

~~SECRET~~

16 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/EA
NIO/AF
NIO/LA
NIO/NESA

FROM: H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
Acting Chairman, NIC

SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing

1. The attached memorandum from the SSCI to the DCI outlines the subject matter for a hearing on 18 June. Dick Kerr and I will attend this hearing and we need your support. Please prepare by noon, 17 June a one- to two-page memorandum covering the following points:

- Describe the regional security policy for your area as we understand it and describe what that means for our intelligence collection and production. Indicate how this problem may change.
- A brief comment also would be appreciated concerning the requirement and utility of covert action as an element of US regional security policy.

2. Please do not be concerned with drawing too fine a measure on resource allocations in terms of regional security policy and the issues of production and collection, a relatively aggregated judgment will be sufficient. We are seeking insights and not necessarily seeking budget data at this point. Sorry to task you on such short notice, but we do need your help.


H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

Attachment:
As stated

~~SECRET~~

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dick Kerr

1. Attached are the four memos you requested in order to provide some insights into the regional security issues to be addressed at the SSCI hearing on 18 June.

2. By now we know this introductory, overview session has been postponed until 24 June. Despite that postponement, I understand the senior experts series of hearings begin on the 19th with East Asia and the Philippines being the focal point.

3. If there is anything else we should do to prepare for the 24th, please advise.



H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

Attachments:
As stated

SECRET
Date

17 June 1986

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
5-75

~~SECRET~~

25X1

NIO/Africa
17 June 1986

SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing

US security policy for Sub-Saharan Africa can be broadly defined as having the objective of facilitating orderly political, economic, and social development in Africa so that the region does not become a growing and long-term liability to the United States and a cockpit for external, especially Soviet Bloc, involvement. This Administration's assistance programs reflect the traditional US emphasis on economic development, with the various manifestations of economic assistance holding a 4-to-1 ratio over military assistance. In more specific security terms, this policy breaks out into US interest in internal and external security threats, and these represent the major foci of intelligence collection/analysis efforts.

Under the rubric of internal security, in recent years both collection and analysis have emphasized economic problems and factors as well as the more traditional objectives of examining political interrelationships and government capabilities and intentions. The dominant reality in Africa in the 1980s is the massive and fundamental economic crisis facing virtually the entire continent and its impact on the societies and governments in Africa. The destabilizing aspects of growing economic distress are profound and, for example, played a major part in the extra-constitutional changes of government in Nigeria, Sudan, and Guinea in the past year. Virtually every government in Africa faces increasing stresses arising from economic factors.

Since 1983, external meddling in Africa has also increased, led by Libya and the USSR. Libyan subversion has spread to a dozen African states and overt Libyan military aggression has occurred in Chad and Sudan. Increased Soviet military engagement in Africa since 1983 has also occurred, with over \$4.5 billion in Soviet military aid sent. Soviet involvement in defending its political/ideological clients in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique from domestic insurgencies has significantly increased. The presence of 40,000 Cuban troops in expeditionary forces mostly in Angola has added leverage to this renewed Soviet destabilization of the continent.

The increase in Libyan and Soviet meddling, combined with the continuing Cuban military presence, has required the allocation of scarce collection and analytical resources to monitor these difficult targets. Special mention must also be made in South Africa, the continent's dominant power, which is of strategic significance to the United States. US policy promotes political and social reform away from apartheid in South Africa and seeks to defuse both internal violence and regional cross-border violence. A number of forces and processes are

1

~~SECRET~~

25X1


SECRET



25X1

unfortunately at play within South Africa and within the southern African subregion which act against these policy objectives, and additional resources have been committed to define and assess these negative forces and processes.

The intractability of Africa's economic problems will require a continued heightened awareness of and focus on economic collection and analysis for the next several years. The renewed emphasis of the Soviet Union on militarily assisting their beleaguered clients serves as an important indicator of Soviet intentions in the Third World and will require the continued application of scarce resources to monitor and assess. The continued subversive activities of Qadhafi's regime will also pose new demands on our resources.



25X1

SECRET



25X1

~~SECRET~~

17 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT: Regional Security Policy for Latin America

REFERENCE: Your memorandum dated 16 June 1986,
Subject: SSCI Hearing

1. US regional security policy for Latin America has the following major objectives:

- A region free of Soviet-dominated or other hostile governments which would require a significant commitment of defense resources.
- Stable and democratic political systems and institutions that are capable of dealing with local social, economic and security problems and are amenable to cooperating with the US on regional and global problems.
- Cooperative bilateral relations to enable the US and the South American countries to deal effectively with mutual concerns and to collaborate on international issues. Activities in South America can have an important direct impact on issues that affect US security and society (narcotics trafficking, foreign debt, counter-terrorism, and illegal immigration are perhaps the most outstanding examples).
- Stable and viable economic systems which, within the context of interdependence, are capable of providing for the basic needs of their peoples.
- Protection of major US trade and investment and access to raw materials.

In support of the above objectives, the US is particularly concerned with preventing the spread of Soviet and Cuban influence in the region and insuring that the Sandinistas are not able to establish another Cuba on the Central American mainland.

~~SECRET~~

25X1

Page Denied

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

17 June 1986

NOTE FOR: AC/NIC - H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

FROM: NIO/EA

SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing

Attached please find my contribution
for the Wednesday SSCI Hearing.


Carl Ford

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SSCI Hearing -- East Asia

- The regional security policy for East Asia includes these principle features:
 - Defending the vital interests of the United States from potential threats posed by the Soviet Union. This particularly includes securing the well-being of allies such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and our other friends in the region.
 - Promoting stability on the Korean peninsula, particularly by maintaining sufficient force to deter a North Korean attack against the South.
 - Promoting improvement in the political situation in the Philippines, especially by assisting the new government in resisting a Communist takeover by force.
 - Securing the peace, tranquility, and friendship of the ASEAN states, including supporting their lead in an effort to resolve the Indochina imbroglio.
 - Encouraging the further development of a positive and cooperative relationship with the People's Republic of China.
 - Continuing to maintain good, cooperative relations with Australia and New Zealand, with the latter insofar as possible under the strains posed by Prime Minister Lange's port call ban.
 - Through economic, diplomatic, and other instruments of power, securing the Sea Lines of Communication, and other key economic and political interests of the United States in the Pacific Basin.
- The implications of this for intelligence collection and production include the following:
 - There must be continuing high priority given to Soviet military, diplomatic, economic, and propaganda activities in East Asia, and a wide variety of intelligence assets must be unceasingly dedicated against these activities. Of particular import will be the growth of Soviet military power in the region. National Intelligence Estimates and other intelligence products will continue to give the highest priority to these Soviet activities.
 - The intelligence community is now devoting special attention to the situation in Korea. A special Korean analytic group now meets bi-monthly and can meet more frequently if the need arises. Additionally, a SNIE was completed recently on Soviet-North Korean relations, and another is now underway on the situation in the South. This problem will continue to receive high priority.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- Last year, the community produced four SNIEs on the Philippines, and another one assessing the Aquino government after its first six months in office is now under way. The special Philippine Analytic Group continues to meet regularly. The situation in the Philippines will continue to command considerable resources and attention.
- The community is also now examining the situation in several ASEAN countries, particularly the issues of leadership succession and political stability. A SNIE on Thailand is now under preparation. The Indochina problem has been the subject of two SNIEs and further work is planned.
- Two Estimates have just been completed on China, one on the succession to Deng, and another on the prospects for China's reforms. Another on China's defense policy is now being drafted. The community will continue to regularly evaluate the situation in China as changes there have a potential to affect US interests.



25X1

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

17 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chairman, NIC
FROM: Daniel K. Webster
National Intelligence Officer for NESAs
SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing

1. American security policy in the Middle East is structured to support four major US foreign policy goals in the Area:

- The maintenance of an unimpeded flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the West.
- The continued existence and security of a democratic Israel.
- The limitation of the presence, control, and influence in the region of the Soviet Union and its surrogates.
- The encouragement of the Arab-Israeli peace process to provide the basis for long-term peace and stability of the region.

2. In the pursuit of these goals, major obstacles continue to be encountered:

- State supported terrorism, with Libya, Syria, and Iran as the primary practitioners.
- Widespread conflict, including major wars such as the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War.
- The Soviet presence and influence in key states of the region, including Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and South Yemen.
- The lack of significant recent progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

3. A great deal of intelligence collection and analysis is focused on this troubled region because the above obstacles put US security objectives at constant risk. The Intelligence Community dedicates considerable assets to:

~~SECRET~~


CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR

SECRET

- Military targets, including developments in the Iran-Iraq war, the Syrian and Israeli military buildup, the Soviet assistance to client states and its military presence in Afghanistan, and a variety of low intensity conflicts.
- Soviet political, military, and intelligence penetration of the region, and support and involvement in terrorism.
- The political dynamics surrounding the peace process, including the stated positions and hidden agendas of key players, and the effect of regional developments.
- The stability of regional states--especially Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--that are key to US policy objectives.
- Intentions and actions of states who undermine US objectives in the Middle East--particularly Libya, Syria and Iran--through terrorism, threats to the free flow of oil, efforts to sidetrack the peace process, or other actions.
- Terrorist groups, methods, support networks and intentions.

4. Trends and changes in the region: There are several trends in the Middle East area which have significant implications for US policy, and for intelligence collection and analysis:

- The uneven distribution of oil wealth has magnified differences between the "haves" and "have nots." Further economic problems and dislocations have been introduced with the oil price collapse, with consequent potentially severe social and political stress and increased opportunities for foreign meddling and interference in the region.
- Beginning with--but not limited to--the Iranian revolution of 1979, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in a variety of forms is on the increase. Much of the Islamic fundamentalism, even in its most benign form, exhibits anti-Western, specifically anti-US, characteristics.




25X1

SECRET

SECRET



25X1


Daniel K. Webster

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	6/18/86
TO:		AC/NIC	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
REMARKS:			
FROM:			
NIO/USSR			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
7E6Z	HQS.		

FORM NO. 1 FEB 56 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

STAT

~~SECRET~~ The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

25X1

National Intelligence Council

NIC #02907-86
18 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for Regional Security Policy

1. The SSCI hearings on this subject look like an inquiry into the so-called Reagan Doctrine...which isn't yet really a doctrine (i.e., a coherent policy) but rather a general aspiration (support anti-communist resistance movements to help block Soviet expansionism) and a set of disconnected programs. A number of critics are probably interested in using any door, of which intelligence support is one, to get into the core issue: Does the Administration know what it is doing, the costs and risks it is incurring, and how far it is prepared to go? The answer is probably "no"...at least, not yet. And this will be a more troublesome issue for any witnesses on this subject than the plusses and minus of intelligence support.

2. The onset of these hearings might well be used as an occasion to press the NSC principals into forming a more coherent policy and policy process on this matter, i.e., defining what the doctrine really is. Among the many issues which need to be addressed, the following are most important:

What are the criteria for deciding which anti-communist resistance movements are worthy of support?

What political, paramilitary, logistics, and other instrumentalities must we develop to be seriously in this business? Just giving supplies to the "good guys" is almost certainly not enough.

How do we manage our relations with resistance movements and with the crucial "interface allies" (e.g., Honduras, Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand) to maximize resistance effectiveness, prevent allies from being destabilized or our policy from becoming hostage to pariah governments, and strike the right balance between assuring our necessary influence and avoiding an "Americanization" of the conflict in question?

~~SECRET~~

1

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Even if the several conflicts addressed by the Reagan Doctrine intensify because of escalating US and Soviet support to respective clients, the costs and risks to the Soviets are still relatively modest and bearable. After all, backing Leninist regimes is the core, albeit not the whole, of Soviet policy in the Third World. How far are we prepared to go to drive up the costs and the risks (escalation, confrontation, damage to other Soviet interests) to the USSR? How far do we go in backing neighboring allies against Soviet or surrogate reprisals and pressures?

How do we manage our overall political relations with the USSR on these "regional security" issues? How much linkage do we press? Does it make any sense to talk at the Soviets about "negotiations among the local warring parties" since these tend to be uncompromisable battles over political legitimacy and power?

It would be helpful if our witnesses could testify that the Administration is currently examining these issues.

Intelligence Support Relating to the USSR

3. There is good, mixed, and bad news.

The good news is that we are in a fairly strong position to follow general Soviet policy toward the Third World and toward specific regimes, including the Leninist clients. We do this by tracking leadership pronouncements, diplomatic relations, aid flows, and elite debates about Soviet doctrine.

The latter are a bit out of harmony with actual Soviet behavior lately. Some Soviet specialists on the Third World are arguing that the Leninist clients are poor investments, while the big countries are more important (Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia). Soviet policy clearly rejects the first, but accepts the second point.

We have a mixed picture with respect to understanding Soviet tactics, especially military tactics, for managing the counter-insurgency business. Part of the problem is that the Soviets themselves are still learning...and probably getting better. We have a good deal of data here, but need to focus some analytic resources on exploiting it. Lack of a clear policy from the NSC level has given us little incentive to do this so far.

4. In my opinion, the bad news is in the area of the close-in political relations among the Soviets, their allies (such as Cuba) and the individuals, factions, and tribes who make up the Leninist clientele. These politics are tricky and volatile for the Soviets. In almost all cases they face risks of being set back or even blown out of their position by coups or factional strife. This is why they strive so mightily to turn small Leninist Mafiosi into full-blown Leninist parties, to create instruments of control, not social progress.

SECRET


2

25X1

5. Because our aim is, presumably, to maximize the impact of necessarily rather weak resistance movements, we have a keen interest in learning when and how we can have an influence in the fractious politics of the enemy side, or at least exploit their divisions. We are not in a good position to do this now. We need a program to improve. But that requires some guidance from the policymaker as to where to focus our efforts, beyond the current obvious cases of Afghanistan and Nicaragua. For example, are we going to get seriously into the cases of Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen?

A Concluding Thought

6. In terms of positive intelligence, meeting the requirements of the Reagan Doctrine to-be will be a difficult but managable task. For CIA, a far more contentious and costly issue is how and how much to build from the current level of effort toward the full-blown paramilitary competence which is probably demanded by the Doctrine.


Fritz W. Ermarth

cc: DDI
DDO
D/SOVA
NIO/EA
NIO/EUR
NIO/AF
NIO/LA
NIO/GPF
NIO/CT
NIO/NESA