

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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DATE: 8 May 1947.

TO : The Director.  
Deputy Director.  
FROM : Chief, Legislative Liaison Division.  
SUBJECT: Eisenhower Testimony at House Hearings on H.R. 2319.

1. Attached herewith is a copy of questions asked by Congressman Busbey during General Eisenhower's testimony.

2. General Eisenhower will return to the stand at 1000 hours this morning.

3. In view of Busbey's question, do you think I should inform General Persons as to our week-end duty officer and stand-by policy, so that General Eisenhower could put some statement in the record in answer to Busbey this morning?

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WALTER L. PFORZHEIMER

The following are extracts from a memorandum submitted on the day of May 7, 1947 to Senator Chan Gurney, Chairman, Senate Arm Service Committee, by Major General William J. Donovan formerly director of the Office of Strategic Services.

In the main, there are two kinds of clandestine organizations, each peculiar to the type of government and the historical origin and development of the intelligence system of that government.

1. " A political secret service with power of arrest designated primarily to protect the security of those who control the authority of the state against their political opponents, which organization has been given or has acquired the responsibility of carrying out espionage and counter-espionage. The Gestapo of Germany and MVB (Ministry of Internal Affairs) also known as NEVD (Peoples' Commissariat) of the Soviet Union are examples of this kind of authority.
2. An organization whose agents are limited to the gathering and reporting of intelligence abroad but who have no police function or power at home or abroad, of which British Secret Intelligence and the United States Office of Strategic Services in World War II are examples. Separation of external intelligence authority and internal police powers is in keeping with a democratic tradition in its concern about undue concentration of power.

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"That no executive department should be permitted to engage in secret intelligence, because secret intelligence covers all fields, but in a proper case call upon the central agency which should be in charge of secret intelligence."

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"That this agency, as the sole agency for secret intelligence, should be authorized, in the foreign field only, to carry on services such as espionage, counter-espionage and those special operations (including morale and psychological) designed to anticipate and counter any attempted penetration and subversion of our national security by enemy action"

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Statement of General A. A. Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps,  
before the House Committee on the Executive Departments on H. R. 2319, the  
National Security Act of 1947.  
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MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

The statement which I have prepared for you is substantially similar to that which I presented before the Senate Armed Services Committee a week ago. Nothing has arisen in the interval which would cause me to change the position which I then took and which I still hold.

I have, however, noted with gratification the interest which this Committee has evinced during previous hearings with regard to the possibilities which this bill holds for the Marine Corps. Your members have asked questions which indicate their concern lest defects in the legislation might, at some future date, imperil the existence of the Corps as we now know it; and you have sought information as to whether or not certain phraseology within this bill (notably that of Sections 103, 112 and 202(b)) is sufficiently descriptive to insure proper Marine Corps participation in the various joint agencies which are to be established by this act. During the latter part of my statement, I shall attempt to answer your inquiries.

I have never opposed the principle of unification, although I have expressed strong disapproval of the objectives underlying the original Collins Plan for outright merger of the armed forces. I am in accord with the over-all objectives which the bill now under consideration seeks to attain. I consider the over-all objectives of the bill to be those of establishing a more economical, integrated means of providing for national security and at the same time formalizing certain proven machinery developed to such good purpose during the war and included in this bill, such as:

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Munitions Board
- The Research and Development Board
- The Central Intelligence Agency
- The National Security Council
- The National Security Resources Board

In order to tie together these new agencies and for better coordination of the several services, there should be an executive appointed from civil life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, whose duty, under the direction of the President, should be to recommend to him policies and programs for the National Defense establishment. He should be empowered to exercise supervision and coordination of the departments and agencies.

Since reading some of the testimony which has been given before this Committee and that of the Senate, on the broad aspects of this bill, I have become increasingly concerned about the danger of

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO H.R. 2319

In Section 103 on page 4, line 18, after the word "Navy," insert the words "Marine Corps,".

In Section 106 add the following subsections:

"(b) Section 1616 of the Revised Statutes (34 USC 711) is hereby repealed.

"(c) There shall be maintained at all times within the naval service and under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy the United States Marine Corps, including the reserve components thereof, to perform the following functions and such additional duties and missions as directed by the President:

(1) To provide a balanced Fleet Marine Force, including its supporting air component, for service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases or for the conduct of such limited land operations as are essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign;

(2) To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy;

(3) To provide security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases;

(4) To provide forces for duty in the occupation of foreign territory or for other duty on shore when directed by the President;

(5) To continue to develop tactics, technique and equipment relating to those phases of amphibious warfare

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP  
 (Revised 10 Sept 1946)

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REMARKS:

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Committee:

I appear before you today to comment on S. 758 - the National Security Act of 1947. The views which I express are personal to me and are the result of long familiarity with the problems which the Committee has under consideration.

Throughout World War II, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - and of the Combined (British-U.S.) Chiefs of Staff - I was in the position to know at first hand the creation and the workings of the military machinery wherewith the war was waged - and won.

As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as Chief of Naval Operations (until relieved by Fleet Admiral Nimitz in December 1945), I have had direct knowledge of all that went on in regard to endeavors to integrate our own military structure. Since December 1945, I have been on duty in the office of the Secretary of the Navy and have been kept well posted in what has taken place since I left office in regard to the matters which have culminated in the bill now before this Committee. I have read most of the hearings that have taken place to date.

I repeat that the views expressed in this statement are to be considered as my own personal views and not necessarily those of the Navy Department.

I am sure that all will agree that the National Security is a matter that calls for straight thinking - and for plain speaking. In my view, it should be emphasized that the really important part of the bill under consideration is that which deals with the National Security Council.

It is only too obvious that war affects the entire nation - all of its people and all of its activities are involved. So, in preparation for future war or emergency, we must profit by the lessons of the past and assess the prospects of the future. It is clear that war and preparation for war is not the business of the armed services alone. All of the factors of national security - not only military but the political, diplomatic, economic, industrial, and even financial factors must be integrated. Policy - foreign, domestic, military - must be integrated. It is the function of the National Security Council - provided for in the bill - to effect this essential integration.

I feel that, in the controversies and discussions that have so far taken place, the emphasis has been wrongly placed - that, so to speak, the cart has been put before the horse. In an orderly analysis of the whole subject, it is clearly the function of the Executive to carry into effect what the Congress may decree - and this applies not only to the Armed

*2 May 1947.*

Statement of Major General Lauris Norstad, Director of Plans & Operations Division, War Department General Staff, before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, House of Representatives re H.R. 2319, National Security Act of 1947. *2 May 1947.*

Since 1918, many studies have been made with a view to developing a workable plan for integrating the armed forces into an efficient and economical machine for the preservation of peace, or as a last resort, for the successful prosecution of war. Since 1921 there have been at least sixty bills introduced in the Congress pertaining to this subject. During the same period there have been some seven Congressional Committees who have studied the problem and submitted reports.

During World War II, a committee composed of Army, Navy, and Air officers of long experience were appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the reorganization of national defense. The committee reported that the majority of the leaders in the field recommended a unified system of organization of the armed forces, and considered it to be essential.

In 1944, the Committee on Post War Military Policy of the House of Representatives, after conducting hearings extending over a period of several months, rendered a report to the effect that the time was not then opportune, because fighting was in progress, to undertake to write the pattern of the proposed unification of the armed forces. They did recommend, however, that when the war was over the question of reorganization of the armed forces should be followed through, with a view to giving to the Congress the results of the study conducted by the committee appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Prior to World War II, the real necessity for the integration of our armed forces was not so readily apparent. I am convinced, however, that one lesson which has been most clearly demonstrated by the costly experience of