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# Senators to Question Haig on 7 Key Areas

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WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 — Insisting they did not want to “rehash Watergate, or witch-hunt,” Senator Claiborne Pell and other Democrats on the Foreign Relations Committee met for two hours today to plan strategy for the confirmation hearings on the nomination of Alexander Haig Jr. to be Secretary of State.

Mr. Pell, the Rhode Islander who is the committee's senior Democrat, insisted Democrats had made no plans about what to do if the voluminous files and tapes Democrats have asked for were not supplied by the Carter Administration. “We'll cross that bridge when we get to it,” he said.

He said he hoped the material could be provided so the committee could weigh it and decide on Mr. Haig by Inauguration Day.

But, with the knowledge that their requests may not be met by then, the Demo-

crats on the committee are approaching Friday's hearings with no sign of great pleasure. At least one influential member has been telling friends that he welcomed neither the nomination nor the need to challenge it and thought that Mr. Haig would be confirmed. But even so, he said, he feels a duty to ask questions about Mr. Haig's record.

## Most Senators Are 'Prudent'

One knowledgeable Senator attributed the muted tone of public comments on Mr. Haig, even from likely opponents, to the absence of any serious outside effort to attack the nomination. “Most of the senators are such, shall I say, ‘prudent people,’” he said, “that unless they are given some encouragement, they won't do anything. They're afraid.”

But while there is no organized opposition, there has not been much support for Mr. Haig from places where it might be expected. Even such backers as Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington called an exploration of Mr. Haig's record “appropriate in our system of government.”

The records the Democrats are seeking might answer some questions, but the records of many congressional hearings and court cases deal in detail with seven issues that one or more Democratic senators have said need to be explored — along with the normal questions any prospective Secretary of State might be asked about the Soviet Union, Iran, El Salvador or Poland.

These seven issues span a decade of controversy, with most of them arising from the days of Mr. Haig's service in the Nixon White House:

1. **Wiretapping.** As deputy to Henry A. Kissinger on the National Security Council, Mr. Haig, then a general, took to the Federal Bureau of Investigation the names of Government officials and reporters to be wiretapped from 1969 onward.

He also studied the records on the tapping — whose subjects included Hedrick Smith and William Beecher of the New York Times, Marvin Kalb of CBS News, and Henry Brandon of The Sunday Times of London. Mr. Haig has said he was following orders, but senators say they want to know if he will promise to resist illegal orders if he gets any as Secretary of State.

## Moves Against Allende

2. **Chile and the so-called “Track Two” effort to topple the Government of Salvador Allende Gossens in 1970.** There was an effort involving the Central Intelligence Agency to stimulate a coup against Mr. Allende. Knowledge of this plan in the White House was apparently limited to President Nixon, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Haig.

3. **Senator Paul E. Tsongas, Democrat of Massachusetts, said today he wanted to know “whether we can expect clandestine attempts to change governments” abroad if Mr. Haig becomes Secretary of State.**

3. **The bombings of Cambodia.** These bombings were carried out in 1969 without consultation with Congress, and they were denied by the Administration. Again, Democrats say they view this issue as one on which to test Mr. Haig's commitment to consult with Congress.

4. **Vietnam peace negotiations.** Mr. Haig made many trips to Vietnam while serving as Mr. Kissinger's deputy, and was reportedly a strong advocate of the intense bombing of North Vietnam in December 1972, an offensive some critics charged was intended not to force concessions from North Vietnam but to impress a reluctant South Vietnamese Government.

5. **For all the public insistence that Watergate is not their focus, senators make it clear they are interested in Mr. Haig's role in helping Mr. Nixon defend himself.** In October 1973, he told William Ruckelshaus, Deputy Attorney General, that he had to fire Archibald Cox, the special prosecutor, because “your Commander in Chief is giving you an order.”

One Watergate tape that has been released includes a passage in which Mr. Haig apparently advised Mr. Nixon, on June 4, 1973, to deal with charges by saying “you just can't recall.”

Mr. Haig's most prominent activity in the Watergate defense was his dealings with Leon A. Jaworski, who succeeded Mr. Cox. Mr. Jaworski speaks highly of the general's role now, but in a 1976 memoir he was ambivalent. In some passages he complained of Mr. Haig's efforts to obstruct him, but at another he conceded: “Haig was the man on the tightrope. Nixon depended on him and Haig felt that he had to support the President.”

6. **The Nixon Pardon.** On Aug. 1, 1974, General Haig told then Vice President Ford that some people in the White House had said Mr. Nixon might resign in exchange for the promise of a pardon. When Mr. Ford did pardon Mr. Nixon on Sept. 8 — a step he had once told Congress he did not think the public would stand for — the question of a “deal rose.” Mr. Ford made an almost unheard-of appearance before a House Judiciary Committee to deny that there was any deal. But efforts to get General Haig to testify were blocked by the subcommittee chairman.

7. **The Iranian revolution.** As commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, General Haig was aware of a mission to Iran in January 1979 by his deputy, Gen. Robert E. Heyser, which considered the possibility of staging a coup against the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Former Ambassador William Sullivan has said that General Haig was furious at the plan — but has declined to say whether he objected to the idea of a coup itself, to involving the American military at all, or simply to a lack of steadfastness behind the Shah.