

June 26, 1980

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

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any yardstick that might be applied, the situation is indefensible.

What do we ask of a sailor or soldier? Only this: That he serve for a fixed term of two or three years, during which time he cannot resign, take another full-time job, join a union, go on strike or picket in support of on-the-job complaints. Only that he be separated from his family for months on end. Only that he be on call far beyond the 40-hour work week of civilian life. Only that he accept the responsibility for maintaining billion-dollar ships and weapons systems. Only that, finally, he may give up his life for his country.

And what is his compensation? The entering recruit would be financially better off if he went to work slinging hash in a fast-food drive-in. The experienced petty officer in the Navy would be better off if he abandoned his career and took his skills into the private sector. The Air Force captain, whose training represents a \$4-million investment, can command half again as much income by flying freight for a commercial airline.

Some specific recent examples: After eight years in the Navy, an electronics technician earns \$12,117. His skills are absolutely vital to the maintenance of a modern-day warship. His counterpart in civilian life, working 9-to-5, looking after his family, earns \$18,515. A boiler technician may earn \$11,730 as a petty officer in the Navy; in private industry his skills command almost twice as much.

Other reasons, of course, contribute to the appalling rates of attrition after first or second terms. Especially in the Navy, men often must be separated from their families for long tours of duty at sea. Officers and non-coms weary of teaching ill-educated recruits who can read at barely a fifth-grade level. Under today's circumstances, it is fearfully difficult to maintain the old esprit de corps that once bound men together in a fraternity of arms.

But the primary cause for this crisis remains: Money. It is ludicrous—it is grossly unjust—to pay service personnel so miserably that several hundred thousand service families must resort to food stamps and to moonlight jobs. The disparities in income and fringe benefits are not confined to comparisons of public and private employment: A staff sergeant, ordered to move his family 2,800 miles to a new assignment, gets a \$950 reimbursement; a GS-9 in the Department of Agriculture, making the identical move, qualified for reimbursement up to \$12,300.

This week the Senate Veterans Committee will hold hearings on a bill sponsored by Sen. Bill Armstrong of Colorado to restore one incentive that used to mean much: G.I. educational benefits. Armstrong also is fighting for a truly significant increase in base pay across the board. Other senators recognize the desperate need. Sam Nunn of Georgia and John Warner of Virginia have cosponsored a bill to make selective increases in the compensation of men with particular skills. Every one of these measures should be passed.

Yes, the bills would cost several billion dollars over the next few years. It is money we cannot afford not to spend. All the marvelous new weapons systems, all the missiles and new ships and high-powered tanks will add us nothing without the manpower to maintain them. So long as we adhere to the policy of an all-volunteer service, nothing will attract and hold desirable personnel but adequate pay and benefits. If Congress fails to meet this reasonable demand, but one recourse will remain: The draft. ■

ON COMPANY BUSINESS"

HON. LARRY McDONALD

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 26, 1980

● Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, in a letter to the chairman and trustees of the Public Broadcasting Service, Mr. Reed Irvine drew their attention to the deplorable expenditure of public funds in an attack by Philip Agee, a CIA defector of the American intelligence community, aired on prime-time television by the PBS.

The second and concluding part of this letter follows:

There is a great deal additional evidence which supports the view that this film [On Company Business] is an instrument of political warfare directed against the basic tenets of American foreign policy and serving the goals of Soviet foreign policy. We are informed that one of its producers, Howard Francovich, was responsible for another film called "Incitement to Nixonicide and Praise of the Chilean Revolution," which was financed by an organization called Non-Intervention in Chile (NICH). NICH has been identified as a support network for the terrorist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which has described itself as "comrades in struggle against a common enemy." It describes the enemy as "the system of imperialism which, as the monopoly stage of capitalism, exploits workers both here and in Chile." NICH cooperates closely with a Cuban-based group called the "Committee of Solidarity with the Chilean Anti-fascist Resistance." This indicates that Mr. Francovich is not the disinterested scholarly documentary maker that he pretended to be on the PBS program "All About TV," where he denied that he had produced "On Company Business" with the intention of "getting the CIA." Mr. Francovich is clearly on the same wave length as Mr. Agee. We understand that Mr. Francovich and Mr. Agee were, in fact, business partners. According to Information Digest, Francovich owned 30 percent of Isla Blanca Films and Agee 20 percent in 1976.

The other producer, Howard Dratch, has been identified by Information Digest as a former officer of the Radical Student Union at the University of California at Berkeley. That was the successor organization of the Berkeley chapter of the Students for Democratic Society after that far left group fragmented. Dratch has long been associated with Pacific News Service, which is sponsored by the Bay Area Institute, which in turn is affiliated with the leftist Institute for Policy Studies. His background is hardly what you would look for if you wanted to commission a scholarly, objective study on the CIA and U.S. foreign policy.

The long list of credits for "On Company Business" includes many persons with ties to Communist Party front groups and far left organizations. Here are some listed by Information Digest:

William Schnapp and Ellen Ray, Covert Action Information Bulletin which is dedicated to revealing the names of CIA agents; Edith Tigar of the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, A CPUSA front; Sylvia Crane of the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation, CPUSA front;

James Larsen, National Lawyers Guild; Neil Gantscher, National Lawyers Guild; Robert High, Non-Intervention in Chile;

Olga Talmonte, said to have been involved with the terrorists in Argentina; and

Morton Sobell, accomplice of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

The point of all this is that even if PBS and CPB had not screened "On Company Business," they could have detected from the backgrounds of those responsible for the program, beginning with Agee, that it was most unlikely that the film would be the "highly responsible overview of the CIA's history" that Barry Chase asserted it to be.

Accuracy in Media has three major complaints.

1. We believe that it is wrong for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to fund and for Public Broadcasting Service to air at public expense films such as "On Company Business," which are clearly instruments of political warfare which serve the purposes of powers hostile to our country and to the cause of freedom.

2. Assuming that such films are shown, however, then it is clearly the duty of PBS to identify for the viewing audience who the people are whose views it is disseminating. In this case, at a minimum, Philip Agee should have been identified not only in terms of the years he served with the CIA, but in terms of his present expressed sympathy for communism and the KGB and in terms of the activities that he is engaging in that have resulted in his expulsion from the U.K. and his being banned by three other European countries. Producers Francovich and Dratch should have been identified in terms of their associations with organizations such as NICH and the SDS. PBS is guilty of grossly deceptive labeling in concealing this type of information from the viewers and in telling the affiliated stations that this program is "highly responsible" and implying that the program was balanced.

3. The program was clearly totally lacking in balance and objectivity and was therefore in gross violation of Section 396(g)(1)(A) of the Communications Act, which requires that programs funded by CPB on controversial topics be produced with strict adherence to objectivity and balance.

Moreover, since this program provided three hours of unremitting attack on American postwar policies of combatting communist expansion and subversion abroad, through the CIA, we believe that it places the licensees that showed the program in violation of the FCC's fairness doctrine.

There are several controversial issues of public importance that were treated in this film. The most basic is whether or not the United States is justified in taking measures short of war to frustrate the efforts of the USSR and its satellites to expand their control over other countries. A related issue is whether or not the United States, under the guise of fighting communist expansion, is suppressing the true forces of democracy and liberation, which would triumph but for our cruel intervention.

Clearly a proper discussion of these issues would require an exposition of what happens to countries that fall under communist control. Are the people liberated or enslaved? Does freedom flourish or is it snuffed out? Are the methods used by the intelligence forces of our adversaries good because, as Agee says, they serve good ends? Are ours evil because they serve evil ends?

We have three hours from Agee and his friends over PBS devoted to the latter proposition and to the theory that the world would be a far better place if the liberating forces of Moscow were allowed to operate unhampered by the obstacles placed in their way by the United States.

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We would like to know when you have shown the other side of this coin, or if you intend to do so. If you contend that you have, please tell us the dates of the programs and provide us with the transcripts.

We would also be interested in obtaining copies of the documents submitted by the producers to PBS in justification of obtaining your cooperation in airing this program. We understand that CPB funded the program after having received assurances from PBS that it met their requirements. We would be interested in seeing copies of that correspondence. I think it will be most interesting to compare what the producers said to PBS in describing this project and what they said in their 1978 fund-raising prospectus referred to above.●

THE SPIRIT OF HELSINKI, VIGIL
1980

SPEECH OF

HON. JAMES M. HANLEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 23, 1980

● Mr. HANLEY. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to participate in "The Spirit of Helsinki, Vigil 1980," which seeks to draw attention to those Soviet Jewish families and individuals who wish to emigrate from the U.S.S.R., but are unable to do so as a result of the restrictive emigration policies of the Soviet Government.

In last year's "Shatter the Silence, Vigil 1979," I again brought to your attention the case of Lev Gendin, a former electronics engineer who was denied an emigration visa to Israel in 1971 and subsequently was dismissed from his job. His wife of 3 months, Aviva Klein-Gendin, alone was granted a visa. Today she continues to work from her home in Israel for the freedom of her husband.

Lev has been continually harassed by the Soviet State since his attempt to emigrate. He has been assaulted by KGB agents both in public and within KGB prisons. He has been subjected to preliminary arrests as well as beatings, and has served over 160 days in prison. He has been denied employment befitting his education, and has been forced to accept menial labor positions to survive.

In September 1979, Lev and a friend went to Novgorodskaya Oblast in order to avoid KGB provocations. While there, an attempt to arrest them failed when they fled the city. Walking between 16 to 17 hours per day in the cold rain, they slept in swamps and forests on their way back to Moscow.

Under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the U.S.S.R., as a final signatory, committed itself to a policy of respect for basic human rights, including the unification of families with members living in more than one country, religious freedom, and free travel between nations.

The Soviet Government has, unfortunately, failed to live up to the terms

of the Final Act. I am calling, therefore, for the commemoration of the fight for freedom by Lev Gendin, and others like him, so that, in the future, men may be able to freely enjoy those basic rights, inalienable to all.●

WAR BY ACCIDENT?

HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 26, 1980

● Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, Fred Charles Ikle, former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and currently an adviser to Ronald Reagan on foreign policy, has written an incisive and thought-provoking article about the chances of setting off a nuclear war by accident. As Dr. Ikle shows, the philosophical assumptions at the heart of the Carter administration's approach to strategic nuclear forces creates the risk of causing a war by accident since it is based on launch-on-warning, a notoriously unreliable and dangerous concept.

At this point, I include in the RECORD "The Growing Risk of War by Accident" by Fred Charles Ikle, from the Washington Post, Tuesday, June 24, 1980.

The article follows:

THE GROWING RISK OF WAR BY ACCIDENT

Twice within the last two weeks, three times within seven months, a false alarm triggered the warning system of our strategic nuclear forces. Judging from published reports, computers indicated that Soviet missiles had been launched against the United States and, in accordance with prearranged procedures, our strategic forces went through the first stages of an alert.

No one was hurt, no damage was done. Harmless incidents? Or are we walking on thin ice and seeing how readily it can crack?

Mankind has suffered from many wars that were launched without much thought and purpose—launched as if by accident. The sequence of rash decisions in 1914, following the assassination of the Austrian archduke, had obviously not been planned by any of the powers that it dragged into World War I. But the nuclear missile age has burdened mankind with a more acute, a far more formidable risk of accidental war. This risk is inherent in the global interlock of armaments capable of inflicting cataclysmic destruction and designed to be committed to war irrevocably, within minutes.

How can we be sure that, for decades to come, a technical malfunction or some human error, or a combination of both, will never trigger a salvo of nuclear missiles? Substantial progress has been made during the last two decades in the design of clever and redundant safeguards for our nuclear weapons and missiles. Despite some bureaucratic resistance and inexcusable sluggishness, these safeguards have been put into effect to an increasing extent. Perhaps that's why we are still here.

However, in recent years, a combination of corrosive forces has been at work to increase, in hidden and insidious ways, the risk of accidental nuclear war. Among them are the relative decline in our strategic power, the unimaginative pursuit of arms control concepts after events have long

overtaken them and—the inevitable accompaniment—deceitful political posturing that tries to conceal fundamental weaknesses.

Beginning in the 1960s, we sought to avert a nuclear arms race, with its feared instabilities, by hobbling our own strategic forces through self-restraint and by attempting to limit the growing Soviet forces through strategic arms control. The former was mighty effective; the latter, alas, was not. Soviet missile forces grew much more than ours and will continue to do so in the early 1980s, with or without the new SALT II agreement. As a result, our deterrent forces will become increasingly vulnerable to a preemptive strike. The balance of terror is becoming less stable.

Despite this disappointing failure of the SALT process, President Carter called the new SALT treaty (yet unratified) "a major accomplishment of my administration."

In planning our strategic forces for the dangerous 1980s, the administration now uses the SALT agreements and SALT concepts as the map for the future. Yet many of these concepts, inherited from the 1960s, have proved to be harmful to strategic stability. The sad truth is they tend to increase the risk of nuclear war.

For example, SALT compels the United States (and perhaps the Soviet Union) to deploy a smaller number of large missiles rather than a large number of small ones, thus concentrating the targets for a surprise attack. Similarly, SALT now tends to impair the mobility of land-based missiles, thus increasing their vulnerability. And SALT generously tolerates ballistic missiles—the main cause of strategic instability—but is intolerant toward cruise missiles even though they are too slow for a surprise attack.

If we continue on the present course—without a sustained effort to reverse the strategic deterioration—the temptation will grow to reach for desperate remedies. Last year, in his annual report to Congress, Defense Secretary Harold Brown raised the curtain on such a remedy. He pointed out that the Soviets "would have to consider the possibility of our having launched" our missiles before theirs arrived. And in this year's report to Congress, the idea is repeated. Prudently, Secretary Brown adds that "we would by no means wish to rely on having to" use such a tactic. But from the context of this statement it is clear that the notion of a "launch-on-warning" possibility is supposed to be reassuring.

"Launch-on-warning," as a remedy for the growing vulnerability of our land-based deterrent forces, is an idea that attracts strange bedfellows. Some shallow superhawks have liked it as a sign of our quick-on-the-draw toughness. Equally shallow arms control advocates (in and out of government) have promoted it as a way of defending SALT against critics who worry about the deteriorating strategic trends. And the defense budget cutters find it irresistible; it is the cheapest "fix" for the strategic vulnerability problem.

But the cure is more deadly than the disease. The more we rely on "launch-on-warning" (or, for that matter, the more the Soviets do), the greater the risk of accidental nuclear war. Anyone who tries to explain that this tactic could be implemented in a totally reliable and safe way is a fool. He does not even know how little he knows. No one can understand in sufficient detail all the possible malfunctions, unanticipated events and human errors that might interact someday to confound the "redundant" warning systems or to bypass the "safeguards" against an unintended release of the command to launch a missile salvo.