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PROGRAM The Fred Fiske Show

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SUBJECT Interview with Valdimir Sakharov

FRED FISKE: We've often spoken about the world of intelligence, of disinformation, of covert action. This evening we have with us a man who knows it well. Vladimir Sakharov was a Soviet diplomat, a KGB agent, and a CIA spy. He tells his unusual story in a new book. It's in paperback and it's titled "High Treason." He wrote it with Umberto Tossi.

Welcome to our program.

VLADIMIR SAKHAROV: It's a pleasure. Good evening.

FISKE: The name Sakharov is a rather common name in the Soviet Union. Are you any relation to the famous scientist?

SAKHAROV: No, no relationship. And it's not a common name at all.

FISKE: Isn't it?

SAKHAROV: It's not like Smith. It's a rather unusual name. Just a coincidence.

FISKE: I see.

Well, you were born into the Russian elite.

SAKHAROV: Yeah.

FISKE: Your family had been rich and influential even before the Revolution, and they had been among the privileged few in the Soviet Union since the Revolution. How did that happen?

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SAKHAROV: My grand-grandfather was a sugar and silk manufacturer. And my grandfather was also -- followed the father's footsteps. When the Revolution came, he was a survivor. He turned over his property to the state. He knew that the new regime will come anyway, so might as well not fight it. And he was given a modest job and an allowance, and he was able to make it without antagonizing the Soviet power.

So it was a family of survivors. He was a Muscovite, old Russian family.

FISKE: So they were members of the bourgeoisie, and not many of those did survive.

SAKHAROV: Well, my father wrote -- you know, every year you have to go through a reevaluation, like, and you have to describe your family background. My father would write about his family roots, that the parents are from working class. Well, they worked. They were merchants. So it's a little deceit that you have to live with.

FISKE: And your father was in the KGB. A colonel in the KGB?

SAKHAROV: My father, since 1945, became one of the first 100 diplomatic couriers in the Soviet Union. They were -- what they did, they carried secret pouches between Soviet embassies around the world.

He told me one day when I was already at my teenage, he told me that, "Look, I have been working for the KGB all these years, and my rank is a colonel." Now, that's what he told me. I knew everybody revered him and a lot of people were afraid of him. But you don't talk about, really, things like "I'm a KGB" in the family. Everybody knows it. You know, it's like that.

FISKE: You suspected it before your father told you that?

SAKHAROV: Oh, sure, because my -- at school, for example, students at school used to tell me, "Oh, come on. Your father is no diplomatic courier. He is intelligence officer, and a very high-level one."

I said, "Well," you know, "if you want to think that way, think that way."

But there is an unwritten and unspoken language in Moscow that, "You don't have to say anything, I understand what you mean."

FISKE: Do all KGB officers carry military ranks?

SAKHAROV: There is a certain leverage that KGB carries a military rank. It's sort of like a parallel to the military rank. But not necessarily.

FISKE: What rank did you hold?

SAKHAROV: I was a co-opted officer, which is a totally different story.

FISKE: You were in the diplomatic service, the foreign service, who was drafted into the KGB.

SAKHAROV: Right. I was a pure [unintelligible] foreign affairs diplomat. I was sent to Yemen, to my internship, from the Institute of International Relations. What happened is that the KGB resident in Hodeida removed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs guy from -- because he didn't like him. For other reasons, too. And I was a young guy there in Yemen, and there was no one else to fill the vacant position. And the KGB resident told me, "You're going to fill the position of the consul, but you will be working for us from now on."

So I became a co-opted KGB while I was working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

FISKE: Your family lived very well in the Soviet Union. You had a nice apartment, lots of friends, parties, plenty of food. I say nice apartment. In Russian terms.

SAKHAROV: By Soviet standards.

FISKE: Describe what would be a nice apartment that your family had, by Soviet standards.

SAKHAROV: It would be a two-room apartment. There is no such thing as a bedroom or a living room. It's two rooms, kitchen and a corridor, and in a nice location, in the center of Moscow. That's considered a very good apartment. That's what we had.

FISKE: And much larger rooms, I suppose, than you'd find in some of the poorer apartments.

SAKHAROV: It would be larger rooms. It will be a nice view, and there'll be nice appliances, and the elevator will work sometimes.

FISKE: Elevator problems are endemic in the Soviet Union. I was there some years ago, and we stayed at the Ukraina Hotel.

SAKHAROV: Oh, yes.

FISKE: A big beautiful hotel, 29 stories. But the elevators were terrible. They had six elevators, and they probably needed 30. It was worth your life to get on and off that elevator.

SAKHAROV: You must have seen our apartment building, because our building was directly across the river from the Ukraina Hotel.

FISKE: Well, my window looked right out over the river.

SAKHAROV: American Embassy, and then next to it was our building. Yes.

FISKE: And in the wintertime they have a ski lift right onto that river. It's a very, very pretty part of the city, by the way.

Now, your family lived very well. You lived very well. You didn't want for anything. You had great privileges. And still -- and your father was able to provide this because he was a KGB colonel. But when he learned that you were becoming involved in it, he warned you against it. Why?

SAKHAROV: He said, "Over my dead body. You're not going there."

FISKE: Now, you would have thought that -- he had a privileged position. Why did he want you not to go into it?

SAKHAROV: He thought that a career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be a pure diplomatic career with the same privileges and prestige as KGB, only I wouldn't get into any political upheavals. Because his philosophy was if you work in the KGB and you are kicked out of the KGB for something -- there is a big changeover, for example -- if you're kicked out, there is no way you're going to make it in life. You will end up working somewhere in the boonies. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he considered our people with more integrity, sort of, and more debonair, and there is more camaraderie between them. So he wanted me to work in the Ministry.

FISKE: Was your mother happy with your father's work in the KGB?

SAKHAROV: Well, she was happy and unhappy. He was away from home most of the time. He would be home maybe a week out of one month. The rest of the time, he'll be traveling abroad. And, of course, it was hard on her to be alone and tend to the family. But at the same time, he brought all those marvelous things.

FISKE: Well, I ask you that question because your wife was very unhappy with it, wasn't she?

SAKHAROV: Uh-huh.

FISKE: Which may have been one of the factors leading to your defection?

SAKHAROV: There was that ingredient. I will say it honestly, that my marriage basically was approved and arranged. I didn't want to marry that woman. I was in love with somebody else, and that somebody else was not from my class, was a lower-class citizen. I was not supposed to marry her. So I had to marry within my class, within the elite, so to say.

FISKE: Isn't that interesting, Vladimir? You come from what's supposed to be a classless society, and you're talking about marrying within your class. And when you went back to Russia from the Middle East, at one point during your career, you say you were able to get two 20-day passes to spend at an elite resort for upper-level people.

SAKHAROV: Right.

FISKE: Now, that sounds strange when you're discussing a supposedly classless society.

SAKHAROV: It's classless for the elite. It's definitely not classless for the rest of the people.

FISKE: Who composes the elite?

SAKHAROV: The elite is a unique phenomenon. It's a society in Moscow which is comprised of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, party officials, International Department of the Central Committee, intelligence officers, and their families, who have access on a permanent basis, or on a from-time-to-time basis, to foreign travel, who enjoy the privileges of shopping in special stores, having special parties, enjoying Western goods, which are not enjoyed by the rest of the Soviet population. And that's a status of movie stars. They're looked upon, from the rest of the people, as movie stars. They are stars.

FISKE: And you look down upon the rest of the people as of a lower class?

SAKHAROV: Yes, precisely.

FISKE: That's very interesting.

You were a good student. But for some reason, you were enamored, you were hooked on things American from very early on.

SAKHAROV: Uh-huh.

FISKE: Now, how does that happen to a youngster, you know, who is brought up in Moscow, from the kind of family from which you came? Relatively little reason to be dissatisfied. You were enjoying the very best. Your life, as you describe it, was the good life. It was, you know, the Joe College kind of existence.

SAKHAROV: Yes, exactly. Uh-huh.

I -- again, going back to my early childhood, we went to Rome when I was two years old.

FISKE: Your father was assigned there?

SAKHAROV: To Rome. I spent there two or three years. My first language was Italian, by the way. I had to learn Russian when we came back.

Then my father was traveling after that for all the time. And the culture in my family was Dave Brubeck, Ella Fitzgerald, Charlie Parker, Nat King Cole, J.D. Salinger. That is, direct connection to all the Western civilization. That didn't fit with my schooling.

FISKE: Well, how did that happen? Was it in Rome or was it before that?

SAKHAROV: Well, it happened after. It's after, after Rome. I came back. I was a regular child who really was out of place, because I had all those things. I have foreign clothes on me. I didn't fit in my school. I didn't belong there, because the rest were dressed in Russian drab type things. And that was in the '50s.

My father spoke perfectly English. He translated to me books that he read. He told me stories about America, about England, Paris. So I felt much above the rest. That was -- maybe that was damaging, in a sense.

FISKE: What was your father's attitude toward the West and toward America?

SAKHAROV: My father was very little politically inclined. He stayed away from politics. He did his job. He liked to go to America. He liked America. He liked people. He used to tell me when he is in Washington he saw all those marvelous houses and people in the streets seemed to be happy and they -- you know, that's what I got when I was young.

FISKE: What would he tell his other Russians about it?

SAKHAROV: He wouldn't say anything to them. But in the family, he shared.

FISKE: And you, as a child, did you tell your friends?

SAKHAROV: No.

FISKE: You knew that you weren't supposed to do that.

SAKHAROV: Yeah. You know what the rules are very early in your childhood.

FISKE: But you had American records, you had -- you smoked American cigarettes and drank American booze.

SAKHAROV: I was stealing American cigarettes from my father.

FISKE: Winston? Wasn't that your brand?

SAKHAROV: Winston, yeah. And Chesterfield.

FISKE: And you were a rather good student, right?

SAKHAROV: Yes, I was a good student.

FISKE: You went to music and language.

SAKHAROV: I started music when I was five, and then I switched to jazz. Later on at the institute, I had my own jazz combo. Jazz was prohibited, so we had to play clandestinely. We picked up all our stuff from Willis Conover from the Voice of America.

FISKE: I worked with Willis Conover when he was in Washington, by the way.

SAKHAROV: Oh, God, he is something else.

FISKE: Many years ago. Yeah. I've known Willis a long, long time.

SAKHAROV: He's done more for the United States and to present American culture to the world, more than any American political leader.

FISKE: I had him on this program a couple of years ago. He's the most listened to radio personality in the world, I suppose. I see him from time to time.

SAKHAROV: My desire, since I was maybe 13 or 14 years old, was to meet one day him and just shake his hand.





SAKHAROV: In Moscow, at the Institute of International Relations, all the subjects were compulsory. I mean you get in class in the morning, you take two hours of Arabic, then two hours of history of Islam, international law, international relations, economics. I mean everything is specified. And you have to memorize everything. You have to really drill yourself all the time. You don't have much time or much need to think, you know, to do any thinking. You just memorize and you create a very good background. It's very area-oriented. You're supposed to work in the Middle East, you study the Middle East very well. You study the customs, the Arabs' traditions. So it's -- that's the Soviet education.

In the States, I went to the international relations graduate school. And what we were studying mostly were theories and methodologies of international relations, maybe 75 theories by different theoreticians, comparative government, comparative politics, comparative this, comparative that.

FISKE: Graduate school is different from undergrad school.

SAKHAROV: Yeah. But I gave some classes in both schools too, and I will be doing that fairly soon in another school.

But the whole thing here is oriented towards more general, general education, towards creating a solid background.

FISKE: But there, a specific purpose.

SAKHAROV: A specific purpose. That's the difference.

FISKE: Did you choose the Middle East as your area?

SAKHAROV: The Middle East was the best area to study at the time because the Soviet foreign political thrust was into the Middle East. There is a need -- or there was a need for Middle Eastern experts. More embassies were opening in the Middle East, more people went there. So there was more room for promotion. That's as simple as that.

I mean if you are specializing in the United States and if you are assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is no way you get promoted, because all the positions above you are occupied by KGB, GRU, Central Committee people. But in a country like Egypt, with a great number of Soviet diplomats, there is a lot of room for promotion.

FISKE: So that's why you chose it.

SAKHAROV: Precisely.

FISKE: Tell me this. You mentioned the thoroughness of the study: Arabs and Arab customs and Arab language, and so on. It makes you wonder why we keep hearing reports that the Russians assigned in that part of the world are generally not well liked. They're kicked out, for example, of Egypt. They're resented. You would think that people so well grounded in the customs of an area, in the traditions of an area would manage to make themselves better liked.

SAKHAROV: Well, maybe that's what we perceive right now. We heard the Vladimir Pelakov (?), the Soviet Ambassador, was kicked out of Egypt. But we look at the gains the Soviets have made in the Middle East for the past 10 years. They might have lost Egypt temporarily, but they have acquired Syria. They have acquired South Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, as far as good relationships are going. So they have acquired more ground than they lost, so far.

FISKE: But the question is, do they -- you say they've acquired. Do they hold these countries militarily, or have they established a genuine rapport, a relationship? That's what I'm talking about. I have no doubt that they can grab a country and hold it militarily. They've done it. But do the people there genuinely like them, admire them, respect them? And from what I hear, that's not the case. And given the kind of training you have for your positions, I would expect it to be.

SAKHAROV: There is a double standard in the Middle East. Soviet diplomatic representatives, KGB officers, GRU, Central Committee functionaries, they are area experts, they can speak Arabic, they can charm the socks off the Arabs. But then there is a group of Soviet specialists which comes along, Soviet military experts and Soviet road construction builders, agriculture experts. They are picked, you know, fresh from the Soviet Union. They have no exposure, they have no experience. They think they are in the Soviet Union, actually, when they are working in Syria or in Egypt. There is no difference for them.

So when the Soviet diplomats are working and establishing good base of operations, usually the specialists and the experts are the ones that foul it up.

So there is a problem for the Soviets.

FISKE: Now, you were assigned, even in the Foreign Service, with a commission in GRU, the military intelligence.

SAKHAROV: Yeah. Uh-huh.

FISKE: Is that usual?

SAKHAROV: That's the standard for any graduate of the

Institute of International Relations. They undergo five years of special military training, which is basically military intelligence type training. And since GRU is an older organization and much more, you know, rooted than KGB in international operations, it was just traditional.

FISKE: Anybody who really knew you shouldn't have been surprised that you defected, because you were never really a dyed-in-the-wool Marxist, although you managed to convince your superiors and your teachers that you were. In your book you make it clear that throughout your training and throughout your internship they test you, they check you.

SAKHAROV: All the time.

FISKE: Is it so clumsy that you're aware of it, so that you, really having doubts about the system, really enjoying so many things American, which would have made you, you know, verboten as a GRU officer, you were able to conceal?

SAKHAROV: There is a thing that certain people can become a part of that system. They can become informants. They can promote their careers by ruining other people's lives, probably. I didn't feel I belonged in that kind of environment. I didn't care for anyone taking my personal inventory at the Institute of International Relations, because I was sort of independent. I kept it to myself, but I thought that was nobody's business, what my views are. You know, as long as I'm doing a good job, forget it.

FISKE: But you gave the answers that were required.

SAKHAROV: I gave the answers. Sure.

There was an example when we had the party at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There was a big function. And my jazz combo, we say we're going to play some...

FISKE: You play piano.

SAKHAROV: Yeah, I play piano. We say we're going to play some music by Soviet composers, and instead we play Charlie Parker's "Lady Be Good."

[Laughter]

SAKHAROV: So stuff like that. That was very exciting.

FISKE: How long did you manage to fool them that way?

SAKHAROV: Until I got to the United States. But it was getting to me. It was getting to me. When I was in Kuwait,

I knew I was walking a very thin rope. I knew that another year, I wouldn't be able to really handle myself.

FISKE: Early on, for some reason, while you managed to fool your Russian superiors, in some way, the CIA was aware of the fact that you were a potential defector. You were very young, very new in the service when George appeared. Now, are you able to understand how that happened?

SAKHAROV: Maybe now I understand it better than then. Obviously, at the time -- I don't think now it would be the case. At the time, the CIA was a rather active organization. They most likely were aware of various Soviet personalities -- well, like the KGB is aware of CIA, and CIA is aware of KGB, and GRU is aware of CIA. It's sort of typical.

And, well, I took taxis a lot. I loved American music. In Yemen I had a good selection of American records. I had great parties, for example, for East Germans. I entertained Egyptian military personnel. I was different. Even when I was working overseas, and when I was in Moscow, I behaved differently sometimes on the street.

FISKE: What's peculiar, though, is that your behavior was different enough for the CIA to realize that you were a potential defector, but not to make the KGB suspicious of you.

SAKHAROV: Well, it's an interesting thing. Well, about my relationship to the CIA, I sort of touched upon it. I didn't go into very intimate details about...

FISKE: You mean in the book.

SAKHAROV: Yes, in the book. I skipped over this.

FISKE: Well, can you tell us a little more? Can you tell us some things that would help us to explain that that are not in the book?

SAKHAROV: When you are, for example, stand at a diplomatic reception, or at any reception -- for example, at the film festival press conference, and you try to sort of look available, through your body language, through your behavior. You come closer to an American, suppose, and you try to get in touch in a conversation, you might be able to get a feedback. When you do that long enough, you either will be suspected as a control agent for the KGB or a possible defector. And that's the answer.

FISKE: I see.

But George presented himself as a German. Why?

SAKHAROV: That was an initial presentation. And I would think that if he had presented himself as an American, naturally, I would just run away.

FISKE: It was very tentative, though, right? No pressure.

SAKHAROV: No.

FISKE: How long did he remain in touch with you at various places? He would show up at various places, leave mementos, leave a book in your car, or something.

SAKHAROV: Uh-huh.

FISKE: How long did this go on before your actual defection?

SAKHAROV: I divide it into three periods. One period of approach, another approach of working through a third party. That was in Egypt. And a third period of direct twice-a-day -- twice-a-week, rather, meetings. And that was in Kuwait. So the active, really grinding period of work was in Kuwait, took place in Kuwait. And that's why I said the psychological pressure was getting to me, because it was more and more difficult on me to keep it up.

FISKE: Vladimir, you were taught in school that the CIA was a much more formidable adversary than you found it to be. Why?

SAKHAROV: At the school we were taught that the CIA is the enemy number one, the United States is enemy number one, and that the CIA spearheads the effort of the United States imperialism to destroy the Soviet Union. That was a dogma, you know. Since, with my all this affection for American culture and civilization and so forth, if they are spearheading the effort of that civilized nation, they must be the good guys.

So -- you have to read between the lines when you are a citizen of the Soviet Union. So I read between the lines.

The agency -- in the book I made that comment, and that comment has to do basically with the period after my defection, after I escaped from Kuwait.

I was debriefed in Washington for about a year. I thought -- I didn't say anything at the time, and I was rather confused by the reception, by what happened to me here. Looking back now, I think that the debriefing was not really that terrific. And later on...

FISKE: Not terrific, in what way? You mean you could have actually been a mole?

SAKHAROV: Well, no, no. What I mean, the debriefing of any individual, whether it's a diplomat or an immigrant or anybody who comes to the United States, there is a special skill of debriefing. You have to be a -- a debriefer has to be an expert in the area on which he debriefs, not a person, simply like that.

Over the years, by osmosis, by other means, I found that the agency does not have expert area capabilities at all. They used to have them. I was fortunate I worked with George. If it were somebody else, I might not have been as fortunate.

FISKE: Is George still in the agency?

SAKHAROV: I don't know. I have never seen him...

FISKE: You're not in touch with him.

SAKHAROV: I've never seen him after I -- well, who quite first the relationship, it's a question. But I have not had any relationship with him for quite a number of years.

FISKE: Shortly after your defection -- you left Washington after a year's debriefing. You went to California. You went to hotel school there.

SAKHAROV: Yeah. They bought me a one-way ticket.

FISKE: Why'd you go to hotel school?

SAKHAROV: That was what you call a resettlement program. Obviously, they concluded that I would make a good busboy.

FISKE: But while you were out there in California, you suspected a plot, an effort on the part of the KGB to do you in. You saw people standing outside your hotel from the window. You finally jumped 30 feet out the window into a swimming pool, injuring yourself.

Are you confident now, as you look back, that in fact it was such a plot?

SAKHAROV: No, no. That was not -- what happened there was a rather soap opera situation, is that when I got to California, I was given a new identity, that I was not a Russian anymore, I was -- I'm Dutch or Swedish, you know, computer salesman.

FISKE: How many languages do you speak?

SAKHAROV: Arabic, German, and English and Russian.

And so I had to play a role of somebody else, and I had to go to the hotel-motel school. And there were two hookers, a couple of people from -- looked who came from Skid Row, and somebody on a government assistance program. And the lecturer at the school said, "Well, you might make busboys and you make good tips." I said, "God, what am I doing here?" You know. And that was a shock. If you take someone from a Soviet elite who was there, you know, and you put him in a dump like that. Sort of a shock treatment.

And I thought that was the end. I thought -- I was extremely bitter and I didn't know what to do, where to go. My cover did not provide for any job background. If I would apply for a job the employer would usually ask you, "Where did you work before?" I said, "Well, I worked for a Syrian outfit which is defunct." You know, now it doesn't work anymore. So, you know, check it out. You can't.

I couldn't get a job. I didn't have much money. So what I was doing in California, I was trying to -- and I wanted to be accepted so badly in American society, because that was my dream, to come here.

I went around. I would go to around those Holiday Inns that go around and around and around, buy a round of drinks for everybody, you know. I would go and invite an expensive call girl and would go for a weekend to Palm Springs and I'd blow 500 bucks. You know, something like that.

Finally, in about six months, I had no way to go anymore. I was out of money. I was out of everything. I was emotionally totally out. I was fortunate I met a very good man. He was a black singer, a jazz singer. And he told me one day that, "Look, you have to get out of that situation on your own. And you have to understand you're not the greatest, that there is a higher power. And if you want to make it, the higher power will take care of you." And I had a very good advice from his friends. And then I -- I got a lot of friends at that time, all of a sudden. And to go to a university and to move out and, under a new identity, establish my new American credentials.

So I went on a work study program. I got a professor at the university -- international journalism professor, by the way. He died now -- who helped me with government grants for research. I drove a cab at night, and sort of worked myself out little by little.

I went through all of the -- even the flower children generation in the United States...

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FISKE: You've been here nine years.

SAKHAROV: Yeah.

FISKE: What about the leap out of the window?

SAKHAROV: In Hollywood?

FISKE: Yeah.

SAKHAROV: That was -- I signed for the loan. That was a collection agent.

FISKE: Really? And you thought it was KGB.

SAKHAROV: Was a KGB. It was a collection agency. Something was after me because I had co-signed for a loan of somebody, I didn't know who. The loan was not too big, though. So I took care of that.

FISKE: You jumped 30 feet into a swimming pool.

SAKHAROV: Something like that.

FISKE: Did you injure yourself?

SAKHAROV: I twisted my ankle.

FISKE: You were lucky.

SAKHAROV: Yeah.

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FISKE: Vladimir's story is told in a book by him titled "High Treason."

Good evening. You're on the air.

MAN: I have read Sakharov's book, and I've read the John Barron (?) book on the KGB. I noticed there were some discrepancies in the Sakharov story, and I was wondering if he would care to comment on that.

FISKE: All right. What are the discrepancies, by the way?

MAN: For example, the description of his father's reaction when he announced he had been recruited by the KGB.

SAKHAROV: There are discrepancies, and I'll tell you why those discrepancies. I wrote this book on my own. When John



Barron was writing his book, he interviewed me. He had a set of questions, obviously, which he had to follow in his writing. I answered his questions to the best of my ability at the time. But that was not me writing the book, again. So you can interpret -- you know, when you write about somebody else, you can really interpret his situation in many different ways. And it's very difficult to be accurate if you write about somebody else. If you write it yourself, you can be subjective, in a sense. But at least it's your own, you know. You put in your own perspective and your own reactions. And this is firsthand material.

And I think what I wrote about my past is -- could be subjective, but at least it's true.

MAN: By the way, I should mention I was very impressed with your book. I was surprised when I read the Barron book, as it happened, just a couple of weeks later and noticed the discrepancies. And I was very puzzled by that.

One other question. You mentioned Nosenko. And I'm wondering if you have had any thoughts since. You may have noticed the Reader's Digest article on him. Have you had any thoughts on...

SAKHAROV: I've heard about this controversy about Nosenko for a number of years now. I didn't know anything about it when I got here, though.

MAN: My impression was that you mentioned Nosenko...

SAKHAROV: He was a legitimate...

MAN: ...kicked out of the institute?

SAKHAROV: Yes. What I did, I stated the fact that his brother -- he was a class above me. He was studying the Arabic language. When Nosenko defected to the United States, his brother was asked by the Director of the Institute of International Relations, who was at the time either Rozenko (?) or Pushkov (?) -- I don't remember. I think so. He was asked to leave the institute and transfer himself to the Institute of Oriental Languages, or to stay at the institute, but there will be no future for him.

So I concluded that his family suffered because his brother got into trouble, you know, as far as his career was concerned.

MAN: Did your own family suffer when you defected?

SAKHAROV: Well, this is very difficult for me to say. I have not kept in touch with my family since I got here.

FISKE: But you really split up with your wife. So

she shouldn't have suffered.

SAKHAROV: No. From what I know, my ex-wife remarried.

MAN: But your father was in a very trusted position, and certainly...

FISKE: Did he suffer any?

SAKHAROV: He got grounded.

FISKE: He did.

SAKHAROV: Uh-huh.

FISKE: Have you heard from him at all?

SAKHAROV: He died.

FISKE: I see.

MAN: May I ask one last question? I notice that you've mentioned your education very generally. And I would guess that there are enough clues in there that if the KGB were interested in finding you -- you know, the international journalism professor who's now dead, that sort of thing -- that they might be able to track you down.

I am personally very interested in Soviet studies, and it would be intriguing to be able to somehow get in touch with you. Is there no way to contact you?

SAKHAROV: You can. You can contact the station. I'm going to leave my coordinates.

MAN: I see.

SAKHAROV: And I'm sure KGB knows where I am. They are...

FISKE: And they're no longer interested in finding you.

SAKHAROV: Why would they make any -- a friend of mine told me not too long ago -- he said, "Vladimir, as long as you are out there in public, they're not going to touch you." I hope so. If you are there somewhere quiet under a new identity, they'll put you away silently and quietly.

MAN: One last thing, please. When I read the book, I was personally mortified at the way you were treated when you came to this country. And, you know, my own apologies obviously don't...

SAKHAROV: No apologies needed. I think I was lucky, in a sense, that I was given a chance. Now I look back and I see that if I were taken care of, all my needs were taken care of, I wouldn't be proud of myself now.

FISKE: Good evening.

MAN: I would like to ask Mr. Sakharov if he knows Victor Lilly (?) and if he could tell us what Victor Lilly's position is in the Soviet Union.

SAKHAROV: Victor Lilly, he worked under various names in the Middle East. He's an expert on the Middle East, and also in the area of Middle Eastern French-speaking countries -- Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. He is an elusive operator. He is an excellent journalist. And he's got a unique position, sort of like Vladimir Posner in New York City.

MAN: Is he a true journalist or is he a colonel in the KGB?

SAKHAROV: Is Vladimir Posner a true journalist? You can be a journalist and you can be a KGB, or you can be a journalist and you can be GRU. In the Soviet Union the difference is between journalists, KGB, GRU, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Central Committee -- are only task differences. That is, what man performs what task. Otherwise, the professions very much intermesh, in many cases.

FISKE: Good evening.

MAN: One of the things that I'm curious about is, if you could tell me, Mr. Sakharov, what you did as -- what was different about your life when you were just in the Foreign Ministry and what additional duties you took on when you became part of the KGB.

SAKHAROV: I never really had the chance to work just for the Foreign Ministry. And Soviet intelligence organizations have a habit of snatching diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a very consistent basis.

I was working in Alexandria, for example, and I was supposed to -- the consul general asked me to go somewhere, and I went there.

MAN: Well, where was that?

SAKHAROV: That was in Alexandria in Egypt.

MAN: Where did he ask you to go? I mean specifically.

SAKHAROV: Well, specifically. Okay. He asked me to clear some 40 cases of equipment from the port of Alexandria. And I took a day to do it.

Now, I was absent for one day. And when I came back, the resident gave me a very hard time because he said, "You should have told me before you went there. Always report to me first before you take any assignment from the consul."

It depends on what your assignment is abroad. Basically, I can characterize it that, number one, is what we perceive here as the KGB is a cloak-and-dagger organization that runs around and snoops around the corner, I think it's the wrong perception. The KGB, GRU, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and CCID, their one primary responsibility is to sell Soviet foreign policy in the country where they are present, by any available means.

So, the character is a bit...

MAN: But really, everybody's on the same team, even though they're carrying different credentials? Is that what you're trying to say?

SAKHAROV: Yes. Yes. There is a big, great intermesh.

FISKE: But they're two separate bureaucracies.

SAKHAROV: They can be two separate bureaucracies, but you can be working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, GRU can come to you and say, "Hey, you know this individual" -- in my case, it was Commande Gallel (?), for example, I knew from Yemen. He was chief of the Egyptian squadron there, naval squadron. I knew him in Yemen. I met him in Alexandria. And the local GRU resident says, "How do you know that man?"

I said, "Well, I used to work with him."

And he said, "Would you do me a favor, please?" And I did him a favor after that, to work with Gallel, whom we later recruited.

So you can work on loan to different organizations.

FISKE: It seems to me, from your book, that while you were assigned there to Alexandria, you spent a considerable amount of time in the port working with -- covertly, I suppose -- with KGB agents aboard various ships, Russian and non-Russian ships, in the harbor. Now, what were you doing with them?

SAKHAROV: I would go twice a week, for example, to check lists of passengers on Soviet liners that came to the port of Alexandria. I would go to immigration authorities at the port

and screen people who are potential candidates for recruitment. I would go to Soviet military ships, and we'd sit around and exchange shop talk with Soviet military -- naval command. I would go and I'd clear military supplies for GKAS. That's State Committee for Economic Relations.

FISKE: This is strictly intelligence work.

SAKHAROV: It was. Yes. Yes. But you do all those million duties which every day you have a different task. It depends on to whom you report. That's all.

FISKE: I was interested that you said that most ships, or all Soviet ships have an intelligence agent aboard?

SAKHAROV: Yes, that's true. Usually second mate.

FISKE: That's interesting. There must be a lot of people working for KGB in the Soviet Union.

SAKHAROV: Well, the communications ship, merchant marine and passenger ships are very important means of communication because they can serve as drops in foreign countries. They can collect secret pouches which, for one means or another, cannot be sent through diplomatic mail, and stuff like that.

FISKE: Good evening.

MAN: ...calling from the Naval Academy. I'd like to ask him -- you've mentioned a lot of discrepancies between the official party dogmatic view of the outside world and between your actual observations and opinions of that world. How -- given that, how can any well-educated member of that elite stay loyal to the system? Why doesn't everybody defect like you did?

SAKHAROV: Well, that's the whole thing about it, is that the elite is so comfortable, they enjoy so much privilege, power, in order to justify their existence and to develop and to provide for their families and their children and make them members of the elite, they have to -- almost to push the same dogmatic line of, you know, the imperialist aggression and military stick, financial oligarchy, and so on and so forth.

They simply -- it's like czarist times, basically. You know, some people have courage to leave or can take a risk and face to the unknown. Some can't. I suppose I could have stayed, maybe.

FISKE: Are you telling us that the kind of lack of belief in the system that you had is widespread?

SAKHAROV: From what I know, because I was in that

environment, the belief is in a system of Moscow elite, of that three to four thousand families and in the prosperity. The Communism arrived for them a long time ago. So that's the system they believe in, in their elite system. And they preserve it and they try to do the best. They'll die for that to preserve it.

They don't believe in a system, in a socialist system that's going to work for the people. They simply don't care about it anymore. They don't know what's going on outside Moscow, the nine-mile (?) limit from Moscow. They don't know what farmers do. They have very confusing feedback from the periphery in Moscow, for example, because they are reported, basically -- the system has said the party committee, for example, of Omsk reports to Moscow, and they say, "We have such-and-such achievements. We developed this and that. We are doing so great."

Well, of course, the party organization of Omsk wants to present to Moscow a good picture in their area. But it's all lies.

So, Moscow doesn't get a clear picture of what's going on inside the Soviet Union. They don't care. And they are interested in themselves so much that they don't give anything about it.

MAN: Well, sir, you being a member of that elite, surely you must have had an idea, given your education and your contacts within the KGB, the international service, the GRU, surely you must have had an idea, at least, of the situation inside your own country.

SAKHAROV: Inside? I had an idea. And some of them do have an idea. They forget, you know, with the current of time. They get involved in their own careers. I had an idea. And maybe that was an additional reason why I didn't want to stay there.

I went on a potato farm. We worked there for a month and a half. We lived in a house. There were 12 of us in one house without electricity, with no john, and with dirt floors. And we saw maybe five women in the village, no men, some children, total destitute, no food except black bread and milk, and a lot of vodka. And that's what we saw. And I said, "God," you know, "what am I doing here?"

MAN: Well, sir, you defected. So obviously you've done something about it. But how about all those other hundreds of thousands, or at least thousands of members of that elite? They must have seen some of it. Are you saying that they just don't give a damn about their Russia, they just give a damn about the elite?

SAKHAROV: Do New Yorkers give a damn about America, sometimes? It's like New -- Moscow is a unique city. It's a showplace. Everybody wants to live in Moscow. It's not that -- people don't give a damn to live anywhere else. They want to be in Moscow.

FISKE: I think I'd prefer living in Leningrad if I were living there.

SAKHAROV: Well, you can't become a member of elite if you are in Leningrad, you see.

So the thing is almost like -- they get entrenched in their elitist position for many years, and children marry into children, and families are getting smaller and the circle of elite is getting smaller. My company counted, for example, there ought to be 2000 families running the Soviet Union by the year 2000. So it's a very closed society.

FISKE: It's like Marie Antoinette. "Let them eat cake."

SAKHAROV: Yeah. And they hope that, well, one day we're going to have -- next year, maybe, we'll have a bigger crop. Next year, maybe, we'll provide better conditions for the people. It's maybe next year. It's also Russian character that, ah, tomorrow, you know.

FISKE: Good evening.

MAN: Didn't Mr. Sakharov say that he would like to meet Willis Conover?

SAKHAROV: Yes.

MAN: Well, it seems to me I heard on WETA this morning that they're having an anniversary celebration this weekend down at the Mall.

FISKE: We're losing, sir. Can you speak into the phone?

MAN: I said it seems to me that I heard on WETA this morning that they're having an anniversary celebration down on the Mall this weekend, and Willis Conover would be there. So if he wants to see -- meet Willis Conover, perhaps he could do it through WETA this weekend.

SAKHAROV: I'm willing and ready.

FISKE: Hello.

MAN: Mr. Sakharov, I wanted to ask you maybe two or

three quick pointers.

Speaking of the elite in Russia, are the members of the military, do they have it as well off as the elite? Are they treated real well, maybe more so than in this country?

SAKHAROV: Members of the military who live in Moscow, again. We're talking about Moscow, mostly. That's where the elite is. General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces are elite. They live in Moscow. They have it very well. They pays are high.

FISKE: That's the officer corps.

SAKHAROV: Yes.

If you are somewhere in the boonies, even if you are a colonel in the army and you're working somewhere on the Chinese border, you probably are not having it as well [as] in Moscow.

It's the city we're talking about, mostly.

MAN: I see. So like the troops that were sent to Afghanistan, once they left the limits of Moscow, then conditions sort of failed for them, huh? I mean it's not -- they're not as well off.

SAKHAROV: No, no. And a lot of construction battalions are in Afghanistan, from what I know. And a construction battalion is a shame to serve in the Soviet Union, even according to Soviet military standards.

MAN: Also, I want to ask you, is the attitude of the general population over there towards the U.S., is it as adverse as it is within the party? I mean do most people really have a bad idea of this country? Or would most of them like to move here if they had the chance?

SAKHAROV: It's a great deal of double standard. I wish the Soviets would really understand -- you see, I've been here for a number of years, and I know America now so well, and I know Americans are not militaristic, they're not out to destroy the Soviet Union. I know them well. They mind their own business.

They don't perceive Americans that way, espe...

MAN: They don't.

SAKHAROV: They don't. But why? The elite, although they enjoy jeans and they enjoy Tom Jones -- not American -- but in any case. But they -- they justify to their people very often



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that the delay of Communism is because of the militaristic [unintelligible] of the United States. You know, that's an internal justification.

People of the Soviet Union are not that exposed to life in the United States. They don't know much about it. Sometimes they buy what they're told. I wish it can be corrected.

FISKE: I have to interrupt.

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FISKE: At our microphones, we're very pleased to have Vladimir Sakharov. He was a member of the KGB. He worked for the CIA. He was a defector. He's been in the United States for some nine years. He tells his very interesting story in his book, available in paperback, titled "High Treason."

Good evening.

MAN: In 1979, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings into the strategic arms limitation treaty, a very perceptive, well-grounded young Soviet embassy attached named Andrei Krutskikh monitored the hearings, and he often used to sit at the press table. And later on, the television program 20/20 identified him as a KGB agent. And I just wondered if you knew whether this was true or not.

SAKHAROV: Well, I don't know. You know, you can't say.

FISKE: There are lots of them.

SAKHAROV: You can estimate 40 to 60, 50 to 70 percent are working, in one capacity or another, for intelligence services. Not necessarily for the KGB. There is Central Committee's International Department. There is GRU. There is KGB. There is all kinds of -- there's a whole ball of wax.

MAN: I suppose it doesn't really make any difference anyway, because they have access to the fellow.

SAKHAROV: That's what I said. It's who reports to whom and what the targets are. It doesn't matter anymore as much as whether KGB or, let's say, whether CCID -- "Oh," they'll say, "well, CCID. They'll say, "Well, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Oh, that's not bad." And that doesn't -- it's not like that anymore. There is an intermesh.

MAN: Thank you very much.

FISKE: Hello.

MAN: Just a quick thing about the WETA celebration. The location of it is between the Reflecting Pool and Constitution Avenue....

FISKE: Hello.

MAN: Mr. Sakharov, tell me about Mr. Vinogradov. In my studies of the Middle East in particular, I've run into that gentleman more times, as far as being Ambassador to Egypt at a crucial time. I'm not sure that he was in Iraq or Yemen, but he was in one of those two places.

SAKHAROV: Which Vinogradov, Sergei or Vladimir? There were two Vinogradovs who replaced -- one Vinogradov died in 1971.

MAN: The one that was Ambassador to Egypt about 1968.

SAKHAROV: Okay. That's Sergei Vinogradov. That's the Vinogradov-[unintelligible]-Kim Philby relationship.

MAN: Oh, really? He's turned up in a lot of places, hasn't he?

SAKHAROV: Vinogradov used to work in Turkey. And I knew him. I worked for him in Egypt. I knew him very well. Actually, he was very instrumental in my promotion and sending me to Kuwait.

MAN: Was he a key political -- I mean did the Soviets have him in Egypt because of the nature of the relationship with Nasser, or did they think he could keep things under control better than some other people, or was it his seniority, or what, that allowed him to be Ambassador at that time? Or was it just luck, or whatever?

SAKHAROV: It's really a puzzling situation because Vinogradov's personality and Nasser's personality did not fit at all. They were totally different people. Vinogradov was very reserved, very authoritative, and he was basically to keep the Soviet colony intact. That aspect, that was his -- and keep the Soviet [unintelligible] in Egypt running smoothly. And, of course, he had Middle Eastern experience by working in Turkey before, when he was Kim Philby's contact there. So he had some Middle Eastern experience. He was just about to retire and that was his last and most prestigious position. So all those ingredients taken together, Vinogradov was there.

Actually, Vinogradov ran Egypt much less than other employees of the embassy were running Egypt. For example, Vladimir Pelakov (?), who was just removed from Egypt, was very prominent in Egyptian operations. Senyanikov (?), Central Committee man, was a topnotch journalist and topnotch public rela-

tions person. He was doing a good job there.

But, you know.

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FISKE: Vladimir, what -- we were talking about Egypt. What specifically did you provide our CIA? Was it information about Soviet plans and activities in Egypt, such as the, you know, plans to prepare Egypt for war against Israel in '73, or the plans to exacerbate the Arab-Israeli conflict generally, to use various groups, like the Arab Brotherhood, for Soviet purposes? Was this the information that you were providing the CIA?

SAKHAROV: Well, the point is that, for instance, that I was not out there like, you know, you imagine a James Bond, running around and stealing secrets, you know. I basically provided what came to my attention, what information came to my attention, so I would not cause any suspicion. What came to me, advanced Soviet annual reports, what the Soviets have achieved in that country, what the next year's plan is to work for the embassy, for the Soviet part of the embassy with which I dealt. And different memos, such as, for example, we had a memo that said the relationship with PLO and other liberation organizations must be channeled, thereupon, only through unofficial sources. The Soviet diplomats are to stay away from PLO and institute -- Afro-Asian solidarity...

FISKE: Why were the Soviet diplomats instructed to stay away from the PLO?

SAKHAROV: It was a temporary measure. When an agent is recruited, for example, the relationship -- the agent is recruited when the relationship becomes a clandestine relationship. The same thing happened to an organization on an organizational level. At first, their relationship was very official. Then there was a number of other organizations plugged in into that relationship, such as Soviet Committee on Women, of all things, Soviet Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, Committee for Friendship with Foreign Countries. They all became in charge of liaison with PLO. So they can be more -- they would have more room to operate in, you know, in all kinds of subject. Because it's difficult on an official diplomat level, sometimes, to...

FISKE: Well, one of the things that we have in this country all the time, and it's discounted, is that, in fact, there is a strong element of Soviet influence in the PLO. Is that true?

SAKHAROV: Well, the PLO turned to the United States at one time. They were rejected. They had to go somewhere, and the Soviets were there to pick up the chips. It happens not to PLO only, to many other organizations. It happened to Egypt, by

the way, in 1956, when Gamal Abdel Nasser came to Allen Dulles asked him for assistance in economic, in arms. We turned him down. He went to the Soviets. The Soviets got Egypt.

FISKE: It happened to Fidel Castro too, didn't it?

SAKHAROV: It happened to many, many countries and organizations. We keep turning down our potential clients and we -- what's going to happen now, in the same respect as that Reagan declared that we're not going to help any more developing countries financially, we're going to cut down aid? We're doing the same thing we did with Gamal Abdel Nasser in '56 now, only on a mass scale. We're telling the Soviets, "You are welcome." We're giving them green light to operate freely in the Third World now.

This is the most ridiculous mistake made by the Administration.

FISKE: You mentioned Nasser. And someplace in your book you speak about being assigned at one time to arrange a trip for Sadat's daughters, and that at a time when the Soviet Union didn't view Sadat as a successor to Nasser.

SAKHAROV: Right.

FISKE: And I wondered, if that was true, why they went to the trouble to have you arrange this trip for his daughters.

SAKHAROV: Well, it was a typical courtesy, you know. I was in charge of Soviet ships. And ship that came to Alexandria, I had to go. Any dignitary that will go on a Soviet ship, I had to accompany. The same thing was with regard to Anwar Sadat's daughters. I was in charge, at one time, one summer, to see them to the ship, to put them in a good cabin deluxe and introduce to the captain, that everything will be fine. And, of course, we made with the Egyptian security all the arrangements.

But I didn't do that for Sadat alone. I did that for other Egyptians. We had, for example, Egyptian chief of Alexandria counterintelligence. We got him because we sent his brother to the Soviet Union. So I was supposed to also take his brother on the ship and see that he would get a nice cabin and smooth it out, massage everybody. I'd say, "This is a man that is with us. Take care of him."

FISKE: Now, was part of Anwar Sadat's disenchantment or coolness to the Soviet Union related to the fact that they didn't think that he would amount to anything back in those years?

SAKHAROV: Well, they were betting heavily on Ali Sabra (?), the Chairman of Arab Socialist Union. Ali Sabra was a leading figure. He had a pizzazz, in Soviet view. It was Vinogradov's misjudgment, by the way, just simply. And they bet on Ali Sabra, and they made a big mistake.

FISKE: You think there probably was resentment on Sadat's part.

SAKHAROV: Sadat was antagonized by the Soviet. I knew it. As far as I remember, Sadat was never allowed to go aboard El Horia (?) -- that was the presidential yacht -- in Alexandria when the Soviets and Nasser would have negotiations. He was kept out of the picture. And that was miscalculation.

FISKE: Good evening.

MAN: Dr. Sakharov, I wonder if you could comment on two things. First, during the time you were receiving your training by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, what did they tell you about the activities and the capabilities of the CIA, if anything? And then, secondly, once you were recruited by the CIA, what -- how do you rate the abilities of the CIA to understand the actions of the various Soviet intelligence agencies and to counteract them?

SAKHAROV: The first part, what I was told about the CIA at the Institute of International Relations was that here is an organization that spearheads the effort of American imperialists -- imperialism to destroy the Soviet Union. And we were told in our military training about situations, how the CIA would approach somebody.

For example, a situation like that: You drive on the highway and you see a car with a flat tire and there is a beautiful woman standing by that car. You can't resist but stop and help the woman to fix the tire. And she is going to be a CIA agent and she's going to get you. And I say, "I wish I was so lucky," you know.

But actually, and they told us there will be blackmail and stuff like that, bad things.

On the other hand, as far as CIA's capabilities of counterintelligence or CIA's capabilities of monitoring Soviet operations, I think at the time when I got here or just before I got there -- here, they existed on a fair level. Otherwise I wouldn't have been accepted to the United States. Later on, with the detente and with the new policies and the confusion and the Watergate and whatnot and the guilt about Vietnam, the CIA simply stopped rocking the boat, so to speak. Everybody's covering their rear in that think tank, and it will get somewhere.

But I really -- I am not qualified to comment on that, even.

FISKE: Good evening.

MAN: I'd like to ask you some questions about Soviet policy towards the country of Turkey, recent KGB activity in that country...

FISKE: Can you speak up a little, sir?

MAN: Any recent developments in the Caucasus Mountain areas?

SAKHAROV: Turkey has been always prime real estate for the Soviets because simply of its extreme strategic importance. For example, one of the people I worked with was a Turkey expert in Kuwait. He went back to Turkey. And the Soviet intelligence in Turkey has been a prime -- usually staffed by very prime intelligence officers, maybe with the exception of one I used to know.

And general comments, that the Soviets have been, in Turkey, very instrumental in creating a network of training for various liberation factions. I'm not talking about just recently, but as far back as late '50s. I know that a lot of Turkish experts were in charge of oversight of Turkey nationals in foreign countries. For example, there was a number of Soviet intelligence officers in Egypt and in Kuwait who were Turkey experts, who were in charge of liaison with Turks, who were trained in Turkey.

So, you know, it's a country and it's important to the Soviet Union.

FISKE: Good evening.

WOMAN: I wanted to ask your guest -- you mentioned Cuba earlier. What -- if he has any knowledge of this, what was the Soviet intelligence reactions in Cuba at the time of the Bay of Pigs to the CIA? And also, the second part of my question is whether there are organized crime links in the KGB, as there are, or there are known to be in the CIA in this country.

SAKHAROV: Goodness. Well, the Bay of Pigs went sort of unnoticed in the Soviet Union, except the Soviets made a big propaganda effort to paint Americans as enemies of national liberation movements, as enemies of the people of the world. That they got the best mileage out of that. They -- and they also painted the CIA one more time. They had been doing that to CIA for years and years, and they're doing it now, to paint it as a tool of imperialists, in quotes. So much for the Bay of Pigs.

There is no relationship to organized crime between the KGB, as far as I know.

WOMAN: How did you find the CIA as different from working for Soviet intelligence?

SAKHAROV: I was lucky. I had a tremendous, skillful, marvelous case officer when I was. I would say that the CIA has totally different character from the KGB. You can't even compare the two organizations.

FISKE: How does the character of the organization differ? Is it in the people or the organization itself that the difference is?

SAKHAROV: In people, as of nowadays, maybe there is a difference. But the character of organization. The Soviet Union works according to a long-range foreign policy. It's made public by -- well, we have a dispute here about that: "No, Soviets don't plan their policy; they just take advantage." But there is a long-range policy plan, which is public, by the way, made available to the population. All you have to do is read Pravda newspaper, and there is no dispute after that.

So, the KGB fits into that long-range policy plan. The KGB performs a function. And so there is a planned effort. The KGB has to get from the Point A to the Point Z in so many years, and they can use all methods in the world available to do it.

WOMAN: So, it is not illegal for them to do some of the things that, in fact, it's illegal for our CIA to do.

SAKHAROV: Precisely. They can do anything they please.

FISKE: Because it doesn't get into the newspapers and...

SAKHAROV: No. It's a closed society. And, again, we're talking about elite. It's a family business, the KGB is.

FISKE: Has it been your experience that the people who work for our CIA are as well trained as you were for the KGB?

SAKHAROV: I -- they probably were as well trained, with a lot of experience, I think. From the period of -- well, after Vietnam and with, you know, the preoccupation of Americans with electronic gadgetry and satellites, the CIA lost a very important ingredient, its human intelligence. The Soviets are prime, they're best in human intelligence.

I think -- I am experienced, basically, with American business, how American business operates. So I can draw a parallel. We go to the top. I mean we go to get our feedback on business intelligence, for example, to the top, who signs the check, whether it's the head of the government or a head of a department in government. We never bother with people in the

streets. We never bothered in Iran to know what the bazaaris in Teheran felt about the Shah or what they were going to do. So we go to the top and we get wrong information from the top most of the time because we're going to get a good picture as to what's going on in the other country. We're going to get the right -- the KGB gets the right picture because they work on a different level. They work with the opposition and they work with the current government and they work in between. So they get a big human-intelligence coverage.

Why they can do it, because they're area experts. We are flying satellites.

FISKE: Vladimir, you spoke about the Soviet long-range plan. One of the things about which they're difference of opinion is whether, in fact, it is the Soviet plan to spread Marxism-Leninism throughout the world. What's your impression? Or do you have any knowledge of...

SAKHAROV: It's less ambitious as spread of Marxism-Leninism, which was the cause of the Internationale of the '30s and early '40s.

There are three ingredients to this plan. The United States is enemy number one of the Soviet Union. It's written in the Soviet military manuals. It's written everywhere in Pravda, daily newspapers, Izvestia, you name it. So, therefore, the policy is to, by economic, political and ideological means, through working in third countries, to change economic, political and ideological structure of the American society, which would be favorable to the Soviet Union. It's not spread of Communism, like that, anymore. It's -- as long as it's working towards the benefit of changing American economy, American -- putting America socialist, by any means. By, for example, cutting oil supplies from the Middle East. The Soviets hope that by cutting off Saudi Arabia from the United States they would be able to manipulate Middle Eastern oil supplies. Therefore...

FISKE: That's part of their plan, to your knowledge.

SAKHAROV: We were taught that. We were taught how to do it at the Institute.

FISKE: How were you supposed to do it?

SAKHAROV: We were taught in area studies. We were taught how to work with the Arabs, how to establish broad base of Soviet penetration in the Middle East. Our primary...

FISKE: Infiltrate the oil workers, oilfield people?

SAKHAROV: Through third countries. Indian Embassy in



Saudi Arabia was our base of operations, for example.

So all those fronts were basically arranged in a way that there will be a broad, some kind of base created for them, which the Soviets succeeded in doing in Southern Yemen, that they will be able to -- from outside, to threaten the existing regime in Saudi Arabia, while the Soviets simultaneously would conduct a very friendly appeasement towards the ruling family of Saudi Arabia and try to establish an overt relationship with the ruling family and try to work it out by peaceful means. And if it doesn't work, then, by external means, the regime will be destabilized. And the policy stands now, too.

MAN: Can you say anything about the recruitment of ethnic Iranians in the Gulf, and particularly in Bahrain or elsewhere?

SAKHAROV: Iranians?

MAN: Yeah, ethnic Iranians, who are very numerous in Dubai or Bahrain and other...

SAKHAROV: Well, we had Qatar...

MAN: Because you say almost nothing about Soviet intelligence operations vis-a-vis Iran.

SAKHAROV: Well, I knew people who were in Iran. By the way, I moonlighted at the Soviet Academy of Social Sciences under Rozenko (?). We had a number of Iranians already in '64-65 studying in that academy, undergoing political indoctrination. Most of them were from Tudeh, from Iranian Communist Party, who were sent back to work as sort of, you know, organizing Soviet arm among the oilfield workers, who later on toppled the Shah, by the way. So, so much goes for Iran.

My responsibility was, when I was in Kuwait, to procure people from Qatar. We didn't have a relationship with Qatar at the time. But it was just in a stage of being established. But still, there was about 90 to 100 Qataris going.

MAN: Are you saying in the book that Ahmed al-Hateb (?) was under Soviet control?

SAKHAROV: Dr. Hateb. Yeah. Yeah.

MAN: You are.

FISKE: Okay. Thank you.

Were you a member of the Communist Party?

SAKHAROV: No, I escaped that.

FISKE: How'd you hold a position like that without being a member of the party?

SAKHAROV: You must become a member of the Communist Party by the age of 28. I was too young to become a member. I was delaying. But you can -- it works this way. You can move up in ranks fairly smoothly. But when you reach 28, you must become a member of the Communist Party in order to move up further in ranks. I escaped that.

FISKE: But why did you resist becoming a member of the party? You were playing the game.

SAKHAROV: Well, a good thing I resisted, because now I'm an American citizen. And if I didn't resist, I would be still some resident alien.

FISKE: You mean you couldn't have become a member -- you couldn't have gotten citizenship...

SAKHAROV: No.

FISKE: ...if you had been a member of the party in the Soviet Union, even though you defected?

SAKHAROV: No. Bureaucracy is bureaucracy.

FISKE: You're on the air.

MAN: I have a question which I realize may sound, or may be naive. But I'm puzzled about how a judgment can be made that a particular defector from Russia is really a defector or whether that person is a double agent, especially in view of the Soviets' very long-range plans.

SAKHAROV: Well, it's a good question. I suppose time shows, really. There will also be a difference of opinions to that subject. And I say to myself, you know, I have friends. I don't have many enemies. I was invited to chair a panel or two with AFIO -- that's Association of Former Intelligence Officers -- and I believe they know better, and otherwise I wouldn't be invited. And other things come to mind. I mind my own business, and I'm happy and I'm comfortable with myself. And whatever anybody else thinks, I don't give a damn.

MAN: Well, I'm trying to get in general. I'm not speaking of you. How can a judgment be made? Is it solely a matter of feelings? Does it boil down to that in the end, about what people just feel about the person?

SAKHAROV: You can check it out. You can usually check the personal background out. There are indicators that can show whether he is right. There is information that a person can supply that can be checked out against the facts that are already available. And if it's all true, then the person might be legit. But then, it might be plant again. And, you know, you can go on forever and ever and end up being paranoid about it.

FISKE: You can't be certain.

SAKHAROV: No.

FISKE: There's a certain element of risk.

SAKHAROV: Risk is everywhere.

FISKE: Hello.

MAN: I'd like to ask Mr. Sakharov -- you mentioned previously that the average Russian believes the government charge that the Americans are an aggressive warlike people and imperialists and so on, and they're trying to take over the world, especially against the Russians, and so on. But you know that the Americans are a peace-loving, non-aggressive people who believe in minding their own business, and so forth.

But if you know our whole history has been one of aggression, invasion, minding other people's business all over the world, as we are today with 25 major military bases surrounding the Soviet Union, we are spending half our military budget, 90 to 100 billion dollars a year, ganging up with the Europeans and others against the Soviet Union -- since the beginning of our history, we took this land by aggressive means from the Indians, and then from the British and the French and the Spanish and the Mexicans, from whom we took our whole Southwest section, from Texas to California. We violated our own Monroe Doctrine and invaded Europe in World War I and II, and then the Far East in Korea and Vietnam.

I admit the average American is for peace and prosperity and minding his own business, but are we Americans not being misled into new adventures abroad by our own ruling elite and our own military-industrial complex, and so on? Are we Americans not now being told that the Russians are aggressive militarists trying to take over the world?

On the other hand, from the Russian history, it has been the -- the Russians have been trying, from the beginning, to defend Mother Russia, first from the Mongols and then from the...

FISKE: Sir, I think we understand your question.

Let's get the answer.

MAN: The point of my question is, it's not -- it's not that it's people against people. I'd like to ask Mr. Sakharov, does he not believe that it's the elite versus the elite of both countries?

SAKHAROV: Well, I picture Americans as a bunch of foreigners who came to this country and want to make it so badly, and they are making it. And they're a bunch of good cowboys who are out there minding their interest. And I do believe, because I'm coming from there, that the Soviet Union -- I'm not talking about Russia, who has been overrun many times by other people, by Tatars, by Mongolians, by Swedes, by Germans, by you name it. The Soviet Union has chosen a doctrine of international revolution since it's very beginning. Lenin stated, "We are going to bury capitalism." Soviet leaders have confirmed it many times. The more detente progressed, the more Soviet leaders tightened their ideological screws at home and the more militaristic the Soviet military doctrine became. If you study Soviet military manuals or Soviet military thought, for example, you see it clearly from there.

They have been engaging in heavy troop movements in Syria lately towards Lebanon. They have been engaging in heavy activities, arms supplies in India. Move toward Pakistan, destabilization of Iran, creating terrorist base in South Yemen, getting back North Yemen, creating a very broad base of support with Libya, selling \$13 billion to Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, concluding new trade treaty with Brazil by which they're likely to supply arms to Brazil within the next five years, getting into Cuba, creating submarine servicing facilities in Cuba, and trying to cause trouble in Salvador, and taking Nicaragua. Okay? So, so much for the Soviet foreign policy. In the meantime, they didn't mind the business of their own people back at home.

So, with this kind of policy, what do you do? Do you say, "Well, come on over and take it"?

You know, I can judge American freedom because I was not born in a free society.

FISKE: are you saying that American foreign policy, the kinds of adventures that our caller was describing, were largely reactive to the Soviet initiatives?

SAKHAROV: American policy has always been reactive. And that's one of the problems [unintelligible] with American policy, we don't plan it.

FISKE: You're on the air.

MAN: Mr. Sakharov, in following up on your last statement, I'm very curious to get your opinions and assess your opinions on the hopes for arms talks agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, given the long-term goals of the USSR?

SAKHAROV: There would be a good prospect of arms talks, but there has to be a package that goes on with the arms talks. We have to be prepared for that. There is a lot of things we have to do before, such as -- and that might be a subject which is not related -- such as opening new cultural centers abroad, such as presentation of good image of America to the rest of the world, such as increasing American economic aid to foreign countries and third countries, such as getting American companies bonded by American government, not to apply contract guarantees against companies' credit. Take, for example, Japanese experience.

At the same time, while building economy, you know that one -- one out of six jobs in America depends on foreign contracts. We're cutting down now on all those fronts. The Stockman program is basically nothing.

So, along with that, we have to understand and realize that the Soviets have a peculiar perspective of their opponents. They would respect you if you are sophisticated, technologically superior, strong militarily. They will talk to you. They will give you concessions. They respect a strong opponent.

If you are appearing a weaker opponent, they will look down on you. And there is no way that you can negotiate any kind of American national interest on those terms with the Soviets.

So, what can I say?

MAN: I get the impression that Mr. Gromyko is standing back, looking at the current Administration and saying, "Oh, there they go again. We'll wait another four years and things will turn around again."

SAKHAROV: Well, I think we made the fatal mistake yesterday, you know, with the Third World countries. And I think that's -- I believed in the programs, but really it was a blast for me personally, that statement.

FISKE: What's your feeling about what the Russian action will be, finally, in Poland?

SAKHAROV: There will be probably no action at the moment because the Soviet Union doesn't know how to handle that situation. There will be a continuous pressure.

FISKE: Do you think they can allow this kind of thing to go on indefinitely? What will the effects be in other bloc countries, for example? And can they afford to risk that similar movements will start in other Communist Bloc countries?

SAKHAROV: That's what they're thinking about right now: "Can we afford it? But can we afford to take upon ourselves to pay Polish debts of \$24 billion?" If they invade, they will have to take responsibility of paying to Western banks. So, can they pay that? I don't think they can afford that.

So there'll probably be a policy of pressure from Warsaw Pact forces, maneuvers here, maneuvers there. And most of all, there is a very clear line right now. The Soviet propaganda effort is distinctly trying to set Polish people against the Solidarity, against the unions. And if you continue doing that for four, five, six months, Soviets hope that they will convince Polish people that Solidarity is a foreign organization. That's what they think, probably, now.

FISKE: Hello.

MAN: I would like to ask Mr. Sakharov to comment on the stability of the present regime in Saudi Arabia. And -- well, relative to the AWACS sale, there have been dire comments as to it can't last long. And if the Soviets get their way and the Saudis do fall, who will take over, and what will the then new regime's policy be toward the United States relative to oil?

SAKHAROV: It's clear if AWACS don't go to Saudi Arabia, we're going to give green light to the Soviet Union to enter into a friendly relationship. Prince Sultan, at World Affairs Council in Los Angeles about 10 days ago, stated just that, that the Saudis will go to the devil himself to get arms.

FISKE: Do you think the Saudis would do that? I can understand that the Saudis might turn to Britain, for example, or France. But to...

SAKHAROV: They will...

FISKE: Well, he said that, but it's inconceivable to me. Whatever else we know about the Saudi royal family, we know that they're not stupid and we know that they regard the Soviet interest as inimical to their own interests, leading ultimately to their own destruction.

While there are other alternatives available -- for example, in Britain and France -- does it make any sense to you that they would go to the Soviet Union?

SAKHAROV: Well, the Soviet Union has managed so far to

surround Saudi Arabia pretty well. The Soviet Union has managed to intimidate Saudi regime by the Soviet military buildup around Saudi Arabia.

MAN: Given this situation, do you feel the present Saudi regime has a chance to survive? I believe the former chief of Air Force intelligence said categorically they would not last more than two years. How do you feel about that?

SAKHAROV: They would not last more than two years if we don't sell AWACS to them. That I can say for sure.

MAN: And then, who is waiting in the wings to take over?

SAKHAROV: Probably -- we say if, we say if. Who is waiting in the wings? It will be somebody from the royal family. You know, the King of Saudi Arabia might step back within the next two months -- who knows? -- because of poor health. And maybe Prince Faisal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, will take charge of Saudi Arabia. Prince Fahd would be probably as chief of the interim government in Saudi Arabia.

MAN: But these people will be pro-American, still. Or am I wrong in that?

SAKHAROV: They would still be. They would still be pro-American. You have to remember that about 40 percent of business agents in Saudi Arabia are from Syria and from other countries.

FISKE: Let me understand. Doesn't the principal threat to Saudi Arabia come from within, from, for example, the forces among the oilfield workers and the foreigners in Saudi Arabia, and the brotherhoods and the various other groups that you were working to build up as Soviet fronts in Saudi Arabia?

SAKHAROV: Right.

FISKE: That's their principal threat.

SAKHAROV: Uh-huh.

FISKE: If that's the fact, why is AWACS key to this? AWACS would reveal an attack against the Soviet Union by air forces from without, but would be of no value at all if the overthrow were to be from forces within, in insurrection from within Saudi Arabia.

SAKHAROV: Let's assume AWACS are sold, everything goes smoothly. Saudis, and Americans too, will have extra capabilities to monitor Soviet moves in the Middle East, in Syria. As I men-

tioned, the Soviets are pouring troops in Syria in quite large numbers. And it will give advanced warning to the Saudis against any unfriendly...

FISKE: Which they now have, for example, except that the planes are American planes.

SAKHAROV: Right.

But there is also that point that Saudi -- we don't understand the Arab character very well in America. We try to apply our own, you know, values. By providing AWACS to Saudi Arabia, we'll give -- it would be a gracious, friendly gesture, just statement that yes, we are with you, and we do not support Soviet moves in the Middle East, and we support your policy.

FISKE: Well, I can understand that. But let me ask -- clear this one other thing up. You say if we do not sell the AWACS, you feel certain that Saudi Arabia might fall within two years. Is that what you said?

SAKHAROV: I would feel certain that the Soviet Union will get involved, with their public, tremendous public relation capabilities, into courting of present Saudi Arabian ruling family. And the Soviet Union do -- it's done is to establish a very good relationship. At the first stage, it will be an embassy exchange. Then, when the Soviet diplomats are moved to Saudi Arabia, the Soviet diplomats will go to work. They will have a capability right there to monitor and to supervise all those foreign third-country nationals working in the oilfields.

They will be working with the regime, with the current regime of Saudi Arabia. But they will be able to dictate the conditions, by being able to operate that network of oilfield workers, like they are doing in Kuwait right now.

FISKE: But that, of course -- we would have to assume that the Saudis are smart enough to know that, as well. And which, again, would mitigate, in my view, against their turning to the Soviets, and more likely to the British or the French.

Now, for example, the prediction that if we don't sell the AWACS, that they might be overthrown within two years raises a very serious question in my mind. These AWACS that we're talking about are not to be delivered till 1985.

SAKHAROV: Right. Right.

FISKE: So those planes can't possibly make the difference.

MAN: I may have misspoke myself here. The Air Force chief of intelligence said...



FISKE: Former chief of intelligence. George Keegan

MAN: ...survive even if we sell them the AWACS. They're just inherently weak, ready to be toppled. And that is one of the reasons why we shouldn't sell them the AWACS, because the technology then will fall into the hands of the Soviets.

My concern, or my question was, how do you feel about the stability of the present regime? Can it last for one year, two years, or 10 years?

SAKHAROV: The present -- well, right now, the present regime lasts because simply of the involvement of American business, because there is HBH in Saudi Arabia, there is Bechtel there, there is Fluor Corporation, who are doing a good job. And the Soviet presence -- kept out Soviet. The American Soviet is kept in Saudi Arabia thanks to American business and American oil companies, whether we like them or not. Not because of American wise policy in the Middle East.

MAN: I see. So you feel that if the American business keeps doing business as usual, the regime will remain stable and, hopefully, friendly to the United States.

SAKHAROV: However -- however, if we don't sell AWACS, Saudis are going to have to ask American business to leave Saudi Arabia in big numbers. They'll say, "British, come on over. Fine. French, come on over. Fine." But Americans will be out.

As you know, in 1974-75, American business, from the contracts volume, in Saudi Arabia was on the third or fourth place. Now we are in the 10th place, behind Pakistanis. We are slipping back. And we will slip back further.

MAN: So you feel the sale of the AWACS is the key to the whole thing. And if we sell the AWACS, we can hope for a long-term lasting friendship with the present regime.

SAKHAROV: I don't believe in long-term lasting friendships with any regimes. I believe in protection of American interests abroad, that we should weigh first what's good for the United States and what's bad for the United States.

I think, right now, not selling AWACS is bad for the United States because our business will be asked to move from Saudi Arabia. We'll give green light to other companies, other entities to get involved. And that will cause destabilization of Saudi Arabian regime, and that will bring about Soviet further presence in the Middle East, and that will bring about what the Soviets always wanted -- that is, to deprive the United States from the oil and energy supplies from the Middle East.

FISKE: Sir, thank you very much.

And Vladimir Sakharov, thank you for coming. I've found these last two hours very, very interesting.

SAKHAROV: Thank you very much.

FISKE: I think the Soviets lost a very, very bright agent. And I'm glad you're on our side.

SAKHAROV: I mind my business now.

FISKE: Vladimir Sakharov. His book titled "High Treason." Well, I've met a lot of very interesting people in my years here as an interviewer, but very few as interesting as Vladimir Sakharov.