

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
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ADDENDUM TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reporting the Floor discussion on
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
in the Senate

7 July 1947 and 9 July 1947

ADDENDUM NO. 2 to VOLUME I.

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80TH CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { REPORT
1st Session - } No. 1051

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

JULY 24, 1947.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. HOFFMAN, from the committee of conference, submitted the following

CONFERENCE REPORT

[To accompany S. 758]

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 758) to promote the national security by providing for a National Security Organization, which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Security, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force within the National Security Organization, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Security Organization with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House to the text of the bill and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House amendment insert the following:

SHORT TITLE

That this Act may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947".

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DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of intergrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

TITLE I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SEC. 101. (a) There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").

The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council: Provided, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

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The Council shall be composed of the President; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense, appointed under section 202; the Secretary of the Army, referred to in section 205; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force, appointed under section 207; the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, appointed under section 103; and such of the following named officers as the President may designate from time to time: The Secretaries of the executive departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board appointed under section 213, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board appointed under section 214; but no such additional member shall be designated until the advice and consent of the Senate has been given to his appointment to the office the holding of which authorizes his designation as a member of the Council.

(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council—

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

(c) The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President, and who shall receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year. The executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is hereby authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.

(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof. The Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services or from among individuals in civilian life. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year.

(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director then—

(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and

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(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of Director of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office of Director, receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which \$14,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council—

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security; and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

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(e) *To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided, however, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.*

(f) *Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office—*

(1) *the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and*

(2) *the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.*

NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD

SEC. 103. (a) *There is hereby established a National Security Resources Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board") to be composed of the Chairman of the Board and such heads or representatives of the various executive departments and independent agencies as may from time to time be designated by the President to be members of the Board. The Chairman of the Board shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year.*

(b) *The Chairman of the Board, subject to the direction of the President, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to assist the Board in carrying out its functions.*

(c) *It shall be the function of the Board to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including—*

(1) *policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war;*

(2) *programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation's natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and conditions;*

(3) *policies for unifying, in time of war, the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials, and products;*

(4) the relationship between potential supplies of, and potential requirements for, manpower, resources, and productive facilities in time of war:

(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic and critical material, and for the conservation of these reserves:

(6) the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's security.

(d) In performing its functions, the Board shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the Government.

TITLE II—THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

SEC. 201. (a) There is hereby established the National Military Establishment, and the Secretary of Defense shall be the head thereof.

(b) The National Military Establishment shall consist of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, together with all other agencies created under title II of this Act.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SEC. 202. (a) There shall be a Secretary of Defense, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate: Provided, That a person who has within ten years been on active duty as a commissioned officer in a Regular component of the armed services shall not be eligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security. Under the direction of the President and subject to the provisions of this Act he shall perform the following duties:

(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment and for all of the departments and agencies therein;

(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies;

(3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research;

(4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies under the applicable appropriation Act:

Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force from presenting to the President or to the Director of the Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any report or recommendation relating to his department which he may deem necessary: And provided further, That the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force shall be administered as individual executive departments by their respective Secretaries and all powers and

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duties relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense by this Act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall submit annual written reports to the President and the Congress covering expenditures, work, and accomplishments of the National Military Establishment, together with such recommendations as he shall deem appropriate.

(c) The Secretary of Defense shall cause a seal of office to be made for the National Military Establishment, of such design as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

MILITARY ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY

SEC. 203. Officers of the armed services may be detailed to duty as assistants and personal aides to the Secretary of Defense, but he shall not establish a military staff.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SEC. 204. (a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to appoint from civilian life not to exceed three special assistants to advise and assist him in the performance of his duties. Each such special assistant shall receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year.

(b) The Secretary of Defense is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such other civilian personnel as may be necessary for the performance of the functions of the National Military Establishment other than those of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SEC. 205. (a) The Department of War shall hereafter be designated the Department of the Army, and the title of the Secretary of War shall be changed to Secretary of the Army. Changes shall be made in the titles of other officers and activities of the Department of the Army as the Secretary of the Army may determine.

(b) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions relating to the Department of War or to any officer or activity whose title is changed under this section shall, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to relate to the Department of the Army within the National Military Establishment or to such officer or activity designated by his or its new title.

(c) The term "Department of the Army" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Army at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Army.

(d) The Secretary of the Army shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Department of the Army, of such design as the President may approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

(e) In general the United States Army, within the Department of the Army, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It shall be responsible for the preparation of land

forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SEC. 206. (a) The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United States Marine Corps, including the Reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.

(b) In general the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy, shall include naval combat and services forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It shall be responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation shall consist of combat and service and training forces, and shall include land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the United States Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the United States Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

The Navy shall be generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and protection of shipping.

The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of naval combat and service elements; matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct: Provided, That such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SEC. 207. (a) Within the National Military Establishment there is hereby established an executive department to be known as the Department of the Air Force, and a Secretary of the Air Force, who shall be the head thereof. The Secretary of the Air Force shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(b) Section 158 of the Revised Statutes is amended to include the Department of the Air Force and the provisions of so much of title IV of the Revised Statutes as now or hereafter amended as is not inconsistent with this Act shall be applicable to the Department of the Air Force.

(c) The term "Department of the Air Force" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air Force at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Air Force.

(d) There shall be in the Department of the Air Force an Under Secretary of the Air Force and two Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(e) The several officers of the Department of the Air Force shall perform such functions as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribe.

(f) So much of the functions of the Secretary of the Army and of the Department of the Army, including those of any officer of such Department, as are assigned to or under the control of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, or as are deemed by the Secretary of Defense to be necessary or desirable for the operations of the Department of the Air Force or the United States Air Force, shall be transferred to and vested in the Secretary of the Air Force and the Department of the Air Force: Provided, That the National Guard Bureau shall, in addition to the functions and duties performed by it for the Department of the Army, be charged with similar functions and duties for the Department of the Air Force, and shall be the channel of communication between the Department of the Air Force and the several States on all matters pertaining to the Air National Guard: And provided further, That, in order to permit an orderly transfer, the Secretary of Defense may, during the transfer period hereinafter prescribed, direct that the Department of the Army shall continue for appropriate periods to exercise any of such functions, insofar as they relate to the Department of the Air Force, or the United States Air Force or their property and personnel. Such of the property, personnel, and records of the Department of the Army used in the exercise of functions transferred under this subsection as the Secretary of Defense shall determine shall be transferred or assigned to the Department of the Air Force.

(g) The Secretary of the Air Force shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Department of the Air Force, of such device as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

SEC. 208. (a) The United States Air Force is hereby established under the Department of the Air Force. The Army Air Forces, the Air Corps, United States Army, and the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command), shall be transferred to the United States Air Force.

(b) *There shall be a Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years from among the officers of general rank who are assigned to or commissioned in the United States Air Force. Under the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall exercise command over the United States Air Force and shall be charged with the duty of carrying into execution all lawful orders and directions which may be transmitted to him. The functions of the Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command), and of the Chief of the Air Corps and of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be transferred to the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. When such transfer becomes effective, the offices of the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, and Assistants to the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, provided for by the Act of June 4, 1920, as amended (41 Stat. 768), and Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force, provided for by section 5 of the Act of June 16, 1936 (49 Stat. 1525), shall cease to exist. While holding office as Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, the incumbent shall hold a grade and receive allowances equivalent to those prescribed by law for the Chief of Staff, United States Army. The Chief of Staff, United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall take rank among themselves according to their relative dates of appointment as such, and shall each take rank above all other officers on the active list of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall have the effect of changing the relative rank of the present Chief of Staff, United States Army, and the present Chief of Naval Operations.*

(c) *All commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, commissioned, holding warrants, or enlisted, in the Air Corps, United States Army, or the Army Air Forces, shall be transferred in branch to the United States Air Force. All other commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, who are commissioned, hold warrants, or are enlisted, in any component of the Army of the United States and who are under the authority or command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued under the authority or command of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Air Force. Personnel whose status is affected by this subsection shall retain their existing commissions, warrants, or enlisted status in existing components of the armed forces unless otherwise altered or terminated in accordance with existing law; and they shall not be deemed to have been appointed to a new or different office or grade, or to have vacated their permanent or temporary appointments in an existing component of the armed forces, solely by virtue of any change in status under this subsection. No such change in status shall alter or prejudice the status of any individual so assigned, so as to deprive him of any right, benefit, or privilege to which he may be entitled under existing law.*

(d) *Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of the Air Force, all property, records, installations, agencies, activities, projects, and civilian personnel under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued to the same extent under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command, respectively, of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, in the Department of the Air Force.*

(e) *For a period of two years from the date of enactment of this Act, personnel (both military and civilian), property, records, installations,*

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agencies, activities, and projects may be transferred between the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force by direction of the Secretary of Defense.

(f) In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF TRANSFERS

SEC. 209. Each transfer, assignment, or change in status under section 207 or section 208 shall take effect upon such date or dates as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

WAR COUNCIL

SEC. 210. There shall be within the National Military Establishment a War Council composed of the Secretary of Defense, as Chairman, who shall have power of decision; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The War Council shall advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces, and shall consider and report on such other matters as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SEC. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the National Military Establishment the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one.

(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

- (1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;
- (2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;
- (3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;
- (4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;
- (5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;
- (6) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and
- (7) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense and shall perform such other

duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as may be prescribed by law.

JOINT STAFF

SEC. 212. There shall be, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Joint Staff to consist of not to exceed one hundred officers and to be composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from each of the three armed services. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall perform such duties as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director shall be an officer junior in grade to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MUNITIONS BOARD

SEC. 213. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military Establishment a Munitions Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board").

(b) The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof, and an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary from each of the three military departments, to be designated in each case by the Secretaries of their respective departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year.

(c) It shall be the duty of the Board under the direction of the Secretary of Defense and in support of strategic and logistic plans prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

(1) to coordinate the appropriate activities within the National Military Establishment with regard to industrial matters, including the procurement, production, and distribution plans of the departments and agencies comprising the Establishment;

(2) to plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization;

(3) to recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities among the several military services and to plan for standardization of specifications and for the greatest practicable allocation of purchase authority of technical equipment and common use items on the basis of single procurement;

(4) to prepare estimates of potential production, procurement, and personnel for use in evaluation of the logistic feasibility of strategic operations;

(5) to determine relative priorities of the various segments of the military procurement programs;

(6) to supervise such subordinate agencies as are or may be created to consider the subjects falling within the scope of the Board's responsibilities;

(7) to make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve existing interservice agencies operating in the fields of procurement, production, and distribution in such manner as to promote efficiency and economy;

(8) to maintain liaison with other departments and agencies for the proper correlation of military requirements with the civilian economy, particularly in regard to the procurement or disposition of strategic and critical material and the maintenance of adequate reserves of such material, and to make recommendations as to policies in connection therewith;

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(9) to assemble and review material and personnel requirements presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those presented by the production, procurement, and distribution agencies assigned to meet military needs, and to make recommendations thereon to the Secretary of Defense; and

(10) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

(d) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office, the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Munitions Board.

(e) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such personnel and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the performance of its functions.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

SEC. 214. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military Establishment a Research and Development Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board"). The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof, and two representatives from each of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to be designated by the Secretaries of their respective Departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year. The purpose of the Board shall be to advise the Secretary of Defense as to the status of scientific research relative to the national security, and to assist him in assuring adequate provision for research and development on scientific problems relating to the national security.

(b) It shall be the duty of the Board, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense—

(1) to prepare a complete and integrated program of research and development for military purposes;

(2) to advise with regard to trends in scientific research relating to national security and the measures necessary to assure continued and increasing progress;

(3) to recommend measures of coordination of research and development among the military departments, and allocation among them of responsibilities for specific programs of joint interest;

(4) to formulate policy for the National Military Establishment in connection with research and development matters involving agencies outside the National Military Establishment;

(5) to consider the interaction of research and development and strategy, and to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection therewith; and

(6) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

(c) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office, the Joint Research and Development Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Research and Development Board.

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such personnel and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the performance of its functions.

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TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS

COMPENSATION OF SECRETARIES

SEC. 301. (a) *The Secretary of Defense shall receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.*

(b) *The Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force shall each receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.*

UNDER SECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES

SEC. 302. *The Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force shall each receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year and shall perform such duties as the Secretaries of their respective departments may prescribe.*

ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND PERSONNEL

SEC. 303. (a) *The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized to appoint such advisory committees and to employ, consistent with other provisions of this Act, such part-time advisory personnel as they may deem necessary in carrying out their respective functions and the functions of agencies under their control. Persons holding other offices or positions under the United States for which they receive compensation while serving as members of such committees shall receive no additional compensation for such service. Other members of such committees and other part-time advisory personnel so employed may serve without compensation or may receive compensation at a rate not to exceed \$35 for each day of service, as determined by the appointing authority.*

(b) *Service of an individual as a member of any such advisory committee, or in any other part-time capacity for a department or agency hereunder, shall not be considered as service bringing such individual within the provisions of section 109 or 113 of the Criminal Code (U. S. C., 1940 edition, title 18, secs. 198 and 203), or section 19 (e) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, unless the act of such individual, which by such section is made unlawful when performed by an individual referred to in such section, is with respect to any particular matter which directly involves a department or agency which such person is advising or in which such department or agency is directly interested.*

STATUS OF TRANSFERRED CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SEC. 304. *All transfers of civilian personnel under this Act shall be without change in classification or compensation, but the head of any department or agency to which such a transfer is made is authorized to make such changes in the titles and designations and prescribe such changes in the duties of such personnel commensurate with their classification as he may deem necessary and appropriate.*

SAVING PROVISIONS

SEC. 305. (a) *All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions applicable with respect to any function, activity, personnel, property, records, or other thing transferred under this Act, or with respect to any officer,*

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department, or agency, from which such transfer is made, shall, except to the extent rescinded, modified, superseded, terminated, or made inapplicable by or under authority of law, have the same effect as if such transfer had not been made; but, after any such transfer, any such law, order, regulation, or other action which vested functions in or otherwise related to any officer, department, or agency from which such transfer was made shall, insofar as applicable with respect to the function, activity, personnel, property, records or other thing transferred and to the extent not inconsistent with other provisions of this Act, be deemed to have vested such function in or relate to the officer, department, or agency to which the transfer was made.

(b) No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or against the head of any department or agency or other officer of the United States, in his official capacity or in relation to the discharge of his official duties, shall abate by reason of the taking effect of any transfer or change in title under the provisions of this Act; and, in the case of any such transfer, such suit, action, or other proceeding may be maintained by or against the successor of such head or other officer under the transfer, but only if the court shall allow the same to be maintained on motion or supplemental petition filed within twelve months after such transfer takes effect, showing a necessity for the survival of such suit, action, or other proceeding to obtain settlement of the questions involved.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of the second paragraph of section 5 of title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, the existing organization of the War Department under the provisions of Executive Order Numbered 9082 of February 28, 1942, as modified by Executive Order Numbered 9722 of May 13, 1946, and the existing organization of the Department of the Navy under the provisions of Executive Order Numbered 9635 of September 29, 1945, including the assignment of functions to organizational units within the War and Navy Departments, may, to the extent determined by the Secretary of Defense, continue in force for two years following the date of enactment of this Act except to the extent modified by the provisions of this Act or under the authority of law.

TRANSFER OF FUNDS

SEC. 306. All unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter made available for use by or on behalf of the Army Air Forces or officers thereof, shall be transferred to the Department of the Air Force for use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Such other unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter made available for use by the Department of War or the Department of the Army in exercise of functions transferred to the Department of the Air Force under this Act, as the Secretary of Defense shall determine, shall be transferred to the Department of the Air Force for use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Unexpended balances transferred under this section may be used for the purposes for which the appropriations, allocations, or other funds were originally made available, or for new expenditures occasioned by the enactment of this Act. The transfers herein authorized may be made with or without warrant action as may be appropriate from time to time from any appropriation covered by this section to any other such appropriation or to such new accounts established on the books of the Treasury as may be determined to be necessary to carry into effect provisions of this Act.

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AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 307. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 308. (a) As used in this Act, the term "function" includes functions, powers, and duties.

(b) As used in this Act, the term "budget program" refers to recommendations as to the apportionment, to the allocation and to the review of allotments of appropriated funds.

SEPARABILITY

SEC. 309. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and of the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 310. (a) The first sentence of section 202 (a) and sections 1, 2, 307, 308, 309, and 310 shall take effect immediately upon the enactment of this Act.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), the provisions of this Act shall take effect on whichever of the following days is the earlier: The day after the day upon which the Secretary of Defense first appointed takes office, or the sixtieth day after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY

SEC. 311. Paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of section 1 of the Act entitled "An Act to provide for the performance of the duties of the office of President in case of the removal, resignation, death, or inability both of the President and Vice President", approved July 18, 1947, is amended by striking out "Secretary of War" and inserting in lieu thereof "Secretary of Defense", and by striking out "Secretary of the Navy,".

And the House agree to the same.

That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House to the title of the bill and agree to the same.

CLARE E. HOFFMAN,
GEORGE H. BENDER,
HENRY J. LATHAM,
JAMES W. WADSWORTH,
CARTER MANASCO,
JOHN W. MCCORMACK,
CHET HOLIFIELD,

Managers on the Part of the House

CHAN GURNEY,
LEVERETT SALTONSTALL,
WAYNE MORSE,
RAYMOND E. BALDWIN,
M. E. TYDINGS,
RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
HARRY F. BYRD,

Managers on the Part of the Senate.

STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE HOUSE

The managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 758) to promote the national security by providing for a National Security Organization, which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Security, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force within the National Security Organization, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Security Organization with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, submit the following statement in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the conferees and recommended in the accompanying conference report:

The House amendment to the text of the bill strikes out all of the Senate bill after the enacting clause. The committee of conference recommend that the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House and agree to the same with an amendment which is a substitute for both the Senate bill and the House amendment, and that the House agree to the same.

The bill as agreed to in conference is the same as the House amendment, except for typographical, clerical, and clarifying changes, and the following:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Both the Senate bill and the House amendment provided (sec. 101 (a)) that the National Security Council be composed of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (in the Senate bill designated as "Secretary of National Security"), the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. Under the Senate bill the Council was also to be composed of such other members as the President may designate from time to time. Under the bill as agreed to in conference (sec. 101 (a)) the Council, in addition to the members specifically named above, is to be composed of such of the following-named officers as the President may designate from time to time: The Secretaries of the executive departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board. No such additional member is to be designated until the advice and consent of the Senate has been given to his appointment to the office the holding of which authorizes his designation as a member of the Council. Thus, for example, the Secretary of Commerce now in office could be designated by the President as a member of the Council, but if in the future a new Secretary of Commerce is appointed the new Secretary could not serve as a member of the Council until the advice and consent of the Senate has been given to his appointment to the office of Secretary of Commerce.

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The Senate bill (sec. 101 (c)) provided that the Secretary of Defense be director of the staff of the Council. The House amendment (sec. 101 (c)) provided that the Council have a staff headed by a civilian executive secretary to receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year. The bill as agreed to in conference (sec. 101 (c)) is the same as the House amendment except the compensation of the executive secretary is fixed at the rate of \$10,000 a year.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Senate bill provided that the Director of Central Intelligence be appointed from the armed services or from civilian life. The House amendment provided that the Director of Central Intelligence be appointed from civilian life. The bill as agreed to in conference (sec. 102) provides that the Director shall be appointed from among the commissioned officers of the armed services or from among individuals in civilian life and adds a new subsection (b) which provides that if a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director then (1) in the performance of his duties as Director, he is to be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and (2) he is not to possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing. Except as noted in the preceding sentence the appointment to the office of Director of a commissioned officer of the armed services and his acceptance of and service in such office is in no way to affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Also any such commissioned officer, while serving in the office of Director, is to receive the military pay and allowance (active or retired, as the case may be) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and is to be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Central Intelligence Agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which \$14,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.

The House amendment (sec. 105 (d)) provided that to the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence operations of the departments of Government as relate to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination. Section 102 (d) of the bill as agreed to in conference provides that to the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating

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to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination; provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

PERSONNEL OF NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD

Both the Senate bill (Sec. 103 (b)) and the House amendment (Sec. 106 (b)) authorized the chairman of the National Security Resources Board to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to assist the Board in carrying out its functions. The Senate bill provided that such authority be subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended. The House amendment provided that such authority be without regard to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended. The bill as agreed to in conference (Sec. 103 (b)) follows the language of the Senate bill.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Both the Senate bill (sec. 202 (a)) and House amendment (sec. 102 (a)) provided that the new Secretary be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The House amendment contained a proviso (not contained in the Senate bill) providing that a person who has held a commission in a Regular component of the armed services shall not be eligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense. The bill as agreed to in conference (sec. 202 (a)) contains a provision that a person who has within ten years been on active duty as a commissioned officer in a Regular component of the armed services shall not be eligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense.

The Senate bill (sec. 202 (a) (2)) imposed upon the Secretary of Defense the duty to exercise general direction, authority, and control over certain departments and agencies. The House amendment (sec. 102 (a) (2)) added the word "general" before the word "authority" and before the word "control". The words added by the House amendment have been deleted in the bill as agreed to in conference (sec. 202 (a) (2)) as surplusage.

The Senate bill (sec. 202 (a) (3)) imposed upon the Secretary of Defense the duty to formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget. The House amendment contained no such provision. The bill as agreed to in conference (sec. 202 (a) (4)) contains this provision from the Senate bill.

COMPOSITION AND DUTIES OF THE NAVY AND OF NAVAL AVIATION

The House amendment (sec. 203 (b)) contained language relating specifically to the composition and duties of the United States Navy and of Naval Aviation. The Senate bill (sec. 206 (b)) provided that

the provisions of this act shall not authorize the alteration or diminution of the existing relative status of Naval Aviation. The first and last paragraphs of section 206 (b) of the bill as agreed to in conference are the same as the first and last paragraphs of section 203 (b) of the House amendment. The second, third, and fourth paragraphs of section 203 (b) of the House amendment are omitted and the following is inserted in lieu thereof:

All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation shall consist of combat and service and training forces, and shall include land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the United States Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the United States Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

The Navy shall be generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping.

COMPOSITION AND DUTIES OF THE MARINE CORPS

The House amendment (sec. 203) contained the following provision:

(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The primary mission of the Marine Corps shall be to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition to its primary mission, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct: *Provided*, That such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the performance of the primary mission hereinbefore set forth. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

The Senate bill (sec. 206 (b)) provided that the provisions of this Act shall not authorize the alteration or diminution of the existing relative status of the Marine Corps (including the Fleet Marine Forces). The bill as agreed to in conference contains the same language (sec. 206 (c)) as that in the House amendment except that (1) the words "The primary mission of the Marine Corps shall be" at the beginning of the second sentence are changed to read "The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped"; (2) the words "to its primary mission" at the beginning of the fourth sentence are omitted; and (3) the words "performance of the primary mission hereinbefore set forth" in the proviso at the end of the fourth sentence are omitted and in lieu thereof the words "operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized" are inserted.

COMPENSATION OF SECRETARIES

The Senate bill (sec. 302 (b)) provided that the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force shall each receive the compensation prescribed for the Secretary of Defense. The House amendment (sec. 301 (b)) provided that these

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three Secretaries shall each receive compensation at the rate of \$14,500 a year. The bill as agreed to in conference (sec. 301 (b)) provides that these three Secretaries shall each receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.

CLARE E. HOFFMAN,
GEORGE H. BENDER,
HENRY J. LATHAM,
JAMES W. WADSWORTH,
CARTER MANASCO,
JOHN W. McCORMACK,
CHET HOLIFIELD,
Managers on the Part of the House.

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Union Calendar No. 499

80TH CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES } REPORT
1st Session } } No. 961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

JULY 16, 1947.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. HOFFMAN, by direction of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H. R. 4214]

The Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 4214) to promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security (short title, "National Security Act of 1947"), having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.

STATEMENT

The original bill was transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on February 26, 1947, by the President, by letter informing the Speaker that the bill had been drawn by representatives of his office and of the armed forces and had the approval of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The bill was introduced by the chairman of the committee, Hon. Clare E. Hoffman, on February 28, 1947, and referred to your committee.

On April 2, 1947, your committee commenced hearings which were finally concluded on July 1, 1947. During this period the committee heard 25 witnesses (list attached) including the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. In addition, this group of witnesses included prominent civilian and military leaders representing a wide variety of viewpoints, organizations, and other interests. Your committee has had the benefit of the advice

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and counsel of the responsible individuals in Government concerned with the national security as well as the benefit of the opinion and suggestions of other interested groups. The hearings necessarily have been extended over a long period because of the importance of this legislative proposal and the desire of your committee to give it the most thorough study possible, weighing carefully every shade of opinion upon each of its provisions. A subcommittee reviewed the testimony and reported to the full committee, which, after some changes, reported out H. R. 4214.

I. NEED FOR REVISION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

The experiences of the war just concluded have proven conclusively that we must maintain in time of peace an adequate organization of the national defense readily adaptable to the needs of war on short notice.

Your committee is of the opinion that the Nation should provide for the effective integration of the many factors comprising the Nation's war potential.

In this way your committee feels that a great contribution can be made to the maintenance of peace and the removal of the causes of war.

II. LESSONS OF THE WAR

While we emerged from World War II as a victorious nation the prodigious national effort which we were required to make, necessitating the sacrifice of American lives and wealth, cannot be repeated if we hope to remain a leading force for world progress and stability.

Since we are a people governed by laws and not by men, the laws we make for the employment of our military forces must not be so restrictive and inflexible as to prevent the accomplishment of the very purposes they are designed to achieve.

One of the purposes of the bill is to give statutory effect to certain organizational features developed during the war and which have proven to be desirable in the control of our armed services.

The advance of science and the magnitude of modern war require that we construct an ample framework for our military services within which they may grow and develop under traditional civilian control in accordance with the needs of the times.

Your committee recognizes as well the totality of modern war and the urgent need for close coordination between foreign policy and military policy, between industry and science and the armed forces.

Your committee is aware of the major lesson of the Nation's great wars, that the sources of strength to resist aggression consist fundamentally in the national morale, leadership, manpower, industrial efficiency, and productive capacity which manifest themselves in successful operations by the armed forces in the field, at sea, and in the air.

Your committee also recognizes the purely military lesson of the recent war that unity of command in the field is essential to success in battle and that the organization, training, and military command of the organized combat forces in time of peace must at all times be directed toward the achievement of harmonious and effective joint action by and among all forces in pursuance of their common and paramount mission to defend the United States.

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Your committee has been mindful of the personal element involved in making changes in our military services. The high morale, the esprit de corps, the long record of valorous and useful service of all elements of the armed forces is fully recognized and appreciated. The need for the preservation of the integrity of elements of the Army, Navy (including naval aviation and the Marine Corps), and Air Forces for future efficiency has received your committee's most careful attention. With these conclusions as a basic blueprint for its work, your committee has earnestly endeavored to produce a legislative framework capable of meeting our modern defense requirements.

The bill as reported differs in certain respects from the original H. R. 2319 and from S. 758. The changes made by the committee are considered to be improvements over the original bill and S. 758.

III. PROVISIONS OF THE BILL AS REPORTED

1. Declaration of policy

The declaration of policy which appears in the bill is deemed necessary by your committee in order that it be clearly shown that it is the intent of Congress to carry out the conclusions reached by your committee and that the traditional superiority of civilian authority over the military within the Government is not being altered.

2. Coordination for national security

The testimony received by your committee discloses an urgent need for a continuous program of close coordination between our domestic, foreign, and military policies so that we may always be able to appraise our commitments as a Nation in the light of our resources and capabilities. This, your committee feels, can be accomplished by the provisions of the bill for the National Security Council supplemented by a Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Resources Board.

(a) *National Security Council.*—This Council, comprised of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Resources Board, gives us for the first time in our history a means of bringing together the responsible heads of Government charged with recommending and carrying out our foreign policies after making a careful appraisal of our domestic and military potentials.

(b) *Central Intelligence Agency.*—In order that the Council, in its deliberations and advice to the President, may have available adequate information, there is provided the Central Intelligence Agency, a permanent organization under the Council, which will furnish such information. At present this function is performed by the Central Intelligence Group which was created by Presidential directive and is temporary in character. The bill, as originally introduced, provided that the Central Intelligence Agency would continue to perform the duties now assigned by the President's directive to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.

Your committee felt that it is better legislative practice to spell out such duties in the interests of clarity and simplicity and has so provided in the bill.

Provision prohibiting the agency from having the power of subpoena and from exercising internal police powers, provisions not included in the original bill nor in S. 758, were added by your committee.

The Central Intelligence Agency, as provided for in the bill, will, in the view of your committee, perform a long neglected and vitally important function.

(c) *The National Security Resources Board.*—The National Security Resources Board provided for in the bill will serve to advise the President with respect to the coordination of civilian, industrial, and military mobilization so that he may be placed, for the first time, in a position to evaluate realistically our resources, capabilities, and risks in relation to our domestic, foreign, and military policies.

The Board would also have the responsibility for planning in peacetime for coordinated civilian-military mobilization in wartime.

3. *The National Military Establishment*

The bill provides for a National Military Establishment consisting of the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air, with a Joint Chiefs of Staff, a War Council, Munitions Board, and a Research and Development Board, all under a Secretary of Defense.

The term "National Military Establishment" is considered a more accurate title than National Security Establishment as used in S. 758.

(a) *Secretary of Defense.*—The complexity and magnitude of the President's task in peace and war are such that your committee believes it is a generally accepted fact that he needs a full-time civilian official to assist him in the performance of his onerous duties as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The Secretary of Defense fills this need. The military services may then be integrated on the departmental level in Washington as they were so effectively integrated in the field during the war, without reducing the ultimate responsibility of the President or diminishing in any way our civilian control over the armed forces. The specific powers given the Secretary of Defense have been carefully delineated in the bill so that there can be no doubt as to the kind and scope of the powers he will exercise. With the advice and assistance of the joint agencies in the National Military Establishment the Secretary can establish general policies and programs, including the supervision of the military budget, and exercise such control and direction as will give us economical and efficient integration of our military arms.

(b) *Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air.*—Separate sections of the bill provide for Departments of Army, Navy, and Air within the National Military Establishment. Except for a change in name, the Department of the Army is the present Department of War, save for the air elements transferred to the Air Force. The Department of the Navy remains as at present, and language has been inserted which will adequately assure the integrity and continued effectiveness of the Marine Corps and naval aviation concerning which some fears have been expressed. The creation of the Department of the Air Force recognizes the war-demonstrated importance of this element of military power and places it on a parity with the land and sea elements of our military forces. This arrangement insures the permanence of planning and management at the seat of government of the team of land, sea, and air forces which gave us victory in the theaters of war.

The elimination of wasteful duplication and overlapping which result from useless competition will be accomplished by the integration

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of the three departments in the National Military Establishment under the Secretary of Defense.

(c) *War Council.*—The War Council, composed of the Secretary of Defense as Chairman, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, together with the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, provides an advisory body for the Secretary of Defense on all matters of broad policy affecting the armed forces which will make a notable contribution to interservice harmony and cooperation.

(d) *The Joint Chiefs of Staff.*—This provision of the bill continues on a permanent basis the most effective interservice coordinating agency developed during the war. It has been further improved by providing, in the form of a National Military Establishment, a means by which differences which have heretofore caused delay may be more readily be resolved. The status of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the source of strategic plans and direction and as the principal military advisers to the President is preserved and their effectiveness increased by provision for a Joint Staff, limited specifically, as the bill provides, to 100 officers and to be composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from each of the three armed forces.

(e) *Munitions Board.*—The new Munitions Board will assume the duties now performed by the Army-Navy Munitions Board, but will have a permanent rather than a temporary character and a wider scope of activity.

Through the studies and recommendations of the Munitions Board the Secretary of Defense will be enabled to assign procurement and technical service responsibilities and through the resulting cross-procurement, cross-servicing and joint use of facilities eliminate duplications of effort where practicable and make important savings in the personnel, money, and facilities now required for similar activities.

(f) *Research and Development Board.*—The provision for the Research and Development Board continues the existing Joint Research and Development Board on a permanent basis. Your committee feels that this Board, in supervising the research and development programs of the armed forces will conserve to a marked degree our limited resources in the way of trained scientific personnel and take full advantage for the benefit of all the services of the latest developments resulting from modern scientific research.

IV. SUMMARY

Your committee believes that the provisions of the bill hereby reported to the House of Representatives accurately reflect a composite of the best suggestions for a comprehensive National Military Establishment.

It is the belief of the committee that the bill as reported contains safeguards and other important provisions not found in the original bill or in S. 758 as passed by the Senate.

It is the belief of the committee that the bill if enacted into law will help insure the coordination of our domestic, foreign, and military policies upon an informed basis; that it will facilitate the integration of all our military services and their unified strategic direction and command; that it will assist in taking full advantage of our resources

of personnel, materials, scientific research, and development; that it will preserve the integrity and more fully exploit the capabilities of all components of ground, sea, and air forces; that all of this can and should be accomplished under traditional American civilian direction and control.

The total nature of modern war and the rapidity with which it could strike; the need for a balanced, adequate armed forces structure and integrated, strategic plans for its employment; the inseparability of the several aspects of our national policy; the requirements for men and materials to be balanced against our resources; and the lack of economy and efficiency in our present system, unite to demand the prompt passage of this proposed bill for unification.

(The list of witnesses referred to follows:)

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson	Dr. Vannevar Bush
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal	Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford
Capt. W. G. Lator, United States Navy	Capt. R. R. Waller
Vice Adm. Forrest Sherman	Harry V. Hayden (American Legion)
Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad	John Dwight Sullivan (American Legion)
Gen. A. A. Vandegrift	Rear Adm. Ralph A. Ofstie
Gen. Dwight Eisenhower	Admiral J. H. Towers
Gen. Carl Spaatz	Capt. Walter Karig
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz	Hon. W. Sterling Cole
Col. Melvin J. Maas	Vice Adm. G. F. Bogan
John P. Bracken	Rear Adm. J. J. Clark
Brig. Gen. Merritt A. Edson	Capt. John G. Crommelin
Rear Adm. Ellis M. Zacharias	

ADDITIONAL VIEWS
OF CLARE E. HOFFMAN, CHAIRMAN

The writer of this report throughout the hearings, during the sessions of the subcommittee and of the committee, reserved the right to, at all times, express his views of the proposed legislation.

Early in the hearings it became apparent that a majority of the committee was determined to report out a bill.

When H. R. 2319, written by the military, forwarded to the Speaker of the House by the President, came over to the committee, the chairman as a matter of course introduced the bill.

The writer of this report is convinced that until a few days before the committee ordered the hearings closed, all officials in the Navy, many of them high ranking officers, who bore the brunt of the Nation's battle on the sea and in many instances in the air, were prevented by Executive gag from freely expressing their objections to the bill.

In the opinion of the writer the proposed legislation does not conform to the procedure for the national defense as outlined in the Constitution.

The proposed legislation, instead of leaving to the Congress the duty and the responsibility of providing for the national defense, of making appropriations to the Army to be expended within 2 years, of providing, as directed by the Constitution, for a Navy, places that duty and that responsibility upon a National Military Establishment—a new and an additional organization superimposed upon the Army, the Navy, the Air Forces, and the Congress.

A careful reading of the bill, of the hearings, and a realization of the implications justify the conclusion that the possibilities of a dictatorship by the military are in this legislation.

There is nothing in the testimony to justify the argument that it will in the near future bring about economy in our Military Establishment.

The argument that it will promote efficiency is met by the historic fact that in our blundering, so-called inefficient, wasteful way, our fighting men have on all occasions overcome the forces of the centralized militarism of those they have met in battle.

The thought that the National Military Establishment and the departments or agencies established by this bill should be clothed with power to plan our foreign policy, thus usurping the functions of the President and the Congress, and under the plea of coordination, regiment our production and our resources, is abhorrent. Yet under this bill that is the proposal.

It is no answer to say that these new agencies are granted only the power to plan, no power to execute; that to Congress they must come for funds to implement their plans.

It is a matter of common knowledge that all too often the Congress and the Nation are whipped into line, compelled to support plans and policies promulgated either by the State Department or the administration and of which the Congress has no knowledge until advised that we, as a Nation, were committed to such a policy.

Why then does the writer file the committee report and not oppose the bill?

Because and only because legislation seems inevitable and H. R. 3979 introduced by him, modified in some respects by the subcommittee and the committee, and finally molded into H. R. 4214, is the best bill that was obtainable.

Forced to take a bitter dose of a medicine of doubtful value the patient seeks to make it less distasteful, less harmful by every conceivable device and provision.

On the evening of the day the bill was ordered reported out by the committee the proposed report which follows was prepared by the writer. Subsequently a report was ordered written by a subcommittee, on which served James W. Wadsworth, John McCormack, and the writer.

There was a difference of opinion as to what should be included in the committee report. The writer yielded in that respect to his colleagues on the subcommittee.

To make the record clear and to point out what the writer considers serious dangers inherent in the proposed legislation, the procedure by, and the testimony on, which the result was reached, this additional report is filed. On the floor of the House during the debate, the views therein referred to will be given more complete expression.

Much of the report written on July 15 has been included in the authorized report.

Because the authorized report does not, in the opinion of the writer tell the whole story, the original proposed report is filed. It is not a part of the committee report. It represents the views of the chairman. It is as follows:

PROPOSED COMMITTEE REPORT ON H. R. 4214

The Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments to which was referred the bill (H. R. 2319) "To promote the national security by providing for a National Defense Establishment, which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Defense, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Forces within the National Defense Establishment and for the coordination of the activities of the National Defense Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security," having considered the subject, report favorably a bill, H. R. 4214 and recommend that it do pass.

The original bill was transmittted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on February 26, 1947, by the President, by letter informing the Speaker that the bill had been drawn by representatives of his office and of the armed forces and had the approval of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The bill was introduced by the chairman of the committee, Clare E. Hoffman, on February 28, 1947, and referred to your committee.

On April 2, 1947, your committee commenced hearings which were finally, on order of the committee, the vote being 22 to 3, concluded on July 1, 1947. The closing of the hearings prevented the appearance of additional witnesses. A partial list of witnesses who were deprived of the opportunity of being heard is attached to these views,

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marked "Exhibit A." During this period the committee heard 25 witnesses (list attached). The committee was handicapped by restrictions, articles 94 and 95 of Navy Regulations. Such restrictions prevented a thorough investigation of many of the important provisions of the measure.

Among other things, article 94 provides that—

all petitions, remonstrances, memorials, and communications from any officer or officers of the Navy or Marine Corps, whether on active or retired list * * * addressed to Congress, or to either House thereof, or to any committee of Congress, on any subject of legislation relating to the Navy or Marine Corps, pending, proposed, or suggested, shall be forwarded through the Navy Department, and not otherwise, except by authority of the Department.

Among other things article 95 provides that—

no bureau, office, or division chief, or subordinate in the Navy Department, and no officer of the Navy or Marine Corps * * * respond to any request for information from either House of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, or any Member of Congress, except through, or as authorized by, the Department; except as provided in sections 102, 103, 104, and 859 of the Revised Statutes.

Unfortunately these restrictions on the free expression of opinion by naval and marine officers were not lifted by the Secretary of the Navy until June 23, 1947, shortly before conclusion of the hearings when a general message was issued to the Navy by Secretary Forrestal which for the first time lifted the restriction.

It is as follows:

From: SecNav.
To: ALNAV No. 139.
Released by: James Forrestal.
Date: June 23, 1947.

I have recently become aware that a feeling of restraint may exist among certain naval personnel in regard to their latitude of expression before committees of Congress on the proposed National Security Act of 1947. This feeling, which is counter to the statutes and to the orderly processes of free expression, may have been engendered by misinterpretation of articles 94 and 95, U. S. Navy regulations, which in practical effect do not limit a naval officer's freedom of expression but require that in addressing Congress, communications are to be channeled through the Secretary of the Navy.

Without in any way weakening my endorsement of the January 16, 1947, agreement between the War and Navy Departments which was promulgated by ALNAV 21, I wish to make clear that every person in the naval service is at liberty to voice his professional and personal opinion when testifying before a committee of Congress on the proposed National Security Act of 1947. To this end, and only with regard to the proposed National Security Act of 1947, those provisions of articles 94 and 95, U. S. Navy regulations, which prescribe that communications between officers of the naval service and committees and Members of Congress be channeled through or authorized by me, have been waived.

Testimony of high ranking naval officers such as Admiral John H. Towers, president of the General Board of the Navy; Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford, commander of Naval Air Forces in the Atlantic; and Brig. Gen. M. A. Edson, United States Marine Corps, disclosed that there is a very significant degree of intelligent opposition to certain provisions of the bill from within the naval service.

A subcommittee reviewed the testimony and reported to the full committee, which after some changes reported out H. R. 4214.

I. NEED FOR REVISION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

In the opinion of the committee the experience of the war just concluded has proven conclusively that we must maintain in time of

peace an adequate organization of the national defense readily adaptable to the needs of war on short notice.

Your committee is of the opinion that the Nation should provide for the effective integration of the many factors comprising the Nation's war potential.

II. LESSONS OF THE WAR

We emerged from World War II as a victorious nation. One of the purposes of the bill is to give statutory effect to certain organizational features developed during the war and which have proven to be desirable in the control of our armed services.

It must be noted that there was not unanimity of opinion among the witnesses as to the urgency of passing this legislation. Both civilian and service witnesses advised against a too-hurried consideration of the bill.

Your committee is aware of the major lesson of the Nation's great wars, that the sources of strength to resist aggression consist fundamentally in the national morale, leadership, manpower, industrial efficiency, and productive capacity which manifest themselves in successful operations by the armed forces in the field, at sea, and in the air.

Your committee also recognizes the purely military lesson of the recent war that unity of command in the field is essential to success in battle and that the organization, training, and military command of the organized combat forces in time of peace must at all times be directed toward the achievement of harmonious and effective joint action by and among all forces in pursuance of their common and paramount mission to defend the United States.

The advance of science and the magnitude of modern war require that we construct an ample framework for our military services within which they may grow and develop under traditional civilian control in accordance with the needs of the times. Your committee recognized as well the totality of modern war and the urgent need for close coordination between foreign policy and military policy, between industry and science and the armed forces.

It is fully recognized that no security organization can be perfect, but it can be so constructed that through an evolutionary process it can be adjusted with a minimum of delay to meet the ever-changing needs of an atomic age.

Your committee has been mindful of the personal element involved in making changes in our military services. The high morale, the esprit de corps, the long record of valorous and useful service of all elements of the armed forces is fully recognized and appreciated. The need for the preservation of the integrity of elements of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, naval aviation, and Air Forces for future efficiency has received your committee's careful attention. With these conclusions as a basic blueprint for its work, your committee has earnestly endeavored to produce a legislative framework capable of meeting our modern defense requirements.

The bill as reported differs in certain respects from the original H. R. 2319 and from S. 758. Such changes as have been made by your committee are considered to be necessary if our constitutional form of government is to continue. The changes made by the committee are considered to be improvements over the original bill and

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S. 758 and have been effected in order to restrict the original bill's grant of excessive power to the military, to protect against the possible development of the Central Intelligence Agency into a Gestapo-type organization, and to provide specific protection for the Marine Corps and naval aviation.

III. PROVISIONS OF THE BILL AS REPORTED

1. *Declaration of policy*

The declaration of policy which appears in the bill is deemed necessary by your committee in order that it be clearly shown that it is the intent of Congress to carry out the conclusions reached by your committee and that the traditional superiority of civilian authority over the military within the Government is not being altered.

2. *Coordination for national security*

The testimony received by your committee discloses an urgent need for a continuous program of close coordination between our domestic, foreign, and military policies so that we may always be able to appraise our commitments as a nation in the light of our resources and capabilities. This, your committee feels, can be accomplished by the provisions of the bill for the National Security Council supplemented by a Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Resources Board.

(a) *National Security Council*.—This Council, comprised of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, gives us for the first time in our history a means of bringing together the responsible heads of Government charged with recommending and carrying out our foreign policies after making a careful appraisal of our domestic and military potentials. The majority of the members of the Council were representatives of the Military Establishment.

(b) *Central Intelligence Agency*.—In order that the Council, in its deliberations and advice to the President, may have available adequate information, there is provided the Central Intelligence Agency, a permanent organization under the Council, which will furnish such information. At present this function is performed by the Central Intelligence Group which was created by Presidential directive and is temporary in character. The bill, as originally introduced, provided that the Central Intelligence Agency would continue to perform the duties now assigned by the President's directive to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.

Your committee felt that it is better legislative practice to spell out such duties in the interests of clarity and simplicity and has so provided in the bill.

Provision prohibiting the agency from having the power of subpoena and from exercising internal police powers, provisions not included in the original bill nor in S. 758, were added by your committee.

(c) *The National Security Resources Board*.—The National Security Resources Board provided for in the bill will serve to advise the President with respect to the coordination of civilian, industrial, and military mobilization so that he may be placed, for the first time, in a position to evaluate realistically our resources, capabilities, and risks in relation to our domestic, foreign, and military policies.

The Board would also have the responsibility for planning in peacetime for coordinated civilian-military mobilization in wartime.

3. *The National Military Establishment*

The bill provides for a National Military Establishment consisting of the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air, with a Joint Chiefs of Staff, a War Council, a Munitions Board, and a Research and Development Board, all under a Secretary of Defense. The term "National Military Establishment" is considered a more accurate title than National Security Establishment, as used in S. 758.

(a) *Secretary of Defense.*—The complexity and magnitude of the President's task in peace and war are such that your committee believes it is a generally accepted fact that he needs a full-time civilian official to assist him in the performance of his onerous duties as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The Secretary of Defense fills this need. The military services may then be integrated on the departmental level in Washington as they were so effectively integrated in the field during the war, without reducing the ultimate responsibility of the President.

With the advice and assistance of the joint agencies in the National Military Establishment the Secretary can establish general policies and programs, including the supervision of the military budget, and exercise such control and direction as should result in efficient direction of our military forces. The provisions of this bill do not terminate the activities of the many (more than 171) interservice joint committees that have been doing an efficient job eliminating duplication and waste within the armed services.

(b) *Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air.*—Separate sections of the bill provide for Departments of Army, Navy, and Air within the National Military Establishment. Except for a change in name, the Department of the Army is the present Department of War, save for the air elements transferred to the Air Force. The Department of the Navy remains as at present, and language has been added which will adequately assure the integrity and continued effectiveness of the Marine Corps and naval aviation.

MARINE CORPS

Examination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1,478 papers convinced the committee that a specific statement of Marine Corps functions was imperative if the Marine Corps was to be protected from being eliminated as an effective combat element, which, according to the testimony of Fleet Admiral Nimitz, was the intention of the Army.

The hearings had not progressed far before it became evident that, not only in the Marine Corps but throughout the country, there was a fear that an effort had been and was being made not only to reduce the size and limit the functions of the Marine Corps, but a possibility that it might be reduced to the status of a police force.

The existence of any justifiable basis for such a fear was denied by some witnesses who held the highest ranks. That there was justifiable ground for this apprehension is apparent if one reads the memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (General Eisenhower), under date of May 16, 1946, and the reply of Admiral Nimitz (hearings, National Security Act of 1947, p. 640).

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In the memorandum forwarded by General Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff, United States Army, among other things we find this:

The conduct of land warfare is a responsibility of the Army. Operationally, the Navy does not belong on the land; it belongs on the sea. It should have only technical and administrative functions on land in connection with its headquarters, bases, or other naval installations. The emergency development of the marine forces during this war should not be viewed as assigning to the Navy a normal function of land warfare, fundamentally the primary role of the Army. There is a real need for one service to be charged with the responsibility for initially bridging the gap between the sailor on the ship and the soldier on land. This seems to me properly a function of the Marine Corps. I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff should give serious consideration to such a concept. The need of a force within the fleet to provide small readily available and lightly armed units to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries is recognized. These functions, together with that of interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments, comprise the fundamental role of the Marine Corps. When naval forces are involved in operations requiring land forces of combined arms, the task becomes a joint land-sea, and usually air force mission. Once marine units attain such a size as to require the combining of arms to accomplish their missions, they are assuming and duplicating the functions of the Army and we have in effect two land armies. I therefore recommend that the above concept be accepted as stating the role of the Marine Corps and that marine units not exceed the regiment in size, and that the size of the Marine Corps be made consistent with the foregoing principles.

To that view, Admiral Nimitz, under date of March 30, 1946, replied:

The basic and major issues considered in J. S. C. 1478/10 and J. C. S. 1478/11 comprise a proposal on the part of the Army (a) to eliminate the Marine Corps as an effective combat element, reducing it to the status of a naval police unit with possibly certain ancillary service functions in respect to amphibious operations, and (b) to abolish an essential component of naval aviation which operates from coastal and island shore bases. To these ends these papers propose to discard agreements on these matters which have been arrived at between the Army and the Navy from time to time over a period of more than 20 years, and which have resulted in a responsibility for functions proven highly effective in World War II.

In matters so vital both to the Marine Corps and to naval aviation, I consider it appropriate and desirable that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have the benefit of the views of General Vandegrift, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and of Vice Admiral Radford, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air. Their comments are attached as enclosures A and B, respectively.

* * * * *

I agree with the Chief of Staff, United States Army, that further exchange of papers on the subject of the missions of the land, naval, and air forces will serve no useful purpose. It is further apparent that the question is part of the larger one of the merger of the War and Navy Departments, which proposal was, at the Army's insistence, referred to the President and which is now before the Congress. Thus, the matter now under consideration has already reached levels higher than the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Spaatz, commanding general, Army Air Forces, wrote:

I recommend therefore that the size of the Marine Corps be limited to small, readily available and lightly armed units, no larger than a regiment, to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries and to provide interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments.

General Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, United States Army, also wrote:

The following is proposed for consideration: * * *

- (1) That the Marine Corps is maintained solely as an adjunct of the fleet and participates only in minor shore combat operations in which the Navy alone is interested.
- (2) That it be recognized that the land aspect of major amphibious operations in the future will be undertaken by the Army and consequently the marine forces will not be appreciably expanded in time of war.
- (3) That it be agreed that the Navy will not develop a land Army or a so-called amphibious army; marine units to be limited in size to the equivalent of the

regiment, and the total size of the Marine Corps therefore limited to some 50,000 or 60,000 men.

Report by Army members of Joint Staff planners (proposal):

* * * * *
Provide landing parties with the fleet to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries in operations short of war, and in time of war to conduct raids and small-scale amphibious demonstrations.

* * * * *
Perform necessary functions aboard ship, at naval installations, and in the ship-to-shore phase of amphibious operations.

Neither the original bill nor S. 758 contains positive protection for the Marines. H. R. 4214 seeks to give the needed protection.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR

The creation of the Department of the Air Force recognizes the war-demonstrated importance of this aspect of military power and places it on a parity with the land and sea components of our military forces. This arrangement insures the permanence of military planning and management of government. The Army, however, is not deprived of certain types of aviation necessarily organic to the Army for the accomplishment of its functions.

H. R. 4214 is a further improvement over the original bill and S. 758 in that your committee considered it advisable to retain the congressional prerogative of stating for what reasons the armed forces are created and supported. Thus, the basic functions of the Army, Navy (including naval aviation), Marine Corps, and Air Force set forth in broad and basic terms that will not restrict military progress, but which are so clearly defined as to prevent the occurrence of another unfortunate interservice dispute such as that which raged over the status of naval aviation and the Marine Corps, and which proved so detrimental to interservice for approximately 2 years. General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz have stated they have no objections to prescribing basic functions.

(c) *War Council.*—The War Council, composed of the Secretary of Defense as Chairman, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, together with the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, provides an advisory body for the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy affecting the armed forces which should make a notable contribution to interservice harmony and cooperation. Some members of the committee questioned the desirability of giving the military Chiefs of Staff coequal membership on the Council with their respective superior civilian secretaries.

(d) *The Joint Chiefs of Staff.*—This provision of the bill continues on a permanent basis the most effective interservice coordinating agency developed during the war. It has been further improved by providing, in the form of a National Military Establishment, a means by which differences which have heretofore caused delay may more readily be resolved. The status of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the source of strategic plans and direction and as the principal military advisers to the President is preserved and their effectiveness increased by provision for a Joint Staff. The Joint Staff must in the future be carefully observed to prevent its possible development into a national general staff.

(e) *Munitions Board.*—The new Munitions Board will assume the duties now performed by the Army-Navy Munitions Board, but will have a permanent rather than a temporary character and a wider scope of activity.

Through the studies and recommendations of the Munitions Board the Secretary of Defense will be enabled to assign procurement and technical service responsibilities and through the resulting cross-procurement, cross-servicing, and joint use of facilities eliminate duplications of effort where practicable and make important savings in the personnel, money, and facilities now required for similar activities.

Congress in the future must be vigilant to prevent undue military domination of the national economy by means of interlocking memberships between the Munitions Board and the National Security Resources Board.

(f) *Research and Development Board.*—The provision for the Research and Development Board continues the existing Joint Research and Development Board on a permanent basis. Your committee feels that this Board, in supervising the research and development programs of the armed forces, will conserve to a marked degree our limited resources in the way of trained scientific personnel and take full advantage for the benefit of all the services of the latest developments resulting from modern scientific research.

IV. SUMMARY

The writer believes that the provisions of the bill hereby reported to the House of Representatives accurately reflect a composite of the best suggestions for a comprehensive National Military Establishment.

It is the belief of the chairman that the bill as reported contains safeguards and other important provisions not found in the original bill or in S. 758 as passed by the Senate.

It is the belief of the chairman that the bill if enacted into law will help insure the coordination of our domestic, foreign, and military policies upon an informed basis; that it will facilitate the integration of all our military services and their unified strategic direction and command; that it will assist in taking full advantage of our resources of personnel, materials, scientific research, and development; that it will preserve the integrity and more fully exploit the capabilities of all components of ground, sea, and air forces; but that all of this can and should be accomplished under traditional American civilian direction and control."

Respectfully submitted.

CLARE E. HOFFMAN

EXHIBIT A

NAVAL AND MARINE CORPS WITNESSES WHO DESIRED TO TESTIFY ON H. R. 2319,
BUT WHO COULD NOT BE CALLED BECAUSE OF THE CLOSING OF HEARINGS

Mr. Artemas Gates, New York Trust Co., 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.	Rear Adm. O. S. Colclough, Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, 2 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.	Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine, on Temporary Duty at Marine Headquarters, Washington, D. C.	Capt. J. P. W. Vest, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, U. S. S. <i>Franklin D. Roosevelt</i> , Portsmouth, Va.
Maj. Gen. Clifton B. Cates, commanding general, Marine Base, Quantico, Va.	Mr. Ralph Bard, Eversharp, Inc., Chicago, Ill.
Capt. G. G. H. Hall, Aeronautical Board, 1701 "L" Building, Washington, D. C.	Vice Adm. Donald B. Duncan, Deputy Chief Naval Operations for Air, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Rear Adm. Clifford A. Swanson, Surgeon General of the Navy, Federal Board of Hospitalization, 1724 F Street, Washington, D. C.	Brig. Gen. William A. Worton, United States Marine Corps.
Rear Adm. L. C. Stevens, Assistant Chief for Research Development and Engineering, Bureau of Aeronautics, 2085 Navy Department Building, Washington, D. C.	Capt. Austin K. Doyle.
Rear Adm. M. L. King, Deputy Chief, Procurement Policy, Material Division, Office of Assistant Secretary.	Rear Adm. Earnest W. Litch.
Brig. Gen. G. C. Thomas, Plans and Policies, United States Marine Corps, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.	Rear Adm. William O. Tomlinson.
	Rear Adm. Richard Whitehead.
	Maj. Gen. Field Narris, United States Marine Corps.
	Colonel Jercme, United States Marine Corps.
	Capt. Aurelius B. Vosseller.
	Capt. George W. Anderson.
	Capt. Herbert Riely.
	Capt. Robert Goldthwaite.
	Commander Charles Lanman.

Calendar No. 246

80TH CONGRESS }
1st Session }

SENATE

{ REPORT
No. 239

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

JUNE 5 (legislative day, APRIL 21), 1947.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. GURNEY, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. 758]

The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the bill (S. 758), to promote the national security by providing for a National Defense Establishment, which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Defense, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force within the National Defense Establishment, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Defense Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The proposed bill (S. 758) was forwarded to the President pro tempore of the Senate on February 26, 1947, by the President, who stated in his forwarding letter that it (S. 758) had been drafted by representatives of the armed services, and had the approval of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The bill was referred to your committee on March 3, 1947.

On March 18, 1947, your committee started hearings which lasted for nearly 10 weeks and afforded a full opportunity to be heard to the representatives of all Government departments and agencies and to all private individuals.

On May 20, 1947, your committee commenced executive sessions to review the testimony received in extensive hearings on the bill, and to consider proposed amendments. During the course of the executive sessions, the bill (S. 758) was so amended, without materially changing its basic provisions, as to make it a clear and precise expression of the will of Congress in regard to unification of the armed services.

On June 4, 1947, S. 758 (revised) was approved in your committee (by a vote of 12 yeas to 0 noes) and ordered reported to the Senate. It should be noted that certain of the committee members, while

voting to report the bill, reserved for themselves the right to offer amendments on the floor of the Senate.

**I. BASIC OBJECTIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT—To MAINTAIN PEACE,
REMOVE THE CAUSES OF WAR AND PROTECT NATIONAL SECURITY**

In preparing the legislation now offered to unify the military departments of the Government, to link them more closely to other agencies of the executive branch, and to strengthen our security measures by the creation of new instruments of policy, this committee has been guided by the basic objectives of our Government (1) to maintain the peace and (2) to remove the causes of war. In support of those objectives it is essential that there be established a structure fully capable of safeguarding our national security promptly and effectively.

One of the characteristics of the present era is the need to maintain adequate security measures at all times, rather than only when hostilities threaten or have broken out. To meet the future with confidence, we must make certain that our foreign and military policies are mutually supporting; that a central intelligence agency collects and analyzes that mass of information without which the Government cannot either maintain peace or wage war successfully; that scientific research and development are coordinated, not only within the military services, but between them and other Government agencies, as well as industrial and educational activities; that intelligent planning guarantees coordination of our military program with the Nation's resources in manpower, materials, and facilities; and that all of these objectives are accomplished with the greatest possible economy compatible with the general effectiveness of our national security.

**II. FACTORS NECESSITATING REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRUCTURE**

World War II crowned the American effort with overwhelming success. At the same time, the projection of this vast effort into almost every field of civil and governmental endeavor disclosed certain fundamental weaknesses in our security structure which should be remedied while their details are fresh in mind. For instance, our slow and costly mobilization, our limited intelligence of the designs and capacities of our enemies, our incomplete integration of political purpose and military objective, and finally, our prodigal use of resources, all demonstrate convincingly that our national existence would be imperiled were we to ignore the costly lessons of war and fail to reorganize our national security structure so as to prevent the recurrence of these defects.

In looking to the future, it is apparent, from the potentialities implicit in scientific developments, that the world is entering an era in which war, if it comes, will be fought at speeds and accompanied by devastations that stagger the imagination. Consequently, in order at once to guard our safety and support our efforts to promote and maintain the peace of the world, it is essential that this country move without delay to provide itself with the best organization for security which can be devised.

In studying and amending the bill (S. 758) forwarded to the Congress by the President, critical attention has been focused on two

principal problems: (1) The structure best calculated to assure optimum efficiency of military operations and the closest integration of the national security organization with the other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and (2) the maximum economy in money, material, and manpower compatible with military efficiency. The last is essential at this time, because it appears certain that military expenditures in the foreseeable future will necessarily be greater than in our former peacetime experience, whatever the form of military organization.

In determining the most suitable organization for national security, no effort has been spared to uncover past mistakes and shortcomings, and to create a structure deemed most likely to prevent their recurrence. The natural confidence in organizations which have well served our needs in the past results in an understandable reluctance to alter their form; but our close scrutiny has failed to disclose valid reasons for postponing further certain steps so clearly indicated in the public interest.

III. UNIFICATION AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

The subject of unification of the armed services is not a new one. After each of the World Wars military and nonmilitary personnel alike have appreciated the urgent need for bringing to the military departments in peacetime a large measure of the unity and commonness of purpose which characterize the operations of the armed forces in time of war. This need has increased as wars have become total and global in character.

Since 1921 there have been no less than 60 bills introduced in the Congress pertaining to unification of the military services. Many studies have been conducted on the subject. The most important recent ones were those by special committees, one appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and one by the Secretary of the Navy. Both of these studies emphasized the need of a single unifying organization to assure complete teamwork between the military arms for efficiency in operation and economy in the use of our resources, and of establishing air power formally in a coequal status with land and sea power. Both of these studies were examined by committees of the Seventy-ninth Congress.

The Army and Navy both agreed in principle to the need for a "single unifying organization" but placed different interpretations on what the scope, composition, and functions of such an organization should be.

The differing views of the War and Navy Departments on unification were presented before committees of the Seventy-ninth Congress in the form of the War Department Plan for the Organization of the Armed Forces of the United States, and the Navy Plan for National Security, respectively. During the hearings which followed, all phases of each plan were exhaustively examined. Civilian leaders, as well as Army and Navy experts, were given the widest latitude in stating their views on the unification problem. Little was accomplished in the early stages, however, toward increasing the area of agreement between the military departments.

On June 15, 1946, the President's proposal for unification was received by Congress in the form of letters to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. By then, considerable

headway had been made toward the accomplishment of a comprehensive plan. The Secretaries of War and the Navy had developed by the above date, through study and conference, certain basic principles upon which unification of the services could be based.

The points upon which the military departments were in agreement at the date of the President's message were primarily concerned with the joint boards and agencies designed to provide coordination among the military departments, and between these departments and the other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the security problem. These points of agreement involved a Council of National Defense, a National Security Resources Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Central Intelligence Agency, a Procurement and Supply Agency, and a Research Agency.

The remaining points upon which full agreement had not been reached involved the status of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the powers of the Secretary of National Defense, the status of naval aviation, and the status of the Marine Corps.

The President's letters recommended the early enactment of legislation. Regarding the points on which full agreement had not been reached, the President recommended the establishment of a single Military Department under a Secretary of National Defense; three coordinate services—the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the more restricted interpretations of the status of naval aviation; and the more liberal interpretation of the status of the Marine Corps.

The Seventy-ninth Congress adjourned without taking final action on these recommendations.

IV. THE JANUARY 16, 1947, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS

The efforts of the War and Navy Departments to reach an agreement on all points of the unification program and to do so within the scope and spirit of the President's letters of June 15, 1946, continued after the adjournment of the 79th Congress.

By November, 1946, by dint of persistent study and evaluation, the departments had resolved the over-all unification issue into three separate though complementary problems, of which the actual Government organization for national security was one. The others were the delineation of the functions of the armed services, and the organization for unified command in the field.

The first agreement reached was on unified command overseas. That problem was completed on December 12, 1946, and, with the approval of the President, a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive was issued on that date, the substance of which was made public.

Meanwhile work was continued on the other problems. Agreement was reached shortly afterward both as to the functions of the services and as to an over-all organization for national security which would provide greater unity between the military departments, and at the same time integrate them more closely with other Federal security agencies, thus meeting the requirements of the basic concepts of both departments.

This agreement which the President approved on January 16, 1947, reads as follows:

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JANUARY 16, 1947.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On May 31, 1946, we jointly submitted to you a letter which gave our respective views on the major elements involved in establishing a greater measure of unification of our armed forces.

In your letter of June 15, 1946, you expressed gratification at the progress made in narrowing the zone of disagreement which had previously existed between the services and stated your position with reference to the essential points on which disagreement still existed.

In our opinion the necessity for agreement between the military services is now even greater than at the time of our earlier letter. We and our representatives have been meeting in an effort to secure further resolution, within the scope of the spirit of the statement of your position, of the views of the two departments. We are pleased to report success in this undertaking.

We agree to support legislation in which the following points are incorporated:

(a) There shall be a Council of National Defense, a National Security Resources Board, and a Central Intelligence Agency (which already exists) as agreed by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy in their letter to the President of May 31, 1946.

(b) The armed forces shall be organized under a Secretary of National Defense so as to place the Army, the Navy (to include the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation), and the Air Forces, each with a military chief, under the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force respectively. Each shall be under a Secretary and, under the over-all direction of the Secretary of National Defense, shall be administered as an individual unit. The Secretary of any of the three departments may, at any time, present to the President, after first informing the Secretary of National Defense, any report or recommendation relating to his department which he may deem necessary or desirable.

(c) A War Council shall be created consisting of the Secretary of National Defense as Chairman and with power of decision, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the military heads of the three services. The War Council will concern itself with matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces.

(d) There shall be a Joint Chiefs of Staff consisting of the military heads of the three services, and also the Chief of Staff to the President if that office exists. Subject to the authority and direction of the Secretary of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide for the strategic direction of the military forces of the United States, will formulate strategic plans, assign logistic responsibilities to the services in support thereof, integrate the military requirements and, as directed, advise in the integration of the military budget.

(e) There shall be a full-time joint staff to consist initially of not over 100 officers to be provided in approximately equal numbers by the three services. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof, shall carry out policies and directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(f) The Secretary of National Defense shall head the armed forces establishment, shall be vested with authority, under the President, to establish common policies and common programs for the integrated operation of the three departments and shall exercise control over and direct their common efforts to discharge their responsibility for national security.

We are agreed that the proper method of setting forth the functions (so-called roles and missions) of the armed forces is by the issuance of an Executive order concurrently with your approval of the appropriate legislation. We attach for your consideration a mutually agreed draft of such an order.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Secretary of War.

JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.

EXECUTIVE ORDER—FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I hereby prescribe the following assignment of primary functions and responsibilities to the three armed services.

SECTION I.—The common missions of the armed forces of the United States are—

1. To support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic.

2. To maintain, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions and areas vital to its interest.
3. To uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.
4. To safeguard the internal security of the United States as directed by higher authority.
5. To conduct integrated operations on the land, on the sea, and in the air necessary for these purposes.

In order to facilitate the accomplishment of the foregoing missions the armed forces shall formulate integrated plans and make coordinated preparations. Each service shall observe the general principles and fulfill the specific functions outlined below, and shall make use of the personnel, equipment and facilities of the other services in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased.

Sec. II. Functions of the United States Army:

General: The United States Army includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It is organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

The specific functions of the United States Army are—

1. To organize, train, and equip land forces for—
 - (a) Operations on land, including joint operations.
 - (b) The seizure or defense of land areas, including air-borne and joint amphibious operations.
 - (c) The occupation of land areas.
2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of Army combat and service elements, coordinating with the Navy and the Air Force in all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious and air-borne operations.
3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.
4. To assist the Navy and Air Forces in the accomplishment of their missions, including the provision of common services and supplies as determined by proper authority.

Sec. III. Functions of the United States Navy:

General: The United States Navy includes naval combat and service forces, naval aviation, and the United States Marine Corps. It is organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat at sea. The Navy is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war, and in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the needs of war.

The specific functions of the United States Navy are—

1. To organize, train and equip naval forces for—
 - (a) Operations at sea, including joint operations.
 - (b) The control of vital sea areas, the protection of vital sea lanes, and the suppression of enemy sea commerce.
 - (c) The support of occupation forces as required.
 - (d) The seizure of minor enemy shore positions capable of reduction by such landing forces as may be comprised within the fleet organization.
 - (e) Naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. The air aspects of those functions shall be coordinated with the Air Force, including the development and procurement of aircraft, and air installations located on shore, and use shall be made of Air Force personnel, equipment, and facilities in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased. Subject to the above provision, the Navy will not be restricted as to types of aircraft maintained and operated for these purposes.
 - (f) The air transport necessary for essential internal administration and for air transport over routes of sole interest to naval forces where the requirements cannot be met by normal air transport facilities.
2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of naval combat and service elements, coordinating with the Army and the Air Force in all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious operations.

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3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.
4. To maintain the United States Marine Corps whose specific functions are—
 - (a) To provide Marine Forces together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of limited land operations in connection therewith.
 - (b) To develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces.
 - (c) To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy.
 - (d) To provide security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases.
 - (e) To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.
5. To assist the Army and the Air Force in the accomplishment of their missions, including the provision of common services and supplies as determined by proper authority.

SEC. IV. Functions of the United States Air Force:

General: The United States Air Force includes all military aviation forces, both combat and service, not otherwise specifically assigned. It is organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained air offensive and defensive operations. The Air Force is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

The specific functions of the United States Air Force are—

1. To organize, train, and equip air forces for—
 - (a) Air operations including joint operations.
 - (b) Gaining and maintaining general air supremacy.
 - (c) Establishing local air superiority where and as required.
 - (d) The strategic air force of the United States and strategic air reconnaissance.
 - (e) Air lift and support for air-borne operations.
 - (f) Air support to land forces and naval forces, including support of occupation forces.
 - (g) Air transport for the armed forces, except as provided by the Navy in accordance with paragraph 1 (f) of section III.
2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization, and equipment of Air Force combat and service elements, coordinating with the Army and Navy on all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious and air-borne operations.
3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.

With the above agreement as a basis, on January 20, 1947, representatives of the President and of the War and Navy Departments started drafting legislation to effectuate its provisions. Their task was to produce a bill which would be both mutually satisfactory and adjusted to the requirements of other interested Federal agencies.

The product of this effort is the bill (S. 758) which the President forwarded to the President pro tempore of the Senate on February 26, 1947, with the statement that: "It is my belief that this suggested legislation accomplishes the desired unification of the services and I heartily recommend its enactment by the Congress."

S. 758 as received was essentially an equitable and workable compromise of views initially divergent. It provided parity for the Air Force. It provided for three independently administered military departments, and for the unification of these departments within a National Security Establishment by a Secretary, assisted by such agencies as a War Council, a Munitions Board, and a Research and

Development Board, all subject to the general direction, authority, and control vested in a Secretary of National Security. It provided for the establishment of unified commands in the field, and vested strategic control of the armed forces in a Joint Chiefs of Staff. It safeguarded the status of naval aviation and the Marine Corps.

During the course of the hearings, the several provisions of the bill were painstakingly examined by your committee. The civil and military heads of the Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces were called, and each declared himself wholeheartedly in support of the bill as referred to this committee. Civilian leaders, who qualified as experts in business and government organization, as well as military and naval officers, both active and retired, were also called. Both civil and military witnesses were given the widest latitude of expression in order that the committee might explore all ideas in this field. During the course of the hearings, it developed that many witnesses had apprehensions with respect to the future of naval aviation and of the Marine Corps. These apprehensions caused your committee to incorporate additional safeguards for these components. These safeguards have the concurrence of the War and Navy Departments and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

During the executive sessions which followed, each proposed amendment was carefully compared with the provisions of S. 758. In addition, records of previous hearings and studies were reviewed in order further to enlarge the background of your committee charged with preparing the bill in its final form.

S. 758 (amended) contains the same basic provisions as the original bill. Many of the sections have been extensively revised, however, in order to clarify their intent, and to delineate their provisions in more specific terms so as to leave no doubt in regard to the will of Congress on this vital subject. Certain sections have been rewritten in their entirety, and some new sections have been added.

In its final form, it will provide a system of national security best suited to our present-day needs, which will—

- (1) Provide the organizational structure best designed to bring about close coordination between the military forces and departments and other branches of Government;
- (2) Insure proper and timely planning for the conservation of strategic resources of the Nation and the mobilization of manpower and industry in the event of an emergency;
- (3) Provide a national-security organization under a Secretary of National Security which will insure the unified direction of the armed services under civilian control;
- (4) Fill the war-demonstrated need for integrated strategic plans and a unified military program and budget, based upon sound and complete intelligence;
- (5) Effect the economies which can be realized by coordinating the supply and service functions of the armed forces;
- (6) Provide the most effective and systematic allocation of our limited resources for scientific research and development;
- (7) Provide the most effective organization for training of joint forces and joint operations of land, naval, and air forces;
- (8) Permit the establishment of unified field commands in coordination with strategic planning;
- (9) Permit the establishment of equitable over-all personnel policies; and

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(10) Provide for the establishment of air power on a parity with land and sea power.

After long and serious deliberation, your committee decided against amending the bill to include the basic functions (roles and missions) of the several services. Your committee came to this conclusion because it felt that such amendments would seriously impair the required flexibility of our military forces, and because such action would violate the principle of separation of executive and legislative authority traditional in American government.

It is the firm conviction of your committee that S. 758 (amended) in its final form, represents a sound and workable means for modernizing our national security organization into a cohesive and balanced whole, and its enactment is strongly recommended, as is evidenced by the final vote of approval, 12 to 0, of your Armed Services Committee.

V. PROVISIONS OF THE BILL (S. 758 AMENDED)

1. DECLARATION OF POLICY

The declaration of policy, which precedes title I of the bill, was inserted by the committee in order to outline in clear and accurate language the intent of the Congress in regard to the National Security Act of 1947. The act has been designed to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States. It does this by provisions involving three levels of the Government. On the highest level, under the immediate supervision of the President, it provides for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies and functions of the Government relating to the National Security. On a lower level, it provides for three independently administered military departments, and provides further for their authoritative coordination and unified direction, but not merger, under civilian control. Finally, on the military level, it provides for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces, for their operation under unified control, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces.

2. COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

The studies made by your committee, and all testimony received by it, shows the need for closer and continuous coordination on a high level within the Government of our domestic, foreign, and military policies, for an appropriate intelligence organization to serve both military and civilian agencies of security, and for vastly improved planning for the control and utilization of our natural and industrial resources in time of emergency.

(a) *National Security Council*

To meet the first of the above requirements, the bill establishes a National Security Council composed of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Security, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and such other members as the President may designate from time to time.

Essentially, the Council is an advisory body to the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies, so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

The bill specifies that the President shall preside over meetings of the Council, and that, in his absence, he may designate any member of the Council to preside in his place.

(b) Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency provided for by section 102 exists now as the Central Intelligence Group. The bill establishes the agency under the National Security Council and assigns to that Council the supervisory authority and responsibility now exercised by the National Intelligence Authority created by Executive order of the President and composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.

The Agency will continue to perform the duties now assigned by letter directive of the President (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) to the Central Intelligence Group until such time as permanent legislation pertaining to its activities is provided by the Congress.

In view of the fact that certain officers of the armed services have had wide experience in handling the type of intelligence with which this agency will be largely concerned, the provision of the bill to permit the Director of Central Intelligence to be appointed from the armed services as well as from civil life is most desirable. During the Agency's formative years, it is essential that its Director be technically the most experienced and capable obtainable, regardless of whether he is appointed from civilian or military life.

(c) National Security Resources Board

As a parallel organization to the National Security Council, but independent of it, the bill provides for a National Security Resources Board. The function of the Resources Board is to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, and thus provide him and the National Security Council with a sound and realistic basis upon which to evaluate the objectives, commitments and risks they must consider in connection with our domestic, military, and foreign policies. This function can best be performed if at least one official is a member of both agencies.

In addition to being a source of information regarding the potentiality of the national economy in terms of natural and productive resources, this board in time of peace would maintain plans for directing and reconciling the military and civilian mobilization of the Nation. In time of war it could be made the effectuating agent for putting these plans into operation generally, and for determining the needs of the civil and military elements of the Nation and allocating material and facilities among them.

3. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION

The bill creates a National Security Organization, consisting of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, together with certain agencies to assist in the coordination of the activities of these Departments.

(a) *Secretary of National Security*

The Secretary of National Security is the head of the National Security Organization.

Experience in peace and war has clearly shown that there is need for an official under the President with powers to exercise general direction and control over the National Security Organization and to resolve differences between the military departments which cannot be settled by agreement on lower levels.

The creation of such an official in no way reduces the responsibility and authority of the President who, by the Constitution, remains both the Commander in Chief, and also the source of all executive power in the Government. The complexities of government under present and future conditions make it essential, however, that the President be assisted by a civilian official who can devote his full time to the matters concerned. Such an official must have authority, under the President, if he is to accomplish his intended purpose.

Both the bill and the agreement which was the origin of the bill vest such authority and power in the Secretary of National Security. They also make clear that these powers shall be exercised to establish policies and programs for the departments, and to direct their efforts. These powers do not extend within the departments themselves in matters of administrative procedures peculiar to and affecting only an individual department, nor do they include the delineation of functions (roles and missions) for the armed forces.

Regarding administrative procedures, the Secretary of National Security has the authority to establish common policies for the National Security Organization which would affect the procedures within the individual departments. In regard to the functions of the armed forces, the President, in his capacity as Commander in Chief, will himself continue to delineate them and prescribe any subsequent changes.

In exercising his authority and power of decision over the military departments, it is expected that the Secretary of National Security will make maximum use of such joint agencies as the War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board, which were created in order to give balance and scope to his efforts at unifying the National Security Organization.

Section 202 (a) provides in part "all powers and duties not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of National Security by this act are retained by each of the respective Secretaries." Under this provision, the Secretaries of the military departments will continue to perform presently assigned duties as well as those assigned under the bill, except for such part of those duties as are assigned to the Secretary of National Security, and subject to the further qualification that the President would in no way be restricted as to the areas in which he may exercise his own executive authority with respect to the three departments.

In section 202 (a) (3) regarding the provisions for coordinating the military budget, the bill is more specific. The Secretary of National Security is charged with coordinating and supervising the preparation of budget estimates by the military departments, and with formulating and determining the combined budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget, and with supervising the budget program.

The bill further provides in section 308 that the military budget will arrive before the Congress in such form as to show the original estimates of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force with all changes made thereto by the Secretary of National Security and the President. These provisions clearly place with the Congress, where it belongs, the final responsibility for maintaining the strength and balance of our military forces. By receiving the military budget as a coordinated whole, complete with the recommendations of the Secretary of National Security and the President, Congress will have all in one piece for the first time in its history the comprehensive information most essential for the discharge of this vital responsibility.

(b) Military and civilian Assistants to the Secretary of National Security

The purpose of section 203 of the bill is to provide the Secretary of National Security with military aides and administrative assistants for functioning of his office, but to prevent the creation of a military staff which could compete with the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Joint Staff established elsewhere in the bill.

Likewise, the purpose of section 204 is to provide the Secretary of National Security with adequate civilian assistants of a high order for a small executive office with which to supervise the National Security Organization. It is essential that the Secretaries of the military departments have quick and ready access to the Secretary of National Security and act as his principal advisers within their respective areas of responsibility.

In the interest of economy and in maintaining intimate contact with the military departments, it is expected that the Secretary of National Security will use to their full capacity such agencies as the War Council, the Joints Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board, and will decentralize to a maximum the duties performed under his discretion.

(c) The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force

The administrative and operational composition of each of the above departments is outlined in separate sections of the bill. Specific safeguards for naval aviation and the Marine Corps are provided which have received the approval of the War and Navy Departments.

Under the provisions of the bill, each department will be administered as an individual unit by its respective Secretary, under the general direction and control of the Secretary of National Security. In the interest of preserving balance among the military departments, the Secretary of each department is given the right of presenting to the President, or to the Director of the Budget, any report or recommendation relating to his department which he may deem necessary, after first informing the Secretary of National Security.

Creation of a Department of the Air Force places this third element of military power on a parity with the land and naval elements and provides essential balance to our military team.

Your committee recognizes that air power has truly come of age and has abundantly established itself in the test of conflict. The war just passed has fully demonstrated its importance. An independent Air Force must be allowed to develop the facilities it needs for any air war of the future if the full strength and balance of our military team is to be achieved.

An extensive Air National Guard program has been developed under the supervision of the National Guard Bureau. The authority over National Guard units wherever they exist, and regardless of type, is focused in a single head in the respective State or territorial governments. The committee considers it essential that this program continue to progress, and that there be a single channel of communications to the several States on all National Guard matters.

Section 207 (f) provides, therefore, that the National Guard Bureau shall continue to perform the same functions and duties for the Department of the Air Force as it does for the Department of the Army and that it shall continue the present relationship to the States on Air National Guard matters.

Weeks of investigation, which included not only the receipt of testimony on unification but the study of the records and lessons of the late war as well, has brought home to this committee certain basic facts in regard to modern war.

Victory in war today and in the future will be achieved only through the application of maximum pressure by land, naval, and air forces. Each of these forces, by the exertion of its unique pressure in the accomplishment of its mission, contributes directly or indirectly to the other two in the accomplishment of theirs, and all contribute toward the accomplishment of the over-all objective. Inferiority in any element of three-environment warfare greatly enhances the problem of the other two.

It is the considered view of your committee that the essential balance and coordination for waging successful three-environment total war can best be achieved through a National Security Organization, the basis of which is three separate military departments as outlined in this bill.

Three departments do not mean triplication of supporting services and facilities. Joint supervisory agencies, such as the Munitions Board, are provided by this bill to insure joint use of the supporting services and facilities wherever added economy and efficiency will result. Sizable economies unquestionably will eventually result from the organization established by this bill.

(d) War Council

The War Council as established in the bill is the principal advisory body to the Secretary of National Security, and is important as a means for bringing into common action the civilian and military direction of the services.

(e) Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff

The bill contemplates the continuance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with duties substantially as at present, and permits functioning in accordance with procedures developed by war experience. The bill preserves their existing status as the principal professional military advisers to the President and gives them a similar status with respect to the Secretary of National Security.

A new feature of the bill is the power of decision over the Joint Chiefs of Staff which, at the discretion of the President, may be delegated, within certain fields, to the Secretary of National Security. It is expected that this power will be exercised largely in regard to administrative matters and the broader aspects of strategy in which political matters become involved.

The Joint Staff is not new. Many of its functions are now performed by a loose structure of committees—some full-time, some part-time. There are somewhat under 100 officers now doing full-time duty of the type contemplated, and several times this number on part-time status. The full-time joint staff established by statute should strengthen the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. The purpose of the Joint Staff is not the complete elimination of committees. The duties of certain committees will be taken over by the Joint Staff, but some of the more important committees will, it is considered, continue to function with the thoroughness and speed of their operational and administrative staff work greatly improved.

The Joint Staff as proposed in this bill has in itself no command authority. The provision for a Director arises from a recognized need for a full-time executive to coordinate staff work under the Joint Chiefs who cannot themselves oversee the Joint Staff continuously. Its purpose is to perform such duties as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(f) Munitions Board

As created in this bill, the Munitions Board assumes the functions now performed by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, with the scope of those functions materially expanded. Essentially, the Munitions Board is a staff agency of the Secretary of National Security for centralizing policy and for coordinating control over the military services in regard to the military aspects of industrial mobilization, procurement planning, procurement allocations and priorities, and allied matters. Power of decision normally rests with the Secretary of National Security. In time of peace and in time of war he would delegate to the Chairman of the Board such powers of decision, coordination and control as he considered necessary.

The Munitions Board to a large extent fulfills the same role in the procurement phase of logistics as the Joint Chiefs of Staff does in the field of strategy and operations, and in the military phase of logistics.

Through the collaboration of these two joint agencies, with the Munitions Board essentially supporting the plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a higher degree of economy in logistics and efficiency in military performance can be obtained than by any other means.

In the field of procurement it is upon decisions flowing from these two agencies that methods of joint purchasing and procurement will be expanded to the maximum extent compatible with military efficiency. Large savings will be the final result.

As regards such supporting services as transportation, hospitalization, maintenance, and others, the common policies and decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Munitions Board will effect economy through the maximum joint use of those facilities which can be accomplished without loss of military effectiveness. Duplication and waste in procurement and other supporting services will thereby be prevented, economy increased, and essential combat balance in the composition, equipment, and efficiency of the military services be retained.

(g) Research and Development Board

Section 214 continues the existing Joint Research and Development Board, formerly called the Office of Scientific Research and Development, with one major difference. The Secretaries of War and

Navy gave powers of decision to the present chairman, realizing that such powers were necessary. These powers of decision will, under the provisions of the bill, pass to the Secretary of National Security.

(h) Temporary retention of current military organization

During the period of the war, the President found it necessary to make certain changes in the organizational structures of the armed forces in order to adapt them to modern requirements. Most of these changes were accomplished under the provisions of the First War Powers Act which is temporary wartime legislation. Upon its termination, the War and Navy Departments and their component parts, insofar as they are currently organized under authority of that act, will of necessity revert to the form provided under prewar permanent law, causing them to go back to organizational structures now generally considered to be obsolete.

As an illustration, prior to World War II the Army consisted of individual branches such as the Infantry, Field Artillery, Cavalry, etc., each with its own head and administrative headquarters. Although this system was at one time proper, under modern conditions it was found to be not only wasteful in men and resources, but obsolete and inflexible in the light of World War II requirements. An organization was adopted in 1942 which eliminated the multiplicity of more or less separate compartments, and brought them together in groupings or forces according to the functional tasks which had to be performed. An example of such a grouping is the Army Ground Forces. A reversion to the prewar organization would resurrect this discarded system and would result in the restoration of activities and agencies long since proved obsolete.

Your committee firmly believes that it is not the intent of Congress to permit such a retrogressive step, and it has therefore included in section 306 (c) of S. 758 a provision that the Secretary of National Security be permitted to continue the present organization structures, components, and the arrangements thereof, as now exist under the Executive orders referred to, until the postwar organizations can be decided and finally acted upon. It has limited the period in which this action must be taken to 2 years from the date of enactment of the act of which it is a part.

VI. SUMMARY

The committee believes that the bill embodies the best thoughts of the able leaders, civilian and military, who have concerned themselves with this problem from the time that studies of unification were first seriously undertaken in 1921, through the well-learned and convincing lessons of World War II.

The basic premise upon which S. 758 (amended) has been constructed is that in unifying the military services the provisions for their management and direction be such that the traditional and fundamental principle of civilian control be not impaired.

The terms of S. 758 (amended) achieve this purpose. The head of the unified National Security Organization and of each department within that organization is a civilian. Furthermore, the structure provided by the bill facilitates Presidential control of the armed forces, and enables the Congress to examine and consider as a whole, rather than as unrelated pieces, the requirements and development of

the armed forces, a method obviously permitting sounder—because better informed—judgment.

The committee sees no danger of militarism in this unity of executive authority over the National Security Organization. Such fears are groundless. The safeguard against militarism in this country is not to be found in the costly confusion and inefficiency of uncoordinated executive agencies with confused lines of authority. It abides rather in the solid conviction of our people, and the basic democratic principle, that the leaders of the armed forces are subordinate to their civilian heads, and through them to the President, the Congress, and the people. Concentration of authority over the armed forces in a single civilian under the President, as provided for in this bill, will no more foster militarism than concentration of that authority in the President has fostered militarism throughout our national history. On the contrary, by permitting direct access to and control of a unified military organization it strengthens the hands of the Chief Executive and the Congress in dealing with the armed services.

S. 758 as amended, provides a Secretary of National Security who is responsible, under the direction of the President, for establishing general policies and programs; exercising general direction, authority and control; and supervising the armed forces budget. In doing this, it also provides the Congress with a single individual to whom the Congress can turn for an integrated view concerning national security matters, and from whom the Congress can require an exposition of armed forces problems in the light of the over-all capabilities and limitations of and requirements for armed forces. Your committee believes that it is most important that the Congress provide an individual with authority and responsibility who can be charged with and held accountable for the maintenance of the most effective security structure and the accomplishment of the maximum practicable economies.

If prompt action is not taken to enact this bill during the present Congress we shall, 2 years after the conclusion of World War II, find ourselves the only major power in the world that has not modernized its Military Establishment in the light of the lessons of that war.

Our purpose has been to meet the need for a comprehensive and continuous program for our future safety and for the peace and security of the world.

Your committee, therefore, strongly recommends that prompt action be taken to enact S. 758 amended into law; and thus provide the unity of military concept, the unity of purpose and effort without which at the present time we may jeopardize our security.

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[PUBLIC LAW 253—80TH CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 343—1ST SESSION]

[S. 758]

AN ACT

To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

That this Act may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947".

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DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and

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procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

TITLE I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SEC. 101. (a) There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").

The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council: *Provided*, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

The Council shall be composed of the President; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense, appointed under section 202; the Secretary of the Army, referred to in section 205; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force, appointed under section 207; the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, appointed under section 103; and such of the following named officers as the President may designate from time to time: The Secretaries of the executive departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board appointed under section 213, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board appointed under section 214; but no such additional member shall be designated until the advice and consent of the Senate has been given to his appointment to the office the holding of which authorizes his designation as a member of the Council.

(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council—

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

(c) The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President, and who shall receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year. The executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is hereby authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.

(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof. The Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services or from among individuals in civilian life. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year.

(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director then—

(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and

(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of Director of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office of Director, receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which \$14,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever

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he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council—

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: *Provided*, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: *Provided further*, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: *And provided further*, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: *Provided, however*, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office—

(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and

(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.

NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD

SEC. 103. (a) There is hereby established a National Security Resources Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board") to be composed of the Chairman of the Board and such heads or representatives of the various executive departments and independent agencies as may from time to time be designated by the President to be members of the Board. The Chairman of the Board shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year.

(b) The Chairman of the Board, subject to the direction of the President, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to assist the Board in carrying out its functions.

(c) It shall be the function of the Board to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including—

(1) policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war;

(2) programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation's natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and conditions;

(3) policies for unifying, in time of war, the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials, and products;

(4) the relationship between potential supplies of, and potential requirements for, manpower, resources, and productive facilities in time of war;

(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic and critical material, and for the conservation of these reserves;

(6) the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's security.

(d) In performing its functions, the Board shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the Government.

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TITLE II—THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

SEC. 201. (a) There is hereby established the National Military Establishment, and the Secretary of Defense shall be the head thereof.

(b) The National Military Establishment shall consist of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, together with all other agencies created under title II of this Act.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SEC. 202. (a) There shall be a Secretary of Defense, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate: *Provided*, That a person who has within ten years been on active duty as a commissioned officer in a Regular component of the armed services shall not be eligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security. Under the direction of the President and subject to the provisions of this Act he shall perform the following duties:

(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment and for all of the departments and agencies therein;

(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies;

(3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research;

(4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies under the applicable appropriation Act:

Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force from presenting to the President or to the Director of the Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any report or recommendation relating to his department which he may deem necessary: *And provided further*, That the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force shall be administered as individual executive departments by their respective Secretaries and all powers and duties relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense by this Act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall submit annual written reports to the President and the Congress covering expenditures, work, and accomplishments of the National Military Establishment, together with such recommendations as he shall deem appropriate.

(c) The Secretary of Defense shall cause a seal of office to be made for the National Military Establishment, of such design as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

MILITARY ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY

SEC. 203. Officers of the armed services may be detailed to duty as assistants and personal aides to the Secretary of Defense, but he shall not establish a military staff.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SEC. 204. (a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to appoint from civilian life not to exceed three special assistants to advise and assist him in the performance of his duties. Each such special assistant shall receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year.

(b) The Secretary of Defense is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such other civilian personnel as may be necessary for the performance of the functions of the National Military Establishment other than those of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SEC. 205. (a) The Department of War shall hereafter be designated the Department of the Army, and the title of the Secretary of War shall be changed to Secretary of the Army. Changes shall be made in the titles of other officers and activities of the Department of the Army as the Secretary of the Army may determine.

(b) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions relating to the Department of War or to any officer or activity whose title is changed under this section shall, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to relate to the Department of the Army within the National Military Establishment or to such officer or activity designated by his or its new title.

(c) The term "Department of the Army" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Army at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Army.

(d) The Secretary of the Army shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Department of the Army, of such design as the President may approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

(e) In general the United States Army, within the Department of the Army, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It shall be responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SEC. 206. (a) The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United States Marine Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.

(b) In general the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy, shall include naval combat and services forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It shall be responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation shall consist of combat and service and training forces, and shall include land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the United States Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the United States Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

The Navy shall be generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping.

The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of naval combat and service elements; matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct: *Provided*, That such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SEC. 207. (a) Within the National Military Establishment there is hereby established an executive department to be known as the Department of the Air Force, and a Secretary of the Air Force, who shall be the head thereof. The Secretary of the Air Force shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(b) Section 158 of the Revised Statutes is amended to include the Department of the Air Force and the provisions of so much of title IV of the Revised Statutes as now or hereafter amended as is not inconsistent with this Act shall be applicable to the Department of the Air Force.

(c) The term "Department of the Air Force" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air Force at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Air Force.

(d) There shall be in the Department of the Air Force an Under Secretary of the Air Force and two Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(e) The several officers of the Department of the Air Force shall perform such functions as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribe.

(f) So much of the functions of the Secretary of the Army and of the Department of the Army, including those of any officer of such Department, as are assigned to or under the control of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, or as are deemed by the Secretary of Defense to be necessary or desirable for the operations of the Department of the Air Force or the United States Air Force, shall be transferred to and vested in the Secretary of the Air Force and the Department of the Air Force: *Provided*, That the National Guard Bureau shall, in addition to the functions and duties performed by it for the Department of the Army, be charged with similar functions and duties for the Department of the Air Force, and shall be the channel of communication between the Department of the Air Force and the several States on all matters pertaining to the Air National Guard: *And provided further*, That, in order to permit an orderly transfer, the Secretary of Defense may, during the transfer period hereinafter prescribed, direct that the Department of the Army shall continue for appropriate periods to exercise any of such functions, insofar as they relate to the Department of the Air Force, or the United States Air Force or their property and personnel. Such of the property, personnel, and records of the Department of the Army used in the exercise of functions transferred under this subsection as the Secretary of Defense shall determine shall be transferred or assigned to the Department of the Air Force.

(g) The Secretary of the Air Force shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Department of the Air Force, of such device as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

SEC. 208. (a) The United States Air Force is hereby established under the Department of the Air Force. The Army Air Forces, the Air Corps, United States Army, and the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command), shall be transferred to the United States Air Force.

(b) There shall be a Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years from among the officers of general rank who are assigned to or commissioned in the United States Air Force. Under the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall exercise command over the United States Air Force and shall be charged with the duty of carrying into execution all lawful orders and directions which may be transmitted to him. The functions of the Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command), and of the Chief of the Air Corps and of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be transferred to the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. When such transfer becomes effective, the offices of the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, and Assistants to the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, provided for by the Act of June 4, 1920, as amended (41 Stat. 768), and Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force, provided for by section 5 of the Act of June 16, 1936 (49 Stat. 1525), shall cease to exist. While holding office as Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, the incumbent shall hold a grade and receive allowances equivalent to those prescribed by law for the Chief of Staff, United States Army. The Chief of Staff, United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall take rank among themselves according to their relative dates of appointment as such, and shall each take rank above all other officers on the active list of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: *Provided*, That nothing in this Act shall have the effect of changing the relative rank of the present Chief of Staff, United States Army, and the present Chief of Naval Operations.

(c) All commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, commissioned, holding warrants, or enlisted, in the Air Corps, United States Army, or the Army Air Forces, shall be transferred in branch to the United States Air Force. All other commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, who are commissioned, hold warrants, or are enlisted, in any component of the Army of the United States and who are under the authority or command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued under the authority or command of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Air Force. Personnel whose status is affected by this subsection shall retain their existing commissions, warrants, or enlisted status in existing components of the armed forces unless otherwise altered or terminated in accordance with existing law; and they shall not be deemed to have been appointed to a new or different office or grade, or to have vacated their permanent or temporary appointments in an existing component of the armed forces, solely by virtue of any change in status under this subsection.

No such change in status shall alter or prejudice the status of any individual so assigned, so as to deprive him of any right, benefit, or privilege to which he may be entitled under existing law.

(d) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of the Air Force, all property, records, installations, agencies, activities, projects, and civilian personnel under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued to the same extent under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command, respectively, of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, in the Department of the Air Force.

(e) For a period of two years from the date of enactment of this Act, personnel (both military and civilian), property, records, installations, agencies, activities, and projects may be transferred between the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force by direction of the Secretary of Defense.

(f) In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF TRANSFERS

SEC. 209. Each transfer, assignment, or change in status under section 207 or section 208 shall take effect upon such date or dates as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

WAR COUNCIL

SEC. 210. There shall be within the National Military Establishment a War Council composed of the Secretary of Defense, as Chairman, who shall have power of decision; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The War Council shall advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces, and shall consider and report on such other matters as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SEC. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the National Military Establishment the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one.

(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

- (1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;
- (2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

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(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;

(4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;

(5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;

(6) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and

(7) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense and shall perform such other duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as may be prescribed by law.

JOINT STAFF

SEC. 212. There shall be, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Joint Staff to consist of not to exceed one hundred officers and to be composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from each of the three armed services. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall perform such duties as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director shall be an officer junior in grade to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MUNITIONS BOARD

SEC. 213. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military Establishment a Munitions Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board").

(b) The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof, and an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary from each of the three military departments, to be designated in each case by the Secretaries of their respective departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year.

(c) It shall be the duty of the Board under the direction of the Secretary of Defense and in support of strategic and logistic plans prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

(1) to coordinate the appropriate activities within the National Military Establishment with regard to industrial matters, including the procurement, production, and distribution plans of the departments and agencies comprising the Establishment;

(2) to plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization;

(3) to recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities among the several military services and to plan for standardization of specifications and for the greatest practicable allocation of purchase authority of technical equipment and common use items on the basis of single procurement;

(4) to prepare estimates of potential production, procurement, and personnel for use in evaluation of the logistic feasibility of strategic operations;

(5) to determine relative priorities of the various segments of the military procurement programs;

(6) to supervise such subordinate agencies as are or may be created to consider the subjects falling within the scope of the Board's responsibilities;

(7) to make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve existing interservice agencies operating in the fields of procurement, production, and distribution in such manner as to promote efficiency and economy;

(8) to maintain liaison with other departments and agencies for the proper correlation of military requirements with the civilian economy, particularly in regard to the procurement or disposition of strategic and critical material and the maintenance of adequate reserves of such material, and to make recommendations as to policies in connection therewith;

(9) to assemble and review material and personnel requirements presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those presented by the production, procurement, and distribution agencies assigned to meet military needs, and to make recommendations thereon to the Secretary of Defense; and

(10) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

(d) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office, the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Munitions Board.

(e) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such personnel and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the performance of its functions.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

SEC. 214. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military Establishment a Research and Development Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board"). The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof, and two representatives from each of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to be designated by the Secretaries of their respective Departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year. The purpose of the Board shall be to advise the Secretary of Defense as to the status of scientific research relative to the national security, and to assist him in assuring adequate provision for research and development on scientific problems relating to the national security.

(b) It shall be the duty of the Board, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense—

(1) to prepare a complete and integrated program of research and development for military purposes;

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(2) to advise with regard to trends in scientific research relating to national security and the measures necessary to assure continued and increasing progress;

(3) to recommend measures of coordination of research and development among the military departments, and allocation among them of responsibilities for specific programs of joint interest;

(4) to formulate policy for the National Military Establishment in connection with research and development matters involving agencies outside the National Military Establishment;

(5) to consider the interaction of research and development and strategy, and to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection therewith; and

(6) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

(c) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office, the Joint Research and Development Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Research and Development Board.

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such personnel and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the performance of its functions.

TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS

COMPENSATION OF SECRETARIES

SEC. 301. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.

(b) The Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force shall each receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.

UNDER SECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES

SEC. 302. The Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force shall each receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year and shall perform such duties as the Secretaries of their respective departments may prescribe.

ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND PERSONNEL

SEC. 303. (a) The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized to appoint such advisory committees and to employ, consistent with other provisions of this Act, such part-time advisory personnel as they may deem necessary in carrying out their respective functions and the functions of agencies under their control. Persons holding other offices or positions under the United States for which they receive compensation while serving as members of such committees shall receive no additional compensation for such service. Other members of such committees and other part-time advisory personnel so employed may serve without compensation or may receive compensation at a rate not to exceed \$35 for each day of service, as determined by the appointing authority.

(b) Service of an individual as a member of any such advisory committee, or in any other part-time capacity for a department or agency hereunder, shall not be considered as service bringing such individual within the provisions of section 109 or 113 of the Criminal Code (U. S. C., 1940 edition, title 18, secs. 198 and 203), or section 19 (e) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, unless the act of such individual, which by such section is made unlawful when performed by an individual referred to in such section, is with respect to any particular matter which directly involves a department or agency which such person is advising or in which such department or agency is directly interested.

STATUS OF TRANSFERRED CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SEC. 304. All transfers of civilian personnel under this Act shall be without change in classification or compensation, but the head of any department or agency to which such a transfer is made is authorized to make such changes in the titles and designations and prescribe such changes in the duties of such personnel commensurate with their classification as he may deem necessary and appropriate.

SAVING PROVISIONS

SEC. 305. (a) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions applicable with respect to any function, activity, personnel, property, records, or other thing transferred under this Act, or with respect to any officer, department, or agency, from which such transfer is made, shall, except to the extent rescinded, modified, superseded, terminated, or made inapplicable by or under authority of law, have the same effect as if such transfer had not been made; but, after any such transfer, any such law, order, regulation, or other action which vested functions in or otherwise related to any officer, department, or agency from which such transfer was made shall, insofar as applicable with respect to the function, activity, personnel, property, records or other thing transferred and to the extent not inconsistent with other provisions of this Act, be deemed to have vested such function in or relate to the officer, department, or agency to which the transfer was made.

(b) No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or against the head of any department or agency or other officer of the United States, in his official capacity or in relation to the discharge of his official duties, shall abate by reason of the taking effect of any transfer or change in title under the provisions of this Act; and, in the case of any such transfer, such suit, action, or other proceeding may be maintained by or against the successor of such head or other officer under the transfer, but only if the court shall allow the same to be maintained on motion or supplemental petition filed within twelve months after such transfer takes effect, showing a necessity for the survival of such suit, action, or other proceeding to obtain settlement of the questions involved.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of the second paragraph of section 5 of title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, the existing organization of the War Department under the provisions of Executive Order Numbered 9082 of February 28, 1942, as modified by Executive Order Numbered 9722 of May 13, 1946, and the existing organization of the Department of the Navy under the provisions of Executive

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Order Numbered 9635 of September 29, 1945, including the assignment of functions to organizational units within the War and Navy Departments, may, to the extent determined by the Secretary of Defense, continue in force for two years following the date of enactment of this Act except to the extent modified by the provisions of this Act or under the authority of law.

TRANSFER OF FUNDS

SEC. 306. All unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter made available for use by or on behalf of the Army Air Forces or officers thereof, shall be transferred to the Department of the Air Force for use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Such other unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter made available for use by the Department of War or the Department of the Army in exercise of functions transferred to the Department of the Air Force under this Act, as the Secretary of Defense shall determine, shall be transferred to the Department of the Air Force for use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Unexpended balances transferred under this section may be used for the purposes for which the appropriations, allocations, or other funds were originally made available, or for new expenditures occasioned by the enactment of this Act. The transfers herein authorized may be made with or without warrant action as may be appropriate from time to time from any appropriation covered by this section to any other such appropriation or to such new accounts established on the books of the Treasury as may be determined to be necessary to carry into effect provisions of this Act.

AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 307. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 308. (a) As used in this Act, the term "function" includes functions, powers, and duties.

(b) As used in this Act, the term "budget program" refers to recommendations as to the apportionment, to the allocation and to the review of allotments of appropriated funds.

SEPARABILITY

SEC. 309. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and of the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 310. (a) The first sentence of section 202 (a) and sections 1, 2, 307, 308, 309, and 310 shall take effect immediately upon the enactment of this Act.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), the provisions of this Act shall take effect on whichever of the following days is the earlier:

The day after the day upon which the Secretary of Defense first appointed takes office, or the sixtieth day after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY

SEC. 311. Paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of section 1 of the Act entitled "An Act to provide for the performance of the duties of the office of President in case of the removal, resignation, death, or inability both of the President and Vice President", approved July 18, 1947, is amended by striking out "Secretary of War" and inserting in lieu thereof "Secretary of Defense", and by striking out "Secretary of the Navy,".

Approved July 26, 1947.

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duties prescribed by the Classification Act of 1923, as amended.

Sec. 5. The committee or its duly constituted subcommittee is authorized, with the approval of the Committee on Rules and Administration, to request the use of the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and agencies in the executive branch of the Government in the performance of its duties under this resolution.

Sec. 6. The expenses of the committee under this resolution, which shall not exceed \$25,000, shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers signed by the chairman.

REFERENCE OF NOMINATION OF BURTON N. BEHLING TO BE A MEMBER OF FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION

As in executive session,

Mr. WHITE submitted the following resolution (S. Ex. Res. 52), which was ordered to lie over 1 day under the rule:

Resolved, That the Committee on Public Works be, and it is hereby, discharged from the further consideration of the nomination of Burton N. Behling, of the District of Columbia, to be a member of the Federal Power Commission for the term expiring June 22, 1952, and that it be referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

MAJ. RICHARD R. WRIGHT

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, last Wednesday, in Philadelphia, Maj. Richard R. Wright passed from this life at the age of 94. His distinguished career was one of the greatest examples of what can be accomplished under our American way of life.

Major Wright was born as a slave in the State of Georgia. For 50 years he was active in the field of education in his native State. He was graduated from Atlanta University in 1876 and took post-graduate work at the University of Chicago, Harvard University, and the University of Pennsylvania.

He first taught in the elementary and secondary schools, and in 1880 was appointed principal of the Ware High School, the first Negro school of its kind in the State.

Later he was made president of Georgia State College, a post which he held for 30 years.

In 1921 he decided to go into business, and organized in Philadelphia the Citizens & Southern Bank & Trust Co., now the largest Negro bank in eastern United States.

He always championed the cause of his people. He fostered National Freedom Day, and his last visit to the Nation's Capital was to advocate recognition of that day. He was active in the church and fraternal organizations. He was interested in military work and attained the rank of major.

By the force of his personality, his work, courage, and knowledge Major Wright achieved outstanding things for himself and his people.

The Philadelphia Inquirer, which seldom refers to individuals in its editorials, paid appropriate tribute to him editorially, and I ask unanimous consent to have this editorial printed in the Record at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

MAJ. RICHARD R. WRIGHT

Maj. Richard R. Wright, who died in this city on Wednesday, achieved distinction in many fields in a long lifetime that stretched back to pre-Civil War days in Georgia, where he was born in slavery.

From those beginnings he rose to become one of the foremost Negro educators in the country. He was principal of the first Negro high school in Georgia and for 30 years president of Georgia State College.

Widening his activities, he turned to banking comparatively late in life and was founder and president of the Citizens & Southern Bank & Trust Co. of this city, the largest Negro-owned and operated bank in the North.

Meanwhile, he served his country in the armed forces during the Spanish-American War, and was named by President McKinley a special paymaster with the rank of major.

He was known not only in Philadelphia but throughout the United States as a civic leader untringly devoted to causes he believed would help the ordinary citizen, and as a sincere champion of his people.

Fostering National Freedom Day and obtaining the issuance of a postage stamp honoring Booker T. Washington were only minor aspects of his unflagging zeal in the interests of his fellow Negroes.

Major Wright was not only a highly successful and capable Negro educator and banker; he was a loyal, conscientious public servant, a distinguished American, and a fine gentleman.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE OF AMERICA?—ADDRESS BY SENATOR WATKINS

[Mr. WATKINS asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Record a radio address entitled "What of the Future of America?" delivered by him on July 5, 1947, which appears in the Appendix.]

INDEPENDENCE DAY IN THE ATOMIC AGE—ADDRESS BY SENATOR WILEY

[Mr. WILEY asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Record an address entitled "Independence Day in the Atomic Age," delivered by him over Wisconsin radio stations on July 4, 1947, which appears in the Appendix.]

AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA—SERMON BY DR. WALTER ROWE COURTENAY

[Mr. STEWART asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Record an article entitled "Clergyman Wants United States To Get Tough With Russia," containing excerpts from a sermon by Dr. Walter Rowe Courtenay, pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Nashville, Tenn., which appears in the Appendix.]

NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE—COMPILATIONS OF FACTS

[Mr. MURRAY asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Record two brief compilations of facts bearing on the need for national health insurance, which appear in the Appendix.]

THE FEDERAL COURTS—EDITORIAL FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES

[Mr. O'CONNOR asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Record an editorial entitled "For the Federal Courts," published in the New York Times, of July 6, 1947, which appears in the Appendix.]

POSTAL RATE ON BOOKS—ARTICLE BY MARQUIS CHILDS

[Mr. O'CONNOR asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Record an article entitled "Postal Rate on Books," written by Marquis Childs and published in the Wash-

ington Post of July 7, 1947, which appears in the Appendix.]

A GOOD FORMULA—AN EDITORIAL

[Mr. BUSHFIELD asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Record an editorial entitled "A Good Formula," published in the July 1, 1947, issue of the Newark Star-Ledger, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE PRESENT LIQUOR SITUATION—ARTICLE BY MRS. D. LEIGH COLVIN

[Mr. LANGER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Record an article entitled "The Present Liquor Situation," by Mrs. D. Leigh Colvin, president of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union, which appears in the Appendix.]

EUROPE'S TESTING TIME—ARTICLE BY BARNET NOVER

[Mr. O'MAHONEY asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Record an article entitled "Europe's Testing Time," by Barnett Nover, published in the Washington Post of July 5, 1947, which appears in the Appendix.]

MEETINGS OF COMMITTEES DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, on behalf of the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary, I ask unanimous consent that it may meet this afternoon during the session of the Senate.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, permission is granted.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy be authorized to sit this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the order is made.

ENTRY OF DISPLACED PERSONS AS IMMIGRANTS—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT (H. DOC. No. 382)

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States, which was read and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(For President's message, see today's proceedings of the House of Representatives on p. 8496.)

CATHLEEN DOYLE HARRIS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 395) authorizing the issuance of a patent in fee to Richard Jay Doyle, which was to amend the title, so as to read: "An act authorizing the issuance of a patent in fee to Cathleen Doyle Harris, sole devise of Richard Jay Doyle, deceased."

Mr. ECTON. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendment of the House.

The motion was agreed to.

UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED SERVICES

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the order of the Senate of Wednesday, July 2, the Chair lays before the Senate the bill (S. 758) to promote the national security by providing for a national defense establishment, and so forth.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 758) to promote the national se-

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curity by providing for a National Defense Establishment, which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Defense, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force within the National Defense Establishment, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Defense Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, which had been reported from the Committee on Armed Services with an amendment to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

SHORT TITLE

That this act may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947."

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TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS

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Sec. 310. Definition.

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DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the naval service, including the Navy and the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

TITLE I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SEC. 101. (a) There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").

The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council: Pro-

vided, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

The Council shall be composed of the President; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of National Security, appointed under section 202; the Secretary of the Army, referred to in section 205; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force, appointed under section 207; the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, appointed under section 103; and such other members as the President may designate from time to time.

(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies of the departments and agencies of the Government and their functions relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council—

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the Department of State, the National Security Organization, and the National Security Resources Board, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

(c) The Secretary of National Security shall be director of the staff of the Council herein established and is hereby authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.

(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof, to be appointed from the armed services or from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of \$12,000 a year.

(b) Any commissioned officer of the armed services may be appointed to the office of Director; and his appointment to, acceptance of, and service in such office shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer on the active list shall, while serving in the office of Director, receive the military pay and allowances payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which \$12,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.

(c) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office—

(1) the functions of the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) are transferred to the National

Security Council, and such Authority shall cease to exist; and

(2) the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence, and the functions, personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Director of Central Intelligence appointed under this act and to the Central Intelligence Agency, respectively, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.

NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD

SEC. 103. (a) There is hereby established a National Security Resources Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board") to be composed of the Chairman of the Board and such heads or representatives of the various executive departments and independent agencies as may from time to time be designated by the President to be members of the Board. The Chairman of the Board shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$15,000 a year or at the rate of \$50 a day but not to exceed \$15,000 in any one year.

(b) The Chairman of the Board, subject to the direction of the President, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to assist the Board in carrying out its functions.

(c) It shall be the function of the Board to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including—

(1) policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war;

(2) programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation's natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and conditions;

(3) policies for unifying, in time of war, the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials, and products;

(4) the relationship between potential supplies of and potential requirements for manpower, resources, and productive facilities in time of war;

(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic and critical material, and for the conservation of these reserves;

(6) the strategic relocation of industries, services, Government, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's security.

(d) The Board shall perform such other functions, not inconsistent with law, concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization as the President may direct.

(e) In performing its functions, the Board shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the Government.

TITLE II—THE NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION

SEC. 201. (a) There is hereby established the National Security Organization, and a Secretary of National Security, who shall be the head thereof.

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(b) The National Security Organization shall consist of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, together with all other agencies created within the National Security Organization.

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

SEC. 202. (a) The Secretary of National Security shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Under the direction of the President he shall perform the following duties:

(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Security Organization and for all of the departments and agencies therein;

(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies;

(3) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of budget estimates; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and supervise the budget program of the National Security Organization under the applicable appropriations acts:

Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the Secretary of any of the three departments hereinbefore mentioned from presenting to the President or to the Director of the Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of National Security, any report or recommendation relating to his department which he may deem necessary; *And provided further*, That the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, shall be administered as individual units by their respective Secretaries and all powers and duties not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of National Security by this act are retained by each of the respective Secretaries.

(b) The Secretary of National Security shall submit annual written reports to the President and the Congress covering expenditures, work, and accomplishments of the National Security Organization, together with such recommendations as he shall deem appropriate.

(c) The Secretary of National Security shall cause a seal of office to be made for the National Security Organization, of such design as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

MILITARY ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY

SEC. 203. Officers of the armed services may be detailed to duty as assistants and personal aides to the Secretary of National Security, but he shall not establish a military staff.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SEC. 204. (a) The Secretary of National Security is authorized to appoint from civilian life not to exceed three special assistants to advise and assist him in the performance of his duties. Each such special assistant shall receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year.

(b) The Secretary of National Security is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such other civilian personnel as may be necessary for the performance of the the functions of the National Security Organization.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SEC. 205. (a) The Department of War shall hereafter be known as the Department of the Army, and the title of the Secretary of War shall be changed to Secretary of the Army. Changes shall be made in the titles of other officers and activities of the Department of the Army as the Secretary of the Army may determine.

(b) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions relating to the Department of War or to any officer or activity whose title is

changed under this section shall, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, be deemed to relate to the Department of the Army within the National Security Organization or to such officer or activity designated by his or its new title.

(c) The term "Department of the Army" as used in this act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Army at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Army.

(d) The Secretary of the Army shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Department of the Army, of such design as the President may approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SEC. 206. (a) The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the United States Navy (including naval aviation) and of the United States Marine Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.

(b) The provisions of this act shall not authorize the alteration or diminution of the existing relative status of the Marine Corps (including the Fleet Marine Forces) or of naval aviation.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SEC. 207. (a) Within the National Security Organization there is hereby established an executive department to be known as the Department of the Air Force, and a Secretary of the Air Force, who shall be the head thereof. The Secretary of the Air Force shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(b) Section 158 of the Revised Statutes is amended to include the Department of the Air Force and the provisions of so much of title IV of the Revised Statutes as now or hereafter amended as is not inconsistent with this act, shall be applicable to the Department of the Air Force.

(c) The term "Department of the Air Force" as used in this act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air Force at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Air Force.

(d) There shall be in the Department of the Air Force an Under Secretary of the Air Force and two Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(e) The several officers of the Department of the Air Force shall perform such functions as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribe.

(f) So much of the functions of the Secretary of the Army and of the Department of the Army, including those of any officer of such Department, as are assigned to or under the control of the commanding general, Army Air Forces, or as are deemed by the Secretary of National Security to be necessary or desirable for the operations of the Department of the Air Force or the United States Air Force, shall be transferred to and vested in the Secretary of the Air Force and the Department of the Air Force: *Provided*, That the National Guard Bureau shall, in addition to the functions and duties performed

by it for the Department of the Army, be charged with similar functions and duties for the Department of the Air Force, and shall be the channel of communication between the Department of the Air Force and the several States on all matters pertaining to the Air National Guard: *And provided further*, That, in order to permit an orderly transfer, the Secretary of National Security may, during the transfer period hereinafter prescribed, direct that the Department of the Army shall continue for appropriate periods to exercise any of such functions, insofar as they relate to the Department of the Air Force, or the United States Air Force or their property and personnel. Such of the property, personnel, and records of the Department of the Army used in the exercise of functions transferred under this subsection as the Secretary of National Security shall determine shall be transferred or assigned to the Department of the Air Force.

(g) The Secretary of the Air Force shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Department of the Air Force, of such device as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

SEC. 208. (a) The United States Air Force is hereby established under the Department of the Air Force. The Army Air Forces, the Air Corps, United States Army, and the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command) shall be transferred to the United States Air Force.

(b) There shall be a Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of 4 years from among the officers of general rank who are assigned to or commissioned in the United States Air Force. Under the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall exercise command over the United States Air Force and shall be charged with the duty of carrying into execution all lawful orders and directions which may be transmitted to him. The functions of the Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command), and of the Chief of the Air Corps and of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be transferred to the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. When such transfer becomes effective, the offices of the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, and Assistants to the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, provided for by the act of June 4, 1920, as amended (41 Stat. 768), and Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force, provided for by section 5 of the act of June 16, 1936 (49 Stat. 1525), shall cease to exist. While holding office as Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, the incumbent shall hold a grade and receive allowances equivalent to those prescribed by law for the Chief of Staff, United States Army. The Chief of Staff, United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall take rank among themselves according to their relative dates of appointment as such, and shall each take rank above all other officers on the active list of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: *Provided*, That nothing in this act shall have the effect of changing the relative rank of the present Chief of Staff, United States Army, and the present Chief of Naval Operations.

(c) All commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, commissioned, holding warrants, or enlisted, in the Air Corps, United States Army, or the Army Air Forces, shall be transferred in branch to the United States Air Force. All other commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, who are commissioned, hold warrants, or are enlisted, in any component of the Army of the United States and who are under the authority or command of the Commanding

General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued under the authority or command of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Air Force. Personnel whose status is affected by this subsection shall retain their existing commissions, warrants, or enlisted status in existing components of the armed forces unless otherwise altered or terminated in accordance with the existing law; and they shall not be deemed to have been appointed to a new or different office or grade, or to have vacated their permanent or temporary appointments in an existing component of the armed forces, solely by virtue of any change in status under this subsection. No such change in status shall alter or prejudice the status of any individual so assigned, so as to deprive him of any right, benefit, or privilege to which he may be entitled under existing law.

(d) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of the Air Force, all property, records, installations, agencies, activities, projects, and civilian personnel under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued to the same extent under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command, respectively, of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, in the Department of the Air Force.

(e) For a period of 2 years from the date of enactment of this act, personnel (both military and civilian), property, records, installations, agencies, activities, and projects may be transferred between the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force by direction of the Secretary of National Security.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF TRANSFERS

SEC. 209. Each transfer, assignment, or change in status under section 207 or section 208 shall take effect upon such date or dates as may be prescribed by the Secretary of National Security.

WAR COUNCIL

SEC. 210. There shall be within the National Security Organization a War Council composed of the Secretary of National Security, as Chairman, who shall have power of decision; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The War Council shall advise the Secretary of National Security on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces, and shall consider and report on such other matters as the Secretary of National Security may direct.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SEC. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the National Security Organization the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one.

(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of National Security, it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;

(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;

(4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;

(5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;

(6) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and

(7) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of National Security and shall perform such other duties as the President and the Secretary of National Security may direct or as may be prescribed by law.

JOINT STAFF

SEC. 212. There shall be, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Joint Staff to consist of not to exceed 100 officers and to be composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from each of the three armed services. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall perform such duties as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director shall be an officer junior in grade to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MUNITIONS BOARD

SEC. 213. (a) There is hereby established in the National Security Organization a Munitions Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board").

(b) The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof, and an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary from each of the three military departments, to be designated in each case by the secretaries of their respective departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$12,000 a year or at the rate of \$50 a day but not to exceed \$12,000 in any one year.

(c) It shall be the duty of the Board under the direction of the Secretary of National Security and in support of strategic and logistic plans prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

(1) To coordinate the appropriate activities within the National Security Organization with regard to industrial matters, including the procurement, production, and distribution plans of the Organization.

(2) To plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization.

(3) To recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities among the several military services and to plan for standardization of specifications and for the greatest practicable allocation of purchase authority of technical equipment and common-use items on the basis of single procurement.

(4) To prepare estimates of potential production, procurement, and personnel for use in evaluation of the logistic feasibility of strategic operations.

(5) To determine relative priorities of the various segments of the military procurement programs.

(6) To supervise such subordinate agencies as are or may be created to consider the subjects falling within the scope of the Board's responsibilities.

(7) To make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve existing interservice agencies operating in the fields of procurement, production, and distribution in such manner as to promote efficiency and economy.

(8) To maintain liaison with other agencies for the proper correlation of military requirements with the civilian economy, particularly in regard to the procurement or disposition of strategic and critical material and the maintenance of adequate reserves of such material, and to make recommendations as to policies in connection therewith;

(9) to assemble and review material and personnel requirements presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those presented by

the production, procurement, and distribution agencies assigned to meet military needs, and to make recommendations thereon to the Secretary of National Security; and

(10) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of National Security may direct.

(d) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office, the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board shall cease to exist and all its functions, records, and personnel shall be transferred to the Munitions Board.

(e) The Secretary of National Security shall provide the Board with such personnel and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the performance of its functions.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

SEC. 214. (a) There is hereby established in the National Security Organization a Research and Development Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board"). The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof, and two representatives from each of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; to be designated by the Secretaries of their respective Departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$12,000 a year or at the rate of \$50 a day but not to exceed \$12,000 in any one year. The purpose of the Board shall be to advise the Secretary of National Security as to the status of scientific research relative to the national security, and to assist him in assuring adequate provision for research and development on scientific problems relating to the national security.

(b) It shall be the duty of the Board, under the direction of the Secretary of National Security—

(1) to prepare a complete and integrated program of research and development for military purposes;

(2) to advise with regard to trends in scientific research relating to national security and the measures necessary to assure continued and increasing progress;

(3) to recommend measures of coordination of research and development among the military departments, and allocation among them of responsibilities for specific programs of joint interest;

(4) to formulate policy for the National Security Organization in connection with research and development matters involving agencies outside the National Security Organization.

(5) to consider the interaction of research and development and strategy, and to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection therewith; and

(6) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of National Security may direct.

(c) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office, the Joint Research and Development Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Research and Development Board.

(d) The Secretary of National Security shall provide the Board with such personnel and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the performance of its functions.

TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS

SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY

SEC. 301. The first section of the act entitled "An act to provide for the performance of the duties of the Office of President in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and of the Vice President," approved January 19, 1886 (24 Stat. 1), is amended (1) by striking out "Secretary of War" and inserting in lieu thereof "Secretary of National Security," and (2) by striking out "or if there be none, or in

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case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the Navy."

COMPENSATION OF SECRETARIES

SEC. 302. (a) The Secretary of National Security shall receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.

(b) The Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force shall each receive the compensation prescribed for the Secretary of National Security.

UNDER SECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES

SEC. 303. The Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force shall each receive compensation at the rate of \$12,000 a year and shall perform such duties as the Secretaries of their respective departments may prescribe.

ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND PERSONNEL

SEC. 304. (a) The Secretary of National Security, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized to appoint such advisory committees and to employ consistent with other provisions of this act, such part-time advisory personnel as they may deem necessary in carrying out their respective functions and the functions of agencies under their control. Persons holding other offices or positions under the United States for which they receive compensation while serving as members of such committees shall receive no additional compensation for such service. Other members of such committees and other part-time advisory personnel so employed may serve without compensation or may receive compensation at a rate not to exceed \$35 for each day of service, as determined by the appointing authority.

(b) Service of an individual as a member of any such advisory committee, or in any other part-time capacity for a department or agency hereunder, shall not be considered as service bringing such individual within the provisions of section 109 or 113 of the Criminal Code (U. S. C., 1940 ed., title 18, secs. 198 and 203), or section 19 (c) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, unless the act of such individual, which by such section is made unlawful when performed by an individual referred to in such section, is with respect to any particular matter which directly involves a department or agency which such person is advising or in which such department or agency is directly interested.

STATUS OF TRANSFERRED CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SEC. 305. All transfers of civilian personnel under this act shall be without change in classification or compensation, but the head of any department or agency to which such a transfer is made is authorized to make such changes in the titles and designations and prescribe such changes in the duties of such personnel commensurate with their classification as he may deem necessary and appropriate.

SAVING PROVISIONS

SEC. 306. (a) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions applicable with respect to any function, activity, personnel, property, records, or other thing transferred under this act, or with respect to any officer, department, or agency, from which such transfer is made, shall, except to the extent rescinded, modified, superseded, terminated, or made inapplicable by or under authority of law, have the same effect as if such transfer had not been made; but, after any such transfer, any such law, order, regulation, or other action which vested functions in or otherwise related to any officer, department, or agency from which such transfer was made shall, insofar as applicable with respect to the function, activity, personnel, property, records or other thing transferred and to the extent not inconsistent with other provisions

of this act, be deemed to have vested such function in or relate to the officer, department, or agency to which the transfer was made.

(b) No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or against the head of any department or agency or other officer of the United States, in his official capacity or in relation to the discharge of his official duties, shall abate by reason of the taking effect of any transfer or change in title under the provisions of this act; and in the case of any such transfer, such suit, action, or other proceeding may be maintained by or against the successor of such head or other officer under the transfer, but only if the court shall allow the same to be maintained on motion or supplemental petition filed within 12 months after such transfer takes effect, showing a necessity for the survival of such suit, action, or other proceeding to obtain settlement of the questions involved.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of the second paragraph of section 5 of title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, the existing organization of the War Department under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9082 of February 28, 1942, as modified by Executive Order No. 9722 of May 13, 1946, and the existing organization of the Department of the Navy under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9635 of September 29, 1945, including the assignment of functions to organizational units within the War and Navy Departments, may, to the extent determined by the Secretary of National Security, continue in force for 2 years following the date of enactment of this act except to the extent modified by the provisions of this act or under the authority of law.

TRANSFER OF FUNDS

SEC. 307. All unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter made available for use by or on behalf of the Army Air Forces or officers thereof, shall be transferred to the Department of the Air Force for use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Such other unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated funds; or other funds available or hereafter made available for use by the Department of War or the Department of the Army in exercise of functions transferred to the Department of the Air Force under this act, as the Secretary of National Security shall determine, shall be transferred to the Department of the Air Force for use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Unexpended balances transferred under this section may be used for the purposes for which the appropriations, allocations, or other funds were originally made available, or for new expenditures occasioned by the enactment of this act. The transfers herein authorized may be made with or without warrant action as may be appropriate from time to time from any appropriation covered by this section to any other such appropriation or to such new accounts established on the books of the Treasury as may be determined to be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this act.

BUDGET ESTIMATES

SEC. 308. (a) So much of the annual budget transmitted to the Congress by the President as contains the estimates of appropriations for and expenditures by the National Security Organization and the departments therein shall be so arranged as clearly to show—

(1) with respect to each item for which the President recommends an appropriation or expenditure, a statement of the nature of such item and of the amount recommended by the President, the Secretary of National Security, and the head of the department concerned, respectively; and

(2) with respect to any item for which the President does not recommend an appropria-

tion or expenditure but for which a budget estimate for inclusion in such budget was submitted by the Secretary of National Security or by the head of a department therein, a statement of the nature of such item and of the amount recommended by the Secretary of National Security and the head of the department, respectively.

(b) Each supplemental or deficiency estimate for appropriations or expenditures transmitted to the Congress by the President which contains any item recommending an appropriation to or an expenditure by the National Security Organization or any department therein shall be so arranged as clearly to show with respect to any such item a statement of the nature of the item and of the amount recommended by the President, the Secretary of National Security, and the head of the department, respectively.

AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 309. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions and purposes of this act.

DEFINITION

SEC. 310. (a) As used in this act, the term "function" includes functions, powers, and duties.

(b) As used in this act, the term "budget program" refers to recommendations as to the apportionment, to the allocation and to the review of allotments of appropriated funds.

SEPARABILITY

SEC. 311. If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the act and of the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Mr. GURNEY obtained the floor.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Dakota yield so that I may suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. GURNEY. I yield.

Mr. WHITE. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Hawkes	O'Connor
Baldwin	Hayden	O'Daniel
Ball	Hickenlooper	O'Mahoney
Barkley	Hill	Overton
Brewster	Hoey	Pepper
Bricker	Holland	Reed
Brooks	Jenner	Revercomb
Buck	Johnson, Colo.	Robertson, Va.
Bushfield	Johnston, S. C.	Robertson, Wyo.
Butler	Kem	Russell
Byrd	Kilgore	Saltonstall
Cain	Knowland	Smith
Capehart	Langer	Sparkman
Capper	Lodge	Stewart
Chavez	Lucas	Taft
Connally	McCarran	Taylor
Cooper	McCarthy	Thomas, Okla.
Cordon	McClellan	Thye
Donnell	McFarland	Tydings
Dworshak	McKellar	Umstead
Ecton	McMahon	Vandenberg
Ellender	Magnuson	Watkins
Ferguson	Malone	Wherry
Flanders	Martin	White
Fulbright	Millikin	Wiley
George	Moore	Williams
Gurney	Morse	Wilson
Hatch	Murray	Young

Mr. WHERRY. I announce that the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from New York [Mr. IVES] is absent by leave of the Senate because of a death in his immediate family.

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] is necessarily absent because of illness in his family.

Mr. LUCAS. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senators from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN and Mr. McGRATH], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK], and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MYERS] are absent on public business.

The Senator from California [Mr. DOWNEY] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS] is absent by leave of the Senate, having been appointed a delegate to the International Labor Conference at Geneva, Switzerland.

The Senator from New York [Mr. WAGNER] is absent because of illness.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Eighty-four Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is present.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I am glad to present to the Senate today the bill dealing with unification of the armed forces. It is labeled the National Security Act of 1947.

I believe that we could have handled this matter sooner. I believe that it is urgent now that the Congress speedily debate the question thoroughly and decide on the entire language of the bill and hurry it along into law.

The law is urgently needed because of personnel problems in the Army and Navy, including the Air Forces. It is needed so that the Congress and the people of the United States may with confidence look forward to efficiency and thrift in the expenditure of the funds appropriated for our national security.

It is my firm belief that not only can large savings be made in manpower, but that huge money savings can also be expected, perhaps not immediately, but during the course of the next year or two. I wish Congress to look closely to the fact that about one-third of our annual budget is spent on the armed forces, and that another third is spent to pay for a past war.

In the consideration of the bill before the Senate, in order to be of as much help as possible, the committee has had prepared a chart which I suggest may be helpful in clarifying to Senators the flow of authority, responsibilities, and so forth, proposed in the bill.

Mr. President, I believe that this is one of the most important tasks with which the Congress is charged under the Constitution; and it stems from its responsibility to provide for the "common defense."

Since 1944 a great deal of attention and effort have been devoted by both the armed services and the Congress to the study of our requirements for the most modern and efficient organization for national defense. That study has finally resulted in a bill for unification of our military forces, which is supported by our principal military and civilian leaders who are concerned with national security.

Your Committee on Armed Services reported this bill, S. 758, to the Senate on June 5, 1947, a little more than 1 month ago. It is my purpose today to discuss

the background of this vital proposal and to emphasize the compelling necessity for its prompt passage.

Mr. President, this bill is fashioned in the light of hard, costly experience, gained by major participation in two great wars. It represents a determination upon the part of responsible civilian and military leaders that our country profit from the terrible lessons of World War II while those lessons are still fresh in our minds—and while the counsel of those who experienced World War I and who directed our efforts in World War II is still available to us.

The unification bill is a sincere and earnest attempt to put into effect by legislation a security organization which is adequate, effective, modern—and yet economical.

Every facility at the disposal of your committee has been used to study thoroughly and exhaustively the whole question of the reorganization of our national security system.

I need cite only a few of the studies which have been made in the last 4 years to illustrate how carefully the whole question has been explored. For instance, in 1944 there was the committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which visited every theater of war and sought the opinions of our top military and naval commanders.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GURNEY. I yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. CONNALLY. Let me say to the Senator that I am delighted that he is discussing the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In years gone by the objections to unification were largely based on the claim that it would interfere with strategic operations. I understand that the bill provides, in effect, for a joint Army and Navy comparably responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff during wartime, so that military and naval operations would be so coordinated as to represent a unified military force. Is that correct?

Mr. GURNEY. The Senator is entirely correct. The committee, in considering this bill, has sought to keep that which is good and to discard that which is bad, and to take advantage of the lessons learned in war when the Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned.

This joint committee made a report to the President, with which most of the Senators are familiar. There were the hearings by the Select Committee on Postwar Policy of the House of Representatives later in the same year, 1944. Again, in the fall of 1945, the Senate Military Affairs Committee conducted extensive hearings in which many expert witnesses from the military services and from civilian life were heard. The report of Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt to the Secretary of the Navy was carefully studied. The Naval Affairs Committee of the Senate studied the problem in the spring of 1946. Finally, after many adjustments by the services to harmonize divergence of opinion the present bill, Senate bill 758, was recommended by the President and introduced with the full support of both the War and Navy Departments. The Senate Armed Services Committee

has now concluded thorough examination of the bill, which is favorably reported to the Senate in amended form.

Mr. President, no legislative proposal within my memory has received the close scrutiny and thoughtful consideration which has been given to this bill. Your committee has deliberated on this legislation for more than 11 weeks, and I assure the Senate that every paragraph, every sentence, every phrase has been very carefully weighed. The committee is proud to present the fruits of its efforts to the Senate. We firmly believe that the bill represents a sound and modern foundation upon which will be erected a lasting structure of national security.

The committee heard testimony against the bill as well as in favor of it. During the hearings two facts became obvious. One fact was that all the civilian officials and officers in uniform who had broad responsibilities for the coordinated use of the military services for our national security were advocates of unification. The other fact was that none of those who opposed unification had duties outside their own branch or specialty. Your committee is in the first category. We have broad responsibilities and we therefore advocate unification.

The bill provides for the creation of a national security organization consisting of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, and four agencies, each with equal representation from the three departments. These agencies are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the War Council, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board. At the head of this organization is the Secretary of National Security.

The bill also provides for a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a National Security Resources Board, all of which report directly to the President, but which also work closely with the agencies under the Secretary of National Security.

I would not impose upon the time of the Members of the Senate, Mr. President, to justify the inclusion of the Army, the Navy or its components, or the Air Forces, in the National Security Organization. Their records of past achievement are sufficient for that purpose. The new position for air power which is proposed is contained in the provisions for a Department of the Air Force and for a United States Air Force, organized and established on a parity with the Army and the Navy.

It may be truly said that during World War II air power came of age and that it proved its terrific force in the test of conflict. The Air Corps' prewar position of inferiority as a subdivision of the Army has been outgrown and outmoded. During the war, by the temporary expedient of the First War Powers Act, the shackles which bound the Air Corps were unlocked, and it was made in effect a basic arm whose contribution to victory in the Army-Navy-Air Force team will never be forgotten. Remember, that was through the provisions of the First War Powers Act. If this bill shall not pass, the Air Force will revert to its prewar

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position of being only a part of the Army.

The emancipation of the Air arm is recognized and made permanent in this bill by establishing it as a separate arm. To do less than this would be foolhardy, for as one defeated German general has said, "Without air supremacy you cannot win; with it you cannot lose."

If we give but momentary thought to the future, it is perfectly clear that if and when another enemy strikes, it will be through the element which has no geographic barrier—the air. To fail to recognize that fact in our defense preparations is to court disaster. Thus, in this bill the air arm is given its logical position of parity with the Army and Navy.

The early history of our country discloses that prior to 1798 all our military forces were under one civilian organization, the War Office. At that time, however, it was logical to "compartmentalize" our armed forces, because land battles and sea battles were clearly separate and distinct from one another. Therefore, with the growth of our naval forces, we established a separate Navy Department and a Navy. But as we have moved into an air age and the period of total war, it is no longer possible to keep our military forces in tight, separated compartments, with no one short of an overburdened President to render decisions in the absence of agreement.

We have just completed a triphibious war, in which closely integrated land, sea, and air teams were required to produce a victorious military force. Coordination and integration of our military forces was achieved with the aid of temporary laws and temporary organization. War forced us to forge these bonds of close cooperation. Now that the compulsion of war is gone, they are in immediate danger of rusting away.

We would be unwise indeed, Mr. President, if we did not preserve for the future every means at our disposal to keep together in times of peace the proven components of our security team.

The experience of the last war has clearly demonstrated that the most effective military organization for this country is one which provides for joint planning and joint logistical support of our fighting arms. It was with that idea in mind that the four joint agencies of the National Security organization to which I have previously referred were wisely included in the bill.

The War Council consists of the Secretary of National Security as Chairman, the Secretary of the Army; Secretary of the Navy; Secretary of the Air Force; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. This Council is the principal advisory body to the Secretary of National Security. Here the joint civilian and military direction of the services is solidly established.

The provision for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, gives legislative permanence to an organization which was created by the compelling necessity of war, and which in the absence of a better organization was the unifying ele-

ment for the direction of the war. Its great contribution to victory has been attested to by all of our leading commanders in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The provision for the Joint Chiefs of Staff gives us a permanent organization of the heads of our three arms, who, working in harmony and unison, with the assistance of their joint staff representing all components of the military forces, will prepare strategic plans, and will provide for the unified strategic and logistic direction of our military forces.

They will establish unified commands, and will provide for joint training, will review the requirements of our military forces from an over-all combined standpoint, and will act jointly as the military advisers of the President and Secretary of National Security. In this way we shall be assured for the first time in our history that all parts of our military strength are jointly represented in a common purpose in time of peace as well as war. Only in this way can the President as Commander in Chief satisfactorily discharge his constitutional duty to the country in an age of high-speed, triphibious war.

In the Joint Staff there is provided, to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a full-time staff which will lend both flexibility and body to the present loose structure of committees by assuming certain of their duties and by assisting the remaining committees to function with increased thoroughness and speed. This Joint Staff has in itself no command authority; it serves a Director, who in turn functions as an executive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose members cannot themselves oversee the Joint Staff continuously. The provision of this agency should remedy the principal defect which has been noted in the present Joint Chiefs of Staff organization.

The Munitions Board provided for under the bill will give us a long-needed permanent board, composed of a chairman and the Under or Assistant Secretaries of each of the three departments, who will coordinate industrial procurement and production plans of the three departments; recommend assignments of procurement responsibility; plan for standardization; prepare estimates of potential production, procurement, and personnel; and determine priorities of the various segments of the military procurement program. The Munitions Board will fill to a large extent the same role in the procurement phase of logistics that the Joint Chiefs of Staff fill in the field of strategy and operations, and in the military phase of logistics. Through the collaboration of these two joint agencies, methods of joint purchasing and procurement will be expanded, and maximum joint use will be made of such services as hospitalization and transportation. These are the measures which are expected to effect the greatest economies, not only in dollar savings, but more important, in time and in the return realized upon the investment of American manpower and resources.

If the experience of the war has brought home one fact more forcibly to the Members of Congress than any other, it is the urgent need to eliminate the

duplication and overlapping between the services which resulted in many dislocations, inefficiency, and unwarranted expense in the prosecution of the war.

I, for one, Mr. President, am sure that the services did not willfully do these things. I believe that because they were laboring within the confines of an outmoded organization, they could not help themselves. Attempts to solve these problems with hastily improvised voluntary joint committees only served to point more clearly to the urgent need for such a body as the Munitions Board. The joint Army-Navy Munitions Board, as now constituted, operates under Presidential authority, and is therefore temporary in character. The duties assigned to the present Board, which under this bill will pass to the Munitions Board in an augmented form, are so desperately important that common prudence dictates that the authority and permanence of the Board be fixed by law.

Faced as we are with the stupendous demands of modern war and with limited resources in manpower and materials, we must provide for the greatest conservation and the most frugal use of those resources. This cannot be accomplished by unbridled competition between the services. It can be accomplished only by careful regulation through a single joint authority such as the Munitions Board.

During World War II, and particularly since the development of the atomic bomb, there has been a growing public consciousness of the rapid strides in research and development. No protection for our country is worthy of the name unless it contemplates continued and intensive research and development.

During the war we achieved notable scientific advances which materially contributed to ultimate victory, but there is no permanent organization for furthering that activity in time of peace. The limited supply of scientifically trained research personnel and the inevitable reduction which will occur in the amount we have to spend for research and development in time of peace, combine to demand the establishment of the Research and Development Board within the National Security Organization. This Board, consisting of representatives from all the services will be able for the first time in our history to prepare a complete and integrated continuous program of research and development for military purposes. It will replace the temporary Joint Research and Development Board which was set up by joint agreement between the Secretaries of War and Navy. It will effect the necessary coordination between the departments on research and development.

Responsibilities for specific programs of joint interest will be allocated between the services and with other agencies of Government, thus effecting economies and fostering efficiency.

I have briefly outlined the various segments of the National Security Organization which have been carefully devised to work in the various fields of interest which experience has dictated must be a part of any modern effective security system.

There is one element which I have purposely omitted until now, in order that I could more clearly illustrate its position in relation to the other elements. I refer, Mr. President, to the Secretary of National Security.

The whole purpose of the arrangement of and assignment of duties to the various parts of the National Security Organization is to insure that all our forces and facilities are directed toward broad common missions.

In the past we have witnessed the fallacy of having two great executive departments of Government so separated and insulated from one another that each tried in effect to become a self-sufficient national security organization. We have learned that this is the wrong approach. We have learned that in peacetime it is expensive, wasteful, and inefficient. We learned at Pearl Harbor that having two steering wheels on our defense machine can send it careening into the ditch.

After December 7, 1941, we resorted to temporary expedients to overcome the difficulties inherent in a double system of defense. But elements of a defense organization cannot be brought together to function as a team without a directing leader—not any more than a football team can have two quarterbacks, one calling signals for the backfield and one for the line. This lesson has been indelibly impressed upon the minds of the students of the past war by the efficiency of our unified field commands, as well as by the problems which arose before those commands were unified.

It is universally recognized that all our forces are subject to the direction of the President as constitutional Commander in Chief. Each of the segments of the National Security Organization provided for in S. 758 could report directly to him. He could point the way in which they should direct their efforts. He could do it, Mr. President, if he were a superman. But all of us know full well that the overburdened Chief Executive of our Government, even though he has the clear-cut responsibility for the operational functioning of our armed forces, cannot possibly discharge that responsibility with a modern military organization. He cannot discharge it by dealing directly and separately with two—much less with three—executive departments—no, not even with the advice and assistance of the joint agencies which are provided in the bill. The departments which deal with the armed forces and the armed forces themselves are too large and too complicated, and the President himself is far too busy to devote the full time necessary for the accomplishment of the task.

What the President needs is a means of dealing only with broad policies and with problems which have been resolved as far as possible before they are submitted to him. Above all, he needs a means of dealing with only a minimum of individuals.

It is therefore necessary, Mr. President, to provide a head for the National Security Organization to whom the President may look for simplification of his task. That individual is the Secretary of National Security, through whom are

tied together all the departments and agencies of the National Security Organization.

The Secretary, under the direction of the President, will establish policies and programs for the National Security Organization and for its departments and agencies. He will exercise general direction, authority, and control over them. He will supervise and control as a coordinated whole the budgeted expenditures of the armed forces. He will thus relieve the President of a mass of detail and submit only for his consideration basic problems of major importance.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LODGE in the chair). Does the Senator from South Dakota yield to the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. GURNEY. I yield.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. The Senator is a member of the Committee on Appropriations, and a very able member. Does he understand that under the proposed plan one budget will come down for the armed forces, and that one bill for the armed forces will probably be introduced and considered in Congress as one bill, or will we have two bills or three bills in the future?

Mr. GURNEY. Under the pending bill it is specifically provided that we will have one bill for the whole National Security Organization. The three departments, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces, will first submit to their own secretaries their requests. Their secretaries will then individually present their requests for the next year's funds to the Secretary of National Security, and in that way Congress will have one bill, not two, as now, or not three, if we were going along under the old budgetary system, when and if we had a separate Air Force.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. I am very glad to learn of that arrangement, because it is an important step forward.

Mr. GURNEY. In addition to having only one bill, the budget will come to Congress at the beginning of the year with only what the President says is necessary for these departments. But there will be a showing, too, in parallel columns, first, of the amount requested by the Secretary of each of the three groups; then, alongside, the request of the Secretary of the Navy, for instance, will appear what the Secretary of National Security recommends. In the third column will appear a showing of what the budget approves. So Congress will be fully informed of the request of the service secretary, the administrator of the individual department, then the recommendation of the National Security Secretary, and finally of the President himself.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. That sounds like a very logical and sensible approach to the problem of financing the armed forces.

Mr. GURNEY. I think that in these times of stress it is very necessary that Congress be fully informed, so that it can go into the background of all requests; and see what the department heads responsible for the security of the Nation recommend in the first place.

Then it will be the responsibility of Congress to decide just what should be done for each department.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. If I may interrupt further, the Committee on Appropriations will have before it, perhaps, the defense plans of each of the branches of the armed forces. They will have their plans of operation, not singly, not one by one, but they will have them all at one time.

Mr. GURNEY. That is correct. Of course, that refers to logistic plans, not strategic plans.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Of course. Mr. GURNEY. In a recent letter to the committee the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, our distinguished former Secretary of War, went straight to the heart of the matter with these words:

What the bill does—

Said Mr. Stimson—

is to delegate to a recognized officer of the Government a part of the authority over the military establishment which in the end always belongs to the President. If it were possible today for any President to give his full attention to military affairs, this step would not be necessary.

For Congress to fail to take this necessary step, in my opinion, would be tantamount to restraining the Commander in Chief from the most efficient possible performance of the responsibility which the Constitution places upon him.

There are some who express a fear that the creation of this office will lead toward dictatorship. I urge those who voice such views to be more objective in their thinking. The Secretary of National Security is being given no new powers by this bill. He is a full-time Presidential representative exercising delegated Presidential power to assist the President in carrying out his responsibility to the Congress, the Nation, and the armed forces. Not since our Nation was young and relatively small has the President been able to assist adequately the Congress in obtaining an over-all picture of our security needs. This bill provides an officer short of the President who can accept in part the President's responsibility to keep the Congress fully and continuously advised of the needs of the armed forces.

Some have feared that this Secretary would be a meddler who would tamper with our military departments. Even a casual reading of the bill will disclose that the administration of the departments will be left to their respective secretaries and that the military forces will be commanded by their respective heads. The sort of order or direction which would be exercised by the Secretary is well illustrated, in my opinion, by the 29-word directive which was issued to General Eisenhower for the invasion of Europe. That directive reads as follows:

You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.

This pointed the direction in which the effort was to be made and stated the ultimate mission or goal. It did not say how it was to be done or deal with details.

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Nor is it intended under this bill, Mr. President, that the Secretary be concerned with details. His task is to keep our military forces heading toward a common goal and to see that they work in harmony and with efficiency. How each element accomplishes its task will be left to the secretaries of the departments and the military commanders, with the advice and assistance of the joint bodies upon which there is equal representation for all.

During the hearings before your committee there was much discussion about the possibility of the Secretary determining the specific roles and missions of the various elements of the armed forces. I think it might be well at this point, Mr. President, to clarify that subject for those Senators who have not had time to study the hearings.

Congress has been given the responsibility under the Constitution to determine what kind of military forces the Nation shall have and how large they shall be. The mere creation by the Congress of a Navy or an Army implies a basic reason for its existence and suggests its general mission. Provision for an air force, for instance, implies that it will be used in air combat; similarly, the law providing for artillery assumes that it is a ground force. The specific combat tasks, however, that are to be performed by any element of the armed forces have never been written into law, because the way in which our military forces are used is the responsibility of the Commander in chief. As the Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, it is the President's day-to-day responsibility, in war and in peace, to give direction to the military forces in the light of current scientific developments and current international balances.

For us to fix by law the specific combat missions of our armed forces would characterize us as being Maginot-line minded. Specific roles and missions could be specifically assigned if we were limited to a small battlefield instead of the whole world and if we knew in detail what kind of war the next one would be, but to set them in the concrete of permanent law, under the conditions of modern total warfare, would prevent the President from exercising the discretionary authority which is wisely provided for in the Constitution.

It is not intended that the President will delegate the authority to assign combat roles and missions to the Secretary of National Security. When the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy presented their joint agreement on unification to the President, they suggested that he issue an Executive order contemporaneously with the approval of this bill, setting forth the current roles and missions of the armed forces. This the President agreed to do, and the draft of the order has been approved by both the Army and the Navy. These combat roles and missions, once established by the President, can be changed only by him. The Secretary cannot do it.

The whole purpose behind the suggestion of writing combat roles and missions into the law rather than leaving them to the President as we have traditionally done for 170 years was that fear

had been expressed that one or more components of the armed forces might be discriminated against by a designing secretary who sought to eliminate them. What kind and how many military forces we have, I repeat, is the responsibility of the Members of Congress, which they cannot delegate to anyone else, even if they wanted to. It is inseparably linked to the control of the purse by Congress. It may well be that the advice of the military experts on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which has equal representation from Army, Navy, and Air Force, will be sought in making a decision as to what forces we shall have, but the final determination is still for the Congress and for no one else. Therefore, Mr. President, I say that the fear of the elimination of some element of the armed forces resolves itself into a fear of the Members of Congress of its own power, and not that of the Secretary, who must work with what Congress provides. Nevertheless, to make doubly certain that the intent of the bill was made crystal clear it has been amended by your committee to safeguard the Marine Corps and naval aviation by specific language, as follows:

SEC. 206 (b). The provisions of this act shall not authorize the alteration or diminution of the existing relative status of the Marine Corps (including the fleet marine forces) or of naval aviation.

Representatives of the Navy Department, including the Commandant of the Marine Corps, agree that this language makes it unmistakably clear that the interests of the Marine Corps and naval aviation are being protected.

Now, I should like to turn to another matter which has been given a great deal of attention in considering this legislation—the matter of procurement and services.

Most of the examples of wasteful duplication which have been pointed out as a deficiency in our conduct of the war have to do with services and supplies. Many situations existed where the Army and Navy maintained duplicate facilities not fully utilized by either. Wasteful competition and overbuying existed in the procurement of common-type supplies. The elimination of these faults of operation should therefore be a source of great economy.

I may interpolate here that the evidence leads me personally to believe that about 67 percent of the Army and Navy needs are common items, and that under the committees so far established there have been combined purchases in about 11 percent of them. Therefore, in that respect there is an important goal to be attained and quite a saving in prospect—the difference between 11 percent and 67 percent.

It is essential, in my opinion, Mr. President, that we seek to economize by eliminating unnecessary expenditures of manpower, strategic materials, and normal supplies. One solution which has been considered is a centralized procurement agency within the National Security Organization. At first blush this might seem to be a good solution. Careful study of the subject, however—and I assure you, Mr. President, that it received very careful and thorough study—

indicates that the solution offered by this bill is much to be preferred.

During the war our two executive departments which performed most of the services and purchased most of the supplies commenced operation in these fields as totally independent and self-sufficient entities. Before the war was over, by reason of sheer necessity and in the absence of any laws to facilitate close collaboration, there had been created some 2,200 committees to try to bring about some semblance of joint action. For the most part they were unsuccessful. In my judgment, a joint procurement agency or jointly operated services would have been almost as bad. We would then and would now disrupt efficient organizations of the military forces to create a new joint organization for the purpose. What we needed then and what we need now is a joint—staff—agency such as the Munitions Board which can determine after study by representatives of all the arms, the agency best qualified to procure what item and to perform what service. Once a decision is made upon a given subject we put a stop to duplication, overlapping waste, and the unnecessary expense which accompany them. At the same time we will not thereby interfere with the integrity of any service or disrupt or scramble it with another. We call this cross-procurement and cross-servicing. It is a sound method of operation, which has the support of all the services. It will save money and men. Under this method the using service, retains the responsibility for procuring specialized items peculiar to that service, while at the same time the door remains open to single procurement of items common to several components of the armed forces. This method also permits standardization of specifications for a multitude of common use items, in itself an important saving device. Such standardization has the cumulative effect of making manufacture cheaper and easier, and of simplifying packaging, storing, and distribution.

It is thus clear that all the savings visualized by the advocates of centralized procurement can be effected under the system of cross procurement provided for in the bill, without disturbing presently operating procurement agencies which are experienced and efficient in their fields.

Critics of unification often demand to know—with tongue in cheek, I think—how much in dollars and cents will be saved each year by unification. I consider the question wanting in frankness because, obviously, no one can spell out in microscopic detail the amount of the dollar savings that will result.

But that there will be savings from unification of the Armed Services—and substantial ones—is crystal clear to anyone making even a casual examination of the legislation. Personally, I think the savings will be astonishingly large because, if for no other reason, our present system is so horribly uneconomical.

The bald fact is that as our security system is now constituted there is no one directly concerned with the defense establishment who has the authority to effect the savings which the taxpayers have a right to expect.

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When Secretary Patterson testified before your committee, he said in part:

Every year I have been asked, when I go down to the Appropriations Committee of the House, how this program fits in with the Navy Department's program. My answer is always, "I don't know." They will say, "Does General Eisenhower know?" I say, "No; he does not know."

They say, "Hasn't he ever studied the Navy budget?"

I say, "No; it is not his duty to, and it is not my duty to."

And, of course, the same thing is true of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. We could not possibly tell any committee of Congress how the two programs fit.

Unfortunately, this little colloquy is as truthful as it is ridiculous—I have heard it many times myself. Clearly, we will not have real economy in our defense organization until we take the obvious first step of giving someone the authority to effect economies and the opportunity to effect those economies with full knowledge of their impact upon our national security. The bill takes that step by setting up a Secretary of National Security.

The bill before the Senate for consideration, in addition to the elements included in the National Security Organization, provides for the creation of a National Security Council. This Council, reporting to the President and having as permanent members, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Security, Secretaries of the military departments, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, gives us for the first time a permanent organization for the thorough integration of our foreign and military policies. Recognizing that military policy is an extension of foreign policy, it gives us a means of developing our foreign policy upon the basis of our military and economic strength. This function is now performed by the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.

As an important adjunct to the National Security Council there is provision for a Central Intelligence Agency, which fills a long recognized demand for accurate information upon which important decisions, relating to foreign and military policy, can be based.

The National Security Resources Board, headed by a chairman and composed of the heads or representatives of such departments and agencies as the President may appoint, will in time of peace advise the President concerning the coordination of military, civilian and industrial mobilization to provide him with a sound basis on which to evaluate the elements involved in our domestic, military and foreign policies.

In time of war it would be made the effectuating agent for putting mobilization plans into operation generally, and for determining the needs of the civil and military elements of the nation and allocating material and facilities among them.

By means of the National Security Resources Board, Mr. President, there would be established adequate and timely provision—provision now desperately needed—for the protection and planned employment of our national

resources; for we cannot afford ever again to dissipate those resources in the pursuit of extemporized plans, conceived in haste and executed under the pressure of emergency.

Mr. President, before I close, I want to recognize and refute the charge that no nation which unified its forces ever won a war. Critics of unification have contended that Germany, for example, had a single military establishment. Let us be clear on this point.

When General Eisenhower appeared before our Senate Military Affairs Committee during the last Congress, he said:

The facts are that Germany never had a single department, nor even unity of direction. One of the major contributing factors to the Nazi defeat was the utter lack of unified direction over the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht, both in the Mediterranean and in Europe.

What about defeated Japan? Japan had two separate departments; one for the Army and another for the Navy, with no coordinated, unified command.

What about defeated Italy? Italy had three separate departments; one for the Army, another for the Navy, and a third for the Air Force, but no unity of command over the three.

And all three of those nations were defeated.

The problems of America's defense are peculiarly America's problems. We should look to other nations and to the experiences of their forces only for the purposes of guidance—but as we look at the experiences of other nations, we can certainly find nothing to recommend separate and uncoordinated defense forces.

Mr. President, many grave problems face the Eightieth Congress—problems calling for prompt and sound solutions. None, in my opinion, transcends in importance and urgency the proposal before the Senate today to unify the armed forces.

The profound significance and far-reaching effect of the legislation may well change the course of history.

I am sure the Senate understands that there is involved here more than a problem of organizing armies and fleets and air forces. There is embraced in the legislation the far greater task of laying the foundation and planning the structure of total national effort in event of total war—and it is perhaps the most challenging organizational problem that any nation can face.

It is not being an alarmist to point out that, with the development of supersonic planes and guided missiles with atomic warheads, the cushion of distance provided by the Atlantic, Arctic, and Pacific Oceans will no longer provide a corresponding cushion of time in which we may react to attack and mobilize our forces. It is not being an alarmist to point out that in the event of another global war hostilities will be initiated without prior warning, and by an attack as complete and devastating as lies within the capabilities of the nation which launches it.

Clearly, Mr. President, the time to plan—the time to prepare—is now.

And yet much of the planning of our military services has had to mark time—

has necessarily had to wait for long months while these basic problems were debated and studied and finally resolved. It is now within the power of the Congress—it is now its responsibility—to give those services improved procedure and adequate agencies to help them with their tremendous task. It is now within our power to shun any display of weakness and vacillation which might encourage aggressors or lessen the faith of free peoples in our steadfastness of purpose. It is now within our power to give the President the help he so urgently needs, and to replace the security organization of 1798 with the organization of 1947. It is now our responsibility to act, for I say to the Senate, in all sincerity, to procrastinate is to invite disaster.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GURNEY. I yield to the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. REVERCOMB. I ask the Senator to yield for a question because I am very much interested in the statements which he made with respect to the lack of effectiveness of the German forces and the Italian forces because there was no unification between the various departments of the army and of the navy. What was the situation with respect to the British forces? Was there unification between the navy and the army such as is advocated by the Senator?

Mr. GURNEY. Not entirely so. However, their basic law is much better than ours; and the white paper recently issued does unify their forces in a much better way than during World War II.

Mr. REVERCOMB. But there was not the unification which the Senator advocates, between the British Navy and the British Army.

Mr. GURNEY. No; not entirely during the war.

Mr. REVERCOMB. I thank the Senator.

Mr. GURNEY. However, there was a unification between their combined staff and our combined staff. There was also an over-all allied combined staff. But we lose that combination and authority of combined forces just as soon as the war powers become inoperative, as soon as we reach the point where they cannot mutually agree, as they had to do during the war.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JENNER in the chair). The question is on agreeing to the committee amendment.

Mr. LODGE obtained the floor.

ALLEVATION OF DAMAGE FROM FLOOD OR OTHER CATASTROPHE

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield to me?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, Senate bill 1515, Calendar No. 447, provides for making surplus property available to States and local governments to alleviate the suffering of the victims of flood and other catastrophe. The bill was unanimously reported from the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments last Thursday, but unfortunately there was no opportunity to bring it before the Senate at that time.

I have discussed the bill with the leaders of the Senate on both sides. I find

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no objection to it. It is essential, if it is to be of value to the sufferers from the recent flood and other catastrophes, that it be passed without delay. So I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be temporarily laid aside, with the understanding that we shall return to it immediately following consideration of the bill, and that Senate bill 1515 be considered at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 1515) to make surplus property available for the alleviation of damage caused by flood or other catastrophe.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, I do not rise to object to consideration of the bill. I merely wish to ask a question. Does the bill apply only to certain properties? I may say that I have discussed the bill with the able Senator from Vermont, and I am in favor of the objective; but does it apply only to certain kinds of property which will be useful in flood relief and in the replacement of building and structures which have been destroyed by floods?

Mr. AIKEN. That is true. It applies only to the victims of catastrophe such as flood, explosion, or any other catastrophe which brings about human distress.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Does the surplus property go to State and municipal governments rather than to individuals?

Mr. AIKEN. That is correct. The bill provides, first, that the President must make a determination that a catastrophe has occurred. A good example was the Texas City catastrophe. Another good example is the recent catastrophes from floods and other causes. When the President makes a determination, then the War Assets Administration is authorized to turn over to the Federal Works Administration any property which may be useful in alleviating the suffering of the victims. The Federal Works Administration will dispose of such surplus property to States and local governments, with or without compensation. Then the States and local governments will have the property wholly in their hands, and will make such arrangements as can be made to rehabilitate the people within their States or cities, under agreement, of course, with the Federal Works Administration.

Mr. REVERCOMB. As I understand, the property goes no further than the State or municipal government; in other words, the State or municipal government cannot dispose of it to individuals.

Mr. AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Can it convey title and ownership?

Mr. AIKEN. The property must get into the hands of the individual in some way; but the committee did not feel that the Federal agency should deal directly with individuals.

Mr. REVERCOMB. I do not mean that the individual may not use the property; but is the property eventually to be a gift from the Federal Government

to the State government or to the city government? After the property leaves the municipal government does it go into the hands of individuals as gifts to them? I have in mind construction machinery, such as bulldozers and concrete mixers. To whom will such property belong?

Mr. AIKEN. That kind of machinery will belong to the State or municipal government. It is not contemplated that surplus property of that kind shall be given free of charge.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. GURNEY. As I understand, the bill about which the Senator from Vermont is speaking has not yet displaced the unfinished business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It has not as yet.

Mr. GURNEY. Reserving the right to object, I ask the Senator from Vermont if he is willing to defer the consideration of the bill if the debate on it takes longer than 10 or 15 minutes.

Mr. AIKEN. That is correct. I am willing to desist if the debate seems to take too long.

Mr. GURNEY. With that understanding, I have no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota can call for the regular order at any time.

Mr. AIKEN. Let me say in reply to the Senator from West Virginia that it is not contemplated that equipment which has permanent value shall be given to the States or municipalities. They would be able to purchase it from the War Assets Administration if it were necessary to rehabilitate their people in a hurry. However, with respect to such things as medicines, temporary bedding, and other similar items of property, it is not believed that a charge should be made for them. Such property could be given in the nature of a grant.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. AIKEN. I yield.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. As a member of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, of which the Senator from Vermont is chairman, I have had something to do with the bill in addition to being one of its sponsors.

I feel that the bill meets a drastic emergency need. I heartily join with the chairmant of the committee in his representation of its emergency nature. I am satisfied that sufficient safeguards have been thrown around the disposition of surplus property so that the property will not and cannot go to the individual use of any persons aside from municipalities or public bodies. Is that the understanding of the Senator, too?

Mr. AIKEN. That is my understanding.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Equipment such as bulldozers and other earth-moving equipment and heavy equipment of a permanent nature can either be leased, with a return provision when the emergency has ended, or it can be sold for its reasonable value, if that procedure is deemed to be sound.

I invite the attention of Members of the Senate to one further point, and that is that the bill is restricted, first, to the declaration of a catastrophe or emergency in a particular section or location. Secondly, the property is to be available for use only in an emergency or catastrophe. I ask the Senator from Vermont if that is his understanding.

Mr. AIKEN. The explanation of the Senator from Iowa is entirely correct.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Permanent property, such as earth-moving equipment, can and probably will be returned to the agencies from which it was obtained when the catastrophe has been ended or the repair has been accomplished.

Mr. AIKEN. That is correct.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. As the Senator from Vermont pointed out, expendable goods such as medicines, and perhaps in some cases food, will be consumed in the process. But I assure the Senate that in my opinion ample safeguards have been established not only to meet the emergency, but to protect and safeguard property.

Mr. AIKEN. The Senator is correct.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I was called from the floor for a moment and I did not hear the Senator's request. Will he repeat his request?

Mr. AIKEN. The request was to lay aside temporarily the unfinished business so that the Senate may consider the bill which was reported last Thursday, providing for the use of surplus property for victims of flood and other catastrophe.

Mr. WHITE. Is the bill on the calendar?

Mr. AIKEN. It is.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. AIKEN. I yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. I do not wish to take up time to suggest the absence of a quorum, but some of my colleagues on this side are not present, and I should like to ask the Senator if the report from his committee is a unanimous report, or was there any objection?

Mr. AIKEN. The report was unanimous. I believe there are eight or nine Members present out of the 13.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. In that case I shall not ask for a quorum call. I am heartily in favor of the measure, but I thought that there might be some objection on the part of Senators who are not present.

Mr. AIKEN. I discussed the matter with several Members on the other side of the aisle and found no objection. The minority leader, however, is not present, but I have confidence enough in the humane spirit of the minority leader to feel that he would not object if he were present.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. The minority leader, I understand, has no objection to the consideration and passage of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 1515) which had been reported from the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, with an amendment to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That, notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the War Assets Administration shall, whenever the President shall determine it to be necessary or appropriate because of flood or other catastrophe, transfer, without reimbursement, to the Federal Works Agency such articles of personal property, which have been declared surplus under the provisions of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (58 Stat. 765), as amended, as in the judgment of the Federal Works Administrator and the War Assets Administrator can be presently utilized in alleviating damage, hardship, and suffering caused by such flood or other catastrophe.

Sec. 2. The Federal Works Administrator is authorized to loan or transfer, with or without monetary consideration and upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe, to States and local governments situated in any area struck by any such flood or catastrophe, any property transferred to the Federal Works Agency for such purposes pursuant to the provisions of this act. All receipts from such transfer shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States to the credit of miscellaneous receipts.

Sec. 3. In carrying out the provisions of this act the Federal Works Administrator is authorized to utilize, and act through, any other Federal agency or any State or local government and he may utilize, without reimbursement therefor, such officers and employees of any such agency or State or local government as may be found necessary in carrying out the purposes of this act. In order to facilitate carrying out the purposes of this act, other Federal agencies shall cooperate with the Federal Works Agency and the War Assets Administration to the fullest extent consistent with the objective of this act.

Sec. 4. To carry out the provisions of this act, including administrative expenses in connection therewith, any funds available to the Federal Works Administrator or Agency for use in connection with the transfer of surplus or other excess property, under Public Law, 697, Seventy-ninth Congress, are hereby made available; and for such purpose there is authorized to be appropriated such additional sums as may be necessary therefor.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Swanson, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 3647) to extend certain powers of the President under title III of the Second War Powers Act; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MICHENER, Mr. SPRINGER, and Mr. CRAVENS were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills, and they were signed by the President pro tempore:

H. R. 195. An act to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to sell certain lands in Alaska to the city of Sitka, Alaska;

H. R. 325. An act to transfer Blair County, Pa., from the middle judicial district of Pennsylvania to the western judicial district of Pennsylvania;

H. R. 599. An act declaring Kenduskeag Stream, Penobscot County, Maine, to be a nonnavigable waterway;

H. R. 770. An act for the relief of Norman Abbott;

H. R. 837. An act for the relief of the estate of Abraham Banta Bogert;

H. R. 959. An act to amend section 3179 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code;

H. R. 1513. An act for the relief of John C. Garrett;

H. R. 1610. An act to amend the act of June 14, 1938, so as to authorize the Cairo Bridge Commission to issue its refunding bonds for the purpose of refunding the outstanding bonds issued by the commission to pay the cost of a certain toll bridge at or near Cairo, Ill.;

H. R. 1851. An act for the relief of A. J. Davis, Mrs. Lorene Griffin, Earle Griffin, and Mary Musgrove;

H. R. 1866. An act for the relief of Paul Goodman;

H. R. 1893. An act to authorize the sale of the bed of E Street SW, between Twelfth and Thirteenth Streets, in the District of Columbia;

H. R. 1945. An act to amend sections 2801 (e) (4), 3043 (b), and 3045 of the Internal Revenue Code;

H. R. 1946. An act to amend section 2801 (e) of the Internal Revenue Code;

H. R. 2302. An act for the relief of the New Jersey, Indiana & Illinois Railroad;

H. R. 2470. An act to authorize the establishment of a band in the Metropolitan Police force;

H. R. 3072. An act to authorize the preparation of preliminary plans and estimates of cost for the erection of an addition or extension to the House Office Buildings and the remodeling of the fifth floor of the Old House Office Building;

H. R. 3235. An act to amend the Code of Laws of the District of Columbia, with respect to abandonment of condemnation proceedings;

H. R. 3251. An act to amend the act of July 24, 1941 (55 Stat. 603), as amended, so as to authorize naval retiring boards to consider the cases of certain officers, and for other purposes;

H. R. 3515. An act to make it unlawful in the District of Columbia to corruptly influence participants or officials in contests of skill, speed, strength, or endurance, and to provide a penalty therefor;

H. R. 3311. An act making appropriations for the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and the judiciary, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, and for other purposes; and

H. R. 3547. An act to authorize funds for ceremonies in the District of Columbia.

INTERSTATE WATER RIGHTS IN COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a copy of Senate Joint Resolution 145, to authorize commencement of action by the United States to determine interstate water rights in the Colorado River. The resolution is now pending before the Senate on a motion to appeal from the decision of the Chair made by the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN]. Copies have not been printed, and I thought it would be helpful to the Members of the Senate if the joint resolution were printed in the RECORD so that it would be available when the matter is

under consideration tomorrow under a special order.

There being no objection, the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 145) to authorize commencement of an action by the United States to determine interstate water rights in the Colorado River was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas the development of projects for the use of water in the Lower Colorado River Basin is being hampered by reason of longstanding controversies among the States in said basin as to the meaning and effect of the Colorado River compact, the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the Boulder Canyon Adjustment Act, the California Limitation Act (Stats. Cal. 1929, ch. 16), various contracts executed by the Secretary of the Interior with States, public agencies, and others in the Lower Basin of the Colorado River and other documents and as to various engineering, economic, and other facts: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, etc. That, for the purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of actions and expediting the development of the Colorado River Basin, the Attorney General is hereby directed to commence in the Supreme Court of the United States of America, against the States of Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah, and such other parties as may be necessary or proper to a determination, a suit or action in the nature of interpleader, and therein require the parties to assert and have determined their claims and rights to the use of waters of the Colorado River system available for use in the lower Colorado River Basin.

UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED SERVICES

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 758) to promote the national security by providing for a National Defense Establishment, which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Defense, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force within the National Defense Establishment, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Defense Establishment with other department and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, let me say at the outset that I am opposed to any bill which endangers the civilian character of our Government. I am opposed to any bill which in any way weakens or dilutes or impinges upon the autonomy, the morale, and the esprit of our existing services, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and the Coast Guard. I am opposed to censorship or muzzling or preventing any men from fully expressing themselves. Let me place all those sentiments in the RECORD at the beginning. I would not be in favor of any of those things. I should like to have that understood before I begin.

If Members of the Senate are wondering how they shall vote on the pending unification bill, I ask them first of all to try to visualize in their mind's eye what the war of the future will be like. Once they have done this I have not much doubt what their conclusion will be.

What will this dreadful war of the future be like? I quote from an expert, Lt. Gen. Lawton Collins.

We could expect—

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He says—

that the war would start very suddenly and come through the air and that the enemy would try to eliminate the United States at the outset, not making the same mistake as last time of taking on somebody else first and allowing us to prepare. The attack would be primarily at the great cities and would cause great destruction both to physical structures and the people. It might involve atomic bombs, radioactive materials, biological warfare, and crop-destroying chemicals. The atomic bomb would probably be used against cities in preference to military targets. We would have chaos, with communications disrupted, millions of persons sick, wounded, and dying, civil disorder and sabotage. The initial bombing attack would likely be followed by airborne troops. There is also the possibility of long-range submarines popping up offshore and directing guided missiles to targets on this continent.

There is the opinion of the responsible professional. Can Senators imagine it? Can they visualize this country with its cities in smoking ruins, its railroads destroyed, its major bridges blown up, all communications such as telegraph, telephone, and mail obliterated? Can they see the dead and the wounded and those who have been artificially made sick by radioactivity and by the germs of biological warfare? Can they comprehend it? It is hard for us Americans to do so, because never in the lifetime of a single American has our country ever been really stricken by a foreign foe. But we might as well start thinking about it now, because if there is another war, that is the way it is going to be.

Then what happens? While we are groaning and suffering, before we have even had time to bury the dead—the airborne attack will come and maybe we will be hit by amphibious attacks from submarines and new-type naval craft. They would, of course, try to invade with actual armed troops just when our demoralization is at its worst, before we have had time to put out the fires, to repair our roads and railroads, while we are still coping with defeatism, demoralization, and disorder.

This is no fantasy. This represents the thinking of many serious and experienced officers.

One military expert says our bomber effectiveness could be wiped out overnight. It could be done by simply loading some shock troops into a half-dozen old transport planes and flying them to each of our six strategic air bases, where they would kill off our few trained bomber crews. It would be a year before we could train new crews. Could we reasonably expect to have another year?

I am not an expert; I am merely a student who tries to keep track of what experts think.

Students of the problem place great emphasis on the enemy working through a powerful fifth column, using sabotage with trained enemy sympathizers operating within our country, taking full advantage of any subversive elements who happened to be here. Therefore, they say, all key installations, whether they be civilian public utility plants or military air bases, would have to be guarded against this particular type of attack.

Mr. President, the conflict which these experts describe would not be merely a subject of civilian defense. It would not be something which could be met with a police force and a few civilian defense volunteers. It would be war—and the worst this country would ever have known.

Probably every man, woman, and child would have to rally to the common defenses. There would be American troops to meet enemy troops, but the entire Nation would have to seek and destroy the scattered air-dropped enemy soldiers, discover and eliminate the spies and saboteurs, fight the fire and pestilence, aid the wounded and maimed, and take part in every other conceivable kind of disaster relief. Our armed forces would comprise only a part of this effort, for the holocaust would be so widespread that nobody anywhere would be safe.

The possibility of panic and anarchy as the enemy bombarded a shocked and shattered people with persuasive propaganda urging us to quit, and promising us what they would call a just peace would also be a tremendous danger.

Above all remember this: Each part of the United States would be isolated from every other. These isolated areas, or pockets, or islands—call them what you will—would in all probability be wholly unable to reinforce each other, either with men or with ammunition, food or other supplies, because roads, railroads, and airfields would be destroyed. The initial force of an enemy invasion would have to be met by troops in the area at the time the blow fell, but again I warn that our own troops would not be in sufficient numbers to repel attacks from every quarter; probably every citizen have to rise against the foe.

Mr. President, there is one picture of what the beginning of future war might be like. Can you see the confusion? Can you picture to yourself what chance we would have of ultimate victory if we had to sit down among the smoking ruins and then try to set up a military command which could take charge of the situation, restore order, repel and destroy the invaders, and conduct the counterattack which would lead to victory?

I repeat, Mr. President, because we must say it over and over and over again to ourselves that whole sections of the country will be cut off from the others. One might say: "Headquarters at Washington will simply send a telegram naming General So and So or Admiral Such and Such to be in command in New England or in California or in Washington or in the Tennessee Valley or wherever the blow or blows might be falling." But, Mr. President, will there be a headquarters at Washington? May it not have been wiped out? Even if there were a Washington with men in it, who could write out orders, is it likely that the orders would be sent or received?

I realize that there are students of the art of war who picture a wholly different type of attack. They argue that the rockets alone will settle the issue, and

will do so in a matter of days, and that manpower is not so important as some of us think it is. In a brilliant and provocative book entitled "There Will Be No Time," William Liscum Borden makes observations which certainly deserve attention, if not agreement. Borden is impressed by these two facts: First, that a single bomb destroyed three-fifths of Hiroshima; and, second, that German V-2 rockets reached a speed of 3,500 miles an hour. He cites the statement, in General Marshall's 1945 report, that—

Goering stated after his capture that it was a certainty the eastern American cities would have been under rocket bombardment had Germany remained undefeated for two more years. The first attacks would have started much sooner.

Borden then declares:

According to Col. John A. O'Mara, of the Air Service Technical Command, the 250-mile extreme range of Hitler's V-2's could be tripled 6 months after VE-day, and flights of 12,000 miles are the foreseeable goal. The United States Army, aided by German scientists, imported from Peenemunde, has conducted successful rocket soundings of the ionosphere over New Mexico; the Navy claims a rocket motor whose thrust exceeds that of the original V-2 by one-third; and Britain has engaged 30,000 square miles in southern Australia as a huge proving ground. The famous multibarreled katusha gun vouches for a long-standing Soviet interest in rockets; experimental robots have recently strayed across the Swedish and Norwegian borders; and at least three U. S. S. R. agencies are known to be active in ionosphere research. All signs indicate that the time lag between Nazi long-range missiles and round-the-world improvements will be short. Before World War II, Belgian fighter pilots found it difficult to attain top speed without overrunning the boundaries of their small country. The great powers are confronted with a similar problem in testing out rockets whose vast range will carry them far beyond national frontiers. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have already recommended surveys for a range on which missiles may be fired at targets 2,000 miles away. A related problem now vexing inventors is how to prevent improved V-2's from drifting off into space because of the earth's low gravitational pull at altitudes above 500 miles.

The accelerating pace of inventions underlines the importance of weapons as yet unknown or undeveloped. Occupation of Japan exposed research upon a death ray capable of killing rabbits at a distance of 40 yards, while the Germans experimented with a sound machine whose pressure waves would theoretically disable troops over a considerable area. Developments in the field of missiles include the Felix, a target-seeking bomb responsive to heat; the Glomb, a television-controlled bomb; and the Bat, whose radar homing instinct caused it to change course relentlessly in pursuit of zig-zagging Japanese ships. Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, the Army Air Forces research director, has actually predicted space vehicles as a likely development of the next few years. In this category might be included satellite rockets which would revolve in an orbit around the earth and when war came, plunge down on the enemy. Planners at the Army's Wright Field testing center foresee artificial planets propelled into the ionosphere, there to form bases for meteorlike bombardments. Under serious study are methods for diverting the ocean's currents and for impregnating clouds with fission by-products, so that subsequent raindrops would

bristle with radioactivity. No possibility is too far-fetched for investigation, not even that of detonating atomic bombs in the antarctic polar regions, which might cause so much ice to melt as to raise the level of the seas, which in turn would inundate such coastal cities as New York. Most awesome and threatening of all is the theory that ionospheric layers shielding the lower atmosphere from the sun could be thinned out over an enemy country. The sun's powerful radiations would then pour through unfiltered and incinerate all life on the exposed terrain.

In the field of poison gas, 1,500 chemicals were tested at a secret University of Chicago Toxicity Laboratory; and Germany developed an almost odorless series known as the Tabum gases, said to be far more toxic than any previously discovered. Deadly fungi, rickettsiae, and bacteria can now be mass-produced for use against men, animals, and plants.

Mr. President, I have just been reading quotations from the book *There Will Be No Time*, by William L. Borden, who writes of some of the things we can contemplate in the war of the future. I shall make four or five quotations from his book, because it is a new one and I think it is extremely interesting.

Borden then speaks of the relative ease of launching rockets in World War II. He says on page 49 of his book:

Launching emplacements consisted of metal tables only 12 feet square—

That occurred during World War II; that is something which was in existence during that war—

small enough to be transported in trucks, and German ground crews were capable of setting up the complete firing apparatus in one-half hour. The rocket-borne atom bombs would require exactly 5 minutes and 6 seconds to reach cities in Britain 200 miles distant. A radar altimeter or even a simple anroid pressure device would cause the warheads to detonate between 1,000 and 2,000 feet in the air, as at Hiroshima, so as to maximize blast effect. German V-2's were not perfectly accurate; but, of those crossing the English coast, a majority struck within 4 miles of their targets, near enough for atomic effectiveness. Casualties from the Hiroshima bomb were closer to 150,000 than 100,000. Taking the latter figure as a conservative estimate, a hundred V-2's could in 6 minutes account for 10,000,000 people, or nearly one-quarter of Britain's total population. Such an attack, far from being a futuristic dream, may have been practical as early as 1945 in terms of the weapons already used successfully in combat. Allowing for developments which must be regarded as a certainty, this is a sure of rocket vulnerability will soon come to include every nation on earth, notably the United States.

On page 52, the author I am quoting makes this statement:

The atom is potentially endowed with such destructiveness that if a rocket-borne nuclear bomb were aimed at the White House in Washington, and actually struck in Bethesda, Md., the Capital City might still fall within the scope of devastation. In time the principal demand on a rocket carrier may be to land the explosive within a territorial area the size of Delaware—especially if the warhead be designed more to scatter radioactive material than to maximize blast.

Will we have a long warning of the approach of danger? He tells us:

Assuming that the present armistice endures until long-range missiles overshadow the heavy bomber, the sole overt warning the United States may have of an enemy

attack is a flight of unidentified rockets on her radar screens. In this initial blow each American community of 5,000 people or more could theoretically call forth a separate rocket. Germany manufactured 650 V-2's per month at a unit cost of some \$35,000. Prof. J. Robert Oppenheimer, former in charge of the Los Alamos, N. Mex., laboratory, has estimated that without any change in existing techniques mass production will reduce the expenditure on one atomic bomb to around \$1,000,000. Since there are only about 2,100 United States communities with a population in excess of 5,000, the money cost of directing a rocket-borne atomic bomb at each in a single mass assault might not exceed \$5,000,000,000, hardly a prohibitive sum in wartime. It is conceivable, though unlikely, that a sneak attack would give no clue to the enemy's identity. Thus a revived Japan might strike at America, not by firing rockets eastward from her home islands, but by firing them westward across Asia, Europe, and the Atlantic Ocean. The inference would then be that our enemy lay in Europe. Hostile rockets may well be powered with atomic energy, but there is little need to explore that possibility, real as it is. The enemy will hit with at least the suddenness of a V-2, whose average ground speed of 2,400 miles an hour has long been an accomplished fact.

Assuming that we have been attacked, what happens next? Borden provides this answer:

If our counterattack were built around rockets guided by human pilots, men would have to be alerted and assigned targets at a briefing. They would lose time adjusting headsets, parachutes, shock absorbers, and the Martian equipment requisite to protect bodies from the terrible heat created by atmospheric friction on a rocket's outer skin, as well as ionospheric extremes of warmth and cold. The men would have to be transported out to dispersal areas and strapped in their ships. They would take off and accelerate slowly for fear of physical injury, and when they curved from vertical to horizontal flight the surge of centripetal force would require deceleration—giving the enemy longer to gear his defenses. By the time our rockets were ready for bombs away, several hours might have elapsed, long enough for the opponent to secure an important and perhaps decisive advantage.

On the other hand, robot-controlled rockets could be on the launching ramps, aimed, and ready to fire as soon as unfriendly missiles appear to our radar sentinels. In the event that the identity of a potential enemy were uncertain, a separate set of ramps could be held in readiness especially for each powerful foreign state. If one attempted a rocket Pearl Harbor, countermeasures would go into effect before the aggressor's missiles exploded over North America and hampered our ability to retaliate.

Listen to this:

We cannot relax in the thought that another aggressor will resemble Hitler, and that hence we shall recognize him in time to take defensive action. The first victim may not be a small neighboring land or a hapless colony. Any incident reminiscent of Manchuria, Ethiopia, or Czechoslovakia would immediately serve notice that the whole world was being attacked, the United States included. Instead, the aggressor might bypass his small neighbors, postpone his colonial ambitions, and fire rockets directly at the United States, which has been underestimated in two wars and which now stands forth clearly as the main challenge to any world conqueror. The little countries could be dealt with more easily and much more safely after the United States was out of the way. There seems to be little likelihood of an unfolding, step-by-step pattern of

aggression, beginning with persecution of minorities, passing through ideological attacks, and culminating with the seizure of one small nation after another.

So much depends on surprise that the aggressor-to-be may be expected to use diplomacy not to alert his victim but rather to lull him into a cozy sense of security. The time for a future Hitler to ready his rockets and atomic bombs is not after the presentation of an ultimatum but after an international conference in which he has made every reasonable concession. The time to attack is not after the aggressor's diplomats have walked out of the United Nations but after the speeches in which they have praised it and declared that nations must cooperate or perish. Here is the way diplomacy, one of the important weapons of war in peace, could be used to reap the full advantage of surprise.

It may be objected that this technique is too cold-blooded and treacherous even for a regimented population to tolerate. It is said again and again that the majority of people everywhere desire peace. Doubtless the statement is true, and hence the people might be expected to revolt against a dictator who followed up a peaceful diplomacy with an unprovoked aggression. The fact is that in any country where power is concentrated in the executive, a dictator can justify treachery merely by whispering to his people, as did Hitler.

Of course, there will be new forms of sabotage and new forms of Trojan horse tactics. This is how this author describes them:

Perhaps an American rocket site in North Dakota will be so deep underground and so cunningly protected by counter-magnetic fields, heat neutralizers, and decoys as to baffle an aerial attack. In that event saboteurs might drive a large moving van concealing an atomic bomb into the fortress' vicinity and thus pave the way for its elimination.

Another famous weapon of war in peace—propaganda—may likewise be tailored to help the offense achieve total surprise. The purpose will be to relax tension in nations being fattened for the kill. Where there is little tension, appropriations for national defense are cut to the bone. Scientists resign from research for the government and return to private universities. Therefore, hostile propaganda might lose its old virulence and take on a conciliatory tone. Political parties which acted as the aggressor's sounding board could be ordered to speak in softer tones than before and to form a united front with moderate groups. Thereupon the victim's fears would tend to dissolve. In addition, much propaganda capital could be made of mankind's yearning for world peace. A reincarnated Goebbels would speak of outlawing war and of one world or none, echoing the very phrases most expressive of peaceful hopes. Far from advocating rebellion and barricades, the new propaganda might even be used to reinforce democracy. From the aggressor's point of view, democracy is the form of government most likely to be caught off guard in a surprise attack. Hence, it might profit him to bolster a government which in the past has usually waited for an armed attack before taking war seriously. Should the democracies awaken to the danger of surprise and therefore ready their defenses for instant use, the aggressor might foment criticism of such defenses as a barrier to international good will.

He concludes that victory depends on "our readiness to fight on a moment's notice, in terms of preexisting stockpiles. We fight with what we have got. Our armed forces should be designed to

fight independently, regardless of conditions on the home front."

It will be seen that his view of future warfare differs markedly from that held by many of the professionals whom I quoted at the beginning of my speech. But he, too, radical thinker that he is, draws the same moral from his contemplation of these horrors. He says that if headquarters A in Arizona were knocked out, headquarters B in Alaska would take over direction of the war, and if it in turn were destroyed, headquarters C in Puerto Rico would assume command. In other words, he visualizes a command and a plan already in existence, because he is sure of what I am sure of, and of what other experts are so sure of, that every part of our country will be cut off from every other. So, in the last quotation which I shall make from his book, I read this brief paragraph:

On the political front our national policy should give precedence over all internal problems to defense. There is only one fundamental issue: Whether or not the Nation will survive. Except as they affect our ability to remain strong, strikes, price control, business regulation, pensions, and other domestic questions are of the most trivial consequence. We need an arrangement with Canada for joint defense of the Canadian Arctic. Fortunately, both countries have a stake in close military cooperation, since any rocket threat to either would loop over the top of the world. American secret intelligence should be under Army-Navy control and not in any way connected with our State Department—an organization which has sufficient worries of its own without trespassing into the military sphere. It is not too soon to consider the problem of national disaster precautions and perhaps building codes which would require earthquake-resistant materials to be used in new urban structures. The need for a whole war's supply of weapons on hand in advance of any fighting, for a unified Department of Defense, for ocean bases, and for sufficient trained professional soldiers has already been stressed. Not to be overlooked is the necessity of legislation authorizing the armed forces to act instantly in case of attack, regardless of whether Congress is in session, how little diplomatic tension exists, and what time of the day or night the attack comes.

Indeed, we could not improvise a plan. We could not take our time as we did in the last war to decide that General X should command one theater and Admiral Y should command another. We could not, after the blow has fallen, indulge in the luxury of that careful, deliberate, advance planning which we have come to associate as being so vital to military success. The plan and the commanders would have to be ready in anticipation of the attack. There would have to be commanders set up to provide for every kind of disaster with staffs and plans which would enable them to conduct operations on land, sea, and air. If the unified command is not in operation before the blow strikes, we shall never survive. The first battle may well be the last.

As General Eisenhower told the Compton commission:

The decision in a future conflict will be determined by our ability to act and react in the first 60 days, rather than in the twelfth, eighteenth, or twenty-fourth month, as in past wars.

One must be ready when the whistle blows. If he is not ready, the whistle, so far as he is concerned, will be the last trump.

Can it be wondered that the Compton commission, which has just finished its survey of what the war of the future will be like, comes to this conclusion? I quote one paragraph:

Because the striking force and the other elements necessary to support it would entail use of air, sea, and ground strength and because all other phases of future war would similarly involve the most coordinated use of our military and civilian energies, we consider it a matter of extreme urgency that there be immediate unification of the armed forces. There can be no realistic planning or preparation without unity. The reluctance of Congress and some branches of the Military Establishment to move wholeheartedly toward unification has been a powerful deterrent toward acceptance by the public of the idea that unity of purpose in our national life is the foundation stone of our security.

I have heard some high-ranking officers say that, of course, unified command is absolutely essential in what the strategists of the last war called the forward areas, but that it was not necessary in the continental United States. In the war of the future every area is a "forward area." As the Compton commission declares:

The addition of the atomic bomb to the incalculable horrors of modern war has eliminated the concept of zones of safety in any future attack on this country.

What happens to the engines of modern war in a case of that kind? How long can the Navy, for instance, continue if all heavy industry is knocked out, if all refueling facilities are destroyed, if pipe lines, tank cars, and all those things are gone? How can the Army or the Air Force hold out since they are dependent on heavy industry? It has been heartening for me to note in recent conversation with friends in the Navy their keen appreciation of the importance of the so-called zone of the interior and of the vital need for a unified command here in the United States, if we are ever to sustain our military power away from our shores.

So there, Mr. President, is my first reason for favoring unification. Without unification we are doomed by the nature of future war, the first effect of which will be to disunite us tactically. I say with all the vigor and all the sincerity of which I am capable, without unification we cannot even begin to fight.

What are some other reasons? Let me assume that we have staved off the first attack—that we have pulled ourselves together and have begun counter-attack and counterbattery. Supposing that we are lucky enough once more to be fighting an overseas war along more or less conventional lines. We know from experience, Mr. President, that we cannot win such a war without a unified command.

I hasten to add that I would be vigorously opposed to any so-called merger bill in which one branch of the service gobbles up another. I want to preserve all the glorious traditions and esprit de corps and effective autonomy of the Air

Force, the Army, the Coast Guard, the Marine Corps, and the Navy. Let me say, too, that I am opposed to anything which in any way threatens the civilian character of our Government. In my judgment, the bill before us contains none of these dangers.

Perhaps I can point out, without being considered too personal, that, emotionally, I feel allied to all the services. Close relations of mine spent their lives in the Regular Navy; my father was in the Navy in the Spanish War, and my brother and my son were in the Navy during World War II. I have relatives and many close friends in the Marine Corps and the Air Force, and, of course, I myself have been in the Army Reserve during all my adult life. I received my first military training at a camp operated by personnel of the United States Marine Corps. As a newspaperman, I made a special study of naval matters and became a director of the Navy League of the United States. To this was added the experience of writing on naval matters for the New York Herald Tribune and other publications, as well as membership in the United States Naval Institute, the Naval Historical Foundation, and the Board of Visitors to the Naval Academy at Annapolis.

When I first came to this body, in 1937, I tried to continue my study of national defense questions. I was a member of the Committee on Military Affairs and was the ranking Republican member of the subcommittee on naval appropriations. Throughout this whole period I was regularly performing short tours of active duty in the Army, where I learned many things which were of immense value to me when I actually went to war, and which experience also taught me many things about human nature in its relation to military problems.

It so happens that I was first commissioned in the horse Cavalry and later was transferred to the Armored Force, which was the World War II descendant of the Tank Corps of World War I. I remember how long it took for the horse to die out in the Army. I think there is a bill on the calendar now, by which the Remount Service is transferred to the Department of Agriculture; which, I suppose, marks the formal end of the horse in the Army. It took a long time. I remember in particular certain Horse Cavalry maneuvers in Texas in which we marched all day alongside of the road while trains and automobiles whizzed by. Every day an old, emaciated-looking tramp used to start out with us in the morning. Regularly in the evening he would pass us. I wondered why it took the Army so long to consider the Horse Cavalry in its proper perspective when it seemed that everyone outside the Army was perfectly clear about it. Later I realized that it was because there were certain persons who had made a life study of the horse and his place in warfare and were naturally convinced that there was nothing which could take his place. I do not say for a minute that these men clung to the horse for selfish reasons or because they thought that if the horse disappeared their chance for distinction, prestige, and promotion

would vanish, although some uncharitable persons made that statement. I am perfectly willing to believe, and I do, that these Cavalry officers were honestly convinced that it was vitally necessary to maintain large units of horse Cavalry. Horse Cavalry was what they knew and they had advanced too far in life to learn something else.

I do not doubt that in the Navy there are also officers who cling to weapons and methods that become outmoded and, for all I know, there are some in the Air Force, even though it is such a new type of warfare. We may develop a guided missile or rocket which does not require anyone to be in it, and there may be found heavy-bombardment advocates who will be holding back and not favoring the use of the guided missile because they cling to the old traditions. I think we all realize that there are also men of that type in business and the professions and it is something with which one must cope—gently if possible, but certainly effectively.

The human tendency for men to divide themselves off into groups is very strong. In the Army there is considerable so-called "branch consciousness"—much too much, to my way of thinking. Of course, I am not talking about the question of unit pride—that conviction held by the members of an air corps squadron or a destroyer or an artillery battery that their outfit or ship is the best in the Army or Navy. That is something entirely different. That is wholesome and good—something which every commander strives, with justification, to inspire in his men. That is something which applies to young men in combat. But I never could see why it was necessary for a coast artilleryman to think he was better than a quartermaster, or for an infantryman to think he was better than a tank man. It is just like saying that apples are better than steak. The two are not comparable. I feel the same way about the old Army and Navy rivalry. I always get a little suspicious when I hear someone say that "the infantry is the queen of battle and the land battle decides the war", or that "seapower determines the victory", or that "airpower is everything in modern war." It is all right for college boys to cheer themselves hoarse about Annapolis and West Point or Harvard and Yale, but when manhood is reached that sort of rivalry and separatism seems utterly out of place. I have lived long enough to realize that it is a very real factor in human nature and is not confined to college boys—grown and otherwise mature men are quite sincere about it. It exists not only in the armed services. I have seen this old school-tie spirit as it might be called, among members of the legislature and Members of Congress. In politics George Washington called it the spirit of the party. It is something which can never entirely be eliminated. The danger is not that this separatism will be abolished; the danger always is that it will go too far and create so much division that effective action is impossible.

We hear it said: "The old methods served us well, therefore why change?" Or: "It is better to do nothing at all than to make a mistake." Whatever validity

these philosophies may have had in the past, they are definitely and indeed dangerously out of line today. We must be bold nowadays and we must be prepared to accept new ideas. One often saves more life by experimenting than by being conservative.

My overseas wartime military service began in Libya in 1942 where the Germans had superiority in the air and on the ground and in the Mediterranean. When we heard a plane in those days, the chances were that it was a German plane. I shall never forget the atmosphere of the battlefield at that time—it was so different from anything I ever ran into later. Senators may remember that the British had lost control of the Mediterranean and that the Germans could come across practically at will. The British had to send their shipping all the way around Africa with enormous delay and expense. It was an object lesson to me in the vital importance of maintaining seapower and sea communications and showed the unspeakable things which happen to a ground Army when it is not supported by an adequate Air Force. That is just one little object lesson which I learned through my own little humble experience, which is very similar to that of millions of individuals.

In Sicily later on, as an observer, I saw General Patton's march along the northern coast road. On the left of this road was a steep precipice below which was the ocean. At the right the mountains rose steeply. When General Patton wanted to make any kind of a flank attack he either had to use mules in the steep Sicilian mountains to go around the right flank or to use naval vessels if he wanted to go around the left. Senators may remember that he had several flank attacks which were carried out by the Navy, and that he had the most harmonious and efficient working relations with the Navy. The result of it all was that the campaign was over in 38 days, which I believe is remarkably quick. If any one factor were to be singled out to explain such a success it was the completely enthusiastic, hard hitting and unreserved teamwork between land, sea and air, teamwork that went ahead without quibbling or pettifogging or suspicion of motives.

Once again, as an observer, I was in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. While I did not witness any actual combat in those areas, I saw enough of those who were engaged in the operations to realize that the whole war out there was a type of leapfrogging in which the Navy and the Army sought to make possible the acquisition of landing fields for the Air Force, whereupon they leapfrogged each other and went forward again, bypassing some islands and landing on others. I do not know whether there is such a word, but I would say this was a completely triphibious type of war. Admiral Halsey, one of the great leaders of all time, in my opinion, for whom I have a limitless admiration and a deep affection, and who accomplished such miracles in the Pacific, actually had one unit under his orders which was commanded by a general in the Army, with

a captain in the Navy as chief of staff, and a colonel in the Marine Corps in charge of operations. That is how far it went. Everyone liked it, and everyone up and down the line was in favor of it.

My next experience was in Italy where I served in an outfit which was on the west flank and went up the Italian shin-bone. There, as everywhere else during the war, I often bumped into naval personnel because the Navy was supporting the detachment at the Anzio beach-head—it will be remembered what a rugged time that was—and doing so under tremendously difficult conditions. There was nowhere one could go where the enemy was not looking right down one's throat all the time. The whole harbor was under enemy observation and artillery fire. I witnessed the enormous air bombardment at Cassino and like every other experience in the war it showed the absolute necessity for teamwork between the different combat elements.

Finally I was one of the many who took part in an amphibious operation—that is an experience in which millions and millions of Americans have shared—which was the landing in southern France, and saw with my own eyes both the plans and the elements of land, sea, and air which participated in it. It was impossible to see the planes coming overhead and to have the Navy pick us up and put us on the beach at the right time and the right place, without giving us a proud feeling that we were all part of a team and that the essential thing was the fact that we were all making our contribution to victory together for our country.

One cannot go through such experiences as that—and they were typical average experiences which I know millions and millions of men in this war underwent—without coming to some pretty strong general conclusions about the way in which our national defense set-up should be established. I am not going into technicalities because I am not equipped to do so. In fact, if there were any real differences of opinion between the officers of our Army and Navy who were charged with studying this matter, I might not be speaking today. The fact, however, that they have agreed on a proposal to unify the services and have done so only after great soul searching and great difficulty, makes me feel very strongly that any man is bold indeed to be the instrument which breaches that agreement. I mean, of course, one who breaches that agreement because of any military considerations. Those who fear that it will set up a power in the Government which will threaten the civilian character of our Government are in a different category. I do not happen to share that worry because I cannot see that it creates any more power than exists already in the President. In my opinion, former Secretary of War Stimson made the complete answer to the charge of so-called military dictatorship when he said:

The Secretary of National Defense will be a powerful officer. That is entirely proper. He cannot successfully exercise his functions without adequate and flexible power. But it should be observed that he is given no powers

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which do not already belong to the President as Commander in Chief. What this bill does is to delegate to a recognized officer of the Government a part of the authority over the Military Establishment which in the end always belongs to the President. Under this bill the President as Chief Executive retains his powers unchanged; he is provided with a suitable officer for the proper exercise of these powers; that officer remains under his entire control. This appears to me to be a wholly proper and natural step, entirely in keeping with our best administrative practices.

In other words, to charge that the Secretary of National Defense will be a military dictator, or a czar, or what have you, is simply to level the same charge against the President, since his powers are given as Commander in Chief under the Constitution. If these charges are justified, then we have been living under a military dictatorship during the lifetime of our Republic.

Prof. Barton Leach, of Harvard Law School, who held several important posts in the Army during World War II, has this to say:

It is a basic reality that a leader of a military establishment must have authority if he is to be effective. You cannot run armies by negotiations. Authority and discipline are the military counterparts of negotiation and discussion in civilian affairs. The Constitution of the United States recognizes this reality by placing in the hands of the President both civilian authority over the executive departments which control the armed forces and military authority over the forces themselves. In Washington's time the burdens of the office of President were such as to make it possible for the President to be, in reality, the civilian and military leader of the very limited armed forces we had at that time. The principle that authority is needed has not changed. Demands upon the man, who, under the Constitution, holds the joint position of civilian and military leadership, have seriously changed. In order to make the President's unified control a reality this bill proposes to give to him a single civilian official who, in pursuance of the President's power and under the President's direction, provides the single authority over the armed services which the Constitution envisaged. Far from being a departure from the wisdom of the fathers, this bill is an implementation of that wisdom and an adaptation of the principle of singleness of control to the realities of our present-day institutions.

I do not favor unification, however, merely because the armed forces have agreed upon this bill, although I think this is a persuasive consideration. My prime reason for favoring unification is that I think it is utterly vital to have the chain of command clearly set up and clearly established. During the course of these remarks I have, first, examined this proposition from the standpoint of the war in the future. Then I examined it from the standpoint of the war in the past World War II, through which we have just come.

No matter how we look at it we are brought to the conclusion that there must be unity.

My feeling as to who should occupy the places in that chain of command is as nothing compared with my belief in the importance of having such a chain. It would be all right with me, as one whose military experience was in the ground Army, to have all the top posi-

tions filled by the Navy or the Air Force so long as the chain of command and the unified team play is a guaranteed fact. It cannot be improvised quickly, and if there is another war, I repeat for the tenth time, we cannot expect to have 2 years in which to argue these things out. This is something which much be ready when the whistle blows.

My second principal reason for favoring unification is that it will result in a definite well-thought-out procedure for the allocation of our available supply of military manpower. Saving money is, of course, of vital importance. But to save manpower is even more crucial because we have a definite shortage of manpower in this country for all of the things that we need to do. If we take the age group of young men physically fit for military service and then deduct the ones who must remain in essential nonmilitary activities, we have not a great deal left. It is too important a matter to leave the allocation of this manpower to last-minute horse trading between the Army and the Navy and the Air Force, as was the case during the war. There must be a definite system of allocation. This is one of the results which will flow from having the machinery to take care of the problems which all the services have in common.

Third on my list is the economy which will come from the elimination of duplicate facilities. The distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. GURNEY] has gone into that question in detail, and I shall not repeat what he said or try to duplicate it. We may differ as to how much money it will save; but it will certainly produce some very real economies.

Fourth, I notice that in this bill the National Security Resources Board is given as one of its functions the duty of advising the President on policies to establish adequate reserves of strategic and critical materials and for the conservation of such reserves. The adoption of an intelligent policy with respect to our diminishing raw materials of all kinds is of vital importance and can mean the difference between defeat and victory in case of war.

I have heard a good deal said about the cooperation which has been achieved so far by using the present system. I was not at a sufficiently high level during the war to speak from personal knowledge of the way the high command functioned; but from what I have read and conversations I have had, I am perfectly prepared to believe that much good work has been done. I do, however, suggest that such integration as has taken place has been due to the pressure of events during the war; and I would not be surprised to learn that some of it was due to the fear of legislative action here in Congress, which would naturally tend to force officers who are not in favor of unification to take some sort of action in order to avert what they might consider was a greater evil.

Mr. President, these are my reasons for favoring unification. Of course, with respect to every legislative proposal, as we all know who are here in the Senate,

there are always arguments on both sides. There is only one argument which has been made against the bill which I think would have merit if it could be sustained. That argument suggests that unification will tend to destroy the autonomy and the esprit de corps of the different branches of the service. I tell you very frankly, Mr. President, that any legislation which I thought would destroy the esprit de corps, the morale, the traditions and the fighting efficiency of the Navy or the Marine Corps or the Army or the Air Force would incur my strongest opposition. I not only do fail to find anything in the bill which would enable that to be done, but I simply cannot conceive of any responsible officer in any of our services desiring to do such a thing. We want to preserve all the strength that we can. The traditions and the morale of a crack outfit like our Marine Corps, for example, are a tremendous national asset; and I have never met an officer in any other branch of the service who I thought was intelligent and who has been successful, who did not agree.

I do not think that we here in Congress can legislate very far into the future, although it is our job to make the best estimate of the future that we can make. That is what makes our job so difficult. In this case, what I want to see above all is the seed planted and given a chance to grow. I have faith in the teachings of experience, in the impact on this plan of the personalities of the men who will administer it, and I believe they are sure to be able men of great character and ability. I have faith in the fact that circumstances will mold this scheme in a realistic way.

All I have tried to say today is that in union there is strength. This is as true in the field of the armed services as it is in the field of public affairs. Modern science has made union more desperately necessary than ever. We must unify or we will perish.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MARTIN in the chair). The bill is before the Senate and is open to amendment.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming obtained the floor.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for the purpose of suggesting the absence of a quorum?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum is suggested. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Connally	Hickenlooper
Baldwin	Cooper	Hill
Ball	Cordon	Hoey
Barkley	Donnell	Holland
Brewster	Dworshak	Jenner
Bricker	Ecton	Johnson, Colo.
Brooks	Ellender	Johnston, S. C.
Buck	Ferguson	Kem
Bushfield	Flanders	Kilgore
Butler	Fulbright	Knowland
Byrd	George	Langer
Cain	Gurney	Lodge
Capehart	Hatch	Lucas
Capper	Hawkes	McCarran
Chavez	Hayden	McCarthy

McClellan	O'Mahoney	Taylor
McFarland	Overton	Thomas, Okla.
McKellar	Pepper	Thye
McMahon	Reed	Tydings
Magnuson	Revercomb	Umstead
Malone	Robertson, Va.	Vandenberg
Martin	Robertson, Wyo.	Watkins
Millikin	Russell	Wherry
Moore	Saltonstall	White
Morse	Smith	Wiley
Murray	Sparkman	Williams
O'Connor	Stewart	Wilson
O'Daniel	Taft	Young

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eighty-four Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is present.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, I desire to speak on behalf of the avowed objectives of Senate bill 758, and to propose amendments which will enable it to achieve its goal. To the bill itself—as it now stands—I am unalterably opposed. I cannot by any flight of imagination regard it as an effective instrument for the attainment of its asserted objectives. I cannot, indeed, regard it as even a worth while effort to achieve them. Aside from its pretentious title, and a pious declaration of policy thrown as a sop to those whose criticisms could not be completely ignored, there is nothing in the bill which promises any substantial improvement over the existing security structure of the Nation. There is much, on the other hand, which will subtract from, rather than add to, the national security.

Mr. President, at the outset I want to state and I desire it to be publicly known that I am 100 percent for unification of our armed forces. I am for the unified command of all forces in every theater of operations in wartime or in peacetime—which we have today. I am opposed to a "merger" of the armed forces; and when I say that, Mr. President, it seems to me unnecessary to say that I am opposed to Senate bill 758 in its present form. In this form, Mr. President, the bill is first and foremost a merger of the armed forces.

According to the dictionary definition of the word "merger," it means, "To sink the identity or individuality of; cause to disappear, be combined, or be swallowed up; to lose identity or individuality; be lost to view or absorbed into something else."

I repeat that I am for the unification of the armed forces, but, Mr. President, in order to obtain real national security, I am for the unification and coordination of much more than the armed forces. I am for the coordination of every phase of our national life which affects national security. I am for the unification and coordination of those phases of our national life, together with the armed forces of the Nation. I am for the coordination of every department and agency of the Government concerned with national security—which the title of this bill sets forth, but never performs.

Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee of the Senate started open hearings on this bill on March 18, and continued them through April until May 9. Members of the committee who attended these hearings found that they left them but little time to attend to other important Senate duties. Almost daily the committee was unable to pro-

ceed with the hearings on account of the lack of a quorum, and often the hearings were delayed from 30 to 45 minutes. This, Mr. President, was no fault of the members of that committee; rather is it the fault of the Reorganization Act under which we are working. Let me call the attention of the Senate to the fact that in this Eightieth Congress, the Armed Services Committee is a "merger" of the Military Affairs Committee and the Naval Affairs Committee of the Seventy-ninth Congress. Each of those committees, Mr. President, had 18 members, making a total of 36. This Armed Services Committee has a membership of but 13 members. Yet, there are just as many functions to be performed by those 13 members, just as many bills to be considered, just as many important hearings to be held by those 13 members as there were by the 36 Senators of the two committees in the Seventy-ninth Congress.

With the Senate meeting almost daily at noon, it does not take a mathematician to figure out the limited time of each day's committee hearing. Although the committee is scheduled to meet each morning at 10 a. m., it was rarely that the hearings started before 10:30, and on many occasions not before 10:45.

Again I say, Mr. President, that this casts no reflection on the chairman or on members of the committee. The bald truth of the matter is that under the present system—that is, under the Reorganization Act—it is a most difficult matter to get a quorum of the committee in all instances.

There is another angle to this matter, and that is the waste of valuable time that is caused the many witnesses the committee has to hear. The Armed Services Committee provides an excellent example of this waste of time of important witnesses. Illustrative of this is the calling of the committee, we shall say, to hear the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Nimitz. The committee is called at 10 a. m. It is 10:45 before a quorum is present, and there is only time to hear Mr. Forrestal; and even 1 1/4 hours is all to short a time to hear the Secretary on such an important bill. Admiral Nimitz has to go away to come back the next day or at the next meeting of the committee. The same thing happens with Secretary of War, Mr. Patterson, and General Eisenhower—and not only with these top officials but with countless others who come to the committee hearings, expecting to be called, and then go away and are asked to come back another day. I do not know whether the Army or the Navy or the Marine Corps keep a record of all calls to, and appearances before, Senate committees, but it would be interesting, and I venture to say amazing, to learn the number of man-hours wasted by officers and men of the armed services as a result of our operations under the Reorganization Act.

After the open hearings closed on May 9, a number of executive committee meetings were held between that date and June 5, the date on which the final executive session was held; and the bill

was voted on to the calendar on June 6, 1947.

During all that period, Mr. President, from March 18 to June 6, the Armed Services Committee was practically unable to consider any of the vast number of bills which were before it. For 11 weeks, out of a total of 27 weeks Congress has been in session, S. 758 was being considered by the Armed Services Committee. I repeat, Mr. President, this is no reflection on the chairman or any members of the committee, but to reduce 2 major committees of 18 members each to 1 committee of 13 members is just not feasible or workable, and certainly is not in the interest of efficiency.

Mr. President, I firmly believe that the most important thing that we, the Senate of the United States, have to consider is the security of the United States. Everything else pales into insignificance compared to the security of the Nation. This is no party question—it is a national question. National security does not belong to any party, any group, any majority, or any minority. It affects every man, woman, and child in the United States. But more than that, Mr. President, our national security, or insecurity, today affects every soul in the world.

If the United States should for any reason whatsoever lose or be unable to maintain its position of national security, then the people of no nation in the world could be considered as secure. Many of the nations of the world today have no national security.

Mr. President, when I speak of national security, I do not mean an army, a navy, or an air force, as these are but the physical means of fighting a battle to maintain security, or to repel insecurity after all other peaceable means have failed.

To be the only Nation to be well fed, where almost every family has an automobile, where the highest wages in the world are paid, where the greatest profits in the world are made, where production is, and can be, greater than in almost all the other nations in the world combined, where our wealth and national income are beyond the dreams of almost any other nation in the world—that is not national security.

If we do not take care of these fundamental assets of our nation, and coordinate them all into one great security program, then we lay ourselves open to the possibility, maybe probability, of having our great national security threatened by insecurity.

Mr. President, Senate bill 758 bears the impressive title of "A bill to promote the national security by providing for a National Defense Establishment, which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Defense, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force within the National Defense Establishment, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Defense Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security."

It is indicative of the thinking of the framers of this bill, S. 758, that in the original bill, title I, entitled "The Na-

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tional Defense Establishment," should be purely military, and that the National Defense Establishment, according to the bill, was to consist of:

Section 101: Establishment of the National Defense Establishment.

Section 102: Secretary of National Defense.

Section 103: Military assistants to the Secretary.

Section 104: Civilian personnel.

Section 105: Department of the Army.

Section 106: Department of the Navy.

Section 107: Department of the Air Force.

Section 108: United States Air Force.

Section 109: Effective date of transfers.

Section 110: War Council.

Section 111: Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Section 112: Joint Staff.

Section 113: Munitions Board.

Section 114: Research and Development Board.

Title II of the bill was outside, separate and apart, from the Defense Establishment, or, as it is now called, "The Security Organization." Title II was entitled "Coordination for National Security," and consisted of:

Section 201: National Security Council.

Section 202: Central Intelligence Agency.

Section 203: National Security Resources Board.

In an effort to bring a realization to the members of the committee that we were seeking a national security organization and not a national military establishment, I was able to have the committee amend the bill so as to make title II, "Coordination for National Security," Title I, thus at least placing first things first.

I must take immediate exception to the application of the term "National Security Organization" to an establishment which is patently a military establishment. National security encompasses far more than the activities of the military departments and the armed services. It is the concern of every citizen—of every man, woman, and child in the United States. It is not only their concern—it is something to which they have in the past contributed and must in the future contribute a substantial portion of their time and their toil. Can my colleagues say to the farmer in his fields, the worker in the factory, the teacher in the classroom, the scientist in the laboratory, or the civil-defense worker patrolling his rounds—can my colleagues say to these citizens: "You are not a part of the National Security Organization. None but military forces contribute to the security of this country." I cannot do so, and I do not believe any of my colleagues can do so, either. Yet S. 758 says that, and we are asked to make that statement law.

The drafters of S. 758 could be excused for such a palpable misuse of the term "National Security Organization" if there were evidence that they were otherwise conscious of the importance of the civilian population and the civilian economy in the achievement of national security. We might excuse them of any intent to deny this importance if elsewhere in the bill there appeared some recognition of

the vital role which the civilian segment of the Nation plays in maintaining its security—if there were due provision to take their viewpoint, their contribution, and their requirements into account.

Much needs to be done to perfect the security of our Nation—but it cannot be perfected if we confine our operation to the province of the military. The lessons of the past great war have indicated that inadequate coordination in and between the departments and agencies of the Government representing the civilian elements of the Nation were of no less importance than the shortcomings of the military departments and the armed services. In spite of strenuous efforts to bring about coordination between civilian elements, and between civilian and military elements, the results were far from satisfactory.

Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence that a most fertile field for integration of the elements of national security lies among the civilian departments and agencies of the Government, or between the civilian agencies on the one hand and the military agencies on the other, the framers of S. 758 have made no attempt to solve this most important aspect of their problem.

According to its title, this is a bill "to promote the national security by providing for the coordination of the activities of the National Security Organization with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security." Wherein does the language of the bill itself support such a title? If such language appears in the bill we should expect to find it in title I—Coordination for National Security—and more particularly in the provisions relating to the National Security Council. From its name and its status as the principal advisory body to the President in matters relating to national security, one might imagine that this body would bring together all the diverse elements of national security, where the potentialities and the requirements of each element could be weighed, and responsibilities apportioned. Surely this is the common ground where diplomacy, agriculture, industry, labor, education, science, and all the other civilian elements of national security would meet with the military and together come forward with balanced programs for the security of the Nation. Surely, in addition to the military departments and the Department of State, we should find represented here, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Interior, and the Treasury, the Director of the Atomic Energy Commission, perhaps the chairmen of the congressional committees most vitally concerned with problems of national defense. But not so. Observe its narrow membership. Other than the President, there are the Secretary of State, the four military secretaries, and the chairman of a national security resources board. What have we represented here? Foreign policy, military policy, and, to some extent, economic policy. But what of the other elements of national security? They are simply not included.

If the language relating to the National Security Council fails utterly to sub-

stantiate the claim of the bill's title that it provides for the coordination of the activities of the National Security Organization with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security, what other language is there in title I or in any other title of the bill to support such a pretentious claim? Mr. President, I have looked searchingly and without success for some evidence that something more than lip service has been paid to the civilian elements of national security—diverse elements of no less importance than the military elements, though less obvious and certainly less vocal. I have sought in vain to find some recognition of the fact that coordination and integration of these elements is one of the real problems facing us today. I have found no such evidence, no such recognition.

If the bill does not coordinate all elements of national security, then what is it intended to do? My colleagues need not turn to the so-called declaration of policy for an answer to this question. The declaration of policy is a soporific to dull the perceptions of those who seek to understand the bill. Let my colleagues read the language of the bill itself; there, we can find an answer if we look closely enough.

The real intent of this bill is to create a vast military empire, one in which ambitious men will wield greater power over the Military Establishment than has ever been heretofore granted to non-elected individuals, and one which will wield untrammelled power over the entire social and economic structure of the Nation.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, or would he prefer not to yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I am yielding to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator, from what provisions of the bill does he draw the inference that there is to be greater military power given to any one man than is the case under the existing law?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, when the pending bill, as it does, creates the Secretary of National Security, over the three Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air, it puts a greater responsibility on that one man than rests on any man in the set-up today.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. But when the distinguished Senator says that the Secretary of National Security is over the three Secretaries, is that strictly true? The Senator from Wyoming had much to do with the argument pro and con in the committee that finally reported the bill in its present form. Does not the bill specifically give the Secretary of National Security limited powers, which are specifically enumerated and set forth, and that all other powers are left in the hands of the present Secretaries? Is that not true?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. It is not true in its entirety. I shall deal with that point as I come to the question of the merger, Mr. President. I shall take care of the Senator's question at that time,

Let us not delude ourselves as to the character of the Military Establishment which this bill would create under the inaccurate title of a "National Security Organization." Here we have a merger of the armed forces, sententious declaration of policy notwithstanding.

I doubt seriously if we would today be considering this proposed piece of legislation had not the Army long ago set its sights on the merger of the armed services into a single service under a single Secretary, a single national Chief of Staff, and a single national general staff. The Navy's objections, supported by a substantial portion of the Congress and the public, resulted in a partial retreat of the Army from its original proposal for a single department and a single service, and a resort to more devious tactics to achieve the same end. The present proposal is a step in the direction of the Army's ultimate goal. It provides a single establishment in which the three military departments and the armed services retain the semblance of autonomy, but not its substance. In the absence of the substance of autonomy, the elements of the Military Establishment will find it increasingly difficult as time goes on to resist the Army pressure to achieve their ultimate goal.

The Army was reluctant to agree to the insertion of numerous clauses that apparently preserve the autonomy of the component departments and services. These supposedly protective clauses lose all their effectiveness—and I am sure the Army was aware of this, when they consented to their inclusion—in the presence of other clauses which give unmistakable, complete authority to the head of the Military Establishment, the misnamed Secretary of National Security.

First, let me read the merger provisions, which compromise eight lines. This is the answer to the question of the Senator from Massachusetts. I quote from title II, section 201 (a):

There is hereby established the National Security Organization, and a Secretary of National Security, who shall be the head thereof.

Let us mark that. The Secretary of National Security shall be the head of the National Security Organization.

Subparagraph (b) describes the composition of the National Security Organization, as follows:

The National Security Organization shall consist of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, together with all other agencies created within the National Security Organization.

The list of those agencies is given in the first pages of the bill, and in this case they are almost entirely military agencies. But there, Mr. President, is the merger. Those eight lines in section 201 (a) and (b) create the merger of the armed forces. Countless persons have written me or told me individually, "I am against the merger of the armed forces, but I am for unification." Many Senators have said the same thing. I firmly believe the majority of the Committee on Armed Services are opposed to a merger but in favor of unification. Yet lines 7 to 14 on page 27 of the bill, which I have just read, create the merger of the

armed forces of the Nation, and place one man in charge of those merged forces. It does not require a lawyer to interpret the words of section 201 (a) and (b). They are clear and decisive. They are the root of the whole bill, and so long as they stay in the bill it is a merger bill, and the press have always been correct in their headlines or releases in giving the name "merger" to the measure.

Only this morning in one of the Washington newspapers I came across this language:

MERGER BILL UP IN SENATE

The Senate today opens debate upon the Army-Navy unification bill forewarned that failure to enact it would make the United States the "only major power which has not modified its Military Establishment"—

And so forth. The article goes on to say:

The measure, requested by President Truman after a more thoroughgoing merger was spurned by Congress last year, would leave the War and Navy Departments intact but would place over them a Secretary of National Security with power to exercise "general direction, authority, and control" over the two war arms.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I should like to call the Senator's attention to a clause on page 31 of the bill with which I know he is familiar, because we discussed the matter at length in the committee. The declaration of policy is stated on pages 30 and 31, and on page 31 it is specifically said: "To provide for" three military departments, and to provide for "unified direction but not to merge" these departments.

"Not to merge" them. Now how can the Senator say that the bill is a merger bill when the declaration of policy specifically says it is not a merger bill?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, I say the declaration of policy is not a part of the law. It simply states in general terms the policy. If that language is followed absolutely in the bill then I have no argument with the Senator, but until section 201 (a) and (b) is eliminated it is in contradiction to the declaration of principles.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield again?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. If the Senator is correct in his statement, then what language in the bill provides for merger? What words in the bill are merger words?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I have just read them to the Senator. I shall be glad to read them again.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I heard those words read, but is there anything in those words that provides for a merger? Do not those words provide for a unified direction rather than a merger?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. No, Mr. President, I do not think the Senator is correct. When one man, the Secretary of National Security, is placed at the head of the organization that makes it a complete merger, and he has complete authority over the various depart-

ments within that merged organization. Let us for a moment see what the duties and powers of this misnamed Secretary of National Security are. I read from section 202:

(a) The Secretary of National Security shall—

(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Security Organization and for all the departments and agencies therein;

(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies;

(3) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of budget estimates; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and supervise the budget program of the National Security Organization.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Yes. Mr. SALTONSTALL. Is not the final determination of the budget the duty of Congress, and if it is the duty of Congress, how can supervision of the work of getting the figures together and coordinating the figures, becomes such an important power as to create a merger or to give the Secretary of National Security more power than he should have?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. No; the fact that he has such powers does not create the merger. The result of the merger is that he has those powers, and he can coordinate the budget, and the estimates all in one lump sum, for the three armed forces.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. But the Congress has the final decision?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. The Congress makes the appropriation.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. Does the Senator think that under those words the Secretary of National Security could modify the uniforms, and take officers out of one branch and put them into another branch, or anything of that kind?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I think he would have such power.

Mr. LODGE. Does the Senator know exactly what provision of the bill gives him power of that kind?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. The power, I believe, comes by reason of his being the head of these three organizations. He is the head of the organization, and he has the power to do anything with respect to functions. I agree with Under Secretary Royall when he says that not only has this man the power to change functions but he must exercise them.

Mr. LODGE. If the Senator will permit me in his time, I should like to say that I would certainly be opposed to anything of that kind. I want to preserve the traditions and the esprit de corps and the autonomy. I think the bill would preserve them.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I know the Senator is honest when he says that he would not agree with the bill if such a provision were in it, but I assure the Senator that that is how I read the bill, and as I have read it from the first.

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That is why I am on my feet today opposing it.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. ELLENDER. I was very much interested in the statement made a moment ago by the distinguished Senator from Wyoming when he said that under the bill a vast military empire can be created. I should like to ask the Senator, how could such a military empire come into being when under section 8 of article I of the Constitution appropriations for military purposes cannot be made for a longer period than 2 years? In other words, it is up to the Congress, as was pointed out by the Senator from Massachusetts, to provide the wherewithal to keep the military and the naval departments operating. If, under the Constitution, which I am sure the bill does not change, it is up to the Congress to provide funds for only 2 years, I was simply wondering how such an empire could be created as the Senator envisaged.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I shall develop that much more fully as I proceed, if the Senator will bear with me.

Mr. ELLENDER. I am very much interested in that point, and I should like to hear the Senator's position with respect to it.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, I just recited the powers and duties of this misnamed Secretary of National Security. I should be grateful if some of my colleagues could point out to me just one thing that the secretary of any executive department could do within his department which the Secretary of National Security could not do within the National Security Organization under these grants of authority.

Except for the dubious right to squeal when stuck, we have given no autonomous rights to the subordinate secretaries. The provision that each department within the National Security Organization shall be administered as an individual unit is inconsequential. Every bureau in an executive department is administered as an individual unit, just as every battalion within a regiment is administered as an individual unit. This is not autonomy; it is simply routine administrative organization. Nor is its significant provision that all powers and duties not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of National Security shall be retained by the subordinate Secretaries; for there are no powers or duties of consequence which have not been conferred upon the super-secretary. The plain fact is that S. 758 creates a new executive department on a grand scale and cloaks the secretary at its head with every power which ordinarily pertains to the head of such a department.

My criticism, however, is not so much that we are providing insufficient safeguards against abuse of power by the head of the National Security Organization, but rather that we are creating such an unnecessary and undesirable organization at all. We are building a new military empire where none was needed, and in doing so we are creating a Frank-

enstein monster which may work to the detriment rather than the enhancement of national security.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator has stated that the bill would create a Frankenstein monster, and has used various other words which would indicate one man was being given tremendous powers. I should like to ask this question: If he has only the powers set forth on pages 37 and 38, where the language occurs designating his powers, and all other powers are retained in the present secretaries, how would a Frankenstein monster be created? What implied powers are being given to him that would create within him such tremendous force?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. In the first place, as I have explained, he is the head of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, together with all other agencies created within the National Security Organization. I think it would be well to refer to those agencies at this time. They are to be found listed under title II, the National Security Organization, sections 201 to 214. I think I have already read them, so there is no need of my repeating them. The Senator has them before him, on page 30 of the bill.

In addition, we vest the super-Secretary with powers to exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies. As I previously stated, he is to have the power to supervise and coordinate the preparation of budget estimates, and so forth. He is to have the power of establishing general policies and programs for the National Security Organization. That means the National Military Establishment. He is to have the power to establish policies and programs for all departments and agencies thereunder. I do not see how we could possibly give any man more power than it is proposed to give to the super-Secretary.

What are the arguments for the erection of a superagency for the coordination of the military efforts and activities of the Nation? For one thing, it is stated that there has been inadequate military coordination in the past. The evidence presented by the military witnesses during the course of committee hearings have brought out instances in which coordination and cooperation could have been improved. The other side of the picture was generally neglected by the administration witnesses. Admiral Carney took notice of this when he said:

I have the feeling that in many instances proponents of merger have overlooked the fact that a great amount of integration has already been accomplished.

After considerable prodding, other witnesses reluctantly admitted that a notable improvement in coordination was actually brought about during the course of the war, and that by its end most of the problems of coordination had been effectively solved—and without merging

the services. The simple fact seems to be that when the need was belatedly recognized, military officers were able to coordinate and cooperate with ease, dispatch, and effectiveness. Now that the lesson has been learned, I do not think it will ever be forgotten.

We are all familiar with the excellent job of coordination which was accomplished in the field by the unified field commands. We are little less familiar with the equally splendid job of command coordination which was effected here in Washington by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have yet to hear any witness challenge the correctness of the decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or offer a valid criticism of the speed with which they were arrived at. It does not require a merger to perpetuate the principle of unified field commands, or to perpetuate the Joint Chiefs of Staff here in Washington. Both are here to stay, with or without a merger.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator stated earlier in his argument, if I correctly understood him, that he was for unification and coordination of more than the armed forces. He has stated that there was unification in the field, and that there was unification in the armed forces in Washington. If this bill, in peacetime, seeks to legalize that unification and continue it, what is the objection to a bill of this character?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. The objection to the bill, as I have endeavored to show so far, and shall continue to endeavor to show, is that the bill is a merger of the armed forces, and very little else. As the Senator knows, I have always claimed that it was absolutely necessary that the Secretary of National Security should be under the President of the United States, and should be Secretary of the entire national security picture, and not merely Secretary of the armed forces, displacing the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force as Cabinet-officers.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Wyoming yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. I should like to make an inquiry of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL].

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield for that purpose.

Mr. DONNELL. I observe, on page 38 of the bill, in line 14, this language:

All powers and duties not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of National Security by this act are retained by each of the respective Secretaries.

I observe, on page 37, as previously quoted by the Senator from Wyoming, that the Secretary of National Security shall, under the direction of the President, perform certain duties, among which are to—

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(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Security Organization and for all of the departments and agencies therein.

(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies.

The question upon which I should like to have the comment of the Senator from Massachusetts is this: What powers and duties are there which are not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of National Security by the bill? Therefore, what powers and duties are retained by each of the respective Secretaries, in the opinion of the Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield in order that I may answer the question?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I think it was the general feeling in the committee when that language was drafted that the general policies referred to, and the duties which the Secretary would perform under the direction of the President, were with regard to laying out the general policies of national defense and national security. He would have nothing to do, for instance, with the education of a naval flier; he would have nothing to do with the education or training of the operator of a tank or with the kind of tank that the Army should use. He could not necessarily say that we should have more jet planes or more planes of another character. Those are problems which are to be worked out, respectively, in the air department, the ground forces, and the Navy. He should, however, have an idea of how those three elements of the national force should be used together to unify all possible methods of establishing our national defense.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a very brief observation?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts, although I am quite puzzled as to how it is possible for any powers and duties not to have been specifically conferred upon the Secretary of National Security by this bill, when by the very language on page 37 it is provided:

Under the direction of the President he shall perform the following duties:

(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Security Organization and for all of the departments and agencies therein;

(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies;

(3) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of budget estimates; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and supervise the budget program of the National Security Organization under the applicable appropriation acts.

It would seem to me that that language is certainly susceptible of the construction placed upon it by the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. ROBERTSON] that it gives the ultimate determination, direction, authority, and control over these departments and agencies to the Secretary of National Security. It is cer-

tainly susceptible, it seems to me, of the construction placed upon it by the Senator from Wyoming to the effect that all powers and duties are specifically conferred upon the Secretary of National Security and that all that are left to the various departments and agencies thereunder are the powers and duties to act as subordinates under the ultimate control of the Secretary of National Security.

May I inquire of the Senator from Wyoming if I have in substance stated his position on the matter?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. The Senator from Missouri has stated my position very clearly, and I thank him.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield further?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I know that the Senator from Missouri is a very careful student of legislation. I would call his attention to the declaration of policy on page 30 of the bill. The declaration of policy, perhaps, is not a part of the proposed law, but it certainly could be used in interpreting the words of the bill. If the Senator reads that declaration of policy I believe that he will answer the question as the Senator from Massachusetts has answered it.

Mr. DONNELL. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts, and I shall not trespass longer upon the time of the Senators.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. Responding to the point raised by the Senator from Missouri, it is my understanding that the Secretary of National Security shall confine himself entirely to those things which are general and not to those things which are special. In the military service those two words have a very clear meaning. I cannot conceive, under this language, and particularly under the language in line 10 on page 38, that he would exercise anything other than general functions for those things which the services have in common. In other words, it would seem inconceivable to me that he would concern himself with questions of uniform, equipment, supply, tactics, training, or any of the other things which take up nine-tenths of the time of a military organization.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield for a brief response?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. I am not familiar, as doubtless is the Senator from Massachusetts, who has just spoken, with the construction of this language in the Army, but it would appear to me that it is perfectly clear that the construction ordinarily given to such language as "exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies."

I say the general construction of that language in law would certainly imply that the official who has that authority has the ultimate general authority, which, as I see it, is the final authority

and control over the departments and agencies involved.

I shall not labor the point or trespass upon the time of any of the Senators, but it seems to me that there is very much to be said in favor of the construction of the Senator from Wyoming, whether we agree with the ultimate conclusion.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator be generous enough to yield again?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. I think there is a misunderstanding of the meaning of the word "general." In most military organizations with which I am familiar there is a general staff. Most of the activities to which the new Secretary, as I read the language, will devote himself will be general matters which the services have in common. Most of the things done in point of time, in point of money, in point of administration are things that they have always handled and will always continue handling.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield for a brief observation?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. GURNEY. I wish to call to the attention of the Senator from Missouri especially the fact that Congress cannot itself relinquish its responsibility. Congress must retain its power to regulate national security, under the Constitution, wherein it is provided that Congress shall provide for the common defense. The power of the purse is all-important. Therefore, I call the Senator's special attention to section 308, page 59, of the bill, wherein it is provided that the budget must be sent to Congress not just as the National Security Secretary wants it, but in minute detail as to the manner in which the secretaries of the branches of the service make their requests to the National Security Secretary.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming again yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. It seems to me that the point made by the Senator from South Dakota certainly indicates that there is detailed statement in the bill as to the requirements of the annual budget, but to my mind he does not answer the proposition submitted by the Senator from Wyoming as to the construction to be placed upon the language on page 38 of the bill, that all powers and duties not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of National Security are retained by each of the respective secretaries.

Looking at that language we immediately search the bill to find what powers and duties are not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of National Security, and we find on the preceding page, which is page 37, that instead of any limitation on his powers, apparently the very broadest possible power is conferred upon the Secretary of National Security, for, without repeating in undue detail, section 202 (a) provides as follows:

Under the direction of the President he shall perform the following duties:

(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Security Organization

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and for all of the departments and agencies therein.

(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies.

I should like to ask the Senator from Wyoming, or either the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] or the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. GURNEY], whether there is any definition of the word "general" in decisions of courts which would enable us to arrive at the proper conclusion to be placed upon the language, "Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies."

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I shall have to leave that to my legal friend from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] to answer.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. MCCARTHY. I should like to ask the Senator, since competent legal minds differ as to the interpretation that should be placed on this language, if that fact alone does not indicate that the powers which are so conferred are so indefinite that they may be dangerously indefinite?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Definitely dangerous, Mr. President.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. GURNEY. For the purpose of further answering the Senator from Wyoming, let me say that the responsibility for performing the roles, missions, and duties to be performed by the branches of our National Security set-up rests entirely with the President of the United States. Under this bill, they are not taken away from the President at all. Under the bill, the Secretary of National Security cannot take them away from the President. They are not changed in any way by the bill. The President himself is the Commander in Chief, and he will remain the Commander in Chief under the Constitution. He alone can set the roles and missions of each branch of the service. Certainly the Secretary of National Security, under the language on page 37, I believe, to which the Senator has referred, could not superimpose himself as the one having the authority that is, of course, retained in the President.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield to me?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. I quite agree with the Senator from South Dakota that the language of section 202 (a) does not superimpose the Secretary of National Security upon the President. In fact, as I have indicated previously, the language is specifically "under the direction of the President."

But as I understand it, the point made by the Senator from Wyoming is that as between the Secretary of National Security and the heads of these various other units, namely, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, the Secretary of National Security is su-

preme, subject only to the direction of the President of the United States.

I ask the Senator from Wyoming whether I correctly understand his position.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. The Senator is correct as to my position.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. The Senator from South Dakota said a few moments ago that the Congress cannot yield the power of the purse, but must retain it. But under paragraph (3) of section 202 (a) it is stated that one of the duties of the Secretary of National Security shall be to—

(3) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of budget estimates; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and supervise the budget program of the National Security Organization under the applicable appropriation acts.

Does not that mean that insofar as the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are concerned the Congress by this act delegates the power of the purse to the Secretary of National Security?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. My own interpretation of that clause is that it means that the Congress surrenders to the Secretary of National Security, absolute power of the purse, as well as practically everything else.

Mr. AIKEN. I can see no other interpretation to be made of that authorization.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, in connection with this matter, I should like to read something which I think answers practically all the questions that have been asked. I refer to the testimony of one of the witnesses who was one of the proponents of this bill, namely, the very able Under Secretary of War, Mr. Kenneth Royall. I quote now from pages 356 and 357 of part II of the hearings on Senate bill 758, the national defense establishment bill:

Mr. ROYALL. . . . I want to say on the functions, I think I stated it later on in the statement that the change of functions can be made in three ways. The President, by Executive order, can delegate that to the Secretary of National Defense, or he can permit the Secretary of National Defense to exercise the powers given him by the bill, but that would be subject to the direction of the President.

Senator ROBERTSON. On page 3, in paragraph 5, you say for the bill to have any real value, for it to accomplish what it is expected, the Secretary of National Defense must exercise as well as possess.

Mr. ROYALL. That is right.

Senator ROBERTSON. Broad authority as to functions.

Mr. ROYALL. That is right. That is right, sir. Of course, that is under the direction of the President.

May I add this, Senator, and I assume that, of course, the bill provides for three separate departments. This does not mean to indicate that the bill contemplates or that any sensible Secretary of National Defense would make changes in roles, missions, and functions, first, unless it was satisfactory with the President or some acquiescence by the President; and secondly, it was to promote either efficiency or economy or security of the country.

Senator ROBERTSON. But, as I gather it, your reading of the bill provides the Secretary of National Defense with the broad authority as to functions, services, procurement, and the like.

Mr. ROYALL. That is right; subject to the direction of the President, and if the President does not himself act in that field, and he has in the case of functions and roles and missions suggested that if this bill is enacted, he will issue an Executive order dealing with that, and the Executive order has been agreed on between the services.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. To answer the question asked by the Senator from Vermont, let me say I think he should read section 308 (a) in connection with the budgetary powers given the Secretary of National Security under section 202 (a), subparagraph (3). Just the first few words of section 308 (a) are:

BUDGET ESTIMATES

Sec. 308. (a) So much of the annual budget transmitted to the Congress by the President as contains the estimates of appropriations for and expenditures by the National Security Organization and the departments therein shall be so arranged as clearly to show—

And so forth. In other words, the National Security Secretary will coordinate the budget, and the President will submit the message, and the Congress will have all the powers it now has under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, the coordination effected in the administration, training, and supply of the armed services is less well known, because it is less spectacular and far more complex; but it was, and is, in many respects as effective as that achieved in the strategic command of the forces. It was brought about by cooperative endeavor and by the more formal efforts of such bodies as the Aeronautical Board, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, the Joint Research and Development Board, and numerous other agencies. Some of these need to be perpetuated by legislation, while others will continue without special statutory recognition. None of them require a merger of the armed services to continue their effectiveness.

Mr. President, I should like to say in this connection that the Armed Services Committee has considered House bill 1366, which has passed the House of Representatives. It is a bill to facilitate procurement of supplies and services by the War Department and Navy Department.

Let me cite some of the methods of effective coordination which came about without benefit of merger. I quote from the testimony on Senate bill 758 of the Honorable W. John Kenney, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, before the Armed Services Committee:

First, there is the collaboration of buyers, wherein the buying agencies of the services are located in the same building and work side by side. Physical proximity and mutual helpfulness are relied upon for results.

This is the method which is used for purchases of textiles and petroleum. Second is

the joint buying agency, which is an agency set up solely to purchase specific commodities for the joint account of the Army and Navy. The Joint Army-Navy Medical Purchasing Agency is an illustration of this.

Third, there is single service, or cross-procurement. Under this method, one service buys all of a commodity required by both the Army and the Navy. Thus the Army buys practically all food for both services and, to cite a different basis for division, all purchases from Pratt & Whitney are made by the Navy, and all purchases from Curtiss-Wright by the Army.

Mr. Kenney went on to say that the purchase of the following styles of material has been coordinated: Landing craft; aircraft engines and propellers; chemical-warfare material; specified items of construction equipment; gasoline, fuel, and lubricants; medical supplies; specified items of ordnance material; subsistence; textiles; internal-combustion engines, hulls, and machinery repair parts for certain vessels; solid fuels; lumber and allied products; specified items of marine life-saving equipment.

Further on in his testimony, on the subject of utilization of facilities, Mr. Kenney had this to say:

Much has already been accomplished in this field of utilization of facilities as a result of the work of such agencies as the Aeronautical Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Research and Development Board, and the Army and Navy Munitions Board. Each case must be analyzed and solved on its own merits. The following are illustrative of accomplishment in this field:

(a) The Army-Navy Air Facilities Committee, formed to facilitate the exchange of facilities, has arranged for the exchanges of complete airfields and joint use of fields. The Navy has taken over 15 or 20 air stations from the Army and has in turn released 2 to the Army and their operation. Eighteen airfields are used jointly and six primary gunnery and bombing ranges are in joint use.

(b) All explosive shipments in the Pacific will be handled through naval ammunition installations which permit deactivation of Army facilities.

(c) There is joint use of the military installations on Johnston Island, Kwajalein, Guam, Okinawa, Alaska, and other areas in the Pacific. This joint use of facilities is not a new development. As an illustration, the Army B-29 that took off from Tinian with the atomic bomb for Hiroshima took off from a field constructed by Navy Seabees and was fueled with gasoline purchased and transported to the Pacific by the Navy. The Army and Navy personnel who manned the plane were fed by food purchased by the Army and transported to the Pacific by the Navy. The bomb was transported to Tinian on a naval vessel, loaded on the plane by Army personnel, armed in flight by a naval officer.

That means given final preparation for detonation—and released by an Army officer.

All this marvelous coordination without merger.

Let me cite some further instances of coordination achieved without benefit of merger. Again I quote Mr. Kenney, who has made an admirable presentation of the brilliant record achieved by the Army and Navy along these lines:

The Army proving ground at White Sands, N. Mex., collaborates with the Navy in the utilization of specialized techniques, such as the telemetering of missiles developed by the Navy. Eventually the personnel will be equally divided between Army and Navy.

The naval air missiles test center at Point Mugu, Calif., which is used to test guided missiles, rockets, and pilotless aircraft, is available for use by both the Army and Navy.

Navy ordnance unit at Newtown Neck, Md., is being disestablished and the activities are being transferred to the Army testing station at Aberdeen, Md.

The Army furnished all naval chemical warfare materials, and trains naval personnel in its chemical warfare schools.

The school for the disposal of bombs, mines, and similar missiles is run by the Navy at Indian Head, Md., for both services.

The Army arsenals at Frankford and Rock Island are manufacturing large ordnance parts for the Navy.

The Army arsenal at Pickett, N. J., renders various services for the Navy installation at Lake Denmark to preclude duplication.

The Army tests all Navy flares and illuminating projectiles, and the Navy tests Army 75-millimeter projectiles, 40-millimeter cartridges, and Air Force rockets.

Mr. President, I do not want to tire my colleagues with an endless list of these fine instances of coordination which have been effected out of Army-Navy wedlock, but I do believe that it is important, when we have been belabored with changes of waste and duplication in the services, that we hear the other side of the story. We stand indebted to Mr. Kenney for giving us the other side—the bright side—the side which has been purposely ignored by the vast majority of those who seek a merger.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President—

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Wyoming yield to the Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Will not the Senator agree with me when I say that each of the witnesses whom he has just mentioned, Mr. Kenney and the representatives of the Army and the Air Force who told us about this great cooperation, stated that he believed that some plan similar to that now proposed should be put through while the present personalities were still in the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces, so that they could work these matters out while they were still carrying them on in an informal way, or under an Executive order?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I think the Senator is correct.

Let me now give a little more of the picture Mr. Kenney has revealed. I again quote his testimony as it appears on pages 247 to 278 of part 2 of the hearings:

Army engineers are undertaking construction work for the Navy at Sangley Point in the Philippines and the Navy is performing some construction work for the Army in Alaska.

The Navy is making pier space available at Oakland so that the Army may give up certain leased piers in San Francisco.

The Army has made a deep-water berth available to the Navy in New Orleans for a floating drydock; the Navy is in turn making berths available as required by the Army thereby obviating the leasing by the Navy of deep-water space.

Steps are in hand to reopen Navy cold-storage space at Cheatham Annex, Norfolk, at the request of the Army. Joint use of

the Army's in-transit depots at Auburn, Wash.; Lathrop, Calif.; and Yermo, Calif.; was expected during the war; the combined total space at the three depots was 3,000,000 square feet. Since the war the Army has transferred the Yermo facility to the Navy as a subcommand of the Marine Corps Depot at Barstow, Calif.

Many naval patients are in Army hospitals, and many Army patients are cared for in naval advance base hospitals. In fact, an agreement has been reached whereby a bed in any governmental hospital is available to any governmental patient.

A joint radio circuit exists between Washington and Rio de Janeiro.

The Navy trains Army personnel for multi-channel radio teletype equipment.

Messages are transferred between many communication centers for delivery to points served only by one service. Common use is made of Army telephone circuits in some overseas areas.

Mr. Kenney continues:

This represents a brief description of some of the areas where there has been common use of facilities. Studies are going forward for increasing the field of common use and particular attention is being directed to the following types of facilities:

(a) Harbor and port facilities at New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and New Orleans.

(b) Communications.

(c) Medical facilities.

(d) Transportation.

(e) Service facilities, such as laundries, commissaries, and bakeries.

(f) Post exchange stores and ships' service stores.

(g) Recruiting.

(h) Supply depots.

(i) Supply centers.

(j) Cost inspection.

(k) Material inspection.

(l) Audit and accounting.

All the instances of existing coordination which Mr. Kenney cited—and I ask you to bear in mind that he made no claim of covering the whole field—are evidence that great achievements are attainable when there exists a will to work together and to solve problems of mutual importance. No evidence has been adduced which indicates that the proposed merger could do better than has been done, is now being done, or would be done without a merger. It is a slur upon the records of the fine officers responsible for the achievements cited—as well as countless other achievements not mentioned—to imply that the efforts of these officers will cease now that the fighting is over—that we must hold over them the threat of compulsion by a supersecretary to force a continuation of the work they have thus far carried on through their own initiative, understanding, cooperation, and perseverance.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. I have very carefully read the bill which was introduced by the Senator from Wyoming, a bill which I think contains all the good features of Senate bill 758, with none of its dangerous features; a bill which I think creates and maintains a balance of power between the military and the civilian economy. I hope I shall have a chance to vote for the measure introduced by the Senator from Wyoming. At this

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time, I should like to know whether or not the Senator from Wyoming intends to offer his bill as a substitute for Senate bill 758.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. No, Mr. President; it is not my intention to do that. I shall offer a number of amendments to Senate bill 758, which, if accepted, would very nearly achieve what I set out to do in the bill I introduced.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, would the Senator be willing to yield for a question? If not, I shall not interrupt him.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield for a question.

Mr. DONNELL. Reference was made earlier this afternoon to the importance of the declaration of policy, as tending to indicate the defect in the position of the Senator from Wyoming. In the declaration of policy, among other things, it is stated, on page 31, in line 4:

To provide for their authoritative coordination—

That is to say, the various branches, the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force—

To provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not merge them—

I emphasize the words "unified direction under civilian control." The question I should like to ask the Senator is this: Is there anything in the pending bill which requires that the Secretary of the Army, under the bill, shall be a civilian? I fail to find anything of that kind, and I am wondering if the Senator has located any requirement to that effect.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I do not know that that is mentioned in the pending bill. I do not recall it. The Senator would be able to know better than I do, whether the Constitution or the existing laws call upon the President, in appointing a secretary, to name a civilian. According to my recollection, the appointee has always been a civilian. I do not recall any exception.

Mr. DONNELL. I may say to the Senator that I am not an expert on the subject, but I do not recall any provision in the Constitution, certainly, that would require it.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. The Senator is an authority on that.

Mr. DONNELL. No, I do not claim to be an authority; but I do not recall any such provision. I should like to ask the Senator whether there is, to his recollection, any provision in the pending bill requiring the Secretary of the Department of the Navy to be a civilian.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. So far as I know, there is none.

Mr. DONNELL. I observe at page 41, lines 12 and 13, that the Secretary of the Air Force is required to be appointed from civilian life. The point I am making and the question I would ask the Senator is this: Assuming that there is nothing in the bill which requires the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Navy to be a civilian, does not the declaration of policy, which states that the intent of Congress is to provide for the authoritative coordination and uni-

fied direction under civilian control of the various branches mentioned in the declaration of policy, substantiate the position of the Senator from Wyoming, when he takes the view that the effect of sections 201 (a) and 202 (a) was to give a unified control in the Secretary of National Security?

The Secretary of National Security, as the Senator will recall, is to be appointed by the President, so section 202 (a) says, from civilian life. I have not very clearly stated it, but the point, if I may repeat it very briefly, to which I invite the Senator's attention and on which I ask his opinion, is this: If there is no requirement in the pending bill that the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Navy shall be a civilian; if there is no provision in the Constitution that requires those two officials to be chosen from civilian life, when the declaration of policy provides that it is the intent of Congress to provide for the authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control, would it not follow that that language in the declaration of policy, instead of tending to defeat the interpretation of the Senator from Wyoming, would tend to substantiate it, because the only man, with the exception of the Secretary of the Air Force, that I have thus far found is required to be appointed from civilian life, is the Secretary of National Security?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. It undoubtedly would tend to substantiate the position I take. But I may say to the Senator, that I feel a civilian appointed Secretary of the Army or Secretary of the Navy becomes a part of the Army or the Navy, as the case may be, by the very contact that he has with the high officers of the Army and Navy, and he naturally is saturated in Army and Navy lore and represents the Army and Navy, although he is a civilian.

Mr. DONNELL. I should like to say, Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, that I do not mean by these inquiries necessarily to coincide with the ultimate conclusion of the Senator as to whether or not the pending bill should be passed, with or without amendments, but the point I am trying to make is that it seems to me that there is very much to be said in favor of the validity of the interpretation placed by the Senator upon the powers of the Secretary of National Security. I see the Senator from Massachusetts is again at his seat on this side of the aisle, and I would ask the Senator from Wyoming if I might very briefly put to the Senator from Massachusetts the same question I put to the Senator from Wyoming a moment ago?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield to the Senator from Missouri for that purpose.

Mr. DONNELL. I will state to the Senator from Massachusetts—

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I heard the Senator's question.

Mr. DONNELL. I did not know that the Senator had heard the question.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would say in reply, I do not agree with that interpretation, at all; because while the title of the Secretary of War is changed to

Secretary of the Army, his powers remain as they now are in the statute. The title of the Secretary of the Navy was not changed, because it was not necessary; and a new Secretary of Air Force has been provided. That is why the word "civilian" was used in connection with the Air Force. I cannot say it definitely, but I believe that both the Army and the Navy, in the statutes are under civilian heads, and that the language used for the Air Force is broadly speaking the same language as that which is found in the statutes for the Army and the Navy at the present time.

Mr. DONNELL. With the Senator's permission, may I ask the Senator from Massachusetts if there is anything, so far as he knows, in the pending bill which delegates the appointive power to select the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Navy from civilian life?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would answer that question in the affirmative, for the reason that I believe it is in the present law, and I believe the President must therefore give effect to the present law in appointing the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. DONNELL. The Senator, I take it, does not consider that the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Navy are new officials, but they are simply old officials with the names changed; is that correct?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is absolutely correct.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. The Senator is correct.

Mr. DONNELL. I thank the Senator. Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. WHERRY. How does the provision in title III relating to succession to the Presidency, affect the present set-up? Is it discretionary in the President to name under secretaries who could fill the offices of Cabinet members? I read the language on pages 53 and 54:

Sec. 301. The first section of the act entitled "An act to provide for the performance of the duties of the Office of President in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and of the Vice President," approved January 19, 1886 (24 Stat. 1), is amended (1) by striking out "Secretary of War" and inserting in lieu thereof "Secretary of National Security," and (2) by striking out "or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the Navy."

Is it the intention of the legislation to provide that that shall be the line of succession for the Presidency?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. That is what I understand to be the intention of the legislation.

Mr. WHERRY. Is there any statute under which the President can name anyone else to his Cabinet in addition to the two Cabinet officers in question?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Does the Senator ask me if there should be?

Mr. WHERRY. Well, yes.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I am not able to answer that question. As I understand, the language under the heading "Succession to the Presidency,"

means that in case the President were unable to perform the duties of his office, the Secretary of National Security would step in, and if the Secretary of National Security did not qualify, then the Secretary of War, and then the next in line would be the Secretary of the Navy, and thereafter the Secretary of the Air Force.

Mr. WHERRY. That is the point I was making. The language beginning at the bottom of page 53 provides that the line of succession shall be first the Secretary of National Security, and in the event the Secretary of National Security does not qualify or is under a disability, then the Secretary of the Navy—

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. No, the Secretary of War is next.

Mr. WHERRY. Let me read the language again:

Sec. 301. The first section of the act entitled "An act to provide for the performance of the duties of the Office of President in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and of the Vice President", approved January 19, 1886 (24 Stat. 1), is amended (1) by striking out "Secretary of War" and inserting in lieu thereof "Secretary of National Security."

I take it the Secretary of National Security is first in line to succeed to the Presidency after the Secretary of State, following the official who was designated in the succession bill recently passed.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I agree with the Senator that that should be the interpretation.

Mr. WHERRY. If the Secretary of National Security does not qualify or is under a disability, then at least under the provisions of the pending bill, the succession would go to the Secretary of the Navy, who is next in line.

Mr. LODGE. No, Mr. President. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. That is what is provided in the language of the bill.

Mr. LODGE. The language is "amended (1) by striking out 'Secretary of War' and inserting in lieu thereof 'Secretary of National Security,' and (2) by striking out 'or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the Navy.'"

Mr. WHERRY. Very well. Let me ask this question. Do the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Navy remain Cabinet officers under the bill?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Not under the pending bill.

Mr. WHERRY. Is the Senator sure that it is not a discretionary right with the President to appoint them to the Cabinet.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. The concept of the bill is that the Secretary of National Security becomes a Cabinet officer, and that the present Secretaries of the Army and the Navy are no longer Cabinet officers.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator. And for the purpose of succession there is simply the one Secretary of National Security, and in the succession line, in which I am very much interested, the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Navy are eliminated, and only the Secretary of National Security is in the line of succession.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Yes. Mr. WHERRY. And that line of succession is mandatory under the terms of the bill?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Yes. Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, there has been much talk—clothed in sweeping generalities—of the savings which will accrue from the proposed merger. Efforts of the Committee on Armed Services to bring forth some concrete instances of such savings have been to no avail. The merger proponents have been asked to give us a blueprint of the proposed structure, indicating what new demands would be made upon the national purse, what returns would be made thereto. We have had no reply, save for a somewhat ridiculous estimate that the establishment of the proposed new departments would cost some \$982,000 per year. Even the most ardent friends of the merger on your committee could not stomach this.

Mr. President, we were asked to believe, for example, that the office of the New Secretary of Air Forces would involve an added expense of only \$107,000 a year, representing the salaries of the new secretary and Under Secretary, two assistant secretaries, and 10 clerical and administrative personnel. I could not refrain from pointing out that the proposed clerical staff for the Secretary of Air was just about the size of the secretarial force of a Senator from one of the larger States. The absurdity of such an estimate was even more apparent when the salary figure of \$107,000 was compared with the similar current appropriation for the Office of Secretary of War, \$7,542,000, or again with the salary appropriation for the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, \$4,785,000.

The estimated extra cost of a separate Secretary of the Air Force cheerfully omitted any mention of contingent expense which would be something comparable, I should imagine, to the current figures of \$3,000,000 for the War Department, or at least the \$1,250,000 figure for the Navy Department. We were asked at the same time to believe that the Office of Secretary of National Defense—this is the top super secretary—would get along with some 100 civilian clerical and administrative personnel at a total cost of \$663,000 for salaries. Such an estimate, Mr. President, shows a clear ignorance or wilful disregard of the facts of life. If anyone who is familiar with the Washington scene imagines that an office directing the destinies of several million individuals and spending one-third of the national budget is going to operate with a civilian force of 100 persons he should see his physician at once. Washington simply does not operate that way. These ridiculous estimates concerned only the very top level of the men of the new departments, of course. Beneath these new department heads we can expect to see the same flowering of bureaucracy that we have never yet failed to perceive when a new departmental seed is planted in our Government. Indisputable evidence of

this natural process confronts us on every side at every moment of the day and night.

Mr. President, the board of directors of any business firm, large or small, would summarily dismiss an executive who proposed a reorganization of the business based on such vague promises of operating efficiency and economy as have been made to your committee during the course of its hearings. Granting that it has been the custom of Congress to be less than exacting in its demands for facts relating to the establishment of new bureaus and agencies of the Government—the history of the past decade and a half bears ample witness to this—still there must be a limit to congressional patience in the face of such cavalier treatment. Surely it is not too much for Congress to ask and receive accurate and detailed estimates of the costs involved in the establishment of new agencies of the Government, and the savings to be realized. Or is this too much of a detail for us to concern ourselves with—a detail to be handled by the executive branch in its own inimitable manner?

When officials of the executive branch are proponents of a reorganization, they inevitably anticipate great savings and insignificant costs. The proponents of this merger are no exception. But let us look at the opinion of an official who only a few years ago was opposed to a similar merger of the armed services. Let us observe what Gen. Douglas MacArthur thought of the prospective economies of a single department when he was in opposition to such a merger. General MacArthur wrote as follows, and I am quoting from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of April 30, 1932:

The history of the Government demonstrates that the parasitical development of bureaucracy springs from the setting up of superfluous echelons of control such as the one proposed.

Although I recognize the possibility of effecting relatively unimportant economies in isolated activities, the ultimate cost of this superimposed structure would, in my opinion, exceed by millions any economies that could be safely effected. The super-Cabinet officer at its head could not fail to be the acquirer of one of the largest and undoubtedly most powerful governmental organizations the United States has ever known.

Continuing, General MacArthur goes on to say:

Rather than economy, this amalgamation would, in my opinion, represent one of the greatest debauches of extravagance that any nation has ever known.

Mr. President, I believe that General MacArthur's observation is as true today as it was 15 years ago, with the possible exception that 15 years ago we were still accustomed to think of Government extravagance in millions. Today we think of it in billions.

I regard the erection of a vast new military empire, merging the armed services and setting up a gigantic new echelon of command on top of them, as not only profligate in the extreme, but highly dangerous as well.

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Let me commence my discussion of this phase of the problem by reading an extract from an editorial which appeared in the Boston Herald on April 5, 1947. It exhibits a breadth of perception which this Nation could use more of today. Quoting from the Herald editorial:

Now that the military have vacated the common, and we've had our fill of buzzing war planes, martial music, and the grim presence of war machines, it may be well to ponder one of the more subtle threats to our liberties. It is the threat of the "military mind," and no small threat it is in a world in which the greatest exterior menace to our Nation is a totalitarian regime, whose war plans are made secretly, and whose attacks in an age of atom bombs and bacteriological warfare, would surely maximize the element of surprise.

In such an age of excessive jitteriness we are all in awe of the military who must protect us. Therein lies the danger to which we have reference here. It is the possibility that we may forget our traditional subordination of the military to the civil authority.

We must not let our fear of the Communist menace blind us to the danger of military domination. For the thing that could most surely end civil liberty in America would be for the Army General Staff to gain such control over the Nation's civil government as to make us all vassals of the military mind. One has only to recall the history of the German General Staff to know how true this is.

This ends the quotation from the Herald editorial. But let me continue perhaps at some length on the subject of militarism and the General Staff, for as I shall point out presently, the bill we are now considering is a bill in the General Staff pattern, and a bill which paves the way to the dominant militarism of a general staff.

Within a democracy such as ours the armed forces occupy a very definite place. Those who founded our system of Government were determined that the military power of the country should be subordinate to the civil power. Only on such a basis could our system of Government be democratic. Not since a small but ambitious group of officers proposed that George Washington declare himself king—a proposal that Washington refused with a burning rebuke—has there been a serious threat to our democracy by any of its military agencies.

Today, however, there are sincere students of government who believe they can detect symptoms of militarism in the thinking and conduct of the relatively small—approximately 5,000—but tremendously powerful War Department General Staff.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. Is the Senator referring to the War Department General Staff, or the General Staff with troops?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. The War Department General Staff, of approximately 5,000.

Mr. LODGE. That does not include the General Staff with troops?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. No; the War Department General Staff.

That such symptoms should manifest themselves within the General Staff is infinitely more serious than if militaristic proposals should be made in an occa-

sional article or speech by an individual army, or naval officer. In such a case it would quite probably represent only the opinion of an individual, and as such would not constitute a threat. Evidence of militarism from within the General Staff is not to be taken so lightly. General staffs are by their very nature fertile fields for the seeds of militarism.

I most emphatically do not mean that army general staffs as purely military institutions are bad. On the contrary, I believe that a general staff system is vitally necessary for the efficient control of a nation's army. General staffs are required for all larger field organizations, as well as for the top level direction of modern armies. When kept within the framework of the organization of the Army, which is subordinate to the civil authority of the government, a general staff is both desirable and indispensable. However, when a general staff forgets its proper relationship in the system of government and seeks to expand its authority over more and more governmental activities, usually doing so under the pretext of promoting military efficiency, then that general staff ceases to be a factor of governmental security, and is instead a mortal threat to the government that supports it.

It is almost axiomatic that militarism in any country increases proportionately to the power of the Nation's general staff.

Of all the nations of the modern world none has brought more suffering to mankind through war than has Germany. In no nation has militarism been more carefully developed according to plan. In no modern nation of the western world has a general staff enjoyed more power. The history of the German General Staff was one of constant struggle for more and more authority and independence within the government. We would do well to compare with it the growth of our own general staff.

From the time that Scharnhorst took charge of reorganizing the Prussian Army—particularly the general staff—after its defeat by Napoleon at Jena, the German General Staff increased in power. Gradually, but ultimately, the Minister of War lost control over the general staff. By 1866 the chief of the general staff, Von Moltke, had reduced even the Emperor to the role of a figurehead who rubber-stamped Von Moltke's plans for battle. The German General Staff constantly asserted its power in wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, until defeated by the Allies in 1918.

Although condemned to abolishment by the Treaty of Versailles, the German General Staff continued to exist under cover until Adolf Hitler decided in 1937 that the time was propitious to reestablish it officially. As Germany continued to prepare for the World War II, the guiding influence of the renascent general staff was ever evident. With each reorganization and further centralization of military authority the general staff gained more power over the nation. It has been said that Adolf Hitler, by taking personal supreme command, superseded the power of the general staff. But as the war went sour for Germany and defeat eventually came, it be-

came more evident that instead of being superseded, the German General Staff had trapped Hitler. Again, as in 1918, when it created the myth of "Victory in the field—defeat at home," the German General Staff had craftily avoided much of the popular—and official—denunciation for the defeat of the German Nation. Adolf Hitler stands eternally guilty before the bar of history, but the German General Staff, the spark plug of German militarism, has avoided indictment as a collective war criminal.

We must understand the history and functioning of the German General Staff if we as a nation hope to avoid the disastrous consequences that accompany malicious militarism generated by an ambitious and excessively powerful general staff.

Study of German General Staff history discloses certain procedures or events that served as the stepping stones to the ultimate militarization of Germany by the general staff. They are: Continuous and accumulative acquisition of power through repeated reorganization of the general staff and the war ministry; an official, army-controlled medium of propaganda; universal military training; and continuous effort to centralize all control of the armed forces under one agency.

Our Army General Staff was originally established in 1903 as a result of the insistence of the then Secretary of War, Elihu Root, a sincere public servant, who realized that a general staff was indispensable to any great army. Yet, even then the establishment of the General Staff was not affected without opposition from those who warned of its potential danger.

Fortunately, Elihu Root and his constant adviser, Brig. Gen. William H. Carter, were no more aware of the necessity for a general staff than they were of the fact that many features of the German General Staff properly belonged to a militaristic system of government rather than to a democracy. Our Nation, in establishing a general staff, borrowed from the German General Staff concept, but did not borrow the German General Staff philosophy. Thus, as originally established, our General Staff was closely integrated with the Army War College, which resulted in the General Staff being drawn toward purely military matters and away from politics. Our General Staff was to plan how to carry out the policies of the Government, rather than to make such policies. Unfortunately, although the founders of our General Staff exercised extreme care in establishing a staff that conformed to our theory of government, they could not insure against the future growth of the germ of militarism that clung to any fragment of the German General Staff.

As a result of the experience of World War I, our General Staff was reorganized. This reorganization was restricted to effecting improvements in organization and technique. Such basic changes as were made were adopted from the French General Staff system, not the German. Our General Staff still retained its significant relationship with the Army War College, continuing the staff's emphasis upon purely military planning and co-

ordinating. It was still a military institution well subordinated to the civil authority of the Government, occupying a proper place within the framework of the armed forces and our system of government.

The reason this 1921 reorganization was not a step toward extension of the powers of the General Staff was largely due to the character of the individuals who were members of the War Department board which effected the reorganization. The board was headed by Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord. Included among its members were Col.—later Brig. Gen.—John McA. Palmer and Col.—later Lt. Gen.—John L. DeWitt, two of the outstanding military thinkers of recent times. These officers were keen students of the history of military institutions, and they knew the proper place of a general staff within the army of a democracy. Under the General Staff system which they helped formulate, the germ of militarism was effectively suppressed.

During the long span of years between wars the General Staff continued largely as devised by the Harbord board, and during this time no one could with reason accuse our General Staff of being an instrument of militarism. But by the outbreak of World War II, the members of the Harbord board had been retired or were no longer in a position to decide General Staff policy. Further reorganization of the General Staff occurred in 1939, 1942, and 1946. These later reorganizations effected the abandonment of the concept of close relationship with the Army War College—a relationship that had emphasized the essentially military aspects of the General Staff. It is significant that since its disassociation with an educational institution, the General Staff has veered sharply from intellectual military pursuits. Like the German General Staff, our War Department General Staff became increasingly interested in civil affairs as it was subjected to repeated reorganizations.

The existence of an officially controlled medium of conditioning the thinking of Army personnel—and indirectly the civilians—was considered important by those who helped create the German General Staff and design the plan for the militarization of Germany. A program for thought-control of an army is a prerequisite and infallible characteristic of militarism and the dictatorship that invariably follows. Today our Army conducts an Army Information School. Graduates of this school are assigned to duty as public information officers to furnish information to the public, or as information-education officers to furnish information to the troops. An Army Information Digest is distributed to all commands, down to and including regiments, and this digest lists the numerous subjects on which Army talks, sponsored by the War Department, have been prepared and are available for distribution to information and education officers throughout the Army. When we contemplate the potentialities of such a great and yet tightly controlled medium of spreading official Army information, we are constrained to remember that when Scharnhorst began his reorganiza-

tion of the German General Staff and planned the militarization of Germany, one of his first proposals for effecting thought control within the Prussian Army involved the establishment of an official periodical to be read to the troops.

Universal military training conducted by a militaristic general staff would be disastrous to a democratic nation. Universal military training subject to proper supervision by properly constituted civil authorities of the Government will increase the security of our Nation. The constant and clamorous support of conscription by the War Department General Staff engenders a strong suspicion of the Prussian procedures being employed by that organization. Just prior to the opening of the present Congress, the War Department bombarded Members of Congress with pamphlets supporting conscription. Use of taxpayers' money by the War Department for propagandizing in favor of universal military training is an overt act of high-handed militarism equaled only by the machinations of the German General Staff.

The development of the German General Staff has been characterized by continued efforts to bring all elements of the armed forces under control of a single agency directly or indirectly controlled by the general staff. Without going into the separate problem of what form the so-called merger of our armed forces should take, we should remember that any plan that would place all armed forces directly or indirectly under the War Department General Staff or any agency indirectly controlled by it would conform to a method by which the German General Staff militarized Germany.

The arguments voiced by our War Department for its plan for unification of the armed forces and creation of a high command seems inspired by the philosophy expounded by those who militarized Germany. For example, we find the following statements offered by high ranking representatives of the War Department before the Senate Military Affairs Committee during hearings on the merger proposal in October and November of 1945. Gen. H. H. Arnold said:

I am fully convinced that both effectiveness and economy will be best served through the establishment of single executive Department of National Defense.

Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle stated:

It is my earnest conviction that the most sound, efficient, and economical defense establishment can be achieved only through a single Department of National Defense which will coordinate the activities of the three components.

Gen. Jacob L. Devers testified:

To fight a war of the future will require * * * a single department with its resultant evolutionary unification of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces.

Maj. Gen. Millan G. White repeated the need for a single department for the armed forces. Gen. Carl Spaatz also advocated a single department. General Bradley said:

It is my opinion that the needed results can best be attained by establishing now a unified, single department for the armed forces.

Gen. Brehon Somervell also testified in favor of a single Department of National Defense.

The repetitious use of the same terminology not only indicates a carefully planned program of thought-control within the War Department, but the collective testimony is all the more startling when we compare it with the following quotation:

Unity of military leadership in a nation can be achieved only by placing all branches of the armed forces under the supervision of a single defense authority. This department must be in charge of all military preparation as well as the actual prosecution of the war.

This quotation is not taken from the testimony of the Army high command before the Military Affairs Committee as were the other quotations above. To the contrary, it is found in *The Axis Grand Strategy*, a compilation of the writings of Germany military writers who contributed to the militarization of Germany and the rise of the Nazi dictatorship. When the high officers of the War Department offer testimony that is practically interchangeable with a key passage in Germany militaristic literature, can we come to any conclusion except that our War Department General Staff has adopted the philosophy and the methods of Scharnhorst, Von Moltke, and Keitel? Again, we are constrained to recall that the early proposals for centralized control of all our armed forces emanated from our General Staff.

It is thought-provoking and not a little frightening when we realize that our War Department General Staff is following so closely the formula by which the German General Staff gained control of that Nation and brought on two great world wars. When considered individually, adoption by our War Department of each of the four German General Staff steps toward malicious militarism might be of only questionable significance. But when we find all four of the German tools of militarism—repeated reorganization of the general staff, an official army-controlled medium of information, universal military training, and continuous effort to centralize all control of the armed forces under one agency—all being so intimately connected with the conduct of our Army General Staff, we cannot pass off such evidence as mere coincidence. We can come to but one conclusion: Our General Staff is fostering a program of militarism, a program that utilizes the means by which the German General Staff enslaved a nation and almost destroyed a civilization.

Thus far the War Department General Staff has been defeated in its efforts to establish a single military commander over the armed forces—not as a result of public recognition of the danger to the Nation inherent in such a step, but because of the recognized harm to the military services which would accrue. But in the provision of S. 758 for a Joint Staff to the Joint Chiefs of Staff there has been implanted the germ from which the great National General Staff is expected to emerge in time. The great general staffs of other nations sprang from no more innocuous seeds than this. Our own War Department General Staff,

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when first created, was limited to some 40 officers. Today, the Pentagon is scarcely large enough to house it.

Nominally, the Joint Staff is to provide assistance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff—a function performed satisfactorily heretofore by a secretariat. S. 758 makes no provision, however, that the Joint Staff shall be confined to secretarial duties, nor that there shall be any limitation to the tenure of office of its members or its director. By virtue of its permanence, its availability, and its invitation to the Secretary of National Security to bypass the Joint Chiefs of Staff and place reliance upon it for the administration of the military services, the Joint Staff will inevitably expand, accumulate executive authority, and become the fountainhead of policy and direction for the Military Establishment. Its members will become a permanent national general staff corps, an inner circle of professional military men of the Nation, just as the Army General Staff Corps did within the War Department. It will be a short step indeed from such a position of actual power to a position of titular power at the head of our military forces and a position of dominance in the affairs of the Nation.

The manner in which the military mind—the general staff mind—will exert its control over the life of the Nation, once it has established its control over the merged armed forces, is not difficult to discern in the structure of and the relationships between the several bodies and agencies set up under S. 758 for the avowed objective of coordinating the Military Establishment with other elements of national security. Earlier we noted the lack of an adequate civilian voice in the national security structure. We are now in a position to see that this omission was not an oversight. It bears all the signs of cynical intent.

The formidable struggle which went on between military and civilian interests in the past war has been ably described by Mr. Donald Nelson in his book, *The Arsenal of Democracy*. Let me recite a few quotations from that source.

In his introduction, Mr. Nelson makes the following statements with regard to the relationship between the War Production Board and the Army:

Our disagreements with the Army are well known and cast no discredit, I believe, upon either party. The cause of almost all these disputes was perfectly simple: The Army always wished to assume greater control over war production and civilian economy than the War Production Board deemed it prudent for it to have.

On page 363, after relating many instances which are illustrative of the struggle between military and civilian interest, Mr. Nelson sums up the situation by saying:

I have no hesitation in saying that from 1942 onward the Army people, in order to gain control of our national economy, did their best to make an errand boy of WPB.

And on page 384:

A friend of mine in the Army once told me that the primary mission of the Army is to enforce its will on the enemy. Considering my own experiences, I believe this to be true. The only thing I can add is that sometimes

the Army doesn't seem to know the difference between its enemies and its friends.

I realize that there may be many among my colleagues who will not wish to accept the opinion of Mr. Nelson on this subject. These colleagues I respectfully refer to an official publication of the Government, *The United States at War*, put out by the Bureau of the Budget. You will find expressed therein many of the same conclusions which Mr. Nelson presented in his book.

It is on the National Security Council that the undue influence of the military will be exerted at the highest level. There it will have its effect upon the determination of foreign policy and upon the most significant questions of domestic policy. We will have lost our traditional concept that the military forces are the instrument of national policy—they will have become primarily responsible for shaping such policy. It is one thing for the Nation's highest advisory body to have available to it information relating to the military means available for enforcing policy decisions, and relating to the requirements of the military forces to implement such policies as may be decided upon. It is quite another thing to pack that body with military spokesmen and thereby place them in a position to decide what the policies shall be. It is the latter alternative which Senate bill 758 has chosen.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I call the Senator's attention to section 101 (a) on page 31 of the bill. I know he has read this paragraph, and perhaps there is merely a disagreement of interpretation. I am referring to the third paragraph of that section. The function of the Security Council, as I interpret that paragraph, is to make it possible for the civilian departments of the Government to cooperate with the military departments so as to advise the President how the military can best protect the national security. The National Security Council is set up principally for the purpose of helping the military to gain knowledge of the civilian departments, in order that they may act more intelligently for national security. It certainly is not, as I understand, the job of the National Security Council and the military members to advise the President how to handle his office or how to handle civilian affairs or how to handle civilian diplomatic relationships with other countries.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Four of the seven named members of the National Security Council are to be the civilian heads of the military departments—the Secretary of National Security and the three lower-grade secretaries—really under secretaries, who are to execute in their respective departments the directions of the supersecretary.

It has been repeatedly asserted by proponents of this merger that the four secretaries, by virtue of their civilian origin, will think, talk, and act as civilians. This is utter nonsense.

I wish the Senator from Missouri [Mr. DONNELL] were here, because this would more fully answer his question than I was able to answer it at the time he asked the question.

One has only to listen to Secretary Patterson or Secretary Forrester to realize that they are, as they should be, the spokesmen of their Departments—that they reflect the military viewpoint of the service officers who daily surround them, who provide them with the information on which they base their decisions, and who analyze that information for them. This is not to detract from the esteem and admiration that I—that all of us—have for these two gentlemen. We would, in fact, look askance at them if their loyalty to the services which they head were one whit less than it is. But the simple fact is that any civilian who is placed at the head of a military department is—by the time he is sufficiently familiar with his department to represent it—so steeped in its philosophy that he cannot help but exude it.

It is only realistic to accept the fact that the civilian heads of the military departments—the four of them on the National Security Council—will give that body a 4-to-3 military majority, and an unmistakable military complexion. It is inescapable that when an issue arises on which military interests are aligned on the one side and civilian interests on the other, the majority vote of the Security Council will go to the military side.

If the National Security Council is to be the body on which the influence of the military is to be felt at the highest level, it is through the relationship between the national Security Resources Board and the Munitions Board—the latter a strictly military body—that the influence of the military is to be made effective at a working level—at least, insofar as domestic economic policy is concerned.

There, Mr. President, we have a most interesting picture, and a most enlightening one if we only stop to think about it. Military requirements are to be taken care of by the Munitions Board—and I have no doubt that they will be well taken care of, for the Munitions Board will function day in and day out, in peace and in war, with ample personnel and facilities to do the job required of it. We may rest assured that exhaustive studies will be made of military requirements, and comprehensive plans prepared to meet them. When M-day comes the military will be ready with their solution—ready after years of painstaking study and analysis of their needs and of the resources and facilities available to satisfy them.

And what of civilian requirements? It looks as though the civilians are going to have to rely, not on a going agency like the Munitions Board, but on an M-day revival of some of the slumbering relics of the past war. The civilian is not going to have a blueprint of his requirements prepared for him through painstaking daily work during years of peace. No one is going to go out looking for factories to produce his needs in time of war. No, indeed. The only blueprint he is going to have on M-day

is one that shows the agencies which will then be activated to see what can be done for him.

The National Security Resources Board is not the agency which is going to prepare the blueprints for mobilization. These blueprints are to be prepared for the military forces by the Munitions Board, for the civilian elements of the Nation by civil agencies to be set up under the National Security Resources Board on M-day. The function of the National Security Resources Board is to take the military and civilian requirements as presented to it by the Munitions Board and the revived civil agencies and translate them into overall requirement programs and procurement schedules—in short, to integrate the military and civilian requirements.

Under these circumstances the same thing will happen in the future that happened in the past. On M-day the military experts on the Munitions Board will come up with a laboriously conceived plan for industrial mobilization that meets military requirements. The civil agencies, still wiping the sleep from their eyes, will have nothing yet to offer. The National Security Resources Board will either have to take the military blueprint of the Munitions Board or stand by and wait until the civil agencies have had the necessary months to get under way. At the beginning of the last war the same situation confronted us. The military had a plan for industrial mobilization and the civilians did not. The military plans were so militarily biased that they were discarded. The result was, in the words of the Navy study, "the confused planning and the hasty, often misdirected, efforts of the first war years." When the next war comes, if there be one, there will be no opportunity to discard biased military plans and wait while mobilization plans are prepared which consider all aspects of the problem. The National Security Resources Board will have no alternative but to accept the military plans for mobilization and hope that the national economy can stand it.

In its relation to the proposed Munitions Board, the proposed National Security Resources Board is not unlike the existing National Defense Council in its relation to the existing Army and Navy Munitions Board. In the years leading up to World War II, the Army and Navy Munitions Board had the necessary working staff to do the job of economic planning for war, and actually did so, while the National Defense Council, with no subordinate civilian agencies to assist it, stood by with its hands in its pockets. It should occasion no surprise that the planning done by the Army and Navy Munitions Board took into primary account the requirements of the military agencies, and left the residual resources, if any, for the civilian segment of the population. Nor should it occasion any surprise that the biased plans of the Army and Navy Munitions Board had to be discarded at the start of World War II.

The basic objection to the relationship between the National Security Resources Board and the Munitions Board thus springs from the reliance which the Resources Board must inevitably place

upon the military Munitions Board as its only continuously functioning subordinate agency for the preparation of plans for industrial mobilization. The Resources Board not only has no active subordinate civilian agencies, but does not even have an adequate staff which could perform even a few of the functions of such agencies. For that matter, in the absence of a suitable staff it is difficult to see how the Resources Board could even perform its assigned functions, let alone those of inactive civil agencies.

A real clue to the reliance which is to be placed on the Munitions Board is to be found in some of the activities of the existing Army and Navy Munitions Board, the predecessor of the Munitions Board to be set up by Senate bill 758. According to an article entitled "The Army's Plans for the Next War," which appeared in the February 1947 issue of the American Mercury:

The Board is setting up some 70 industrial advisory committees to deal with all phases of governmental and industrial war activity. Army and Navy procurement officers are in the field inspecting potential war plants. The part each of these will play in the national defense, the weapons it will make, and even the schedule upon which it will turn them out are being determined now.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. I may have misunderstood the distinguished Senator from Wyoming, but I thought I heard him say that in the War Department General Staff there are 5,000 officers. I have just looked up that matter, and I think it is correct to state that at the present time in the War Department General Staff there are 810 officers.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I am advised that the General Staff of the War Department was 5,000, but is slightly below that number today.

Mr. LODGE. I wonder whether the Senator included in that number the staff officers with the troops.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. It may be that the Senator from Massachusetts is correct as to that.

Mr. LODGE. Of course that is entirely different. There are staff officers with the divisions in the field. But in the War Department the staff officers are 810.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I have the chart for the total number, but probably the Senator from Massachusetts is correct when he says that the number I have stated would include the officers in the field, as well.

Mr. LODGE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, here indeed is indisputable evidence that the present Army and Navy Munitions Board is taking the mobilization of American industry completely under its wing. Now let me quote a provision of Senate bill 758:

When the chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office (the chairman of the new Munitions Board, that is), the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board shall cease to exist and all its functions, records, and

personnel shall be transferred to the Munitions Board.

In short, Mr. President, the Munitions Board is to continue to regard as its domain the whole of American industry.

As a matter of fact, the Army and Navy Munitions Board is not only going into fields that are to be the concern of civil agencies under the Resources Board—after M-day, of course—but is also going into the problem of how those civil agencies are to function. The same article in the Mercury Magazine which I quoted a moment ago goes on to say:

Among the other activities sponsored by the Board is a probing analysis of the record of the War Production Board. It has called in a group of outstanding civilians who served with the WPB to dig through its history and make recommendations for the organization of a new WPB in any future war.

In short, Mr. President, the military is going to make sure that in the next war it will not meet the civilian opposition to its schemes that it met during the last war. I hardly need suggest that the outstanding civilians will be those whose views, while members of the WPB, coincided with the Army's views in the disputes between the WPB and the General Staff.

While on the subject of the American Mercury article, I do not think I should fail to give you one more quotation which is illustrative of the ambitious plans of the military mind:

The Army is also anxious for legislation which would provide for a labor draft in case of World War III. Overtures are now being made to the CIO and the AFL to win organized labor's support for such a measure.

The final clincher in the military design to secure control of the National Security Resources Board, and thereby to secure control of the national economy in time of war or emergency, is the interlocking membership between the Resources Board and the Munitions Board. This exists, not as a fact but as a possibility, though a real one it is, since the membership of the Resources Board is unspecified, except for the Chairman, who is to be appointed from civilian life. Many proponents of the merger have suggested, in fact, that an interlocking membership would be a desirable arrangement. I think it would be disastrous.

The pattern of military control of the Nation is carried forward another important step in the provision of the bill that the Director of Central Intelligence may be a military officer. The bill really goes further than this; by its emphasis on provisions relating to a military director it suggests that the Director should be a military officer. Originally, the bill required a military director; the modification to permit a civilian to serve as Director was inserted only after opposition to such an obviously improper requirement. The mere fact that the bill still permits a military officer to serve as Director is sufficient indication, to my way of thinking, that the drafters of the bill still expect the President to appoint a military officer to the Director's job.

It is necessary to go to Executive order to find out what the functions and powers of the Central Intelligence

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Agency are to be. Many of those who have taken the trouble to do so—and I comment parenthetically that it should be unnecessary to go to an Executive order to interpret a statute—have reported that the proposed Agency has all the potentialities of an American gestapo. Needless to say, it would be an invaluable asset to militarism.

From all that I have so far said I hope it will have become apparent to my colleagues that we are being asked, in Senate bill 758, to create a military empire which cannot be justified on the grounds advanced for it, namely, those of increased effectiveness and economy, and one which is designed to immeasurably enhance the power of the military over the general affairs of the Nation.

There can be no compromise on this question of military versus civilian control of the policies of the Nation. There likewise can be no compromise on the basic military philosophy on which our armed services are to be organized. The Army and the Navy hold diametrically opposite views on this philosophy. Unless we wish to make our Military Establishment an arena for a continuing struggle which may well plunge us down the road to military defeat and national downfall, we must recognize these fundamentally incompatible points of view, and make a choice between them at the very outset.

The Army General Staff is completely sold on the theory that everything that flies through the air should be put in the Air Force, everything that walks or rolls on land should go to the Army, while everything that sails on or in the water belongs to the Navy. The Army calls this the ideal philosophy for the organization of the armed services.

This philosophy of the Army is known as the tri-elemental philosophy, since it segregates the components of military power according to the natural elements in which they operate. It might also be called the authoritarian philosophy, since it was the accepted philosophy of Napoleonic France, of Von Moltke's and Hitler's Germany, and of Mussolini's Italy. It is the Russian military philosophy today.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I yield.

Mr. GURNEY. I understand that the Senator from Wyoming would prefer to conclude his remarks on Wednesday, for I understand that tomorrow we are to have other business before the Senate. As chairman of the committee and Senator-in-charge of this bill, it is not my intention in any way to hold any Senator on the floor tonight. I should have no objection to some understanding, at least, that the Senator from Wyoming could have the floor again on Wednesday when this bill would come up for consideration as the unfinished business. If that is agreeable to the Senator from Wyoming, I would just as soon have the Senate take a recess at this time.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, I am in no sense a filibusterer, and I would, indeed, appreciate having such action taken.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, the understanding is that tomorrow the Senate will proceed with the disposition of the Dooley nomination. The Senate will meet at 11 o'clock, and the vote will occur at 4. It would be my hope that we might then proceed, after 4 o'clock, to dispose of other matters on the Executive Calendar.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair will state to the Senator from Maine that there is also an agreement that after 4 o'clock a parliamentary point of reference respecting Joint Resolution 145 is to be settled.

Mr. WHITE. Then my suggestion would not be a happy one, but from 11 o'clock until 4 the day would be given to the consideration of the Dooley nomination.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time from 4 to 6 is to be given to the appeal from the decision of the Chair.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, in keeping with what the majority leader has said about the program for tomorrow, I think it should also be stated, so that Senators can prepare for the balance of the week, that the policy committee desired to have it announced that, if it meets with the pleasure of the Senate, at the completion of action on the unification bill, which it is hoped will be by Thursday afternoon at least, the tax bill will be ready to be reported, and will have the right-of-way on Thursday and Friday, if, as I have stated, action on the unification bill shall be concluded on Thursday. It is the intention of the policy committee to have the Senate sit on Saturday, if necessary, in order to complete the consideration of the tax bill, if that is possible. So that Senators should hold themselves in readiness for a session Saturday, if it becomes necessary that one be held.

Mr. MORSE. I am wondering if the Senator has in mind a meeting on Sunday, as well.

Mr. WHERRY. I will say with a great deal of optimism that it is my hope that it will not be necessary for the Senate to meet on Sunday, but such an emergency might arise.

NOMINATION OF JOE B. DOOLEY

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD endorsement of the nomination of Mr. Joe B. Dooley to be United States district judge by 15 former presidents of the bar association of the State of Texas.

There being no objection, the communications were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DALLAS, TEX., July 5, 1947.

Senator TOM CONNALLY,
Senate Office Building:

As former presidents of the State Bar Association of Texas we unanimously certify to the character and ability of Joe Dooley and endorse him for United States district judge.

D. A. Simmons, of Houston; Robert W. Stayton, of Austin; T. W. Davidson, of Dallas; A. H. Britain, of Wichita Falls; Henry P. Burney, of San Antonio; H. C. Pipkin, of Amarillo; Ben H. Powell, of Austin; John C. Townes, of Houston; Few Brewster, of Temple; Gordon Simpson, of Tyler; James L. Shepherd, of Houston.

HARLINGEN, TEX., February 4, 1947.

Senator TOM CONNALLY,
Washington, D. C.:

I respectfully endorse the nomination of Hon. Joe B. Dooley, of Amarillo, for judge of the western district of Texas. He is held in high esteem by the bench and bar of Texas and in my opinion his appointment is one of the best made during my legal experience. He possesses the attributes of character, judicial temperament, and moral integrity of the highest degree and will reflect credit upon the Federal judiciary if confirmed.

CLAUDE E. CARTER,
Former President, State Bar of Texas.

BEAUMONT, TEX., February 5, 1947.

Hon. ALEXANDER WILEY,
United States Senator, Chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

I notice that the Senate Judiciary Committee is considering the appointment of Mr. Joe B. Dooley, of Amarillo, Tex., for judge of the United States District Court for the western district of Texas. I know Mr. Dooley to be an able, outstanding lawyer, and legal scholar during my term as president of the State bar of Texas, 1943-44, during which time he served as vice president of such State bar. I had occasion to be associated with him often and to hear comments of the Texas lawyers as to him. From this I feel, and believe that a large majority of the Texas lawyers feel that he is fully qualified to make an able judge of the United States District Court. Accordingly I desire to add my name to those recommending him to your committee.

MAJOR T. BELL,
Former President, State Bar of Texas.

DALLAS, TEX., February 5, 1947.

Senator ALEXANDER WILEY,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee:

Mr. Joe B. Dooley, nominated for district judge, northern district of Texas, is a man of the highest integrity and a lawyer of the first order of ability. He has had wide and varied experience, and is one of the most outstanding lawyers of Texas. He possesses the personal qualities of courtesy, patience, fairness, and courage. He is thoroughly grounded in the principles of the Constitution and the body of the law, and as a judge will perform his duty impartially and fearlessly. The lawyers of Texas overwhelmingly approve his appointment. I was formerly chief justice of the court of civil appeals at San Antonio and was last year president of the State bar of Texas, succeeding Mr. Dooley in the latter position. I make this personal reference to give assurance of my basis of opinion and to afford the committee, in considering the nomination, the assistance that is due from the bar.

JOHN H. BICKETT, JR.,
Former President, State Bar of Texas.

DALLAS, TEX., July 7, 1947.

Hon. TOM CONNALLY,
Senate Office Building:

Please add my endorsement, Joe Dooley was not present when other past president Texas bar endorsement was sent.

ANGUS G. WYNNE.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I also ask to have printed endorsements of Mr. Dooley's nomination from representative members of the State bar in Texas.

There being no objection, the communications were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS,
SEVENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
Amarillo, Tex., June 12, 1944.

Hon. TOM CONNALLY,
United States Senator of Texas,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: It seems to be generally known that there will soon be a vacancy due to the retiring of one of the judges of the United States District Court of the Northern District of Texas, and we are all interested in seeing a good, strong, active successor appointed.

Since the western and northwestern part of the district has never had a man on the court, we feel that we are in a position to urge a most earnest consideration of the appointment of a good man who we believe would be the most acceptable man to the bar generally in the district. We recommend without reservation and urge the appointment of Joe B. Dooley, of Amarillo, when the vacancy occurs.

Mr. Dooley is well and favorably known throughout the State. He has the qualifications and we think he possesses the natural ability for such a position. He has never been in politics but has exercised considerable influence in strengthening the judiciary and in trying to keep it above criticism. He has been closely identified with the organizations of the legal profession, is an outstanding and popular leader within their ranks, and has their confidence and respect. He is a member of the law firm of Underwood, Johnson, Dooley & Wilson, of Amarillo, and enjoys a good practice. He is old enough to be settled and deliberate, yet young enough to be active and alert, with the prospect of at least a score of years of valuable service ahead of him.

Hoping this matter will have your most earnest consideration at the proper time, and assuring you of my personal regards, I am,

Very truly yours,

E. L. PITTS,
Chief Justice.

STAMFORD, TEX., February 10, 1947.

Hon. TOM CONNALLY,
Senate Office Building:

Advise Dooley if prairie-dog lawyer can assist to call me collect. He is suited and qualified for appointment by nature, character, balance, integrity, experience, ability, and judicial temperament. A vast majority of the lawyers of the district will be pleased by his confirmation.

CHAS. E. COOMBES.

AMARILLO, TEX., February 9, 1947.

Senator TOM CONNALLY,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.:

My occupation is that of a cattleman and farmer. This expression is prompted by no one. I have known Joe Dooley as a gentleman and friend for 25 years. I have no ax to grind. As a student of the law he is regarded very highly and thorough. In my opinion he will discharge his duties on the Federal bench in an honorable and unimpeachable manner.

Respectfully yours,

BEN MASTERSON.

STOCKTON, TEX., February 25, 1947.

Senator TOM CONNALLY,
Senate Building:

Believing the vast majority of the lawyers of Texas desire the appointment of Joe B. Dooley, of Amarillo, as district judge for the northern district of Texas, I want to express my appreciation of your continued efforts on his behalf.

TRAVERS CRUMPTON,
District Attorney,
Eighty-third Judicial District of Texas.

EL PASO, TEX., February 24, 1947.

Hon. TOM CONNALLY,
Senate Chamber:

As an outstanding lawyer and gentleman, Joe Dooley is entitled to the appointment as United States district judge, northern district of Texas. We earnestly urge your continued support.

MAURY KEMP.
EUGENE R. SMITH.
J. M. GOGGIN.
WYNDHAM K. WHITE.

EL PASO, TEX., February 24, 1947.

Senator TOM CONNALLY:
We are enthusiastically endorsing the appointment of Mr. Joe Dooley as district judge.

CYRUS H. JONES.
THORNTON HARDIE.
ALLEN R. GRAMBLING.
BEN R. HOWELL.
WILLIAM B. HARDIE.

EL PASO, TEX., March 6, 1947.

Senator TOM CONNALLY,
Senate Office Building:

Heartily approve your stand on appointment of Joe B. Dooley and will appreciate your continued efforts on his behalf.

J. L. RASBERRY.

SAN ANGELO, TEX., February 26, 1947.

Hon. TOM CONNALLY,
United States Senate:

The undersigned attorneys of San Angelo and, we think, practically our entire bar here strongly commend your stand on appointment of Dooley as United States district judge. He is worthy of the honor and we wish you success in your effort to secure his confirmation.

Lloyd Ker, Louis Gayer, B. W. Smith,
W. A. Griffis, Travis Baker, Herschel Upton, Lee Upton, Tom Lear, C. T. Dalton, James P. Farrell, Olin Blanks, John Logan, H. E. Jackson, Scott Snodgrass.

DALLAS, TEX., July 4, 1947.

Senator TOM CONNALLY,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

The 1911 law class of the University of Texas of which Joe B. Dooley, of Amarillo, is a distinguished member held its thirty-sixth annual reunion in cooperation with the State bar in Dallas today. Forty-six members consisting of more than two-thirds of the surviving members of the class were present representing every political thought in Texas today. By unanimous vote the class instructed the undersigned to assure you that Joe B. Dooley is an outstanding lawyer of the very highest personal integrity, fully capable of discharging any responsibility and deserving of any honor that may be conferred upon him. Copy of this telegram is being sent to Senator W. LEE O'DANIEL.

C. M. CALDWELL, Abilene, Tex.,
President.
EUGENE L. HARRIS, of Houston,
Secretary.

Mr. CONNALLY. I also ask to have printed a tabulation of the civil cases handled in the United States Federal Court for the Northern District of Texas.

There being no objection, the matter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Tabulation of civil cases, U. S. Federal Court,
Northern District of Texas

Fort Worth	1,212
Amarillo	816
Lubbock	503
Abilene	446

Wichita Falls	388
San Angelo	184
Amarillo and Lubbock	1,319
Abilene, Wichita Falls, and San Angelo	1,018
Amarillo, Lubbock, Abilene, Wichita Falls, and San Angelo	2,337

The above tabulation is based on letters from the clerks' offices at the several cities named covering the number of civil suits filed at said respective offices of the Federal court in the northern district of Texas since the effective date of the Federal rules of civil procedure, which was September 16, 1938. The Fort Worth letter is dated October 11, 1946, the Amarillo letter October 15, 1946, and the Lubbock, Abilene, Wichita Falls, San Angelo letters all dated October 14, 1946.

ADDITIONAL REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM—INTER-AMERICAN HIGHWAY (S. REPT. NO. 440)

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I wish to file with the Senate a report from the Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program on its investigation of the Inter-American Highway. I ask unanimous consent to submit the report, and request that it be printed with illustrations.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the report will be received and printed as requested by the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, before sending the report to the desk, I desire to make a brief statement concerning the committee's investigation.

In one respect, Mr. President, the committee's investigation of the Inter-American Highway differs from many of the other investigations the special committee has conducted. This investigation was a job given the committee by the Senate itself. It was not a matter which the committee had decided to go into from its general investigation of war expenditures. I think it would be helpful for the record to recall, briefly, the circumstances under which our committee undertook this work.

In June, 1945, Fulton Lewis, Jr., the commentator, in a series of radio broadcasts, attacked some aspects of the manner in which sections of the Inter-American Highway in Central America had been built by the Army engineers. Mr. Lewis recited information obtained from people who had worked on the project. Transcripts of these broadcasts were made a part of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD by certain Members of the Senate. A number of Senators, during the course of the debates, urged that the matter be thoroughly explored by the Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program. As one of the Senators on the floor at that particular time, I, as a member of the committee, thought the program should be investigated by the Senate committee, and so expressed myself.

On June 19, 1945, former Senator James M. Mead, then the chairman of the committee, announced in a speech on the floor of the Senate that the committee would undertake the investigation.

Subsequently, a subcommittee was appointed, of which the chairman was the

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"(C) Adjusted gross income less than \$5,000; if the adjusted gross income is less than \$5,000, the standard deduction shall be an amount equal to 10 percent of the adjusted gross income upon the basis of which the tax applicable to the adjusted gross income of the taxpayer is determined under the tax table provided in section 403."

"(c) Ten five years to which applicable: The amendments made by this section shall be applicable with respect to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1947. For treatment of taxable years beginning in 1947 and ending in 1948, see section 6."

NOTICE OF MOTION TO SUSPEND THE RULE—AMENDMENT TO MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT APPROPRIATION BILL

Mr. GURNEY submitted the following notice in writing:

In accordance with rule XL of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby give notice in writing that it is my intention to move to suspend paragraph 4 of rule XVI for the purpose of proposing to the bill (H. R. 3778) making appropriations for the Military Establishment for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, and for other purposes, the following amendment, namely:

On page 58, after section 17, insert a new section reading as follows:

"Sec. 18. The limitation imposed by section 14 of the act of May 24, 1946 (60 Stat. 500), shall not apply during the fiscal year 1948 to such personnel as the Secretary of War may determine to be necessary in lieu of military personnel authorized and appropriated for to carry out the purposes of this act: Provided, That not to exceed 25,000 civilian employees may be employed under the authority of this section."

Mr. GURNEY also submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to House bill 3678, making appropriations for the Military Establishment for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, and for other purposes, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

(For text of amendment referred to, see the foregoing notice.)

RETURN OF THE REMAINS OF MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES KILLED IN WAR

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, at the last call of the calendar I objected to the unanimous consent consideration of order No. 364, House bill 3330, to amend the act entitled "An act to provide for the evacuation and return of the remains of certain persons who died and are buried outside the continental limits of the United States," approved May 16, 1946, in order to provide for the shipment of the remains of World War II dead to the homeland of the deceased or of next of kin, to provide for the disposition of group and mass burials, to provide for the burial of unknown American World War II dead in United States military cemeteries to be established overseas, to authorize the Secretary of War to acquire land overseas and to establish United States military cemeteries thereon, and for other purposes.

Since making that objection I have conferred with officers in the Department in charge of this function, and I find that all the doubts I had entertained are resolved. I therefore withdraw the objection.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator desire the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. LODGE. No; I do not desire that. I merely want the RECORD to show that I have withdrawn my objection.

MEETING OF COMMITTEE DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare be permitted to hold a hearing during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the order is made.

MORALS OF SELLING LIQUOR—ARTICLE FROM KIPLINGER MAGAZINE

[Mr. CAPPER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "Morals of Selling Liquor," published in the July 1947 issue of Kiplinger magazine, which appears in the Appendix.]

FUTILE SOVIET AGREEMENTS—EDITORIAL FROM THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

[Mr. MCCLELLAN asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Futile Soviet Agreements," published in the Washington Daily News of July 9, 1947, which appears in the Appendix.]

BETTER GOVERNMENT—EDITORIAL FROM THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

[Mr. MCCLELLAN asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Better Government," published in the Washington Daily News, July 9, 1947, which appears in the Appendix.]

A CAPITALIST LOOKS AT LABOR—ARTICLE BY CYRUS EATON

[Mr. MORSE asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "A Capitalist Looks at Labor," by Cyrus Eaton, published in the University of Chicago Law Review for April, 1947, which appears in the Appendix.]

REFUSAL TO ACCEPT GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY—LETTER FROM JOE M. BAKER

[Mr. WILEY asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a letter from Joe M. Baker, district freeport sales manager of the Milcor Steel Co., of Washington, D. C., together with an article by Edwin A. Laley, which appear in the Appendix.]

WALTER CHANDLER—ADDRESS BY WALTER P. ARMSTRONG

[Mr. STEWART asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address entitled "Walter Chandler—Citizen, Lawyer, Soldier, Public Servant," delivered by Walter P. Armstrong, of the Memphis bar, at a testimonial dinner given to Walter Chandler in Memphis on September 30, 1946, which appears in the Appendix.]

AUTHORIZATION FOR REPORT FROM FINANCE COMMITTEE

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, the Committee on Finance has favorably reported House bill 3350, a bill for the reduction of taxes. I ask unanimous consent to be permitted to submit a report by midnight tonight.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, permission is granted.

MRS. MILDRED WELLS MARTIN

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the amendments of the

House of Representatives to the bill (S. 113) for the relief of Mrs. Mildred Wells Martin, which were, on page 1, line 7, after "\$4,000" insert "; to pay the sum of \$2,500 to Mrs. Mabel Jones, of Camden, S. C."; on page 1, line 10, strike out "the said Mrs. Mildred Wells Martin" and insert "them"; on page 1, line 11, strike out "she was" and insert "they were"; on page 1, line 11, strike out "a passenger" and insert "passengers"; and to amend the title so as to read: "An act for the relief of Mrs. Mabel Jones and Mrs. Mildred Wells Martin."

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House.

The motion was agreed to.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT—APPROVAL OF BILLS

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries, and he announced that on today, July 9, 1947, the President had approved and signed the following acts:

S. 394. An act authorizing the issuance of a patent in fee to Raymond Wesley Doyle;

S. 396. An act authorizing the issuance of a patent in fee to Thurlow Grey Doyle;

S. 397. An act authorizing the issuance of a patent in fee to Lawrence Stanley Doyle;

S. 398. An act authorizing the issuance of a patent in fee to Spencer Burgess Doyle; and

S. 399. An act authorizing the issuance of a patent in fee to Gladys May Doyle.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session,

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Maurer, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills and joint resolution, and they were signed by the President pro tempore:

S. 640. An act to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to sell certain property occupied by the Weather Bureau at East Lansing, Mich., and to obtain other quarters for the said Bureau in the State of Michigan;

S. 1316. An act to establish a procedure for facilitating the payment of certain Government checks, and for other purposes;

H. R. 494. An act to reorganize the system of parole of prisoners convicted in the District of Columbia;

H. R. 3737. An act to provide revenue for the District of Columbia, and for other purposes; and

H. J. Res. 170. Joint resolution authorizing the erection in the District of Columbia of a memorial to Andrew W. Mellon.

UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED SERVICES

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 753) to promote the national security by providing for a National Defense Establishment, which shall be administered by a Secretary of National

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Defense, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force within the National Defense Establishment, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Defense Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming obtained the floor.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Alken	Hayden	O'Connor
Baldwin	Hickenlooper	O'Daniel
Bail	Hill	O'Mahoney
Barkley	Hoey	Overton
Brewster	Holland	Pepper
Brieker	Jenner	Reed
Bridges	Johnson, Colo.	Revercomb
Brooks	Johnston, S. C.	Robertson, Va.
Buck	Kem	Robertson, Wyo.
Bushfield	Kilgore	Russell
Eutler	Knowland	Saltonstall
Eyrd	Langer	Smith
Cain	Lodge	Sparkman
Capper	Lucas	Stewart
Chavez	McCarran	Taft
Connally	McCarthy	Taylor
Cooper	McClellan	Thomas, Okla.
Cordon	McFarland	Thye
Donnell	McGrath	Tydings
Dworschak	McKellar	Umstead
Ecton	McMahon	Vandenberg
Ellender	Magnuson	Watkins
Ferguson	Malone	Wherry
Flanders	Martin	White
Fulbright	Maybank	Wiley
George	Millikin	Williams
Green	Moore	Wilson
Gurney	Morse	Young
Hatch	Murray	
Hawkes	Myers	

Mr. WHERRY. I announce that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from New York [Mr. IVEs] is absent by leave of the Senate because of a death in his immediate family.

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] is necessarily absent because of illness in his family.

Mr. LUCAS. I announce that the Senator from California [Mr. DOWNEY] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND] is absent on public business.

The Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS] is absent by leave of the Senate, having been appointed a delegate to the International Labor Conference at Geneva, Switzerland.

The Senator from New York [Mr. WAGNER] is necessarily absent.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Eighty-eight Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is present.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, when consideration of Senate bill 758 was temporarily suspended on Monday I had, up to that time, endeavored to show that the bill provided for a complete merger of the armed forces in every aspect. I had also endeavored to point out that the savings which were estimated to result from the passage of the bill would not in fact result; that on the contrary the set-up as envisioned under S. 758 would vastly increase the cost of the operation of our armed services.

I had also pointed out many, many instances of coordination between the Army and Navy which had taken place without the benefit of any merger, and which were increasing day by day until there was almost complete coordination in practically every function of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force which it was possible to coordinate.

I had also endeavored to point out to the Senate the dangers of the military dominance of not only the military system of the country but of our whole economic system.

Now, Mr. President, I desire to discuss for a short time the different concepts of the Army, Navy, and Air Force with regard to the basic set-up of our armed services.

The Army General Staff is completely sold on the theory that everything that flies through the air should be put in the Air Force, everything that walks or rolls on land should go to the Army, while everything that sails on or in the water belongs to the Navy. The Army calls this the "ideal" philosophy for the organization of the armed forces.

This philosophy of the Army is known as the "trielemental" philosophy, since it segregates the components of military power according to the natural elements in which they operate. It might also be called the "authoritarian" philosophy, since it was the accepted philosophy of Napoleonic France, of Von Moltke's and Hitler's Germany, and of Mussolini's Italy. It is the Russian military philosophy today.

The paper simplicity of trielemental concept is its leading attraction for those who are unfamiliar with military problems. There is something very alluring about a concept which puts the various military components into such neat compartments. It looks obvious and economical to have all aircraft under a single management—the same with ships and ground troops. But those who are familiar with all the ramifications and problems involved know that the simplicity and the economy are not realized in a practical application of the concept.

The truth of the matter is that the conduct of warfare becomes more rather than less complicated under the trielemental philosophy. The reason for this lies in the fact that the trielemental concept makes every major military operation a joint operation. Even amateur students of warfare know that ground operations require close air support as well as aerial observation, reconnaissance, and spotting of artillery fire. They know that naval operations rely heavily upon aviation for attack on surface targets, and for reconnaissance, gunfire spotting, and aerial defense. They know also that amphibious operations require the highly coordinated use of ground, sea, and air forces. Every major operation thus demands the participation of at least two of the military components which are completely segregated by the trielemental concept.

Since the trielemental philosophy makes every important operation a joint operation it forces on us the necessity of habitually maintaining joint commands, joint administrative echelons,

joint logistic structures, all of these in addition to the completely developed structures set up separately to administer the ground forces, the sea forces, and the air forces. Instead of the simple and economical structure hoped for, the trielemental concept in its practical application requires us to maintain an exceedingly complex and costly overhead structure replete with duplications.

The objections of complexity and cost are secondary, of course, to the primary question of military effectiveness, and here the objections to the trielemental concept are even more cogent. The coordination of ground, sea, and air elements in a modern campaign is a most difficult problem. Split second timing, rapid shifting of forces, and intimate familiarity of one element with the problems of the others are of paramount importance. These are not easily achieved, if they can be achieved at all, in a trielemental system where mixed forces must be assembled for each job, under a temporary joint command.

The question may well be asked, Why, in the face of these objections which are obvious to any military dilettante, would the Army and the Air Force support such a philosophy? The answer lies in a corollary of the trielemental concept—a corollary which says that one element of the armed services should dominate the others. In the past, when the trielemental concept has held sway, the dominant element has been the Army—hence the attractiveness of this philosophy for the Army. In the future the Air Force hopes to become the dominant element—hence the attractiveness of the trielemental philosophy for the Air Force.

The corollary of armed services combination by a single element springs largely from the premise that an element which is common to all operations should occupy the key position. The Army points to the fact that all warfare reaches its final conclusion on land, hence they argue that the land element is the common element and should dominate. They fortify this argument by reciting the relative strengths of the various elements and by pointing out that even navies and air forces require land bases and are to that extent always dependent on the land forces for a place from which to operate. The German Army used this same argument effectively in establishing its own dominance of the German armed forces.

The Air Force does not go along all the way with this line of reasoning, of course. They are willing to agree to the general premise that if there is a common element to all operations it should dominate the armed services. They think, however, that aviation will eventually become the common element. The matter of relative service size does not bother them particularly, as they hope the present size relationship will shift in their favor before very long. They brush aside as inconsequential the Army's contention that wars are fought from land bases for land objectives.

There are other reasons why the Army and the Air Force are intrigued with the trielemental philosophy. Its rigid compartmentalization would put naval and

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Marine Corps aviation out of business or into the Air Force, and would put the fleet marine force out of business or in the Army. The Army and Air Force have itched for years to take over these elements of the Navy. Such desires of the Army and Air Force are really side issues, however. Their real aim is the domination of the armed services as a whole. If the United States accepts the trielemental concept, along with its corollary of single-service domination, the stage will be set for the most spectacular interservice battle this country has ever seen—the battle between the Army and the Air Force to determine which one will be top dog in the United States defense establishment.

It may be that the trielemental philosophy, with its corollary of single-service domination, is the correct philosophy for a country which is forced by geography or by other influences to concentrate the major portion of its strength in a single element of its armed forces—for a country which can safely relegate its other military components to a subordinate role.

We have the word of General von Brauchitsch that it was the proper thing for the Germans to do. It may also be that it is the proper philosophy for a totalitarian state. No less an expert than General Keitel, Hitler's chief of staff, wrote that the organization of the German armed forces command, the ultimate embodiment of the trielemental philosophy, represented "the most logical and most efficient solution for an authoritarian state."

Before we accept these opinions, however, we should not overlook the misuse of the German Air Force and Navy which resulted from the German acceptance of the trielemental philosophy, nor should we overlook the historical misuse of navies and air forces by other countries which made the same decision. Without exception, those nations which have embraced the trielemental philosophy in the past have gone down to military defeat. Let us not follow their example.

Opposite the trielemental philosophy is the task force or functional philosophy espoused by the Navy. This might also be called the democratic philosophy, inasmuch as it is the traditional military philosophy of the democratic nations of the world. In this concept, land power, sea power, and air power are recognized as the basic elements of over-all military power, rather than ground troops, ships, and aircraft. One component of the armed services, the Army, is made responsible for the exercise of land power and is given the necessary forces—primarily land forces, but including necessary air and sea auxiliaries—to do the job. By the same token the Navy is given the requisite sea, air, and amphibious ground forces to wield effective sea power, while the air force is equipped with appropriate air, land, and sea forces to exert strategic air power. Each service thus constitutes a balanced arm to exercise one particular aspect of over-all military power.

The chief advantage of the task-force philosophy, as contrasted with the trielemental philosophy, is that it provides

a far more effective application of the several elements of military strength.

It is well known that the exercise of land power involves a great deal more than the efforts of ground troops. In particular, it involves the closely coordinated use of aviation to provide observation of the battlefield, to report developments behind the immediate field of operations, to spot and adjust artillery fire, and to bomb and strafe enemy troops and positions which are holding up the ground advance. These supporting missions can be carried out effectively only by aviation which is organic to the ground troops, which has trained habitually with ground troops, and which is under the immediate control of the ground commander. Effective land power thus demands that the ground force be constituted as a balance force comprising not only ground elements, but aviation elements as well. By similar reasoning, organic water-borne elements are also a necessity for a balanced ground force. The ground commander should not be forced to call upon a naval commander for the boats required to effect a river crossing.

Air power, on the other hand, seeks to destroy the enemy's will and ability to fight, not by attacking his troops on the field of battle, but by direct attack on his seat of government and the main elements of his war economy. It also bears the primary responsibility for defending the Nation against aerial attack. It cannot discharge these responsibilities with aircraft alone. It, too, demands a balanced force. It must have the means to defend its ground installations against surprise attacks from the ground. It must have the antiaircraft troops to complete its aerial defense of the Nation, and it must have the boats and other naval appurtenances necessary to operate strategic bombers from seaplane bases.

The Navy has always been constituted as a balanced force for the exercise of sea power. It has maintained a substantial aviation component for aerial defense of the fleet, for aerial attack of naval targets, for antisubmarine warfare, for sea reconnaissance, and for observation and control of naval gunfire. It has maintained a fleet marine force for the seizure and defense of the bases required for fleet operations.

Much of the success of the recent naval campaign in the Pacific was directly due to the fact that naval aviation had been maintained for years as an organic part of the Navy, was subject to Navy command, and was thoroughly familiar with naval operations. Similarly the fleet marine force was an effective force in amphibious operations because it had been maintained as an arm of the fleet, had developed amphibious techniques in conjunction with the fleet, understood fleet operations, and contained a marine aviation component which was expert in the support of amphibious forces.

The task-force philosophy leads to economy as well as military effectiveness. Most warfare is capable of division into well-defined areas where land power, sea power, and air power are applied individually and independently, ex-

cept for the over-all coordination at the very top level.

In Europe, after the Normandy landings, the combined armies of the United States, Great Britain, and France engaged in a tremendous land campaign which embraced all the elements of land power and which was entirely apart from the strategic air offensive against the heart of Germany. The latter was a manifestation of air power. At the same time that land power and air power were being exerted in Europe, sea power was keeping open the Atlantic lanes for the transport of supplies and manpower. In the Central Pacific, meanwhile, sea power was being pushed to the very doorstep of Japan, setting the stage for the exercise of air power against the Japanese war potential and the eventual exercise of land power on the home soil of Japan.

It is only in the marginal areas that land power, sea power, and air power are exercised in conjunction with each other, and there only for relatively short periods. Under the task force philosophy, such joint undertakings are of a transitory nature, marking the shift in emphasis in a particular area from sea power to air power, from sea power to land power, or from air power to land power. Under the task force concept, joint operations are therefore of comparatively rare occurrence and are short-lived. We are not faced with the continual necessity of maintaining joint commands. The task force philosophy thus insures a simple command, administrative, and logistic structure, one which is immeasurably more effective and economical than the dual structure required by the trielemental concept.

Inasmuch as the task force philosophy renders joint operations the exception rather than the rule, no single service appears as a common element in every major operation, and there is no resulting corollary that a single service should dominate the others. There is, in fact, no place whatsoever in the task force concept for the combination of the armed services by a single element, since the task force philosophy is the characteristic philosophy of nations which must place equal or nearly equal reliance on air power, sea power, and land power for survival. Such nations dare not permit the subordination of any of these elements to another.

The task force philosophy has been the traditional American philosophy, just as it has been the traditional military philosophy of all major democratic nations. It is the philosophy which has enabled these nations to build incomparable military machines without surrendering to them the power of government. It is also the philosophy which has emerged victorious in every modern war.

It is obvious that these two philosophies are implacably opposed to each other. In view of the manifest impossibility of compromising these concepts, and in view of the unwillingness of the Army and the Navy to surrender their conscientious convictions, it is not surprising to find that the merger bill now being considered glosses over this all-important matter, leaving it as a subject for continuing interservice controversy and ultimately for Executive decision.

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I am opposed, Mr. President, to such a procedure, for I believe that it is essential to national security that the issue be settled now and by action of Congress. If it is true that one philosophy is particularly appropriate to a democratic nation, whose first line of defense lies in its sea power and its air power, then I believe that Congress should make its choice in favor of that philosophy and write that philosophy into law.

I should like to make particular mention of naval aviation and the Marine Corps, two components of our armed forces, the maintenance of which is indispensable to the task-force philosophy, two components which will not long exist if the Army succeeds, by the device of Executive order, in foisting upon us its trielemental concept.

Whenever these two branches of the service, namely, naval aviation and the Marine Corps, have been mentioned in committee, my colleagues have united to express their admiration and esteem. My colleagues have never failed to utter their objections to any suggestion which would deprive these gallant services of the continuing opportunity to serve the Nation in the future as they have in the past. In the face of these utterances, I find it difficult to understand their reluctance to provide adequate protection in the proposed legislation. I cannot reconcile their outspoken solicitude for the welfare of naval aviation and the Marine Corps with their repeated refusals to set at rest the minds of the thousands of officers and enlisted personnel in those services. On numerous occasions there has been evidence presented to us that naval aviators and marines are with good reason apprehensive of what the future has in store for them. We cannot make a sounder contribution to national security than to give these fine officers and men the assurance they are waiting for. If we must write a little more detail into the law than some of my colleagues think necessary—and I for one do not regard the necessary provisions as details—then let us do so, for the reward is overwhelmingly great. It is the peace of mind of those who should be able to devote their uninterrupted attention to the dangers which threaten from without.

As sure as I am of the bitter struggle which exists between the two opposing concepts of military organization, I personally find much of substance to the fears expressed by the marines and the naval aviators. One need only look to the 1478 series of papers of the joint Chiefs of Staff for evidence that within the past few years there have been repeated and strong attempts to restrict the combat functions of naval aviation and the Marine Corps. The very functions which have made these services great, the functions in which they have rendered incalculable service to the Nation.

Many of my colleagues will be startled to learn that the leaders of the Army and the Army Air Force proposed, almost at the outset of this controversy, that the Marine Corps should no longer be accorded an opportunity to continue its leadership in the development of am-

phibious warfare, which is the primary peacetime occupation of the corps. It is difficult to comprehend how such a proposal could be seriously advanced in the face of historical facts. The Marines brought this highly specialized form of warfare to perfection almost single-handed, starting at a time when the Army was content to accept the lesson of Gallipoli as indisputable evidence that the job could not be done.

The Pacific campaign of the war just ended is a tribute to the foresight of the Marines, and to the skill and perseverance with which they pursued their objective. It is no less their credit that they cheerfully taught the art of amphibious warfare to the Army when the latter service belatedly recognized its importance on the very eve of war. The amphibious doctrines and equipment perfected by the Marines contributed no small share to the success of the Army landings in north Africa and Normandy.

It is no less startling to learn that behind public utterances of affection and esteem for the Marine Corps, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the commanding general of the Army Air Forces proposed variously during the past 2 years or so that the Marines should be transformed into boat crews, that in time of war their combatant operations should be limited to feints or demonstrations, or that their units should be lightly armed and limited to regimental size. This is the fate, carefully veiled in military secrecy, that the leaders of the Army and the Army Air Force have in store for the Marines. What a fate, Mr. President, for the intrepid corps which stormed the beaches of Guadalcanal, Bougainville, Tarawa, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okniawa! What bitter irony that the commanding general of the Army Air Forces should propose such a fate for the gallant corps which fought the bitterest battle of its illustrious history at Iwo Jima in order that the B-29's of the Air Force might find a welcome haven when they returned crippled from the bombardment of Japan, in order that the same B-29's might have fighter protection on their hazardous trip to Japan! What a mockery if that glorious symbol of American bravery and self-sacrifice—the raising of the flag on Mount Suribachi—is to become the symbol of the passing of the Marines as a combatant corps! I ask my colleagues if they are prepared to become a party to such a desecration?

The Army knows that the respect of the Nation for naval aviation and the Marine Corps is too high to permit a summary destruction or emasculation of those services. It is for this reason that the War Department has consented to their nominal continuation under Senate bill 758. But at the same time they have insisted that the basic functions of these services should not be written into law, but should be reserved for determination by Executive order. The method in this is all too plain. Executive orders are written with one stroke of the pen, and can be changed or canceled with another. Under Executive order the functions of the Marine Corps and of naval

aviation can slowly be whittled away, bit by bit, until nothing but the name remains.

The probable course of events which would follow the passage of Senate bill 758 is obvious from examination of the proposed Executive order which accompanied it when it left the White House. In this order the functions of the armed services are set forth in detail. It is an order replete with duplications, just the sort of duplications which this bill purports to avoid. These duplications are purposeful, duplication is to be established in every controversial field. Then at some later date, under the guise of eliminating duplication, the Marine Corps and naval aviation will be forced to vacate the field in which they have attained original primacy and operated so gallantly and effectively in the past.

I do not anticipate immediate and drastic reductions in functions. Drastic reductions, particularly in the immediate future, would invite the attention of Congress and the public to the duplicity of the scheme. The reductions will be postponed, and when they occur they will be in the nature of nibblings, each bite of insufficient size to attract notice, but in the aggregate and in the end the result would be the same—destruction or emasculation.

I stated that the proposed Executive order was detailed. I think it was made so purposely, in order to convey to Congress and to the members of your committee the impression that a statutory delineation of functions would be correspondingly detailed, and therefore inappropriate to legislation. Such is not the case. The basic functions of the Army, the waterborne Navy, and the Air Force are simple of statement and relatively immutable. Because they border on the functions of the other services, although they do not duplicate them, the functions of naval aviation and the Marine Corps require slightly greater specification, but they are still capable of statement with a breadth and brevity appropriate to legislation.

It is most fitting and proper that Congress should legislate the functions of every service. In the well-chosen words of General Vandegrift:

To do so is no more than to state the reasons for its existence. When Congress calls the several armed services into being, it recognizes a specific need for each of the several components of Nation security. The very existence of each component is predicated upon a conclusion by Congress that a mission actually exists—that a role must be filled. As specifically relates to the Marine Corps, Congress should ask itself whether the traditional need for an amphibious fighting force in being still exists—whether the need for a Marine Corps is in fact justified by the events of the past and the forecasts of the future. If it determines the Marine Corps' function is still to exist, then it should be set forth in law—otherwise the implicit will of Congress can be utterly and legally ignored.

I agreed wholeheartedly, Mr. President, with General Vandegrift when he said that.

Frankly, I think the position of those who advocate leaving the delineation of functions to Executive order is untenable. Are we so awed or panic stricken

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by our fears of the future that we must write a blank check for those to whom we look for military security? Would it be any more absurd if our fears of an economic depression led us to create a huge Government reconstruction corporation, financed with billions of dollars, and if we left it to the President or an appointed head to decide what the functions of the corporation should be? I am certain that we would write the functions of such an organization with the greatest of care; and I doubt if anyone would have much success in avoiding a careful delineation of functions by talking about the evils of freezing organization and making it too rigid. Yet that is exactly what the Army and its friends have told us. They have asked for a blank check, and have thrown up their hands in horror when we have talked of how it should be spent.

All this talk of freezing things in the pattern of the present leaves me singularly unimpressed, particularly when it comes from military officials whom Congress has repeatedly had to spur into progress in the past. Numerous complaints have been made that past statutory delineation of functions has impeded progress in the services. I challenge the truth of such statements. The fact is that there was little impetus for change within the services, and it was rare indeed for a military spokesman to come to Congress and ask that changes be made. The opposite was frequently the case; Congress had to force progress on the military service. If my memory serves me correctly, we would have entered World War II with an equestrian Army if it had not been for the efforts of Congress to separate the Army from its idolatry of the horse. I think Congress may still have to step in to divorce the Army from the pigeon.

Those who protest the statutory delineation of service functions on the ground of undue rigidity or legislative draftsmanship are seeking to beguile us. So long as there was a possibility that a delineation of functions could be legislated which would further the Army objectives with respect to naval aviation and the Marine Corps, there was no objection on the part of the Army's friends to so doing. The President, when he thought a year ago that he had arrived at an acceptable compromise on the subject of functions, recommended that his compromise be written into the law. The Army, however, was not willing to compromise on this point, and seeing that they could not accomplish their objective in the law, determined that it would be settled outside the law and to their satisfaction.

Mr. President, I cannot speak too strongly on behalf of naval aviation and the Marine Corps, not because of my personal admiration and esteem for members of those branches of the service, but because to my way of thinking those progressive branches of the service have a most significant contribution to make to the security of the Nation in the years ahead. That contribution will not and cannot be made if these organizations are deprived of the com-

batant functions they now perform. I want to see those functions written into law. If the future demands a change in those functions, I am confident that the Navy will have no hesitation in coming to us and asking us to change the law. And I am confident that the Congress will meet the demands of the future with vigor and dispatch.

I should like to say, Mr. President, while I am speaking of writing functions into law, that I have observed a marked tendency throughout this bill to leave to determination by Executive order many matters which in my opinion are matters for determination by the legislative branch of the Government.

I have just discussed at length the manner in which the functions of the armed services are to be left to the discretion of the executive branch of the Government. Earlier I pointed out that in place of a statutory statement of the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency there is simply an affirmation of functions assigned by Executive order. I might also point out that much of the decision as to what is to be transferred from the Department of the Army to the Department of the Air Force is likewise left to the executive branch. Going still further, I might call attention to the fact that for a period of 2 years from the date of enactment of the pending bill, ostensibly a transition period during which permanent legislation is to be written, the secretary of national security is to be permitted to determine which of the organizational features of the War and Navy Departments, born of Executive orders issued under war powers acts, are to remain effective. It is not without interest to recall that in the original version of the bill there was no 2-year limitation on the exercise of such power. I commend my committee colleagues for inserting the 2-year limitation, but I shall be greatly surprised if in the course of the next 2 years there are no further attempts to restore the power of the executive branch to determine the organizational structure of the military departments.

It is apparent, when one considers the features of the bill which I have just mentioned, that the bill provides no more than a framework for our national security structure, and leaves to the executive branch the task of filling in the details.

Some of my colleagues have in fact stated that all this bill should attempt is the setting up of such a framework. If this is my colleague's goal, then I cannot but admit my admiration for the way in which they have succeeded. This is indeed a bill which cannot stand alone; it is a bill which rests upon existing Executive orders, and will require countless additional ones to make it effective.

I for one do not subscribe to this sort of legislation, if it can in fact be called legislation. However much we may have been obliged by circumstances during the past decade or so to confer broad grants of authority to the executive branch of the Government, I do not believe that I misgauge the sentiments of the majority of this body when I say

that the tendency today is for Congress to regain its traditional role as the sole legislative agency of the Government. This wholly admirable tendency will receive a drastic set-back if we revert now—in connection with this bill—to the practice of drafting only in broad outline, leaving to the executive branch the authority to interpret our intent and to fill in the vacuum we create.

I regret, Mr. President, that I am obliged to take so much of my colleagues' time in presenting my objections to S. 758—time on which there are so many other heavy demands. The necessity arises, however, from the difficult position in which a critic of the proposed legislation finds himself. The other side of this controversy is the side which has enjoyed the advantage of superficial plausibility. It is the other side of the argument which has at its disposal the slogans, the catch phrases, and the glib generalities which can be such an effective facade for an unsound structure. The critics of this legislation, on the other hand, are faced with the necessity of making and presenting a patient analysis, of searching for the thought behind the word, of throwing light where light was not intended to fall. If I fail to convince my colleagues, it will be because I have not devoted sufficient time to the exposition of my position, not because I have devoted too much time to it.

When Senate bill 758 was first introduced into the Senate and referred to the Armed Services Committee, I had made a most careful analysis of its provisions. I found in it so much that cried for correction that I despaired of remedying its defects and deficiencies, one by one, and decided that the preferable course would be to take the avowed objectives of the bill, with which I am in complete agreement, as well as many of its detailed provisions, to which I could and do heartily subscribe, and draft a new bill—one which I thought would meet the full approval of all those to whom the avowed objectives of Senate bill 758 are a goal and not a subterfuge. The bill (S. 1282) was the result of my endeavors and was referred to the Armed Services Committee.

I was greatly disappointed. As time went on, it became apparent to me that many of my committee friends were disposed to accept what I regard as considerably less than full attainment of our common goal. There emerged from committee a bill which by no stretch of the imagination can be considered a bill to promote the national security.

I would be less than just to my colleagues if I failed to observe that important changes have been made in Senate bill 758 in committee. Senate bill 758, as reported by the committee, is distinctly a better bill than it was in its original form. Much still remains to be done, however, if we are yet to enact a law which can be a source of subsequent security to the Nation and of pride to ourselves.

The first step which needs to be taken is to recognize that the "national security organization" created by title II is, in reality, nothing more than a national

military establishment, and should be so designated throughout title II.

The next step is to give some foundation in fact to the statement in the declaration of policy that it is not the intent of Congress to merge the military departments and the armed services. This we can do only by discarding the concept of the national military establishment as a super department with a secretary at its head, and employing the term "national military establishment" simply as a collective term embracing the military departments, the armed services, and the various agencies created under title II of the bill.

By revising our concept of the national military establishment and eliminating the need for a head thereof, we make it possible to place the Secretary of National Security in his proper position as an assistant to the President in all matters relating to national security. Once we have established the Secretary of National Security in a position where he reflects an over-all viewpoint, as the President's chief assistant in all matters relating to national security, there need be no objection to his performing, in addition to his broader duties, the specific duties set forth in section 202 with respect to the departments and agencies collectively comprising the national military establishment, for these departments and agencies will loom no larger in his perspective than any of the other Government departments and agencies concerned with national security.

By way of illustrating the proper position of the Secretary of National Security, I call to mind the position of Mr. Byrnes when he was acting as top coordinator of the war agencies. The term "Assistant President" was frequently applied to Mr. Byrnes at that time, and I think it was an appropriate title. The Secretary of National Security should occupy a similar position—one from which he would supervise and coordinate all agencies of National Security. Top men of the Nation must be sought for this job. Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Hoover, and Mr. Charles Wilson, of General Electric, come to my mind as men of the type needed.

Once we have placed the Secretary of National Security in his proper perspective, it remains only to transfer those sections relating to him to title I of the bill, the title relating to coordination for National Security.

With respect to the Central Intelligence Agency, I shall leave to other critics of the bill the problem of writing into law a proper set of functions to replace the bland reference to present duties under executive order. As a minimum step in the protection of civil liberties it should be made mandatory, however, that the director of Central Intelligence should at all times be a civilian who can make such a position a career.

The measure which I have already outlined, namely, the establishment of proper status and perspective for the Secretary of National Security, and the curtailment of military influence on the National Security Resources Board, will do much to give a proper balance to the National Security Council. I would go even further than this, however, and

broaden the membership of the council to bring into it, at the very least, the chairmen of those congressional committees most intimately concerned with the broad aspects of national security.

Finally, Mr. President, we should give to naval aviation and the Marine Corps the assurances of continued usefulness which they have repeatedly asked, and which so far have been denied them. We need not go into details of reorganization and technique in so doing, but we must mark out for them a clear-cut field of endeavor in which they can function with a full and lasting consciousness of security and freedom from interruption or interservice vendetta.

All these changes, Mr. President, are embodied in the amendments which I will propose. It is my fervent hope that my colleagues will not fail to give them their full support and thereby cast a vote for real national security.

ALLEGED THEFT OF SECRET FILES AT OAK RIDGE, TENN.

Mr. BALDWIN obtained the floor.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BALDWIN. I yield to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, I will say to the Senator from Connecticut that I should like to take about 10 or 12 minutes to make a statement on a very vital matter which I think is of great interest to the Senate and the country.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Connecticut yields to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, as chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, I should like to make a statement concerning a very disturbing article which appeared in the New York Sun this morning. The article relates to the security situation at Oak Ridge, Tenn., in connection with the operation of the atomic-energy project there. It is particularly alarming to note there is a statement that certain highly classified files have been stolen from that institution.

Mr. President, at this point in the Record I ask unanimous consent to have printed the teletype story as it came over the wire a little while ago. The matter has not yet appeared in the editions of the newspapers which have been received here in Washington, but I am informed that the teletype copy I hold in my hand is the story upon which the news reports are based.

There being no objection, the teletype story was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Unknown agents, working from within the atomic-energy plant at Oak Ridge, Tenn., have stolen several files of highly secret data on the atomic bomb, an investigation by the New York Sun revealed today.

Disclosure of this startling laxity on the part of American security agents who permitted the loss of such top secret information is expected to blast the Nation's atomic-energy set-up into a total reorganization. Full details, when revealed, will rival the Canadian atom-bomb spy story, the alarmed informants of the Sun predict.

Congressmen serving on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy are frightened,

baffled, and thoroughly disgusted. FBI agents and security police who replaced the highly trained military counteragents guarding Oak Ridge during the war are at this moment combing vast grounds and the labyrinth that comprises the electro-magnetic or gaseous diffusion plants of the inner nuclear fission works.

Guards and workers, clerks and scientists are being interrogated repeatedly as the G-men and civilian intelligence officers seek to repair the damaging security leak by recovering the missing data. The exact nature of the documents is being withheld.

Individuals known to be of questionable loyalty, and even those with close kin who are Communist Party members, are working at Oak Ridge. The wife of one employee is on the staff of the Soviet Embassy here in Washington. Another atomic-energy scientist spent his vacation in Canada, visiting with Dr. Alan Nunn May, since jailed by the Canadians for betraying atom-bomb secrets during the war. Others in the suspect list work daytime in the atom-bomb plants and then hang around evenings, apparently out of sheer curiosity.

It would be a fairly simple matter to climb over the fence at Oak Ridge. Guards no longer patrol the perimeter of the grounds as they did in wartime, although this fact came as a surprise to the deputy general counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission, who also was the acting director of security. It would be a simple matter also to sabotage Oak Ridge, since it is unlikely that anyone would be halted in approaching within 75 yards of the plants. A hand grenade would do the job.

Representative J. PARNELL THOMAS, Republican, of New Jersey, said when informed of the Sun's investigation that "This comes as no surprise to me." THOMAS recently visited Oak Ridge to check on Communist infiltration in the plant and returned to submit a secret report to the committee that was critical of the security procedures and revealed the presence of known Reds and numerous fellow travelers.

The Congressman declared that security patrols are lax and virtually useless. He stated further that the FBI has its hands tied, because under the law agents can only report their suspicions concerning disloyal individuals. They lack the power to act.

Another prominent Congressman, alarmed over the laxity of security, is JAMES VAN ZANDT, Republican, of Pennsylvania, a former naval intelligence officer, who is baffled by the Sun's disclosures. VAN ZANDT is on record as approving military security control at Oak Ridge and at other atomic-energy plants.

Although the congressional committee will go slow in putting the finger on Russian agents as responsible for the missing documents because of international implications, there are no such inhibitions connected with the FBI revelations. Four Soviet agents during the past 2 years have made an effort to wear atom bomb information from Americans. One or two may have returned to Russia.

Two of these agents attempted to secure information from scientists at Columbia University in New York. The other two operated in the field near the big atom plants. None was successful in his efforts, although the FBI remains mum concerning the previous attempts of additional persons who may have been cooperating with the agents. The four were not arrested or jailed, principally because of the weakness of United States laws and because they led the G-men to other Kremlin agents.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, the joint committee, in carrying out the duties charged to it by law, has been exceedingly zealous to observe the security standards not only at Oak Ridge but in act at all installations of the Atomic En-

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ergy Commission. Our findings at these installations, whatever they may be, have always been brought to the attention of the Atomic Energy Commission. Correspondingly the Atomic Energy Commission has been exceedingly cooperative in reporting its views and findings and problems to the joint committee. Whenever corrective steps, regardless of their importance or vitality, are considered necessary, they are taken with promptness and dispatch.

So far as the loss of files at Oak Ridge is concerned, my committee has no information on the subject, and presently no reason to believe that important, highly classified, secret documents have been surreptitiously removed or stolen from that institution. However—and I say this, Mr. President, because, while it has been considered vital and important secret information, yet perhaps in the light of this news story, specific facts should be given to the Congress and the country—the Atomic Energy Commission did appear and report to the joint committee that there were certain missing atomic energy files at the Los Alamos plant in New Mexico. This information has been known to the joint committee for some time. The occurrence took place in March 1946 when two Army sergeants, who had been detailed to the project, then under the War Department, took certain documents and information with them when they were demobilized.

The fact that the documents were missing was discovered by the present Atomic Energy Commission in the early part of this year, shortly after it took charge. Those facts were brought to the attention of the FBI and to the attention of the joint committee. The FBI, with immediate vigor and in full cooperation with the Commission, promptly located the two men; and the documents were, as we believe, completely and fully recovered. The FBI investigation indicates, at least up to now, and I believe that the indications are presently sound, that the individuals were souvenir hunters, and that they did not allow unauthorized persons to have any access to these documents. We have no present information that any unauthorized persons did in fact see the documents other than the two Army sergeants. The matter, however, is under present consideration by the Department of Justice.

Mr. President, I can say that, so far as I know, the members of the joint committee are convinced that no effective breach of security in those instances was accomplished, and that the security was in fact maintained, even though there was a surreptitious removal of certain important documents and information at that time.

The documents apparently were kept locked up with the private papers in the files of these individuals. The evidence does not disclose that they were displayed, as I have said to anyone.

I wish further to report to the Senate, to the Congress, and to the public that the joint committee, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the military and naval establishments of the Government, all are keenly aware of the transcendental

importance of the security of the facilities of the Atomic Energy Commission. I wish to state at this time that all possible effort is now being concentrated and will be continued to be devoted to the protection of these installations and the information kept therein.

Mr. President, I may say that there are a number of apparent conjectures in the teletype story, perhaps based on suspicion, perhaps based upon guess, some of which might be classified as "dope" paragraphs, if you please, and I feel that the story probably may arouse a wrong connotation insofar as concerns the security and the vital protection that are being provided and thrown around the installations in our atomic energy plants and their operations.

I may say, Mr. President, that I presume no enterprise, regardless what its size may be, can always be 100-percent secure in all its details against any possible invasion by individuals or any possible access by unwarranted persons.

I may also say that our committee is convinced that while there are always problems of security in connection with these plants, we are convinced that a vigorous and an intelligent effort is being made and an effective program provided to safeguard these plants. I should like to give the Senate that assurance as the overwhelming opinion and belief of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will my colleague from Connecticut yield to me for a very brief observation?

Mr. BALDWIN. I am glad to yield to my colleague.

Mr. McMAHON. I wish to commend the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for the clear and lucid statement he has made as to the apparently indisputable facts of the situation. I wish to congratulate the Atomic Energy Commission for their vigilance in discovering the incident to which the chairman of the joint committee has referred so soon after they took over control of the organization.

I wish further to pay high tribute to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their truly magnificent work in this case so soon after the Commission discovered the loss in going to work, bringing the culprits to book, and restoring the material to a place of security.

I think it is somewhat regrettable that the story which has appeared has so far deviated from what are the facts in the case, and I am delighted that the Senate and the country may be assured that the Commission to which we have entrusted this great and overwhelming responsibility has not been derelict in its trust.

UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 758) to promote the national security by providing for a National Defense Establishment, which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Defense, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force within the National Defense Establishment, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Defense Establishment with other departments and agencies of the

Government concerned with the national security.

Mr. BALDWIN. Mr. President, I rise to speak briefly on Senate bill 758, which has been misnamed by some as the merger bill, but which is really and truly correctly called the unification bill.

I may say that it is with some regret that I find myself differing with my distinguished, able and learned colleague from Wyoming (Mr. ROBERTSON). He said that Senate bill 758, as it came out of the committee, is a much better bill than the bill which was originally submitted to the committee. In that I feel he is absolutely correct. I want to say that one reason why it is a better bill is because our distinguished and able colleague from Wyoming, who has this matter very close to his heart, and who has made a deep study and examination of the whole subject, was able to make some very able and worth while contributions to the work of the committee, and the bill bears the imprint, in some very important features, of the contribution which he made.

I might say also, Mr. President, that when I first considered the bill I was against it. I was against it perhaps almost entirely for nostalgic reasons. It was my privilege and opportunity to serve on a destroyer overseas in World War I, and in World War II my two older boys served in the United States Navy, one on a destroyer. So I have a deep and abiding interest, indeed an affection, for the naval service, because it was my privilege and opportunity to serve in the Navy at a very impressionable time in my life, and because since I have continued that interest. I was somewhat doubtful as to whether, in a plan of merger or unification, the Navy would eventually get its full share of what it needed in the way of direction, funds, equipment, and all the other things which are necessary for the establishment and maintenance of an adequate and effective naval service. I am confident that there are in the bill guarantees which will enable the Navy to grow and develop in the future as it has in the past; that it will be able to attract able leadership and able seamen, and that we shall continue to have an increasingly better Navy. I believe that there are safeguards in the bill which do the same thing for the other branches of the service.

At the outset there was a great deal of discussion as to what would happen to the Marine Corps. I yield to no man in my admiration for the Marine Corps. There is not now, and probably there has never been a more effective fighting unit than the American Marine Corps. Its history is a glorious one, and in it we all take tremendous pride. Since it was a part of the Navy, I, too, was extremely anxious to see to it that every guarantee was placed in the bill to assure the continuance of the Marine Corps, enable it to continue to draw to its ranks able leadership and good men, and make certain that it should have funds sufficient for its maintenance and development, and for the equipment which an armed service needs.

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At this point I invite attention to a provision in the bill which deals specifically with the protection and continuation of the Marine Corps as a separate unit. On page 41 of the bill, in section 206, subsection (b), there is this language:

(b) The provisions of this act shall not authorize the alteration or diminution of the existing relative status of the Marine Corps (including the Fleet Marine Forces) or of naval aviation.

It seems to me that that language throws as strong a safeguard around these two services, preserving them as independent services, and as a part of the Navy, as language is capable of doing.

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BALDWIN. I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. MAYBANK. I am very much impressed with the provision of the bill which the Senator has just read. Is it not a fact that before that provision was finally written Admiral Sherman and General Vandegrift agreed to it, and believed that with that amendment the bill was satisfactory to the Marine Corps and to the Navy?

Mr. BALDWIN. The Senator is correct. I thank him for bringing that fact to my attention. Both Admiral Sherman and General Vandegrift were present, and they were in agreement with respect to the language of the provision.

Mr. MAYBANK. Is it not also a fact that in executive session we had several conferences with General Vandegrift and Marine Corps groups, in which he specifically answered the question on behalf of the Marine Corps, to the effect that the provision was satisfactory to the Marine Corps?

Mr. BALDWIN. The Senator is correct, to the best of my recollection. I thank him for his contribution.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BALDWIN. I yield.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I ask the Senator if the language to which General Vandegrift agreed was not the particular language in regard to the Marine Corps.

Mr. BALDWIN. That is correct.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. He was not agreeing to the over-all bill, but simply to the specification of the functions of the Marine Corps.

Mr. BALDWIN. That is correct. As I remember, General Vandegrift was present at several of our sessions. My recollection is that it was his specific purpose in appearing before the committee to see to it that the Marine Corps was preserved. It was our specific intention, not only as a result of our own feelings, but as a result of what he had to say and our admiration and respect for him and his character, to place in the bill language as strong as language could be made. I do not intend to imply that General Vandegrift approved of the bill as a whole. I do not recollect that he was asked that question, or that he gave an opinion on the bill as a whole.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WILLIAMS in the chair). Does the Senator from Connecticut yield to the Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. BALDWIN. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I remind the Senator from Connecticut that General Vandegrift specifically approved the language with relation to the Marine Corps, which language was drafted in his presence, after several meetings, and after several hours in the last meeting. It is my recollection that he specifically and affirmatively approved the language as it now is.

Mr. BALDWIN. That is my recollection, too. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts for his contribution.

Mr. President, there is another phase of the bill which has been discussed at length, and upon which I should like to comment at this point. In all the discussion concerning this proposed legislation the position, function, and authority of the Secretary of National Security have probably aroused the greatest interest. There were some who felt that in providing for a Secretary of National Security we would be creating a super-official who would have wide and broad powers over the administration of all the armed forces, including the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Forces. So a great deal of time was taken in the committee in discussing the place which the Secretary of National Security should have.

At one time it was felt that it would be wise to make the Secretary of National Security the chairman or vice chairman of the Security Council, to serve in that position as a designee of the President. I am frank to say that I shared that view, because I felt that in accomplishing the unification of the armed forces it might be well to center authority in the National Security Council and have the organization branch out from there. However, I must admit that the change which was made was a better suggestion.

So when we examine the section which deals with the National Security Council we find that the Council is to be composed of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Security appointed under the act, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Resources Board, together with such other members as the President may designate from time to time.

I think it was forcefully demonstrated that to make the Secretary of National Security vice chairman of the National Security Council would be to place him in a position of too much power and authority. It would place him ahead of the Secretary of State, for example. It was finally decided by a majority of the committee that it would be wise to have him on the National Security Council, but that he should not serve as the vice chairman; that he should have no different status than that of any of the other Secretaries, including the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force,

any one of whom may, for a meeting or for a period of time, be designated by the president as the acting chairman of the National Security Council. So it seems to me that in making the change which was made, by not providing that he should be the vice chairman of the Council, to serve in the absence of the president, we have somewhat curtailed the possibility of power which many were fearful he might exercise in such a position.

Mr. President, it is very important that all the armed forces should have adequate appropriations. In the bill it is provided that the Secretary of National Security should be the one to submit the budget. Of course, the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, in turn would submit their budgets to the Secretary of National Security. It would be within the range of possibility and, perhaps, of probability that the Secretary of National Security might feel that more money should be spent on one particular branch of the armed services than on another and that he might want to curtail the amount of money available for a particular branch or division of a branch of the armed services. So, Mr. President, we specifically provided in the bill that when the budget is submitted to the Congress, which, after all, is the agency which has the final authority of passing upon the amount of the appropriation, it must show what was recommended by the Secretary of National Security and must also, in turn, show what was recommended by the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Forces, and also what was recommended by the Budget Bureau itself. So that Congress, which is the final arbiter as to the amount of money available for our armed forces, will have before it in the appropriation bill for the armed forces a detailed estimate of what the Secretaries of National Security, the Army, Navy, and Air Forces recommended.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BALDWIN. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Is there not one additional step? Cannot the Secretaries of the Navy, Army, and Air Forces, prior to the budget's actually reaching Congress, object to what the Secretary of National Security recommends and make a report directly to the President before he submits his budget?

Mr. BALDWIN. That is correct. That is a point I shall now cover. It is also possible for any of the Secretaries to go around the Secretary of National Security to the President himself on any matter.

So it seems to me, Mr. President, that we have safeguarded one very important point, namely, the opportunity of the Secretaries of the several branches of the services themselves to appear before the Congress and make their own recommendations as to appropriations, and thus make it a public issue in the Congress of the United States. It seemed that that was an adequate provision to safeguard against the possibility of any

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Secretary of National Security arbitrarily reducing appropriations beyond what the Secretary of a particular branch of the service felt was needed.

In speeches in the Senate with reference to subjects which we discuss from day to day there is often reference to the history of the past. I think that is most desirable, Mr. President, because, in my judgment, we cannot too often review the things that have happened in this country in the past and the activities of the great men who have made them happen. So I was interested in looking up the question of how the Cabinet office of Secretary of the Navy came about.

In the original organization of the Federal Government under President Washington there was no Secretary of the Navy. There was simply provision for a Secretary of War. It apparently was the assumption at that time that the Secretary of War would deal with all matters relating to war, but apparently later it was believed that there should be a Secretary of the Navy, because it was felt, perhaps, that too much attention was given to the Army by the Congress and that Army officers were too powerful and influential in the Government. Therefore the Cabinet position of Secretary of the Navy was created. The office of Secretary of the Navy came into being under the administration of President Adams, in 1798. It was apparently the intention of those who organized the Federal Government that the armed forces should be unified under one Secretary, and no doubt it was the exigencies of the particular situation, when we had no navy whatsoever, that made it appear advisable that there should be a separate Department of the Navy. But, Mr. President, while the fact that now we may be carrying out what were the original intentions of the founders of our Government, or those who set it upon its successful course, does not necessarily imply that we must follow them, there is afforded, it seems to me, an interesting precedent.

Briefly, what does this unification accomplish? First, it provides a National Security Council to advise with the President and the Congress on the integration of our domestic, foreign, and military policies. That is a very important consideration. It is something which we did not achieve in World War II until we had had a long and bitter experience with a different situation. We tried to establish it in Washington in a way that would provide the greatest coordination, but we found from experience that there was much delay, much uncertainty, and a lack of a sound integration of policy and program, and it was not until along toward the end of the war that we approached in our organization an establishment which is similar to that provided for in this bill—the National Security Council. True, the personnel are different, but our experience demonstrated conclusively that we needed something of that kind. So this bill creates a National Security Council.

I might point out, Mr. President, that the National Security Council is entirely, as I recall it, a civilian organization. It is made up of the President, the Secre-

taries, and such other persons as the President may designate. Of course, that Council could bring to its service any officer it might desire. Consequently, it is the main coordinating factor, I think, in all our preparations for national security and for our defense. God grant that we shall not have to prepare for war, but merely for the possibility that it may come, and thus be prepared to defend ourselves.

Under the Council there is established a central intelligence agency to provide coordinated, adequate intelligence for all Government agencies concerned with national security. When one reads the record of the past war in regard to that field it is found that there was much to be desired in the way intelligence was covered, and there was great conflict about it. I say nothing here in depreciation of the men who were engaged in the intelligence service, because some remarkable and extremely courageous things were done. Nevertheless, we demonstrated from our experience the need of a central intelligence agency; and this bill provides such an agency. Neither a National Security Council nor an intelligence agency now exists.

The bill provides for a National Security Resources Board to advise the President and the Congress on the coordination of the military, industrial, and civilian requirements of all national resources for war. It gears the capacity of our national economy to the requirements of national security and works closely with the National Security Council. That Board does not now exist. We had its counterpart in several different boards during the war, but it took a long time to coordinate them and have them work together. Provision is made for that by this bill.

The bill creates a National Security Organization consisting of the armed forces proper, together with certain additional agencies whose need has been shown by experience. Such an organization does not now exist, and its absence constitutes a serious lack of coordination in the armed forces.

Let me say here that I thank the learned and able Senator from Wyoming for his contribution in regard to that particular phase of the bill, because I think he brought home to the committee very forcefully that, after all, we are dealing with two different sets of functions, namely, the civilian ones, which we want to provide with coordinating agencies, and also the armed forces as such. It has been through the recommendations of the distinguished Senator from Wyoming that the bill in large part has taken its form.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me once more?

Mr. BALDWIN. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator was discussing the National Security Council and its importance. Does the Senator agree with me when I say that the purpose of creating the National Security Council is not to set up a new function of government with extraordinary powers, but solely to provide an organization to give advice to the President, not on general affairs of state, but through civilian groups, on

affairs of state affecting the national security and tending to make the military forces more efficient? Is not that correct?

Mr. BALDWIN. I agree wholeheartedly, Mr. President. In other words, it is not essentially an administrative agency. It is an advisory council.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. And it is advisory on security matters alone.

Mr. BALDWIN. That is correct.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BALDWIN. I yield.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Is it not also somewhat of an enlargement upon the existing committee, the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, which reconciles and coordinates the action to be taken by the State, War, and Navy Departments on matters of common interest, and then establishes its policies on political-military considerations?

Mr. BALDWIN. I believe that is correct.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. That committee is in existence, and it now meets every week.

Mr. BALDWIN. That committee is not identical with the National Security Council. The Council will take over the functions of that committee. So I think I am correct when I say that we now have no National Security Council; but today in the Government most of the functions covered by this bill are, in large part, and at least as to the great majority of them, being performed. The purpose of this bill is to coordinate and unify the performance of those functions. It seems to me that is the only purpose of the bill.

Mr. President, this bill provides for a Secretary of National Security as head of the National Security Organization. In effect, that official will, in a sense, be an assistant to the President, just as the Senator from Wyoming has indicated. But he will exercise general direction and control over, and will resolve differences between, the military departments, except when such differences are of a nature to be resolved by the President as Commander in Chief. The Secretary of National Security in no way will diminish the responsibility and authority of the President, but he will merely provide the President with an impartial assistant to view national security problems from the over-all standpoint, rather than from that of any one element of the armed services.

Of course, Mr. President, as I have previously pointed out, and I should like to emphasize this point again, the mere fact that the Secretary of National Security is the man dealing with the armed services and is the one who is closest to the President, and the fact that it may be said that he rather insulates the other Secretaries from the President, should be considered in the light of the provision contained in this bill that any one of the Secretaries—the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force—can go to the President. So it seems to me that when that specific provision is made, the Secretary of National Security could not

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well find fault, as it has been claimed that he might, with a Secretary who, when finding himself in disagreement with the Secretary of National Security, goes to the President, who, of course, as Commander in Chief is the final arbiter of disputes of that kind.

The Secretary of National Security is charged with preparing an over-all budget for the national security, and this for the first time in the history of our country. That will give the Congress some basis for granting appropriations in proportion to the realistic requirements, it seems to me, rather than on the impractical basis upon which the Congress must act today in many cases. The Secretary of National Security will also be in a position to eliminate certain duplications, inefficiencies, inequities, overlapping, and wastage which result from the present system of two independent departments, each one pursuing objectives of national security, but with no one, short of the President, to coordinate their efforts.

Of course, certain military and civilian assistants are provided for the Secretary of National Security; but it is my recollection that he is not to have a military staff as such.

Mr. President, it seems to me that with the experience all of us have been through, now is the most appropriate time in all our history to take this proposed step. Now there is great interest in it. Now the recollections of all of us are freshest about our past experience in these matters. Now the records of the past war are available to us and are before us. So now is the time to take this step.

We cannot help but be impressed with the recommendations of the men who have led our armed forces. Many of them recommend the passage of this bill. Among them are General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz. It seems to me that these men, who so recently have demonstrated their abilities, capabilities, courage, foresight, and judgment, are men whose opinions and recommendations should be given great weight, indeed. I do not mean that the Congress should defer to the military in any sense of the word, but I think we are getting advice at this time from men who have established, perhaps if not the finest, at least one of the finest records that have ever been established for military and naval and air leadership in the history of these United States.

Mr. President, this bill establishes the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force—three, whereas formerly there were two. In effect, the present Army Air Force is redesignated as the United States Air Forces, and a new Executive department is established for its administration, thus recognizing the compelling lesson of World War II that air power is on a parity with land and sea power. These three departments are to be administered by their respective Secretaries, and will be under the general supervision of the Secretary of National Security.

It has been ably demonstrated in the recent war, on many a front, Mr. President, in spite of the great pride of the

Air Force in its effectiveness, that the Air Force without the Army and Navy cannot win a war. It has also been amply demonstrated that the Army cannot do so without the Navy and the Air Force, nor can the Navy do so without the Army and the Air Force. Consequently, when we give the Air Force a status equal to that of the other two main branches of the armed services, I think we are not completely throwing overboard the recognition that these three forces must continue to be integrated. As was stated several times in the course of the hearings, whatever the Air Force may do in the way of bombardment or whatever the Navy may do in the way of bombardment or in the way of bringing material and equipment to the spot and keeping the lines of supply open and beating off attacks on the lines of supply, both under the sea, on the sea, and in the air, it is the man with the gun and the hand grenade, who slogs up the beaches and along the roads and through the fields and gullies and mountains, who, in the last analysis, takes the land and holds it and makes the victory complete. I think the mere fact that the Air Force has been so all-powerful means that probably it will be used in the future as it has been used in the past, namely, to carry that most devastating of all weapons, the atomic bomb. Nevertheless, I think that from the testimony of various witnesses at the hearings it is apparent that they recognize the great importance of the other two branches of the armed services, and recognize that time and time and time again they were entirely dependent upon the other two branches for their support and help and success.

Mr. President, specific safeguards for the continued existence of the Marine Corps and naval aviation are provided in the pending bill. I have already discussed that point.

In the bill the National Guard Bureau is perpetuated, and under the bill it will perform the same functions for the new Air Force, Army, that it now performs for the War Department.

The bill provides for a War Council as an advisory body to the Secretary of National Security on the over-all problems of the armed forces. Presently no such identical agency is in existence.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are continued as the principal military advisers to the President. The effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is approved by giving to the Secretary of National Security the power of decision in certain matters upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot agree, and which the President delegates to the Secretary.

Mr. President, I doubt if we would ever have in our history a Secretary of National Security who, knowing that his decision would commit the administration, would not be extremely careful to see that any matter of policy of a momentous or extremely important nature was put up to the President of the United States for his final decision; and that is as it should be, as I see it, under our Constitution.

At present the requirement for unanimous consent before the Joint Chiefs of

Staff can reach a decision is generally considered a serious deficiency. I think we were all impressed at the hearings by the testimony of General Eisenhower on that point. He went so far as to say that oftentimes, or sometimes, perhaps even a poor decision was much better than none at all; that is, things had to be decided, they had to be decided so that other things could be done which depended upon that decision; and the proposal before us makes that more readily possible.

A research and development board is established to continue the existing Joint Research and Development Board. The important functions of this Board will be charged ultimately to the Secretary of National Security.

Each one of these development boards, Mr. President, can be called in by the Security Council, and the knowledge and information it has will be available to the National Security Council and to the President at any time. It seems to me that the set-up under the bill makes a much better working organization than we have had heretofore.

Many times, when the subject of reorganization of our armed forces has come before the Congress, it has been opposed by some on the basis that it would pave the way to military control of our Government, and to its ultimate overthrow, and military dictatorship. It is very well that Americans should be fearful of that possibility. This suspicion of the military is traditional to our people, although throughout the history of the United States there has never been any justification for it.

The framers of the Constitution, mindful of the military tyranny abroad in the world at that time, provided adequate safeguards against military domination in a newly founded government. In the first place, they provided that the civilian head of the State, the President, should be the Commander in Chief of the armed forces, as he still would be under the bill. Congress cannot change the Constitution of the United States.

Furthermore, all the executive departments which administer the armed forces are controlled by civilian Secretaries. Of course, the Secretary of National Security will be a civilian. Most important, the constitutional clause limiting military appropriations to a period of two years absolutely retains ultimate control in the hands of the legislature, in the hands of the Congress, and consequently, being retained in the hands of the Congress, it is retained in the hands of the American people. This power of the purse-strings is, in the last analysis, the real guarantee against any military threat.

There is another safeguard against military domination, namely, the very character and nature of our professional soldiers and sailors. The nucleus of the American officer corps comes from West Point and Annapolis. Every Member of Congress is certainly conscious of the democratic method by which appointments to these great institutions are made.

The graduates of the two academies represent a cross section of American intelligence and leadership in American

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ideals. They are in no way regimented or molded into militaristic form. They are a part of our national life. There is no caste system which separates them from the people whom they serve. Furthermore, the officers who enter our armed forces directly from civilian life certainly represent a non-military, unbiased viewpoint.

Of course, presently we have found that our military and naval leadership, as produced by the academies, is not going to be adequate. The last war demonstrated that that was so, and it probably is going to be so in the future. As a result, provision is made whereby boys graduating from our regular colleges may seek and find careers in the armed forces.

I am happy to say that in my experience, with the Navy, particularly, I find a very keen desire on the part of naval officers of the higher ranks to take in on an even basis men who come from colleges and are not graduates of the Military and Naval Academies. Facilities and programs are now under way to make it possible for these men to attain, technically, as good an education in the armed forces, and in the use of weapons and tactics, and all that goes with military preparedness and operations, as is available to the men who graduate from the Academies. There is a keen, earnest desire to take them in and make them part of the great body of the officer personnel of the armed forces of the United States.

Returning to the question of military domination, some of our foremost soldiers have become the most ardent civilians once they have laid down their arms. Men like Washington, Andrew Jackson, Zachary Taylor, Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, J. J. Pershing, certainly cannot be cited as menaces to the American system. Neither can such great citizens as Secretary of State Marshall, Gen. George Patton, General Eisenhower, or General MacArthur, or any of the other great generals of the war lately concluded, be cited as men who would favor military domination. Of course, the important consideration is that the example they have set, both as leaders and as citizens, soldiers and sailors and civilians, is one which has made an impression upon the youth of the country that will last for ages to come.

The question of civilian control, as I have said, has been raised repeatedly in the discussions. Although the armed forces of the United States are at present under stringent civilian control, and although there has never been any legitimate fear that such control might be lessened or was becoming undermined, the unification bill, it seems to me, greatly increases civilian control over the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Let us examine into that for a moment. In the first place, the traditional and constitutional control of the President as Commander in Chief of the armed services remains unchanged. Secondly, the Congress, with its constitutional responsibility for the raising and supporting of armies and navies, will, as in the past, continue to control appropriations and statutory authority for the armed forces.

Mr. President, it seems to me those are two very vital matters. First, the President of the United States is bound to be, as he should be, responsive to the will of the people, and certainly the Congress is, as it should be, responsive to the will of the people.

Next, the Secretary of National Security is a civilian official who acts as a delegate of the President. The Secretary is expressly forbidden in the bill to establish a military staff. In fact, emphasis is placed on the civilian aspect of his office by the spelling out of four principal civilian assistants to aid him. He is to have no military assistants.

The Secretary of each of the Departments which administers the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force is also to be a civilian, as are his Assistants and Under Secretaries. These Departments are entirely controlled by civilian heads, and the military personnel therein are subordinate to civilian direction.

Certainly these provisions in the bill in no way lessen this civilian control. In fact, if anything, they increase that control by one echelon; that is, by the addition of a Secretary of National Security.

Not only is there increased civilian control in the direction and maintenance of the armed forces, as just stated, but there are several new agencies which will have considerable influence over the military forces, but they are to be predominantly civilian in nature and composition.

I think one great thing the bill accomplishes is that it brings into closer contact with the armed forces themselves a larger number of civilians than ever. That was true during the war, and one thing the bill does is that it continues and preserves those relationships with these new agencies, several of which are controlled in large part by civilians.

For example, the National Security Council is composed of a civilian Secretary of State, a civilian Secretary of National Security, the civilian Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, a civilian executive secretary, and such other members as the civilian President may designate. Military domination of that body hardly seems likely.

Next, we find nothing but civilians in the National Security Resources Board, which is composed of a civilian Chairman and such civilian heads or representatives of the various executive departments and other agencies as may be designated by the civilian President.

Furthermore, the Research and Development Board and Munitions Board are headed by civilians. Also the Central Intelligence Agency may be a civilian, as decided by the President. In addition, the War Council is headed by the civilian Secretary of National Security.

The only military agency in the entire bill is the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the reason that is a military agency is that it is set up to do a purely military job.

Actually, the insistency on civilian control of the armed forces tends to become somewhat academic in view of the

nature of modern war. The great portion of the able-bodied men of this country were in uniform in World War II, but civilian control of our Government was not diminished. It was not necessary to take steps to increase civilian control to offset any imagined threat that the military, total over 10,000,000 at the peak of the war, might get out of hand. Lack of civilian control over the military in the United States has not, through 172 years of history, become acute. There has never been a menace to our civilian form of government. I pray God that there never will be. Most certainly, Mr. President, the pending bill makes adequate and complete provision against it.

In fact, in a modern war it does not make too much difference whether a citizen is in uniform or not because the entire country goes to war in this day and age. To quote General Eisenhower:

War is no longer the concern of the soldier alone; in its commencement, its waging, and its settlement, he is only one of many. Although the outcome of battle is depending upon his action, the strength for a victory is the product of the entire nation behind him. The economist, industrialist, scientist, the farmer, worker, and teacher are all necessary to the waging of war. Similarly they are likely targets of enemy action. Security against war is a function that belongs to all citizenship.

In a word, there has always been adequate civilian control over the armed forces. Now that we have found a need for wider civilian participation in the national security, we are proposing in this bill an increase in the civilian control to be exercised what might be termed the national, not merely the military, mobilization of the United States in the interests of its own existence.

In closing, Mr. President, I should like to say simply that the pending legislation, like all legislation enacted by the Congress, is not perfect. Many of us still can find fault with some of its provisions; many of us, as individuals, can pick out things that we think might be better, things that might be done more effectively the other way; and it is well that that is so. Let us continue that interest, because it is an evolution through which we are passing. This has not been done before, in time of peace, but the lessons that have been learned both in time of peace and in time of war dictate that we should now take advantage of our great experience, and that now, when our recollections are strong and the men who have had these experiences in a most bitter war are here to advise us, now is the time when we should take a step for unification of the armed forces. I submit, Mr. President, that the pending bill does that as effectively as any legislation which I believe it is possible for us to evolve and write at the present time.

Mr. HILL obtained the floor.

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, I want to thank the Senator from Alabama for yielding to me, so that I may make merely a short statement in connection with the pending bill. The subcommit-

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tee of the Committee on Armed Services, consisting of the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BALDWIN], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. WILSON], and I have a most important meeting at 2:30 o'clock, to consider the GI terminal-leave bill. It is for that reason that I shall limit my remarks, and shall make but a very brief statement.

I should like to say first that, last year and year before last, as a member of the Committee on Military Affairs, I attended the hearings, day after day and month after month. This year, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I likewise attended, whenever possible. I believe that the bill which has been finally drawn and reported to the Senate by the able and distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee is far superior to the bill which was discussed and agreed upon last year in the Military Affairs Committee.

I am in thorough accord with what has been said by many of the distinguished Senators who have preceded me. Endorsing the able argument of the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BALDWIN], I should like to add that before I finally voted for the bill, I was perfectly satisfied from the testimony of Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Sherman that the Navy was properly protected. I might say that in the hearings, at page 114, I asked Admiral Nimitz the direct question, whether he was perfectly satisfied with the bill as written. He replied that he was perfectly satisfied with it.

I am not one to put my judgment above that of the able war leaders of this country. Last year, before the committee, General Marshall, then Chief of Staff, and others testified on the subject. This year, General Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz, General Spaatz, and other distinguished leaders appeared and testified. After hearing from all of them, who were satisfied and approved the bill, there was objection from a man for whom we all have great respect and admiration, General Vandegrift, the leader of the Marine Corps. It was at the suggestion of members of the committee that the General was recalled. He appeared twice, later, in executive session, and finally agreed thoroughly with the amendment, insofar as the Marine Corps was concerned, which was read a few moments ago by the Senator from Connecticut. I supported this amendment because of my respect for General Vandegrift. Hence all war leaders agreed.

One of the great benefits of the bill, as I see it, Mr. President—and I feel very keenly about it, and always have—is the raising of the Army Air Force to a higher position in the armed services of the country. The Army Air Force performed a magnificent service in the war. I am very glad to say that in this bill the status of the Army Air Force, in my judgment, will be raised to that of the Ground Forces and of the Navy, and, above all, the status of the Naval Air Force, which performed so gallantly and contributed so much to our victory in the Pacific, will not be interfered with. I am convinced the amendment protects the Naval Air Force and also protects the Marine Corps.

There is little else that I may say. Much has been said on the subject of the Security Council. Much has been said about the powers of the Secretary of National Security, and about other things. But I believe the committee has submitted to the Senate a bill that is worthy of the consideration and vote of every Senator.

I take this opportunity to commend the committee for its untiring work, and to thank the chairman for the many courtesies he showed to all members of the committee during the lengthy hearings. I thank the Senator from Alabama again for yielding to me. My only regret is that, since I must attend another meeting, I shall not be here to listen to the address by the distinguished Senator from Alabama, as he discusses the bill in greater detail.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alabama yield for the purpose of suggesting the absence of a quorum?

Mr. HILL. I hope the Senator will not insist on that. I prefer to proceed. I thank the Senator very much. I deeply appreciate his offer.

Mr. President, we won the greatest war in history—at a cost of over a million casualties; a quarter of a million lives and over \$300,000,000,000. We won with our industrial capacity, our natural resources and the genius of our people. We won by the heroism and sacrifice of everyone—our men and women in uniform and those out of uniform. But regardless of wealth, industry, and resources, we would have lost World War II but for two powerful allies: Time and space.

Time was bought for us by the blood of those peoples who were attacked first, time to prepare; time to mobilize; time to plan; time to forge our winning war machine. Time saved us. But it was given to us by others. We will not have this gift again.

Our other indispensable ally was space. There was a barrier of thousands of miles between us and our enemies. The weapons of 1941 could not cross this barrier. But—like our ally of time—space will not save us again. The weapons of today can cross that barrier. The weapons of tomorrow will laugh at it.

By VJ-day we had entered a new age of science, of warfare, and of world relations. The United States has attained an unprecedented ascendancy among nations. Willing or not, we have acquired new and awful obligations. A large part of the responsibility for the future peace of the world rests with us. The world looks to us for our cooperation, but even more it depends upon our willingness and ability to back cooperation with the military power to preserve the peace. The peaceful nations of the world know that they can cooperate to preserve the peace only if they are backed by a strong United States, strong not only in moral values and material resources but strong in military potential.

The nations that are not peaceful or cooperative look to us also. Our resources make us world enemy No. 1 of any envious or aggressive power. Have no doubt about it; we would be first on

the list for any sneak attack. The United States will be tomorrow, if it is not today, within range of immediate assault from any portion of the globe.

We must quickly adapt our defenses to our new position. To delay is to jeopardize our own future safety and the peace of the whole world. Our present organization for defense is geared to the past. Early and favorable action on the pending bill is a necessary first step to reorganize for the future. No effective modern military war plan can possibly be evolved by our present disjointed, compartmentalized, jealous bureaus of War and Navy Departments. We cannot complacently continue an organization proved imperfect by the past war, and which the logic of the present so obviously proves obsolete.

The idea of the unification of the Armed Services is not new. In May, 1944, 1 year before VE-day, I introduced S. 84, a bill for the unification of our Armed Services. This was before the shortcomings of our system were as well known as they are now; before the radically new weapons and means of war revealed at the war's end were known to the public.

The Senate Military Affairs Committee bill, S. 2044, which was reported out of committee in the closing days of the last Congress, was an improvement and development of the earlier bill. It was the result of careful, protracted, and exhaustive hearings and studies, but no action was taken because of the smoke screen of false issues which was thrown around this simple, logical, urgent proposition. What is now proposed has been the subject of thorough thought and long investigations over the years by many authorities. It is not by any means, as some misinformed opponents would have us believe, a new or radical measure. But until World War II there was no working proof of the merits of the idea in modern warfare. Until recent world-shaking scientific developments, there was no compelling urgency to change. The proof of the idea's effectiveness and the need for its adoption are upon us, demanding action now.

The urgent recommendation of the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee has been followed in this bill, in the creation of a National Security Organization. The Joint Chiefs of Staff established the committee in 1944—at the height of the war—to study and recommend the best and most efficient form of peace-and-wartime military organization. The committee was composed of two ranking generals and two ranking admirals. It had the advantage of being able, during the war, to visit and obtain the opinions of senior military experts both in Washington staff positions and in the top positions of command overseas. Every theater of operations was visited. The views of 40 generals and a like number of admirals were obtained. The basic recommendation of the committee, supported by the views of over 90 percent of all Army commanders and exactly half of the Navy commanders overseas, was to establish a single organization of national defense. The bill in its present form, however, creates no single military commander of all armed forces; an office which the Joint

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Chiefs Committee included. But the basic idea of the bill, the single Security Organization, was the basic idea of the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Great benefit was derived, likewise, from the evidence taken during the lengthy hearings conducted by the Woodrum Committee of the House of Representatives on the same basic issue of a single organization. In 1944—also at the height of the war—that committee took over 320 printed pages of valuable testimony. It took no action, deferring to the comprehensive study then being conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee to which I have just referred. Of particular interest was the evidence taken by the Woodrum Committee on the subjects of supply and procurement, which emphasized the absolute necessity of a single Security Organization to prevent the appalling waste and staggering cost to the taxpayer of competing separate supply systems.

The bill before us is not an Army plan or a Navy plan. It is a legislative plan evolved through a typical example of the working of our legislative process as provided by the Constitution. It comes closest to the plan of the Committee of the Wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military side, and closest to the Eberstadt plan, devised by Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt at the request of the Secretary of the Navy on the civil-economic-industrial side.

It would provide adequate security measures at all times, rather than only when hostilities threaten. It creates the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board, in order that we may make certain that our foreign and military policies are coordinated and mutually supporting; that a central intelligence agency may collect and analyze the mass of information which is so essential for the Government to maintain peace and without which the Government cannot wage war successfully; that scientific research and development may be coordinated, not only within the military services, but between the military services and other Government agencies and with industrial and educational activities; that intelligent planning may guarantee coordination of our military program with the Nation's resources in manpower, materials, and facilities; and that all these objectives may be accomplished with the greatest possible economy consistent with a strong and effective national security.

The result is a balanced, workable composite of the sound, constructive proposals advanced through the long history of this vital measure. In that regard it is significant that the Army-Navy agreement evolved by Admiral Sherman and General Norstad and transmitted by the President to the Congress with the full approval of Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal and of Admiral Nimitz and General Eisenhower is in important particulars identical with S. 2044 of last year, which was evolved by the Senate Military Committee. Thus the pending bill, S. 758, can find its genesis in proposals

which the Congress commenced to study over 3 years ago and which have through mature and deliberate consideration been embodied in the wise and constructive measure now before the Senate.

The bill is simple. In essence it does two things: First, it creates a single Secretary at the head of a National Security Organization for general supervision and control of an autonomous Army, Navy, and Air Force; and, second, it creates machinery for coordinating military and foreign policy on the one hand and military and industrial mobilization of resources on the other. That is all. But if these things are not done, I fear for our future security.

In order that the record may be clear, let me briefly state some things that the bill does not do. First, it does not provide for a merger of the services. We still have an Army and a Navy with an Air Force. They are virtually untouched by this bill or by any of its predecessors.

I should like once and for all to blow away the biggest smoke screen that has so skillfully been laid around this bill by its artful opponents. The bill does not affect the Marine Corps or naval aviation, or even the Navy. Except for setting up a separate Air Department, it does not affect the Army or Air Force. It is not an armed service bill at all. It is an organization of the constitutional Commander in Chief for his own official family for supervising these services. It is an arrangement of offices in the executive branch of the Government—not of navies and armies—certainly not of interior subcommands of the Navy such as the Marine Corps and naval aviation. The United States Marine Corps is no more affected by the bill than is the United States Infantry. The bill deals with civil organizations, not military organizations.

The three major services, Army, Navy, and Air Force, will be separate autonomous entities—not a single merged service of all arms. But they will form a single team which they do not form today. Each of the three coordinate arms is administered by its own civilian secretary, and commanded by its own military commander. Each has its own staff and personnel. Each continues its own distinctive uniform, perpetuates its traditions, maintains its own esprit de corps. Each arm is left free to develop itself in its own special sphere of activity. Each arm alone conducts its own individual operations and all those activities in which it alone is expert. But the authority to compel teamwork, to provide for over-all planning, to eliminate waste and duplication, to advise the President responsibly and intelligently on interservice differences, is established in the person of the civilian Secretary of National Security. In those fields where spheres of activity and specialty overlap and conflict, the Secretary has the full authority to direct unified, integrated action; to require planning, training, and operations as a team. That is all. There is clearly no submergence of any service.

Furthermore, as I have previously stated, the bill does not set up a supreme military commander. No military au-

thority exists above the commanding officers of the three coequal components. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is a balanced body drawn from all the services, and it is only advisory. But unification of general direction, supervision, and administration resides in the single secretary as the direct delegate, agent, servant, or lieutenant of the constitutional Commander in Chief, and no longer is left to desultory committee action in which unanimity must be reached before decisive action can be taken.

With an understanding of what the bill does and does not do, let us look at its basic idea—unified direction and control of the military departments of the executive branch of the Government.

On the 7th of December 1941, the defense of the country was entrusted to the hands of two separate and independent organizations. One was the War Department; the other, the Navy Department. These two organizations were, legally, as distinct and as unconnected as were the State Department and the Treasury or the Post Office Departments. Practically, they had in some ways become even more distinct than these civil agencies are from each other. But their responsibility was single and indivisible. This single responsibility was to defend against and overcome the military forces of our enemies. Their responsibility was single, but their authority was divided. This was almost fatal. Pearl Harbor proved that. We looked to the Army for the defeat of the foe on land, and to the Navy for his defeat at sea. Twenty years after Billy Mitchell we still had the same basic framework under which the Navy fought the pirates of Tripoli while the Army fought the Indians. Yet, above both land and sea there now lay a new battleground—the all-covering third element of the air. A smooth path extended across the historic domains of the older services. Shore lines meant nothing to this new air power. Yet the Army and Navy had their whole machinery geared to a line of demarcation at high-water mark. The Japs saw this flaw in our machine and took advantage of it. Pearl Harbor was the result.

The lesson is still recorded at Pearl Harbor for all to read. It is to be found there in the burned-out hulls of a great part of our Pacific Fleet. It is perpetuated there by 3,000 American graves. But the lesson of waste and defeat is proved by a much longer record than that of December 7, 1941. It extended all through the dark days of 1942. Hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping and supplies lie rotting on the bottom of the North Atlantic. The watery graves of thousands of merchant seamen; the shattered armies, air forces, and navies of England and Russia, Australia and Holland must be reckoned in the cost.

The hulks of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* at the bottom of the South China Sea are further tokens of the blunders that beset the traditionalists of our sister navy in the British service.

The lesson that we learned is teamwork—coordination, integration, and unity. We learned it the hard way. It was taught us by the enemy in our de-

feats. This basic truth was forced on us constantly and daily throughout the war, in every aspect of our mighty effort: The armed services can no longer stand separate and apart one from the other. The proof was costly indeed. Improvised temporary measures and hastily rigged expedients were powerless to stop the awful waste. With cessation of hostilities, still other considerations have arisen which compel us to stem service separatism. I shall speak more about these shortly. But first let me review the major reasons why a single national security organization is so necessary at this time. For this is not something we can safely lay aside again. We cannot just let it slide. To reject unification now might be to risk our survival as a free people.

First, modern military operations require the coordinated action of all arms and all services. In the course of the lengthy hearings of the Committee on Military Affairs or the Committee on Armed Services not a single witness who appeared, whether of the Army or Navy, military or civilian, for unification or against it, this year or last year, denied what has now come to be accepted doctrine: The necessary coordination of action in theaters of operation, out where the actual fighting is taking place, can be insured only if some one individual has single authority to direct all land, sea, and air forces within that theater. The truth of this doctrine, now accepted by all, was forced on our separate military departments only by the urgent necessities of conflict. It was slow in obtaining acceptance. It was resisted by those who were jealous of the power and prerogatives of their department or bureau or service. It was resisted by the very same considerations that now oppose a single organization. But neither America nor the armed forces themselves could then afford delay. We cannot afford it now.

Thus, in every theater of war, no matter how diverse the conditions, there emerged one supreme commander: Eisenhower in Europe, MacArthur in the southwest Pacific, and Nimitz in the central Pacific. They were supreme not only in operations but in all of the manifold administrative and supply functions in their theaters. These theaters were virtually single governmental departments of the three fighting arms together with all their support, operating successfully in the field. No suggestion was then long entertained that equally satisfactory results might be had by relying on voluntary cooperation and agreement among the various arms, or that inter-service committees should be tried instead of a single commander. The chips were down; the peril was too apparent to debate the obvious action. Departmental prerogatives were suspended to win the common victory.

What was proved to be necessary yesterday in the hemispherical theaters of war is today even more imperative in global defense.

What was the D-day landing on the beaches of Normandy? Was it an Army show? The Army came through the surf and fought their way inland in one

of the greatest military achievements in history. Was it a Navy show? The Navy landed the men and supplies in perhaps the most complex naval operation the world had ever seen. Was it an air show? Air power cleared the enemy from the skies, stopped his reinforcements from reaching the battlefield, dropped airborne troops behind him and bombed and strafed away his resistance. Never before were so many sorties flown in a single day.

Again, what effected the final surrender of Japan? Was it air power, which, operating from bases won by sea and land power, left over 40 percent of the urban areas of the Jap's 60 major cities in ashes, gutted his war industries, killed over 250,000, left 10,000,000 homeless, and held the potentiality for complete annihilation by repeated atomic attacks? Was it sea power, which with air power, had swept the Jap's Fleet from the oceans and blockaded his homeland? Was it land power, which with both sea and air power, had won the air, sea and ground bases from which the final assault on his homeland could be launched?

There is no answer to these questions except this: All these operations were won by triphibious teams of land, sea, and air. The nineteenth-century reasons for two departments are gone with the horse and buggy. We must streamline for a streamlined age.

The need for unity in the last war will be multiplied many times in the next. Pilotless aircraft, homing rockets, supersonic planes, and atomic explosives will finish the demonstration that the Japanese Zero of 1941 so dramatically began. Any future battle may extend anywhere in the world with forces of land, sea and air. To divide our defense against such warfare along lines that no longer exist is sheer folly.

There is even less reason for departmental separation in Washington today than there was for separation of the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Five long years of positive proof has hammered home the compelling need for unity. It simply cannot be seriously or rationally maintained that, although we must have unity of military command in the field, we should not have unity of civilian authority in Washington. There is not one consideration which forced us to adopt unified command in combat that does not, with even greater logic, compel the acceptance of over-all administration of our armed forces here at home. We cannot have effective unity of effort down the line if we lack unity of purpose and direction at the top. We cannot fight as a unit unless we are directed as a unit. Neither a man nor a fighting team can serve two masters. We cannot prepare our forces for unified action unless we train them together. We cannot hope for true common action in the battle when there is no single common plan of battle. All this means unification of planning, training, research, intelligence, and supply, as well as unified operations. In other words, all departmental functions, as well as field command, must be unified.

There is another cogent reason why unification is needed in Washington, in addition to the ones I have just stated,

and that is that our own country may be a battlefield of the future. Any enemy strong enough to be a threat to world peace, will have weapons of range and power sufficient to attack our homeland, the United States itself. If the enemy is going to launch a world war, he will launch those weapons against us. Our clear duty is to admit this fact, and to plan now for our security. If the United States should become a true theater of operations, no one would argue that we should have divided command in this, the most vital theater of all, while admitting the necessity of unity elsewhere.

If we are to be prepared at all to meet the speed of future attack, we must prepare in peacetime. We cannot wait for the distant red glow of another and far more disastrous Pearl Harbor to give us the danger signal. This unification proposal lies at the very base of all this country's postwar military planning.

We know that this over-all planning function cannot be satisfactorily discharged by the President alone in his constitutional role of Commander in Chief. Military planning is a problem of tremendous and growing scientific complexity. It is a problem which requires the broadest possible knowledge of the several arms' missions, potentialities and status; it requires a broad vista of foreign intelligence, and of current and future scientific developments. This demands not only the full-time individual attention of a single over-all civilian authority, but also the integrated effort of a large staff of specialized and capable military and scientific advisors and professional planners. The President, with the multitude of other demands on his time and effort, cannot be humanly expected to personally make sound initial rulings on the partisan plans brought to him by the separate services. He should be able to rely for such coordination on a single member of his Cabinet, on the head of an organization responsible to him for the national security. The President has made it quite clear, in his successive messages to the Congress, that he needs this assistance. The President is in the best position in the world to know whether he, as Commander in Chief, needs this assistance. This vital national function clearly requires the facilities of a specialized organization. It could not possibly be achieved either by a single deputy at the White House level or by any committee or board between the White House and several separate department heads. All these devices have been tried before, and they have never worked. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not working now—just as General Marshall predicted in 1945. This bill provides a real remedy to the problem of adequately supervising comprehensive security planning in this new age of scientific warfare. This bill is the first necessary step in solving that problem.

Another serious consideration, in addition to the urgent need for unified planning, is the problem of joint training. Officers cannot be indoctrinated in the tactics of unified command under a system of separation. Officers and men of each force must absolutely be required to learn the techniques, weapons, ca-

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pabilities, limitations, and functions of their sister services. This is no job for boards or committees for voluntary coordination. This is a vital operating job. It requires direction, not debate. All agree that training of each service for its own specialty must not be neglected. Also, men must be indoctrinated in the customs and traditions of their own service. Everybody wants all the services to retain the splendid esprit de corps which each has developed throughout the years, but the hand of tradition should go no further. Insofar as it inspires morale, it is good. Insofar as it is allowed to divide our defense force, it is bad.

I come now to the question of cost. Here is our big chance to really do something about economy, instead of just talking about it.

When the peril was great, we waged war without counting the cost. In peace, this is impossible. We enter the postwar era with obligations, resulting from the last war, which we know now will last for many years. These obligations require us to be much stronger than our traditional military policy has ever before demanded. The price of adequate security has increased greatly with the advance of scientific warfare. Our national security is bound to be a drastic drain on the Treasury. It will strain our reserves of manpower as well as our pocketbooks. Our limited reservoir of technicians and scientists will be drained for years to come. We can never again afford to be as profligate with our assets as we were in World War II—in war or peace. We have learned that our resources in men and materials are far from inexhaustible in modern war. We must plan now to hoard and ration them. All our plans must call for their most economical and efficient use. This requires a single security organization under a single responsible civilian secretary.

There is an even more vital aspect of this problem. I speak of scientific research. This will require vast sums of money in addition to all other expenditures. In the end, if properly directed and coordinated, it may save us much of the cost of war. In any case, our armed forces must continue to move forward into ever new fields of development if we are to plan adequately for our security. War has become increasingly a struggle of technicians. It is more and more a struggle between men of science. It requires no great foresight to see that this trend will be progressive. But though research is costly in money, it is more costly in scientific manpower. We may beg, borrow, or steal money, but we cannot conjure up scientists. Yet, between the War and Navy Departments, there has been little or no coordination in research activities.

What of the budget? What is the remedy? Mr. President, we now have two separate agencies coming before separate committees of the Congress to compete for separate shares of the national budget for the same purpose—the national security. So long as we continue this practice, we shall continue to be advised, not by judicious counselors, but rather by jealous partisans, special pleaders, each clamoring for as much money as the traffic will bear. A single

plan and a coordinated budget must be evolved by a single professional agency. Only by means of a single organization under the direction of a single secretary can we hope to obtain a single-balanced plan or a coordinated budget providing for a reasoned distribution of available funds according to military value. In the absence of such an agency, Congress cannot possibly weed out continuing waste, duplication and parallel activities, nor stop needless spending. There is no other way out.

The wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff served us well. It was the best substitute for unification which could be improvised at the time. It produced sufficient integration of effort to win the war. This country will remain eternally in the debt of those great military leaders who devoted their efforts to making this body work. Although under the pressure of war they were able to give us enough coordination to bring victory in World War II, they did not and could not give us the efficient integrated team we will need for a war of the future. While these top military leaders have undoubtedly done their best to get together on questions of grand strategy, the competing departments have kept up their rivalry and their duplications and inherent waste.

Mr. President, the final major consideration which I wish to urge in support of the single organization proposed by this bill is air power.

World War II demonstrated beyond all argument, speculation, or doubt the terrific and overwhelming force of air power. Regardless of handicaps imposed upon it by antiquated military and naval organizations acting sometimes as unsympathetic stepfathers, air power, by its inherent might, was able to overcome all these. It clearly established itself in battle as a complete and basic arm which must be employed side by side in an integrated effort with the land and sea arms. Air power has achieved its emancipation in fact. At this tardy date, we cannot do less than to legalize the emancipation it has already won by its magnificent performance. This bill does that.

The question of unification, as I have said, has long been made the subject of the fullest and most comprehensive debate that is possible under a free democracy. The entire problem has been subjected to the most thorough study and restudy. We have had the benefit of reports and recommendations originating in civil, in military, and in legislative sources. We have examined all witnesses, we know the positions of all parties, we have heard all sides. We have heard them at great length. We have heard them to the total exhaustion of the subject. There is no aspect of the problem that has not already been presented, re-presented, and presented again. Mr. President, there has been no argument on any side of any phase of this subject that was not presented several times. The evidence has long been completely before us and is completely before the Nation. I know of no similar question that has been the subject of more widespread public debate. The country is clearly for unification.

Our military departments are for it. Secretary Forrestal has taken the lead in evolving the Army-Navy agreement which gave the immediate impetus to the bill in its present form. Secretary Patterson has been urging unification for years. Admiral Nimitz and Generals Eisenhower, Spaatz, and Vandegriff have all agreed to this bill in its present form. General Norstad and Admiral Sherman, who drafted the agreement, represent the Army Air Forces and naval aviation, respectively. The public and press demand for prompt action is overwhelming.

In the meantime, our Military Establishment, awaiting our action, stands today deprived of the fundamental premises upon which all its planning must be based. It has stood thus for two long years while we have delayed. The state of unrest and uneasiness which the continued pendency of this matter has occasioned is being daily aggravated. Further delay and inaction can serve no wholesome purpose. Our duty to America is clear—the urgency is great—the time is now.

Senators who support the cause of unification today will be called the statesmen of the future, for the cause is sound, and the national security requires action. Those who oppose unification now may well weigh the consequences of their decision.

I speak earnestly because I feel deeply that unification is right, that it is necessary, and that it must precede any orderly and sane solution of our security problem.

With this expression of my own conviction, I commend the issue to the Senate. I believe we should act at once.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, at the outset of my discussion of the unification bill, I want to pay very deserved tribute and commendation to one of the opponents of the bill. I refer to that very distinguished Senator from Wyoming [Mr. ROBERTSON]. As a member of the Armed Services Committee, serving over many weeks with the Senator from Wyoming, also a member of that committee, I developed a great respect for the sincerity of purpose and the intelligent approach which the Senator made to this bill, and which he evidenced in offering opposition to certain features of it. As a result of the work of the Senator from Wyoming on the Armed Services Committee in opposition to the bill, it is a much better bill than it was when the hearings were started and when the executive sessions on the bill were begun. Time after time the Armed Services Committee, in a good-faith attempt to adjust differences in points of view with the Senator from Wyoming, accepted a great many of his suggestions. Although the adjustments did not satisfy him in their entirety, I may say that I think the Senator from Wyoming, in turn, appreciates the approach which those who are opposed to his point of view in the committee took in our discussion of the bill. In my opinion, the country owes much to the Senator from Wyoming for the fine contribution he made in Committee in presenting his differences in points of view to the rest of us, for we now have

a bill which I think avoids the pitfalls which the Senator from Wyoming called to our attention at the beginning of the discussions.

Furthermore, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I want to commend the chairman of the committee, the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. GURNEY], for his patience, his fairness, his absolute impartiality in seeing to it that all had their full say and that due consideration was given to every suggestion made by each member of the committee. There was no attempt in the consideration of the bill, Mr. President, to hasten action in the committee. In fact, at times the members of the committee were criticized because they did not proceed more rapidly in reporting the bill; but each one of us recognized the vital importance of the bill to the future security of the Nation. Hence, we felt that whatever time it took to make a full disclosure of our points of view and to iron out, to the extent we could, our differences, was time well spent.

After those careful deliberations, I reached the final conclusion that the bill in its present form should be passed by the Senate of the United States.

A CHALLENGE TO ACTION

Mr. President, the unification legislation pending before the Senate and known as Senate bill 758 is of as great importance to the United States as any measure awaiting action by this body. It is a subject upon which the Congress must come to a decision without delay or be guilty of dilatory and negligent performance of its duty to the American people.

WHAT KIND OF UNIFICATION?

This matter of unification has been the subject of a continuing controversy for nearly 3 years. We of the Congress, along with many of our fellow citizens both in and out of the armed services, have been very much perplexed about this issue as we have tried to enter a fair judgment on it. It has not been so much that we have doubted the need for some kind of unification—that has hardly even been suggested. It has been rather that fears and confusion have arisen as to just what the form and substance of the unification measure we might adopt should be.

The general reasons for some kind of unification have been all too obvious to most of us. We have seen two great but independent organizations, the War and Navy Departments, each going its separate way toward the single end of providing security to the United States. Common sense alone would be enough to convince any reasonable man that something should be done to bring these services together. And as reinforcement to the common-sense reasons for unification, there are many specific examples and conditions, as portrayed to us by expert testimony as well as in actuality, which attest that it is both uneconomical and inefficient for two independent agencies to be seeking to accomplish the same ultimate mission.

No, Mr. President, it has seldom been doubted that unification as a sound and vital measure in the interest of national security, should be brought about. The

controversies which have delayed a decision on this subject have always developed around the specific details of unification. Indeed, there have been raised in the past numerous doubts—most of which have been sincere and legitimate—as to how far toward unifying the armed services any unification bill should go. And although nearly everybody has said he favors unification, events have revealed measurably different definitions of the term "unification." It finally became apparent that resolution of the issue boiled down to a removal of the specific objections that have arisen.

OLD OBJECTIONS REPEATEDLY RAISED

In certain of the bills which were introduced in previous years, there was proposed a single military Chief of Staff, who was feared by many to be a potential "man on horseback"—a military threat to the civilian control of our Government.

Even with the elimination of the single military Chief of Staff there have been voiced objections that the proposed single Secretary of National Security, albeit a civilian, would have too much power to be safe, would abrogate the powers of the President, and would become a czarlike authority unto himself—a dire menace to our form of government.

It has been further contended that to put any man short of the President, whether he be civilian or military, over the armed forces would cause our security establishment to become unbalanced because the top man might neglect one of the forces through favoritism toward another one. This fear of even civilian control of the armed forces has been perhaps unreasonable since, after all, what kind of control do we want if not civilian?

ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR MARINES, NAVAL AVIATION

Throughout the consideration of this bill I have been of particular concern that nothing should hurt or serve to reduce the effectiveness of the various elements of our great fighting forces. When fear was expressed from certain quarters over the future of the marines and naval aviation, I was moved to join, and did join, with the Senator from Wyoming to do what could be done in seeing that nothing should detract from the usefulness to the United States of these services. I wanted to be certain that under the bill they would not lose their identity or their value as members of our fighting team. With the other members of the Committee on Armed Services, I made it my business to see that guarantees were made to safeguard the marines and naval aviation. Such guarantees have now been written, in my opinion, into the bill and are satisfactory to the commanding general of the Marine Corps and to the top naval aviators. Further, the assurances of Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz, of Admiral Nimitz, and of the Secretaries of War and Navy—in whom I share the unbounded confidence of my colleagues—are safeguards which we can all assume to be as reassuring as any which could be written into the statutes.

OBJECTIONS PROGRESSIVELY ELIMINATED

Progressively and with considerable patience on the part of all concerned, these and all other doubts and fears over the authority and control to be granted this top Secretary have been removed or allayed. Finally, today there is almost unanimous accord that the threats which have been inherent or imagined in previously proposed legislation to unify the armed forces have been erased. This accord has been reached through the democratic processes of our Government. All parties concerned have been heard and the conflicting views have been blended by compromise—the American way of reaching peaceful conclusions. The legislation before the Senate represents a series of carefully drawn compromises which reflect a meeting of the minds among those who were once in disagreement. From all the negotiations which preceded the final bill there has evolved a workable, sound proposal. The fact that the legislation is practical and beneficial, and at the same time satisfactory to the major interested factions, is, indeed, a high tribute to the American system.

OBJECTIONS TO TOP MAN ELIMINATED

The traditional civilian control of our armed forces is guaranteed. The civilian Secretary of National Security is superior to the three military commanders—Army, Navy, and Air Force. There is no single military chief of staff. The top Secretary views the over-all problem of national security impartially and on a broad basis, and is a principal assistant to the President and adviser to the Congress on the general subject.

Mr. President, I do not think we should overlook the fact that he will function under the bill as the adviser to the Congress.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force retain their identities as integral members of the security team. They are administered by three departments of the Government, the civilian secretary of each of which has access to the President. These three secretaries and the senior military officers of each service will be the principal assistants to the President and advisers to the Congress in their own particular fields. Thus, in addition to having the viewpoint of the several services, the country will have the benefit of an official whose sole job is to study and advise on what should comprise a balanced program of all the services. Lack of such an official constitutes a striking deficiency in our Government today.

CIVILIAN CONTROL INCREASED

Every precaution has been taken by the Army and Navy representatives who drafted the original bill, and by your committee in amending it to its present form, to insure adequate civilian control. The President, of course, retains the paramount civilian control of the armed forces, as Commander in Chief. The bill actually makes it easier for the President effectively to carry out his duties as civilian commander because it gives him much needed assistance in this tremendous task.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that we should not overlook the fact that the

President does remain the top civilian controller of our armed services. Under our democratic system we do not have to fear that any military official, be he civilian top secretary under the unification bill, or a man in uniform, will attempt to take unto himself too much power, which some seem to fear might still be possible under the bill. Why do I say that? I say it because the President of the United States would soon be apprised of any such attempt on the part of any official under the unification bill. A President of the United States usually likes to be reelected, and if he discovers that there is opposition in the country to an attempt on the part of the Secretary of National Security to take more power unto himself that he should have under the spirit and intent of the bill, the Secretary is going to hear from the President. If the situation were such that the particular President did not want to be reelected, we could be sure that his party would want to elect someone in his place. So we have under the bill, as we have under all legislation, the ultimate political control resting in the people of the country which will manifest itself if anyone under this bill should attempt to engage in arbitrary or abusive power. I am not at all fearful so long as the President of the United States remains the civilian controller of our Military Establishment, or of any man in uniform, or of any civilian who is a top Secretary, abusing the power granted to him under the terms of the bill.

Of course the constitutional power of the Congress to raise and support armies and navies comprises the real civilian control over the military, and this fundamental safeguard can never be abridged by the establishment of new agencies. We are the ones who vote the funds. The Congress, incidentally, will be aided greatly in obtaining a balanced picture of the problem of security, for at any time it can call for advice from any representative of the different services or the several impartial agencies and offices established to deal with the broad phases of the entire matter of security. Under existing circumstances, the Congress is denied such valuable information and counsel as it will be afforded under unification, and is constantly harried by pressures from all sides for this or that phase of national security, without ever getting an appreciation of the over-all picture.

Mr. President, I served for a time on the old Naval Affairs Committee. It seemed to me our common practice was to move somewhat in the dark as we took up naval affairs matters, which related also to military matters but which fell within the jurisdiction of the then Military Affairs Committee. I feel that the same problem exists within the Appropriations Committee under our present system. One subcommittee deals with naval appropriations, another subcommittee with Army appropriations, and seldom do the twain ever meet in a common understanding of their mutual problems.

One of the great procedural and administrative strengths of the bill, as I see it, is that for the first time, through the top Secretary provided for in the

bill, there will be submitted to Congress an over-all budget report, and over-all advice as to what a balanced program should be for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

I now want to say, because the pending bill is not perfect in many respects, that I think one point the Senator from Wyoming makes is a very telling point. I do not think the record on the bill shows that any great economy will flow from it, certainly in the early years of its administration. I may say to the Senator from Wyoming that, as a lawyer, I would have to say that I think the preponderance of evidence in the record supports his contention that the bill will not produce great economies at first. If one wants to vote for the bill solely on the ground of economy he will find that the evidence does not support such a vote. However, it is not a wasteful bill, it is not a costly bill in the sense that it increases costs for the same functions, as now rendered. It had within it, in my judgment, the procedure which makes it possible for the top Secretary and the Secretaries of Air, Navy, and Army to bring about great economies as they learn to work together in closer cooperation, as I am sure they will, once the terms and provisions of the bill are put into operation. I happen to be one who feels that once the law is on the statute books and the Secretary of National Security and his Assistant Secretaries proceed in conference after conference, they will see a multitude of ways to bring about economy. I have always been, and still am, critical of wastes within the administration of the War and Navy Departments. They go back to roots which have grown for decades. I think we have before us a bill which would make it possible to tear up some of those roots.

I do not believe that the bill goes nearly far enough with regard to the whole question of greater unification for procurement. Further, I would that it provided for greater unification, for example, in such specific instances as medical services; but it does not make it impossible for that type of economy to develop. In fact, I think that type of economy will be possible only under the terms of this bill. It certainly will not come about if we continue the status quo.

Let me say frankly that I admit that in my judgment I cannot show from the record any great economies which will immediately flow from the passage of the bill. I am satisfied that economies will develop as the officials given responsibility under the bill come to administer it and come to see that the spirit and intent of Congress in passing the bill is to place upon them the responsibility for effecting economies. Then, too, with this bill and the powers given to the top Secretary, it seems to me that we shall be in a much better position when he sits down to advise with Congress when he makes his annual reports to us, to require him to show specific cause why certain economies, if they are not in his report, are not made or cannot be made.

I suppose that my economic argument could be summarized in this way: Although the bill in its present form does not immediately effectuate great econ-

omies, it does provide the procedure and the administrative machinery for effecting such economies if the top Secretary and the three Assistant Secretaries keep faith with the spirit and intent of the act.

This bill represents a careful step in the gradual, deliberate chain of evolution which is typical of arriving at change in our governmental structure. No radical departure is entailed. S. 758 does not seriously alter the present scheme of things, but does take advantage of certain obvious lessons of World War II and gives the country a means to see where other improvements may possibly and appropriately be made.

If experience gathered from functioning under the bill so dictates, further revisions in our national-security structure may be proposed and judged by the Congress and the people. That is certainly not violent, but is the American way of progress.

The bill has been so revised from the versions of previous years that some say that it is now too weak to be effective. It has been accused of having no teeth to make the improvements that must be made. I have heard it said that so much power is reserved to the Army, Navy, and Air Force and that there will not be the flexibility necessary to make indicated changes. This may be, although I doubt it very much. In any case, the actual operation of the bill is the only true test of its effectiveness. Therefore, if after a few years too much authority seems to be vested in the three military departments and unnecessary duplications cannot be eliminated because of restrictions in the bill, the Secretary of National Security and the President may make further recommendations to the Congress for such alterations as seem desirable. To this end, the bill makes specific provision for further studies and recommendations.

In any case, the legislation does not go too far. It is a good first step. It not only retains civilian control over the military, but it increases that control. Actually, there has never been a serious threat by the military in the history of the United States. Our professional soldiers and sailors have never manifested a desire to run the country. They have always taken pride in their role of public servant. In fact, during the deliberations on this unification bill, military leaders have been the foremost in insisting that maximum civilian control be provided in all parts of the legislation.

It is a favorite form of cynicism on the part of some critics constantly to throw in the direction of the military very unfair and below-the-belt criticisms. I think that has frequently been costly to the prestige of our military, particularly in the minds of the youth of the land. During the war I had an opportunity on the home front to pass judgment upon the faith in our democratic processes of the high military authorities. Frequently I saw them in a position where materials of war were being held up because of domestic difficulties on the home front, but not once did I hear a high authority in the military take the position that we should adopt undemocratic procedures for the handling of those

problems. I want to say to the credit of the military that it has been my observation that they usually demonstrate a greater faith in our democratic processes and in the right of our people to be protected from military abuses than do many of our civilian officials. I was pleased with my observations of our military government in Germany last fall—to note that in the operation of that military government first attention was always given the question as to whether any rule, regulation, or administrative order was in accordance with democratic rights. So I am not one of those who take the position that there is any basis in fact—certainly no basis in fact was developed during the hearings and the consideration of this bill—for fear of usurpation of power on the part of the military to the detriment of American domestic processes.

Now that the objections against unification have been met and the fears calmed, this moderate, temperate, and yet progressive bill stands before the Senate for decision. Where unanimity once was lacking, the agreements which have been reached and from which this bill results must surely remove all former obstacles. Where controversy and confusion once clouded the issues, there is now, for the most part, satisfaction on all sides. Not even the obstacle of political partisanship attends this measure. It has shared the same impartial treatment that has been so wisely afforded our foreign policy.

One immediate need for the bill lies in the fact that the Army and Navy are in urgent need of some permanent basis for their future organization. Except for certain emergency authority under which the armed forces were drastically reorganized for their successful prosecution of World War II, there is nothing on the statute books under which these forces can shape their postwar organizations except the antiquated laws which governed their organization between the two world wars.

It is the lessons of World War II which we must now apply. We must look forward so that we shall not be caught unprepared and outmoded if another war must come. If it comes, it will come fast.

I believe that that is what the bill would do. It applies those lessons in an intelligent, gradual fashion and provides a means for a further study of the complex problems of national security.

One of the most compelling lessons of the recent war is that there are imperfections and gaps in the relationships between the military and foreign policies of this country. This bill corrects that situation by the establishment of the National Security Council, wherein the complex and now uncoordinated problems of bringing foreign policy into harmony with the military means to enforce that policy may be brought to light and resolved.

A corollary lesson is that the people, the Congress, and the President have no single individual or agency charged with the over-all problem of national security to whom they can look for impartial recommendations and coordination. This bill provides the Secretary of Na-

tional Security, a sort of Deputy President, to assist the Chief Executive in the carrying out of his great responsibility as Commander in Chief.

Unification will also apply another clear lesson of World War II, and World War I for that matter, and that is that there must be an agency to plan and administer the proper allocation of the economic and human resources of the country so that both civilian and military needs are adequately met in time of war. The National Security Resources Board is proposed for just that purpose. Under a National Security Establishment wherein the efforts of all the armed services are brought into harmony—and there is no such establishment today—unnecessary duplications of money and effort can be eliminated. And through the recommendations of the Secretary of National Security to the President and the Congress, continuing improvements in efficiency and economy can be made which will carry out the obvious intent of the Congress.

The various civilian agencies and the key civilian officials provided in the bill assure the traditional (and essential, if our system of government is to continue) civilian control of the Military Establishment. Together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these civilian agencies comprise an organ which can plan and prepare for the United States to meet the threat of a total war. Mark you, Mr. President, no one longer doubts that the next world war, if it should come, will be a total war. Much of this planning has not even been started, and without passage of this bill it will continue to be delayed.

The issues of unification are now clear. Controversy no longer exists. All interested persons and parties have had their doubts satisfied, and there is hardly a responsible individual in or out of Congress who has cause to oppose this present bill. There is opposition to details, yes; but not to the great objective of the bill. Even those vigilant guardians of our American way of life, the Daughters of the American Revolution, in their recent national convention here in Washington, adopted a strong resolution in favor of this legislation.

The United States must not be forced to depend upon an outmoded military establishment to fight or avert another world war—and may a strong America prevent it from ever coming.

The Congress must act now—this session—in order to give the country and the people the best security for the money spent. The lessons of World War II, only recently so vivid to us all, are dimming as time passes. We cannot ignore them. It would be a shocking incrimination of the Congress, and a welcome scandal for those at home and abroad who decry our form of government, if that which the country and its responsible leaders so clearly want is ignored or delayed by the representatives of the people in the Congress. I entreat my colleagues in the Senate, Mr. President, to take immediate and favorable action to accomplish the translation of the unification bill, S. 758, into enacted legislation so that it may become a law of the land to provide a suitable structure for our postwar

national security in a world where lack of security may well spell a nation's death warning.

STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. President, earlier in the day the junior Senator from Michigan (Mr. FERGUSON) submitted a resolution expressing the desire and the need for strengthening the United Nations. I was one of the sponsors of the resolution. However, a number of my colleagues and I feel that the previously presented resolution is not sufficiently specific and not sufficiently strong. Therefore we are presenting another resolution. This action is not to be construed as a condemnation of the previous resolution, but rather as a more accurate expression of the thinking of some of us on this all-important subject. I might say, Mr. President, that the concurrent resolution which I shall send to the desk is one which was approved by a large group of Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. The concurrent resolution, as I send it to the desk, is as it has come from the House of Representatives where it is being or has been offered by Representative Judd and Representative Hays, together with a large number of cosponsors.

I send the concurrent resolution to the desk and ask that the clerk read it, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the concurrent resolution.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 24) submitted by Mr. TAYLOR (for himself, Mr. CHAVEZ, Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, Mr. TOBEY, Mr. PEPPER, and Mr. MURRAY) was read and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

Whereas all the world deeply desires durable peace; and

Whereas the United Nations was created as an instrument to preserve the peace of the world; and

Whereas experience increasingly indicates that the United Nations in its present structure is not fully adequate for this task; and

Whereas the United Nations Charter in its article 109 provides a procedure whereby the Charter of the United Nations may be revised and amended: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the President of the United States should immediately take the initiative in calling a general conference of the United Nations pursuant to article 109 for the purpose of making the United Nations capable of enacting, interpreting, and enforcing world law to prevent war.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, immediately following the printing of the concurrent resolution, article 109 of the United Nations Charter.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

ARTICLE 109

1. A general conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Each member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

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signed up by one man in a matter of a few days in a city like Baltimore.

There being no objection, the petition and the signatures were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

To United States Senate and House of Representatives:

"Resolved by the United States Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President of the United States shall immediately take the initiative in calling a general conference of the United Nations pursuant to article 109 for the purpose of making the United Nations capable of enacting, interpreting, and enforcing world law to prevent war."

The undersigned who are interested in strengthening the United Nations into at least the beginnings of a world government hereby urge that this resolution to strengthen the United Nations be pushed vigorously and that the Charter of the United Nations be revised and amended in the light of this resolution.

Philip L. Sykes, Rosco Bernard, Anne E. Jenkin, Anna Syret, Louis Nathans, Edward Hjek, Rodney Link, Samuel D. Kushues, Arthur Krishmer, Fannie H. Rice, Calvert Cummins, Samuel I. Duoritz, Rosa Lee Altshul, Max Suslin, Jacob W. Barenburg, Harry D. Ambrose, R. G. Green, Colman Klein, Eli Cohen, Maurice R. Oppenheim, Isaac E. Davison, Helen E. Romm, Kay Solomon, Etta L. Leist, Jesse Ashman, William Klemmer, Louise Levin, Charles W. Main, Bernard E. Ster, Boris M. Spector, Harry Yaffe, Alexander J. Lane, Edwin Kohn, David W. French, Henry I. Bonsbund, Iris B. Jossen, H. Henry Rosenberg, Philip Tachs, Louis C. Fried, Julius P. Robinson, Paula Ulman, Simon Nobel Silverberg, Hyman I. Cohen, Samuel Rubin, W. A. Schmidt, William T. Irid, Julius Krump, Maxwell Alpert, Herman Punplan, Herbert Kaufman, Harry Rapport, Ely Ashman, Abraham Finkelstein, H. D. Cofran, Jim Finney, Joseph Siegel, Alfred F. Dedomenico, Harry Bernstein, Francis F. Commer, Jakob Hesker, Charles Caplan, Agatha Roenstadt, S. S. Zuercher, Lil Strocket, Anna Cohn, Emma Gardner, Dorothy Adkins, Rose Fagan, Fred Mechl, Sr., W. I. Magills, Emanuel J. Riback, Harry Saeffer, Reva Marshall, Allen J. Eisner, Bradford Bloom, Lawrence Greenebaum, Sophie H. Steckel, Louis Bender, Nathan H. Miller, Allen T. Cohn, Abner J. Weinger, Johnny Helis, Jack Norin, Jas. D. Balachow, Emmet Stein, M. A. Cummins, Meyer Shapiro, W. Kelles, Allen W. Eaton, M. J. Steinhom, Thomas J. Ringgold, Carlie F. Parrish, James W. Miller, Mannes Freedenberg, S. C. Katzoff, Maurice Schoenfeld, Bernard Klein, Samuel Vataposky, Nathan Abamanitz, Abraham Kahn, Esther Goldsheldes, Frederick J. Freely, Jr., Ethel E. Wahl, William Alvin Wahl, George O. Blome, Anthony F. Di Domenico, Wm. Weinblatt, Rose S. Zetzer, Allen C. Capone, D. M. Lehtinett, Frank M. Merrick, H. LaRue Parke, Anthony I. Gedenico, Jeanne Hofman, Leon A. Rubenstein, H. B. Hofman, Joshua C. Gwin, Harvey D. Bickel, Medford D. Lilly, Alberta Talbott, Marcellus S. Jonas, Martin H. Larsen, Hugh Anthony, F. J. Richardson, James L. Muller, Lottie Friedler, Herbert Lockwood, Edwin Greenebaum, Ellis Levin, Jack A. Miller, Lawrence Lockwood, Miss Anna M. Robinson, John Howard Clarke, John J. Smith, Lena DePaul, Thos. W. Pond, E. Joseph, John A. Novak, Aaron A. Baer, Adolph Schick-

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UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED SERVICES

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 758) to promote the national security by providing for a National Defense Establishment, which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Defense, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force within the National Defense Establishment, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Defense Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the committee amendment.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, I wish to call up an amendment for consideration. It is amendment D.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment will be stated.

The CHIEF CLERK. In the committee amendment on page 37, line 3, it is proposed to strike out "Security" and insert "Military"; in line 4, to strike out "Organization" and insert "Establishment"; in line 5, to strike out "Security" and insert "Military"; in line 6, to strike out "Organization" and insert "Establishment"; in line 7, to strike out all after "Sec. 201" down to and including "Organization" in line 14, and substitute in lieu thereof the following: "The National Military Establishment shall consist of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, together with all other agencies created under title II of this act"; in line 16, after "SEC. 202. (a)", to insert "There shall be a Secretary of National Security who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. In addition to such other duties as the President may assign to him in connection with the national security, the Secretary of National Security, under the direction of the President, shall perform the following specific duties relating to the National Military Establishment provided for under title II of this act"; in line 21, to strike out "Security" and insert "Military."

On page 38, line 3, to strike out "Security" and insert "Military."

To strike out all of lines 22 to 25 and insert: "The Secretary of National Security shall cause to be made for his use a seal of office of such design as the President shall approve and judicial notice shall be taken thereof."

On page 39, line 16, to strike out "Security" and insert "Military"; in line 17, to strike out "Organization" and insert "Establishment."

On page 40, in lines 4 and 5, to strike out "within the National Security Organization."

On page 41, in lines 9 and 10, to strike out "Within the National Security Organization there" and insert "There."

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. May the Chair inquire of the Senator from Wyoming if he desires to have the amendments considered en bloc?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I will explain, Mr. President, that the root of the amendments is the striking out of section 201 (a) and the rewriting of section 202 (a). The others are merely changes in names which would be necessary if the main objectives were attained.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Then, without objection, the amendments will be considered en bloc.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Very well.

Mr. President, I have been very much interested by the debate which has ensued during the consideration of the bill on the floor of the Senate. I think the Senators listening to the debate have reached the conclusion that there is a national security set-up which includes not only the Military Establishment consisting of the Secretary of National Security, the military assistants, civilian personnel, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force, War Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, Munitions Board, and Research and Development Board, but also that the National Security Organization includes the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security and Resources Board. I think every Senator is of that opinion.

I want to say, Mr. President, that that is not correct. The National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board are not in the National Security Organization as set forth in the bill. Those three are contained in title I under the heading "Coordination for National Security," and are something separate and apart from the National Security Organization. I think that is one of the basic things the Senate must realize before it can thoroughly understand the bill so as to vote intelligently upon it.

Even the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services in his excellent statement on the bill pointed out that the Secretary of National Security was in effect a deputy of the President, or words to that effect. That, Mr. President, it is my contention he should be. But it is my contention that the bill does not make him so. I am for the objectives of the bill as put forward, but they are not in the bill. Hence I offer the amendment which will, I hope, help to put them in the bill.

Title II, deals with the National Security Organization. It should be called the National Military Establishment, as it was called in the original bill. Title I can still remain "Coordination for National Security," which it is. But

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Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Very well.

Mr. President, I have been very much interested by the debate which has ensued during the consideration of the bill on the floor of the Senate. I think the Senators listening to the debate have reached the conclusion that there is a national security set-up which includes not only the Military Establishment consisting of the Secretary of National Security, the military assistants, civilian personnel, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force, War Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, Munitions Board, and Research and Development Board, but also that the National Security Organization includes the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security and Resources Board. I think every Senator is of that opinion.

I want to say, Mr. President, that that is not correct. The National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board are not in the National Security Organization as set forth in the bill. Those three are contained in title I under the heading "Coordination for National Security," and are something separate and apart from the National Security Organization. I think that is one of the basic things the Senate must realize before it can thoroughly understand the bill so as to vote intelligently upon it.

Even the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services in his excellent statement on the bill pointed out that the Secretary of National Security was in effect a deputy of the President, or words to that effect. That, Mr. President, it is my contention he should be. But it is my contention that the bill does not make him so. I am for the objectives of the bill as put forward, but they are not in the bill. Hence I offer the amendment which will, I hope, help to put them in the bill.

Title II, deals with the National Security Organization. It should be called the National Military Establishment, as it was called in the original bill. Title I can still remain "Coordination for National Security," which it is. But

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the Secretary of National Security should be, and in fact must be, the coordinator not only of the military establishment, but also of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board, and in effect be a Presidential deputy for national security. Practically every one has named him as such. Everyone feels that he is such under the terms of the bill; but I repeat that the bill does not make him that. The bill merely makes him a super-secretary of the three armed services, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. That is set out so clearly in section 201 (a), which I am seeking to strike, that I cannot for the life of me understand why the Senate should be advised that the Secretary of National Security is over the entire structure. Let me read section 201 (a):

There is hereby established the National Security Organization and a Secretary of National Security, who shall be the head thereof.

He is the head of the National Security Organization, which, as I have pointed out, includes, in title II, the Army, the Navy, and Air Force.

But it goes further. Subsection (b) provides as follows:

(b) The National Security Organization shall consist of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, together with all other agencies created within the National Security Organization.

A few moments ago I read the list, from section 201 to section 214.

Mr. President, I wish to emphasize that this Secretary, whoever he may be, is merely the Secretary of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The existing secretaries become mere under secretaries of those three organizations. They lose their Cabinet positions. According to the bill, the single secretary is the Cabinet officer for the armed forces. That is what I want to change by my amendment. I want to place the Secretary of National Security over the entire structure. I want to elevate him to a position where he will be over the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board, and over the entire military establishment as well. He is the coordinator.

The amendment which the clerk just read would strike out section 201, from line 7, on page 37, down to line 14. That is under the heading "Establishment of the National Security Organization." That, Mr. President, is the merger, the merging of the armed forces under one secretary. That is all that it does. It has nothing to do with the National Security Council in any way whatsoever.

In order to place the Secretary of National Security in a proper position I seek to amend section 202 (a) in line 16, on page 37, so that that paragraph will read:

There shall be a Secretary of National Security who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. In addition to such other duties as the President may assign to him in connection with the national security, the Secretary of National Security,

under the direction of the President, shall perform the following specific duties relating to the National Military Establishment provided for under title II of this act.

Those duties are set forth exactly in the same way as they are set forth in the bill. There is no change in the duties. He has every duty conferred upon him that is conferred upon him in the bill, but he is no longer merely the head of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Mr. President, I do not think I can explain the amendment any more thoroughly except by repeating myself, which I do not intend to do. The other part of the amendment is merely to change the word "security" to "military" and the word "organization" to "establishment," so that title 2 will assume its correct character and be called the National Military Establishment.

Mr. President, that is the amendment. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. ROBERTSON] to the committee amendment.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, the Senator from Wyoming has several amendments on the desk. In this instance I believe he has selected the most important amendment in the list. I say that because should this amendment be adopted it would take the heart out of the bill.

In the first instance, as the bill was introduced, it provided for an organization known as the National Defense Establishment, similar to the organization provided for on page 37 under the name "The National Security Organization." The name "National Security Organization" is more inclusive.

I make the statement that this amendment would affect the heart of the bill because not only must we have an overall organization, over the three military branches—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—but also we must have an organization including the War Council, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board. They must all work together. Those civilian agencies are as necessary as the military branches in the allocation of materials and in the development of plans.

Therefore, Mr. President, after wrestling with this question for 11 weeks, our committee came to the conclusion, by a large majority vote in the committee, that the provision should be as it is in the committee amendment. To take section 201 from the bill would, I repeat, take the heart out of the bill. Therefore I recommend that the Senate reject the amendment.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GURNEY. I yield.

Mr. HILL. Would the amendment have the effect of placing the Secretary of National Security ahead of the Secretary of State in the National Security Council?

Mr. GURNEY. That is correct.

Mr. HILL. The Security Secretary, the Defense Secretary—the Military Secretary, so to speak—would be placed ahead of the Secretary of State, the officer in charge of our foreign policy. Is not that true?

Mr. GURNEY. The Senator is correct. Our committee did not feel that we should give the Secretary of National Security complete authority over the Security Council which is established to advise the President on security problems. Nor did we feel that the new Secretary of National Security should be given authority over the National Security Resources Board. The Council and the Board were set up to coordinate the activities assigned to them in the bill, and to advise the President. The Secretary of National Security would sit on the Council and on the Board; but we did not feel that he should have overall authority. Therefore our committee, after much debate, recommended to the Senate that the organization be established in the manner set forth in section 21. It might be called an "establishment," but we prefer the word "organization."

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GURNEY. I yield to the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. REVERCOMB. The Senator has argued that it is a part of the plan set forth in the chart on the wall. If the amendment were adopted how would it change the design set forth in the chart on the wall?

Mr. GURNEY. Because it would give the Secretary of National Security overall direction of the National Security Council and also of the National Security Board, by moving him up in the preferred position, right under the President. It would in that way give the Secretary of National Security a superior Cabinet rank to that held by the Secretary of State, because he would, in a way, be over the Security Council which is presently composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Security Council, and the Secretaries of the three military branches. The committee did not believe we should give this man that much power over other Cabinet officers, mainly the Secretary of State.

Mr. REVERCOMB. The Secretary of State in serving on the National Security Council has an additional duty placed upon him. In other words, the Secretary of State as a member of the National Security Council would in no way be dominated by the Secretary of National Security in the performance of his usual functions as Secretary of State except as he would serve as a member of the National Security Council. In other words, he has almost an ex officio position on the National Security Council.

The point I want to inquire about is this: If we make the Secretary of National Security next in rank to the President and the one to advise with him over the National Security Council, we would not in fact place him over the Secretary of State in the performance of the natural duties of a Secretary of State; it would be one over-all board on which the Secretary of State serves with others?

Mr. GURNEY. That Board, I may point out, is the Board that advises the President on all matters of national security. The Secretary of State is not now sitting on that Board as an ex officio member; in fact, his place on the Board

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which exists now by mutual agreement is probably one of his most important duties, and his position on this Board will remain as his most important duty, to advise the military and to have the military advise him. The foreign policy and the military policy in that way dovetail together so that the President is advised not by one and then by another in a haphazard manner.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. GURNEY. Yes.

Mr. REVERCOMB. The able Senator has mentioned only the Secretary of State and the fact of the Secretary of State being a member of the National Security Council as the reason why he would not put the Secretary of National Security next to the President and over that Council. I point out that the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, who, as we know will be under the Secretary of National Security, will also be on the Council.

Mr. GURNEY. I may say to the Senator that the reasons I have given are not all the reasons. In subordinating, so to speak, the Secretaries of Navy, Army, and Air, taking them out of the Cabinet, we must not cut down their job or cut down their responsibility; we must keep them at a level where the secretaries of these three branches should be. By giving them equal status with the Secretary of National Security and the Secretary of State on the National Security Council we are, the committee believes, accomplishing that purpose, because all five of them, with the assistance of others named, will form the policy and advise the President on matters of national security.

Mr. REVERCOMB. I observe from the plat that the Secretary of National Security is over the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force.

Mr. GURNEY. His name happens to be above.

Mr. REVERCOMB. If he is not over them, how can he coordinate their work? If he does not have the authority of higher rank, how can he coordinate it?

Mr. GURNEY. In a military way they are separate units, and the administration of each branch remains in the Secretary of that branch.

Mr. REVERCOMB. But the whole purpose is to coordinate?

Mr. GURNEY. That is correct.

Mr. REVERCOMB. But if the Secretary of National Security—an office which is being created—does not have the authority to direct the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, I should say he could not coordinate their activities.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. GURNEY. I wish to answer the Senator from West Virginia, if I may.

In the National Security Council there are brought together the Secretary of State, who is responsible for our foreign policies, and the Secretaries of the three

military branches and the Secretary of National Security himself. There are five. When we get down to coordinating the military branches, the coordination of the military service does not occur in the Council which works on foreign policy. That coordination in bringing them together comes in the War Council, which the Senator will notice on the chart in a position immediately below the position of the Secretary of National Security. That is where the military policy is brought together. In that way we bring together those branches and give the Secretary of National Security the coordinating authority which is so necessary in order to effectuate the purposes which we feel the pending bill will accomplish.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Let me say, then, that if the coordination is to take place through the Secretary of National Security, as I have stated before, at the risk of repetition, it seems to me that the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Air Force must be under his direction, or, if I may say so, his command. As the Senator has pointed out, they are all brought together under the War Council?

Mr. GURNEY. That is correct.

Mr. REVERCOMB. And they are all brought together under the Munitions Board. It seems to me that unless he has direct power to coordinate instead of running around through all the blocks set forth on the plat, the control over them would not be such as to be very effective in bringing about coordination.

Mr. GURNEY. If the Senator will turn to page 37 of the bill—

Mr. REVERCOMB. I was speaking of the plat.

Mr. GURNEY. If the Senator will turn to page 37 of the bill I am sure he will understand it thoroughly.

For instance, in line 23, page 37, it is provided that he shall "exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies."

I now yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I wish to advise the Senator from West Virginia that he is absolutely correct when he says that the Secretary of National Security, whom we in committee called the super-secretary, is over the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force. It is provided distinctly in section 201 (a), on page 37, line 7, as follows:

There is hereby established the National Security Organization, and a Secretary of National Security, who shall be the head thereof.

Section 201 (b):

The National Security Organization shall consist of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, together with all other agencies created within the National Security Organization.

At another point in the bill the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force are given the right to bypass their "boss," the Secretary of National Security,

and go to the President if they see fit to do so.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, let me say to the Senator from Wyoming that the National Security Council is not included in title II of the bill, and is not included in the National Security Organization.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GURNEY. I yield.

Mr. REVERCOMB. I should like to ask a question of the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. GURNEY. I shall be glad to yield the floor, if the Senator wishes me to do so.

Mr. REVERCOMB. No; I do not ask the Senator to do that.

Mr. GURNEY. Very well; I yield to the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. REVERCOMB. I should like to ask the Senator from Wyoming this question: Does the plat now on the wall, about which we have been talking, follow out correctly, from the viewpoint of the Senator from Wyoming, what is now contained in the bill and will continue to be contained in it unless it is amended?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Absolutely.

Mr. REVERCOMB. The amendment would remedy the fault, as seen by the Senator from Wyoming, by permitting the Secretary of National Security to take authority over the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Air; and the amendment would not have him bypassed through the several blocs and courses shown on the chart or plat, which portrays the situation under the bill as it is now written; is that correct?

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, my amendment would place the Secretary of National Security immediately under the President of the United States. I cannot help thinking that the distinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. GURNEY], felt that was the understanding, for when he made his speech introducing this bill, as shown at page 8464 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for July 7, he made the following statement:

The Secretary of National Security is being given no new powers by this bill. He is a full-time Presidential representative exercising delegated Presidential power to assist the President in carrying out his responsibility to the Congress, the Nation, and the armed forces.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I reiterate that statement, and I believe it to be correct.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. GURNEY. I yield.

Mr. REVERCOMB. The Senator from South Dakota has made the principal argument that the Secretary of National Security should not have control over the National Security Council for the principal reason that the Secretary of State is on that Council. Would not this whole situation be met by adopting the amendment of the Senator from Wyoming and removing the Secretary of State from the National Security Council? That can be done without los-

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ing the advice or direction of the Secretary of State. He is a member of the President's Cabinet, and certainly the President can at any time call on the Secretary of State to advise with that Council or to confer directly with the President.

So would not this whole matter be settled by adopting the amendment of the Senator from Wyoming? Would not the objection of the Senator from South Dakota be met by removing the Secretary of State from the National Security Council?

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I call attention to the fact that the bill provides that the President shall preside over the National Security Council, provided that in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place. That is set forth in title I of the bill, on page 31.

We do not propose to give the Secretary of National Security such standing that he will in a sense be the deputy commander in chief, shall we say? We do not wish to take away from the President, in any shape, manner, or form, his constitutional duty as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. With the President a member of the National Security Council and with this board set up primarily to advise the President on matters of national security, our committee did not feel that we should put the new Secretary of this new organization in a position superior to the one in which he is now placed by the bill, as shown on the chart. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy now meet, and they did so all during the war, as a committee of three to advise the President on national-security problems.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me once more?

Mr. GURNEY. I yield.

Mr. REVERCOMB. I would say that in the United States no one should be placed over the President. The President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces.

Under the amendment of the Senator from Wyoming, as I understand, the Secretary of National Security would be immediately under the President. The fact that the President might preside over any of these blocs or boards which would be set up, inasmuch as he is Commander in Chief, and is over all, would not in any way place him in a position inferior to that of the Secretary of National Security, because very often the President may attend the Council meetings and very often he may advise with the members of the Council. He will remain the Commander in Chief, of course.

But it seems to me that if we leave this bill as it is now written there will be danger that the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force will have a position equal to that of the Secretary of National Security. If that be so, and if the Secretary of National Security is not over them, I do not see that the Secretary of National Security will have authority to coordinate them.

Mr. GURNEY. In this bill we are setting up a new organization with the Secretary of National Security over those

three branches of the armed services and the agencies that are concerned with supplying the armed services. Let me say to the Senator from West Virginia that the National Security Council is not in any way intended to be a part of the armed services organization, nor is the National Security Resources Board intended in any way to be a part of the armed services organization.

We might call the armed services organization our policeman. But we believe that the men in the organization, under the Secretary of National Security, will be men of standing, and men who will have knowledge of much value in meeting the whole national security problem. Therefore, taking them out of their positions as heads of the military branches or as heads of the Research and Munitions and War Council Boards, and bringing them up to sit on the Security Council, is of great value. We do not believe that the National Security Secretary should in any way control, by means of a superior position, the conclusions which emanate from the Security Council or the Resources Board.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment submitted by the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. ROBERTSON] to the committee amendment.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, as to the National Security Council, I wish to point out that that Council is merely a continuation of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, which committee reconciles and coordinates the action to be taken by the State, War, and Navy Departments on matters of common interest, and establishes policies, based on political-military considerations. The object of that committee has nothing to do with forming foreign policies, as has been suggested here. The Secretary of State sits on that committee, as he did on what is known as the committee of three, to which I have just referred, in order to convey to the Secretaries of War and Navy the international situation, so that they may plan accordingly. It is the outcome of the Pearl Harbor disaster, when there was no coordination, apparently, between the State Department and the military.

That Council will enable the Secretary of State to advise the Secretary of National Security of existing conditions, so that he may formulate his plans. The fact that the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Air Force are placed on that Council has only one significance, namely, that if the Secretary of National Security is the head of the War, Navy, and Air Forces, as he is according to title II, those under secretaries, as they then will be, will receive their instructions from him on that matter, just as well as on any other matter.

There is just one more point, Mr. President, which I do wish to emphasize. The Senator from West Virginia is so right when he says that according to the chart on the wall the Secretary of National Security is nothing more than a secretary of the three armed forces, coordinating the other military councils with the armed services.

It should be particularly noted that in the case of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they receive their direct orders from the President, and pass them on to the unified commands in the various theaters of war when we are in war, but now, during peacetime, to the unified commands in the Pacific and the Atlantic.

Mr. President, this amendment places the Secretary of National Security in the position in which he should be, next to the President, in order to enable him to carry out the instructions of the President in the whole national security picture, and not merely from the military point of view.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. ROBERTSON] to the amendment of the committee.

The amendment to the amendment was rejected.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I have been somewhat concerned in reading Title I, Coordination for National Security, and the language with regard to the National Security Council. The language might justify the idea that all domestic and foreign policies were to be subordinated to the military exigencies. On page 31, line 20, the bill reads:

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies—

That covers all kinds of policies; it covers every policy with which Congress deals—

so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

That merely states a result. I have suggested to the distinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. GURNEY], that we should insert in line 22, after the word "policies," the words "relating to the national security." I think that is clearly the intention of the bill, and I call attention to the fact that in the preamble in section 2, page 30, it is said distinctly that the purpose is "to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security."

The same question arises as to page 32, where, in paragraph (b), the bill reads:

In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies of the departments and agencies of the Government—

That is not qualified in any way; it means all functions and policies of the Government—

and their functions relating to the national security.

Again it seems to me it should be made clear that the limitation relating to the national security should apply to the policies as well as to the functions of the other departments of the Government.

Therefore, Mr. President, I move that on page 31, line 22, after the word "policies," the words "relating to the national security" be inserted, and on page 32, line 11, after the word "policies," the words

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"and functions" be inserted, and in line 12, that the words "and their functions" be stricken out, so that the qualification relating to the national security may apply to the policies as well as the functions of the department.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the amendments will be considered en bloc.

Mr. TAFT. That is correct; it is all one question.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, certainly it is not the intention of the committee, or of anyone having anything to do with the bill, to provide that the National Security Council should do anything other than consider questions of national security. Personally I am glad the Senator from Ohio has brought up this amendment. I have conferred with other members of the committee, and all of us have agreed that not only do both the amendments make the purposes of the bill clearer, but we also thank the Senator from Ohio for a little better language. Therefore I am perfectly willing to accept both the amendments.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Ohio yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. I fully approve the Senator's amendment, except that I should like to point out that I do not think he has helped the situation very much by putting in the language "relating to the national security." Was not that the language suggested by the Senator?

Mr. TAFT. Yes.

Mr. McMAHON. As I see it—and I think the Senator will agree—that is all-encompassing. I can think of no policy having to do with our national existence, our Government, or our national life, that would not come within that language.

Mr. TAFT. I think it is a question of degree. Many policies might, but I think most of the domestic policies which we are considering—the question of taxation, questions raised by the labor bill, and the like—can hardly be said to relate to the national security in the sense in which those words are used in the bill.

I see no reason why the Council should not volunteer its advice as to something if it thinks it does relate to the national security, but I do not want Congress to be on record as saying that the Council can consider things which do not relate to the national security, and I am afraid that unless the amendment is made, that claim could well be asserted.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I think the Senator's amendment is a good one, and I certainly think the amendment, read in connection with the declaration of policy in the very beginning of the bill, makes it clear that the whole procedure and machinery are tied to the national security.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Taft] to the amendment of the committee.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator from South Dakota a question. Is there anything in the bill which changes in any way the rules regarding the sending of military and naval missions into foreign countries, or is that covered in the other bill which is now before the committee?

Mr. GURNEY. I am quite sure there is nothing in the pending bill which in any way authorizes missions to foreign countries. There is before the Armed Services Committee a bill seeking permission to send military missions to countries other than those in the Western Hemisphere, which latter can be done under the present law. The Department presently has permission to send missions into countries in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. TAFT. I thank the Senator. I understood the question was dealt with in a separate bill.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, I should like to answer the Senator from Ohio in regard to this matter.

Senate bill 758 depends largely on an attached Executive order, which the Senator will find starting on page 5 of the report.

Mr. TAFT. I read the Executive order, and on the whole, it seems to me that that Executive order is an order, in effect, to the Army, or to the various Secretaries, to proceed to draw bills. If the bill itself does not contain any such authority, I do not see how an Executive order can be read into the bill; that is to say, an order proposed to be issued by the President.

At the end of the joint letter by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy it is said:

We are agreed that the proper method of setting forth the functions (so-called roles and missions) of the armed forces is by the issuance of an Executive order concurrently with your approval of the appropriate legislation. We attach for your consideration a mutually agreed draft of such an order.

The bill may have been changed; we may have changed it. As I understand, the committee says distinctly, on page 9 of the report:

After long and serious deliberation, your committee decided against amending the bill to include the basic functions (roles and missions) of the several services. Your committee came to this conclusion because it felt that such amendments would seriously impair the required flexibility of our military forces, and because such action would violate the principle of separation of executive and legislative authority traditional in American government.

I do not see how an Executive order can now be issued without conforming to the changes made in the bill, so I do not think we are bound by the terms of the Executive order printed in the report.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. The Senator may be right, because the Executive order could be changed tonight, or on any day, by the stroke of a pen.

I do call the attention of the Senator from Ohio, as an outcome of his question regarding the possibility of the armed forces being sent to service in for-

eign countries, to page 6 of the report, section II, section 2, "Functions of the United States Army," paragraph 3, which reads:

To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.

Mr. TAFT. Yes; but as I understand it, this is a proposed Executive order, prepared by the Secretary.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. That is correct.

Mr. TAFT. When the President comes to issue an Executive order, it seems to me he must conform the order to the provisions of the bill itself, and if the bill does not contain authority to do this particular thing—and particularly in view of the fact, I think, there are other laws that prohibit it; I am not certain about that, but I think there are—then it seems to me that what is proposed to be an Executive order becomes of no importance.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I think that is true, but in view of the Senator's question, I felt it only right to point out that paragraph to him, at least to show the thinking of the authors of the bill and of others who considered it.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. HILL. The Senator from Ohio is absolutely correct in his interpretation and in his judgment of this matter. Nothing confirms the wisdom of the Senator in this matter better than the fact that a separate bill has been introduced which is now pending in the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the Armed Services Committee of the House, to authorize the sending of these missions. That bill has been presented because there is no such authority in the pending bill.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I think the Senator from Ohio has made a very able contribution to the debate on this matter, from the standpoint of subsequent judicial interpretation of the bill. I think it is particularly clear that unless the bill itself contains terms of reference in regard to military missions, then no Executive order could possibly be incorporated into the bill by reference. It would be necessary to include very definite terms of reference in the bill, and there is no language in the bill that would justify or support an Executive order in regard to military missions, as was so ably pointed out by the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. TAFT. Then there is the language in the report itself, later on, in effect disowning, it seems to me, that particular intent.

Mr. MORSE. Furthermore, any language in a report that is inconsistent with the clear language in a bill has no standing in court as carrying any weight in determining congressional intent.

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Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. GURNEY. I should like to make just one more statement so it will be clear in the Record that there is nothing in the bill which in any way authorizes foreign missions. The purpose, of course, is that any missions which may be authorized by law would be provided by the security organization, but they could not be used in any way unless they were otherwise authorized by some other law. They are not authorized in the bill at all.

Mr. TAFT. I am glad to have the opinion of so many members of the Committee on Armed Services who have participated in the framing of the bill. I think there can be no doubt of the intent of its framers.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The committee amendment is open to further amendment.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, I have another amendment here, but I should like to say I am a little amused, because in committee, in the consideration of the bill, when we were endeavoring to get the functions stated in the bill itself, we were told that that was not necessary, as they would all be taken care of in the accompanying Executive order.

I now offer amendment No. 7, and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Wyoming offers an amendment, which the clerk will state.

The CHIEF CLERK. It is proposed to amend the committee amendment, on page 49, line 10, by striking out the period and inserting the following: "and shall be chosen in rotation from the three armed services: *Provided*, That the total service of any officer as Director of the Joint Staff shall not exceed 4 years in all: *And provided further*, That the combined service of any officer as Director or member of the Joint Staff shall not exceed 3 years in all."

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, the object of the amendment is very evident, I think. It is merely to provide for a rotation of the important office of Director of the Joint Staff, and it limits the time one officer can possibly be the Director or a member of the Staff. I hope there will be no objection to the amendment.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, our committee considered this matter somewhat. It has been the custom for a long time for the chief of branch in both the Army and the Navy to serve for a period of years. Without doubt that custom will be followed, because in the Navy each officer is required to have sea duty ever so often, and, of course, when an Army officer is brought into Washington to be Chief of Branch, he is only allowed to serve, generally, for 4 years. I hope the amendment will not be brought forward at this time, for the reason that it will in a way disrupt the smoothness of the bill as it now reads, and the acceptance of it by the several departments. It has been agreed to by the land, sea, and air forces, and I can see no reason why we

should accept the amendment at this late date. I would not be authorized, as chairman of the committee, to accept it. I hope, therefore, the amendment will be defeated.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Wyoming to the committee amendment.

The amendment to the amendment was rejected.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The committee amendment is open to further amendment.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, I send to the desk amendment No. 8.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Wyoming offers an amendment, which the clerk will state.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, I wish to delete certain portions of the amendment, and ask the clerk to read that part of the amendment which begins "On page 50, strike out lines 8 and 9, and insert the following." That begins at the bottom of the sheet, and I think goes over to the other side.

The CHIEF CLERK. In the committee amendment, on page 50, it is proposed to strike out lines 8 and 9, and insert the following:

(2) To advise the National Security Resources Board of the military material and manpower requirements in order that they may be integrated in the over-all plans for national industrial mobilization.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. That is all that is proposed. That is the only change I am asking. Again, I say, I hope the committee will accept the amendment. I think it states much more clearly than does the committee amendment the purpose in mind, which is simply to plan for military aspects of industrial mobilization, that the National Security Resources Board, which would largely be responsible in the matter, should be advised. The amendment merely seeks to provide that the National Security Resources Board shall be advised of the military material and manpower requirements, in order that they may be integrated in the over-all plan for national industrial mobilization.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, will the Clerk restate the amendment? I am unable to keep track of just which amendment it is. By the way, Mr. President, these amendments are identified by letter.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. It is identified by the letter H, at the bottom of page 1 of the amendment. The amendment will again be stated.

The CHIEF CLERK. It is proposed to amend the committee amendment, on page 50, by striking out lines 8 and 9, and inserting the following:

(2) To advise the National Security Resources Board of the military material and manpower requirements in order that they may be integrated in the over-all plans for national industrial mobilization.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Wyoming to the amendment of the committee.

The amendment to the amendment was rejected.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Mr. President, I offer an amendment which I ask to have stated.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment will be stated.

The CHIEF CLERK. On page 41 it is proposed to strike out lines 4 to 7, inclusive, and to insert in lieu thereof the following:

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of this or any other act, the existing status of the Marine Corps (including the Fleet Marine Forces) or of the Naval Aviation shall not be altered or diminished; nor shall their existing functions or missions be transferred to other services.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Mr. President, the amendment hardly requires any explanation. It is obvious from the reading of it that the purpose of the amendment is to provide that neither the missions of naval aviation nor the Marine Corps, nor their functions, can be transferred to any other branch of the service by the supersecretary. I feel that if, for example, it is to be decided at some future time that naval planes should not protect shipping, if it is to be decided that the marine amphibious units should be disposed of, it should be done by the Congress, and not be left to the whim and caprice of some supersecretary who at that particular moment might happen to hold the position of authority.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I assured the Senator from Wisconsin that I would here on the floor of the Senate make a statement regarding my personal belief in the value of the Marine Corps, and of my determination, so far as I could do so, always to oppose any move which would cripple or destroy the Marine Corps.

I am opposed to the Senator's amendment. I am opposed to it in the first place because the bill on page 41, beginning in line 4, contains a provision safeguarding the Marine Corps, which has been approved by General Vandegrift. That is the first reason why I am opposed to the amendment.

I am opposed to it in the second place because I think it is most unwise to seek to legislate tactics into the statute law of the United States. I think we have got to leave questions of military strategy to professional men to make the decisions at the proper time.

Mr. MCCARTHY. May I interrupt the Senator at that point? Is it the Senator's understanding that under the bill as presently written the supersecretary can at will transfer missions and functions from one branch of the service to another?

Mr. LODGE. I would say in the first place that I never use the word "supersecretary." I think that is a sort of a smear word, and I do not think it is accurate. Secondly, I do not think the Secretary of National Security possesses a single power in the world that the President of the United States has not had for 150 years.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Let me ask the Senator a further question. Is it the Senator's thought, then, that some of the powers which the President has had for 150 years are to be transferred to the supersecretary, if I may call him that?

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Mr. LODGE. Well, the Secretary of National Security, of course, exercises his power subject to the direction of the President.

Mr. McCARTHY. I should like to get the Senator's thought on this point, if I may. The Senator from Massachusetts has done much work on the bill and given a good deal of attention to it. Is it the Senator's thought that under the bill as presently written the Secretary of National Security does have the power, for example, to say that naval planes shall no longer protect Navy shipping? Does the Senator think he has the power, for example, to say, "We will completely do away with the marine amphibious force and transfer that function to the Army?" Does the Senator think the bill gives him that power?

Mr. LODGE. I am very glad the Senator raised that question, because I should like to assure him, and I should like to assure the high command of the Marine Corps, a body to which I am bound by a great many close ties, and I should like to assure anyone else who may be worried about it, that the fate of the Marine Corps does not depend upon some statute that we pass here in Congress. The Marine Corps can no more be abolished or crippled than can the United States Senate. In fact, I think the position of the Marine Corps is more secure, because the United States Senate has its roots in the Constitution, whereas the Marine Corps has its roots in the hearts of the American people. There is no need to be worried upon that point. There is no need to be worried over such flyspecks as where commas are to be placed, or such legalistic matters. That is a matter about which no one need be worried, because the position of the Marine Corps is absolutely assured.

Mr. McCARTHY. I am not so much concerned with the fate of the Marine Corps or the fate of naval aviation, but I am concerned with the strength of our military forces. I know the Senator is well acquainted with what is known as the 1478 series.

Mr. LODGE. No, I was not at the high level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war. I do not know what conversations they had.

Mr. McCARTHY. That series was discussed in the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate, and it is now under consideration by the House Armed Services Committee. The House committee is studying that matter. It consists of an exchange of papers between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and if the Senator were familiar with the contents of those documents I am sure he would be disturbed about the fate of naval aviation and the fate of the Marine Corps, and consequently the fate of our military forces.

Mr. LODGE. Let me say to my good friend from Wisconsin that one can undoubtedly find some individual in one of the departments who has at some time written a paper in which he said he did not like the Marines. I know that an Assistant Secretary of the Navy came before a Senate committee and said the Navy was a complete force in itself, and ought to take over all sorts of land functions. One can always find some indi-

vidual who expresses some such outlandish opinion. But what I want to point out to the Senator is that if anyone wanted to do anything which would cripple the Marine Corps, he would first of all have to get by the President of the United States, he would then have to get by the Congress of the United States, he would have to get by all the congressional committees, he would have to get by the press and the radio of the country, he would have to get by the American people, and that, to me, is simply out of the question.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President—

Mr. LODGE. Let me finish my objection to the Senator's amendment. We used to provide by statute the number of men there should be in a company of infantry, and how many corporals and sergeants there should be in the company. I remember we provided in the Defense Act of 1920 that the infantry was to be in charge of the development of the tank. When I was on active duty there developed a demand for a fast tank, and there developed a demand for a self-propelled artillery piece which the artillery would operate. Because it had a caterpillar tread the authorities could not get around the statute in any other way than by calling it a combat car. When we begin legislating tactics into laws of the United States we are gazing into a crystal ball and will be making a mistake. I think the language proposed to be inserted by the Senator from Wisconsin, if adopted, would kick back on the Marine Corps some day.

Mr. McCARTHY. I am not trying to legislate tactics. I think, however, it is wrong for us to give to some appointed official power which no man has ever had before. I think if any of the missions or functions of the Marine Corps are ever to be changed, they should be changed by the Congress and not by any super-secretary.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I want to point out to the Senator from Wisconsin how correct he is in referring to the statements made by the high officials regarding the Marine Corps. General Spaatz, head of the Air Force, said:

During the war the Navy developed and employed the Marine Corps as a major force in land and air warfare. This is patently an incursion by one service into the normal roles of the other two services. Such a wartime practice should not be considered as a cogent reason for perpetuating this assumption of mission on the part of the sea forces. I recommend therefore that the size of the Marine Corps be limited to small, readily available, and lightly armed units, no larger than a regiment, to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries and to provide interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments.

The Chief of Staff of the United States Army said:

There is real need for one service to be charged with the responsibility for initially bridging the gap between the sailor on the ship and the soldier on land. This seems to me properly a function of the Marine Corps.

I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff should give serious consideration to such a concept.

The need of a force within the fleet to provide small, readily available, and lightly armed units to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries is recognized.

I quote further:

Once marine units attain such a size as to require the combining of arms to accomplish their missions they are assuming and duplicating the functions of the Army, and we have in effect two land armies. I therefore recommend that the above concept be accepted as stating the role of the Marine Corps, and that marine units not exceed the regiment in size, and that the size of the Marine Corps be made consistent with the foregoing principles.

Mr. BALDWIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. BALDWIN. Let me say to the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin that I shared the same feeling with reference to protecting the Marine Corps that he himself has expressed. I felt that they were entitled to all the protection language could give them, without freezing missions and freezing units so that in time of warfare they could not be adequately and completely handled. I feel that the bill does exactly what the Senator wants to have done. Let me refer to section 206 (a)—

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me interrupt the Senator. If the Senator feels that the bill does exactly what I want to have done, in view of the fact that many of us differ with the Senator's interpretation of the bill, can the Senator have any conceivable objection to making sure that the bill does what he thinks it does?

Mr. BALDWIN. My objection to the particular amendment lies against the word "mission," because it seems to me that in time of war if the Supreme Command says, "Here is the available air power which we have. It happens to belong to the Marine Corps. We must send it to protect some military transports," it does not want to be faced with the situation that the statute does not permit the use of naval aviation or marine aviation to protect military transports or other things of that nature. It seems to me that the language in section 206 (a) is adequate to do what the Senator wants to do. It provides as follows:

The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of government—

That is the administration at Washington—
the headquarters, United States Marine Corps—

That is here—

the entire operating forces of the United States Navy (including naval aviation) and of the United States Marine Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.

It is further provided:

(b) The provisions of this act shall not authorize the alteration or diminution of the existing relative status of the Marine Corps

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(including the Fleet Marine Forces) or of naval aviation.

It seems to me that we would weaken the provisions of the bill by adopting the Senator's amendment, because subsection (a) of section 206 is a detailed description of what shall constitute the naval forces of the United States, including all the component parts of the Marine Corps itself, and including naval aviation. As I recall, this particular section of the bill received more attention from the committee, from the point of view of time and discussion, than did practically any other part of the bill. This language was prepared with extreme care. At one of the sessions General Vandegrift and Admiral Sherman were present, and we worked over this language and finally obtained an agreement. They indicated at the time that it was satisfactory.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. HILL. I ask the Senator from Connecticut, with reference to General Vandegrift, if it is not true that the committee brought General Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps, into executive session at the time it was considering this very language, and whether this language, drafted by the committee in the presence of General Vandegrift, was not specifically approved by him?

Mr. BALDWIN. That is my recollection.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I think that is the whole trouble with the drafting of the bill. We have called in generals from the various branches of the service, and if a certain amendment or section met with their approval, it was given no further study. I was not a member of the committee.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me finish.

Mr. HILL. Certainly.

Mr. McCARTHY. I was not a member of the Committee on Armed Services, but I did attend many of its meetings, and watched much of the deliberation. I think that is the principal criticism that could be made of the committee, even though I know that it did an excellent job otherwise. It would call in a general or admiral and ask his advice. As the Senator says, General Vandegrift was called in; and because General Vandegrift said that this language met with his approval, the committee concluded that it was all right.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. HILL. Let me say to the Senator that we did call in many generals and many admirals, as well as many persons who were not either in the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force. We sought the best advice, the greatest possible store of information, and the wisest counsel we could find. We did not necessarily accept a provision because some general, some admiral, or some civilian approved it. However, as the Senator from Connecticut has said, we did perhaps give more time to the provision with respect

to the Marine Corps than to any other provision. We worked long and hard, because we were all interested in doing everything we could to safeguard and protect the Marine Corps. As I have stated, we counseled with General Vandegrift. He approved this language; and after the committee had weighed it carefully, the committee decided that the provision now in the bill was the best possible language to do that which all of us wanted to do, namely, protect and safeguard the Marine Corps.

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me point out to the Senator that prior to the time when the committee called various generals and admirals to obtain their advice, the President, as Commander in Chief, had ordered this particular bill, and that every general and every admiral who was before the committee was under specific, definite orders. There is no question about that, is there?

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. GURNEY. Let me say to the Senator that if he will read the paragraph at the top of page 9 of the report—I am sure he has already read it—

Mr. McCARTHY. I have.

Mr. GURNEY. I will not ask the Senator to read it again. It was the intention of the committee to preserve the basic functions and the required flexibility of our entire military force. Personally, I believe that General Vandegrift accepted the language which we presented to him because he thought it was all right. I am sure that our committee accepted it because we thought it was all right.

Mr. President, I include myself among other Senators who have made similar statements this afternoon. I yield to no one in my firm resolve to protect the standing of the Marine Corps and of naval aviation—and, in fact, of all branches of the service. I believe the bill does just that. I will say definitely to the Senator from Wisconsin that the Secretary of National Security provided for by the terms of the bill could not, by himself, without the President's direction, change the functions, roles, or missions of the Marine Corps in any way. There is no authority in this bill or in any law which gives him such power.

Mr. McCARTHY. I suggest to the Senator that the mere fact that the committee may have sold General Vandegrift a bill of goods does not make this provision right.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. REVERCOMB. It is very apparent that we are all interested in protecting the status of the Marine Corps, and that the Marine Corps should exist in the same status it has today. The Senator's amendment reads:

Notwithstanding the provisions of this or any other act, the existing status of the Marine Corps (including the Fleet Marine forces) or of Naval Aviation shall not be altered or diminished.

If the amendment were to stop there, would it not be the same as the pro-

vision of the bill in subparagraph (b) of section 206, on page 41?

Mr. McCARTHY. Except, if the Senator will refer to page 41, line 4, he will note that I add after the words "this act," the words "or any other act."

Mr. REVERCOMB. I have some misgivings with regard to making provision that none of the missions shall be transferred or changed. The word "missions" troubles me somewhat. As I understand the word, I do not think we should, by legislation, stop the heads of the military forces from directing missions. If we take the status or perhaps the functions and provide by legislation that they shall remain as they are, that the Marine Corps shall be intact as a recognized unit, I think we will have what is desired, and what apparently is the intent of the bill, as expressed even by the Senators who have spoken against the proposed amendment. It seems to be their intent. But I myself must express a misgiving as to the use of the word "missions." That I understand to be the performance of a particular service.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I am interested in the discussion of the question of functions and missions, because I questioned Under Secretary Royall very thoroughly in committee on this very question. The examination will be found on pages 362 and 363 of the hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, regarding our national defense establishment.

I read from the hearings, as follows:

Senator ROBERTSON. Well, that is possibly what he said when he was referring to the Executive order, but this is the bill he is referring to, and, as I say, I quote him again:

"I further understand it that no function of one department of Government and no organization can be changed from one to the other except under specific provisions of law, and that if the President wants to make such a change, he has to lay it before the Congress for approval."

That was a quotation from General Eisenhower. Then I asked Mr. Royall these questions:

Senator ROBERTSON. Then you feel, do you, that the Secretary of National Defense, or the super-secretary must be given the power to change the functions of amphibious warfare, of land-based naval aircraft, and of guided missiles, if he sees fit?

Mr. ROYALL. I think he should have that power, subject to the direction of the President, and I do not think it is confined only to the functions that happened to be performed by the Navy. I think he should have it as to the Air Forces and the Army. I think he should have the right, for example, in the question of the Army Ground Forces which bore the big brunt of this war, at considerably more casualties than all of the others put together, including the Air Forces and everybody else—I think he should have the authority.

Senator ROBERTSON. You would not exclude the marines from that?

Mr. ROYALL. I say "including all of the rest": That the Ground Forces had more casualties than all of the others put together.

Senator ROBERTSON. In proportion to their number more than the marines?

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Mr. ROYALL. Gross; I do not know about proportion. I am a great admirer of the marines.

Mr. BALDWIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. BALDWIN. I recall the questioning of General Royall on that subject by the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. ROBERTSON], and he went into it very thoroughly. I should like to do him the honor of saying that because of the discussion and the questioning by the Senator from Wyoming, when we went into executive session in the committee we put into the bill the language which is in it specifically to protect the Marine Corps. If that point had not been raised, and the Senator from Wyoming had not pressed it so effectively and earnestly, I doubt very much that we would have this language in the bill. It is a very decided change from the original draft introduced in the Senate.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I want to ask the Senator from Connecticut if we did not go further and, as a result of the testimony of Secretary Royall, insert the provision that the three departments, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, should retain all their present functions?

Mr. BALDWIN. That is correct.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. And that the Secretary of National Security should have the functions given to him by statute?

Mr. BALDWIN. That is my recollection, Mr. President.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, in order to have the RECORD clear, in case this amendment is not agreed to, I should like to ask the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, if I may, whether he feels that the bill as written does or does not give the supersecretary the power to transfer functions from one branch to another. Does the Senator feel that the bill gives the supersecretary the right to say, for example, that naval aviation shall no longer have land-based planes?

Mr. GURNEY. To make the answer very simple I will say "No"; there is nothing in the bill which gives the Secretary such right. It must come from the President, as it has since our Army and Navy started.

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator feels, then, that under the bill as presently written the supersecretary cannot say that the amphibious operations of the Marine Corps are a duplication of the amphibious operations of the Army, and therefore we shall do away with amphibious Marine Corps units?

Mr. GURNEY. Definitely, the Secretary of National Security will not have that power.

Mr. McCARTHY. I disagree with the Senator, but I am glad to have that answer on the RECORD.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, I hope the Senator from Wisconsin will insist on his amendment. Irrespective of what some general or some admiral might have done, the fact still remains that they do want to get away from the Marine Corps. I hope that the Senator will outline completely the thought. Not only that, but when the amendment comes to a vote I hope he will insist on a record vote.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator from New Mexico very much; and to show how correct he is, all I need do is refer to the statement of General Spaatz. He said the Marine Corps should be no larger than one regiment. The Chief of Staff said that there should be no duplication on the part of the Marine Corps of things being done by the Army. That is an unqualified statement that he feels that the Marine Corps should no longer have any amphibious units. I think that for that reason the bill as presently written is tremendously dangerous.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment submitted by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY].

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Hill	Myers
Baldwin	Hoey	O'Daniel
Ball	Holland	O'Mahoney
Barkley	Johnson, Colo.	Overton
Brooks	Johnston, S. C.	Pepper
Butler	Kilgore	Revercomb
Byrd	Knowland	Robertson, Va.
Cain	Langer	Robertson, Wyo.
Capper	Lodge	Russell
Chavez	Lucas	Saltonstall
Connally	McCarran	Smith
Cooper	McCarthy	Stewart
Cordon	McClellan	Taft
Donnell	McFarland	Taylor
Dworshak	McGrath	Thye
Ecton	McKellar	Umstead
Ferguson	McMahon	Vandenberg
George	Malone	Watkins
Green	Martin	Wherry
Gurney	Maybank	White
Hatch	Millikin	Williams
Hawkes	Moore	Wilson
Hayden	Morse	Young
Hickenlooper	Murray	

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Seventy-one Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is present.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY] to the committee amendment.

Mr. McCARTHY. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President; a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator will state it.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Is an amendment to the pending amendment in order?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. It is in order.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Then to the pending amendment I offer the following amendment, to strike out the words "or missions", so that the amendment then will read:

Notwithstanding the provisions of this or any other act, the existing status of the

Marine Corps (including the Fleet Marine Forces) or of the naval aviation shall not be altered or diminished; or shall their existing functions be transferred to other services.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I have no objection to that amendment to my amendment, and I shall be glad to accept it.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Inasmuch as the yeas and nays have been ordered, the Senator from Wisconsin can perfect his amendment only by unanimous consent.

Is there objection to the perfection of the amendment as indicated? The Chair hears none; and, without objection, the amendment is perfected as indicated.

The question now is on agreeing to the perfected amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin to the committee amendment.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I shall not prolong the debate, except to say that the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin was discussed in the committee for a long time. We felt that it would do more harm than good to the Marines.

I call attention to the fact that the word "relative" appears in the bill, but that word is omitted from the amendment. The amendment reads "existing status." The bill reads "existing relative status."

The bill does not freeze the Marines in their present status and their present duties, but it allows them to take their relative status as a part of the Navy and as a part of our armed forces in any situation that may arise. We do not know what part the Marines will be called upon to play in these days of jet bombs, atom bombs, and guided missiles. We wish to preserve the Marines in the same relative status to the Navy that they now are in. But we do not wish to freeze them to their existing status, as we know it today. We want them to go forward, not backward, as Admiral Halsey stated so well at Philadelphia on the Fourth of July.

So, Mr. President, I sincerely hope that the perfected amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin will be rejected.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I am sure the Senator from Massachusetts is sincere in telling us that he is concerned about the Marine Corps. This amendment was offered in the House, but there, instead of the final four words "transferred to other services," the word "curtail" was used. I understand that is the word to which the Secretary of War objected.

The Senator from Massachusetts seems to be disturbed because we omitted the word "relative." That was done advisedly, because I think it has no meaning whatsoever in that connection, and is deceptive. But if the Senator from Massachusetts believes that word is necessary in order to protect the Marine Corps, I shall be glad to perfect my amendment by inserting that word in it.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Wisconsin request unanimous consent that he may perfect his amendment in the way indicated?

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Mr. McCARTHY. Yes; for the benefit of the Senator from Massachusetts, I make that request.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the perfecting of the amendment as has been indicated? The Chair hears none; and, without objection, the amendment is further perfected as indicated.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator will state it.

Mr. LODGE. Where is that word to be inserted in the amendment?

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, it is to be inserted before the word "status" in line 2 of the amendment.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, it is my opinion that the amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY], as perfected, should be agreed to. I approve of the words of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] that the Marines should not be frozen, and for that very reason I think the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin should be agreed to.

If we do freeze them, if we do take the advice of some naval officer or army officer in the Department of National Security, who is going to carry out landing operations in case of war? All one has to do is to read the history of the Marines to know their worth. Because we do know their history, because we do respect their valor and their courage, and know how they take their objectives in places which the Army and the Navy could not reach, we do not want them frozen. We want the Marines to remain as they are, and as they have been in the past, able to go forward with the performance of their duty as they have been in the past, from the inception of the country.

Mr. President, it is fine to think of the Army and to think of the Navy. Both those services have done wonderful work. But why at this late day, after a brilliant history, should we do something that would sidetrack the Marines?

Mr. President, I do hope the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin will be agreed to.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY] to the amendment of the committee. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. WHERRY. I announce that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from New York [Mr. Ives] is absent by leave of the Senate because of a death in his immediate family.

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] is necessarily absent because of illness in his family.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. REED], who is necessarily absent, has a general pair with the Senator from New York [Mr. WAGNER].

The Senator from Maine [Mr. BREWSTER], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. ERICKER], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES], and the Senator

from Delaware [Mr. BUCK] are unavoidably detained on official business.

The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. BUSHFIELD], the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. JENNER], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. KEM], and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY] are necessarily absent.

Mr. LUCAS. I announce that the Senator from California [Mr. DOWNEY] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND] is absent on public business.

The Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS] is absent by leave of the Senate, having been appointed a delegate to the International Labor Conference at Geneva, Switzerland.

The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], the Senators from Maryland [Mr. O'CONNOR and Mr. TYDINGS], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. THOMAS], and the Senator from New York [Mr. WAGNER] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] is absent on official business.

The Senator from New York [Mr. WAGNER] has a general pair with the Senator from Kansas [Mr. REED]. If present and voting, the Senator from New York would vote "nay."

If present and voting, the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS], and the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS] would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 19, nays 52, as follows:

YEAS—19

Aiken	Langer	Moore
Brooks	McCarthy	O'Daniel
Butler	McClellan	Revercomb
Chavez	McFarland	Robertson, Wyo.
Ecton	McKellar	Wherry
Hayden	McMahon	
Hickenlooper	Malone	

NAYS—52

Baldwin	Hoey	Pepper
Ball	Holland	Robertson, Va.
Barkley	Johnson, Colo.	Russell
Byrd	Johnston, S. O.	Saltonstall
Cain	Kilgore	Smith
Capper	Knowland	Stewart
Connally	Lodge	Taft
Cooper	Lucas	Taylor
Cordon	McCarran	Thye
Donnell	McGrath	Umstead
Dworshak	Martin	Vandenberg
Ferguson	Maybank	Watkins
George	Millikin	White
Green	Morse	Williams
Gurney	Murray	Wilson
Hatch	Myers	Young
Hawkes	O'Mahoney	
Hill	Overton	

NOT VOTING—24

Brewster	Ellender	Reed
Bricke	Flanders	Sparkman
Bridges	Fulbright	Thomas, Okla.
Buck	Ives	Thomas, Utah
Bushfield	Jenner	Tobey
Capehart	Kem	Tydings
Downey	Magnuson	Wagner
Eastland	O'Conor	Wiley

So Mr. McCARTHY's amendment to the amendment was rejected.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment of the committee is open to further amendment.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, in connection with the construction placed

by the Senator from Wyoming on the powers of the Secretary of National Security, as compared with those of the heads of the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, there occurred a day or so ago some colloquy on the floor of the Senate as to the possible effect of the declaration of policy in interpreting the meaning of the language in sections 201 and 202. In that connection I made the point that the language in the preamble, that is to say, the declaration of policy, referring to unified direction under civilian control, tended to substantiate the view of the Senator from Wyoming, because of the fact that there is no requirement in the bill that anyone except the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of National Security shall be appointed from civilian life. It was suggested by the senior Senator from Massachusetts that there may be some statutory provision which makes it obligatory that both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy shall be chosen from civilian life. In order that the record may be clear on this point, I desire to offer and to read into the RECORD a letter from Ernest S. Griffith, Director of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, dated July 8, 1947, addressed to me in response to my request of the same date as follows:

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE,

Washington, July 8, 1947.

HON. FORREST C. DONNELL,
United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR DONNELL: This is in response to your telephone inquiry of this morning as to whether there is any provision in the Federal statutes or in the Constitution of the United States which would require either the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy to be a civilian.

You are advised that neither the Constitution nor any Federal statute requires that the incumbents of these cabinet positions be civilians.

However, no officer of the Army on the active list is permitted to hold any civil office, whether by election or by appointment, and every such officer who accepts or exercises the functions of a civil office thereby ceases to be an officer of the Army, and his commission is thereby vacated (10 U. S. C. 576; R. S. sec. 1222).

Prior to the act of August 5, 1882 (22 Stat. 238), specifically authorizing such temporary designation, it was held that the prohibition of the above statute was sufficiently broad as to preclude a general of the Army from serving even temporarily as Secretary of War during the absence of the Secretary without vacating his commission as general of the Army (14 Op. Atty. Gen. 200).

No statutes similarly restricting Navy officers in the acceptance of civil employment have been noted.

Sincerely yours,

ERNEST S. GRIFFITH,

Director, Legislative Reference Service.

Mr. President, I submit respectfully that the statement by Mr. Griffith tends to substantiate the point made by the Senator from Wyoming as to the proper construction of the declaration of policy and its effect upon the respective powers of these officials.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment is open to further amendment. If there be no further amend-