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them on a long-term basis, it will be a very significant stimulus to a very sick U.S. shipbuilding industry. The private sector will build; the taxpayers will lease. It is a very good arrangement for both.

Mr. President, I know of no objection to this legislation. I believe it is cleared on both sides. I urge its adoption.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished Senator from California for a very fine amendment which permits the Secretary of the Navy to use his authority under title 10 to lease and charter tankers to support naval requirements. This side supports the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there other Senators desiring to speak to the amendment?

If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 721) was agreed to.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. WILSON. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I believe that we are awaiting the arrival on the floor of others with amendments that will be acceptable to both sides. In view of that, and rather than suggesting the absence of a quorum, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to proceed as though in morning business for 5 minutes for the limited purpose of introducing a bill totally unrelated to this subject matter and for very brief remarks in connection with the introduction of such a bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The remarks of Mr. DIXON will appear later in the RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Idaho.

AMENDMENT NO. 722

(Purpose: To void certain agreements relating to the site of the Soviet Union's embassy in the District of Columbia)

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, are we setting aside temporarily the Weicker amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous agreement, the vote on

the amendment of Senator McCAIN will occur at 6 p.m.

Mr. BYRD. And the amendment by Senator WEICKER is not required to be temporarily set-aside?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Weicker amendment will recur after the vote on Senator McCAIN's amendment, as matters now stand. The Weicker amendment will recur after the vote on Senator McCAIN's amendment.

Mr. BYRD. We will have to make a different arrangement.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. Leader, might I help with the order. This amendment that I am offering will require a roll-call vote. I assume that the leader would want to set that vote to follow the other votes that are stacked at 6 o'clock.

Mr. BYRD. Yes, I would like to do that.

Mr. President, for the moment, I suggest we proceed with the amendment by Mr. SYMMS. I think he has already gotten consent to have that amendment offered.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might just interrupt for a moment, in listening I certainly concur with the majority leader that we have to work out some arrangement that was consistent with the understanding last night in connection with the Weicker amendment and the right for the majority leader to at the appropriate time put in a substitute.

Mr. BYRD. Yes.

Mr. WARNER. We will work in cooperation with the Senator.

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Idaho yield just a moment to me?

Mr. SYMMS. Certainly. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. DIXON. May I say to my friend from Idaho that we have quickly examined the amendment. The content would indicate that some of the folks on the Foreign Relations Committee ought to have a look at it. So I do not know how long the Senator will take, but may I say to him that we will require some time over here to determine what our ultimate position will be. But I suspect that some on this side will want to oppose that amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, let the clerk read the amendment. Following the reading, I will make some comments about the amendment.

The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Idaho [Mr. SYMMS] proposes an amendment numbered 722:

At the appropriate place in the bill, add the following:

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) Soviet espionage agents have installed listening devices in the structure of the new American embassy in Moscow in blatant defiance of the spirit of the embassy agree-

ments and certain recognized norms of international relations;

(2) this Soviet espionage effort has been so extensive and insidious as to require the virtual rebuilding of a large part of the new American embassy in Moscow, the construction of which has cost American taxpayers tens of millions of dollars;

(3) it is well known that Soviet espionage agents intend to use the new Soviet embassy in this country as a platform to conduct highly sophisticated electronic surveillance of the United States Government offices and even the private telephone calls of American citizens;

(4) the purpose of this surveillance can be none other than to undermine the national security of the United States and further the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union;

(5) the location of the new Soviet embassy at a site nearly 350 feet above sea level is ideal for this type of surveillance, having been offered to the Soviets at a time when electronic surveillance techniques and potential were not fully understood in the West;

(6) subsection (b) of 22 U.S.C. 4305 specifically allows the Secretary of State to "require any foreign mission to divest itself of * * * real property * * * where otherwise necessary to protect the interests of the United States"; and

(7) Congress, through enactment of such subsection, has clearly expressed the desire that the Secretary exercise such authority when necessary to protect the vital security interests of the United States.

(b) NEW AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION.—The President shall—

(1) void the current embassy agreements; and

(2) enter into negotiations for a new agreement under which the Soviet Union will move its new embassy to a site in the District of Columbia that is not more than 90 feet above mean sea level.

(c) EMBASSY AGREEMENTS.—For the purposes of this section the term "embassy agreements" means—

(1) the "Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Allocation for Use Free of Charge of Plots of Land in Moscow and Washington", entered into force on May 16, 1969; and

(2) the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Conditions of Construction of Complexes of Buildings of the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow and the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington", entered into force on December 4, 1972.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, this is an issue that the Senate has previously visited this year. It was Vote No. 215 on July 30, 1987. At that time, this amendment was offered in the form of a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, whereas today it is offered as an amendment to the Armed Services Committee bill. But just to refresh the memory of Senators, Senator PELL moved to table this amendment. The motion to table was rejected by a vote of 71 to 26. This was originally offered as an amendment to the human rights to Haiti resolution that the distinguished Senator from Florida [Mr. GRAHAM] had offered and was then set aside. It was subsequently separated from Senate Resolution 248 by unanimous consent and was considered as a

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freestanding resolution, Senate Resolution 261. This resolution also passed unanimously by a voice vote. I want to remind my colleagues of this. I will be very brief in my explanation of it.

Soviet espionage agents have installed listening devices in the structure of the new American Embassy in Moscow, defying blantly the spirit of the Embassy agreements and certain recognized norms of international relations. It is well known that Soviet espionage agents intend to use the new Soviet Embassy in this country as a platform to conduct highly sophisticated electronic surveillance to undermine United States national security. The location of the new Soviet Embassy was offered to the Soviets at a time when electronic surveillance techniques and the potential for their further development were not fully understood by the West. So the amendment would very simply have the State Department do what it already has the authority to do. It would void the current Embassy agreements. Then, there would be negotiations for a new agreement under which the Soviet Union will move its Embassy to a site in the District of Columbia that is not more than 90 feet above mean sea level.

I know there will be people who oppose this amendment. They will argue that the Soviets originally wanted to locate a new Embassy at Chevy Chase. We objected, and then they chose the site in midtown Washington; we objected again, and subsequently the Mount Alto site was found and the United States was in favor of their building an Embassy on that site.

That may well be the case. But I think the record clearly shows that the proper course of action for our new Embassy in the Soviet Union would be to raze that Embassy. The next step should then be to have us move the Soviets out of the building they are moving into—where they are setting up all their spying apparatus. I believed we should renegotiate new agreements, the building that the Soviets now have could be put to some other good use. Whether we want to make it available for the Salvation Army, for the homeless or whomever, I do not know. But it could be put to some use other than where it would be used to spy on the Pentagon, the White House, the Capitol of the United States, the State Department, and other areas. So it is very self-explanatory. I think all Senators have had an opportunity to look at the issue. They have all voted on it once.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. SYMMS. I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the amendment take place immediately following the McCain amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am seeking recognition to comment on the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator object?

Mr. McCAIN. I reserve the right to object, Mr. President.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the Symms amendment deals with the United States-Soviet agreement on location of embassies. This issue is properly within the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and is dealt with in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1987. That bill is on the calendar and I expect will be taken up promptly.

I therefore urge my colleague from Idaho to withdraw his amendment and to resubmit it during Senate consideration of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. If he is unwilling to do so, I hope the Senate will defeat the Symms amendment.

The Foreign Relations Committee will hold a closed briefing on the United States-Soviet Embassy agreement and on the threat from Mount Alto on Tuesday afternoon. Further, the administration is currently engaged in a process of consultation on the future of the new U.S. Embassy complex in Moscow. Any action we take with regard to Mount Alto is certain to lead to a Soviet response against our facilities in Moscow.

The marginal gain to the Soviet Union from the Mount Alto location may well be far less than commonly imagined. The damage to U.S. national security interests from being ousted from our new facility in Moscow could be very substantial.

These issues cannot be discussed in public session on the floor of the U.S. Senate. For this reason the Foreign Relations Committee—the committee of jurisdiction—will consider these matters in detail in Tuesday's closed session. I invite interested colleagues to attend.

In the interim I urge defeat of the Symms amendment, because it could do serious, albeit unintended, damage to the national security of the United States. The Senate will have ample opportunity to revisit the issue during consideration of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am not sure that all interested Members here have had an opportunity to discuss this very important amendment. Frankly, I am not clear about the parliamentary procedure.

But I would request that Members be given an opportunity to debate and discuss my colleague's amendment.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I want to join my friend from Arizona. It appears there was an earlier rollcall on this earlier this year. Frankly, it appears this Senator voted with the Senator from Idaho. It also appears how-

ever that some on this side opposed this amendment. It is sort of uniquely a Foreign Relations Committee question more than a question for our committee. This side has informed the chairman and others on the Foreign Relations Committee of the pendency of this amendment.

I dislike closing off debate on the amendment, Mr. President, in the event that others from this side might want to be heard against the amendment although this Senator has no reason to be heard against the amendment. So I wonder if the Senator from Idaho might accommodate us.

Mr. SYMMS. It is not the Senator from Idaho's intention to close off debate. I wanted to get the procedure in line, I say to my good friend, so we will vote on this amendment as I requested in my unanimous-consent request after the stacked votes. If we want to debate it here for the rest of the day, that is all right with me. I do not care.

If I could add one little bit of information that I neglected. On the resolution that has been introduced into the Congress, not on this amendment, the cosponsors of that resolution are Senators BYRD, CONRAD, HELMS, NICKLES, GRASSLEY, and McCAIN. On the resolution it carries the same thrust and text of this amendment.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I believe I still have the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order that further debate be made on this amendment pending agreement that a recorded vote be allowed on the amendment by the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I hope not to object, there is no objection at all for going on and debating this amendment, whatever the Senator would choose. The Senator from Connecticut has been cooperative in coming over. He has been working out an amendment that will not take very long, I do not believe. Perhaps we could have that one go first depending on the Senator from Idaho.

I would like to have time to alert those people who know the most about this amendment which would be the Foreign Relations Committee on both sides of the aisle and the intelligence people on both sides of the aisle so if they choose to be heard they can come over. I have no objections whatsoever to getting a vote on this amendment after 6 o'clock this evening.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the request of the Senator from Idaho. Is there objection?

Mr. NUNN. Would the Chair state the unanimous-consent request?

Mr. SYMMS. The unanimous-consent request, Mr. President, that I thought was already agreed to—maybe it has not been.

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. It has not been agreed to.

Mr. SYMMS. The unanimous-consent request is that the vote on the Symms amendment occur immediately following the vote on the McCain amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. NUNN. I have no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMMS. I thank my distinguished chairman and the manager of the bill, and the distinguished Senator from Arizona.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have a parliamentary inquiry. Are we going to move to the Dodd amendment at this time and still allow time for further debate on the Symms amendment, or are we going to continue with the Symms amendment, dispose of debate on the Symms amendment, and then move to the Dodd amendment?

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Arizona, if he will yield, anyone can get the floor and any amendment is in order at this time. What I would suggest is we take the Dodd amendment first, if the Senator from Idaho is agreeable to that, and if the Senator from Connecticut gets the floor that could perhaps be disposed of rather quickly. We will send out word that the Symms amendment will be the next amendment and get the parties here. Then we will take that one up, debate it, and if we cannot get a time agreement to debate, fine. If not, perhaps we could conclude debate and have the votes stacked a little later.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's amendment would have to be set aside to proceed with the other amendment.

Mr. NUNN. That would be up to the Senator from Idaho. Would he be willing to temporarily set this aside for a very brief time to take up the Dodd amendment? It is my understanding the Dodd amendment will not take very long.

Mr. DODD. If the Senator will yield, the Senator is correct.

Mr. McCAIN. We already agreed to vote.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, the Senator from Idaho has no objection as long as we are going to vote on my amendment immediately following the vote on the McCain amendment. It is up to the managers of the bill.

Mr. NUNN. If he would agree to temporarily lay his amendment aside, it would be my hope we could get to it in 15 minutes and we could go ahead and begin debate on it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Connecticut.

AMENDMENT NO. 723

(Purpose: Concerning United States policy with respect to Panama)

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] for himself, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. DURENBERGER, Mr. D'AMATO, and Mr. KERRY, proposes an amendment numbered 723.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 114, between lines 13 and 14, insert the following new section:

SEC. . POLICY TOWARD PANAMA.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—
(1) the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the Government of Panama are now under the influence and control of the Panamanian Defense Forces;

(2) a broad coalition of church, business, labor, civic, and political groups have joined to call for an objective and thorough investigation into the allegations concerning serious violations of law by certain officials of the Government of Panama and the Panamanian Defense Forces, and have insisted that General Noriega and others involved relinquish their official positions until such an investigation has been completed.

(3) the Panamanian people continue to be denied the full rights and protections guaranteed by their constitution, as evidenced by continuing censorship and the closure of the independent media, arrests without due process, and instances of excessive force by the Panamanian Defense Forces; and

(4) political unrest and social turmoil in Panama can only be resolved if the Government of Panama begins to demonstrate respect for and adherence to all provisions of the Panamanian constitution.

(b) Policy.—Therefore, it is the sense of the Congress that the United States should—

(1) cease all economic and military assistance provided pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act to the Government of Panama, except that the United States should continue to make available assistance to meet immediate humanitarian concerns,

(2) suspend all shipments of military equipment and spare parts to the Government of Panama or to any of its agencies or institutions, and

(3) prohibit the importation of sugars, syrups, or molasses that are products of Panama into the United States and to reallocate among other foreign countries such quantities of sugar, syrups, and molasses that would have been imported from Panama but for such prohibition;

unless no later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this act—

(1) the Government of Panama has demonstrated substantial progress in the effort to assure civilian control of the armed forces and that the Panama Defense Forces and its leaders have been removed from nonmilitary activities and institutions;

(2) the Government of Panama has established an independent investigation into allegations of illegal actions by members of the Panama Defense Forces;

(3) a nonmilitary transitional government is in power; and

(4) freedom of the press and all other constitutional guarantees to the Panamanian people are restored.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, there is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution that addresses itself to the issue of the preconditions in Panama. This is an amendment that I have worked on with my colleagues here over the last several days in an attempt to come up with language that, I believe, is acceptable to all sides.

It is an amendment that will put the Congress, particularly the Senate, on record, concerning the ongoing unrest and political instability in Panama and to spell out in very simple and clear terms what most of us in this Chamber believe to be the appropriate response by the United States as we look to the days ahead.

The future of democracy, Mr. President, in Panama is being seriously threatened by the flatering commitment of the Panamanian Government to democratic institutions, procedures, and values. It is being threatened by a military establishment that unfortunately has forgotten what its responsibility is to the people of Panama; namely, the defense of that nation—not the plundering of the treaty which is what they have been engaged in.

A broad-based coalition of the Panamanian society has said that enough is enough. Businessmen and labor leaders, students and teachers, peasants and priests, civic leaders and political organizers, have taken to the streets over recent months and weeks to demand respect for basic civil liberties, and a return to democratic processes guaranteed by the Panamanian constitution.

Mr. President, the United States and this body cannot ignore their plea. We must demonstrate in very concrete terms that we are prepared to do our part on their behalf. At the very least, we must speak out on their behalf and let them know that we are going to take very concrete actions that go beyond the sense-of-the-Senate resolution; that go beyond just the firing the shot across the bow, as we say through resolutions that merely threaten certain actions if there is not change. Rather, this resolution spells out very clearly what the next steps will be if there is not that change and those steps will be taken very quickly and very dramatically.

We must demonstrate, Mr. President, in very certain terms, that we are not going to let this Congress, this session of this Congress, complete its action without taking those steps if there is not some change.

This amendment, Mr. President puts General Noriega and his cohorts on notice that unless there is evidence of a renewed commitment to democratic processes and procedures, including firm civilian control over the Panamanian defense forces, the U.S. Congress will take the following very specific legislative action within 45 days after the enactment of these provisions.

No. 1, Mr. President, this resolution says we will stop all economic and mili-

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tary assistance of the Government of Panama. No. 2, we will halt all shipments of military equipment and spare parts to the Government of Panama. And No. 3, we will revoke Panama's sugar quota and reallocate it to other nations.

Mr. President, the first action, the stopping of all economic and military assistance, means that any new requests would be terminated or would be denied.

The second proposal, the halting of all shipments of military equipment and spare parts, means that regardless of whether or not there has been any agreement, any military equipment or spare parts sitting on docks waiting to be shipped, for example, would not be shipped. Thus, it would affect existing contracts.

The third proposal, of course, the revoking of the sugar quota and the reallocation of it to other nations, is designed to tell the private sector, if you will, in Panama—many of whom have remained silent or have supported, unfortunately, some of the activities of the Panamanian Government—that our actions will go beyond public assistance or governmental assistance government-to-government. Rather, they will learn that we are prepared to also deal with issues that affect them directly as private concerns in that country.

Mr. President, I hope that the leaders of Panama will be listening to what we say here today.

It would be disgraceful and unfortunate if we were to have to take these actions.

All we are saying today is that if there is no improvement, this is the next round. The next shot will not be across the bow. The next shot will be aimed directly and targeted to Panama.

I hope the Senate will adopt the amendment by an overwhelming vote and that the other steps will not be necessary. General Noriega has 45 days before the continuing resolution or an appropriations bill comes before this body, but the Senate will not adjourn in this calendar year 1987 without taking specific action against Panama if they fail to take the steps we have outlined in this proposal. The situation is serious. We want to let the Panamanians know that we are serious. This amendment provides that kind of notice.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we wish to commend the distinguished Senator from Connecticut. Throughout his career as a public servant, he has devoted a great deal of time to issues in this hemisphere. While we sometimes do not always agree with him, we respect his knowledge and his study of these issues. In this particular

instance, we are prepared to support him wholeheartedly.

It is my understanding that the Senator from Connecticut worked with the distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HELMS], and the Senator from New York [Mr. D'AMATO], and that this amendment reflects a work product of a bipartisan nature. Indeed, I think it is one that will gain the full support of this body.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I join the Senator from Virginia [Mr. WARNER] in supporting this amendment.

First, I should like to express my appreciation to the Senator from Connecticut, as the chairman of the commission appointed by this body to monitor the peace efforts in Central America, for the courtesy and kindness extended to me as we have worked together in seeking not only to monitor but also to assist in the efforts for peace in Central America.

I am aware, as I know my friend from Connecticut is, that there will be times when we are in disagreement. But I believe that we have indicated that a very sensitive and difficult issue can be addressed in a bipartisan fashion.

I think his commitment to peace in Latin America and his involvement and expertise in these affairs is indicated by this very carefully crafted sense-of-Congress amendment. I emphasize that it is a sense-of-Congress amendment. There will be some people, as I am sure the Senator from Connecticut is aware, who believe that this is not strong enough. I think the Senator from Connecticut has just responded to those criticisms by stating unequivocally that within 45 days, before the Senate adjourns, action will be taken concerning the situation in Panama, whether it be primarily appropriations or other methods.

This situation that is existing in Panama today cannot be allowed to continue for a longer period of time. The people in Panama are suffering a deprivation of basic human rights which is unacceptable in this hemisphere, as we focus all our attentions on Nicaragua and El Salvador—and that attention is well deserved, I might add.

I should like to express my appreciation again to the Senator from Connecticut for bringing attention to the deplorable conditions existing in Panama. It appears that this condition is not showing the slightest improvement. I think this Nation can be proud of our record for two administrations, both the Carter and the Reagan administrations, in the fostering of human rights and democracy in Latin America. Eight nations, to my knowledge, have gone from totalitarian governments to freely elected ones, and this defies the predictions of many so-called experts on Latin American af-

fairs. I suggest that not only does the credit go to the Carter administration and the Reagan administration but also to Members of this body, including the Foreign Relations Committee, who have devoted much effort in that direction.

The fact is that not only must we insure that the people in Latin America who have already achieved their human rights and basic freedoms—which we all cherish—maintain those, but also, we must move forward and work together to see that that also takes place and that that evolution takes place in other parts of Latin America, including Panama—which, by the way, happens to be the country of my birth, the Canal Zone, which is an area now of the Panamanian nation.

So, I want to congratulate my friend from Connecticut.

Also, it should be of interest to Members of this body and to the Panamanian Government that this amendment has widespread support on both sides of the aisle. There is not a sharp division. There may be unanimous agreement, but I think you will find overwhelming support when we have the vote later this evening.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona and the distinguished Senator from Virginia for their kind comments.

I would be remiss if I did not say that if there are any commissions or committees appointed here, the extent to which they are successful is because the Members make them successful. I traveled to Latin America this past weekend and I feel fortunate to have as a cochairman someone who is thoughtful and as committed to these issues as I am. We hope that the efforts in Central America will be as successful as our commission in the coming weeks. I am grateful to the Senators for their comments.

I think it is important that the remarks of the Senator from Arizona be emphasized, that this is a strong bipartisan effort. The Senator from Arizona is absolutely correct. There are others who wanted to make this a statute, to make this a part of law, to stop all military and economic assistance now, and to cut off the sugar quota now. It is hard to argue with them, given the events of the last few months in Panama; but we would like to give the Panamanian Government one more opportunity to demonstrate that they are going to change. If they do not, this Senate will join the forces that have argued for a permanent prohibition against assistance and the sugar quota.

In the past, I have been a little negative about some of the restrictions we wanted. I felt that we may be going too far and that we were going to end up with a self-fulfilling prophecy. But I am convinced today that these leaders in Panama have not taken us seriously, and I hope that this resolution

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time ago and there are concerns about an electronic safety device and the possibility of its vulnerability, but I have every confidence that these differences can be worked out between the Department of the Army and our staffs and Congress so that we can embark on this very important effort in safeguarding these missiles if they should happen to fall into the wrong hands and preventing them from being used. I strongly support this amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to support this amendment and will accept it. I would make a couple of comments in the meantime, however.

I congratulate the senior Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeCONCINI] for offering this amendment. It is something that has bothered us for a long time. Can Stinger missiles that might fall out of inventory and into the wrong hands be used for purposes of terrorism or whatever? How can we stop that? That is the problem the Senator is trying to address. I might add that in the Governmental Affairs Committee, of which I chair, we have had hearings in which the Comptroller General, Mr. Boucher, has testified that we are having a lot of trouble finding the inventory numbers to match the Stingers that we now have in storage. We cannot locate all of them. If that does not chill you, I do not know what will. Because it means that some of these things may have gotten into terrorists' hands or white supremacy groups or whatever. We do not even know what organizations.

THE STINGER ELECTRONIC SAFETY DEVICES

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I join my friend from Arizona in cosponsoring this amendment and commend him for his diligent work and perseverance on this effort.

I share his concern over the possibility of this type of missile falling into the wrong hands and have considered the horrible consequences of terrorist use.

This amendment properly focuses the resources and efforts of the Army first on the basic Stinger, which is the model being used by those irregular forces we support. While it is encouraging to note the effectiveness with which these irregulars are using the Stinger, the concern is still there that these missiles might be captured, stolen, or otherwise fall into the hands of terrorists.

This amendment also provides funds for the development and demonstration of a safety device for the Stinger with reprogrammable microprocessor.

The Army has indicated that development and demonstration of a safety device for this Stinger configuration might require additional funds and money over and above that provided for in this amendment. Nevertheless, I agree that we should proceed with the development of a device for this configuration also.

The Army has also indicated their concern over the vulnerability of the

Stinger when equipped with a safety device. Is it possible that we might undermine our own missiles with such a device?

We won't know, of course, until we build and test such devices.

This amendment properly provides for development and test of these devices. At some point in the future when we know the results of the tests provided for, then we can consider the questions of whether and how to install, retrofit, or deploy these devices.

With the terrorism that seems to be rampant around the world, we do not want to see Stingers added to that.

Having said that, I want to make absolutely certain that what we are approving today is not in any way a commitment to go ahead with installation of these devices on existing Stinger missiles. It is a study. It brings it through the development stage to see whether it works or not.

I, at the same time that I am for this, also am reminded all too well of the fact that it took us many years to make the Stinger workable, to get it up to the point where it was reliable.

When you start fussing around with systems to turn it off, we want to make absolutely certain that this cannot be back engineered by the Soviets or someone else to find ways of turning it off when we do not intend to turn it off.

There is a difference between the analog systems and the other systems. The analog or the digital system is what I am trying to say. And those require different approaches to them. We want to make certain that now we have the Stingers as a reliable missile we do not set something up that introduces a vulnerability into the system and makes it a less reliable weapon than it now is.

So I am all in favor of what the Senator is trying to do on this because it has been something that we have been concerned about for a long time. But we do have Stingers in second-party hands. Some of those may be able to even be subverted into third-party hands. We do not want to see that used for terrorism or for purposes for which we never intended when the missiles were built or were transferred to someone else.

I understand July 1 is the date by which the distinguished Senator would like to have an answer back on this. That is a very short timeframe to do something like this. I would presume a lot of work is already underway by some of these companies to see that they can meet that July 1 date.

With those comments I will accept the amendment on behalf of the majority. It will provide a demonstration and vulnerability testing without making the commitment to install them on existing Stingers until the results are available.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If not, the question is on agree-

ing to the amendment of the Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeCONCINI].

The amendment (No. 728) was agreed to.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. McCAIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair wants to thank the managers and members of the committee for accepting the amendment.

The clerk will call the roll.

(Mr. BINGAMAN assumed the chair.)

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished junior Senator from Idaho [Mr. SYMMS] and myself be added as original cosponsors to amendment No. 721, earlier agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SANFORD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SYMMS AMENDMENT NO. 722

Mr. SANFORD. Mr. President, I rise to address the distinguished Senator from Idaho's amendment dealing with the Embassy treaties between this country and the Soviet Union.

It is easy for us, as Members of the Senate, to take offense at the efforts of the Soviet Union to plant surveillance devices in our new Embassy in Moscow. It is also appropriate for us to have some concern about the location of the new Soviet Embassy in this country. Certainly it sits on high ground. Certainly the conventional wisdom, if not the technical intelligence wisdom, is that the higher the ground the more you can see and the more you can hear. And so there is some cause for concern about the location of that Embassy.

But the suggestion of the Senator from Idaho that, because of those two conditions, we cancel the two treaties and start over is hardly a realistic approach.

All Members of this body share the Senator's concern for the security of our Embassy in Moscow, and more wish to cast a vote that appears to di-

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AMENDMENT NO. 728

Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Arizona [Mr. DECONCINI], for himself, Mr. NUNN, and Mr. WARNER, proposes an amendment numbered 728.

Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate point in the bill, insert the following provision:

() STINGER ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEM.—Of the funds appropriated pursuant to Section 201(a)(1)(A), not less than \$4,000,000 shall be available solely for purposes of demonstrating and testing alternative electronic safety devices that can be installed or retrofitted on Stinger air defense missiles in both the basic Stinger configuration and the reprogrammable microprocessor configuration. The results of demonstration and testing on the basic Stinger configuration shall be summarized and reported to the Congress not later than July 1, 1988, and the results on the reprogrammable microprocessor configuration not later than January 1, 1989.

Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, this amendment is rather simple and straightforward, and reflects the long-standing interest of many Senators in the issue of Stinger missiles' security protection or lack thereof.

This amendment is cosponsored by the distinguished floor managers of the bill, Senator NUNN and Senator WARNER.

Mr. President, I would like to thank both Senators and their staffs for working with me and my staff on this very important matter that I have been concerned with for several years.

I would also like to take this opportunity to commend the diligent efforts of the Armed Services Committee on both sides of the aisle. There has been a long, hard struggle here. There are so many important things in this bill. Senator NUNN and Senator WARNER, with their leadership, and that of my distinguished colleague from Arizona and the distinguished Presiding Officer, have been very instrumental in writing this bill which is so important for the institution of the Senate as for the U.S. national security.

As a member of the Appropriations Committee, I thoroughly recognize the vital need for this body to authorize defense spending.

Additionally, Mr. President, this bill contains many important provisions and recommends prudent spending levels. Programs such as the Apache helicopter are strongly supported, especially in light of an impending zero-zero option between the United States and the Soviet Union, which makes conventional weapons a crucial variable in Europe. Also, this bill contains

people provisions for our Armed Forces. In particular, I would like to single out the objection that the committee included in the bill to an OMB provision that initiated a test program requiring user fees for outpatient care at military hospitals by military retirees and dependents.

I have opposed this for some time. I submitted a resolution opposing it. We have 22 cosponsors, and so I am grateful to the Armed Services Committee for adopting this objection to that OMB procedure.

Now, Mr. President, the amendment that I have at the desk would direct that not less than \$4 million should be available, out of existing appropriated funds pursuant to section 201(a), solely for purposes of demonstrating and testing alternative electronic safety devices that can be installed or retrofitted on Stinger air defense missiles in both basic and reprogrammable microprocessor configurations. The results of the demonstration and testing on the basic configuration for Stinger shall be summarized and reported not later than July 1, 1988, and the results for the reprogrammable microprocessor configuration not later than January 1, 1989.

Last year Congress provided \$1 million to study the feasibility of developing electronic safety devices for the Stinger. As I have argued on the floor numerous times, this concern for safety measures comes directly from the possibility that Stingers could fall into the wrong hands, into the hands of terrorists, into the hands of enemies that would use them some day, God forbid, against our own forces. This is high technology as we know and there is a great proliferation of this particular weapon system today by our country.

Consequently, in following through on last year's directions from Congress, the Army did let a contract to General Dynamics, the manufacturer of the Stinger, to conduct the study. Two other companies have also initiated proposals to address the safeguarding issue. The Army has issued a contract to General Dynamics to exhibit such a requirement on the Stinger but has failed to release funds to address the need of that contract. So that is like saying it is a good idea but we are not going to do it.

I have monitored the situation over the last year and I have been very displeased with the foot-dragging of the Army and the reluctance to move forward on what Congress directed them to do.

While I am not endorsing nor am I advocating a particular system for safeguarding the Stinger or whether or not we can devise such a system that will protect the Stinger from being disarmed if captured, I am supporting money directed at such research and such development and to test it and to see potentially if this can be properly implemented. As we have read in the press lately, the Stinger is

increasingly being used to support U.S. interests all around the world. This should not eventually be used against us, and if this weapon falls into the wrong hands, I would hope that we will have a system that can disarm it remotely if necessary.

So, Mr. President, ideally the safety device improves the chances of democratic resistance efforts that are permitted to have this weapon as well as our allies who may use it in overt actions and provide us with the safety that if indeed this weapon falls into the hands of the wrong people, it might be disarmed and thereby not used against our own forces, God forbid, some day or against civilian targets.

I thank the manager of the bill, and particularly the Senator presiding, and my colleague from Arizona for considering this amendment.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment by my good friend, Senator DECONCINI, the senior Senator from Arizona. I think it is well to note that he has been concerned about this issue for some years, and I think his concern, frankly, Mr. President, is very well founded. This kind of a weapon in the hands of terrorists can wreak unbelievable havoc. I am reminded of a few years ago when there was an apartment in Rome near the airport that had been occupied by terrorists, and those terrorists were in possession of a very rudimentary missile which was not nearly of the sophistication nor the capabilities of the missile about which we are talking here.

I think there is very little doubt that history shows us that over time any new weapon, no matter how carefully guarded or how careful the owner is in the dispensation of that weapon, sooner or later will come to widespread use. I see no reason why that would not be the case with the Stinger missile. This missile, as I said, in the hands of the wrong people, can cause incredible damage to the lives and property of innocent civilians.

I think it is very clear as recently as a couple nights ago from the speech of the President of Iran at the United Nations that there are people in this world who would seek to inflict damage, death, and injury to American citizens in response to either real or perceived acts on the part of the United States Government.

(Mr. DECONCINI assumed the chair.)

Mr. McCAIN. I think it is clear the paper studies indicate there are two potential technical approaches, neither of which have been demonstrated. The Army indicates and has made a strong case that there is a strong possibility additional funds and additional time—they are talking roughly of 10 months—may be required to fix one of the models of the Stinger missile. It is clear that the Army did let a contract to conduct such a study some

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minish their sense of outrage at this recent spying by the Soviet Union.

But there are implications here that need to be considered. And whether or not this amendment passes tonight, I would like the RECORD to reflect the fact that at some time, in conference or elsewhere, we are going to have to bring more sober thought to the consequences of canceling these two treaties.

This amendment does not require the new Embassy in Moscow to be torn down. That matter is under careful consideration by the administration, which has requested expert advice from a number of people. I am confident that the President is giving very careful thought as to what should be done about the Embassy there and the treaties.

Over the August recess I traveled to Moscow and had the opportunity to view the Embassy complex and discuss the situation with the personnel there. In light of that, I have two observations. First of all, this matter is on the President's desk. We should allow him to study the situation, make a recommendation, and then let's discuss it.

Second, we have moved 175 families into the compound in Moscow. The Soviets have moved into the living quarters of the compound at Mount Alto. At the present time, neither chancery building is occupied.

The effect of canceling these treaties would be that all of these families would have to move out. Well, what difference does it make to the Soviet Union if they have to move their people out? This does not present a large problem for the Soviet families currently living at Mount Alto. They can go to Chevy Chase, they can go on an open market to obtain their living accommodations. But in the Soviet Union, the situation is entirely different. Our people would simply be devastated. In that country, the Government controls all housing. Our people would have to take whatever accommodations the Soviet Union gave them.

I can tell you right now that the morale of the personnel of the American Embassy in the Soviet Union would plummet. If we forced all of those people who have finally found suitable living conditions, where their children can go to day schools, where they can have educational opportunities and recreational facilities, if we move them out in this kind of hasty action, the morale there will not be up to what it has to be if we are to maintain the kind of presence that we need to maintain in Moscow.

So I hope that we could leave the careful determination of this to a hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee. I think this is the kind of issue that needs to be carefully studied and decided. I hope that we do not vote hastily on a course of action that will have such drastic consequences for our people in Moscow.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I believe there is a time agreement on the amendment I am about to offer relating to underground nuclear testing. Is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The agreement provides for a time limit on such an amendment of 2 hours equally divided.

Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Chair.

AMENDMENT NO. 729

(Purpose: To impose certain limitations on underground nuclear testing)

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will have to obtain unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be temporarily set aside.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD] (for himself, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. WIRTH, Mr. DeCONCINI, Mr. PELL, Mr. STAFFORD, Mr. DANFORTH, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. MATSUNAGA, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. PROXMIER, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. KERRY, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. SIMON, Mr. HARKIN, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. METZENBAUM, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. SANFORD, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. FOWLER, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. INOUE, Mr. ADAMS, and Mr. MOYNIHAN) proposes an amendment numbered 729.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 114, between lines 13 and 14, insert the following new section:

SEC. 812. UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The national interest of the United States would be served by the achievement of mutual, verifiable nuclear arms reductions with the Soviet Union and by mutual, verifiable limits on the number and yield of future underground nuclear explosions conducted by both nations.

(2) A 2-year, mutual moratorium by the United States and the Soviet Union on virtually all underground nuclear explosions above a verifiable low-yield threshold would be a crucial first step by both nations

toward achieving the goals described in paragraph (1).

(3) A 2-year, mutual moratorium on underground nuclear explosions above a verifiable low-yield threshold would constitute a good faith step toward fulfilling the obligations of the United States and the Soviet Union under article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty to pursue "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date" and under article I of the Limited Test Ban Treaty to seek "the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground."

(4) A level of weapon reliability sufficient to deter the use of nuclear stockpiles can be maintained at a greatly reduced rate and yield for underground nuclear test explosions.

(5) The task of monitoring the yields of explosions for compliance with a low-threshold moratorium can be made considerably easier by limiting test explosions to one small test area composed of strong-coupling rock, thereby allowing detection-identification of any off-site nuclear explosion, regardless of yield, to serve as sufficient evidence of violation of the moratorium.

(6) A 2-year moratorium on any underground nuclear test which has an explosive power greater than one kiloton could be verified with a high degree of confidence if the current external seismic monitoring network were supplemented by three in-country networks, each composed of four stations, deployed in the vicinity of each nation's primary test site and in regions where peaceful nuclear explosions may have created suitable decoupling cavities in thick salt deposits.

(7) A joint research project between the United States and the Soviet Union to determine the number, type, and locations of additional in-country seismic monitoring stations necessary to verify long-term compliance with the limitations of a low-threshold test ban treaty would contribute significantly to the prospect of concluding such a treaty in the future.

(b) LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING.—(1) Subject to paragraph (2), during the 2-year period beginning 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, funds may not be obligated or expended by any department or agency to conduct an underground nuclear explosion—

(A) with a yield greater than one kiloton, except for two designated test explosions, each with a yield not exceeding 15 kilotons;

(B) in weak-coupling geologic media;

(C) at a location that is not part of a single designated test area; and

(D) unless a public announcement of a proposed explosion has been made at least 30 days before the date of the explosion.

(2) The restriction in paragraph (1) shall cease to apply if—

(A) after the restriction has become effective, the President certifies to Congress that the Soviet Union—

(i) has conducted an underground nuclear explosion having a joint seismic yield estimate which indicates a yield greater than one kiloton, except for two designated explosions with a joint seismic yield estimate indicating a yield not greater than 15 kilotons;

(ii) has conducted an underground nuclear explosion in weak-coupling geologic media; or

(iii) has conducted an underground nuclear explosion at a location that is not part of a single designated test area; or

(B)(i) the President certifies to Congress that the Soviet Union has refused, after the restriction has become effective, to imple-

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ment reciprocal, in-country monitoring arrangements; and

(ii) Congress has enacted a joint resolution approving such certification.

(c) **TERMINATION FOR CERTAIN NEW AGREEMENTS.**—The restrictions on testing contained in subsection (b) shall cease to apply if supplanted by an agreement, accord, or treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union which makes reductions in the number or yield of underground nuclear explosions permitted under treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union signed before January 1, 1987.

(d) **DEFINITIONS.**—For purposes of this section:

(1) The term "designated test area" means an area not exceeding 100 square kilometers within the Soviet Union or the United States, as the case may be, which—

(A) is located within the boundaries of a single existing nuclear weapons testing site in each country;

(B) incorporates competent or water-saturated strong-coupling rock that does not contain closely spaced underground tunnels or a cavity with a radius greater than 20 meters; and

(C) has been the site, before the effective date of the testing restrictions specified in this Act, of five nuclear calibration explosions having a range of of independently determined yields, conducted for the primary purpose of improving the accuracy of seismic monitoring techniques, without the use of diagnostic equipment, except equipment for a Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus Time Experiment (CORRTEX), or any other method of ascertaining the yield of explosions which is mutually agreeable to the United States and the Soviet Union.

(2) The term "joint seismic yield estimate" means a composite estimate at a high confidence level which—

(A) is based on the concurrent employment of several independent methods for calculating yields of explosions at designated test sites using different seismic waves from an underground nuclear explosion; and

(B) has been the subject of a technical report, provided in both classified and unclassified form to the Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Armed Services and on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, conducted by a scientific review panel convened under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and comprised of ten highly qualified seismologists designated as follows:

(i) one by the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(ii) one by the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

(iii) one by the head of the Air Force Technical Applications Center;

(iv) one by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency;

(v) one by the Director of Central Intelligence;

(vi) one by the head of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency;

(vii) one jointly by the directors of the national weapons laboratories;

(viii) one by the Director of the Geological Survey;

(ix) one by the Director of the Office of Technology Assessment; and

(x) one by the President of the National Academy of Sciences.

(3) The term "reciprocal, in-country monitoring arrangements" means arrangements between the United States and the Soviet

Union to supplement national technical means of verification through—

(A) the conduct by either country of up to six on-site inspections on the national territory of the other, each of which shall be allowed to commence within 10 days after the day on which either nation has presented to the other a formal request demonstrating the need for additional information to identify a specific ambiguous event or activity related to apparent violations of the restrictions specified in subsection (b)(1);

(B) designation by each country, not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, of a candidate designated test area, followed by an independent inspection by the monitoring country, beginning not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act and ending not later than 180 days after such date, of—

(i) the geologic and material properties within each candidate designated test area, including the presence and disposition of any underground tunnels and cavities; and

(ii) complete drill cores and logs from five calibration test holes of appropriate depth within each candidate designated test area, the drilling of which has been observed and the locations of which have been selected by the side monitoring that area;

(C) the provision of at least 30 days advance notice of—

(i) the scheduled date, time, depth, and coordinates for each nuclear test explosion of one kiloton or less;

(ii) the scheduled date, time, depth, and coordinates for not more than two explosions, each with a planned yield in excess of one kiloton, but not exceeding 15 kilotons; and

(iii) the coordinates, dates, times, and yields of industrial explosions larger than 20 tons of high explosive to be conducted within the nuclear test-capable areas defined in clause (D);

(D) the emplacement by each country, on the national territory of the other, of twelve high performance seismic stations (four bore-hole instrument packages sited within 1,500 kilometers of each designated test area and eight additional seismic stations in regions where peaceful nuclear explosions may have created suitable decoupling cavities in thick salt deposits) such that the combined internal and external seismic monitoring network of each nation will be capable of detecting and identifying all nuclear explosions with yields exceeding one kiloton—

(i) at known nuclear weapons tests sites of the other country; and

(ii) at sites in the other country having a current capability to accommodate a decoupled nuclear explosion with a yield exceeding one kiloton; and

(E) the conduct of a joint verification study by experts on nuclear test verification techniques from both the United States and the Soviet Union for the purpose of determining the number and locations in both countries of additional in-country seismic monitoring stations needed to monitor long-term compliance with the terms of a low-yield threshold test ban treaty.

(e) **SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING LEGISLATION APPROVING PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION.**—(1) For the purpose of expediting the consideration of a joint resolution referred to in subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii), the procedures specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection shall apply.

(2)(A) For the purposes of subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii), "joint resolution" means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on which a certification by the President under such subsection is received by Congress the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That Congress approves the cer-

tification made by the President, dated _____, with respect to the refusal of the Soviet Union to implement reciprocal, in-country monitoring arrangements in connection with underground nuclear testing," the blank space therein being filled with the appropriate date.

(B) A resolution described in subparagraph (A) introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in subparagraph (A) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. Such a resolution may not be reported before the 8th day after its introduction.

(C) If the committee to which is referred a resolution described in subparagraph (A) has not reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) at the end of 15 calendar days after its introduction, such committee shall be deemed to be discharged from further consideration of such resolution and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(D)(i) When the committee to which a resolution is referred has reported, or has been deemed to be discharged (under subparagraph (C)) from further consideration of, a resolution described in subparagraph (A), it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution, and all points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

(ii) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(iii) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in subparagraph (A), and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(iv) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subparagraph (A) shall be decided without debate.

(v) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in subparagraph (A), that House receives from the other House a resolution described in subparagraph (A), then the following procedures shall apply:

(i) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee.