a National General Staff—the "Oberkommando" of the Prussian military system. It is this body of permanent General Staff officers which will formulate the policies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be, in fact, the military advisers of the Secretary of the National Military Establishment.

Congress should recognize this fact, and, as it has done in the past when dealing with the War Department General Staff, should carefully delineate and circumscribe its powers and functions. Also, in my opinion, Congress should limit the tenure of duty of its members, and provide for equitable, rotation of the office of Director among all the services. Only by so doing can Congress prevent the growth of a military clique which will inevitably extend its influence into every department of government—civilian as well as military. We have only to search the records of history to realize the truth of this statement.

This warning was reiterated by Admiral Zacharias and Captain Karig of the Navy.

There is not a sufficient understanding among Members of Congress as to the true implications of the section on the Joint Staff. For instance, the report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, commenting on the Joint Staff,

minimized the grave warnings with the statement:

The Joint Staff as proposed in this bill has in itself no command authority. (P. 14, Report of Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 758.)

That statement is in itself true, but it is false in its inference that in this respect the Joint Staff differs from any other staff. The fact is that no staff has in itself any command authority. Staff officers exercise their power in the form of delegated authority from their superiors. Paragraph 6, United States Army Field Manual 101–5, Staff Officers' Field Manual.

It is the imperceptible, gradual, and constant accumulation of more authority in carrying out the policy of their so-called superior authorities that national general staffs became a dominant force in their government. Again it is well to emphasize that while this section does not make it mandatory that the Joint Staff shall become a National General Staff, the section, by its lack of restrictions, opens the door to such an eventuality. Not even the great German General Staff had in itself command authority. Von Moltke, at the pinnacle of his power as chief of staff—military ruler of that nation, had, in himself, no command authority, as he issued orders in the name of his superior, the Emperor—data from Whitten's Von Moltke, a biography.

Congress has never previously permitted the fact that a "staff in itself has no command authority" to deter it from prescribing the most definitive restrictions on the War Department General Staff. The Defense Act of 1916 placed definite restrictions on the War Department General Staff, restrictions designed to keep that staff from accumulating increasing authority even within the War Department.

Congress was even more insistent in controlling the ambitions of the War Department General Staff, and specified detailed General Staff restrictions in the National Defense Act of 1920.

Thus, this Congress in authorizing a National General Staff is giving such a staff a completely free hand at the highest national military level, whereas it has been the historic sense of Congress to impose most specific restrictions on General Staff influence within even the relatively restricted sphere of the War Department.

The mere fact that the military resists congressional efforts to put restrictive provisions on the Joint Staff is prima facie evidence of the fact that those who sought an outright authorization of a National General Staff in last year's unification bill fully intend to use the Joint Staff in this year's bill as a means of attaining their nefarious objective.

Congress should consider well the inherent dangers of the section of the bill pertaining to the Joint Staff before giving it the effect of law. If the section as written is passed it will mark the victory of General Staff influences over Congress, which for 44 years has fought to restrain such influences within our Government.

ECONOMY

Innumerable claims have been made by proponents of this legislation that great savings will result from its enactment through the elimination of waste and duplication. These claims are invariably couched in generalities, and in spite of repeated demands from committee members that concrete facts and figures be produced to support these claims, no such facts and figures have been forthcoming. The reason for this is probably a realization on the part of the bill's sponsors that if they cited a specific instance of waste and duplication that would be eliminated on passage of the bill, the question would immediately be asked: "Why do not you do it now—what prevents you?". The answer is, of course, that nothing in the present system stands in the way of the elimination of waste and duplication.

The fact should not be overlooked, in connection with any possible economies which might result from merger, that there is a point of diminishing returns in the growth of any organization. When this fact is coupled with the fact that the chief partner in the proposed merger is notorious for its inept and profligate management of its business affairs, the specious claims of economy may well be questioned.

Neither the Marine Corps nor naval aviation was adequately protected in either S. 758 or in H. R. 2319.

Provisions which I think were necessary and which may be adequate to protect the integrity of the marines, of naval aviation, have been written, first, into H. R. 3979 introduced by me, and later into H. R. 4214, which is now before the House.

The representatives of the Joint Staff have insisted from the very beginning until the last day this bill was under consideration that there should not be written into it the roles and functions of the component parts of our armed forces.

Their very evident and apparent desire is to retain in their own hands supreme power.

FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMED SERVICES

The matter of legislative delineation of the roles and functions of the armed services is one of the chief issues in the unification controversy.

If the basic functions of all services were clearly defined, the apprehensions of the Navy for its air component and the apprehensions of the Marine Corps for its effectiveness would disappear—and with them much of the present disagreement.

The War Department is urgently desirous of excluding the roles and missions of the armed services from law, since such an omission will permit the gradual reorientation of our military power in the direction of the ground arm. Every bill that the War Department has had a part in framing has avoided mention of roles and functions, and War Department spokesmen have fought against statutory enactment.

When closely examined, War Department witnesses admit the unquestionable right of Congress to establish the basic functions of any agency it creates, yet it is claimed that roles and functions are constantly changing and are thus not suited to legal expression. This is specious reasoning.

The fears of naval aviation and the Marine Corps are based on the strongest of written evidence—the following statements:

General Spaatz, commanding general, Army Air Forces:

I recommend therefore that the size of the Marine Corps be limited to small, readily available, and lightly armed units, no larger than a regiment, to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries and to provide interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments.

General Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, United States Army:

I therefore recommend that the above concept be accepted as stating the role of the Marine Corps and that marine units not exceed the regiment in size, and that the size of the Marine Corps be made consistent with the foregoing principles.

Admiral Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, in reply to the above:

The basic and major issues * * * comprise a proposal on the part of the Army (a) to eliminate the Marine Corps as an effective combat element, reducing it to the status of a naval police unit.

General Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, United States Army, also wrote:

1. That the Marine Corps is maintained solely as an adjunct of the fleet and participates only in minor shore combat operations in which the Navy alone is interested.

* * * * *

3. That it be agreed that the Navy will not develop a land army or a so-called amphibious army; marine units to be limited in size to the equivalent of the regiment, and the total size of the Marine Corps therefore limited to some 50,000 or 60,000 men.

In addition to General Eisenhower, others expressed their willingness to see the basic functions written into law. Why, then, was a meaningful section on the subject not included in S. 758? There are two reasons:

First. The War Department didn't want it.

Second. It was part of the agreement not to have it.

The question may well be raised, if Secretary Forrestal, Admiral Nimitz, and General Vandegrift have all declared that S. 758 provides adequate protection for the Marine Corps, what further objection could there be? In answer to this it must first be recalled that the principals in this controversy have been under continuing, and understandable, pressure to reach a compromise.

Second, and most significant, it must be realized that no individual primarily involved has been a free agent as to testimony, the Cabinet officers because of their administration affiliation and the military personnel because of the official gag, which, most significantly, was not raised until June 23, after all chance of effective testimony was past.

H. R. 4214 is a superior bill to S. 758 in that it prescribes the general functions of the armed services. It does not legislate tactics, and its provisions are sufficiently broad so as not to freeze progress. But at the same time it is sufficiently

definite to prevent the recurrence of such unfortunate interservice disputes as that which raged over the Marine Corps and naval aviation for over 2 years.

But, while the representative of the Joint Staff, General Norstad, appearing as late as Thursday afternoon before members of the subcommittee, insisted that the Congress should not write into the act provisions which some members of the committee believed were necessary if the integrity of naval aviation and the Marine Corps was to be protected, when confronted by the provisions of the Constitution, it was admitted that the Congress had the unquestioned right to write legislation such as that embodied in H. R. 4214.

In all humility, it is respectfully submitted that H. R. 4214 will more adequately protect and make efficient the armed forces of the Nation than will S. 758 or any similar bill.

At the same time, I cannot again avoid calling to the attention of this Congress the provisions of the Constitution and the fact that legislation of this kind is a right-about-face and a retreat from the theory of government established therein.

Our forefathers, burdened by excessive and oppressive taxation, deprived of their personal and their religious liberties, came to this country and they here established a form of government then new to the world.

They established a system of checks and of balances.

They provided that the Congress should provide for the national defense.

In the Constitution they sought to implement that defense by providing that the Congress should establish and maintain an army, appropriations for which were limited to a 2-year period. That limitation was undoubtedly written into the Constitution because its authors feared military authority, feared a dictatorship.

The Constitution provided that the Congress should establish and maintain a navy.

Now, because of the fear brought about by propaganda, the military seeks to, and apparently will be successful in inducing the Congress to abdicate its authority, to shirk its responsibility, and to turn over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to a supermilitary organization imposed upon our armed forces, the duty of providing a national defense.

This bill does not provide for unification. It adds to the Army and the Navy provided for in the Constitution a third department—the Air Force.

No one is so dumb as to believe that the Constitution bars the use of any and all methods of defense or offense which would add to our national safety.

Few, indeed, are those who believe that either the Army or the Navy could in these days provide national defense without adequate air forces.

Few, indeed, are those who believe that the Air Force alone or any outfit advocating the efficiency of a push-button war, could carry on without the aid of both the Army and the Navy and all their component parts.

For more than 150 years, under the principles prescribed in the Constitution and using the methods advocated by the leaders of our armed forces, this Nation has successfully defended itself.

The last two world wars have demonstrated beyond any argument that our fighting forces are superior, when backed by our production methods, to that of any one or all other armed forces now or heretofore in existence.

Other nations have followed their military leaders in their unification and centralization schemes, giving power to military leaders. Hitler tried it. Mussolini tried it and Stalin has used it. Yet, every time it has failed when confronted and put to the test by the so-called wasteful, inefficient methods of the United States of America.

Unification, centralization, in the hands of the military authorities has been one of the major causes of the downfall of every nation which has adopted it.

It is difficult to understand why we, successful as we have been under our constitutional methods of fighting and winning wars, should adopt, embrace and follow the methods of the losers.

My vote will be cast for H. R. 4214 because and only because some legislation on the subject is to be adopted by this Congress and that bill is the least harmful.

Were it in my power, I would refuse to legislate on this subject at this time; recommit the bill to the committee, with instructions to its sponsors to lay on the line some assurance that they are not seeking regimentation, a dictatorship, and that their proposals would give us some economy, some greater efficiency.

EXHIBIT A

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Mass., of May 26, 1947]

MUCH MORE THAN A MERGER BILL

The so-called merger bill is turning out under close inspection to be something quite different—something much broader and more far-reaching. To put it differently: There is another, less obvious side of the bill which is neither being headlined nor discussed. And it is time the American people are told what this measure really means.

This bill does more than draw a blueprint of unified direction and better teamwork for the military and naval services. Of much deeper significance, it is a piece of basic legislation which establishes how and by whom national policy and the civilian economy shall be controlled in any prospect of war.

We have supported the general provisions of the merger, particularly coordination of foreign policy, military policy, and industrial potential. But because this bill originated in the thinking of military men, the power it assigns or permits to the military over national policy and civilian affairs is very great—much greater, we think, than the American people would knowingly choose.

Here are some of the provisions of the National Security Act which we question in this regard:

1. On the National Security Council, which should not only coordinate but also keep in balance foreign policy, military policy, and national production and resources, the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board face not only the Secretary of National Defense, but also the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The ratio thus is weighed 4 to 2 in favor of the armed forces.

2. The National Security Resources Board, an independent agency, is charged with advisory duties only and concerned with broad preparedness policy. The Munitions Board, however, is placed wholly within the Department of National Defense and staffed with top officials of the three military departments. This Board is given the kind of functions which could mean actual control and direction of the civilian economy by the military in case of war: to determine priorities, to supervise subordinate agencies, and to "make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve existing interservice agencies operating in the fields of procurement, production, and distribution."

3. The wording of the act not only permits, but actually encourages, interlocking directorates as regards the Munitions Board, the Resources Board, and a third, the Resources and Development Board. Representatives, and perhaps the same representatives, of the military departments could dominate all three.

4. The act permits, in fact suggests, that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency serving the state as well as the Defense Departments, be an officer of one of the armed forces rather than a civilian.

5. In somewhat oblique but nonetheless definite language the act perpetuates certain of the war powers of the President notwithstanding the expiration provisions in the laws which established them. It hands over to the Secretary of National Defense the blanket authority which hitherto in peacetime has traditionally rested with Congress.

We do not impute to the generals and admirals any plot to set up a military dictatorship. Their training and professional experience have simply made them pattern this legislation by military standards.

But if history teaches anything at all, it teaches that the military do not understand the workings of industry nor the needs of civilian economy. It teaches that the direction of top national policy must be wholly free from military domination.

What to do about this Security Act of 1947? The essential basis of the merger compromises between the armed services, perhaps, should not be disturbed. But the broader objectives of the bill need study and public discussion before anything becomes law.

EXHIBIT B

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Mass., of July 10, 1947]

THAT HISTORIC EQUILIBRIUM

The Gurney bill providing for merger of the armed forces has just been passed by the Senate with but slight amendment. It now goes to the House of Representatives where its counterpart is still in committee, together with an alternative bill introduced by Representative CLARE E. HOFFMAN, of Michigan. The Senate bill is backed by the administration, and is the one now being publicly discussed.

This newspaper approves and has supported the general framework and the broad objectives of the administration measure. We believe that the conduct of this country's military and foreign policies and the development and mobilization of its industrial potential and natural resources must be coordinated closely at the highest levels. We are in agreement that grand and lesser strategy must be planned and executed with all the service branches working as members of one team. We are persuaded that this can be done without loss of the esprit de corps and the specialized know-how of each of these branches or of constructive rivalry between them. We are sure that existing duplications can be greatly reduced in the interests of efficiency and economy.

All of these things the Gurney bill sets out to do. With certain exceptions, it is so framed, in our opinion, that it should accomplish its purpose. But these excep-

tions have a momentous bearing on the American way of life.

They have little or nothing to do with the military aspects of the merger. They do not pertain to unified command, to task-force strategy, or teamwork between the fighting arms.

These exceptions are provisions in the Gurney bill which would weight the top coordination of the armed forces, State Department, and industrial potential much too heavily with the military view. They would set up a Central Intelligence Agency, with no restrictions against possible evolution into some sort of a superpolice force within the United States.

They would place military chiefs on the highly important War Council to sit as coequals with their civilian Secretary superiors. They would locate too much of the job of industrial mobilization wholly within the new military department. These are some examples.

Fortunately, Congress has specific correction right at hand for these dangerous defects. It is in the form of certain provisions of the Hoffman bill (H. R. 3979), which has taken account of testimony given at House committee hearings.

We cannot go along with Mr. HOFFMAN in his weakening of the Secretary of National Defense by making him a coordinator instead of a true department head. Other than that, his bill appears specifically and effectively to counteract the military overloading inherent in the Gurney bill.

We urge that these corrections be written into the Gurney bill and the amended bill enacted. Americans want true unification of all of their instruments of national defense. They want also preservation of that historic equilibrium between civilian and military control. If Congress is alert, they can have both.

The CHAIRMAN. There being no further requests for time, the Clerk will read.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered as read, that it be printed at this point in the RECORD, and be open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama?

There was no objection.

(The bill reads as follows:)

Be it enacted, etc., That this act may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947."

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DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including the naval air force and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

TITLE I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SEC. 101. (a) There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").

The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council: *Provided*, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

The Council shall be composed of the President; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense, appointed under section 102; the Secretary of the Army, referred to in section 202; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force, appointed under section 204; and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, appointed under section 106.

(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council—

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

(c) The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President, and who shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year. The executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is hereby authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.

(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SEC. 102. (a) There shall be a Secretary of Defense, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate: *Provided*, That a person who has held a commission in a Regular component of the armed services shall not be eligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security. Under the direction of the President and subject to the provisions of this act he shall perform the following duties:

(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment and for all of the departments and agencies therein;

(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies;

(3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research;

(4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment; and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies under the applicable appropriation act.

Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force from presenting to the President or to the Director of the Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any report or recommendation relating to his department which he may deem necessary: *And provided further*, That the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force shall be administered as individual executive departments by their respective Secretaries and all powers and duties relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense by this act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall submit annual written reports to the President and the Congress covering expenditures, work, and accomplishments of the National Military Establishment, together with such recommendations as he shall deem appropriate.

(c) The Secretary of Defense shall cause a seal of office to be made for the National Military Establishment of such design as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

MILITARY ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY

SEC. 103. Officers of the armed services may be detailed to duty as assistants and personal aides to the Secretary of Defense, but he shall not establish a military staff.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SEC. 104. (a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to appoint from civilian life not to exceed three special assistants to advise and assist him in the performance of his duties. Each such special assistant shall receive compensation at the rate of $10,000 a year.

(b) The Secretary of Defense is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such other civilian personnel as may be necessary for the performance of the functions of the National Military Establishment.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 105. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof. The Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services or from among individuals in civilian life. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year.

(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director then——

(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and

(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of Director of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office of Director, receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which $14,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.

(c) Nothwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council—

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the President through the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: *Provided*, That the Agency shall have no police, subpena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: *Provided further*, That the responsibility and authority of the departments and other agencies of the Government to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence shall not be affected by this section: *And provided further*, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence operations of the departments and other agencies of the Government as relate to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination.

(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office—

(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1496) shall cease to exist; and

(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.

NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD

SEC. 106. (a) There is hereby established a National Security Resources Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board") to be composed of the Chairman of the Board and such heads or representatives of the various executive departments and independent agencies as may from time to time be designated by the President to be members of the Board. The Chairman of the Board shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year.

(b) The Chairman of the Board, subject to the direction of the President, is authorized, without regard to the provisions of the civil-service laws and regulations and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to assist the Board in carrying out its functions.

(c) It shall be the function of the Board to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including—

(1) policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war;

(2) programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation's natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and conditions;

(3) policies for unifying, in time of war, the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials, and products;

(4) the relationship between potential supplies of, and potential requirements for, manpower, resources, and productive facilities in time of war;

(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of, strategic and critical material, and for, the conservation of these reserves;

(6) the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's security.

(d) In performing its functions, the Board shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the Government.

TITLE II—THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

SECTION 201. (a) There is hereby established the National Military Establishment, and the Secretary of Defense shall be the head thereof.

(b) The National Military Establishment shall consist of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, together with all other agencies created under title II of this act.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SEC. 202. (a) The Dpartment of War shall hereafter be designated the Department of the Army, and the title of the Secretary shall be changed to Secretary of the Army. Changes shall be made in the titles of other officers and activities of the Department of the Army as the Secretary of the Army may determine.

(b) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions relating to the Department of War or to any officer or activity whose title is changed under this section shall, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, be deemed to relate to the Department of the Army within the National Military Establishment or to such officer or activity designated by his or its new title.

(c) The term "Department of the Army" as used in this act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Army at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, Reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Army.

(d) The Secretary of the Army shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Department of the Army, of such design as the President may approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

(e) In general the United States Army, within the Department of the Army, shall include land combat and services forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It shall be responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SEC. 203. (a) The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the United States Navy, including naval aviation which shall hereafter be designated the naval air force, and of the United States Marine Corps, including the Reserve components of such forces; all field activities,

headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.

(b) In general the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy, shall include naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It shall be responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The primary mission of the Marine Corps shall be to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition to its primary mission, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct: *Provided*, That such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the performance of the primary mission hereinbefore set forth. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SEC. 204. (a) There is hereby established an executive department to be known as the Department of the Air Force, and a Secretary of the Air Force, who shall be the head thereof. The Secretary of the Air Force shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(b) Section 158 of the Revised Statutes is amended to include the Department of the Air Force and the provisions of so much of title IV of the Revised Statutes as now or hereafter amended as is not inconsistent with this act shall be applicable to the Department of the Air Force.

(c) The term "Department of the Air Force" as used in this act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air Force at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, Reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Air Force.

(d) There shall be in the Department of the Air Force an Under Secretary of the Air Force and two Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(e) The several officers of the Department of the Air Force shall perform such functions as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribe.

(f) So much of the functions of the Secretary of the Army and of the Department of the Army, including those of any officer of such Department, as are assigned to or under the control of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, or as are deemed by the Secretary of Defense to be necessary or desirable for the operations of the Department of the Air Force or the United States Air Force, shall be transferred to and vested in the Secretary of the Air Force and the Department of the Air Force: *Provided*, That the National Guard Bureau shall, in addition to the functions and duties performed by it for the Department of the Army, be charged with similar functions and duties for the Department of the Air Force, and shall be the channel of communication between the Department of the Air Force and the several States on all matters pertaining to the Air National Guard: *And provided further*, That, in order to permit an orderly transfer, the Secretary of Defense may, during the transfer period hereinafter prescribed, direct that the Department of the Army shall continue for appropriate periods to exercise any of such functions, insofar as they relate to the Department of the Air Force, or the United States Air Force or their property and personnel. Such of the property, personnel, and records of the Department of the Army used in the exercise of functions transferred under this subsection as the Secretary of Defense shall determine shall be transferred or assigned to the Department of the Air Force.

(g) The Secretary of the Air Force shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Department of the Air Force, of such device as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

SEC. 205. (a) The United States Air Force is hereby established under the Department of the Air Force. The Army Air Forces, the Air Corps, United States Army, and the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command), shall be transferred to the United States Air Force.

(b) There shall be a Chief of Staff, United States Air Forces, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of 4 years from among the officers of general rank who are assigned to or commissioned in the United States Air Force. Under the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall exercise command over the United States Air Force and shall be charged with the duty of carrying into execution all lawful orders and directions which may be transmitted to him. The functions of the Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command), and of the Chief of the Air Corps and of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be transferred to the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. When such transfer becomes effective, the offices of the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, and Assistants to the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, provided for by the act of June 4, 1920, as amended (41 Stat. 768), and Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force, provided for by section 5 of the act of June 16, 1936 (49 Stat. 1525), shall cease to exist. While holding office as Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, the incumbent shall hold a grade and receive allowances equivalent to those prescribed by law for the Chief of Staff, United States Army. The Chief of Staff, United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall take rank among themselves according to their relative dates of appointment as such, and shall each take rank above all other officers on the active list of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: *Provided*, That nothing in this act shall have the effect of changing the relative rank of the present Chief of Staff, United States Army, and the present Chief of Naval Operations.

(c) All commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, commissioned, holding warrants, or enlisted, in the Air Corps, United States Army, or the Army Air Forces, shall be transferred in branch to the United States Air Force. All other commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, who are commissioned, hold warrants, or are enlisted, in any component of the Army of the United States and who are under the authority or command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued under the authority or command of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Air Force. Personnel whose status is affected by this subsection shall retain their existing commissions, warrants, or enlisted status in existing components of the armed forces unless otherwise altered or terminated in accordance with existing law; and they shall not be deemed to have been appointed to a new or different office or grade, or to have vacated their permanent or temporary appointments in an existing component of the armed forces, solely by virtue of any change in status under this subsection. No such change in status shall alter or prejudice the status of any individual so assigned, so as to deprive him of any right, benefit or privilege to which he may be entitled under existing law.

(d) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of the Air Force, all property, records, installations, agencies, activities, projects, and civilian personnel under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command of the commanding general, Army Air Forces, shall be continued to the same extent under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command, respectively, of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, in the Department of the Air Force.

(e) For a period of 2 years from the date of enactment of this act, personnel (both military and civilian), property, records, installations, agencies, activities, and projects may be transferred between the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force by direction of the Secretary of Defense.

(f) In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF TRANSFERS

SEC. 206. Each transfer, assignment, or change in status under section 204 or section 205 shall take effect upon such date or dates as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

WAR COUNCIL

SEC. 207. There shall be within the National Military Establishment a War Council composed of the Secretary of Defense, as Chairman, who shall have power of decision; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Forces; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The War Council shall advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces, and shall consider and report on such other matters as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SEC. 208. (a) There is hereby established within the National Military Establishment the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one.

(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;

(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;

(4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;

(5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;

(6) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and

(7) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense and shall perform such other duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as may be prescribed by law.

JOINT STAFF

SEC. 209. There shall be, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Joint Staff to consist of not to exceed 100 officers and to be composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from each of the three armed services. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall perform such duties as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director shall be an officer junior in grade to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MUNITIONS BOARD

SEC. 210. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military Establishment a Munitions Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board").

(b) The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof, and an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary from each of the three military departments, to be designated in each case by the Secretaries of their respective departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year.

(c) It shall be the duty of the Board under the direction of the Secretary of Defense and in support of strategic and logistic plans prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

(1) to coordinate the appropriate activities within the National Military Establishment with regard to industrial matters, including the procurement, production, and distribution plans of the departments and agencies comprising the Establishment;

(2) to plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization;

(3) to recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities among the several military services and to plan for standardization of specifications and for the greatest practicable allocation of purchase authority of technical equipment and common use items on the basis of single procurement;

(4) to prepare estimates of potential production, procurement, and personnel for use in evaluation of the logistic feasibility of strategic operations;

(5) to determine relative priorities of the various segments of the military procurement programs;

(6) to supervise such subordinate agencies as are or may be created to consider the subjects falling within the scope of the Board's responsibilities;

(7) to make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve existing interservice agencies operating in the fields of procurement, production, and distribution in such manner as to promote efficiency and economy;

(8) to maintain liaison with other departments and agencies for the proper correlation of military requirements with the civilian economy, particularly in regard to the procurement or disposition of strategic and critical material and the maintenance of adequate reserves of such material, and to make recommendations as to policies in connection therewith;

(9) to assemble and review material and personnel requirements presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those presented by the production, procurement, and distribution agencies assigned to meet military needs, and to make recommendations thereon to the Secretary of Defense; and

(10) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

(d) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office, the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Munitions Board.

(e) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such personnel and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the performance of its functions.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

SEC. 211. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military Establishment a Research and Development Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board"). The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof, and two representatives from each of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to be designated by the Secretaries of their respective departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year. The purpose of the Board shall be to advise the Secretary of Defense as to the status of scientific research relative to the national security, and to assist him in assuring adequate provision for research and development on scientific problems relating to the national security.

(b) It shall be the duty of the Board, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense—

(1) to prepare a complete and integrated program of research and development for military purposes;

(2) to advise with regard to trends in scientific research relating to national security and the measures necessary to assure continued and increasing progress;

(3) to recommend measures of coordination of research and development among the military departments, and allocation among them of responsibilities for specific programs of joint interest;

(4) to formulate policy for the National Military Establishment in connection with research and development matters involving agencies outside of the National Military Establishment;

(5) to consider the interaction of research and development and strategy, and to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection therewith; and

(6) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

(c) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office, the Joint Research and Development Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Research and Development Board.

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such personnel and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the performance of its functions.

TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS

COMPESATION OF SECRETARIES

SEC. 301. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.

(b) The Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force shall each receive compensation at the rate of $14,500 a year.

UNDER SECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES

SEC. 302. The Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force shall each receive compensation at the rate of $10,000 a year and shall perform such duties as the Secretaries of their respective departments may prescribe.

ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND PERSONNEL

SEC. 303. (a) The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized to appoint such advisory committees and to employ, consistent with other provisions of this act, such part-time advisory personnel as they may deem necessary in carrying out their respective functions and the functions of agencies under their control. Persons holding other offices or positions under the United States for which they receive compensation while serving as members of such committees shall receive no additional compensation for such service. Other members of such committees and other part-time advisory personnel so employed may serve without compensation or may receive compensation at a rate not to exceed $35 for each day of service, as determined by the appointing authority.

(b) Service of an individual as a member of any such advisory committee, or in any other part-time capacity for a department or agency hereunder, shall not be considered as service bringing such individual within the provisions of section 109 or 113 of the Criminal Code (U. S. C., 1940 ed., title 18, secs. 198 and 203), or section 19 (c) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, unless the act of such individual, which by such section is made unlawful when performed by an individual referred to in such section, is with respect to any particular matter which directly involves a department or agency which such person is advising or in which such department or agency is directly interested.

STATUS OF TRANSFERRED CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SEC. 304. All transfers of civilian personnel under this act shall be without change in clasification or compensation, but the head of any department or agency to which such a transfer is made is authorized to make such changes in the tiles and designations and prescribe such changes in the duties of such personnel commensurate with their classifications as he may deem necessary and appropriate.

SAVING PROVISIONS

SEC. 305. (a) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions applicable with respect to any function, activity, personnel, property, records, or other thing transferred under this act, or with respect to any officer, department, or agency, from which such transfer is made, shall, except to the extent rescinded, modified, superseded, terminated, or made inapplicable by or under authority of law, have the same effect as if such transfer had not been made; but, after any such transfer, any such law, order, regulation, or other action which vested functions in or otherwise related to any officer, department, or agency from which such transfer was made shall, insofar as applicable with respect to the functions, activity, personnel, property, records, or other thing transferred and to the extent not inconsistent with other provisions of this act, be deemed to have vested such func-

tion in or relate to the officer, department, or agency to which the transfer was made.

(b) No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or against the head of any department or agency or other officer of the United States, in his official capacity or in relation to the discharge of his official duties, shall abate by reason of the taking effect of any transfer or change in title under the provisions of this act; and, in the case of any such transfer, such suit, action, or other proceeding may be maintained by or against the successor of such head or other officer under the transfer, but only if the court shall allow the same to be maintained on motion or supplemental pleading filed within 12 months after such transfer takes effect, showing a necessity for the survival of such suit, action, or other proceeding to obtain settlement of the questions involved.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of the second paragraph of section 5 of title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, the existing organization of the War Department under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9082 of February 28, 1942, as modified by Executive Order No. 9722 of May 13, 1946, and the existing organization of the Department of the Navy under Executive Order No. 9635 of September 29, 1945, including the assignment of functions to organizational units within the War and Navy Departments, may, to the extent determined by the Secretary of Defense, continue in force for 2 years following the date of enactment of this act except to the extent modified by the provisions of this act or under authority of law.

TRANSFER OF FUNDS

SEC. 306. All unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter made available for use by or on behalf of the Army Air Forces or officers thereof, shall be transferred to the Department of the Air Force for use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Such other unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter made available for use by the Department of War or the Department of the Army in exercise of functions transferred to the Department of the Air Force under this act, as the Secretary of Defense shall determine, shall be transferred to the Department of the Air Force for use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Unexpended balances transferred under this section may be used for the purposes for which the appropriations, allocations, or other funds were originally made available, or for new expenditures occasioned by the enactment of this act. The transfers herein authorized may be made with or without warrant action as may be appropriate from time to time from any appropriation covered by this section to any other such appropriation or to such new accounts established on the books of the Treasury as may be determined to be necessary to carry into effect provisions of this act.

BUDGET ESTIMATES

SEC. 307. (a) So much of the annual budget transmitted to the Congress by the President as contains the estimates of appropriations for and expenditures by the National Military Establishment and the departments therein shall be so arranged as clearly to show—

(1) with respect to each item for which the President recommends an appropriation or expenditure, a statement of the nature of such item and of the amount recommended by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the head of the department concerned, respectively; and

(2) with respect to any item for which the President does not recommend an appropriation or expenditure but for which a budget estimate for inclusion in such budget was submitted by the Secretary of Defense or by the head of a department therein, a statement of the nature of such item and of the amount recommended by the Secretary of Defense and the head of the department, respectively.

(b) Each supplemental or deficiency estimate for appropriations or expenditures transmitted to the Congress by the President which contains any item recommending an appropriation to or an expenditure by the National Military Establishment or any department therein shall be so arranged as clearly to show with respect to any such item a statement of the nature of the item and of the amount recommended by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the head of the department, respectively.

AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 308. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions and purposes of this act.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 309. (a) As used in this act, the term "function" includes functions, powers, and duties.

(b) As used in this act, the term "budget program" refers to recommendations as to the apportionment, to the allocation, and to the review of allotments of appropriated funds.

SEPARABILITY

SEC. 310. If any provisions of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid the validity of the remainder of the act and of the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 311. (a) The first sentence of section 102 (a) and sections 1, 2, 308, 309, 310, and 311 shall take effect immediately upon the enactment of this act.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), the provisions of the act shall take effect on whichever of the following days is the earlier: The day after the day upon which the Secretary of Defense first appointed takes office, or the sixtieth day after the date of the enactment of this act.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] desire to offer any committee amendments at this time?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment offered by Mr. HOFFMAN: Page 37, after line 22, add the following new section:

"SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY

"SEC. 312. Paragraph 1 of subsection (d) of section 1 of the act entitled 'An act to provide for the performance of the duties of the office of President in the case of the removal, resignation, death, or inability of both the President and Vice President,' approved July 18, 1947, is amended by striking out 'Secretary of War' and inserting in lieu thereof 'Secretary of National Security' and by striking out 'Secretary of the Navy'."

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to modify the amendment by striking out "Secretary of National Security" and inserting in lieu thereof "Secretary of Defense."

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer a committee amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment offered by Mr. HOFFMAN: Page 2, at the end of the table of contents, add the following:

"Sec. 312. Succession to the Presidency."

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer a committee amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment offered by Mr. HOFFMAN: Page 14, line 3, strike out the comma after "of" and in line 4, strike out the comma after "for."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer a committee amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment offered by Mr. HOFFMAN: Page 32, line 5, strike out "(c)" and insert "(e)."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment offered by Mr. HOFFMAN: Page 18, line 7, after "established", strike out "an executive" and insert "a military."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that if on the reading of the bill we discover other typographical errors they may be corrected by the legislative clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Clerk will be authorized to correct typographical errors.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. JUDD: Beginning on page 8, line 10, strike out all down to and including line 18 on page 9 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"(b) If a commissioned officer of the regular establishment of any of the armed services is nominated by the President for appointment as Director and his nomination for such appointment is confirmed by the Senate, he shall be ineligible to accept such appointment until he has resigned his commission or has been retired. Any such commissioned officer nominated and confirmed for appointment as Director shall be entitled, at his own request, to be retired from the armed service of which he is a member and to have his name placed upon the retired list of such service in the grade of major general or rear admiral (upper half), whichever may be appropriate, or in any higher grade in which he may be entitled to be retired under other provisions of law. Any commissioned officer retired under the provisions of this section shall be entitled to receive retired pay at the rate of 75 percent of the pay of the grade held by him on the retired list. While serving as Director he shall receive his retired pay and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which $14,000, exceeds the amount of his annual retired pay."

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, this amendment was submitted in the committee before I got it worked out in perfected form with the help of the legislative counsel. It was voted down there by a small majority. I can explain briefly what it does.

Along the line of the remarks just made by the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] there is a legitimate fear in this country lest we develop too much military control of any agency which has great powers and operates in secret. This central intelligence agency is sup-

posed to collect military intelligence abroad; but we want to be sure it cannot strike down into the lives of our own people here. So we put in a provision that "the agency shall have no police, subpena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions." To make still more certain that no would-be military dictator could ever use it as a gestapo many of us feel the director should be a civilian. Much of the testimony before us from people with a great deal of experience in this field was to the effect that the director should be a civilian. On the other hand, the committee did not think it ought to exclude a man who is now or at some later time may be in the military service from being appointed as director of the Central Intelligence Agency if he should be the best man for the job. It was agreed that he should not have the job unless he first becomes a civilian so that he will have no divided loyalties, will not be standing with one foot in the civilian trough and one foot in the military trough.

Under the present language of this bill which the committee has drawn up, it was trying to accomplish the same thing I am after, but I do not believe it goes far enough. On page 8, line 10 is the following:

If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as director then—

(A) in the performance of his duties as director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the department of the Army, the department of the Navy, the department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof.

Now, that sounds all right, but all of us, being human beings, surely know that if a one-star general is Director of Intelligence, and a two-star general or a three-star general talks to him, it is wholly unrealistic to imagine that they will not have an influence over him, despite the law.

The man who had charge of our secret intelligence in Germany during the war was a civilian, Mr. Allen Dulles. He did such an extraordinary job that he was in contact with the top men in Hitler's secret service. Hitler had to execute his top five men because they were double-crossing him and playing ball with our people. Mr. Dulles told us that the man that takes this job ought to go into it as a man who goes into a monastery. He ought to take it as J. Edgar Hoover has taken the FBI job—make it his life's work. He certainly ought to be cut completely loose from any ties or responsibilities or connections with any other branch of the Government—civil or military—except the President and the National Security Council.

All this amendment does is to provide that if a commissioned officer of the armed services is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate as Director of Intelligence, then he shall be ineligible to accept such appointment and take office until he has either resigned his commission or has been retired. The amendment provides further that he can at his own request be retired in order to accept this appointment, but his retirement rights are protected so that when he is through as Director of Intelligence he will have the same perquisites and retirement benefits as does a major general or rear admiral, upper half.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JUDD. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Does the gentleman think that you can legislate relative to the heart and the mind of an individual?

Mr. JUDD. No, indeed.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Does the gentleman think it makes any difference whether he is retired or whether he has not retired?

Mr. JUDD. Yes, I do.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. His sympathies and his heart will be with whatever branch of the service he was connected with.

Mr. JUDD. Certainly, his heart will always be with that branch, but his organic connection with it will be broken. In no sense will he be under its control or influence. Under the bill as it is written now he is always tempted to regard himself as what he still is, an officer of the armed forces. When he gets through as Director of Intelligence, or if he does not like the work, or does not do too good a job and is let out, well, never mind, he can always go back to active military service. To do that, he has to keep his bridges intact, his military fences in good repair. That is, his mind may not be single because his interests are divided. We do not want that.

Under the amendment he will still have his retirement rights; his family will be protected, and yet he is retired and completely separated from the military service, free from any possible influence so that he does not need to consider what might happen if the time should come that he wanted or needed to go back into the military service.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, the bill itself says: "In the performance of his duties as Director he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction or prohibition, military or otherwise."

Mr. JUDD. That is correct.

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Now, how much stronger can you make it? The only way you can change it is to say, "You are going to have a civilian."

Mr. JUDD. The only way to make it stronger is to have the man resign or retire. I do not want to make him resign and lose the benefits accumulated during his military life. I want him to retire so he can go, as it were, into a monastery; but at the same time to preserve what he has earned as an officer in the armed services so he and his family have that security. It seems to me that this is the middle ground between the two extremes. It will give us civilian-directed intelligence, and at the same time will protect any commissioned officer, if one is appointed because he is thought to be the best man for the job. I hope the Committee will support the amendment.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, this section on central intelligence was given more study by our subcommittee and by the full committee than any other section of the bill. It was a most difficult section to write. All of us had the same objective in view, yet we had different ideas on it. I think personally that the compromise we reached adequately protects the position. Eventually I certainly trust that the head of this intelligence agency will be a civilian who is trained in the agency. It takes years to train that type of man. Some will tell you that the present director is not adequately trained; that is true. We do not have any man in the United States who has adequate training today to do this kind of work because unfortunately the United States has never gone in for the right kind of intelligence. If we had had a strong central intelligence organization, in all probability we would never have had the attack on Pearl Harbor; there might not have been a World War II. Many witnesses appeared before our committee. We were sworn to secrecy, and I hesitate to even discuss this section because I am afraid I might say something, because the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD is a public record, and divulge some information here that we received in that committee that would give aid and comfort to any potential enemy we have. For that reason I am even reluctant to mention the testimony. I hope the committee will support the provision in the bill, because the future security of our country in a large measure depends upon the intelligence we get. Most of it can be gathered without clandestine intelligence, but some of it must be of necessity clandestine intelligence. The things we say here today, the language we change, might endanger the lives of some American citizens in the future.

I think you can rely on the patriotism of men like the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH], the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK], the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD], the gentleman from New York [Mr. LATHAM], and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN]. We did our best to work out language here that would protect that position and keep from building up a so-called military hierarchy. A bill will be introduced soon after this legislation becomes law that will be referred to the Committee on Armed Services, where more study can be given to this most important subject. I sincerely trust that the amendment will be voted down.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANASCO. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I note the gentleman's statement that the subcommittee did its best. Yes, we did our best, but we had a great deal of doubt when we

finished whether we were right or not. Does the gentleman recall that?

Mr. MANASCO. We did, and still have.

Mr. HOFFMAN. We are not seeking to impose our judgment on the Members of the House.

Mr. MANASCO. That is right. I am just trying to show that we were all honest in our efforts to accomplish the same objective.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANASCO. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. If the Members read this section carefully they will see that we did everything possible to divorce any military person from this position without taking away from him his prequisites, emoluments, pension expectations, and so forth, and also the rights of his family. I do not believe the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. JUDD] will cover particularly the family rights of the indiyidual. At the present time we have Admiral Hillenkoetter in there. It seems that he is the best man for the job at the present time. I favor a civilian director in this position, but there is certain intelligence work in which Admiral Hillenkoetter is engaged at this time, he has the background of certain information, he is engaged in putting forward certain plans in this field, and so, in the wisdom of the committee, it was decided that he should not be interfered with at this particular time.

Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last two words.

Mr. Chairman, I trust the committee will give the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. JUDD] very careful consideration, because I think it is extremely important. There was considerable discussion in the committee, and by a very, very narrow vote it was decided not to include the amendment in the bill as reported by the committee.

I call the attention of the committee to one thing that I believe the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. JUDD] failed to emphasize due to the fact that he did not have enough time. This agency has been running less than a year and a half. We have had three directors of the Central Intelligence Agency in that time. No one is criticizing Admiral Hillenkoetter, the present director of the agency, but there is nothing in the world to prevent him from being removed next week or next month and replaced with someone from the War Department or the Navy Department. The main point in the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. JUDD] is permanency and the effort to work toward a civilian head who is not influenced by any department of our Military Establishments.

It is true that you can refer to the language of the bill where it states he is relieved from this and he is relieved from that, but you cannot write into legislation that human element which enters into the Military Establishment of our country of a subordinate officer fearing that some day he might come under the direct command of a superior officer somewhere along the line, which [illegible] That is what the amendment of the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. JUDD] will correct. I think it is very important that the committee adopt this amendment. It provides for all retirement pay and other provisions for a military man so he can afford to separate himself completely from the military and make intelligence his life work.

The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. MANASCO] said that we could not find a man trained for this job. I believe it would be more correct to say that no attempt has been made to find a civilian to fill this particular job in the Central Intelligence Agency.

The committee as a whole was agreed that it would be fine to have a civilian head of the Central Intelligence Agency. But they did not want to include a qualified military or naval man from occupying such a position. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota corrects this situation, and I hope the Committee will adopt it.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUSBEY. I yield.

Mr. HARDY. Under the present language of the bill, assuming that the admiral now in charge continues in his present position, he would still be in the Navy, would he not?

Mr. BUSBEY. He would absolutely be in the Navy, and he could be transferred at any time.

Mr. HARDY. That is my point. He certainly could be transferred, and he could work it out with the Navy Department and get any other assignment that he wants.

Mr. BUSBEY. Absolutely. He is still a naval officer.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUSBEY. I yield.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I know the gentleman wants to be fair. Section (A), page 8, line 12, continuing to line 19, and then in section (B), expressly states that no superior officer of any of these departments shall have any control over the gentleman once he is appointed by and with the consent of the other body. He could not be shifted or given a tour of duty. There is absolutely no control over him. The gentleman knows that that language is in the act.

Mr. BUSBEY. I am sorry, but the gentleman, I believe, did not understand my reference to human nature when it comes to military officers.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

(Mr. McCORMACK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, in an effort to help the Committee, I have a few observations to make on this very important question. I want no member to underestimate the importance of this. Whatever action the Committee of the Whole takes will be most agreeable to me because if we were not confronted with a very practical situation, in the subcommittee and in the full committee, I would have voted to provide for the appointment only of a civilian. I would have taken that action at the outset. But we [illegible] situation where the present director is an officer in the United States Navy with the rank of rear admiral.

As I see it, the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. JUDD] has this weakness as compared with the provisions of the bill: Suppose a man is 51 years old and he is an Army or a Navy officer. I think the admiral who is Director now is not much older than that. Immediately upon being appointed under the Judd amendment he will take three-quarters pay as retirement and in the next highest grade. Then, if he remains as Director for 2 or 3 or 4 years—and there is no term of tenure in this bill—if he were to be separated in 3 or 4 or 5 years, he is still a young man and he still would have three-quarters retirement pay, with the retirement age at 62.

We on the subcommittee tried to meet the practical situation so that whoever is appointed, if a commissioned officer, he would not be serving in a dual capacity. We put language in there just as strong as can be expressed by the human mind, that while Director he is serving in a civilian capacity. If he is removed, he is still young enough to continue in the service and, if he desires to do so, he does not get his retirement but he goes back and serves his time in the Army or Navy until he has earned his retirement. However, while he is in there the emoluments of the office that would accrue to him for retirement purposes and rank purposes would accrue to him.

It seems to me if we are going to keep any language in here, the language contained in the bill is preferable to that proposed by the gentleman from Minnesota, Dr. JUDD. I agree that whoever is appointed should be permanent. But what is permanency, unless it is appointment for life, with removal as provided for in the case of judges? We cannot give any man any assurance of permanency as far as an administrative position is concerned. The best we can do is as in the case of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover: A man by his personality, a man who impresses himself so much upon his fellowmen that permanency accrues by reason of the character of service that he renders. But J. Edgar Hoover has no tenure for life. He has earned it because of his unusual capacity. I remember in 1933 I was one of those who advocated his reappointment by the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt. A distinguished former member of the House from Alabama, Mr. Oliver, and I went to the President on three different occasions urging the reappointment of J. Edgar Hoover. It was something I was proud to do, because he was the man for the job. But we cannot provide a permanent tenure.

In fact, after this bill passes, enabling legislation must be enacted with reference to this and other agencies affected by this bill.

We felt also that the basic question of whether or not one should be a civilian should lie with the standing committee, the regular committee of the House to which the bill will be referred. In the stop-gap situation—and that is what [illegible] that the method we em-

ployed was the best that could be adopted under the existing circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK] has expired.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I offer a substitute amendment which I have sent to the desk.

The Clerk read as follows:

Substitute amendment offered by Mr. BROWN of Ohio: On page 8, strike out lines 5 to 52, both inclusive; on page 9, strike out lines 1 through 18, both inclusive, and insert in lieu thereof the following: "head thereof. The Director shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year."

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a simplifying amendment. This amendment is offered for the purpose of settling the differences between the members of my committee, the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. It simply eliminates any quarrel or discussion about just how we take care of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency if he should be a commissioned officer by providing very simply that the Director shall be a civilian. Then as a result you can strike out all of subsection (b) and on down to line 18 on page 9.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. I yield.

Mr. JUDD. I may say to the gentleman from Ohio and the Committee that I myself prefer his amendment and have from the beginning. I have one exactly like it which I intended to offer if the one I have offered were to be defeated. In it I was trying to go halfway between requiring that the man to be appointed be wholly a civilian, and giving a chance for men now in the military service to take the job as civilians, but without losing their retirement rights.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. I remind the gentleman from Minnesota that at times one comes to the place where one has to go all the way, where one cannot go halfway.

In my mind the people are afraid of just one thing in connection with this bill and in connection with many other matters that have come before this Congress in recent months and recent years, and that is they are afraid of a military government, some sort of a superdictatorship which might arise in this country. They are afraid, in this particular instance, over the possibility that there might be some sort of Gestapo set up in this country.

I will agree and I will admit to you very frankly that it is entirely possible that you might have a military officer who would like to do that; but I know one thing, that if you require a civilian to be the head of this agency then you will not have any danger within the agency of military influence or military dictatorship. I do not believe the present occupant of that office would ever abuse it; I have the highest confidence in him, but I do not know who may succeed him. We have had three different military officers in charge of this central intelligence group or agency in the last 15 months [illegible]. I say to you that we need a civilian of the type of J. Edgar Hoover in charge of an agency like this, and the appointment of a civilian would at least be a partial guaranty to the people of the United States that this agency is not going to be usurped by any branch of the armed services at any time.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield again?

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. I yield.

Mr. JUDD. And is it not true that under the language of the gentleman's amendment a military man could become the head of this unit if he first became a civilian?

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Certainly, if he becomes a civilan first.

Mr. JUDD. The only thing is that you require him to resign.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. That is right.

Mr. JUDD. Whereas under my original amendment he would be permitted to retire and keep his perquisities as a retired officer while serving as a civilian as Director of Central Intelligence. It is my belief that a man of sufficiently great ability and interest in the field of intelligence to merit this appointment would be willing to resign, despite the sacrifice of retirement rights. I remind the committee that he would receive $14,000 a year, far above his salary as an officer. I approve the gentleman's substitute amendment.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. A resigned military officer is no longer under the control or direction of the military branch. A retired military officer is subject to recall in time of emergency, still has to take certain orders and instructions from the military branch of the Government. The gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. JUDD] in his provision to permit a military officer to hold the post, set up certain safeguards. My amendment goes the whole way.

Mr. MACKINNON. There is a difference between one who resigns and one who retires; is that not right?

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Yes; the retired officer is under the control of the Army. A resigned officer becomes a civilian and is no longer under the control of the Army.

Under my amendment you do not have to figure out what commission he should have when he retires, what perquisites he should have, and so on. It seems to me this is a very simple solution of the problem but it is also a very important angle of this bill and I hope that the substitute will be adopted.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.

The question is on the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BROWN].

The substitute amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question now occurs on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. JUDD], as amended by the substitute offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BROWN].

The amendment as amended was agreed to.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. JUDD: Page 11, line 18, strike out the words "and other agencies", and in line 22, at the end of the sentence, add the words "of the Government."

Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?

There was no objection.

Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, I should like to direct myself now to section 105 concerning the Central Intelligence Agency, to which section my proposed amendment relates. The amendment, in effect, provides that a civilian shall head this Intelligence Agency rather than allowing a choice of a civilian or a military man. It also provides that the powers granted the Central Intelligence group under the President's Executive order shall pass on to the National Security Council as was designated in the bill which passed the other body on July 9.

The amendment further provides that the authority and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be those which were designated under the President's Executive order. As this section is now constituted, the Director of the Intelligence Agency to be chosen by the President, with the consent of the Senate, may be either a civilian or an officer of the armed services. I feel that it is extremely undesirable to have as head of this agency, in a position which makes it incumbent upon him to coordinate intelligence reports from the various services, a member of one or the other services. A civilian in this position would not be subject to a cry of discrimination or favoritism and would, therefore, be in much better position to be completely objective in his discussion. The portion of this amendment which relates to the granting of powers under the President's Executive order to the National Security Council retains at least a semblance of power within this agency to effectively correlate, evaluate, and disseminate information which is gathered by other intelligence services.

By confining its powers to this authority we, therefore, effectively deny to the Central Intelligence Agency the power to interfere with the work personally being done by established services in this field.

I refer you, Mr. Chairman, to House Report No. 2734 of the Seventy-ninth Congress, which is a report on the intelligent section of our national war effort and which includes recommendations made by the House Committee on Military Affairs at that time. While the mistakes of World War II are still fresh in our minds, the committee undertook a survey to determine what our policy on national intelligence should be. Their recommendations are not wholly carried out in the measure here contemplated; but the gains made since their report would be consolidated by adoption of this amendment.

I feel, Mr. Chairman, and I cannot stress it too strongly, that what is needed is an independent intelligence agency, working without direction by our armed

services, with full authority in operational procedures.

However, it seems impossible to incorporate such broad authority into the bill now before us—so consequently I support the amendment which has now been offered. To do less than this would be to wreck what little has been done to strengthen our intelligence system. I feel that it is very important for the security of our Nation, at a time when our security is more and more threatened, to grant adequate authority to the Central Intelligence Agency.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I do want to commend the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] and the other members of his committee for their ardent work and fairness in reporting this measure.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, to reassure the committee let me say that this is the only other amendment I shall offer. I present it now because it also has to do with the Central Intelligence Agency. If the members of the committee will look on page 11 of the bill, line 16, subsection (e), and follow along with me, I think we can make it clear quickly. The subsection reads:

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence operations of the departments and other agencies of the Government as relate to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence.

The first half of the amendment deals with that. It strikes out the words in line 18, "and other agencies." Why? Primarily to protect the FBI. I agree that all intelligence relating to the national security which the FBI, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other agencies with secret intelligence activities develop should be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination. The second half of my amendment provides that their intelligence must be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence. But under the amendment he would not have the right to go down into and inspect the intelligence operations of agencies like the FBI as he would of the departments. I do not believe we ought to give this Director of Central Intelligence power to reach into the operations of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI, which are in the domestic field. Under the language as it now stands he can do that.

The Director of Central Intelligence is supposed to deal with all possible threats to the country from abroad, through intelligence activities abroad. But without this amendment he will have not only the results of the FBI's intelligence activities here at home, but also the power to inspect its operations. I do not believe that if we had realized the full import of this language when we were studying it in committee we would have allowed it to stand as it is. Surely we want to protect the Atomic Energy Commission and the FBI from the Director of Central Intelligence coming in and finding out who their agents are, what and where their nets are, how they operate, and thus destroy their effectiveness.

Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JUDD. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. BUSBEY. Under the present language of the bill, is it not the gentleman's judgment that the Central Intelligence Agency has the right, the power, and the authority to go down and inspect any records of the FBI which deal with internal security, whereas the Central Intelligence Agency deals only with external security?

Mr. JUDD. Yes; not only inspect its records but also inspect its operations, and that includes its activities and its agents. We do not for a moment want that to happen. I hope the members of the committee will accept this amendment.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JUDD. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. MANASCO. If you do not give the Director of Central Intelligence authority to collect intelligence in this country and disseminate it to the War Department and Navy Department, the Air Force, and the State Department, why not strike the entire section out?

Mr. JUDD. We do under this amendment give him that power. We say: "Such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government"—that includes the FBI and every other agency—"shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination."

Mr. MANASCO. If the FBI has intelligence that might be of benefit to the War Department or State Department, certainly that should be made available.

Mr. JUDD. Under this amendment it will be made available. I do not strike that part of the section out. All the intelligence the FBI has and that the Atomic Energy Commission has must be available to the Director of Central Intelligence if it relates to the national security. But the Director of Central Intelligence will not have the right to inspect their operations, which is quite a different thing. I do not think we ought to give the Director of Central Intelligence the right to go into the operations of FBI.

Mr. STEFAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JUDD. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. STEFAN. In setting up the Central Intelligence group it was agreed that the FBI was a part of the organization. Now, what would the gentleman's amendment do?

Mr. JUDD. Does the gentleman state that the FBI is a part of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. STEFAN. Certainly. As I understand it, as it was explained to our committee, the FBI information would be part of the information secured by the CIG.

Mr. JUDD. That is right. The FBI information would be available to the Director of Central Intelligence, but under my amendment the FBI operations would not be part of the Central Intelligence as they would be under the present language of the bill.

Mr. STEFAN. But the CIG could draw any information from the FBI it wanted?

Mr. JUDD. Yes, it would be made available, if relating to the national security.

Mr. STEFAN. But what would the gentleman's amendment do other than what this is doing?

Mr. JUDD. It would merely withdraw the right of the Director of Central Intelligence to inspect the intelligence operations of the FBI. It would still make available to him the intelligence developed by FBI.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has expired.

Mr. STEFAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be permitted to proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska?

There was no objection.

Mr. STEFAN. Does the gentleman feel that this section on Central Intelligence makes it possible for the Director of the GIG to go into Mr. Hoover's office?

Mr. JUDD. That is right.

Mr. STEFAN. And supersede his direction of FBI operations?

Mr. JUDD. Well, it says plainly that "Such intelligence operations of the departments and other agencies of the Government as relate to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence. "Other agencies" certainly includes the FBI.

Mr. STEFAN. And the gentleman objects to the inspection of it, does he?

Mr. JUDD. The inspection of its operations; yes.

Mr. STEFAN. I agree with the gentleman.

Mr. JUDD. Then the gentleman will support my amendment.

Mr. STEFAN. I certainly shall.

Mr. JUDD. Under it, the information is all available, but the operations are not open to inspection.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JUDD. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. I want to get this straight. If the FBI has information about fifth-column activities and subversive information affecting the national defense, would that be open to the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. JUDD. Yes. It must be made available under this subsection, but the Director of Central Intelligence under my amendment could not go in and inspect J. Edgar Hoover's activities and work. Central Intelligence is supposed to operate only abroad, but it will have available all the pertinent domestic information gathered by the FBI. It should not be given power to inspect the operations of the FBI.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JUDD. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The gentleman realizes that the limitations in the first

lines would limit his ability to go in and inspect any operation.

Mr. JUDD. That is true.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I do not think it is necessary for him to inspect the operations in order to set up his own intelligence unit in the way that he wants to, and I point out that the National Security Council is composed of the Secretaries of State, of National Defense, of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence Agency, so it seems to me that the protection of the National Security Council is a check and the President is a check. I hardly think that the man could exceed his authority.

Mr. [illegible] Well, I believe the FBI operations should be protected beyond question. It is too valuable an agency to be tampered with.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has again expired.

Mr. THOMAS of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may proceed for two additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

Mr. THOMAS of New Jersey. I want to say to the gentleman from Minnesota that I am wholeheartedly in favor of his amendment. If we open the doors to the Central Intelligence Agency to go in and inspect the operations of the FBI, you are starting to do the thing that is going to be the end of the FBI in time, because you will open it to this agency and then you will open it to somebody else. I think we will make a great mistake unless we accept the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. JUDD. I thank the gentleman. I think we will all agree he knows what he is talking about.

Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JUDD. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. BUSBEY. In reference to the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD], when he states that we can assume that this National Security Agency will do this and do that, I just wish to remind the membership that the trouble in the past with legislation has been that we have not taken the time to spell out these little details. It is these assumptions we have had that have gotten us into trouble. I think it is very important that the gentleman's amendment be adopted.

Mr. JUDD. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JUDD. I yield to my colleague from Minnesota.

Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. Is there anything in here that permits the FBI to inspect the personnel of the Central Intelligence?

Mr. JUDD. No; there is not.

Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. I understand that some of the men in Central Intelligence at the present time are certain foreign-born persons who might need some inspection, and they hold some very important positions with Central Intelligence.

Mr. JUDD. I have had no information on that one way or the other. I must assume the Director of Central Intelligence is going to exercise utmost care in choosing his personnel. I hope this amendment will be adopted because I cannot see how it can hurt the Central Intelligence Agency in the slightest and it certainly will protect the intelligence operations of FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. JUDD].

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. TABER: On page 35, beginning in line 18, strike out all of section 307.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TABER. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. MANASCO. I am prepared to say that the members of the committee on the minority side are willing to accept the amendment.

Mr. TABER. I wonder if we may have an acceptance from the majority side? If so, I would not care to speak on the amendment.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TABER. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. HOFFMAN. May I ask the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. KEEFE], who is on the Committee on Appropriations with the gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER], to express his opinion on the amendment to strike section 307, on page 35? I should like to have the Committee have the benefit of the opinion of the various members.

Mr. KEEFE. If the gentleman will yield, may I say that I have carefully examined these provisions in section 307, and in my humble judgment that whole section can just as well be stricken out of this legislation. It will not cause one bit of difficulty. I think the committee ought to accept the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York. The fact of the matter is that what you have sought to do the chairman or any member of any subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations can do by asking any Navy or Army officer that comes before the committee the question, "What was your request of the Bureau of the Budget? What did you ask for?" and they will tell us what it was. That is all there is to it.

Mr. TABER. There is a little more. It is spread out, and the whole budget will be made up originally on a propaganda basis. That is where the trouble is with the language.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TABER. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. JUDD. I think it ought to be said in explanation of the action of the committee that this section was put in the bill at a time when there were not as yet in the bill any provisions dealing specifically with the Marine Corps and naval aviation. It was put in primarily to protect their right to appeal to the Congress over the head of the Department or of the Bureau of the Budget or even of the President. They were afraid they might be frozen out and not given any or adequate funds. With the amendments that are now in the bill, with officially defined status given to the Marine Corps and naval aviation, they will have greater security than they have now or ever had before, and this section is not necessary.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, unless some member of the committee objects, and they are all here and on the job, I will accept the amendment in behalf of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER].

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New York: On page 3, line 2, after the word "including", strike out the words "the naval air force" and insert "naval aviation."

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, the committee will accept that amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New York: On page 6, line 3, after "general", strike out "direction, authority, and control over" and insert "authority for the integration, coordination, and supervision of."

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that any explanation whatsoever is necessary, but in order that it may be understood this amendment is offered for the purpose of clarifying the authority and power given to the Secretary of Defense. It amends subparagraph (2) to conform more nearly with the expressions that have been made by the proponents of this bill as to the authority of the Secretary of Defense. It will read as amended:

The Secretary of Defense shall exercise authority for the integration, coordination, and supervision of such departments and agencies.

I have submitted the amendment to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH], who, insofar as I know, his interposed no serious objection to it.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.

Mr. HOFFMAN. This is not the amendment which you submitted to the subcommittee yesterday afternoon.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, I hope there is no misunderstanding between the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] and myself on this particular amendment. It is true that he and I have discussed it, but I have been unable thus

far to ascertain just what he is driving at. The language of the bill reads that the Secretary shall exercise general direction, general authority, and general control over such departments and agencies. I think that is proper language. The language of the gentleman's amendment strikes out the word "general"; it strikes out the word "direction"; it strikes out the word "control"; and it leaves just the word "authority."

Mr. COLE of New York. That is not correct. If the gentleman's interpretation of subparagraph (2) is as he has just expressed it, I would have no objection, and those who are apprehensive about it would have no objection. If the authority of the Secretary were to exercise general direction, general authority, and general control, there would be no objection. But the bill does not say that. The bill says he shall "Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies."

Mr. WADSWORTH. Does not the word "general" qualify the words "authority and control"?

Mr. COLE of New York. Who is going to interpret it? I think the Congress should say what is meant by it. I do not believe the Congress intends that this Secretary of Defense shall have absolute, arbitrary, and complete and unlimited control over all the departments.

Mr. WADSWORTH. He cannot have it under this law anyway because on this very same page at the bottom it says, "That the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force shall be administered as individual executive departments by their respective Secretaries and all powers and duties relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense by this act shall be retained." There is no specific authority in subparagraph (2). It is general. I think the language of the bill provides three departments and also guarantees that the Secretary shall have the necessary general direction and authority to accomplish the purposes of the act.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.

Mr. JUDD. If the Members will turn to the preceding page and look on line 21, they will see the rest of this grant of authority. It is "under the direction of the President and subject to the provisions of this act" that the Secretary of Defense shall exercise general direction, authority, and control. It is only with respect to carrying out the unification and reorganization provisions of this act that the general authority can be exercised, and even then only with the consent of the President. So there are restrictions and limitations both at the beginning and at the end of the grant of power. Is that not true?

Mr. WADSWORTH. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] has expired.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] had better give further consideration to his amendment. To those who want unification as distinguished from merger—we provided for unification in this bill—if you want merger, then you had better vote for the Cole amendment. That amendment is more authoritative in its directions than the provisions of the bill. The committee recommendation as contained in the bill is to exercise general direction. My friend from New York says, "exercises authority."

Mr. COLE of New York. No. The amendment does not say that. The authority would read that the Secretary shall exercise general authority for the integration, coordination, and supervision of the departments and agencies.

Mr. McCORMACK. The gentleman leaves the word "general" in there?

Mr. COLE of New York. Yes.

Mr. McCORMACK. Under those circumstances, it seems to me that the language of the committee is certainly as effective as that offered by the gentleman from New York. We say, "exercise general direction, authority, and control." The gentleman says, "exercise general authority for the integration, coordination, and supervision of such departments and agencies." It seems to me that both would confer substantially the same power. As between the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE], and that which was carefully worked over by the committee, it seems to me the committee's provision should be retained. I urge that the gentleman's amendment be rejected and that we keep the language in the bill as recommended by the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. COLE of New York) there were—ayes 36, noes 190.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New York: On page 6, insert the word "general" before "authority and control."

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, the Clerk did not report the amendment correctly. It is on page 6, line 3, insert the word "general" before the words "authority and control."

Then the authority of the Secretary would be to exercise general direction, general authority, and general control over such departments; and that complies as near as words can comply with the statements made by the gentleman from New York as to what this authority should be.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.

Mr. MANASCO. Does not the language contained in the bill now mean that?

Mr. COLE of New York. If that is what is meant, let us say so.

Mr. MANASCO. I am not an expert on grammar and so forth. The gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. JUDD] is our man on that.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE].

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New York: On page 7, line 24, after the words "functions of", strike out the words "National Military Establishment" and insert "his office."

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, an explanation of this amendment——

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.

Mr. WADSWORTH. While the gentleman from New York was addressing the House during general debate earlier this afternoon he mentioned this very language on the bottom of page 7 and I took it upon myself with great impertinence to say at the time I could not see any objection to making this change as it was really the intent of the bill and the intent of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I offer another amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New York: Page 10, line 22, after the word "intelligence", insert the words "and his evaluation thereof."

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, just a brief explanation of this amendment, and it is rather a minor one. I am reluctant to impose on the Committee for any extended period of time since we have been discussing the bill for many hours.

Under the obligations of the Central Intelligence Agency its duty, as expressed in the bill is "to provide for the proper dissemination of such intelligence," that is the intelligence which the central agency gathers; and yet the Central Intelligence Agency is also obligated to evaluate the intelligence.

The effect of this amendment is to require the Agency when it disseminates the intelligence which it has gathered to dissiminate not only the information which it has received but also its interpretation and its evaluation of the information.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.

Mr. MANASCO. Do I understand the gentleman is striking out the word "evaluated" in line 20 and inserting it in line 22?

Mr. COLE of New York. No.

Mr. MANASCO. What does it do?

Mr. COLE of New York. In line 22, after the word "intelligence" it inserts the words "and its evaluation thereof."

Mr. MANASCO. Does not the language in lines 20 and 21 provide for the same thing the gentleman has in mind?

Mr. COLE of New York. Let me read it. I think I can explain it. Subparagraph 3 reads that the central agency——

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Does not line 20 correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to it? What does the gentleman want to do now? Evaluate the dissemination of it or what?

Mr. COLE of New York. If the gentleman will let me explain what I have in mind. Section 3 reads in part "and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government." My amendment would have him disseminate not only such intelligence but his evaluation of the intelligence within the Government, and so forth.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Already evaluated.

Mr. COLE of New York. The amendment simply provides for what I am assured is already being done. It is that the dissemination back to the source agency or to other agencies shall be not only of the intelligence which the central agency has received but also its evaluation of the intelligence.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLE of New York. I yield.

Mr. HOFFMAN. In other words, if the intelligence mentioned in line 20 is worth 5 cents then you want to make it absolutely certain that the intelligence is also worth a nickel.

Mr. COLE of New York. The gentleman is a bit flippant. As the subsection reads now it contains absolutely nothing which requires the agency to send back to the agencies of the Government its evaluation of the intelligence, the interpretation which the agency places upon the information it has gathered. The amendment I have offered imposes upon them that obligation.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLE of New York. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Does the gentleman mean to say that the word "intelligence" in line 22 does not refer back to the "intelligence" in line 20 which has been gathered and evaluated?

Mr. COLE of New York. It does not say so.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Then I do not understand any of the language.

Mr. COLE of New York. An agency is obliged to correlate and evaluate the intelligence, but it is not obliged to pass back to the other agencies of the Government the interpretation, the correlated intelligence, the evaluated intelligence.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. What words would the gentleman's amendment substitute?

Mr. COLE of New York. Line 22, after "such intelligence", insert the words "and its evaluation thereof" so that the agency would be obliged to provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence and its evaluation thereof.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think the gentleman's purpose and the purpose of the committee is the same. The word "intelligence" in line 22 clearly refers back to the word "intelligence" mentioned in the other line.

Mr. COLE of New York. But what is the intelligence to be disseminated? I shall not undertake to belabor the matter, it is not of great importance. I understand that is the practice of the agency, and I see no reason to not write it into the act.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York.

If the Members will take the bill and refer to page 10 they will find that this agency is charged with the duty of collecting and evaluating intelligence, and then it is disseminated. What is the use of rewriting it again in the next line? If we are to go over this bill and change every comma and period and put it three words down or three words ahead, we will be here all night.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE].

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New York: Page 16, lines 13–14, after "Naval aviation", strike out "which shall hereafter be designated the Naval Air Force."

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, there is no objection to that amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New York: On page 17, after line 5, insert the following:

"All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation, both combat, service and training, shall include the entire aeronautical organization of the United States Navy; all land-based naval aviation; ship-based aviation; naval air-transportation services; fleet air forces; carrier forces; all aviation components of the United States Marine Corps; and all other aviation, air weapons, and techniques involved in the operations and activities of the United States Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

"The Navy shall be generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. Matters of joint concern as to the air aspects of those functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, including the development and procurement of aircraft and air installations located on shore, and use shall be made of personnel, equipment, and facilities in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased. Subject to the above provision, the Navy will not be restricted as to types of aircraft maintained and operated for these purposes.

"The Navy shall maintain the air transport necessary for essential naval operations and for air transport over routes of sole interest to naval forces where the requirements cannot be met by normal air-transport facilities.

"The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization, and equipment of naval combat and service elements; matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy."

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, this amendment has been submitted to the members of the committee and has been accepted by them.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word to make the observation that the gentleman from New York has consulted myself and other Members. In my opinion, the amendment is a very proper one and, speaking for myself, it is agreeable. I just want to make that observation to confirm what the gentleman has said.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last two words.

Mr. Chairman, for the information of the House let me say that the House bill differs from the Senate bill quite materially in this regard. In the House bill there is inserted a provision reciting the roles and missions of the Army, the roles and missions of the Navy, the roles and missions of the Marine Corps and the roles and missions of the Air Force. For the first time in our history we are attempting such legislation. The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] in which the naval aviation personnel are deeply interested, is to add to the list of those branches of the service whose missions and roles shall be frozen into law.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. VORYS. Does this provide for a separate procurement for naval aviation?

Mr. WADSWORTH. It does not, Mr. Chairman. As a matter of fact, in each of the instances in this bill where we are reciting the roles and missions of the branch of the service, we have paraphrased the language contained in the Executive order of the President which, it was agreed, among all the services concerned, would be isued to the services in the event of the passage of this bill. We have simply taken from the Executive order, the tentative one which has been agreed upon by all services, and paraphrased them properly in a legislative sense and inserted them in the bill, and the language which the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] has proposed, is parallel with the language of the Executive order.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

(Mr. HOFFMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, when this bill came before the subcommittee, the same question which is now up was raised. There is no question on the record but that it was the purpose of the staff—I think they called it the Joint Chief of Staff—to practically get rid of and reduce to the status of a police force the Marine Corps. Then there arose the question about naval aviation and there was the thought in the minds of some of the members of the committee that an effort was being made to do that, or at least, there was a fear in the minds of the high-ranking officers of the Navy, especially those who were on the ships where the battles on the sea were fought, the admirals and the captains who, if they lost their ships went down with the ships, unless they were lucky enough to be among the fortunate few who were saved, that aviation was to be taken from the Navy and they objected. Then there came this question raised by the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH]

as to whether or not we should depend upon some Executive order to be issued in the future to protect the marines and naval aviation, and the subcommitee decided that they would write into the law, not tactics, not specification, but a general over-all policy. We concede that to be our duty. That question came up again when the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] brought this to our attention and to the attention of the members of the subcommittee yesterday afternoon. That conference was attended by a representative of the Navy and a representative of the Army, the ones who drafted this bill, and it was finally decided unanimously, except for the opposition of the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] and if I am wrong, correct me. The rest of those present decided that they would accept this amendment.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Am I wrong?

Mr. WADSWORTH. The gentleman from New York agreed to it.

Mr. HOFFMAN. The gentleman means he did?

Mr. WADSWORTH. This gentleman from New York agreed to it.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I understood he opposed it in the subcommittee and was opposing it now.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I am not. I am describing what it does.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Evidently then, while I was referring to the original Cole amendment, the gentleman was referring to that amendment as subsequently amended by the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] before it was today presented. That being the situation, permit me to add that I sent a copy of the present amendment to each member of the committee. Having heard no opposition from committee members the committee accepts the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE].

The amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the next amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New York: Page 23, line 19, after the word "assigned" strike out the period and insert "by this act."

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, just a very brief explanation of the amendment. This language is found on page 23, line 17, in which it says:

In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned.

What does that mean? Not otherwise assigned where? Not otherwise assigned by whom? I insert the words "not otherwise assigned by this act," so that there is a direct reference back to the amendment relating to naval aviation which has just been adopted. I feel quite certain it was the intention of the authors of the bill that the United States Air Force should have the functions not otherwise assigned by the act. If I am in error, I would be happy to have some gentleman explain it.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLE of New York. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. WADSWORTH. The gentleman apparently suspects the use of the words "unless otherwise assigned." No one can tell tonight where some special mission of the Air Corps will be required. They might be otherwise assigned, for example, to the international force under the Charter of the United Nations. No one can tell. So in all of these provisions for the roles and missions of the several branches we have put in that phrase, "unless otherwise assigned." Otherwise you might get into a situation where the assignment to something not recited in the law, being absolutely necessary, could not be made.

Mr. COLE of New York. I call the gentleman's attention to the fact that this provision authorizes the United States Air Force to include aviation forces, both combat and service, not otherwise assigned. This act, by the amendment offered by me and just adopted, would assign certain aviation forces, both combat and service, to the Navy. Is it the intention that the United States Air Force can be assigned aviation relating to the Navy, in contravention of the amendment that has just been adopted?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLE of New York. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. HOFFMAN. If I thought the gentleman's amendment would prevent the assignment of our forces of any kind to the United Nations I would be wholeheartedly for it. The difficulty of this is that in all of these provisions relating to the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force we have these same words, and if we put the gentleman's words in here, it would appear that the Naval Aviation could not be assigned to help out the Army or the Navy itself, or the Marine Corps.

Mr. COLE of New York. The gentleman's understanding of the purpose of my amendment is entirely in error. My point is that by the amendment regarding naval aviation which has just been adopted certain "aviation forces" have been assigned to the Navy. If it is meant that those forces which by the act have been assigned to the Navy cannot be later assigned to the United States Air Forces, I would be quite happy and content, but I want to make sure that that will be the result, that, having written that amendment into the bill, it is not intended that later on by some executive order aviation forces assigned to the Navy by the act will be assigned to the United States Air Forces. If that is the understanding, then I withdraw the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from New York withdraw his amendment?

Mr. COLE of New York. Upon reconsideration I do not, Mr. Chairman; let us have a vote on it.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely trust that the committee will reject this amendment because that language appears in many, many places in the bill, and this is the first time anyone has ever objected to the language. If we amend it here, we should stay here another 3 or 4 hours and go back through the bill and amend it properly in all the other section. I suggest that we vote down the amendment.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANASCO. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. McCORMACK. I thoroughly agree with the gentleman. Further, the gentleman from New York himself has clearly evidenced his uncertainty by expressing a willingness to withdraw his amendment and then insisting upon a vote. The words the gentleman has suggested be added will disturb the whole set-up throughout the bill. We have done something in this bill that has not been done in the Senate bill. We put in the general functions, leaving the specific functions for executive order or for the standing committee that will consider legislation later on.

If the words in the gentleman's amendment are included, it will be a serious limitation upon the Department of Air, the separate and independent Department of Air that this bill establishes.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANASCO. I yield.

Mr. DORN. May I say to the members of the committee that an amendment like that would restrict the operations of the whole Air Force and if inserted in other sections might restrict the Marines or the Navy. I think this amendment should be voted down.

Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANASCO. I yield.

Mr. HALLECK. Reference has been made to the attitude of the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] when it was suggested by him that he might withdraw the amendment. My understanding from what he said and from the observation that he made was that the explanation of the intendment of the language as it is contained in the bill apparently is in line with what he thinks would be accomplished by his amendment. Therefore, the matter, being finally a matter of interpretation of that language which will ultimately be in the law, the amendment is not of that degree of importance that it might have been heretofore except for the discussion that we have had on the floor in respect to it.

Mr. MacKINNON. Mr. Chairman, I offer a substitute amendment for the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE]:

The Clerk read as follows:

Substitute amendment offered by Mr. MACKINNON for the amendment offered by Mr. COLE of New York: Page 23, line 19, after "assigned" and before the period, insert a colon and the following: *"Provided*, That it shall not include aviation forces otherwise assigned by this act."

Mr. MacKINNON. Mr. Chairman, I offer this in the hope that the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] and the committee can accept it because

I think that this more clearly sets out exactly the intent that is sought to be expressed by the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] and it still leaves open "the forces not otherwise assigned" for the legitimate purposes for which the gentleman from New York stated that they probably wished to leave this open.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MACKINNON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. COLE of New York. My understanding of the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota is that it accomplishes the same purposes as the amendment which I sought to have adopted, and the substitute therefore is entirely agreeable to me.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MACKINNON. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. MANASCO. I am just wondering where in this act we assign the Air Force. We leave the assignment of the Air Force to the Commander of the Air Force.

Mr. MACKINNON. The bill most certainly assigns those components of aviation that are assigned here by legislation.

Mr. MANASCO. I do not know that we assign any air forces.

Mr. MACKINNON. You just adopted some amendments to that effect a while back when by adopting the Cole amendment you assigned naval aviation to the Navy Department.

I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH].

Mr. WADSWORTH. The gentleman is very courteous to yield to me. But this bill does not assign any element. It describes the roles and missions. The assignments are made by the Commander in Chief.

Mr. MACKINNON. Mr. Chairman, I contend that when you place naval aviation in the Department of the Navy, that amounts to an assignment of naval aviation to the Department of the Navy. I think that is just as clear as a bell. Of course, if it is the general understanding that naval aviation is definitely assigned to the Navy Department, and as such not subject under any possible contingency to being assigned to the United States Air Forces, then this amendment would not be necessary. Under the statements of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. MANASCO] and the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] the amendment would only be a clarifying one. These men are both members of the committee and their statements as to the construction of the language, as negotiating any such future assignment of naval aviation to the United States Air Forces are entitled to great weight. Their statements might make the adoption of this amendment unnecessary.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. MACKINNON].

The substitute amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The vote now recurs on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE].

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment, which is at the desk.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendments offered by Mr. CASE of New Jersey:

On page 12, strike out all of line 18 after the word "Board", all of lines 19 and 20, and the words "of the Board" in line 21, and insert in lieu thereof the following: "; an Assistant or Under Secretary from each of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and Labor; the Chairman of the Civilian War Agencies Planning Commission appointed under section 106A; the Chairman of the Munitions Board appointed under section 210; the Chairman of the Research and Development Board appointed under section 211; and such other members as may be designated by the President from time to time."

On page 14, immediately after line 8, insert a new paragraph, as follows:

"(d) The Board shall supervise and direct the execution of such policies and plans relating to military, industrial, and manpower mobilization as may be approved by the President, and shall perform such other functions, not inconsistent with law, concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization as the President may direct."

On line 9, change "(d)" to "(e)."

On page 14, immediately after line 11, insert a new section, as follows:

"CIVILIAN WAR AGENCIES PLANNING COMMISSION

"SEC. 106A. (a) There is hereby established a Civilian War Agencies Planning Commission (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Commission") to be composed of the Chairman of the Commission, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and such additional civilian members as the President may designate.

"(b) It shall be the duty of the Commission—

"(1) to investigate and appraise the Nation's requirements for civilian agencies of the Government to operate under the direction of the National Securitiy Resources Board and to be charged with preparing plans for the civilian aspects of industrial and manpower mobilization for war and with supervising the execution of such plans in time of war or national emergency; and

"(2) to recommend to the Congress, not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this act, the permanent establishment under the National Security Resources Board of such civilian war agencies as in the opinion of the Commission are essential to the national security.

"(c) The Chairman of the Commission is hereby authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Commission in the performance of its functions.

"(d) The members of the Commission, while actually so serving, shall receive compensation at the rate of $50 a day, but not to exceed $14,000 in any one year.

"(e) The Commission shall cease to exist 2 years from the date of enactment of this act, unless sooner terminated by joint resolution of Congress."

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, since I have amendments to two different sections in this amendment, I ask uanimous consent to proceed for an additional 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the debate on this amendment, and any amendment in substitution therefor, be limited to the 10 minutes which the gentleman has been allowed.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, that is either a great compliment or the worst insult I have ever had.

Mr. Chairman, before discussing the amendment, I want to make my general position on this subject very clear. I support completely the proposition that the security of the United States and the hope for the establishment and maintenance of a peaceful world require that our military strength be developed to the highest possible degree. I have supported and will continue to support all measures designed to further that objective. For example, I have come, though with considerable reluctance, to the conclusion that compulsory military training is necessary and I intend to support it. I believe that unification of our armed services is essential and I support this bill.

I have no interest in whatever latent rivalries may still exist between the Army and the Navy. Nor have I sufficient acquaintance with the matter from the technical standpoint to know whether, under this bill, the necessary degree of healthy competition between the services to keep each of them at its peak of efficiency will be encouraged. As to such matters, I must and do accept the judgment of the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] and others whose experience is far greater than mine.

But there is a feature of this bill, not related to unification, not related to merger of the services, which leaves me greatly disturbed.

Who will prepare in time of peace the plans for industrial mobilization, manpower utilization, and the like, which will be put into effect if war comes?

This question is more vital than it has ever been before.

If and when the next war comes, there will be no time to make these plans. No period of trial and error through which we have always gone in the past, before settling on methods for industrial and manpower mobilization—before determining who shall do the job.

General Eisenhower has told us that the next war will be won or lost within 60 days. When the next war comes, we must be able immediately to put into effect mobilization plans which will work.

I am convinced that if the peacetime planning for our industrial and economic mobilization is not done by civilian agencies, but is rather done by the military, the result will be completely unworkable.

The provisions of the pending bill, I am convinced, will result in such planning being done by the military.

My fears as to this were confirmed by the explanation of the bill so fairly and clearly made by the gentleman from New York this morning. He stated, and I think that I am quoting him correctly, that the Munitions Board would have the function, among others, of constantly studying our industrial capacity, and of making recommendations and plans for industrial and economic mobilization to be put into effect on the outbreak of war.

If you will turn to section 210 of the bill, commencing on page 26, you will find in paragraph 2, on page 27, that the Munitions Board has the duty, among others, "to plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization." And, in paragraph 3, on page 28, it is directed "to maintain liaison with other departments and agencies for the proper correlation of military requirements with the civilian economy."

Obviously, the proper performance of its duties in these two respects will require the Munitions Board to plan for the mobilization of our entire economy as in wartime every aspect of our economy will necessarily be a military aspect.

The Munitions Board will consist of a chairman, appointed from civilian life, and of an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary from each of the three military departments. Now, these Secretaries will be nominally civilians, but it is obvious from our experience during the past war alone, that they will be imbued with and will express the military point of view. It is inconceivable that the plans prepared by the Munitions Board will not be products of the military mind.

Is it necessary for me to recall our experience in the last war?

At the outset the military plans for industrial and manpower mobilization had to be discarded completely. These plans you will remember, had been prepared by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, of which, as the gentleman from New York stated, the Munitions Board provided by this bill will be the successor. Our industrial and economic mobilization had to be planned all over again, from the beginning. Countless weeks and months of precious time—time which we will not have again—were wasted until finally, through trial and error, our economic mobilization was effected, under civilian auspices.

Is it necessary to recall the struggles throughout the war, between the military and civilian agencies as to who should direct the wartime economy?

The military mind simply does not understand that the most effective mobilization of our economy cannot result from the methods to which it instinctively turns.

I am sure that nearly all of us agree that plans for the mobilization of industrial power and our resources generally should be made by civilians, in addition to being carried out under civilian control and by civilian agencies.

Under the bill, the National Security Resources Board is created. Its function is to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization. It is merely an advisory agency. It should, I submit, be made the agency charged with the actual preparation in detail of the plans which we must have ready when war comes for our industrial and economic mobilization.

The amendment which I have offered is intended to bring that about and I believe that it would do so.

The amendment has two parts—first, it would make specific the composition of the membership of the Board. Under the bill, as introduced—section 106 on page 12—the Board would be composed of a chairman, appointed by the President from civilian life and "such heads or representatives of the various executive departments and independent agencies as may from time to time be designated by the President." Under my amendment, the other members of the Board, in addition to the Chairman appointed by the President, would be an Assistant or Under Secretary from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and Labor, the Chairman of the Munitions Board already referred to, the Chairman of the Research and Development Board provided for by another section of the bill, and such other members as the President may designate.

The naming, as members of the National Security Resources Board, of the Chairman of the Munitions Board and Chairman of the Research and Development Board, both of the latter boards being dominated by the military departments, carries with it the implication, and is so intended, that no other representatives of these military agencies should be appointed to membership on the National Security Resources Board. It is essential to maintain the civilian character of the National Security Resources Board.

The second point of my amendment is that it creates, as a temporary body, a Civilian War Agencies Planning Commission, consisting of a chairman, appointed from civilian life by the President, and such additional civilian members as the President may designate. The Planning Commission would investigate the Nation's requirements for permanent civilian agencies, to operate under the direction of the National Security Resources Board and to be charged with preparing plans for the civilian aspects of industrial and manpower mobilization for war and with supervising the execution of such plans in time of war or national emergency. The temporary Commission would be directed to recommend to Congress, within 1 year, the permanent establishment, under the National Security Resources Board, of such civilian war agencies as the Commission deems essential.

The Commission, as I stated, would be a temporary body and would cease to exist 2 years from the date of enactment of the act, unless sooner terminated by joint resolution.

The purpose of this part of the amendment is obvious. Nowhere in the bill is there clear provision for the preparation, in peacetime, by civilian agencies of industrial and economic mobilization plans. My amendment recognizes that principle and provides a method by which it may be made effective.

I hope that the committee will see fit to adopt it. If it is adopted, it is my intention to suggest a further amendment to the section of the bill relating to the Munitions Board. So that the committee may have a complete picture of my purpose, I would briefly explain my Munitions Board amendment:

It would substitute for paragraph 2 on page 27, which now charges the Munitions Board with planning for the military aspects of industrial mobilization, a provision making it the duty of the Munitions Board to advise the National Security Resources Board of military matériel and manpower requirements in order that they may be integrated into the over-all plans for national industrial and manpower mobilization plans which, under the amendment now pending, would be made by the National Security Resources Board and its subordinate civilian agencies. I said earlier that I was convinced that the great majority of the Members of the House believed deeply in the principle that the economy of the country, in wartime as well as in peacetime, must be controlled and directed by civilians. I have attempted to point out that under the pending bill there is at least great danger that this would not follow. I believe that it is more than a danger and would be the certain result, and I am not alone in my fear.

The Christian Science Monitor which, like me, supports the principle of unification, has clearly expressed the same fear in a number of its recent editorials. Thus, on May 23, it stated:

> This bill does more than draw a blueprint of unified direction and better teamwork for the military and naval services. Of much deeper significance, it is a piece of basic legislation which establishes how and by whom national policy and the civilian economy shall be controlled in any prospect of war.

The editorial continues:

> We have supported the general provisions of the merger, particularly coordination of foreign policy, military policy and industrial potential. But because this bill originated in the thinking of military men, the power it assigns or permits to the military over national policy and civilian affairs is very great—much greater, we think, than the American people would knowingly choose.

I am sure that a number of the members of the committee very honestly believe that my fears in this connection will not materialize. It is my own equally honest and deep conviction that the situation presents very great danger.

Should we not take a course which would eliminate any possibility of results which we all would deplore?

My amendment offers a way to avoid that risk.

I believe that it is well drawn, and I can say so without embarrassment because it is taken very largely from the carefully prepared bill, H. R. 3979, introduced on June 25 by the distinguished Chairman of the Committee. But, even if there should be imperfections in it, in detail, that should not deter anyone from supporting it, since any such defects can, and of course would, be eliminated in conference with the other body, to which this bill, of course, will go in any event.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. I yield.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I may say to the gentleman from New Jersey that I tried that same thing in the committee and the committee and could not get anywhere.

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. May I say that this amendment is exactly the amendment which the gentleman tried to have approved by the subcommittee and the committee; and I am emboldened to repeat the attempt here because of the success we have had with somewhat similar amendments offered to the committee this afternoon.

The National Security Resources Board, a civilian agency, is the outfit that, under this bill, should have the full power to prepare all plans for industrial and manpower mobilization and for organizing our natural resources.

My amendment would provide for the creation of a temporary commission to decide what agencies, subordinate to the National Security Resources Board, should be included as a part of the permanent structure and be charged with that particular duty.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. WADSWORTH. The National Resources Board to which the gentleman has just referred, is charged with some of these very duties, to fix policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war, and determine the relationship between the potential resources and potential requirements for manpower, resources, and productive facilities.

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I would first of all point out to the gentleman from New York that it is the function of the board, the National Security Resources Board, to advise concerning these various matters. I find nothing in the bill under consideration that authorizes the board to prepare and make those plans. But in the bill there is an express provision that the Munitions Board shall have power to make plans. It looks very much to me as if it had been deliberately planned that the military board will make the plans and this civilian commission will merely advise the President about them, and I think that is the completely wrong approach. I would be glad for further enlightenment and further instruction from the gentleman.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I read such an interpretation of the functions of the Resources Board as does the gentleman from New Jersey, because it has the duty to advise; and, of course, to advise they would have to plan—to advise the President about industrial and civilian mobilization and manpower problems.

The gentleman's proposal, as I recall, was rejected by the committee.

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. That is correct.

Mr. WADSWORTH. The gentleman gives the power of execution to a board, and all through this bill we have declined to give powers of execution to these boards.

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. May I state to the gentleman that both the War Department and the Navy Department have stated that it was their purpose under unification that the execution of the plans should be carried out by civilian agencies similar to the War Manpower Commission, the Office of Defense Transportation, and the like. I would not willingly accept management of our economy in wartime or peacetime by the military. I believe that in both wartime and peacetime it should be managed by civilian agencies, and I am very much afraid that will not be the result under this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. CASE].

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. MITCHELL: Page 26, line 12, strike out the period and insert the following: "and shall be chosen in rotation from the three armed services, provided that the total service of any officer as Director of the Joint Staff shall not exceed 4 years in all: *Provided further*, That the combined service of any officer or Director or member of the Joint Staff shall not exceed 8 years in all."

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, one point in connection with the joint staff which we are setting up under section 209 is the vagueness of that section's language.

For example, Mr. Chairman, I note that it fails to specify the qualifications, tenure of duty, or methods of rotation of officers on the joint staff. These are extremely important matters in connection with a general staff. You all know of the rise of the Prussian General Staff, and I might add that one of the most potent factors in that rise was the fact that its officers and its directors were allowed to remain undisturbed on general staff duty year in and year out, working, planning, studying, and contriving to dominate the nation.

Between 1857 and 1906, Mr. Chairman, the period in which Germany forged the iron spells which ripped our world apart, there were but three directors of the Prussian General Staff: Generals Von Moltke, Von Waldersee, and Von Schlieffen. Of these three, Von Waldersee was unimportant, holding office but 3 years. Two ruthless, brilliant, and aggressive military intellectuals, Moltke and Schlieffen, actually effected the transition of Prussia into the agressive, war-mongering state which we have unhappily learned to know too well, and it was their descendants in office who made World War II a reality.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MITCHELL. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. MANASCO. I think that is a matter that requires consideration, but I understood the chairman of the Armed Forces Committee to say today that his committee is going to study this question. It is a matter we did not feel was in the jurisdiction of our committee because it should be left to the Armed Forces Committee. I think we can assure the gentlemen that study will be made at another date.

Mr. MITCHELL. I thank the gentleman, but I certainly would like to see this spelled out in the present bill inasmuch as you provide for it substantially in section 206 and I cannot see where the addition of my amendment is going to do any harm and it might possibly be a very important stop-gap.

In contrast to that, Mr. Chairman, this House has always carefully limited the scope, tenure, and rotation of General Staff officers in every previous piece of such legislation that has come before us on the subject, in 1903, 1916, and 1920, to name the most notable occasions.

I suggest, therefore, if we are to have our Joint Staff, as a matter of legislative consistency and in keeping with our American traditions, that at least we write into section 209 the normal provisions for tenure, rotation, and scope of duties which we have always set forth for the War Department General Staff, and I so offer amendment to accomplish this purpose.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana.

A moment ago the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] made a very wise observation when he said that the staff would do the principal work for all the Secretaries and Chairman of the Board. I think it is acknowledged that here the Joint Staff will do most of the work for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If such is the case, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff may change and rotate, at the same time there is no provision, as has been pointed out by the gentleman from Indiana, for the rotating and the changing of the members of the Joint Staff. It is possible that the Director of the Joint Staff might be an infantryman and he could slant and direct all tactics along infantry lines. The result would be, whether his policy was right or wrong, we would pursue that policy irrespective of what the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought.

We know that we need new blood, and if we adopt this amendment and rotate the members of the Joint Staff, there is no danger of us making the mistake that was made by the Joint Staff in France when they set up the Maginot Line and did not know anything about aviation or anything of that kind. So I heartily endorse the amendment.

Mr. MANASCO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMATHERS. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. MANASCO. It is my understanding that the promotion bill passed by the House a week or two ago, that came out of Armed Services Committee, does contain a provision or rotation of officers. I am not a member of that committee, but I would be glad to have them answer that question. I think that is an important matter.

Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMATHERS. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. DURHAM. It certainly was the intention of the committee to set up this promotion list in the bill we passed a few weeks ago. Whether or not it cures the particular point under discussion here, I am not in a position to say, but certainly that was the intention of the Armed Service Committee. I see the chairman on the floor at the present time, who can probably enlighten us on that subject.

Mr. SMATHERS. In any event, Mr. Chairman, everybody agrees that there should be rotation, so in order to be safe, let us adopt this amendment, and then if the Armed Services Committee wants to make further changes, they can do so, but let us adopt this amendment and assure ourselves of rotation.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield at this time to the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee on that point.

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. I have no idea of disagreeing to the amendment, except that any study of the promotion bill passed by the House for the Army or the Navy, or the present set-up, you understand, is a matter purely within the province of the rules and regulations of the Department that pass through the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. MITCHELL. The gentleman says he has no objection to the amendment.

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. It is a matter, as I see it, not within the province of this bill. That is a matter for legislation by the Armed Services Committee upon the direction of the Department, and that is the sort of legislation we are making all the time.

Mr. MITCHELL. It pertains particularly to section 209. It prevents the permanency of holding office. That is the thing I wanted to get away from.

Mr. ANDREWS of New York. That is prevented automatically.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then what is wrong with writing it in this bill?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, we have been very careful on the Committee on Expenditures of the Executive Departments not to go into the field of the Armed Services Committee regarding promotions, tours of duty, pay, and so forth. All of those questions come within the province of that committee. I think [illegible] members of the committee are in sympathy with the purposes of the gentleman's amendment, but I submit that this particular subject should be the subject of inquiry by the Armed Services Committee and hearings should be held on it, and that it should be given that attention by the committee which they normally would give.

I ask that the amendment be voted down.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto do now close.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. MITCHELL].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. MITCHELL) there were—ayes 37, noes 117.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. CLASON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. CLASON: On page 31, strike out all of line 2 and insert "the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments."

(Mr. CLASON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close in 7 minutes, 5 minutes to be allotted to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. CLASON].

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. CLASON. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my amendment is to give to the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force the pay of $15,000 a year. At the present time we have two incumbents, one of whom may move up or both oy whom may not move up. Each of them is a very well qualified man and is more than earning the $15,000 a year he is receiving.

On page 30, section 301 (a), it is provided:

The Secretary of Defense shall receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.

Each one of these other Secretaries is the head of an executive department, by the provisions of this bill.

On page 6 it is stated:

That the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force shall be administered as individual executive departments.

On page 18 it is provided:

There is hereby established an executive department to be known as the Department of the Air Force, and a Secretary of the Air Force, who shall be the head thereof.

On page 30 we provide that the Secretary of Defense shall receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments. According to this bill, each one of the other Secretaries is the head of an executive department. I feel that each one, even though he is not to have the Cabinet position, and even though by this bill, under an amendment thereto that was adopted this afternoon, he is no longer in the line of succession, is certainly entitled as the head of one of these three great departments, which are going to be so important in the lives of every one of us, to receive the pay of the head of an executive department inasmuch as they hold that job under this bill.

Under this provision on page 31, the compensation they are now receiving as the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy will be cut from $15,000 to $14,500 a year. I am sure every person here will agree with me that Secretary Patterson, Secretary Forrestal, and Secretary Royall, or any of the persons who have been occupying those positions or will occupy them in the future, are entitled to be considered as heads of departments and to receive the pay thereof. All I am asking is that they be acknowledged as having the right to the pay of the head of an executive department, as provided on pages 6 and 18 of this bill. In fairness to them, I think they ought to get $15,000. I do not want to be one of those to cut the pay of either Mr. Forrestal or Mr. Royall, for I feel each of them is entitled to every cent he is getting and a whole lot more.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HARNESS].

Mr. HARNESS of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I hope this amendment will be voted down. We are not legislating here for any particular individuals who may be in office. After all, the two Cabinet members, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, are urging us to adopt this legislation. The committee gave careful consideration to reducing the pay from $15,000 to this figure of $14,500, for the sole purpose of distinguishing between Cabinet members in the executive department and the heads of the new Departments of War, Navy, and Air. There has been some question raised here as to whether or not these three new department heads would become members of the President's Cabinet. This, in itself, answers that question. Five hundred dollars a year is not the thing that is involved. It is not a question of money. It is a question of establishing a policy. I hope the members will stand by the committee's bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. CLASON].

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. OWENS: Page 5, line 12, after the period, insert "That such recommendations or reports shall, upon request, also be made to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate; provided that said information shall be confidential and not of public record."

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OWENS. I yield.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto, and substitutes therefor, close in 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I had not intended to take but a moment to explain the amendment. But I understood the amendment was acceptable. They told me when I submitted the amendment that it would be acceptable.

Mr. Chairman, you have heard quite a few remarks about amendments to change commas and words, and so forth.

I am not asking you to do that. I am pointing out that this bill would create a council such as we have not had in the history of our Government. There has not been one word said about the Congress, the representatives of the people themselves, having one word to say about the plans that are being made 1 year or 2 or 3 or 4 years ahead. By this amendment I say that the recommendations and reports that are made to the President shall, upon request of the Speaker of the House of Representatives or the President of the Senate, be forwarded to them, and it shall be confidential and not of record so that they will at least have the information and be able to act upon it should it be necessary. That is really a safeguard which the people need in a bill like this. As I said when I gave it to the committee members of each body, they agreed readily to the amendment because they could see the sense of the amendment. I was not even prepared to argue it, but I now ask you to use your good judgment in having the same information which is given to the President; given to our Speaker and the President of the Senate when they make request for the same.

Why should such an amendment be defeated? I ask you to vote for it.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. OWENS].

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. GOFF. Mr. Chairman, I think it has long been the hope of the majority of our citizens that we should have a unification or merger of our armed services. Unfortunately, the bill before us falls far short of a true unification, and when analyzed, does not, except in small measure, accomplish that purpose. One weakness is that it actually creates a whole, new separate department, with a new Secretary for Air, and superimposes a new super secretary with his staff over our already complicated establishments to maintain the security of our country. It is hard for me to see how it can be called unification, when it provides for four secretaries, instead of two, and when it adds an entirely new department. The bill merely complicates our present arrangement and makes it cost more. As I say this, I am fully aware of the tremendous contribution to victory made by the Army and Navy air arms. The coordination of the air and ground units of our Army and Navy was the major factor in our victory, and I cannot see why we should jeopardize that close coordination by deliberately providing for a separation, when we have the lessons of World War II so close at hand. Remember that the Germans had a separate air force, and it seems to me we are taking a step backward rather than forward if we destroy the close unity between our own air and land arms as is provided in the committee bill. Certainly, such an arrangement cannot promote economy, and there is no use spending more to provide a less efficient organization simply because we have let our admiration for the great service rendered by our aviators run away with our more sober judgment.

Economy alone should not, of course, be the major consideration, for what we want is the most effective means to guarantee our national security. But I do not see how the efficiency of our defense establishment can be increased by setting up a new and separate department, with all its complicated staff organization, and distinctive uniforms for the members of this new agency. You can be sure that one of the first steps taken by this new department will be to prescribe an entirely different uniform from that used in the Army or the Navy, with new titles for the different grades, similar to what has been the case in the Royal Air Forces of the British Commonwealth. If it is wiser to leave the air arm of the Navy as a part of the Navy, then why should we divide the two highly effective parts of our Army which brought victory by their unified command and close cohesion when launched against our late enemies?

I would not have you think that I do not fully appreciate the importance of the air arm in the situation that faces the security of this country today. In evaluating our national defense establishment, we must come down to the practical business of analyzing just what enemy we are likely to fight, should the great tragedy come of our being forced into another war. I think all of us have to agree that there is but one nation from whom we may have any cause to anticipate an attack. That attack is bound to come by the air, for compared to ours, it has no navy in size even to be thought of as a threat, and navies are not built in the matter of a few months or could be, in the case of Russia, in a matter of years. I say again that the attack, if it comes, will be by air, over the polar cap, and that is why I spoke so strongly for an increase in the House appropriation for the construction of planes, when the War Department appropriation bill was before this body.

In my view, for the next two decades war with Russia will almost entirely depend on whether we maintain an air-striking force superior to that of Russia. It will be far cheaper for this country to spend the major part of its defense funds for planes and guided missiles in the sure hope and expectation that they will never have to be used and, from time to time, be discarded as obsolete. We will have no war if we can maintain air superiority over the Russians until by education and agreements sincerely entered into on both sides, war is at last abandoned as a method of settling disputes and uniform disarmament becomes possible.

We should not forget, when we are thinking about setting up a separate air force, that there is ample basis for the belief that the real striking force in the future war will be by guided missiles or by planes which fly without human pilots. The planes in which human pilots sit at the controls may come to be only troop-carrier planes, in which our forces will be transported, to follow up and complete the full exploitation of the devastating effects of an aerial bombardment.

I hope this House will not vote to create a separate air force. However, if it should do so, I intend to vote for the bill, but this only because of the hope that in case of war the new Secretary of National Defense will be strong and able enough, and our President will be strong and able enough, to force a unification which is lacking by the terms of the bill that we now have before us.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise and report the bill back to the House with sundry amendments, with the recommendation that the amendments be agreed to and the bill, as amended, do pass.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. CASE of South Dakota, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill H. R. 4214, directed him to report the same back to the House with sundry amendments, with the recommendation that the amendments be agreed to and that the bill as amended do pass.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them en gross.

The amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The SPEAKER. Under the order of the House, the Clerk will report the Senate bill, S. 758.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the unanimous-consent agreement, I offer an amendment to the bill S. 758, to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the provisions of H. R. 4214, as passed by the House.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HOFFMAN: Strike out all after the enacting clause of S. 758 and insert the provisions of H. R. 4214, as amended.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The title was amended so as to read: "To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security."

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in engrossing the bill, H. R. 4214, the Clerk may be authorized and instructed to make the necessary corrections in page numbers, sec-

tion numbers, subsection numbers, and correct typographical errors.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. BUCK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend the remarks I made earlier today in the Committee of the Whole and to include therein extraneous matter.

Mr. KEARNEY asked and was given permisison to revise and extend his remarks.

Mr. PATTERSON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD and include an article from the Saturday Evening Post of July 19, 1947.

Mr. CASE of New Jersey and Mr. MACKINNON asked and were given permission to revise and extend the remarks they made earlier in the day in the Committee of the Whole.

Mr. MUNDT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD and include a newspaper editorial.

Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR., asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD and include an editorial from Newsweek under date of July 21.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD and include a resolution.

Mr. BUCHANAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD and include an editorial from the New York Times entitled "Gambling With Securities."

Mr. EVINS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD and include an article.

Mr. BLATNIK asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD and include two resolutions.

Mr. SCHWABE of Missouri asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD in two instances.

Mr. BRADLEY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD and include an article from the Press Telegram.

Mr. GOFF. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD with regard to the unification bill just passed and that they may appear in the RECORD just prior to the motion that the Committee rise.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Idaho?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION TO FILE REPORT

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to file supplemental report No. 958, part 2, on the bill (S. 364) to expedite the disposition of Government surplus airports, airport facilities, and equipment and to assure their disposition in such manner as will best encourage and foster the development of civilian aviation and preserve for national defense purposes a strong, efficient, and properly maintained nationwide system of public airports, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

CONTINUATION OF MORATORIUM STATUTE

Mr. MICHENER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of S. 1563, to amend the act entitled "An act to express the intent of the Congress with reference to the regulation of the business of insurance," approved March 9, 1945 (59 Stat. 33).

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the act entitled "An act to express the intent of the Congress with reference to the regulation of the business of insurance", approved March 9, 1945, is amended by striking out the words "January 1, 1948", wherever they appear in such act, and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "June 30, 1948".

Mr. MICHENER. Mr. Speaker, this bill passed the Senate on July 3, and came to the House. It is simply a continuation of the moratorium statute. That statute expires on the 1st day of January, 1948, and this continues the life of the present moratorium statute until June 30, 1948.

I have polled the members of the Judiciary Committee to which the bill was referred. They are unanimous in favoring the report except three who are out of the city. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALTER], a member of the minority, is here, and is prepared to make any statement required. I have also consulted with the majority leader and the minority leader.

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

INTERIOR DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATION BILL, 1948—PERMISSION TO FILE CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. TABER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the managers on the part of the House may have until midnight tonight to file a conference report and statement on the bill (H. R. 3123) making appropriations for the Department of the Interior for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

The conference report and statement follow:

CONFERENCE REPORT

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 3123) making appropriations for the Department of the Interior for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its amendments numbered 14, 82, 83, 97, 93, 103, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 126, 127, 155, 160, 173, 174, and 175.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 46, 47, 45, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 89, 95, 102, 106, 107, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 121, 122, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 139, 142, 147, 150, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 163, 165, 170, and 172, and agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 3: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 3, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: Restore the matter stricken out by said amendment amended to read as follows: ": *Provided further*, That not to exceed $50,000 of this appropriation may be used for the Division of Power under the Office of the Secretary"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 9: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 9, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "$1,900,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 13: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 13, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "$8,596,400"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 19: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 19, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: Restore the matter stricken out by said amendment amended to read as follows:

"Construction: The funds appropriated for the fiscal year 1947 (Interior Department Appropriation Act, 1947), are hereby continued available during the fiscal year 1948 to meet obligations incurred in contract or contracts duly executed and in force on or before June 30, 1947; for administrative expenses connected therewith; including purchase of five, and hire of passenger motor vehicles; for temporary services as authorized by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (Public Law 600), but at rates not exceeding $35 per diem for individuals; printing and binding; for the purchase or acquisition of necessary lands for rights-of-way and necessary engineering and supervision of the construction under said contracts; and for the construction of necessary interconnecting facilities incident to and connected with the construction of the Denison-Norfork transmission line."

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 20: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 20, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "$1,175,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 29: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 29, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "$3,500,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 30: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 30, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "$11,139,700"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 31: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 31, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amend-

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dination of the activities of the National Security Organization with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and I ask unanimous consent that the statement may be read in lieu of the report.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN]?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the statement.

(For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of July 24, 1947.)

Mr. HOFFMAN (interrupting the reading of the statement). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the statement be dispensed with.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN] is recognized for 1 hour.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. RIZLEY. Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Obviously no quorum is present.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 131]

Barden	Hall, Edwin Arthur	Norton
Bell	Harness, Ind.	O'Toole
Bland	Hart	Pfeifer
Bloom	Hartley	Philbin
Buckley	Hays	Phillips, Calif.
Bulwinkle	Hébert	Poulson
Butler	Heffernan	Powell
Cannon	Hendricks	Rabin
Carroll	Herter	Rayfiel
Case, S. Dak.	Jenison	Reed, Ill.
Celler	Jenkins, Pa.	Rooney
Chelf	Johnson, Okla.	Sabath
Clark	Jones, N. C.	Sadowski
Clements	Jones, Wash.	Sarbacher
Cole, Mo.	Kee	Smith, Ohio
Cole, N. Y.	Kefauver	Somers
Cox	Kelley	Stigler
Dawson, Ill.	Kennedy	Taylor
Dawson, Utah	Keogh	Thomason
Dingell	Klein	Tollefson
Domengeaux	Lesinski	Trimble
Durham	Ludlow	Vail
Elsaesser	Lynch	Vinson
Fellows	McCowen	Welch
Fernandez	McDowell	Williams
Fuller	Macy	Wood
Gathings	Marcantonio	Worley
Gifford	Mason	Youngblood
Gore	Meade, Md.	Zimmerman
Gossett	Norrell	
Gregory		

The SPEAKER. On this roll call 340 Members have answered to their names; a quorum is present.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes and ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. The Chair cannot entertain that request at this time. Perhaps later in the day the Chair may be able to, but not now.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, it is my hope that during the time of adjournment the vacation of Congress, so-called, which is always to the individual Members a period of extra work and overtime, you all will have a pleasant time with the folks at home.

Mr. Speaker, this legislation, which is H. R. 4214, under the number S. 758, to my mind, is as important as any that could come before the Congress. There is no question but that we need unification. All admit that in all preparations for national defense or for war there has been inexcusable duplication and waste. War is waste and destruction.

My reluctance to vote for legislation of this kind grows not out of the fact that it is not needed but that for some 25 years certain individuals connected with the Joint Staff have been seeking not only to give the Nation unity in its preparations for defense and for war and greater efficiency, but that some of those pushing it seek to open the door to the establishment of a military dictatorship. Not only does the General Staff want to give us greater efficiency but as indicated by the terms of this bill they want the power to plan our domestic as well as our foreign policy. When you read the bill you will discover that that is the fact. All too often these planners become the ones with authority and carry out their plans as distinguished from the plans of the Congress.

And so there may arise in your minds the question as to why I support it, and I can only repeat what I said in the beginning when this bill was before us for the first time. It is the lesser of two evils. Apparently we are going to pass—I may say it is evident we are going to pass—some legislation on this subject, and may I respectfully submit to you and to your judgment that the bill that your committee brought back, the bill just returned by the conferees to this House, is a great improvement over the original bill, and the best we can get at this time. That is why the conferees bring it back for your consideration.

In this bill you will find provisions that make it necessary that future Congresses will be required, if our liberty is to be preserved, to guard against the planning of the State Department and the military in this country with reference to foreign policies, with reference to domestic economy, with reference to the dissipation of our resources and our production, our industrial plants, because, as we all know, in these days the planning is more than half the battle; and when they bring planned or planning legislation here to Congress—when it relates to foreign policy or domestic policy the Congress has been all too willing, for what reason I know not, to accept, adopt, and carry it out.

Now to touch the provisions of this bill, the points on which your conferees could not carry out your wishes to the extent which they desired. Distinguished gentlemen from the other end of the Capitol had something to say about it. They had quite a lot to say about it.

You will recall that when the House passed on this legislation it amended the bill H. R. 4214, which the committee reported, with reference to the Central Intelligence Agency. The committee had written into the bill a provision that the head of that agency might be a civilian or a man from the armed services. The House amended the bill to provide that he shall be a civilian. During the debate the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. JUDD] offered an amendment which provided that if a man from the armed services was appointed he should be required to relinquish his rank and his authority in the Army.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself five additional minutes.

Mr. Speaker, when we went into conference, the conferees for the other body flatly refused to accept that amendment. They had made certain concessions to which your attention will be called later on, but on that one they stood pat. They refused to accept the House amendment to the committee bill so your conferees compromised by accepting the language of the bill, 4214, as reported by your committee to the House, thus discarding the amendment written into the bill by the House which would have required that the head of that agency be a civilian. My own choice, and I think the choice of six of the seven members of the House subcommittee who were conferees, was that the head of that agency should be a civilian, but we could not get it, so we went along with that compromise. It seeks to divorce the head of the agency from the armed services if a man in the service is appointed.

It will be recalled also, if you have read the hearings, that there was a deliberate effort on the part of the Army part of the Joint Staff to reduce the marines to the status of a police force. Your committee, and the House sustained its action, wrote into the bill certain provisions which protect the marines. You may just as well talk about stopping the sunrise or the setting of the sun as to think that the people of this country are going to permit the Congress to vote to get rid of the marines. The marines have fought their way into the hearts of all the people, and the conferees who were opposed to the provisions which protected them could get nowhere. In my humble judgment, this bill protects to the fullest extent the marines, their activities, their role, their missions, their rights to develop the kind of warfare and weapons they think are necessary or of advantage to the country.

There was fear on the part of some who had been in the Navy as to certain omissions in the original bill as sent up by the administration. You will recall that the men who fought as admirals, vice admirals, rear admirals, men who fought in the last war as captains, and officers of lower rank, some of them having had

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their ships blown out from under them, did not get an opportunity to appear before the committee to express their thoughts and their ideas as to what the legislation should be. You will recall that 4 or 5 days before the hearings were ended, and they were closed in spite of my protest, there were two orders of the Navy, 94 and 95, which prevented the fighting men and officers in the Navy, except as their views were channeled through the Secretary of the Navy from expressing their opinions. That gag was only removed a few days before the hearing ended. It was then impossible to call those witnesses. So there was a justifiable fear on the part of the enlisted men in the Navy and on the part of the officers of the Navy that an attempt was being made to take from them naval aviation.

The gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] offered an amendment in the House, and it was adopted, which in our opinion and apparently in the opinion of the Members of the House protected the Navy by permitting it to continue to have naval aviation.

We had to make some changes in the phraseology of that amendment as written in by the House. But again, in my judgment, there is no change in the basic thought; there is no change in the language that will prevent the Navy from carrying out to the fullest extent its desire to be adequately protected in time of war by naval aviation and to develop before war comes naval aviation.

Those were the three more important points in the legislation as it went to conference. First was the appointment of the head of the Central Intelligence. We had to guard against a gestapo, and we wrote in there a provision which we think now will do that. Then there was the protection to be given to the marines and there was the protection to be given to naval aviation. We have both in the bill as it comes back from conference. So, on the whole, if we must have a bill—and we must—it is here. We do most humbly and respectfully submit this bill for your consideration and action. My only purpose in calling attention to the dangers the bill carries is this: It opens the door to military dictatorship and renders more burdensome the duty of future Congresses to adequately protect us from government by the armed services. All in all, inasmuch as the Congress is determined to pass a bill, this is the best we can get, and it is if the powers granted are not extended and if the organizations set up by it are content to remain within the written provisions of the bill, not too bad.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MCCORMACK].

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I am overwhelmed by the continued generosity of my distinguished chairman. My friend the gentleman from Michigan has referred to the Director of Central Intelligence, and I think I might advise the House that that was the last question that we passed upon in conference. The Senate accepted the House provision of the bill as reported out of the House committee.

You will remember when the bill was on the floor we frankly advised the Committee of the Whole at that time that the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments was strongly inclined toward, if not favorable to, a civilian director, but in view of the immediate situation that confronted us we put in the provision that in case a military man, a career officer of the Army or the Navy, was appointed that he would have to occupy what would be, in effect, a civilian position. We tried to protect him so that he would be free from a dual influence. I recognize, if one were to argue or say it did not completely eliminate a dual influence, that I could not challenge that statement. But we did the best we could from a human angle. We felt, since enabling legislation was going to come in later from another standing committee of the House—and we know that; we were advised and saw a copy of the proposed bill—that that question, with the other questions that would arise in connection with this Central Intelligence Agency, should be left to the standing committee, and that our committee should try to meet the immediate problem. The bill as it comes back is substantially the House bill. I think it is a much better bill—and I agree on that with my friend the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN]—than any of the bills that were considered by the committees of both branches and an improvement upon the bill that passed the Senate. It is now a bill that probably expresses in the most effective way possible the collective action to a satisfied extent of the membership of the House and the Senate.

This bill is one of the most controversial problems that came up in Congress at the outset of this session, and we have seen it go through the House practically without any opposition. The House is now ready to accept the conference report. I think this is a strong indication of the confidence the House has in the considerations of the House committee and in the bill the House committee reported.

One of the most controversial problems and consequently one of the last to be resolved was the question of providing in legislation a reasonable assurance that the Marine Corps and naval aviation would continue to perform their proper functions in the National Military Establishment after unification. Fears were expressed, and honest fears, that an attempt to describe in detail the composition of forces, and their functions and missions might introduce an inflexibility which would impair the effectiveness of the armed forces.

Your committee recognized these fears, and while they considered it desirable to provide in general terms for the continued functioning of these two elements of the armed services, it was not their intent to create a statutory rigidity which would be a bar to future progress. By the same token, it is not their intent by this act to freeze the organization of the armed forces, or the concept of military operations, since a major purpose of the act is to assure that scientific progress shall be reflected in a progressive and dynamic organization. It is in no way the intent of the committee to tie the hands of the Secretary of Defense in any manner which would prevent the increased economies and the enhanced efficiency which the people of the United States have a right to expect. Further, nothing in this act should be construed as infringing upon the traditional and constitutional authority of the President as Commander in Chief.

The bill permits broad flexibility in administration and in operation in all of its aspects, and should be construed in the future from that angle. Under no conditions, either directly or indirectly, even if we had the power to do so, does it infringe upon or invade the powers of the President, as President or as Commander in Chief. This is clearly the intent of the Congress.

We have now come to the final legislative stage in this very important and far-reaching piece of legislation. It shows what the processes of legislative action under constitutional government are. As we look back through the months we recollect the fears that were expressed, and some properly so, then we recollect the evidence considered in hearings and the fears taken into account. Then the bill went through the legislative processes, and has finally come down to this final legislative stage, and we now find a feeling of abiding satisfaction that the bill represents the best that can be done at this time in connection with legislation along the lines outlined therein.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCORMACK. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. JUDD. I concur in what the gentleman has said. As the gentleman knows, I personally think it is a mistake not to require that the Director of Central Intelligence be a civilian, but I am sure that on the whole the bill is in excellent shape and that the majority of the provisions for which the House committee voted and which it believes to be right have been written into the bill. I think the committee is to be congratulated.

Mr. McCORMACK. I thank the gentleman. I think the House can accept the statement of the chairman, in which I concur, that the conferees on the part of the House are able to report back to the House that the substance of the changes made by the House committee are contained in the bill.

It has been a pleasure to me to work with all of the members of the committee on this bill. Every Member approached this problem with an open mind, no matter what party he belongs to. The members of the conference committee, both of the House and of the Senate, did likewise. There were no difficulties at any time. We went into the thing very carefully. It is a bill which through able and courageous administration will produce efficiency and economy in our armed services, and will make stronger our future national security.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the conference report.

The conference report was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.