




**Directorate of
Intelligence**

~~Top Secret~~

031



Developments in Afghanistan



25X1

5 September 1986

~~Top Secret~~

*NESA DA 86-009CX
SOV DA 86-009CX*


5 September 1986

Copy **143**

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1

Developments in Afghanistan



25X1

5 September 1986

1 Perspective—Afghanistan: Competing Diplomatic Offensives



25X1
25X1

[Redacted] NESA

The Afghan regime, under Moscow's tutelage, has embarked on a more aggressive diplomatic campaign to improve its international image in preparation for the Nonaligned Movement summit and the United Nations General Assembly session this fall. This effort not only reflects longstanding Soviet-Afghan sensitivities to world public opinion but also is a response to the Afghan insurgents' diplomatic ventures.

25X1

3 Briefs

9 The Insurgency This Summer



25X1
25X1

[Redacted] NESA

Insurgent activity in urban areas and along key lines of communication increased this summer. The Afghan resistance is concerned about its ability to sustain the high level of activity into the autumn months in the face of Soviet and Afghan regime countermeasures.

25X1

15 Sibghatullah Mojadedi: Spokesman of the Resistance Alliance



25X1
25X1

[Redacted] LDA

Sibghatullah Mojadedi, leader of the traditionalist Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan, is unlikely to make significant headway in achieving the goals he has set during his three-month tenure as spokesman of the resistance alliance. These goals include opening alliance offices abroad.

25X1

19 Bonn Unlikely To Make Major Changes in Policy on Afghan Issue



25X1
25X1

[Redacted] EURA, and [Redacted] LDA

West Germany is openly critical of the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan and provides some humanitarian aid to Afghan insurgents. Bonn's overriding concern with East-West rapprochement, however, will continue to be a significant brake on the activities it is willing to undertake on the resistance's behalf.

25X1

25X1

This document is published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor,



25X1

Reverse Blank



Top Secret

NESA DA 86-009CX
SOV DA 86-009CX

25X1

5 September 1986

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Developments in Afghanistan 


25X1

5 September 1986

Perspective


Afghanistan: Competing Diplomatic Offensives 

25X1


Kabul, under Moscow's tutelage, has embarked on a more aggressive diplomatic campaign to improve its international image in preparation for the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Zimbabwe and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session this fall. We believe this campaign reflects not only longstanding Soviet-Afghan sensitivities to world public opinion but also concerns about stepped-up Afghan resistance diplomacy in recent months. Although the insurgent alliance's tour of the United States and Europe this summer fell short of its goals, we believe it raised the diplomatic costs of the war for Moscow. 

25X1


Kabul Promises Diplomatic Campaign

In his July address to the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, General Secretary Najibullah urged that propaganda and counterpropaganda activities be intensified. Saying that "this task has special importance on the eve of the conference . . . in Harare and . . . the next session of the UNGA," Najibullah said Afghan officials had been instructed to cultivate relations between Afghanistan and the developing countries soon. 


25X1

As part of this diplomatic initiative, a delegation led by Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Sarwar Yurish traveled in July to Zimbabwe—the NAM chairman for the next three years—to establish diplomatic relations. Yurish obtained Prime Minister Mugabe's agreement in principle—a development Kabul media immediately announced with great fanfare. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, however, Zimbabwean officials told the Pakistanis that they have no intention of opening an embassy in Kabul, will not allow Kabul to open one in Harare soon, and will delay diplomatic relations until a political solution to the Afghan conflict is reached. The Zimbabweans promised no change in their support for the proposed NAM summit's or UNGA's language on Afghanistan. 

25X1



25X1




25X1



Top Secret


NESA DA 86-009CX
SOV DA 86-009CX


5 September 1986

25X1

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

We believe Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is partly designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative at the UNGA. Gorbachev may also be hoping that Moscow's overtures toward China will raise concern in Islamabad about China's long-term steadfastness on the Afghan issue. [redacted]

25X1

According to the US Mission to the UN, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen—Moscow's client—proposed in a surprise move in June that the UNGA's Asian Group endorse Afghanistan's candidacy for one of the vice-presidencies of the 41st UNGA. The candidacy has virtually no chance of success, however. [redacted]

25X1

The Resistance Grand Tour

The Soviet-Afghan diplomatic offensive probably is, in part, a reaction to the more active diplomacy of the Afghan resistance alliance this year. In early June, members of the alliance began a tour to gain international recognition for the organization, enhance its legitimacy, and increase the diplomatic costs of the war for the Soviets. Although the visit failed to gain the alliance official US diplomatic recognition, the resistance leaders' well-publicized meeting with President Reagan was immediately condemned by Soviet and Afghan media, which accused the US of supporting "hired killers." [redacted]

25X1

The Soviets may also have been disturbed by the high-level reception that Burhandudin Rabbani, then alliance spokesman, received in Saudi Arabia, where he met with King Fahd, and in France, where he met with French Prime Minister Chirac and Foreign Minister Raimond. Initially reluctant, the Saudis [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] publicly

25X1

acknowledged Riyadh's contribution to the resistance war chest. In France, Rabbani received the highest official reception accorded any Afghan resistance leader to date [redacted]

25X1

The French gestures probably were particularly galling to Moscow because they came just before French President Mitterrand was to meet Soviet leader Gorbachev. [redacted]

25X1

Prospects

The Afghan regime's efforts will have little chance of significantly eroding support for the resolutions on Afghanistan at the UN and the NAM summit. These resolutions are in fact anodyne, falling short of condemning the Soviets by name and calling only for an end to foreign interference in Afghanistan and for peaceful resolution of the dispute. Nevertheless, we believe the regime will look for opportunities to keep the resistance and its external supporters on the defensive. Such surprises as seeking a UNGA vice-presidency are likely to be repeated. [redacted]

25X1

The Soviet-Afghan response to the resistance's increased politicking is, in our view, disproportionate to the alliance's real gains internationally but is, in itself, an indication that the resistance can—and did—raise the diplomatic costs of the war for the Soviets. Still, the resistance remains hamstrung by internal divisions over its international diplomacy and Pakistani disinterest in pushing stronger language for the resolutions. [redacted]

25X1



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret




25X1



Briefs

Soviet and Afghan Forces React to Insurgent Activity 

25X1

Combat activity remained at fairly high levels during the past month as Soviet and regime forces responded to mounting insurgent pressure. 

25X1
25X1





25X1



25X1

Despite tough new draft laws and increased efforts at conscription, the Afghan Army has made little progress in resolving its serious manpower shortages. The US Embassy reports that regime conscription teams have patrolled Kabul since the mid-June draft decree to round up all draft-eligible men, and similar activities are occurring elsewhere. The new conscription regulations are designed, in part, to provide 19,500 men for three new infantry divisions to be formed by October,

 Continuing desertions from the armed forces are offsetting increases, however. 

25X1


25X1

25X1



Top Secret

NESA DA 86-009CX
SOV DA 86-009CX


5 September 1986

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret

25X1

Afghanistan



25X1

Top Secret

25X1


Top Secret



25X1

Postmortem on Peace Talks 



25X1



25X1



25X1


 According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Pakistanis will press Soviet South Asian expert Valkov, who is visiting Pakistan this month, on Moscow's views on creating a more representative government in Kabul. Islamabad expects Moscow to continue efforts to foment unrest in tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan. 

25X1




25X1


25X1



25X1

China's Response to Gorbachev's Vladivostok Speech 

25X1

Beijing initially reacted to Soviet leader Gorbachev's speech of 28 July in Vladivostok, in which he pledged withdrawal of six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan, by issuing a Foreign Ministry statement reiterating a call for prompt and complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops. In our view, Beijing addressed the question of Afghanistan so quickly—it initially ignored Gorbachev's other proposals in its comments on 30 July—because the UN-sponsored proximity talks were about to begin in Geneva. China wanted to keep Islamabad from seeking a separate peace with Moscow during the negotiations. 

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

In our opinion, the Chinese response indicates that Beijing will maintain a hardline stance against the Soviet occupation. According to the US Embassy in Beijing, China sees the Gorbachev speech as a masterful presentation of concepts and gestures heavy on rhetoric and containing only minimal, low-cost Soviet concessions. In a meeting with US Embassy officials, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen remarked that "it only took four days (for Soviet troops) to enter Afghanistan and now they are talking about a four-year timetable to remove them." We believe it is unlikely that the Chinese and the Soviets will hold secret talks on the Afghan problem.



25X1

Soviet Ammunition Storage Facilities Vulnerable



25X1

A series of explosions in July damaged the Soviet ammunition storage facility at Bagram airfield. An estimated 3,000 metric tons of ammunition were destroyed. Insurgent rocket fire evidently initiated the explosions.



25X1



25X1

Soviet ammunition storage and handling facilities routinely violate safety regulations. Ammunition revetments and storage buildings are too close together, with the open ends of some revetments facing one another. In addition, the Soviets store excessive amounts of ammunition in depots. Under such conditions, the effects of a detonation are likely to be greatly magnified, and even a minor accident could threaten destruction of an entire depot.



25X1



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

The Insurgency This Summer




25X1

Insurgent attacks in Afghanistan's urban areas escalated this summer, and the insurgent threat to key lines of communication prompted Soviet and Afghan regime forces to mount at least two sizable operations. Guerrilla forces have also expanded activity in the northern border provinces, an area that has been a relative backwater of the war, and have maintained a fairly high level of activity in the eastern border region that has been a key target of government pacification efforts.



25X1



25X1

25X1

25X1

Urban Areas Are a Key Target

The guerrillas battled regime and Soviet forces this summer in and around three major cities—Kabul, Herat, and Qandahar. It is unclear to what degree insurgent groups coordinated planning for those operations.



Sustaining combat activity in key urban areas served another important purpose for the resistance; it refuted regime assertions that these areas are "without fighting" and under government control. Especially in Kabul, the guerrillas wanted to challenge the appearance of normalcy that the Soviets and Afghans have gone to great lengths to maintain.



Although the US Embassy reported sporadic rocket attacks and explosions in the capital during the spring, the frequency and extent of such activity increased sharply beginning in early July. By mid-month, the US Embassy said that the activity had demonstrably brought the war a little closer to Kabul. At month's end, there were almost daily rocket attacks and explosions, and the movement of Soviet and Afghan convoys in and out of the city and flights by combat aircraft were noticeably greater.



Guerrilla operations on the periphery of the capital have also increased this summer. The most dramatic attacks occurred when insurgents caused extensive damage to a Soviet ammunition storage facility at Bagram Airfield in the second week of July, and damaged an Afghan missile facility in Kabul on 26 August. West of Kabul, in the hilly Paghman area, the insurgents evidently succeeded in overrunning about a half dozen security outposts that the Soviets and Afghans set up last winter to hamper rocket and mortar attacks. According to the US Embassy in Kabul, the resurgence of guerrilla activity in Paghman is attributable, in part, to the close cooperation of local insurgent commanders, who have coordinated attacks and shared intelligence. South of the city, the guerrillas have conducted several ambushes; in one instance in late July, a Soviet convoy en route to Paktia Province was forced to turn back by an attack.



25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Qandahar—the country's second-largest city—has been the site of several battles this summer. In late July, the US Embassy commented that the insurgents were stronger in the city than at any time in the past two years. Sources of the US Embassy have said that

25X1

Top Secret


NESA DA 86-009CX
SOV DA 86-009CX

5 September 1986

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



The main mosque in Herat apparently has incurred damage by Soviet and Afghan regime forces during the fighting this summer.

25X1


Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret





25X1



25X1



25X1

Soviet and regime forces have succeeded only in controlling the airport outside the city as well as the road into town. 

guerrilla forces in the area continue to have trouble coordinating operations because of often crippling differences of opinion. 

25X1

25X1

Nevertheless, the creation of security rings around Qandahar city is creating increased problems for the guerrillas in infiltrating men and materiel. 
 the defensive perimeter is forcing the insurgents to make changes in tactics, and a number of guerrillas have relocated from the city to outlying areas. Because the fighting has interrupted basic services in the city, the logistic burden of the insurgents has increased. In early August, the US Embassy reported that even water supplies had been cut off for several days. Despite these new challenges,

Fighting in the vicinity of the western city of Herat has been intense at times this summer. Insurgents there have withstood repeated Soviet and Afghan regime attempts to clear them out of the city. After three weeks of combat in July—that the US Embassy in Kabul says caused extensive damage in the old quarter—the insurgents mounted a successful attack in the city. Frustration at their inability to crush the

25X1

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

resistance inside Herat has prompted the Soviets to begin razing wide swaths around the old quarter; [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] Another major joint operation was initiated in mid-August, probably in response to continuing guerrilla activity. [Redacted]

25X1

The guerrillas also have been active in and around several smaller urban areas. Although an Afghan Army officer told the US Embassy in Kabul in late July that downtown Jalalabad is safe during the day and night, he commented that the surrounding countryside is not safe at any time. [Redacted]

.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] Moreover, a traveler from Gardeyz told the US Embassy in August that insurgent activity was making life in town "very difficult." [Redacted]

25X1

Expanding the War in the North

The month-long multiregimental offensive by Soviet and Afghan forces during June and July in the Konduz-Eshkamesh-Taloqan area of Konduz and Takhar Provinces suggests that insurgent activity close to the USSR border had reached a level that the Soviets considered unacceptable. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1


[Redacted] several convoys a month were being hit by insurgent forces. The offensive evidently failed to stem guerrilla attacks, however. A press statement by Hizbi Islami guerrillas in early August admitted they had incurred some 55 casualties during an ambush in Badakhshan Province of a large Soviet and Afghan convoy, [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1



The War in the East

In the eastern border provinces this summer, insurgent groups have engaged in what an official of the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs called a return to "classical guerrilla warfare." The resistance has continued harassment of selected Soviet and Afghan regime installations and conducted ambushes of enemy convoys, even on heavily guarded roads. For example, there have been numerous clashes in Nangarhar Province centered around regime outposts, such as at Nazian and Towr Kham, and in Paktia, a government garrison at 'Ali Kheyl remains under insurgent pressure, despite the offensive in May to end those attacks. Barikowt, in the upper reaches of the Konar Valley, has been besieged by the guerrillas, [Redacted] Gulbuddin Hekmatyar told the US Consulate in Peshawar in early August that insurgents in Lowgar Province had recently attacked several enemy outposts and established new bases of their own to offset Soviet plans to "seal" guerrilla infiltration routes. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Clouds on the Horizon

The guerrillas have sustained a relatively high level of combat activity this summer despite concerted efforts by Soviet and Afghan regime forces to weaken the

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



Camel caravans are used to transport materiel for the guerrillas over particularly difficult terrain.

25X1

underpinnings of the insurgency. Even so, resistance fighters are concerned about their future operational capabilities. Several developments are particularly worrisome to them:

- *The regime's policy of "shielding the borders."* One of its features is keeping up fairly steady pressure on key insurgent supply lines. Resistance alliance spokesman Mojadedi recently admitted to US officials that the Soviets and Afghan regime have made "progress" in closing some of the border entry points from Pakistan. Their efforts have interrupted and caused the rerouting of some insurgent shipments, which drive up the costs to the guerrillas of transporting materiel and result in spot shortages. But we are uncertain if these efforts have caused a net reduction in the overall amount of insurgent arms, equipment, and food delivered to
- *Retaliation against guerrilla supporters.* The Soviets and the Afghan regime have long engaged in retaliatory acts against villages that provide assistance to the resistance, but there are now more reports of selective crop destruction. Insurgent commanders in some cases have sought to compensate for the damage suffered by providing food to their supporters, but most have only a limited capability to do so. Some local inhabitants have responded to the retaliation by withdrawing their support for the insurgents altogether or by leaving the area.

Afghanistan. Supplies expended in the fighting this summer will need replacement and add to the burden of what must be carried in to support combat this fall.

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

[redacted]

25X1

- *Growth in militia forces.* The insurgents are increasingly concerned about the militia forces that the regime is creating through the use of bribes and pledges to spare collaborators' areas from combat. Expansion of these forces along key lines of communication, in particular, poses potential obstacles for transiting guerrilla forces.
- *Proliferation of security zones and outposts.* The Soviets and Afghan regime have expanded their program this summer for creating no man's lands, manned defensive perimeters, and strategically placed outposts to restrict the guerrillas' freedom of movement around important targets. These security measures, if fully implemented, have the potential to be significantly disruptive to insurgent operations and will force the guerrillas to rely less on traditional rocket and mortar attacks.
- *Recruitment of informers by the Afghan intelligence service.* [redacted] resistance commander Masood believed that government agents were a primary factor in the increasing interdiction of guerrilla supply caravans. The insurgents' counterintelligence efforts have exposed a number of informers, but others remain undetected. [redacted]

systems. At the same time, Soviet and Afghan regime forces are likely to intensify attempts to limit insurgent activity within the defense perimeters. The practice in Kabul of arresting the entire family of anyone who is discovered assisting a guerrilla operation is one such technique. [redacted]

25X1

The continuing guerrilla attacks in key urban areas, on important lines of communication, and in the northern provinces almost certainly are an unwelcome development to Moscow. Consequently, the scheduled removal of two motorized rifle regiments may be more costly to counterinsurgency capabilities than Moscow originally anticipated. The Afghan armed forces—undermanned, demoralized, faction-ridden, and ill-equipped—remain an unreliable ally, unable to undertake major operations on their own in the war against the guerrillas, and Soviet forces will continue to be the core elements of counterinsurgent operations. Moscow probably will seek to offset its reduced ground strength, in part, by ordering heavier use of airpower and air assaults—a new helicopter squadron was deployed to Afghanistan in July.

25X1
STAT

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1
25X1

The Fighting This Fall

The insurgents' show of strength this summer is likely to cause the Soviets and Afghan regime to redouble their counterinsurgency efforts. A key target of these efforts almost certainly will continue to be the guerrillas' logistic system. Guerrillas in a number of areas are likely to require more supplies to keep fighting even at current levels because their forces and the remaining populace have a diminished ability to support themselves locally. Some commanders probably are concerned about the effect of shortages on the morale of their forces. [redacted]

25X1

The surge in guerrilla activity in recent months also probably will stimulate the expansion of static Soviet and Afghan regime defenses around the major urban areas and important military installations. The Soviets' and the Afghan regime's forces want to keep insurgent groups at distances from their installations that exceed the range of the guerrillas' weapons

Top Secret

[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

**Sibghatullah Mojadedi:
Spokesman of the
Resistance Alliance**



25X1

Sibghatullah Mojadedi, the leader of the traditionalist Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan (the Afghanistan National Liberation Front or ANLF), began a three-month term as spokesman of the Afghan resistance alliance in July. Mojadedi advocates insurgent unity and the convening of a *Loya Jirga* (grand tribal council) to form a resistance government-in-exile. While spokesman, he would like to establish alliance offices abroad—especially in New York and Jeddah—and streamline the alliance bureaucracy. Mojadedi's accomplishments, however, will probably be limited by his lack of political and administrative skills, his forces' minor role in the fighting, and an antagonistic relationship with two key fundamentalists of the alliance.

A Mullah, Not a Soldier

According to Western scholars, Mojadedi, who is 60 years old, is a leading Islamic philosopher and scholar. He holds a graduate degree in Islamic law from the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo. During the 1950s, he taught theology at two secondary schools in Kabul and was a professor of Islamic jurisprudence at Kabul University. From 1974 until 1978, Mojadedi headed the Islamic Center of Scandinavia in Copenhagen.

Mojadedi studied the Naqshbandi order of Sufism, which his family has headed for over a century. The nearly 3 million Afghan sect members regard Mojadedi as the leader of a revered dynasty. (Some claim that Mojadedi is a direct descendant of Umar, the second caliph). In addition, his father and great uncle, both religious scholars, were honored for their efforts in fighting the British in 1919. As a result, the family added prestige and, through a royal reward, great wealth to its religious credentials.

Small and Ineffective Forces

The ANLF is probably the smallest and least effective of the Peshawar-based resistance groups. Although Mojadedi's family claims to lead up to 40,000 armed men operating from bases in Kabul city



Sibghatullah Mojadedi: leader, Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan since 1978 . . . tenure as spokesman of alliance ends 1 September . . . Islamic scholar and philosopher . . . traditional political outlook . . . many family members imprisoned by regime . . . quiet and unassuming with sense of humor . . . speaks fluent Arabic and English, some Urdu, German, and Russian . . . married twice . . . has at least seven children

25X1

and in Lowgar, Nangarhar, Qandahar, and Konarha Provinces, we believe that the ANLF has relatively few supporters scattered in the immediate area of the Pakistani border. the ANLF has often claimed credit for other groups' military successes.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Most of the ANLF's troubles in the field can be traced to poor administration and organization in its headquarters in Peshawar. Logistic snarls keep many supplies from reaching the battlefield. In addition,

25X1



Mojadedi's family, which holds most of the decisionmaking power within the organization, has been accused of questionable financial dealings and selling weapons for personal profit, although Mojadedi has not been personally implicated in any wrongdoing.

25X1

25X1

25X1



25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

NESA DA 86-009CX
SOV DA 86-009CX


5 September 1986


25X1


Top Secret

25X1

**Just About Anything
But Communism**


Mojadedi has a long history of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet activities. In 1959 he was arrested for allegedly plotting to assassinate Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who was on an official visit to Kabul. He subsequently served a four-year prison term—three years of which he spent in solitary confinement. From his release until 1974, when he fled the country for Denmark, he served as a translator at the Saudi Arabian Embassy and actively organized street demonstrations against Communism. In 1972 he formed the secret Jamiat al-Ulami Mohammadi as an Islamic counterweight to growing Communist influence in Kabul. While in self-imposed exile, Mojadedi traveled around the Middle East trying to mobilize opposition to the leftist regime of Mohammad Daoud. 


Although Mojadedi has never hesitated to use Islam as a political tool, he opposes the establishment in Afghanistan of an Islamic republic modeled after Iran. According to US officials in Peshawar, he has labeled Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of a Hizbi Islami faction, and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the head of the Ittihad-i-Islami Barai Azadi Afghanistan (the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan), as fanatics for their support of a Khomeini-style government. He personally favors a nonaligned democracy based on Islamic and traditional Afghan values and advocates convening a *Loya Jirga*—a traditional form of self-rule based on popular representation—to establish the future government of Afghanistan. 

Mojadedi is ambivalent about a future role for former King Zahir Shah, to whom he is distantly related through his second wife. In 1984, Mojadedi told US officials that the King's past mistakes had led to the present political chaos and that the monarchy was an anachronism. Mojadedi has since said that the King is still popular among his former subjects and could serve as a rallying point for the rivalry-plagued resistance. 


The Spokesman: Promoting Unity


Mojadedi stresses the need for unity within the resistance. Since the beginning of the war, he has participated in every alliance created by the moderate

factions, and from 1982 until 1985 served as chairman of the three-party moderate alliance (Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedin). Although Mojadedi insists that without solidarity the cause may be lost, we believe that he realizes an alliance is also in his best interests. In view of the ANLF's poor military and financial condition, the unity group provides Mojadedi with more exposure and power than he would otherwise have and gives him increased access to funding and logistic aid. 

However, working with the alliance's fundamentalists, particularly Gulbuddin and Sayyaf, has not been easy for Mojadedi. In addition to their differences over the form of a post-Communist government in Afghanistan, they are at odds over the nature of the present coalition. Mojadedi maintains that Gulbuddin and Sayyaf have little regard for unity and are a hindrance by refusing to cooperate with it. He blames their arrogance and intransigence upon their allegedly close ties to Khomeini and Libyan leader Qadhafi. Mojadedi is especially hostile toward Gulbuddin, whom he branded as the "world's biggest terrorist" and accused of assassinating fellow resistance commanders. He may also be jealous of the military prowess of Gulbuddin's forces and Sayyaf's financial support from the Saudis. 

Pro-US Attitude

Mojadedi looks favorably upon the United States. He wants the United States to provide more humanitarian and military aid to the resistance in general, and the ANLF specifically, and to increase diplomatic pressure upon the Soviet Union to pull out of Afghanistan. After his trip to Washington, in June 1986, Mojadedi commented that he appreciated meeting President Reagan and was impressed with his knowledge of the resistance effort. He also has said that as spokesman he intends to maintain close contact with the United States. 

Mojadedi, however, is not as positive about relations with Pakistan. He has complained bitterly of Pakistani interference in resistance affairs and refused initially to accept his turn as spokesman to emphasize his dissatisfaction. 

Top Secret

25X1


Top Secret




25X1

As Spokesman:

A Look into the Crystal Ball

Mojadedi, no stranger to the limelight, will probably stress public relations during his tenure as spokesman. He is fluent in English and Arabic and speaks some German and Urdu. He is an experienced public speaker and on occasion has delivered powerful and moving speeches. A personable man, he enjoys giving press interviews; he even appeared in 1982 on the US evangelical television program *The 700 Club*. 

25X1

Mojadedi's goals of opening offices abroad, consolidating the work of alliance committees, and promoting an assembly to create a government-in-exile will probably be unfulfilled. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, Sayyaf and Gulbuddin are opposed to opening an alliance office in Jeddah. They also disagree with Mojadedi and the traditionalists over the method of selecting representatives for the *Loya Jirga* and relations with the United States. More important, Mojadedi lacks the political power  to influence the other alliance leaders. Therefore, Mojadedi will probably move slowly toward his objectives while preserving the facade of alliance unity. He will also work behind the scenes to enlist US aid in weakening Gulbuddin's and Sayyaf's veto power over alliance decisionmaking.

25X6



25X1



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Bonn Unlikely To Make Major Changes in Policy on Afghan Issue



25X1

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has repeatedly criticized Soviet involvement in Afghanistan over the past six years, and public and private funds from West Germany support humanitarian aid programs for the Afghan resistance. We believe, however, that the West Germans' desire for East-West rapprochement limits the degree to which Bonn is willing to expand aid to insurgents. This restraint is reinforced by widespread public apathy on the issue.



Juergen Todenhoefer: Bundestag...widely regarded as one of the rising stars in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)...disarmament spokesman for the CDU/CSU (Christian Social Union) parliamentary caucus and a member of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee...has twice visited Afghanistan...founder of the Action Focus on Afghan—Reporters for Peace, an organization that trains young Afghan rebels in media techniques to better publicize what Todenhoefer has called "the forgotten war."

25X1

Words Are the Weapon of Choice

The invasion of Afghanistan was unsettling to the West Germans, but the desire of the Social Democrat-led coalition government under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt not to jeopardize gains made from detente confined Bonn's response to the invasion to rhetoric. Left-of-center members of the coalition, while condemning the invasion, argued that Islamic states bordering Afghanistan should take the lead in responding to Soviet actions.



occupation of Afghanistan, called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops, and requested that the European Community step up economic and financial aid to the Afghan people.



25X1

25X1

25X1

Although opposition conservatives said the Soviet aggression should not be ignored and insisted that Soviet actions in other parts of the world could not be severed from their intentions toward Western Europe, the accession to power in 1983 of the Christian Democrats did not change the basic tenor of West German policy on the Afghan issue. Instead, the main facet of this policy has continued to comprise censuring the Soviets for their continued occupation of Afghanistan.



The Afghan issue, however, is of low priority for most West Germans. According to the US Embassy in Bonn, the sixth anniversary in 1985 of the Soviet invasion was scarcely remembered. A poll taken around the time of that anniversary showed that West Germans ranked Afghanistan well below the issues of nuclear arms, the Middle East, and South Africa. Similarly, one-third of those polled had no opinion about what Bonn should do about the presence of Soviet troops. A year earlier, only 11 percent had no opinion. The Bundestag hearings in March of this year were held, in part, to combat this growing public apathy.



25X1

25X1

Bundestag hearings—the most recent held in March 1986—and periodic government-supported rallies have consistently called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Juergen Todenhoefer, a Christian Democrat deputy in the Bundestag and a prominent spokesman for the resistance, has worked to keep the issue in the forefront. Hans-Gert Poettering, also a Christian Democrat, has authored two proresistance resolutions in the European Parliament during the past 12 months. The resolutions condemned the Soviet

Modest Aid Programs

In line with its preference for emphasizing the social and moral consequences of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, the West German Government is

Top Secret

NESA DA 86-009CX
SOV DA 86-009CX

5 September 1986

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

unwilling to provide much more than humanitarian aid and public relations assistance to the Afghan resistance. Official assistance to the refugees seems to have peaked in 1984, when it amounted to about 60 million deutsche marks—roughly \$30 million. In 1985, aid levels had declined to an estimated 45 million deutsche marks—about \$22 million. According to the US Embassy in Bonn, a West German Foreign Ministry official recently suggested that Bonn is considering participation in the US-sponsored McCollum program that provides medical treatment in Western Europe and the United States for Afghan war-wounded. Several private West German organizations, some of which are directed by Afghans, currently provide medical assistance both to the resistance and refugees. [Redacted]

resistance. A West German analysis in early 1986 of Soviet Afghan policy concluded that the Soviet obsession with secure borders was an overriding concern that would shut out any real movement on the issue. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] The West Germans probably view Soviet leader Gorbachev's treatment of Afghanistan at Vladivostok in July 1986 probably as little more than skillful propaganda.

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

A privately funded media project was initiated in 1985. Under the auspices of Verein Fuer Afghanistanische Fluehlingshilfe (VAF)—the Aid Association for Afghan Refugees—the program seeks to train resistance cameramen to use donated video equipment to produce documentary footage upon their return to Afghanistan. As of June 1986, 20 insurgent veterans, who were chosen by the resistance alliance from as many different provinces and organizations as possible, had completed an intensive four-week training course. Another 40 men have been selected for the program and some 3 million deutsche marks raised to cover expenses, although the US Embassy in Bonn says that the West Germans want to see the results of the first contingent before proceeding with the training of the second group. [Redacted]

25X1

Outlook

The West German Government will continue to be openly critical of the Soviet actions in Afghanistan and supportive of the resistance; Foreign Minister Genscher even agreed to a proposed meeting with an insurgent alliance spokesman earlier this summer. But we believe that it is unlikely to significantly increase its aid to the guerrillas. Afghanistan is clearly not an issue for which the government would be willing to risk complicating its relations with the Soviet Union. [Redacted]

25X1

German skepticism about Moscow's willingness to change its policies on Afghanistan will remain a strong constraint on what Bonn will do to aid the

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret