



Directorate of
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

025

25X1



Developments in Afghanistan



Developments in
Afghanistan
25X1

7 March 1986

~~Top Secret~~

NESA DA 86-003CX
SOV DA 86-003CX

7 March 1986

Copy 145

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret

[Redacted] 25X1

Developments in Afghanistan [Redacted]

25X1

7 March 1986

1 Perspective—The Afghan War: Is Moscow Changing Course? [Redacted]
[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

There are growing diplomatic signs that Moscow may float a new initiative on Afghanistan—most likely as part of a sophisticated diplomatic and propaganda campaign—but Party General Secretary Gorbachev’s opening speech to the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress suggests that no diplomatic breakthrough is imminent. [Redacted]

25X1

3 Briefs

[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

13 The Afghan Military: Weak But Surviving [Redacted]
[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

The Afghan regime has stepped up attempts to boost its military performance during the past six months by increasing the use of paramilitary units, improving training, and closely supervising Afghan-army operations. These efforts will probably result in only marginal improvements because of ongoing problems with morale, manpower, and performance. [Redacted]

25X1

17 Soviet-Afghan Efforts To Destabilize Pakistan’s North-West Frontier [Redacted]
[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

The Afghan regime, with Soviet backing, has tried to stir up tribal unrest in the border regions to discourage Pakistan from assisting the insurgents. [Redacted]

25X1

This document is published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence. [Redacted]
[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

Top Secret
[Redacted]

25X1

Developments in Afghanistan [Redacted]

25X1

7 March 1986

Perspective

The Afghan War: Is Moscow Changing Course? [Redacted]

25X1

There are some signs that the Soviets may float a new initiative on Afghanistan soon, but party General Secretary Gorbachev's opening speech to the 27th Communist Party Congress in late February suggests that no diplomatic breakthroughs are imminent. A number of events—the March round of UN talks on Afghanistan, a second set of Soviet-US bilaterals on the same subject, and the next summit—will provide opportunities for Moscow to offer a different approach. Although a new initiative would, in our view, probably be limited to a skillful repackaging of old negotiating proposals accompanied by a sophisticated diplomatic and propaganda campaign, we cannot rule out the possibility of more radical moves. As with other Gorbachev proposals, it could feature a “first step”—possibly including the withdrawal of some troops—designed to win headlines.

[Redacted]

25X1

Hints From Soviet Officials

Soviet President Gromyko and Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko recently [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] said that

25X1

Moscow will create an independent “nonhostile” government in Kabul and that recent attempts by the Afghan Government to broaden its base represent the first steps. [Redacted]

25X1

First Deputy Chief of the CPSU International Department V. V. Zagladin gave a speech to the Turkmen party congress in January emphasizing the Soviet commitment to a negotiated political settlement. He claimed the Soviets have already done much and would do more “in the nearest future.” Moscow is also pushing Kabul to expand its political base, possibly even to include some insurgent leaders in the government. [Redacted]

25X1

Rumors of Troop Withdrawal

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

Top Secret
NESDA 86-003CX
SOV DA 86-003CX
[Redacted]
7 March 1986

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted] A Soviet Afghan expert indicated to US Embassy officials that a Soviet withdrawal could begin when the insurgents had agreed to a cease-fire. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Moscow is pushing the Afghan Government to expand its forces. In response, Kabul recently announced that its security forces will be increased to some 200,000 and will soon take on more of the fighting. [redacted]

25X1

What is Moscow Up To?

A Propaganda Offensive? Most likely the Soviets are trying to sow confusion in the resistance, gain the diplomatic high ground, and put the United States on the defensive. Gorbachev's statement to the Soviet Communist Party Congress was a reformulation of the standard Soviet position that places Afghanistan firmly in the Soviet strategic orbit and indicates interest in a political settlement only if it meets Soviet security objectives. Statements that Moscow and Kabul have reached agreement on a phased Soviet troop withdrawal are probably intended to increase pressure on Islamabad to accede to direct talks with Kabul. Additional minor changes in the Afghan regime and token troop withdrawals are also possible. [redacted]

25X1

"Afghanization?" The Soviets may believe the situation is improving enough to push the Afghans forward and reap the benefits of a lower Soviet profile. They may also have decided they can live with a less orthodox brand of socialism in Afghanistan than is represented by the current regime. In any event, the Soviets probably calculate that "Afghanization" would aid their propaganda offensive. This approach could include:

- Strong pressure on the Afghans to broaden the government.
- Attractive offers to key insurgent leaders to get them to stop fighting.
- Attempts to seek a quid pro quo from Pakistan and the United States to reduce aid to the insurgents.
- Some reduction in the number of troops and level of combat involvement.
- Perhaps even a public statement dropping preconditions for pulling out. [redacted]

25X1

A Major Military Withdrawal? This is the least likely explanation. It would reflect a decision to wind down involvement in Afghanistan despite the probable resulting collapse of the current regime. The Soviets might make a public statement suggesting military success and stressing the present government's responsibility for Afghanistan's future. They probably would approach the United States and Pakistan privately to try and negotiate the best possible deal. A withdrawal of most of their forces could be preceded by a large influx of equipment and intense offensive operations to provide breathing space. [redacted]

25X1

The initial signals may be hard to sort out. Even if the main Soviet objective is to seize the initiative for diplomatic and propaganda purposes, they may well portray their actions as "Afghanization." In any event, Gorbachev has been supervising the war for nearly a year now and, unless he can come up with an innovative approach, he, too, will soon be identified with the Soviet's longstanding Afghan dilemma. [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret


[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Afghanistan Briefs



25X1

Combat Activity Remains Steady

25X1

Combat activity throughout Afghanistan remained light in late January and mid-February, but by the end of the month, several Soviet-Afghan multibattalion operations were underway.

25X1
25X1

[Redacted text block]

In late February, US Embassy reporting [redacted] indicated Soviet battalions were conducting operations in Kabul, Parwan, and Nangarhar Provinces. Major elements of an Afghan division launched a combat sweep south and east of Jalalabad. Kabul remained relatively quiet,

25X1
25X1

Top Secret
NESA DA 86-003CX
SOV DA 86-003CX
7 March 1986

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

according to the US Embassy, although it experienced rocket attacks and small
gunbattles during early February.



25X1
25X1



25X1
s




25X1
s

.

.

∇

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Soviets Improve Airfields [Redacted]

25X1

The Soviets are completing an expansion and improvement program of their facilities at major airfields in Afghanistan begun in 1985. These upgrades will provide facilities for recently deployed Soviet aircraft, allow for the deployment of additional aircraft and munitions, and improve airfield security. [Redacted]

25X1
25X1

- *Bagram*: A new revetted dispersal area was constructed and subsequently occupied by a Soviet squadron of SU-25 ground attack aircraft that relocated from Qandahar last summer. A new munitions storage area, which will triple the ammunition capacity of the airfield, is nearing completion.
- *Kabul*: An additional helicopter runway, parking apron, and parallel taxiway are nearing completion. These improvements will not only facilitate operations of the helicopter regiment deployed here but also will allow Soviet transport and logistic activities at this airfield to proceed uninterrupted.
- *Qandahar*: A dispersal area was renovated, and last month a new SU-25 squadron from the Soviet Union was deployed there.
- *Shindand*: A new revetted squadron-sized dispersal area is nearing completion and will probably be occupied by the MIG-23 Flogger squadron deployed at the airfield. [Redacted]

25X1

Trouble In The Northern Tier [Redacted]

25X1

Resistance efforts near Mazar-e Sharif in Balkh Province were set back last year, [Redacted] primarily because of a leadership vacuum caused by the death of Jamiat-i-Islami commander Zabiullah Khan. The Soviets captured the insurgents' permanent base camp in the hills surrounding the city, discovered a network of underground bunkers, and also arrested many insurgent sympathizers in the city. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

Pakistan Responds to Soviet-Afghan Border Violations [Redacted]

25X1

Pakistani authorities have reacted forcefully to an increase in Soviet-Afghan air violations along the border. [Redacted] the Pakistani military claimed to have shot down two Afghan fighters with Stinger surface-to-air missiles

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[redacted]

25X1

Resistance Cites New Pressures [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] who met with Afghan resistance leaders, reports that although “the insurgents are now better armed, better trained, and more effective” than at any time in the past, they face new problems. There is a growing feeling among the resistance that they have increasingly been forced into a defensive, reactive position by new Soviet techniques. Resistance commanders in Afghanistan are especially worried about night ambushes and what they called the “long rifle”—a silencer-equipped Soviet sniper rifle that is causing significant casualties among insurgent groups. The resistance admitted that it could not do much in Kabul last year, citing the effectiveness of the newly installed Soviet restricted zones around the capital. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

The insurgents are also feeling the effect of an improved Afghan intelligence effort. A number of resistance groups have been penetrated—Jamiat-i-Islami and Hizbi Islami Gulbuddin were believed to be the most vulnerable because of their willingness to accept new members without close scrutiny. [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

**The Fall of Peshghowr:
Who Dares, Wins**

25X1

The fall of the Afghan garrison at Peshghowr in the Panjsher Valley marked the first time that insurgent forces successfully assaulted and captured a major government position. The victory exposed the vulnerability of the Karmal regime's garrisons and demonstrated the growing professionalism of insurgent leader Masood and his forces.

The Players

The garrison at Peshghowr—strategically located in the central portion of the Panjsher Valley—was manned in June by several hundred officers and men of an elite Afghan Army Commando Brigade. An Afghan intelligence service (KHAD) unit, a contingent of armed police and a senior Afghan Army delegation from Kabul, headed by Deputy Commander of Afghan Army Central Forces General Ahmaduddin, were also present. There were no Soviet advisers at the base at the time of the attack on 15 June.

The garrison was ringed by a series of outposts connected by trenches to the central base. Primary fire support was supplied by artillery located at Barak a few kilometers away.

A 30-man mobile group from Masood's elite forces and 22 members of the local Peshghowr unit formed the core of Masood's assault force against the garrison. Masood deployed the elite unit, not only to boost local military capabilities, but also to ensure that any victory would foster Panjsheri unity rather than be viewed as just a Peshghowri accomplishment,

Commander Mirzah—the leader of the local Peshghowr unit and one of Masood's top three or four commanders—was chosen to lead the operation,

Masood's Strategic Concerns

Panjsher Valley
Commander Ahmad Shah Masood believes that the northern provinces of Afghanistan are crucial to the war effort. In his view, Soviet consolidation in the north would place more pressure on insurgent forces in the east and the south. He believes that the best way to prevent Soviet control of the north is to seize the initiative between the Soviet border and Kabul, Key areas between the border and the capital include the Panjsher Valley, the Andarab Valley—a foodgrowing area and one with access routes to Jamiat-i-Islami fronts in the north—and the Khowst va Fereng area that dominates the northern approaches of the Panjsher.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

David Thrashes Goliath

Masood made careful preparations prior to the assault. Nightly insurgent mortar and machinegun fire stimulated a steady stream of deserters from the garrison's outposts.

25X1

These deserters provided valuable intelligence on the garrison's defenses, minefields and communications facilities.

25X1

Masood concluded that, because of terrain, the defenders of Peshghowr expected an attack from the mountainous northern approaches to the base. In mid-May, Masood eliminated a government outpost that dominated the southern approaches to the garrison—the insurgents' avenue of attack,

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

The assault force infiltrated a partially destroyed farmhouse near the garrison's perimeter under cover of darkness on 14 June and remained hidden there

25X1

Top Secret

NESA DA 86-003CX
SOV DA 86-003CX

7 March 1986

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1

Afghan Army prisoners from the Peshghowr garrison following its capture by Masood's insurgents.




25X1

throughout the following day [redacted] At dusk on 15 June, the assault force moved forward under a covering barrage of heavy weapons fire and neutralized the minefield surrounding the garrison. The assault force then divided into teams and moved against predetermined objectives which included KHAD headquarters—the primary objective—and the communications facility, [redacted] An insurgent team quickly captured the communications facility and radioed the regime's fire support base at Barak that the situation was normal and the base was not threatened. [redacted]

The Spoils
The insurgents occupied Peshghowr for at least two days while staging a deceptive communications operation with the Afghan Army post at Astaneh, [redacted] They summarily executed the KHAD personnel, took their files, and ransacked the base. Prisoners were divided into three categories: defectors were separated and sent under escort to Chitral, Pakistan; soldiers who surrendered early were released and sent home; those that continued to fight were taken to a jail at Deh mikeni in the Moqoni Valley near one of Masood's northernmost mountain bases. [redacted]


25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

By the morning of 16 June, the insurgents had captured the base, and taken 126 officers and 450 soldiers prisoner. One hundred and twenty Afghan soldiers defected as soon as they saw the insurgents, and most of the remainder surrendered in the first 15 minutes [redacted] The visiting army delegation, the KHAD unit, and many officers continued fighting until morning, resulting in the death of General Ahmaduddin [redacted] The insurgents suffered only one insurgent killed during the fighting and three killed by a mine after the fighting had ended. [redacted]



25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Afghan Army prisoners carrying captured munitions from the Peshghowr garrison and transporting them to insurgent areas in the mountains.



25X1

The insurgents were astounded at the huge quantity of supplies uncovered, enough to last Masood's forces for a year [redacted]

They worked around the clock using horses and donkeys to transfer arms and supplies to insurgent storage areas. The booty included at least four artillery pieces, which were probably taken to the insurgent base nearby. [redacted]

The Astaneh garrison discovered the ruse on 18 June and realized that the Peshghowr garrison had fallen, [redacted] The insurgents, after trading insults with Astaneh, evacuated the post. The next day, Soviet and Afghan jet aircraft and helicopters bombed the garrison and government forces reoccupied Peshghowr. [redacted]

A Bloody Finale

The Soviets launched a counteroffensive against Masood in early July. Fifteen thousand Soviet and Afghan troops supported by airstrikes and heliborne

assaults moved up the Panjsher from Jabol-os Saraj and began fanning out into the side valleys. [redacted]

Masood believed that the main objective of the Soviet offensive was to rescue the prisoners held by the insurgents, [redacted]

[redacted] the main assault of the heliborne troops was directed at the Moqoni Valley. A heliborne assault with attack helicopter escort against the Deh mikeneni Prison was driven off by heavy insurgent machinegun fire, but Soviet troops landed at nearby landing zones located to the northwest, west, and southeast of the prison, and began closing in on Masood, [redacted]

[redacted] Masood's sharpshooters fired on advancing troops with sniper rifles from the heights overlooking

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1
25X1

25X1
25X1
25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

the valley as they undertook an all-day withdrawal by way of a circuitous overland route to the mountain base at Dahane Rewat. [Redacted]

25X1

Masood reluctantly gave the order to kill the remaining prisoners—almost all officers—at about 1700 hours as Soviet troops were nearing the prison. The bodies of the slain prisoners were floated down the river in the direction of the advancing Soviet troops. [Redacted]

25X1

Soviet forces subsequently destroyed the Deh mikeni Prison and an abandoned insurgent mountain base and heavily mined the areas around these facilities, [Redacted]

25X1

The Soviets also destroyed some food supplies, but did not find any arms caches. When, after a week, the Soviets withdrew from the area, the insurgents rebuilt their bases, although Soviet mines resulted in 20 insurgent casualties. [Redacted]

25X1

Insurgent Strengths and Regime Weaknesses

The attack at Peshghowr demonstrated Masood's understanding of reconnaissance, intelligence, planning, coordination, discipline, training, and tactical surprise. It also showed his capability for aggressiveness when conditions required it. [Redacted]

25X1

Masood also demonstrated political astuteness by including in the operation insurgents from outside the Peshghowr area to foster unity and common cause among the insurgents. His release of the prisoners who surrendered quickly guaranteed that news of the victory would spread and would adversely affect Afghan morale as well as encourage other soldiers to surrender in the hope of staying alive. [Redacted]

25X1

The regime's performance at Peshghowr underscores an appalling lack of morale and aggressiveness that, in our view, is characteristic of much of the Army, especially when it operates independent of Soviet forces. The garrison had hundreds of elite troops in fortified positions surrounded by minefields and with fire support nearby. Nonetheless, the majority surrendered within the first 15 minutes of combat. The Afghan Army's poor performance also shows that the Soviets must man garrisons themselves if they are to be effective. [Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

**The Afghan Military:
Weak But Surviving**

[Redacted]

25X1

The Afghan Government has been doing more to expand and improve the capability of its military forces over the last six months, probably largely as a result of Soviet pressure on the Babrak Karmal regime to assume a larger role in the war. During this period, the Afghan Army has evidenced marginal improvements—there have been fewer cases of disintegration under fire than in the past—but its capability to fight the insurgents has not grown substantially. Low morale, defections and desertions, inadequate conscription, and significant casualties continue to plague the Army. In our view, it will remain seriously understrength, and the Karmal regime's recent emphasis on improving the capability of border troops, Sarandoy (police), KHAD military groups, and local militias is unlikely to effectively fill the gap. [Redacted]

regime's three main military arms under a single head was probably encouraged by the Soviets. [Redacted]

25X1

Some senior Afghan Army officers, suspected of coup plotting were purged in late 1985. [Redacted]

25X1
25X1

Political and military training plays a key role in the government's attempts to develop a competent and loyal Afghan military. [Redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

A Renewed Regime Effort

The Karmal regime reportedly is trying to increase significantly the size of its Armed Forces to take over more of the fighting from the Soviets. [Redacted] in December Kabul decided—probably at Soviet behest—to raise the total "operational strength" of the Army, police and government intelligence services (KHAD) to 200,000 men by the end of March. The Army alone is to be increased to 140,000, almost three times its current estimated size. [Redacted] regime authorities are also transferring Afghan and some Soviet guard and road security duties to the police in order to free more soldiers for offensive operations. [Redacted]

[Redacted] The PDPA Central

Committee is directly involved in the administration of a new educational and training academy for the military, [Redacted] In October a new course was developed for KHAD and Sarandoy (police) personnel to ensure that they have the "correct" ideological framework, [Redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

Pushing the Army Harder

There are growing signs that the Afghan regime is putting the Army to the test. [Redacted]

25X1
25X1

The government has also taken a series of political steps aimed at improving the reliability of the Afghan Army. In November, Najibullah, former Chief of KHAD, was promoted to the post of People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's (PDPA) Central Committee Secretary—a new position that will involve overseeing KHAD, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Defense, according to the US Embassy in Kabul. We believe placing the Afghan

[Large Redacted Block]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

NESSA DA 86-003CX
SOV DA 86-003CX

[Redacted]
7 March 1986

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret

25X1



Former Afghan Government forces stand with their weapons after defecting to the resistance.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The Kabul government is also expanding the Afghan Army presence in key provinces along the Pakistan border in an effort to interdict insurgent supplies, with some success. In Nangarhar, [Redacted] the number of Afghan military posts and smaller firebases had more than quadrupled by late 1985, but [Redacted] insurgent base camps in the province have not been penetrated and that supplies are adequate. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Developing Local Force Alternatives

The regime is also placing increasing emphasis on improving the military capability of its local forces, which include border troops, Sarandoy, KHAD groups, and local militias:

- *Border troops*, located in provinces which border Pakistan and Iran, operate under the Ministry of Defense through the Border Security Command. They are lightly armed but they know the local terrain and people and thus have useful intelligence capabilities. Two new border brigades—the 11th in Helmand Province and the 10th in the Konar Valley region—were formed recently.

- The *Sarandoy* has been transformed into the equivalent of a light infantry force that, in conjunction with the Army, is responsible for urban security and suppression of the resistance in the countryside, [Redacted] Their operational units are equipped and organized like regular infantry battalions—giving them a limited combat capability to engage small, lightly equipped insurgent groups. One such battalion participated in joint Army-Sarandoy operations in Khowst in January 1986. The Sarandoy reportedly suffer from personnel shortages, however.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

- *KHAD* has also formed combat units, [Redacted] Since early 1985, battalion-sized KHAD units have been stationed throughout Kabul Province [Redacted] One, responsible for Kabul proper, consists of approximately 1,100 personnel, divided into 11 units of 100 personnel each.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

- *Militias* have been organized into battalions and brigades by the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs. Originally tasked with providing security along main highways and at chokepoints [Redacted] many of the units are participating in joint operations with regular Army units, Sarandoy units, and border troops [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Most militias have been formed by bribing tribal and local chiefs to sign "mutual understanding" agreements with the regime. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

The Karmal government is also raising youth battalions to free the Army for more combat duty. Afghan youths who recently returned from military training in the USSR were formed into "party" battalions last December to guard government offices and radio stations, [Redacted]. Units already are in place in Qandahar and Herat.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Problems Persist

We see little likelihood that present attempts to increase the Afghan military role in the war will result in significant gains for the Kabul regime:

- The military forces continue to be plagued with severe morale and manpower problems, and defections are widespread.
- Although some new units have been formed, the Afghan Army continues to operate at almost less than 50 percent of its authorized strength.
- The Afghan Army is filled with inexperienced, poorly trained officers and conscripts—who are usually forcibly recruited.

Nevertheless we have not seen much evidence of mass disintegration of Afghan Army units under fire—as has been the case in the past—and Kabul's recent effort will probably result in improvements at the margin. [Redacted]

25X1

o

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

**Soviet-Afghan Efforts
To Destabilize Pakistan's
North-West Frontier** [Redacted]

25X1

The campaign by the Afghan regime, probably Soviet sponsored, to pressure Islamabad into curbing insurgent movement across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has increased in intensity, raising intertribal tensions and strife in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). We believe that fear of Kabul's meddling in the tribal territories precipitated Pakistani Government intervention in the Khyber Agency in December, although Islamabad billed the operation as an antinarcotics campaign. We do not believe the Soviet-Afghan campaign will deflect President Zia or the new civilian leadership from its support for the Afghan insurgents. [Redacted]

The Campaign Heats Up

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The Soviet-Afghan campaign apparently seeks to pit Pushtun clans against each other, reinforce traditional mistrust among these highly individualistic groups, and separate the Afghan insurgents from the people of the North-West Frontier in the hope of limiting insurgent movement of men and supplies across the porous border into Afghanistan. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Islamabad is anxious to curb Moscow's and Kabul's influence before it undermines Islamabad's political standing in the NWFP and weakens public support for the Afghan insurgents. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] An official in the Pakistani

Pakistan's Tribal Areas

Much of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is inhabited by highly independent tribes, many of whom frequently live on both sides of the Durand Line—the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Tribal Territories include the Bajaur Agency (inhabited by Utman Khel and Tarkhani tribesmen), Mohmand Agency (Mohmand and Safi), Khyber Agency (Afridi and Shinwari), Orakzai Agency (Orakzai and Gangash), Kurram Agency (Turi, Mengals, and Bangash), North and South Waziristan (Wazirs and Mahsud). [Redacted]

25X1
25X1

The Pakistani Government, like the British colonialists, have historically exercised only loose control of the tribesmen of the North-West Frontier. Late 19th century treaties granted limited autonomy from the central authorities to the tribes. Islamabad has allowed the Pushtun tribes to maintain their own tribal jirgas (councils) and to transit the frontier relatively unimpeded. The government has been able to maintain peace along the North-West Frontier by a judicious use of bribes for good behavior and periodic forays by paramilitary armed forces. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

The Durand Line cuts deep into the Pushtun tribal area that was the traditional home of the dominant Afghan ethnic group. Pushtun tribesmen since the beginning of this century have sought to create an independent Pushtunistan in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan where they form a majority; Pushtun-dominated Afghan governments in Kabul have espoused the cause of their separated brethren. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and Islamabad's subsequent decision to support the anti-Kabul insurgents has riveted official attention on the people of the North-West Frontier Province as major actors in the regional struggle. The influx of nearly three million Afghan refugees into 239 camps spread across Pakistan and increased narcotic smuggling have made the situation even more volatile. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1

Top Secret

NESA DA 86-003CX
SOV DA 86-003CX

[Redacted]

7 March 1986

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1



25X1

Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the US Embassy that there were 46 sabotage incidents last year—resulting in 51 dead and 156 wounded—a nearly 20-percent increase in incidents over 1984. [Redacted]

room of the Peshawar center of Pakistani TV and the 22 January explosion at the Pakistani International Airlines (PIA) office in Peshawar highlighted the saboteurs' ability to strike at high profile and well-protected government facilities. The bombing of the PIA office in Peshawar generated a series of protest marches in Peshawar by Pakistani civilians angry at the Afghan refugees for bringing the war to Pakistan and prompted calls in the parliament for a review of government policy toward the Afghan insurgents. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted] apprehended KHAD saboteurs are generally well armed, trained, and equipped with fairly sophisticated explosives and timers. They had been instructed to cross into Pakistan as refugees, to establish contact with other KHAD agents in Pakistan, to stockpile arms and explosives, and to await orders. [Redacted]

Pakistani and Afghan insurgent political leaders are also concerned about the impact of the wide open arms traffic on law and order in the frontier region. Simple disagreements, authorities believe, have often

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

The sabotage campaign escalated at the end of 1985 from back alley attacks on insurgent homes and businesses to attacks on Pakistani Government facilities. The 16 October bombing of the control

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

exploded into major gun battles. According to press accounts, rocket launchers and other advanced weaponry were used in a clash between Pakistani tribes in September and a violent clash between Afghan refugees and Pakistani tribesmen in Bajaur Agency in early November. [Redacted]



Wali Khan Kukikhel: Age 74 ... presides over Afridi sub-tribe of about 70,000 ... biggest landlord of the Khyber Agency ... close ties to the Kabul regime ... speaks Dari and Urdu. [Redacted]

25X1
ZSAI

We believe Afghan and Soviet authorities are also increasing direct military pressure on Pakistan as part of the destabilization campaign. Air violations of Pakistani territory have increased yearly to approximately 280 in 1985, [Redacted]

[Redacted] Although most of these are byproducts of combat operations on the Afghanistan side of the border, Pakistani authorities believe a series of high altitude helicopter attacks on civilian targets in and around Parachinar on 26-30 January were intended to demonstrate that Pakistani support for the insurgents bears a direct military cost. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

Proffering Carrots

Money. The Soviet-Afghan tribal destabilization program involves buying the loyalty of border tribal groups. [Redacted]

[Redacted] In exchange, Afghanistan expects the tribal groups to inhibit insurgent transit through their territory when possible. [Redacted]

Narcotics. We believe that Kabul has acquiesced to traditional tribal smuggling activity—including narcotics production and distribution—in order to curry tribal favor and to disrupt Pakistani security and antinarcotics efforts in the border regions.

25X1
25X1
25X1

[Redacted] the US Embassy in Islamabad, major Pushtun narcotics traffickers, especially Wali Khan Kukikhel, have for several years received the backing of the Afghan Government and have been provided with refuge from Pakistani security personnel. Press accounts report that poppy production has increased along the border region because poppy fields are rarely disturbed by combat operations. [Redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

Arms. [Redacted] the Kabul regime has distributed thousands of Kalashnikov, Kalakov, and, [Redacted] Vietnam-vintage US M-16 rifles to the Pushtun tribesmen whose leaders participated in the Kabul jirga (council) held in September. [Redacted]

[Redacted] this policy signaled the beginning of a Soviet-Afghan plan to take the war into Pakistan. The border region is to be "flooded" with arms and the Afghan Government does not particularly care who obtains these arms. [Redacted]

Pakistan Responds

Pakistan has reacted to the destabilization campaign by upgrading its air defense capabilities, launching military operations against errant tribesmen, and trying to reassure a skittish civilian population that Islamabad is prepared to protect them. [Redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

- The increased presence of paramilitary Frontier Corps in the Khyber and Kurram Agencies has created economic hardship and loss of traditional freedom of movement for all of the tribal groups.
- Prominent Muslim religious leaders have reacted negatively to the apparent alliance of Wali Khan with the atheistic, communist government in Kabul.

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Outlook

Many tribal groups find it expedient to accept bribes temporarily without abandoning their tacit support to the Afghan resistance. The Soviet effort to flood the border regions with arms is likely to be counterproductive because many of those weapons will probably be turned against the Soviets and their Afghan colleagues. Nevertheless, the Soviets and the Afghan Government will probably find the opportunities for splitting the insurgency from its supporters sufficiently enticing to continue the effort.

[Redacted]

25X1

Islamabad also launched operations against Wali Khan Kukikhel—leader of one fractious clan of the Afridi (Pushtun) tribe who has had longstanding ties to Kabul. The Frontier Corps sent 3,000 men to subdue the Afridi and Shinwari tribes in the Khyber Agency. This operation followed a security sweep last March in which the fortified home of Wali Khan was destroyed. While publicly aimed at capturing Wali Khan and curbing the narcotics smuggling trade, the December campaign was intended to signal to the tribes that challenging Islamabad's authority in the NWFP and cooperating with Kabul would not go unpunished. [Redacted]

If the border situation in the North-West Frontier Province were to deteriorate rapidly, civilian criticism of the lack of security along the border would probably push the issue to the top of the government's foreign policy agenda. Civilian authorities will also continue to be apprehensive about the potential for sophisticated arms spilling over into the troubled Sind and Baluchistan Provinces. Although President Zia and Prime Minister Junejo would probably face more domestic pressure to alter Islamabad's support for the insurgents in order to gain a respite from Soviet pressure, we do not believe they would back away from their support for the insurgents. Pakistan's leaders, however, are likely to use any deterioration in the border situation to justify its requests for increased US military assistance. [Redacted]

25X1

We believe the forceful Pakistani response to Wali Khan's challenge has successfully undermined the support he had from other border tribe leaders:

- The fate of Wali Khan—now bottled up between insurgent forces and the Pakistani Frontier Corps in a remote, inhospitable region of the NWFP—will probably discourage other tribal leaders seeking to follow his example.
- Many tribesmen now blame Wali Khan for inciting the Pakistani military response through his abuse of Pakistani provincial leaders and his acceptance of money and arms from Kabul.

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

Top Secret