

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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ILLEGIB

TO : WLF  
FROM : MSC  
SUBJECT: House Hearings on Unification Legislation.

DATE: 26 June 1947.



1. The following are excerpts from today's hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on unification legislation, at which Vice Admiral Radford was the main witness.

DORN: (Rep. W. J. Bryan Dorn, D., S.C.) -- With regard to the Central Intelligence Agency -- I may be wrong, but I have always felt that if Admiral Kimmel had had proper intelligence from Washington, the attack on Pearl Harbor would not have occurred, or at least we would have been able to meet it better. From your experience, do you not think that this Central Intelligence Agency alone would warrant the passage of this bill?

RADFORD: Of course, I think it is most important. Actually, it is in existence now. It is already functioning.

DORN: Yes, but it exists now only by Executive Order. We need something more than that.

RADFORD: I think that it is probably perfectly safe as it is. I don't think it would die with the end of the President's war powers.

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JUDD: (Rep. Walter H. Judd, R., Minn.) -- Regarding the Central Intelligence Agency, do you think that it ought to be under the National Security Council, or directly under the Secretary of National Defense, on a par with the Munitions Board, the Joint Research and Development Board, and the National Security Resources Board? The Central Intelligence Agency is put under the National Security Council, so that it has a dozen heads. It seems to me that this is so important that it ought to be on a par with those other agencies.

RADFORD: ... I feel that the Central Intelligence Agency should be under the National Security Council.

JUDD: You don't think that its reports will make the rounds and never get any action?

RADFORD: I hardly think so. I think it is important to have the Agency. I think its handling of reports can be controlled by the Director. I am sure it would be.

EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EXECUTIVE EXPENDITURES  
ON H.R. 2319, 24 JUNE 1947.

REP. WALTER JUDT, (R., Minn.): ... I have concern as to whether the Intelligence Agency provided in the bill is given anywhere near the importance it deserves. I think it has got to be put on a parity with the Munitions Board and the others. Instead, it seems to be a joint and hydra-headed agency which will weaken our intelligence rather than strengthen it.

DR. VANNEVAR BUSH: I second your thoughts very strongly, sir. I feel very strongly that in the post-war period we must improve our intelligence work in this country. That is in no criticism of what we did during the war. During the war I was one of the users of our intelligence. Each of it I found to be excellent. In the post-war period it will be exceedingly important. There is a difficulty as one looks over this section of the bill. The Central Intelligence Agency provided for links the military establishment and the State Department, and hence cannot logically be placed under the Secretary of National Defense. It is a joint matter. It might be reporting directly to the President...

JUDT: I have never seen a hydra-headed organization which functions as well as one headed by a single man. If we were caught flat-footed without proper intelligence at the outbreak of another war, it might be disastrous.

BUSH: There is another aspect which troubles me. I have had close contact with the Central Intelligence Group since it was formed, and the CIC has had very close contact with the Joint Research and Development Board as it has worked out its plans for scientific intelligence. What we have had since CIC was established is three different Directors. That bothers me. I can see the point of view of the military officer. He does not feel that he is getting anywhere. It is not a permanent assignment, but just another tour of duty. The answer to that is a civilian head. I feel that a civilian head would be better if exactly the right man could be found. But to find exactly the right man, I grant, would be difficult indeed. We have no natural training ground. However, there is no requirement that the Director of Central Intelligence be a military man. I think that the provisions of this bill would work as effectively as anything I could suggest. I could not propose an alternative.

JUDT: The man should go into it as a life work, just as J. Edgar Hoover has with the FBI. It should not be another temporary tour of duty. To me, the Joint Research and Development Board and the Central Intelligence Agency are the two most important things in the bill.

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STATEMENT OF DR. VANNEVAR BUSH,

BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE  
DEPARTMENTS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN CONNECTION  
WITH S. 758, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

*(24 June 1947).*

One of the great lessons from the past war is that the conduct of war has become exceedingly complicated and its various aspects are necessarily closely inter-linked. The time is long past when the Navy merely transported the Army to the place of battle and the Army then fought on land. In modern war, every important operation also involves the air, and usually involves ground and sea action as well. It is crystal clear that if this country is to be completely ready for a future emergency, it must replace the old traditional form of organization with one that is better adapted to meet present needs. This means a single integrated military establishment.

Creation of such a single establishment is important for purposes of economy, but it should be emphasized at once that economy will not be realized instantly on effecting coordination. The immediate effect will be to increase the costs. Reorganization and integration of the military establishment, as provided in this or any other practicable bill, necessarily involves the superposition on the existing structure of a new and important unit. This means greater costs in the short run, but in the long run it undoubtedly will involve substantial economies. But aside from the question of economy, it does mean in the long run, a more effective effort.

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*Refer to Mr. Spingarn*

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