

Text of President's Address at U.N.

UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 28 (AP) — Following is the text of President Reagan's speech as delivered at the 38th session of the United Nations General Assembly today.

Thank you for granting me the honor of speaking today, on this first day of general debate in the 38th session of the General Assembly. Once again I come before this body, once again I come before the United Nations in this chamber to address the Special Session on Disarmament. I have come today to renew my nation's commitment to peace. I have come to discuss how we can keep faith with the dreams that created this organization.

The United Nations was founded in the aftermath of World War II to protect future generations from the scourge of war, to promote political self-determination and global prosperity and to strengthen the bonds of civility among nations. The founders sought to replace a world at war with a world of civilized order. They hoped that a world of relentless peace would give way to a new era, one of freedom from violence previously unknown.

Whatever challenges the world was bound to face, the founders intended this body to stand for certain values, even if they could not be achieved, and to condemn violence, even if it could not be stopped. This body was to speak with the voice of moral authority. That was to be its greatest power.

The evidence on violence. But the awful truth is that the use of violence for political gain has become more, not less, widespread in the last decade. Events of recent weeks have presented new, unwelcome evidence of brutal disregard for life and truth. They have offered unwanted testimony on how divided and dangerous our world is, how quick the recourse to violence.

What has happened to the dreams of the U.N.'s founders? What has happened to the spirit which created the U.N.? The answer is clear: Governments go in the way of the dreams of the people. Dreams became issues of East versus West. Hopes became political rhetoric. Progress became a search for power and domination. Somewhere the truth was lost that people don't make war, governments do.

And today in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the North Pacific, the weapons of war shatter the security of the peoples who live there, endanger the peace of neighbors and create ever more arenas of confrontation between the great powers. During the past year alone, violent conflicts have occurred in the hills around Beirut, the deserts of Chad and the Western Sahara, in the mountains of El Salvador, the streets of Suriname, the cities and countryside of Afghanistan, the borders of Kampuchea and the battlefields of Iran and Iraq.

War still being used. We cannot count on the instinct for survival to protect us against war. Despite all the wasted lives and hopes that war produces, it has remained a regular, if horribly costly, means by which nations have sought to settle their disputes or to achieve their ends. And the progress in weapons technology has far outstripped the progress toward peace. In modern times, a new, more terrible element has entered into the calculations — nuclear weapons. A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. I believe that if governments are determined to deter and prevent war, there will not be war. Nothing is more to keeping with the spirit of the U.N. Charter than arms control.

When I spoke before the Second Special Session on Disarmament, I affirmed the United States Government's commitment to a new international commitment to reduce nuclear arms and to negotiate in good faith toward that end.

Today I reaffirm those commitments. The United States has already reduced the number of its nuclear weapons worldwide, and will continue to place of older weapons. It is unavoidable, we wish to negotiate arms reductions and to achieve significant, verifiable, and irreversible reductions. And let me add, we must insure that world security is not undermined by the further spread of nuclear weapons. Our nuclear deterrence strategy must not be the forgotten element of the world's arms control agenda.

A Propitious Moment. At the time of my last visit here, I expressed hope that a whole class of weapons systems — the longer-range I.N.F. missiles — could be banned from the face of the earth. I believe that to relieve the deep concern of peoples in both Europe and Asia, the time was ripe, for the first time in history, to resolve a security threat exclusively through arms control. I still believe the elimination of these weapons is the most practical solution to this problem. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union refused to accept the total elimination of this class of weapons.

When I was here last, I hoped that the critical Strategic Arms Reduction Talks would be the source for arms control agreements. Last June, I proposed a new approach to arms control. We did not alter our objective of substantial reductions, but we recognized that there are a variety of ways to achieve our goal. During the last round of Geneva talks, we presented a draft treaty which responded to a number of concerns raised by the Soviet Union. We will continue to build upon this initiative.

Similarly, in our negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces, when the Soviet leaders adamantly refused to consider the total elimination of these weapons, the United States proposed a new approach. We proposed, as an interim solution, some number on both sides between zero and 372. We recommended the lowest possible level.

Once again, the Soviets refused an equitable solution and proposed instead a new approach. We proposed zero option — zero for us and many hundreds of warheads for them. That is unacceptable. We have not given up hope that the Soviet Union will enter into serious negotiations.

Arms Control Initiatives. We are determined to spare no effort to side with a secure, verifiable agreement. For this reason, I have given new instructions to Ambassador Spinka, telling him to put forward a package of proposals designed to advance the negotiations as rapidly as possible. These initiatives cannot be won and must never be fought. I believe that if governments are determined to deter and prevent war, there will not be war. Nothing is more to keeping with the spirit of the U.N. Charter than arms control.

First, the United States proposes a new initiative on global limits. If the Soviet Union agrees to reductions and limits on a global basis, the United States for its part, will not offset the entire Soviet global missile deployment through U.S. deployments in Europe.

Second, the United States is prepared to be more flexible on the content of the current talks. The United States will consider mutually acceptable ways to address the Soviet desire that an agreement should limit aircraft as well as missiles.

Third, the United States will address the mix of missiles that would result from reductions. In the context of reduced levels, we are prepared to reduce the number of Pershing 2 ballistic missiles as well as ground-launched cruise missiles.

Fourth, the United States is prepared to be more flexible on the content of the current talks. The United States will consider mutually acceptable ways to address the Soviet desire that an agreement should limit aircraft as well as missiles.

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Peace cannot be served by pseudo arms control. We need real, verifiable, reciprocal reductions. I call upon the Soviet Union today to reduce the tensions that have beset our relations in the past few weeks and to show a renewed commitment to peace by coming to the bargaining table with a new attitude of good faith.

Meaningful arms control agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would make our world more secure and more peaceful. We have confidence-building steps we have already proposed to the Soviet Union.

Arms control requires a spirit beyond narrow national interests. The spirit is a basic pillar on which the U.N. was founded. We seek a return to that spirit. A fundamental step would be a new nonalignment of the United States. This would signal a return to the true values of the Charter, including the rights of democracy, self-determination, and justice.

Throughout the 1960's and into the 1970's, the United States and the Soviet Union each had an arsenal of tactical, or battlefield, nuclear weapons in Europe that were of little concern to arms control experts.

In 1977, concern grew in Europe over Soviet development of the SS-20, an advanced missile, and the NATO allies began taking steps to counter that development.

Today, Mr. Reagan altered that proposal to say that the United States would be willing to promise not to deploy any intermediate range missiles in Europe as long as the Russians had in Europe and Asia, but would "retain the right" to deploy intermediate range missiles in other parts of the world.

The Soviet Union, however, has been unwilling to accept any American plan that allows the deployment of any new American missiles.

Key Points in Reagan's U.N. Address

Excerpt Background

Medium-Range Missile Negotiations

"First, the United States proposes a new initiative on global limits. If the Soviet Union agrees to reductions and limits on a global basis, the United States for its part, will not offset the entire Soviet global missile deployment through U.S. deployments in Europe. We would, of course, retain the right to deploy missiles elsewhere."

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Possible Soviet Violations

"We have negotiated arms agreements, but the high level of Soviet secrecy hides information needed for their verification. A newly-discovered radar facility and a new ICBM raise serious concerns about Soviet compliance with agreements already negotiated."

"The President's reference to a radar facility is only one in a series of violations which are being investigated by the United States. The question was whether the radar was being used in violation of the 1972 treaty on antiballistic missile defense. The reference to the 'new ICBM' is a new missile, code-named 'PL-24' by the United States, which has been tested in Pleiades, from where the first test was launched in 1978. It is actually an upgraded SS-13, and thus not a violation."

"The Soviet Union is believed to be more concerned about the 108 Pershing 2 missiles to be installed in Europe than about the 464 cruise missiles being deployed in Europe. This proposal amounts to a pledge that if there is an agreed reduction in the number of Pershing 2 missiles, the United States will not make its cuts in the cruise missiles."

"The original American proposal deferred discussion of the United States' question of whether bombers considered at the same time. This proposal accepts the principle of talking about bombers, but leaves open for future negotiations such questions as exactly which planes should be subject to the negotiations."

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Missile Issue: U.S. and Soviet Each See Other in Lead

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be willing to accept a Soviet proposal for "mutual-capable" medium-range missiles. Although the two sides are far apart on just what planes fit into that category, the senior Administration official, briefing reporters today on Mr. Reagan's speech, was asked whether public discussion impeded negotiations.

"Basically, yes," he replied. "If it were possible to conduct negotiations privately, that would be advantageous. But that doesn't seem possible."

Throughout the 1960's and into the 1970's, the United States and the Soviet Union each had an arsenal of tactical, or battlefield, nuclear weapons in Europe that were of little concern to arms control experts.

In 1977, concern grew in Europe over Soviet development of the SS-20, an advanced missile, and the NATO allies began taking steps to counter that development.

Today, Mr. Reagan altered that proposal to say that the United States would be willing to promise not to deploy any intermediate range missiles in Europe as long as the Russians had in Europe and Asia, but would "retain the right" to deploy intermediate range missiles in other parts of the world.

Achieving results in negotiations, but they assert that they cannot afford to lose the contest for that. They believe that this would allow the antinuclear forces in Western Europe to block the installation of the new missiles.

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Vatican Employee's Daughter Is Still Alive, Lawyer Believes

ROME, Sept. 28 (AP) — The lawyer for the family of a Vatican employee whose daughter was kidnapped three months ago, said today he believes she is alive and can be rescued.

Reasons for Disclosure

This fundamental difference over the balance of power has caused the Russians and the allies to compete openly in an effort to influence public opinion in West Germany, Britain and Italy, where the first of the new missiles are being deployed.

Arms as Deterrent Alone

In 1968, President Dwight D. Eisenhower made an observation on why our deterrence in a letter to a publisher. He wrote: "When we look at the point, as we do every day, that the two sides know that in any outbreak of general hostilities, regardless of whether the United States is victorious, destruction will be both reciprocal and complete. Possibly we will have sense enough to meet at the conference table with the understanding that the era of armaments has ended and the human race must conform its actions to its truth."

Reawakening of Moral Outrage

If the governments represented in this chamber want peace as genuinely as their peoples do, we shall find it. We can do so by reawakening the moral authority of the United Nations. In recent weeks, the moral outrage of the world seems to have reawakened.

Backing for Regional Groups

The U.N. Charter gives an important role to regional organizations in the search for peace. The U.S. efforts in the cause of peace are only one extension of that which also animates others in the world community. The Organization of American States was a pioneer in regional security efforts.

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