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pound their task. They realize that it will be difficult to effect deep strategic penetrations against prepared defenses. Although there has been a considerable effort to find a solution to this problem, if anything, the Soviets appear to be moving closer to a strategy of attrition. This is reflected in their growing reliance on artillery and dismounted infantry. There is no evidence that the Soviets have made a conscious decision to fight a war of attrition. Instead, it appears that they are being inexorably drawn in this direction by their efforts to neutralize the growing firepower, both ground-based and air-delivered, available to NATO.

## SOVIET TRAINING AND INITIATIVE

Finally, there is the question of whether the Soviet army has the necessary raw skills. Any army that intends to implement a blitzkrieg must have a highly flexible command structure as well as officers and NCOs at every level of the chain of command who are capable of exercising initiative. A blitzkrieg is not a steamroller; success is ultimately a consequence of able commanders making rapid-fire decisions in the "fog of battle" which enable the attacking forces to make the crucial deep strategic penetrations. Should the Soviets attack NATO, there is a chance that the Soviets will open a hole or holes in the NATO front. Naturally, NATO will try to close those holes and seal off any penetrations as quickly as possible. The key question is: can the Soviets exploit such opportunities before NATO, which is well prepared for such an eventuality, shuts the door? In this battle, the crucial determinant will not be how much firepower the Soviets have amassed for the breakthrough; success will be largely the result of highly skilled officers and NCOs making the decisions that will enable the armored spearheads to outrun NATO's defenses. A blitzkrieg depends on split-second timing since opportunity on the battlefield is so fleeting.

There is substantial evidence that Soviet officers and NCOs are sadly lacking in individual initiative, and furthermore, that the Soviet command structure is rigid.

Their absence is largely the result of powerful historical forces. Fundamental structural change in Soviet society and the Soviet military would be necessary before there would be any significant increase in flexibility and initiative.

Other deficiencies in the Soviet Army cast doubt on the Soviets' capacity to launch a successful blitzkrieg. For example, the Soviets have significant problems with training. Overreliance on training aids and simulators is a factor often cited, and there is widespread feeling that the training process does not satisfactorily approximate actual combat conditions. Training is of special importance for the Soviets since their army is comprised largely of conscripts who serve a mere two years. Moreover, since new conscripts are trained in actual combat units, more than half of the troops in the 19 Soviet divisions in East Germany are soldiers with less than two years of experience. At any one time, a significant number of those troops is either untrained or partially trained. It should also be noted that Soviet soldiers are deficient in map reading, a skill which is of much importance for an army attempting to launch a blitzkrieg.

Finally, one must consider the capabilities of the non-Soviet divisions, which comprise approximately half of the Pact's 57½ standing divisions. Although the Soviet divisions will certainly perform the critical tasks in any offensive, the non-Soviet divisions will have to play a role in the operation. Otherwise, the size of the offensive would have to be scaled down significantly. One cannot say

with any degree of certainty that the East Europeans would be militarily incapable of performing their assigned task or that they would not commit themselves politically to supporting a Soviet-led offensive. The Soviets, however, would have to give serious consideration to the reliability of the East Europeans.

## CONCLUSION

Even if one were to discount these weaknesses of the Soviet Army, the task of quickly overrunning NATO's defenses would be very formidable one. A Pact offensive would have to traverse the obstacle-ridden terrain which covers almost all of Germany and restricts the movement of large armored units. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that NATO has the wherewithal to thwart such an offensive. In short, NATO is in relatively good shape at the conventional level.

Two very important caveats, however, are in order. First, NATO must provide for the continuation of ongoing improvements in its force structure. There is no evidence that the Soviet effort to modernize her forces in Central Europe is slowing down. Therefore, NATO must continue to make improvements if it is to maintain the present balance. It is absolutely essential, for example, that deployment of the American Corps in NORTHAG be completed. It is also imperative that the Belgians, the British, and the Dutch continue to modernize and upgrade their conventional forces. More specifically, these forces, especially the British, must increase the firepower of their individual brigades. And, the Allies need to place more emphasis on improving the sustainability of their forces.

Fortunately, the conventional wisdom is wrong; NATO presently has the capability to thwart a Soviet attack. Unfortunately, too few people recognize this. The second caveat concerns warning time and mobilization. Given NATO's present intelligence capabilities and the Pact's force structure, there is little doubt that NATO would detect a full-scale Pact mobilization almost immediately. Obviously, NATO must ensure that it maintains this capability. Problems arise, however, in circumstances where the Pact pursues a limited mobilization which is somewhat difficult to gauge. Although there are real limits as to how much mobilization the Soviets can achieve before tipping their hand, NATO needs to be especially sensitive to such an eventuality. Moreover, NATO must be prepared to respond to a limited mobilization, even if the evidence of such a mobilization is somewhat ambiguous. This leads to the critical problem of mobilization.

This article highlights how important it is that NATO mobilize its forces immediately after the Pact begins its mobilization. A favorable balance of forces in a crisis will be a function of political as well as military factors.

The real danger is that NATO's leaders will not agree to mobilize in a crisis for fear that such a move might provoke a Soviet attack. The risk of pushing the Soviets to preempt can be reduced, however, by avoiding certain provocative moves and by clearly communicating one's intentions to the other side. Nevertheless, the risk of provoking a Soviet attack by initiating NATO mobilization can never be completely erased. That risk, however, must be weighed against the far greater danger that if NATO does not mobilize, the capability to defend against a Pact attack will be lost. Moreover, once the Pact achieves a decisive superiority because of NATO's failure to mobilize, it would be not only difficult, but very dangerous for NATO to attempt to redress the balance

with a tardy mobilization. Seeing that process set into motion, the Pact would have a very strong incentive to attack before NATO erased its advantage. In short, it is essential that NATO plan for ways to mobilize that do not provoke a Soviet attack, but, at the same time, ensure that NATO does not lose its present capability to defend itself effectively against a Soviet offensive.

## DEATH TO DRUG KING PINS

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I want to get the drug dealers and the drugs out of our homes, our schools, and our communities. I voted to table the amendment that would have imposed a Federal death penalty for certain drug related murders because I do not think it would do the job that must be done.

I want to get the people who carry out the vile and viscious sale of drugs off our streets. I want them caught, convicted, and incarcerated. I'm tired of the havoc that drugs and the drug trade are causing.

However, Maryland law enforcement officials have advised me that with a death penalty in effect they would have additional problems obtaining convictions. I do not want to do anything that makes convictions harder to obtain, so I supported tabling the amendment that added a Federal death penalty for drug related murders.

Mr. President, I support the death penalty in cases of extraordinary or heinous crimes such as treason, terrorism or the murder of a law enforcement officer. If I thought it would help the drug fight, I would consider supporting this amendment. But the people in Maryland who are on the front lines of this fight have told me this sort of proposal will hurt their efforts.

I would support life without parole for drug related murders. We must do everything we can to make sure the furs of the drug trade is lifted.

**EXECUTIVE SESSION—TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES (THE INF TREATY)**

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar Order No. 9, Treaty Document No. 100-11, Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Eliminations of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the INF Treaty), on the understanding that the reading of the treaty proceed through section 17, down to the signatures of the President and the leader of the Soviet Union, at which time there be a temporary dispensation of the reading of the treaty.

That will allow the Senate to get back to a discussion concerning the

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D'Amato amendment on the DOD authorization bill, and we will see where we go from there. That will not waive any Senator's right to insist on the full reading of the treaty, which every Senator has a right at this moment to insist upon. I shall not insist upon going beyond the 17th section. Every Senator has that right. Any Senator who wishes to object to calling off the reading of the treaty can do it. That goes, however, beyond the 17 sections. This, it seems to me, would allow the Senate to utilize the time to good advantage in both respects.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I am not going to object—I just want to nail down that there is no waiver of the point of order implied in this unanimous consent request.

Mr. BYRD. No, there is not.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senate will go into executive session.

The clerk will report the treaty.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

## ARTICLE I

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.

## ARTICLE II

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

2. The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

4. The term "GLCM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.

5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers.

6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.

7. The term "deployment area" means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located.

8. The term "missile operating base" means:

(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

9. The term "missile support facility," as regards intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility or a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility as those terms are defined in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. The term "transit" means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this Treaty, of an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility and a deployment area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility.

11. The term "deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

12. The term "non-deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

13. The term "deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

14. The term "non-deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

15. The term "basing country" means a country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles of the Parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after November 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be "located."

## ARTICLE III

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United

States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.

## ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both Parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented into two phases so that:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 20 months after entry into force of this Treaty:

(i) the number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads;

(ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads;

(iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads;

(iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and

(v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediate-range missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and

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(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated.

## ARTICLE V

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1,000 kilometers.

## ARTICLE VI

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:

(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

## ARTICLE VII

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.

4. The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1,000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1,000 kilometers but not in excess of 5,500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

5. The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs.

8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.

9. The number of missiles each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply:

(a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;

(b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and

(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

11. A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguished from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers.

12. Each Party shall have the right to produce and use for booster systems, which might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launchers of such booster systems shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that:

(a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this Treaty;

(b) such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves;

(c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time; and

(d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty.

## ARTICLE VIII

1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.

3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers, of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall be completed within 25 days.

5. All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of the deployment area.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. Neither Party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities.

8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

9. Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article.

## ARTICLE IX

1. The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notification required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. The Parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

3. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding by informing the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes.

5. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party:

(a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the schedule date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility;

(b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of each change;

(c) notification, except with respect to launchers of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including:

(i) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;

(ii) the elimination site;

(iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and

(iv) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including:

(i) the type of missiles to be eliminated;

(ii) the location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and the number of launches in the series;

(iii) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this treaty; and

(iv) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the Protocol on Elimination, including:

(i) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and

(ii) the date and location of such elimination; and

(f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:

(i) the number of missiles or launchers;

(ii) the points, dates and times of departure and arrival;

(iii) the mode of transport; and

(iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

6. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall notify the other Party, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this Treaty.

## ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection.

3. When a Party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-109G flights. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions.

4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Section IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to this Treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated in situ.

5. Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles.

6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4.

7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missiles operating bases and missile support facilities. A Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:

(a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;

(b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and

(c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

9. If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

## ARTICLE XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party

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and within the territories of basing countries.

3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are thus no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this Article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct:

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and

(b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring:

(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or

(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced.

The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure

that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility for the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment has been completed.

8. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of the Protocol on Elimination.

## ARTICLE XII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or

(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The

Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.

Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

## ARTICLE XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to:

(a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination;

(b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty;

(c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and

(d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty.

## ARTICLE XIV

The Parties shall comply with the Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

## ARTICLE XV

1. This Treaty shall be unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardizing its supreme interests.

## ARTICLE XVI

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

## ARTICLE XVII

1. This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.

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This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, under the agreement that was entered, there will be a momentary temporary dispensation of the further reading of the treaty with no rights of Senators waived, and I take the floor at this time to suggest the absence of a quorum, with the approval of the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, in the hope that we can get some understanding as to where the negotiations are at this point on the D'Amato amendment to the DOD authorization bill. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FOWLER). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the agreement was that the first 17 articles of the treaty would be read down to the signatories, at which time the reading of the treaty would be temporarily held in abeyance with all rights reserved to Senators in the hopes that during that time of reading the first 17 articles, Senators who were working on an agreement anent the D'Amato amendment might be able to reach such an agreement so that the Senate then could dispose of the Department of Defense authorization bill.

Senators are still working on such an agreement and will not be able to conclude that agreement until tomorrow morning at a time when Senator KENNEDY will be here. He is very much involved in that amendment and he cannot come to the Chamber this afternoon.

So we are at the point now where we either have to continue with the reading of the protocols, which will take several hours, or we dispense with further reading of the protocols and perhaps get on with our opening statements.

The Senator from North Carolina is on the floor. He did not raise an objection, but he was in a position to raise an objection, to the calling off of the reading of the treaty at the end of the 1 hour, or such time as was required to read the 17 sections. So I would like to proceed now, if we could, to dispense with the further reading of the protocols.

I will inquire of the distinguished Senator if he has any objection. As a

matter of fact, I will ask unanimous consent for the record, that further reading of the treaty be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. HELMS. Reserving the right to object, and I shall not object, because I am confident the majority leader and the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and I have an understanding. I have no desire to keep the Senate here tonight to read the protocols. On top of that, I talked to the clerk. He is getting a little raspy in his delivery and his Russian is not all that good, and a lot of this is in Russian.

But I would inquire of the majority leader if he would include in his unanimous-consent request that all rights are protected. I may have a couple points of order which I will want to raise at the appropriate time. The unanimous-consent request suits me fine, if I may be protected on that score.

Mr. BYRD. All right. As I understand it, the distinguished Senator would not object to calling off the further reading of the—we will use the word "treaty"—further reading of the treaty and its attending protocols, provided no rights are waived thereby.

Mr. HELMS. Correct.

Mr. BYRD. Which leaves with every Senator any points of order that he otherwise might wish to raise at this particular point.

Mr. HELMS. Well, it is a little bit ticklish about the timing of this, according to my understanding of the rules. But the distinguished majority leader would know more about that.

In any case, just so my rights are protected in that regard, that is fine.

Mr. BYRD. Let me word the request like this and see if it meets with the approval of the Senator.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the treaty be dispensed with, provided that the rights of all Senators are preserved; that no points of order are waived for the remainder of today and up to the point of tomorrow's beginning on the treaty by virtue of this consent request.

This would mean that whatever rights the Senator has or any Senator has at this point would still be preserved to that Senator or any Senator up to and including the moment that the Senate resumes consideration of the treaty tomorrow. So he is in the same position tomorrow morning as he is right now. But this would allow us to dispense with the further reading of the treaty and get on with it. Some of us want to make opening statements today.

And if the Senator wanted in the morning to insist upon further reading of the protocols, he could do that. He could do it right now. This preserves his right for the next several hours until the Senate resumes consideration of the treaty on tomorrow.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, it seems to me that the majority leader has made it abundantly clear and I have no objection whatsoever.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Hearing no objection, the unanimous-consent request is agreed to.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from North Carolina.

Now, I will make this proposal to the distinguished Republican leader that for the remainder of the day—and we will not be able to settle the situation concerning the D'Amato amendment until tomorrow morning. The only thing we can accomplish the rest of the day is to get some opening statements out of the way on the treaty. I would suggest that we equally divide the time for the remainder of this day and that we let the distinguished Republican leader and the majority leader control the time, or their designees. I will yield most of the time to Mr. PELL for the remainder of the day. This would preclude any amendment from being called up today. We might proceed on that basis for the rest of the day.

Mr. EXON. Would the majority leader yield for a question?

Mr. BYRD. Yes, I would be happy to.

Mr. EXON. Does the majority leader anticipate rollcall votes this afternoon? Or have you mentioned that? For the rest of the day?

Mr. BYRD. That is a very good question. I know of no reason why there should be any rollcall votes during the remainder of this day.

Mr. EXON. I thank the majority leader.

Mr. BYRD. I know no reason why there should be and I do not foresee any.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Ms. MIKULSKI). The Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PELL. Madam President, I yield myself such time as I need.

Madam President, I am very pleased that the Senate is now in position to begin consideration of the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter range missiles.

This treaty, known as the INF Treaty, was signed by President Reagan and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, on December 8, 1987, here in Washington. The treaty, together with two protocols and a memorandum of understanding was transmitted to the Senate on January 25, 1988. The Committee on Foreign Relations held a comprehensive series of 29 hearings in January, February, and early March, and heard testimony from more than 50 witnesses. On March 30, 1988, the committee ordered the resolution of ratification, as

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amended by a condition, reported favorably by a 17-to-2 vote.

Prior to its markup, the Committee on Foreign Relations received a report from the Committee on Armed Services concerning the treaty's effect on NATO defense and from the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. ability to monitor and verify treaty compliance. The reports were helpful to the Committee on Foreign Relations in reaching its overall judgment that the treaty would serve the national interests of the United States and should be ratified.

After the treaty was reported, certain issues related to particular rights and obligations of the parties arose during U.S.-Soviet talks on treaty implementation. Administration officials worked with the Senate in determining how best to resolve these issues and consulted on numerous occasions with the Soviet side. Secretary of State Shultz met with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on May 11 and 12 in Geneva to gain final clarifications before the full Senate took up the treaty. The Secretary reported to the Committee on Foreign Relations on May 16, and I am happy to report that the issues appear to have been resolved in a manner satisfactory to the United States. Thus, it is appropriate that the Senate now proceed.

Madam President, the INF Treaty requires that the United States and the Soviet Union:

Eliminate all ground-launched intermediate-range (1,000-5,000 kilometers) missiles and launchers in phases over three years;

Eliminate all shorter-range (500-1,000 kilometers) ground-launched missiles and launchers within 18 months; and

Not produce, flight-test, or possess such systems for the indefinite duration of the treaty.

Under the terms of the treaty, the United States will eliminate 120 deployed and 127 non-deployed Pershing II ballistic missiles, for a total of 247. The United States will eliminate 309 deployed ground-launched cruise missiles and 133 non-deployed GLCM's, for a total of 442. Taking both types together, the United States will eliminate 689 intermediate-range missiles.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union will eliminate a somewhat greater number of intermediate-range missiles, as follows: 405 deployed SS-20's, 245 non-deployed SS-20's, 65 deployed SS-4's, 105 non-deployed SS-4's and six SS-5 missiles, for a total of 826.

In the shorter-range category, the United States will eliminate 170 Pershing 1A missiles now in storage. The Soviet Union will eliminate 220 deployed and 506 non-deployed SS-12's and 22's, and 167 deployed and 33 non-deployed SS-23's, for a total of 926.

In terms of deployed warheads, the asymmetry is even greater. The United States will take out a warhead for each deployed missile for a total of 429, and the Soviet Union will take out

three warheads for each deployed SS-20 and one warhead for each of its other deployed intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles for a total of 1,667. This constitutes a four-to-one disparity in favor of the United States in terms of deployed nuclear warheads.

Under the terms of the treaty and the protocol on eliminations, the elimination process will be tightly controlled. Allowable locations of missiles and launchers to be eliminated are carefully specified, and systems must be eliminated in complete units, support structures must be eliminated where they stand, and destruction must occur only at agreed facilities. During the first 6 months a maximum of 100 intermediate-range missiles may be eliminated by launching. The two sides made an extensive and unprecedented data exchange as of November 1, 1987, and updated information is to be provided within 30 days of entry into force and at 6-month intervals thereafter.

In monitoring compliance, national technical means, which includes satellite and other collection assets, will be crucial. The parties have not only agreed not to interfere with each other's NTM but also to take specific steps to enhance each side's ability to monitor compliance by NTM. In addition, there is provision for on-site inspections, including base-line, close-out, elimination, and short-notice inspections, as well as portal monitoring of a missile assembly plant on each side.

I find the strong verification provisions are reassuring. Clearly, we would be able to detect and react in time to any militarily significant violations, and there is reason for confidence that any such violations would be detected through our national technical means. At the same time, the committee was alert to the danger that excessive verification requirements might have led to a treaty which fell short of its potential. We concluded that a good balance was struck and that the treaty is a solid accord with effective verification.

Having reached these judgments, the committee concluded that the treaty warranted approval without change. At the same time, the committee judged it crucially important that one formal condition be adopted. This condition affirms certain constitutional principles related to the treaty power and requires that these principles govern U.S. interpretation of the INF Treaty. The purpose of the condition is to reaffirm the long-standing practice and long-standing principle that the current "shared understanding" of the Executive and the Senate, as reflected in the Executive's formal representations, is defining in terms of the President's future latitude in interpreting and implementing the treaty. Given recent administration assertions to the contrary, the committee judged that, in the absence of such

a condition, the Senate would face the alternative of considering countless other conditions designed to formalize the Senate's understanding of various INF Treaty provisions.

Madam President, the Committee on Foreign Relations questioned administration and other witnesses closely on this treaty. We weighed the merits carefully, and we looked for flaws as well. We would not have supported this treaty if it jeopardized U.S. security in any way.

Madam President, the INF Treaty comes to the Senate after more than 7 years in which there have been no formal accomplishments in the arms control arena. Of course, that alone is not sufficient justification for approval of the treaty. But the treaty's substantive merits do provide such justification. With the Foreign Relations Committee having studied the treaty carefully, I welcome the opportunity to state that the committee has given its imprimatur to this arms control achievement.

I hope that the Senate will move to approve the INF Treaty promptly and that we will not become bogged down in the consideration of unnecessary conditions and amendments. If we understand that the INF Treaty is a modest achievement in military terms and a more important success in political terms, I believe we will be able to put the treaty in the right perspective. The treaty, in my view, is most important as the beginning of a new continuum in arms control that could lead us to further and quite significant achievements. The treaty could be followed by verification agreements which opened the way to ratification of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. It could help open the way to success in Geneva in negotiating a solid, comprehensive START treaty, which would be of great military significance by requiring deep cuts in the strategic weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. With regard to Europe, the treaty could set the stage for success in reaching agreement to sharply reduce the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces. Such successes could be enhanced by an early agreement on a chemical weapons ban.

We should bear in mind that the INF Treaty is of little military significance. Only 5 percent or 1/20th of the total number of deployed nuclear weapons is being removed. And every targeted military or civilian site that is no longer targeted as a result of the removal of the nuclear weapons covered by the treaty may, if the opposing side wishes, be retargeted by sea or air-based missiles, as well as land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles not covered by the treaty.

The importance of this treaty is political and psychological—to signal a stop to the nuclear arms race, a halt to

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the present continuous upward escalation of Soviet and American nuclear weapons. It would start a momentum downward, not upward.

When that is accomplished, it would be time to consider the next stage of negotiations, which should be participated in by all nuclear weapons nations. To reach that stage, we must be serious and dedicated now.

The INF Treaty represents a small, but vitally important step toward successes which could get us back on track in the search for far more substantial arms reductions. I urge that the Senate proceed expeditiously to approve the INF Treaty.

I invite to the attention of my colleagues that this treaty is of immense psychological and political importance, a good forward step; as Bob Kennedy once put it, "The journey of a thousand miles starts with a simple step." And this step could hopefully reverse the present flow of escalation and increasing numbers of nuclear weapons.

I yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, will the Senator yield me some time?

Mr. PELL. Certainly. I yield such time as he may need to the majority leader.

Mr. BYRD. I thank my distinguished friend.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the time for debate today on the treaty be limited to 2 hours to be equally divided between the minority leader and myself. The distinguished Republican leader and I have discussed just a few moments ago the amount of time we would proceed for the rest of the day with the understanding that the time can be extended but for now that we might have a backdrop on the amount of time that we expect to take we begin with 2 hours. Is that agreeable? I make that request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is before the Senate, and it has to do with the elimination of the intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, together with the memorandum of understanding and two protocols thereto, collectively referred to as the INF Treaty.

This is the subject matter before the Senate as of now. It is a treaty of great importance to our Nation and to this body for a number of reasons. It is the result of a long, difficult confrontation with our primary adversary since the end of World War II—the Soviet Union—which took the form of a military challenge to the NATO alliance in the 1970's, in a provocative deployment of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles targeted at European capitals. The deployment was a form of intimidation designed to break the will of the Atlantic alliance, to divide and

conquer European countries. This treaty, first and foremost, is proof positive that the Soviet strategy has not worked. It is proof positive that American leadership of a strong united alliance has worked over the span of two administrations, one Democratic and one Republican.

This treaty is, to a large extent, a European treaty, since none of the weapons which will be eliminated by the treaty are capable of reaching the continental United States, with the exception of those Asian-based SS-20's capable of reaching portions of Alaska. Therefore, it was important that it be satisfactory to the Europeans, and that they be consulted as it was being negotiated. I commend the administration for a successful effort in this regard. I led a bipartisan delegation of Senators to five NATO capitals in February—a delegation composed of the three committee chairmen who thoroughly investigated and explored the provisions of this treaty, and who are to be commended, along with Mr. WARNER, who is not only ranking on the Armed Services Committee but also sits on the Intelligence Committee and has had a very important and responsible role in this process.

I refer, of course, to those chairmen—Senator PELL, Senator NUNN, and Senator BOBEN—of the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence, respectively.

I then testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on the results of our trip on February 24, 1988, and have submitted, on behalf of the delegation a comprehensive report on our trip to the Senate on March 12, 1988.

I include a copy of that report in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

We found that there was widespread support for the treaty among our NATO partners, and as the report concludes, "On the narrow question of ratification on the INF Treaty, opinion was virtually unanimous that it should be approved by the Senate for ratification, and that failure to ratify could create a grave crisis in Western Europe and NATO."

Nevertheless, there was also a consensus that only sound agreements should be concluded by the United States with the Soviets. There was a consensus that we have to be careful that the momentum of good publicity surrounding signing ceremonies, portrayed in the sophisticated publicity campaigns of the new Soviet leadership does not create a false momentum toward agreements that are not carefully negotiated and concluded with our security interests uppermost in our consideration. The report concluded that, in NATO, there was a "clear consensus that arms control agreements, including a START agreement, should be concluded when issues in dispute have been satisfactorily negotiated, and should not be negotiated

under the pressure of artificial deadlines.

"Likewise, when and if a sound agreement is in sight, there should be no delay in concluding it, since to do so is in our common interest. But the important thing is that it be a good agreement—not dictated by calendar deadlines or election year politics."

We have seen in connection with this treaty, which is rather minor in comparison with the START agreement, that there have been problems, there have been loose ends, there have been matters that have not been thoroughly gone into, some of which were not even discussed or brought up by our negotiators. And because of the insistence of this Senate on a thorough understanding of what we were doing and where we were going before we jumped, the insistence of this Senate on the part of its committees, it led the way that our negotiators go back and resolve these differences and disputes and disagreements with the Soviets before the Senate began debating on the floor the full treaty.

As a result of the position that the Senate has taken in that regard, of course, General Powell has indicated that in his opinion the process greatly enhanced and advanced the security interests of the United States.

So with that lesson in mind before them, I hope that our negotiators, when they sit down with the Soviets to discuss the START agreement, will clearly remember that this is no push-over, this Senate, and that it is an institution that under the Constitution has a role, an important role, one that is not a symbolic role, one that is not a rubberstamp role to any President, but one which is a role that protects the interests of the American people. And this Senate has demonstrated in this case that it will not be an institution that will just roll over and play dead, but it means to have its say and it means to take a good look at any agreement. And we also keep in mind that we are dealing with the Soviet Union.

So it might also be a good lesson to the Soviets that under this system, under the American system, there is no single individual in this society or in this Government who has all power, and that this is a system of tripartite powers and equal and separate branches.

So it may be a good civics lesson for our friends in Moscow as well as they look toward possibly discussions that might at some point ultimately lead to another agreement, START agreement.

It might also be a matter of considerable solace and comfort to our allies to know that there is a Senate, that there really is a Senate, and that it is just not an institution in name. It is an institution that takes very seriously those words that were written into the Constitution by our forefathers and believes that those words were just not



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put in to fill out sentences or pages in the Constitution.

So our allies can depend on this Senate as well in protecting their interests, the allies' interests, as long as treaties are entered into that involve the security of the allies.

The important thing is, as we see it, that this be a good agreement, not dictated by calendar deadlines or election year politics.

Mr. President, this conclusion applies to the way in which this Senate conducts its review of treaties. I would point out that recent history is very mixed, and rather disappointing on the question of arms control treaties. We have not considered a major arms control treaty on this floor since the ABM Treaty was approved in 1972. Less than 20 percent of the Senators now sitting in this body have participated in such an important exercise. In fact, the distinguished minority leader and I were so concerned about the history of arms control and the Senate's role in arms control that we created a special Senate body, the arms control observer group, as the major item of Senate business on the first day of the last Congress, the 99th Congress, on January 3, 1985.

As we said in our report to the Senate at that time, "We seek to avoid a recurrence of the problems of the 1970's, when three successive arms control treaties, signed by three Presidents, were never approved for ratification by the Senate—including two nuclear testing treaties and the SALT II Treaty." I believe the functioning and existence of that group has been of value to this Senate, and to the three committees, and I commend the work of the leadership of that group, Senators PELL, NUNN, LUGAR, and STEVENS.

Overall, we must be thorough. We have already learned that lesson in spades on this INF Treaty. Both the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees found gaps, loopholes, and ambiguities in this treaty which had to be cleared up—which had to be clarified with the Soviet Union. This was the case most notably on the issue of future weapons systems and whether they are clearly banned by the treaty. It was also the case on the matter of some problems which arose on the novel, unique, on-site verification system which is being created by this treaty.

The Foreign Relations Committee reported this treaty favorably on April 14, 1988. In the days since that report, substantial improvements have been made, including negotiations with the Soviet Union on the verification procedures of the treaty. The thoroughness of the Senate regarding this treaty has already paid dividends to the Nation. It is my hope and my expectation that the careful consideration of the full Senate on this floor will enhance the value of this treaty further for our Nation.

Madam President, the result of these efforts throughout the Senate is that we are now prepared to move to the important and critical final step of Senate action: debate on the treaty and the resolution of ratification on the floor of the Senate.

I expect the debate here on the floor will be thorough, and there will undoubtedly be amendments, offered, debated, and voted upon. These are important matters and they deserve the careful attention of the Senate. I hope that all Senators will devote time and energy to be here to participate in this important debate. I hope that the quality of the debate will serve to inform the American people and to reassure them about the thoroughness of the procedure by which this Senate approaches this extremely important, and why not say critical matter. I intend to, and at the moment it is my intention to support consent to the ratification of the INF Treaty. I believe it passes the critical test which is that it enhances the security of the United States, and it is a list, and that it is in the interest of NATO to ratify the treaty. Several issues are likely to attract considerable attention in coming days. The Foreign Relations Committee has reported a resolution of ratification with a suggested condition on treaty interpretation.

Such a condition is necessary, in my view, in light of our experience over the past 2 years with the issue of treaty interpretation. In light of the insistence by parts of the administration that testimony by administration officials is not authoritative in the interpretation of provisions of a treaty, and that only the classified negotiating record is authoritative, we had to arrange for the administration to provide us with the entire negotiating record. We established a separate office, the Arms Control Treaty Review Support Office, which has exhaustively evaluated that record, developed a sophisticated computer program to evaluate that record, so that comparisons could be made by the committees of that record with the testimony being provided by administration officials. The system has worked well, and sets an important precedent for consideration of future treaties.

I also believe it will be necessary to attach a binding condition concerning the issue of future technologies. As a result of the exchange of notes in Geneva last week, the two sides have now clearly stated their common understanding that the INF Treaty bans all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, regardless of the type of weapons they carry. This understanding should have equal status with the other elements of the treaty, in my opinion, and I will support a condition on the resolution of ratification which binds the two sides to this statement.

I believe this is an important treaty, dealing with important issues which

critically affect the security of ourselves and our allies. It is not, in my opinion, militarily insignificant or a minor matter. The treaty breaks new ground by requiring the complete elimination of classes of weapons, by requiring an intrusive inspection and verification system, and in the degree of cooperation required from basing countries and allies in implementing the treaty.

Madam President, I hope the treaty can be approved without attaching additional conditions on policy and on United States-Soviet relations which are not directly related to the treaty itself and the matters it covers.

Like other Senators, I have a number of concerns about Soviet behavior in various parts of the world. We all know that their invasion of Afghanistan and the bloody 8-year war in that country was devastating to the last arms control treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union and, as a matter of fact, was a deciding factor that prevented that treaty from being called up by the then majority leader, myself, for debate and action on this floor.

When the Soviets went into Afghanistan in the summer of 1979, that, of course, was the straw that broke the treaty's back, and I never called up that treaty.

As I indicated to Mr. Gorbachev when he was in this city a few weeks back, in the presence of other Senators, it would be very helpful when we consider this treaty if we could have a timetable on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

It was my intention at that time to have several days of debate on Afghanistan during consideration of this treaty and to attach some reservation or declaration or understanding or statement of some kind that would put the Senate in a strong position with respect to advocating the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan. The Soviets have now established and publicized a timetable for their removal, and I commend the administration, and in particular I commend Secretary of State Shultz. Because of the fact that that timetable has now been publicly established, the debate on this treaty will be much shorter than it otherwise would have been.

I do not have in mind anything by way of any reservation that I will seek to attach to the treaty, and I do not have in mind any long debate, so far as I am concerned, in that regard. But that was certainly a very forward step taken by Mr. Gorbachev, and it saved a lot of the Senate's time in the deliberations on this treaty.

So it is a hopeful sign that as we take up this INF Treaty, the Soviets have decided to acknowledge their failure to subjugate that brave country and those brave people who believe in freedom, who put freedom above their lives, and the Soviets are beginning to withdraw.

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I encourage the Senate to thoroughly examine and debate the treaty itself, and not go too far afield into other policy areas that can be debated on other vehicles, because we must remember that, after all, we are debating an arms control treaty. I hope we will try to stay as close as we can to that subject matter.

I want to commend the Republican leader for the support he has given to the imperative that the Senate fulfill its proper role in connection with the approval and ratification of treaties.

I also commend, once again, the chairmen of the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence, and the ranking members thereof.

I know that perhaps one ranking member of those three committees is not wholly supportive of the treaty. Nevertheless, he is fulfilling his responsibility as he sees it. That is his right and that is his duty—to fulfill his responsibility as he sees it.

Having said that, Madam President, I close by asking unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD certain excerpts from the report to which I alluded and certain excerpts from the report creating the Soviet arms control observer group delegation.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE INF TREATY AND THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE

(Report by Majority Leader ROBERT C. BYRD)

FOREWORD

MAY 11, 1988.

From February 6-14, 1988, I led a bipartisan Senate delegation to five NATO capitals to investigate and discuss matters related to the INF Treaty. Accompanying me on the delegation were the leaders of the three committees with responsibilities for aspects of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, the committee with jurisdiction over the Treaty; Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services; Senator John W. Warner, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services; and Senator David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence.

The purpose of the trip was to hold consultations and discussions with government leaders, opposition politicians, and leading figures from academia and the media in key NATO countries, focusing on the INF Treaty and its significance for the future of the NATO Alliance. At the time of the trip, all three committees were in the process of holding hearings on aspects and implications of the Treaty. President Reagan signed the Treaty with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, on December 8, 1987, in Washington, D.C., and submitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on January 25, 1988. Since the United States, in essence, negotiated this Treaty with the Soviet Union on behalf of the NATO Alliance, the Senate leadership deemed it important to seek directly European leaders' views and advice as an integral part of the process of reviewing the Treaty.

At the outset of the trip, the delegation attended the 25th annual International Wehrkunde Meeting in Munich, Federal Re-

public of Germany, the theme of which was "The American-Russian Disarmament Negotiations and their Consequences." At this conference, a sizable representation of officials from all NATO countries, as well as opinion-makers and outside experts, were gathered. Both Senator Nunn and I delivered addresses to that gathering, which are included in this report as Appendices A and B. The delegation had an opportunity to hear a variety of informed opinions as to the future security needs of and challenges for the Alliance. Following that conference, the delegation traveled to London, Bonn, Paris, Ankara, and Rome. In each capital, it met the head of state or of government. Additionally, it met with the defense and foreign ministers at each stop, opposition leaders, and opinion-makers, as well as with both foreign and American press representatives. A full listing of those individuals follows:

OFFICIAL DELEGATION MEETINGS

Munich

Senators Byrd and Nunn addressed Wehrkunde Conference

Luncheon meeting with Dr. Willem Van Eekelen, Minister of Defense of the Netherlands and Chairman of the Eurogroup Defense Ministers

London

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher  
Defense Minister George Younger  
Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs David Mellor  
Former leader of the Social Democratic Party David Owen

Luncheon hosted by Ambassador Price, guests included Labour Party Leader, Mr. Neil Kinnock

Bonn

Chancellor Helmut Kohl  
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher  
Defense Minister Manfred Woerner  
Minister of State Helmut Schaefer, Foreign Office

Mr. Karsten D. Voight, SPD, Bundestag Deputy; SPD Spokesman, Foreign Affairs Committee

Mr. Wolfgang Boetsch, CSU, Bundestag Deputy

Dr. Gerhart Baum, FDP, Bundestag Deputy

Paris  
President Francois Mitterrand  
President of the National Assembly Jacques Chaban-Delmas

Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond  
Defense Minister Andre Giraud  
Chairman of Military Committee of French National Assembly, M. Francois Fillon

Turkey

President Kenan Evren  
Prime Minister Turgut Ozal  
Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz  
Defense Minister Evran Vuralhan  
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Necip Torumtay

President of Turkish Grand National Assembly Yildirim Akbulut

Italy

Prime Minister Giovanni Goria  
President of National Assembly Giovanni Spadolini

Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti  
Defense Minister Valerio Zanone

Transcripts of various round table discussions and meetings the delegation had with the press are reproduced in the appendices.

The Alliance is currently enjoying the fruits of its steadfastness in pursuing a negotiated agreement on land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces. By following through on the 1979 dual track decision to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles and

Pershing II ballistic missiles while, at the same time, pursuing discussions of limits on those missiles, the Alliance has achieved a great victory. This victory was not achieved without considerable courage and the expenditure of political capital by leaders in each of the NATO countries. Through courage and farsightedness, NATO was able to reaffirm the principles that the Alliance will take whatever steps are necessary for its own security, and that its members will stand together in pursuit of these common objectives.

Inevitably, the attainment of the Alliance objective of total elimination of these systems through asymmetrical reductions opens the agenda for the next set of decisions which must be addressed. Therefore, this delegation focused on the challenges and decisions facing NATO in the post-INF era, rather than solely on the question of treaty ratification. The Alliance as a whole is to be commended for the victory in attaining the treaty, but this is not a time for excessive self-satisfaction or relaxation. Instead, a healthy period of reexamination, assessment, and planning for the Alliance future is in order. The leaders with whom the delegation met shared this view.

This Congressional delegation visited NATO capitals at a time of renewed debate and discussion regarding the Alliance's purposes and future directions. Although the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) represents a victory for Alliance cohesion and steadfastness in pursuing a common policy, it also represents the end of a ten-year phase during which INF was at the core of Alliance efforts in arms control and force modernization.

At this time, the full Senate is considering the INF Treaty and it is hoped that this report will provide useful perspectives on the issues which form the larger international context for the accord. Finally, the delegation notes with appreciation the preparation of this report by Richard D'Amato, Scott Harris, and Wendy Decker.

ROBERT C. BYRD, *Majority Leader,*  
*Delegation Chairman.*

INTRODUCTION

The delegation embarked on the visit with three objectives. The first of these was to receive firsthand the unfiltered views of the leaders of the alliance regarding the INF Treaty. Given the significance of this treaty for European security and for the continued unity of NATO, views of the European Allies constitute an important factor to be taken into account during the Senate's consideration of this treaty.

A second objective was to discuss, not only with government officials but with opposition leaders and private citizens as well, the impact of the treaty on the future of NATO. The Alliance will face crucial, and potentially controversial, decisions in the post-INF political and military environments. In the opinion of the delegation, it is important to begin now to consider these issues and to begin to formulate a common course. In particular, it is important that NATO identify a common set of objectives for the next round of arms control, particularly in the area of conventional arms reductions. Many useful suggestions in this regard were identified during the course of the delegation's discussions with European leaders.

The third objective of the delegation's visit was to explore with European counterparts their perceptions of the objectives and style of Soviet policy toward the West, particularly the impact of Soviet diplomacy on Western public opinion. Is there a generalized perception that the threat to Western

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security has diminished, or that NATO's strategy of deterrence based on the capability for flexible response is no longer widely supported?

In addition to the mission of listening to European views and learning about the trends of European public opinion, the delegation also conveyed to interested European audiences, in public as well as private sessions, a message concerning the U.S. commitment to NATO and the inherent stability of the American political system. Particularly in an election year, when the level of political rhetoric and debate could convey confused and conflicting images of the United States to Europeans, the fact that the Senate of the United States is a continuing body is worth recalling and emphasizing. Moreover, the members of the delegation focused on the essential facts that the INF Treaty is a victory for NATO unity and cohesion, and that, regardless of the debate over ratification which will ensue in the coming weeks, it is highly likely that the Senate will consent to the Treaty's ratification. For that reason, it is important for NATO to begin now to look beyond the specifics of the INF Treaty and to focus on future challenges.

#### A. CONTEXT: BACKGROUND THEMES OF THE VISIT

Several developments related either to the INF Treaty or to political trends in Europe occurred during the time of the delegation's visit. They provided important background themes, the essential context in which the discussions in Europe took place.

##### a. INF TREATY INTERPRETATION

Most visible of these background developments was the ongoing controversy over future interpretation by the executive branch of the INF Treaty, a controversy which stems from the efforts of the Reagan Administration to reinterpret the ABM Treaty in a manner different from its traditional interpretation. The possibility of delays in Senate consideration of the INF Treaty as a result of the dispute between the Senate and the Administration over whether Administration testimony as to the meaning of the Treaty would be authoritative and binding in the future received considerable attention during the trip.

Senators Byrd, Pell, Nunn and Boren engaged Secretary Shultz and Ambassadors Kampelman and Nitze in an extensive discussion of this issue in the weeks leading up to the delegation's departure, without reaching a final agreement. Nevertheless, the records of the negotiations on the Treaty were delivered to the Senate on February 5, 1988, and terms for access to the records had been arranged. Senators Byrd and Nunn alerted the Secretary in a letter on February 5, 1988; that due to the Administration's failure to provide any assurances with regard to future interpretation of the INF Treaty, consideration of the Treaty in the Senate could be delayed pending the outcome of the interpretation dispute. This letter was widely reported in the press, and the issue was frequently raised during the delegation's first few days in Europe.

Senator Byrd and Senator Nunn took the opportunity of the dispute to educate the European audiences on the role of the Senate in the treaty-making process in the United States. As part of this effort, they assured the European publics that this dispute would be resolved, that it was a procedural and Constitutional dispute which probably would have little bearing on the actual outcome (i.e., likely consent to ratification) regarding the INF Treaty, but that it was necessary to resolve the issue, especially as it relates to the instant treaty.

When, on February 10, 1988, the Secretary of State responded with another letter clarifying his position, Senators Byrd and Nunn indicated at a news conference in Paris that the response was generally satisfactory and that the possibility of a delay in consideration of the Treaty as a result of this dispute appeared to have been eliminated. The dispute makes it highly likely, however, that the Senate will address the issue during consideration of the Treaty, and Europeans should expect such an outcome. (For texts of the letters and the Senators' statement, see Appendix N.)

Despite the favorable progress toward resolving this dispute, the debate over treaty interpretation raises questions in the minds of many Europeans about the stability of the American system and the ability of the United States to conclude treaties in good faith. The delegation emphasized that this issue was not the result of any actions initiated by the Congress and that, moreover, it was the Congress which had resisted attempts by the Administration to reinterpret the meaning of the ABM treaty. The delegation also stressed that actions currently being pursued in the Senate should lead to a satisfactory resolution of this issue.

##### b. AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO EUROPE AND THE DANGER OF "DECOUPLING"

The prospect of the withdrawal of a class of nuclear weapons from Europe has again raised anxieties about "decoupling" and the credibility of the American commitment to European security. While the Pershings and Cruise Missiles are often portrayed simply as a response to the SS-20 deployments by the Soviet Union, it is important to remember that they were also justified as part of the continuum of NATO's deterrent capabilities, a necessary rung on the ladder of escalatory options. Removal of this rung understandably creates uncertainties. This natural reaction is given increased impetus by the fact that, within the NATO countries themselves, significant political constituencies remain opposed to nuclear weapons and fearful of their continued deployment in large quantities in Europe. The Soviets, of course, seek to exploit these fears through a skillful propaganda campaign and a diplomatic offensive aimed at highlighting these fears. Soviet leaders seek to engage the Alliance in discussions on the remaining short-range nuclear weapons prior to addressing issues such as the imbalances in conventional and chemical forces. Added to this volatile mix of nuclear anxieties have been the confusing signals sent by Washington during the past few years concerning the nuclear guarantee and the United States' commitments to nuclear deterrence.

This concern has become more pronounced since the U.S.-Soviet summit at Reykjavik in 1986. The impression conveyed from that summit was that the United States was uncertain about the value of nuclear deterrence in the European theater, raising old fears of a "decoupling" of America and Europe, and fueling the arguments of those who believe that Europe should become a "nuclear-free zone." The denuclearization of Europe appears to be a high priority for the Soviet Union, which will miss no opportunity to exploit either division in the West or confusion on the question of nuclear deterrence.

The delegation took the opportunity to reaffirm the commitment to the NATO strategy of flexible response and to indicate that there is broad support in the United States and in the Senate for NATO and for the current NATO strategy. As Chancellor Kohl and others remarked during the visit, it has been the credibility of the nuclear deterrent which has been of central importance in

breaking the cycle of wars on the European continent for the last 43 years.

Related to the question of American staying power was the perception that the United States may be considering the withdrawal of troops from Europe. Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci delivered an address at the Wehrkunde Conference with could have been interpreted as making just such a threat, resulting in newspaper headlines with an alarmist tone, such as "U.S. Warns of Troop Pullout if Bonn Bars Nuclear Arms," which appeared in the *International Herald Tribune* (see Appendix C). While this characterization of the Secretary of Defense's remarks may be stronger than he intended, the theme of threatened U.S. withdrawal of troops from Europe in the absence of continued commitments to nuclear modernization continually reappeared throughout the next several days. It contributed more to European anxieties about American presence and commitment than it did to the rallying of opinion behind common security objectives. Such statements contain the danger of undoing much of the good that was done by Alliance solidarity throughout the INF negotiations. Moreover, since the remarks could be seen to be directed at particular factions within the Federal Republic, German sensitivities were somewhat aroused by this public browbeating of an ally. Such apparent or misconstrued threats should be avoided as they are counterproductive, and the apparent use of them by United States officials can do our Allies a disservice.

Additional concerns in Europe could be found regarding the shifting priorities of the United States, particularly in light of the report *Discriminate Deterrence* recently issued by a Blue-Ribbon Department of Defense task force. The delegation pointed out that although this report has received considerable attention in Europe, it is not authoritative or representative of a consensus in the U.S. Senate.

##### C. MEETING THE SECURITY CHALLENGE IN AN ERA OF CONSTRAINED BUDGETS

Most of the major NATO countries, including the United States, will not be able to meet the goal of real increases in defense spending of 3% in the coming year. The United States has not met this goal for the past two years. Only Italy will come close to this goal. Turkey is making a positive effort but the Turks face the greatest requirements for modernization and must rely on security assistance from the United States and West Germany to meet their minimum security needs.

This fact is well understood in NATO, but the regularity with which the goal of 3% increases are missed suggests that this is no longer a useful yardstick for measuring Allied contributions to the common defense. It is unrealistic to expect Allied governments to increase dramatically the shares of government spending devoted to defense. This does not mean, however, that improvements cannot be made in the ways in which the money is spent or in the efficiency of expenditure. The delegation, and Senator Nunn in particular, urged the Allies to cooperate more effectively in an effort to "think smarter, not richer," in order to provide the types of conventional forces which the Alliance will require.

The importance of devoting sufficient resources to defense lies in the critical relationship between credible conventional defense forces and the nuclear option which backs up the conventional forces. NATO does not have as a goal matching the Warsaw Pact gun for gun or tank for tank. There is no need for that on the part of a

defensive alliance. On the other hand, reliance on nuclear weapons as the exclusive deterrent to aggression raises deep concerns among publics in Allied countries and could be seen as lacking credibility by potential aggressors. NATO has established an official goal of having sufficient stocks to achieve the ability to defend NATO territory conventionally for thirty days, but only the United States comes close to meeting this objective among the NATO allies.

These issues of burden sharing, reduced funds available for conventional forces, declining or inadequate levels of assistance to the Southern Region countries, and inefficient expenditure of resources among NATO partners will confront the Alliance with major challenges in the coming years. They constitute an important backdrop to the need for progress toward conventional arms control and conventional force reductions in the coming months.

#### d. PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE

Considerable press attention was focused on the delegation's visit. Press events and public discussions with journalists and commentators were held at each stop. This afforded the delegation the opportunity not only to hear the views of knowledgeable observers of the European scene, but also to convey to European publics, through the media, messages concerning the role of the Senate in the American Constitutional system and the fact that the Senate is a source of stability and continuity in American policy.

The following sections describe the principal themes discussed in each country visited by the delegation, with a final section summarizing the findings and observations of the delegation.

#### B. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The delegation spent a fruitful day in Bonn on February 9, 1988, in discussions with leading figures in the Federal Republic, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, and other officials.

There is widespread agreement in the Federal Republic that the INF Treaty should be ratified without amendment. Despite initial doubts about the "second zero" of short-range INF missiles and reluctance to scrap the German Pershing I's, the Treaty has widespread support in the German government, in the opposition, and among the general public.

The issues foremost on the agenda in the Federal Republic concern the nature and scope of future arms control negotiations, the timetable for decisions concerning modernization, and bilateral relations between the Federal Republic and other NATO allies, particularly France. These issues are, of course, overlaid by the dynamics of German domestic politics, where the opposition Social Democratic Party is showing increased strength at the *Land* level and where tensions on these issues within the ruling coalition can be discerned.

#### FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

The themes which were examined during the meetings in Bonn were previewed in the speeches by Chancellor Kohl and opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader Hans-Jochen Vogel at the Wehrkunde Conference. Vogel, although carefully couching his words in terms of overall support for the Alliance, nevertheless raised a number of issues which clearly run counter to the consensus among NATO governments today and could presage future controversies in NATO. He indicated, for example, the SPD's support for *Simultaneous* pursuit of

negotiations to reduce the conventional force imbalance and further efforts to negotiate limits on short-range nuclear forces. This view is also shared by many in the ruling coalition.

In contrast to the apparent position of Dr. Vogel, officials in the Federal Republic expressed their opposition to the "Third Zero" of short-range land-based ballistic missile reductions. But a significant cleavage, not only within German opinion but also between Germany and the rest of the NATO Alliance, may be developing concerning the timing of discussions concerning the short-range systems. Both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher appear to favor beginning discussions on reducing the short-range nuclear systems deployed in Europe (most of which, of course, are deployed by NATO in West Germany and by the Warsaw Pact in East Germany) at the same time discussions on limiting conventional forces are undertaken, a position which appears to be in line with that outlined by Dr. Vogel at Wehrkunde. West German officials argue that the communique of the NATO ministerial meeting at Reykjavik endorses this concept. This view is not shared by the other NATO Allies. Even within Germany, the fear was expressed that undertaking such discussions could result in NATO facing a Soviet proposal for a third zero which would be hard to resist. It is likely that disagreements over the timing of discussions on further efforts to reduce short-range nuclear arms in Europe will characterize Alliance discussions in coming months. This issue could become one of significant dispute within the NATO alliance unless handled skillfully and carefully.

#### OVERALL SECURITY CONCEPT

The German officials with whom the Congressional delegation met placed a great deal of emphasis on the need for an overall concept of security to guide the Alliance in its force modernization decisions and in its arms control approach to the Warsaw Pact. While it would be possible to see this as an effort to delay tough decisions or to revisit decisions which the Alliance has already made, it can also be seen as a legitimate concern and one which the Alliance should take seriously. The Federal Republic can be expected to press this view in coming months.

As the Alliance struggles to define a common position for new talks on conventional stability in Europe, talks which may start later this year, it will be important for the Alliance to be guided by a common set of objectives and a shared vision as to the desired outcomes of the negotiations. It goes without saying that asymmetrical reductions in Warsaw Pact troops will be required, but in the absence of a common set of goals and a vision of the final outcome of the talks, the Alliance runs the risk that Soviet proposals which appear good on the surface could be used to great public relations effects in the West without an effective counter by NATO governments. This must be avoided, and, to that extent, the German emphasis on a strategic concept should be welcomed. Focus on the concept could have the additional benefit of providing the means by which the French can be truly brought on board an Alliance-wide position in the talks.

Officials in Germany, and Chancellor Kohl in particular, emphasized that NATO is about to enter into a contest of "religion" and psychology with the Soviet Union over the question of conventional force reductions, and that it is very important for NATO to seize the psychological initiative on these issues in the coming year. NATO should take advantage of the momentum generated by the INF agreement to formu-

late a proposal on conventional arms control which unites the West and challenges the Soviets.

#### NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

The question of modernization of short-range nuclear weapons was one which arose at every session with German officials. Chancellor Kohl carefully skirted the issue of modernization in his address at the Wehrkunde gathering, artfully avoiding the use of the term. While the Congressional delegation strongly supports the Montebello approach to these issues and believes that all NATO Allies should fulfill their responsibilities within the NATO context, the delegation shared the view in Germany that modernization of short-range forces and the INF Treaty are *separate* issues which are not and *should not be directly linked*. The delegation shares the view of Defense Minister Woerner and others that the issues of nuclear modernization and the nature of the specific systems to be modernized are decisions which should be handled in due course as part of the Alliance's routine nuclear planning process. There is no need for a bruising public debate on these issues at the present time.

#### BILATERAL INITIATIVES

Concerning the initiatives with France and the formation of the Franco-German Defense Council and the jointly-manned brigade, the German government argues forcefully that bilateral initiatives with France are designed to bring France more fully into cooperation with NATO, and are not part of the creation of a rival force to NATO. German officials also express strong support for the efforts of the Action Committee for Europe and the strengthening of the European Pillar—and contend that France must be brought into these efforts. It is unlikely that the scope and extent of the bilateral cooperation will extend beyond the recently established single brigade in the near future, but it could be expanded in principle. The Germans, of course, wish to use the brigade as a device to draw the French more firmly into the forward defense concept of NATO as well. The delegation expressed, in general, its support for improved bilateral initiatives, emphasizing the importance of avoiding the creation of organizations competitive with NATO. German officials carefully noted that the forces committed to the joint brigade in no way would reduce the numbers of German forces committed to NATO.

#### SOVIET POLICY

The diplomatic efforts of the Soviet Union and the dynamic public relations offensive which Mr. Gorbachev is capable of mounting will doubtless be directed at the Federal Republic with special force in the coming months. Chancellor Kohl, in recalling the extensive efforts to block developments of the INF, which the Soviets encouraged in direct and indirect ways, noted that he has seen no deviation in the Soviet objective of isolating Germany and splitting it from the rest of NATO under the Gorbachev regime. While we are unlikely to see in the near future the spectacle of 300,000 demonstrators gathered on the lawn outside the Chancellor's office, as was the case prior to INF deployments, it is worth recalling that great political obstacles were overcome in successfully implementing the INF decision, and that future decisions may require commensurate efforts.

#### C. BRITAIN

The delegation met with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Defense Minister George Younger, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David

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Mellor, and with the former leader of the Social Democratic Party (and former Shadow Labour Defense Spokesman) David Owen. In addition, a luncheon with Neil Kinnock and other leaders of the opposition, Labour Party was hosted by the Ambassador.

The discussions in Britain centered on the security issues facing the Alliance in the post-INF environment, with attention to the themes which characterized discussions in all countries: maintaining the unity and cohesion of NATO; responding to the challenges of Soviet initiatives in all spheres, but especially in conventional arms control; pursuit of cooperative ventures with France without, at the same time, undermining the unity and cohesiveness of NATO; and modernization of remaining nuclear systems in NATO.

Strong support exists among officials in the British government for the ratification of the INF treaty without substantial amendments or reservations which would alter its fundamental character. Officials expressed satisfaction with the manner in which consultations on INF had been conducted by the United States before the summit. The British, not unlike other NATO allies, had been concerned following the Reykjavik summit about comments made by President Reagan questioning the utility of nuclear deterrence and favoring a nuclear-free world, but, on the whole, these concerns appear to have been mollified. At bottom, the view was expressed that it would be a disaster if the INF Treaty were not ratified, if the word of the U.S. President in these matters could not be taken seriously.

Mrs. Thatcher, in particular, went to considerable lengths to express her own view that the nuclear genie could not be put back into the bottle, and that efforts to try to do so would be in vain. She stated that her preference is for a world free from war, not a world free from nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is nuclear weapons and NATO's doctrine of deterrence through flexible response that has preserved the peace in Europe.

Getting the French to act in support of the NATO Alliance, even if they refuse to rejoin the integrated military command, is an objective of British policy. The skepticism regarding the French-German brigade, which had been voiced earlier by Mrs. Thatcher, seemed to have been toned down during the visit of the delegation. Instead, Mrs. Thatcher and others emphasized that they welcomed French activities which could be seen as supportive of NATO's objectives. The British are opposed to the creation of multilateral organizations which could be seen to compete with NATO. For these reasons they did not support the inclusion of forces from other countries in the French-German brigade, and they also believed that the institutions of the Western European Union should be co-located in Brussels. Finally, the British expressed support for cooperative development of a stand-off missile by the United States, United Kingdom, and France rather than solely a bilateral British-French project. Again, the objective is to bring the French more closely into cooperation with NATO.

Mr. Gorbachev is viewed by the British government with skepticism and caution. While he can be seen as a reformer in the Soviet domestic sense, his foreign policy remains based on the military power of the Soviet Union and on efforts to drive a wedge between members of NATO, particularly between the United States and Europe and between the West Germans and the rest of NATO. Soviet arms control proposals will be couched in terms designed to have the maximum psychological impact on Western pub-

lics. It will be important to prepare appropriate responses, and to develop our own proposals which seize the initiative.

The British government is emphatic in stating its belief that discussions on limiting NATO's short-range nuclear forces should not begin until progress has been made on more pressing issues of chemical weapons and the conventional forces imbalance. The British also argue that modernization of short-range forces should proceed with no delays. It is possible to proceed in two separate boxes, one focusing on the agreements made at Montebello, and the other focusing on the current work of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, which is considering specific proposals which might be seen as implementing the Montebello and Reykjavik agreements by NATO. The British are unabashed in their willingness to press the Germans on the point of nuclear modernization, rejecting the German argument that negotiations on short-range nuclear forces can occur simultaneously with negotiations on conventional forces. The British government is also skeptical about the position of FRG officials that, once begun, the discussions on shorter-range systems can be limited to proposals for equal ceilings on each side rather than the Third Zero. In the British view, the entire Soviet approach is aimed at reducing the nuclear deterrent in Europe, and discussions on short-range systems are subject to manipulation for public impact. Therefore, they should be avoided.

While supportive of a START agreement at the earliest time feasible, the British are adamantly opposed to the inclusion of any third country systems under START ceilings until well after superpower arsenals have been reduced by fifty percent. They are also concerned that START counting rules for Trident missiles not have an adverse impact on the British Trident system.

## D. FRANCE

During a two-day stop in Paris, the delegation met for an hour and a half with French President Francois Mitterrand, and had extensive discussions with Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond, Defense Minister Andre Giraud, President of the National Assembly Jacques Chaban-Delmas, and Chairman of the National Defense and Armed Forces Committee of the National Assembly Francois Fillon. In addition, the delegation met for two hours in a round table discussion with French intellectuals and journalists on the range of issues confronting the Alliance. The transcript of that round table discussion is included in Appendix J. It provides important insights into the range of French views on the security issue.

The visit to Paris came at a time of important reassessment by the French of the state of the Atlantic relationship, and the delegation was given an articulate exposition of the various risks which the Alliance currently faces. The visit also occurred at a time when the French have undertaken historic initiatives with the Germans in cooperative arrangements in the military field. On January 22, 1988, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl strengthened their ties by forming a high-level military commission to coordinate Franco-German policies on defense and arms control matters. Second, the French responded enthusiastically to Chancellor Kohl's offer to form a Franco-German military brigade, composed of 3,000-4,000 troops. At the time of the delegation's visit, the planning for the brigade was proceeding smoothly. Despite initial reservations by other European NATO partners (primarily Italy and Great Britain), a growing consensus on the acceptability of the arrangement can now be discerned. The delegation repeated its view, expressed in

Germany as well, that this is a generally positive development.

## ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS SUPPORTED

President Mitterrand was emphatic in his support for the INF Treaty, and noted that he wasn't merely paying "lip service." He outlined his opposition in principle to the development of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, based on his belief that they weaken deterrence because they could lead an adversary to question one's resolve to use strategic weapons in response to aggression. He gave a spirited exposition on the need for a high level of deterrence—that is, unquestioned certainty in the mind of the adversary that any attack would meet with immediate and overwhelming response—and of the need for the adversary to fear such a response. Thus, his approval of the INF agreement, which he indicated he believed to be stronger than that of most European leaders, was based in part on his lack of enthusiasm for the doctrine of flexible response.

A corollary to the President's view in this regard in his relative lack of enthusiasm for modernization of short-range nuclear missiles and artillery. Mitterrand is thus more supportive of what appears to be the German government's position on this issue than are most other European officials.

Mitterrand favored a START agreement, but did not feel it made much of a difference, given the overwhelming size of the superpower's arsenals. On the other hand, he emphasized his conviction that the "most urgent priority" in arms control was to move forward on negotiations on *conventional arms reductions*, both to reassure Western publics and to indicate to the Soviets that we are watching them and will not let them go any further to tilt the balance in this area. Mitterrand said that, while "reductions of 50 percent (START) is a good thing, it doesn't diminish the risk, especially for Europe. It would be more important, more significant to see an agreement reached in the fields of conventional and chemical weapons." He emphasized that the Senate should be aware that the conventional arms reductions negotiations are the most important negotiations that can reassure America's European partners. And, like other French officials, he contended that short-range nuclear weapons should be separated from the conventional talks.

Foreign Minister Raimond observed that the major risk that must be understood is that of "precipitous" negotiations with the Soviets which further advance the Soviet goal of denuclearizing Europe. A specific manifestation of this problem could include being swept into negotiations which put irresistible pressure on the West to eliminate all ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles, i.e., the "third zero."

In Raimond's view, the very fact of having negotiated the zero agreement in the INF Treaty fits into the Soviet goal of denuclearizing Europe, a goal which is clearly a central objective of Soviet policies toward Europe. Thus, it is clear that Gorbachev's next focus will be to push for a third zero on the remaining nuclear missiles as the further expression of this policy.

Pressure for negotiations toward a third zero fits into the fundamental objective of dividing NATO, because the Soviets recognize the potential of the third zero to cause strains between Germany and the United States. (Indeed, the French noted that the "second zero" on shorter-range missiles embodied in the INF Treaty has already begun to produce tensions between Germany and the rest of NATO over modernization issues.) This does not mean, of course, that the INF Treaty is not valuable. Achieve-

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ments such as asymmetrical reductions and verification breakthroughs are duly noted. The real question concerns the priorities of the United States subsequent to the INF accord. Minister Raimond listed conventional and chemical arms reduction talks, along with START, as the proper focus of the U.S. and the West for the present time.

Raimond identified a second risk which the West faces in the post-INF environment, and that is to confuse nuclear and conventional negotiations. The Soviets need a large conventional force to maintain their hold over Eastern Europe, and will try to mix conventional talks with those involving Western short range nuclear systems. The West must not permit such mixing.

A third risk is to negotiate with the Soviets against the pressure of deadlines. For instance, a good agreement on START, including subceilings, verification and other matters would be acceptable if reached this year, but it appears unlikely that such an agreement could be achieved. In no event should time deadlines force the West to agree to something which is not consistent with security requirements.

## FRENCH-GERMAN RELATIONS

On the subject of French-German relations, President Mitterrand made several important observations. First, he stated that he has revised the De Gaulle Doctrine whereby French forces should not be east of the Hamburg-Munich line to avoid getting mixed up with NATO forces. Now, instead, French forces will be anywhere that there is a threat of war or a war. President Mitterrand stated, "I . . . don't like French forces integrated into the allied command but, if we see soldiers of a neighboring country threatened, France could not face dishonor and pull its forces out—the only possible course of action is to intervene." Thus, while France will not reevaluate its decision to avoid military reintegration into NATO, primarily because it does not want to be a prisoner of the decisions of the collective Alliance, these statements on French willingness to consider French security as linked inextricably to that of its neighbors represent a significant step in France's strategic thinking.

Mitterrand recalled that, as a young deputy only three years after the end of World War II, he had participated in symposia oriented at the integration of Europe and the importance of bringing Germany back into the European community. He felt that that challenge had been won. Frenchmen today, in opinion polls, rank Germany most popular, only behind a few French-speaking countries. He praised the Franco-German brigade and its importance in historic terms, and reassured the delegation that there was no intent on the part of France to use it to weaken Germany's place in NATO.

## ASSESSMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY

President Mitterrand praised Gorbachev's broad-mindedness and frankness, which had been demonstrated during his extensive personal dialogues with the Soviet leader. Mitterrand observed that it is irrelevant whether Gorbachev is "sincere." That is not the question. The question is whether a politician is behaving as if he were sincere. We have to create the conditions such that what is stated by a leader actually happens, to make it to his advantage to do as he says. Mitterrand evaluated Gorbachev as the manager of a revolution, not a revolutionary; a Leninist, not a Stalinist; and of the Andropov type, not a Brezhnev or Chernenko type. He is a realist. The challenge to the West is not to do those things which are in Gorbachev's interest only, but to work on

areas where his interests and the West's converge.

While confident that adroit diplomacy and careful management of the public debate could easily counter the challenges presented by Gorbachev, French officials nevertheless counseled caution in dealing with the Soviets and expressed respect for Gorbachev's public relations skills. The key is not to pursue either extreme in interpreting Gorbachev: (1) assuming that he is simply a Machiavellian manipulator, and that nothing has changed, or (2) assuming that he is a genuine reformer and that everything has changed. The West must encourage the changes being undertaken in the Soviet Union, but keep a clear eye focused on Western security interests in negotiating with the Soviet leadership.

Finally, the underlying French concern is the effect that Gorbachev's seductive style is having on the West. Western leaders must be prepared to "go against public opinion, and convince the people" of where their real interests lie.

Foreign Minister Raimond observed that Gorbachev is an astute and dangerous manipulator of Western public opinion. He reiterated the French view that the period immediately ahead would be difficult and would present a number of risks and challenges to the West, in part due to the non-confrontational style employed by Gorbachev in pursuit of traditional Soviet foreign policy objectives.

## FRENCH CONSENSUS

French Defense Minister Giraud reiterated many of the same themes expressed by other officials. Indeed, there is broad agreement in France on many questions related to security and to nuclear weapons. Of specific interest were Minister Giraud's comments that, with the march of technology, there was enhanced need for greater cooperation on a wider range of technical military matters among members of the Alliance. He specifically cited both French-British and French-American cooperation, in addition to the initiatives that the French were engaged in with the Germans. In Giraud's view, all of this must be pursued under the condition that such European cooperation not weaken, or appear to weaken, NATO. The effect of the INF Treaty on European security must be coldly analyzed, from a military perspective, and Minister Giraud reiterated the priorities outlined by Foreign Minister Raimond, i.e., support the efforts on START while avoiding the trap of discussions leading to a third nuclear zero prior to settling the serious imbalances which exist with the Warsaw Pact on conventional and chemical weapons.

The delegation was impressed with the creativity and seriousness of French thinking on security issues, and feels that the observations made in discussions in France added greatly to the delegation's overall understanding. Efforts to strengthen the European Pillar of western security, in which the French role will be critical, should be encouraged. The Recommendations and Declaration of the Action Committee for Europe (See Appendix O), the significance of which was emphasized by President of the National Assembly Jacques Chaban-Delmas and by Francois Fillon, merit careful attention in regard to these issues.

## E. TURKEY

As a NATO ally which could be subjected to missile attacks from SS-20s based in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, Turkey has a special interest in the global elimination of long-range INF missiles and, like other NATO Allies, is supportive of the INF agreement as negotiated. Turkey has not had intermediate-range surface-to-surface

missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union based in Turkey since the Jupiters were withdrawn in the early 1960s. Removal of the INF missiles places all of NATO once again in this category.

Turkey shares an extensive border with the Soviet Union and Soviet ships must pass through the Bosphorus as they enter and exit the Black Sea. The geographical location of Turkey affords it a key role in the defense of NATO's Southern Region, and its contribution to the conventional defense of NATO is especially important. Therefore, while Turkey generally welcomes the INF agreement, the treaty will have relatively little impact on the Turkish strategic situation. From that standpoint, the need to modernize the Turkish conventional forces and to present the Soviet Union with a credible conventional deterrent remain high priorities, virtually unaffected by the INF agreement.

The high priority accorded conventional force modernization is understandable in view of the overwhelming Soviet advantage in the force balance opposite Turkey and in view of the extreme needs faced by the Turkish forces. In this context, the fact that security assistance to Turkey has, in the past two years, amounted to approximately half of what would be required to implement fully the conventional force modernization program identified by NATO as meeting Turkey's requirements has been a disappointment to the Turks.

The Codel met with a broad range of Turkish officials during its brief visit to Ankara. Despite the short duration of the visit, a full exchange of views was held on a variety of security issues, including but not limited to the INF Treaty and its impact on NATO.

As noted above, Turkish officials were unanimous in their support for the treaty, hailing it as a big step forward for the Alliance. At the same time, as was noted in other countries visited by the Codel, the treaty also removes one component of the Alliance's flexible response strategy. This means that it will be necessary to pay continued attention to the issues of modernization of the remaining conventional and nuclear forces. In Turkey, there is strong support for modernization initiatives in NATO, and the Turkish government can be expected to participate to the limits of its ability in these common efforts.

The Codel emphasized in its discussions with Turkish officials, including Chief of the Turkish General Staff General Necip Torumtay, an appreciation of the unique geographic situation of Turkey and of the efforts of the Turkish military to maintain its capability in the face of severe resource constraints. The military and intelligence-gathering functions which Turkey performs are important contributions to overall Alliance security.

Two issues which have been the sources of some problems were discussed in this regard: the continued deadlock on Cyprus and the continued presence of Turkish troops on the island, and the fact that the Side Letters to the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) which had been signed in March of 1987 had not yet been fully implemented by Turkey.

With regard to Cyprus, Turkish officials were hopeful that progress could be made in the further reduction of Turkish presence on the island and in achieving a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Citing the recent meeting in Davos, Switzerland, between Prime Minister Ozal and Greek Prime Minister Papandreu, the Codel expressed its hope that the "spirit of Davos" could be extended in dealing with the situation on

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Cyprus. While reiterating the Turkish government's position that the proposals of the United Nations Secretary General should be accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, Turkish officials also expressed a willingness to pursue new avenues towards an accord, especially in light of the recent elections on Cyprus and the fact that the Greek Cypriots have elected a new leader. The Codel strongly encouraged further steps in the direction of a negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem.

The Codel also urged Turkey to end the delay in ratifying the DECA side letters, noting that nearly one year had passed since their signing. The Codel argued that ratification of the side letters would be in Turkey's interest and would send a positive signal to the United States about the continued close cooperation between the two countries. Prime Minister Ozal stated that he would, in fact, ratify the two side letters in the near future, as a symbol of his desire to continue to build upon and improve the extensive military and security cooperation between the United States and Turkey. [Note: Subsequently, on February 26, 1988, the Turkish government ratified the side letters.]

Immediately following the departure of the Codel, the incident in the Black Sea involving two U.S. warships and a Soviet vessel occurred. This incident points up the strategic importance of the Turkish Straits and the continued potential for conflict in this area. It reinforces the points made by the Turkish General Staff in briefing the Codel immediately prior to its departure.

## F. ITALY

The Delegation arrived in Italy in the midst of a governmental "crisis" over the budget. Prime Minister Gorla had resigned, and it was not clear that he would be asked to form a new government. Of course, these "crises" occur in Italian politics with some frequency, and they do not often result in major changes of direction in the basic course of Italian policy. (During the Delegation's stay in Rome, Gorla was asked to form a new government by Italian President Cossiga, but that government was also short-lived.) In addition to its own governmental dilemmas, Italy also attended the European Community Economic Summit on February 12, 1988, which, after thirty hours of extremely difficult bargaining, produced an important agreement on the future economic structure of the Community. Despite these distractions, Italian officials were generous with their time and with their insights on the issues of concern to the Delegation.

The Delegation was able to draw some preliminary observations based on its visits to four NATO capitals prior to Rome and to share those observations with Italian journalists and academic experts at a meeting on February 12, 1988. The transcript of that session is printed in Appendix L.

The Delegation emphasized to Italian officials with whom it met that Italy's contributions to the NATO Alliance were not only recognized but deeply appreciated. Italy was the first country on the continent of Europe to accept the deployments of the INF missiles, thus relieving the Federal Republic of Germany of its fears of "singularity" in deployments and paving the way for the Netherlands and Belgium to accept deployments as well. At the same time, Italy has been strongly supportive of the efforts to negotiate the zero option, and is unreserved in its support of ratification of the Treaty.

At the same time, Italian officials recognized that NATO is at a moment when new challenges must be confronted and when NATO's cohesion will be tested. Foreign

Minister Andreotti, who has served in the Italian government virtually throughout the entire history of NATO, argued strongly that NATO must formulate new approaches for the new contingencies which lie ahead, emphasizing at all times the unity and cohesion of NATO.

The theme of the need to focus on NATO unity and the security of the West as a whole was a constant theme in the remarks of Italian officials. For example, while not unduly concerned about the French-German brigade and efforts at improved bilateral relations, the Italians warned that such approaches could divert NATO members from the central task, which is common security. The Western European Union or NATO should be the focus of most efforts. Creating zones of "differentiated security" in NATO must definitely be avoided.

The Delegation members shared this view, and assured Italian officials that the United States was committed to a strong NATO and a unified Alliance. Senators Byrd and Boren, in particular, praised Italy for its willingness to step up to important Alliance decisions, citing not only the INF deployments but also areas not strictly related to NATO, such as the deployments to Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and intelligence cooperation.

Widespread consensus was noted among Italian officials regarding the priorities for arms control negotiations and the next steps which NATO should take in this regard. The START talks were accorded a high priority, to be followed by talks on chemical and conventional weapons. There was little support for beginning talks on short-range nuclear forces before the other talks had achieved results.

Italian officials were optimistic about the implications of the INF Treaty for future arms control negotiations, an attitude which in some ways paralleled the German views. They were pleased at the opinion expressed by members of the Delegation that the INF Treaty was likely to receive a favorable vote in the Senate. They regard the principles of asymmetrical reductions and *reductions* rather than *ceilings* as important milestones in the history of arms control, achievements which, in the words of Foreign Minister Andreotti, constitute a great landmark. The hope was widely shared that these principles could be applied in conventional forces talks as well.

The Italian officials also took a pragmatic approach to the question of nuclear modernization. Rather than press for any public or immediate decision at the present time, they counseled that modernization decisions should be taken when required and pursued in a businesslike fashion. There is no need, according to this line of thinking, for there to be a public crisis in the Alliance over these issues.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The delegation encountered a widespread consensus in the capitals visited on the essential course of Alliance policy. The need for continued unity and close cooperation was recognized and was evident in virtually every meeting with key officials. The delegation found general agreement on: (1) the need to explain effectively and persuasively to Western publics the goals and purposes of the Alliance, in order to maintain a unified front in the face of new and aggressive propaganda challenges from the Soviet Union; (2) the need to develop an agreed set of priorities and to take the initiative in dealing with Gorbachev and the new style of Soviet leadership; and (3) the need to increase cooperation and consultation, using the model of the INF Treaty as a good example for future efforts. At the same time,

there was general recognition that the Alliance will confront new challenges in the coming years, and that difficult choices lie ahead.

## a. FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST

The delegation was impressed with the sensitivity of NATO leaders to the need to inform and educate our respective constituencies in a comprehensive and persuasive fashion on the Alliance's priorities and strategies. It was felt that the efforts of the delegation in this regard would have a beneficial effect on public opinion in Europe.

Although it is too early to ascertain fully the impact of the new style of Gorbachev's diplomacy on public opinion in Europe, NATO leaders agree that this new style presents the West with a vigorous challenge. In the words of a French official:

"We are entering a difficult period. Western public opinion is susceptible to Gorbachev's charm and cleverness. We should not be afraid of going against public opinion. We must explain to the generally uninformed public where its interests lie."

A German official echoed this thought:

"The present East-West discussions are narrowed down to the issues of disarmament which, though important, are only part of the spectrum. We will deviate from the right course if we don't have a cool head about it. We should make good use of the time available, so we should make a common conception for the West; we should stabilize and strengthen NATO whenever possible."

Regarding Mr. Gorbachev, another German official commented:

"We should talk to him and base our readiness on the principles of concessions and counter-concessions, and not act like maniacs. Our policies must be right and we have to explain them to our people. We should make good use of the present year to launch a psychological offensive vis-a-vis the Gorbachev regime on the conventional side."

The delegation strongly believes that NATO's efforts in the field of public explanation and persuasion must be coordinated fully and pursued in conjunction with new initiatives in the fields of arms control and weapons modernization. The effort at public education and explanation particularly as it relates to the continued importance of nuclear deterrence should be afforded a high priority, and should be fully and carefully discussed at NATO's regular meetings.

## b. RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY

On the narrow question of ratification of the INF Treaty, opinion was virtually unanimous that it should be approved by the Senate for ratification, and that failure of the United States to ratify could create a grave crisis in Western Europe and NATO. This view, shared broadly across the political spectrum and in virtually every country, prevailed despite a recognition that the Treaty creates new uncertainties and does not resolve many fundamental issues facing NATO.

Opinions varied on the handling of the negotiations by the United States and the adequacy of consultations with the Allies, but the overall assessment was that consultations between the United States and European leaders has been excellent. Potential criticisms of details of the treaty or of aspects of the inspection system were outweighed by the generally favorable view of the Treaty.

The final assessment was that, having persuaded public opinion to accept the deployment of nuclear systems in part as a response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20's, and having pursued the objective of elimination of those missiles in negotiations for

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over six years, it would be virtually impossible to convince the public that, at this point, those systems should remain in place and that the Treaty should be rejected.

Leaders also expressed some concern over the political momentum generated by the INF Treaty. In line with the concerns that the Alliance's objectives and policies be clearly communicated to the public, leaders felt that the underlying security interests of the Alliance must be clearly articulated, and not lost sight of in the enthusiasm for negotiated arms reductions. In this regard, there was a clear consensus that arms control agreements, including a START agreement, should be concluded when issues in dispute have been satisfactorily negotiated, and should not be negotiated under the pressure of artificial deadlines. Likewise, when and if a sound agreement is in sight, there should be no delay in concluding it, since to do so is in our common interest. But the important thing is that it be a good agreement—not dictated by calendar deadlines or election year politics.

#### C. MODERNIZATION OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS

The modernization issues which the Alliance faces have been under examination since the 1979 INF decision and have been intensively investigated since the Montebello meeting. The Montebello framework of reductions in total numbers of deployed weapons accompanied by modernization of those weapons remaining, continues to be operative. Specific choices concerning which systems to modernize and their precise numbers are not required at the present time. The military authorities of NATO are examining the required modernizations and will make their recommendations at the appropriate time.

There is no need to link modernization of short-range nuclear systems with the INF Treaty. The delegation believes that it will be necessary to modernize certain systems not prohibited by the Treaty, but these decisions are some months in the future and should not be at the center of our discussions of the Treaty at this time.

The delegation believes, based on its discussions throughout Europe, that those systems not covered by the INF Treaty which have longer ranges should receive priority consideration for modernization, rather than battlefield systems (such as artillery).

#### D. ARMS CONTROL PRIORITIES AND INITIATIVES WITHIN NATO

NATO leaders must proceed carefully and resolutely in setting priorities for arms control initiatives in the Alliance. It cannot be overemphasized how important it will be for NATO to coordinate its positions in such a way that fears of "singularity" (in, for example, the Federal Republic), or zones of "differentiated security" (in countries not in the Central Region) do not become serious problems for the Alliance.

The top priority for NATO at the present time should be to formulate a comprehensive and detailed proposal on conventional arms reductions for presentation to the Warsaw Pact later this year. A consensus must be built in the Alliance, and the task will be formidable. But the attempt must be made. The delegation believes that Europe would welcome thoughtful, vigorous American leadership on these issues.

The delegation also believes that negotiations on a chemical weapons ban must be pursued with renewed energy. The delegation was impressed by the seriousness with which the European Allies view the threats posed by the existing imbalances in chemical weapons favoring the Warsaw Pact, and agrees that this problem demands careful and thorough attention by the Alliance.

The delegation also believes that negotiations on further tactical nuclear weapons arms control should not be entered into until negotiations on conventional and chemical arms have shown results.

Progress toward a START agreement is broadly supported but, as was pointed out on several occasions, the issue of START is less immediately relevant to European security than are other arms control issues. European leaders would welcome a solid START agreement, but there is no urgent pressure emanating from Europe to reach one. Appropriate subceilings (an issue which could affect the British strategic forces) and verification procedures which are satisfactory are, of course, strongly supported.

#### E. BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS

The general assessment in the Alliance is that bilateral arrangements such as those between France and Germany concerning the joint brigade are positive developments. This arrangement could help to place longstanding historical frictions in Europe further behind us. Such arrangements can complement rather than compete with NATO if pursued properly. A widespread consensus exists that military organizations competing with NATO are not helpful.

At the same time, efforts to strengthen the European Pillar of Western defense are being reinvigorated at the present time, and this must be viewed as a positive development. The delegation feels that mechanisms which could strengthen and enhance the Allied contributions to European defense must be encouraged wherever possible.

#### F. UNITED STATES POLICIES IN THE PRESENT PERIOD

In the months ahead, the United States must act with purpose and strength in facing the next round of challenges. The INF Treaty is a victory for Alliance solidarity, but it represents the beginning rather than the end of the effort to achieve lasting stability in Europe through negotiated arms reduction agreements.

In addition to the recommendations outlined above, the delegation feels that it would not be prudent at the present time to reassess the size of the American troop commitment in Europe.

The advent of talks on conventional forces and the post-INF political environment are likely to draw increased attention to the importance of the Southern Region in NATO's collective defense. Italy and Turkey, along with the other NATO members in the Southern Region, play a vital role in Alliance defense. Too often, their contributions have been underappreciated. The delegation welcomes the far-sighted action of the government of Turkey in ratifying the side letters to the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement and the actions of Spain in renewing the basing arrangements in that country (while noting the regrettable decision to require removal of the F-16s from Torrejon.) It urges the administration to pursue vigorously the current negotiations with Greece on renewing the basing agreement with that country. Similarly, the delegation believes that the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing should remain deployed in Europe, and welcomes the Italian government's willingness to consider basing options. NATO should strive to achieve a cooperative solution to this matter as soon as possible.

#### ORIGIN AND SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES THE SENATE ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP Background

On March 12, 1985, arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union resumed after a hiatus of some

15 months, a hiatus which had resulted from the breaking off of negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and START by the Soviet Union in, respectively, November and December 1983. Because of the importance of these new negotiations, at the initiative of the Majority and Minority leaders, the Senate created a new Senate body, the Senate Arms Control Observer Group, to monitor them. This was the major item of Senate business on the first day of the 99th Congress, January 3, 1985, (S. Res. 19).<sup>3</sup>

The Observer Group is a bipartisan body of five Senators from each party, as well as the Majority and Minority leaders as ex officio members. In addition to the ex officio members, the group consists of Senators Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Sam Nunn (D-Georgia), Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), and Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode Island) as co-chairmen, and Senators Al Gore (D-Tennessee), Ted Kennedy (D-Massachusetts), Pat Moynihan (D-New York), Don Nickles (R-Oklahoma), John Warner (R-Virginia), and Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyoming). A delegation consisting of eight of the ten Senators in the Arms Control Observer Group, and headed by the two leaders, attended the opening sessions of these negotiations from March 9-12 in Geneva.<sup>4</sup>

The United States Senate has the constitutional responsibility of providing advice and consent in the making of treaties. This responsibility imposes upon Senators the obligation to become as knowledgeable as possible concerning the salient issues which are being addressed in the context of the negotiating process. Any accord with the Soviet Union to control or reduce our strategic weapons carries considerable weight for our nation. It will vitally affect our national security, the security of all our constituents, and the security of our allies. Such an agreement, or agreements, must be supported by a substantial national consensus to stand the test of time. Such a consensus is best achieved through the traditional treaty-making process which has been followed in the field of strategic arms control agreements entered into by the United States.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has jurisdictional and oversight responsibility with regard to arms control negotiations and agreements. It is the purpose of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group to supplement the activities of the Foreign Relations Committee by providing a more regular and systematic involvement of the full Senate in the negotiations, without in any sense assuming the role of participants or negotiators in these talks. While the Foreign Relations Committee oversees arms control negotiations on a continuing basis the full Senate has focused its attention in the past only sporadically on the vital aspects of arms control negotiations, usually developing a knowledge and understanding of the issues being negotiated after the fact—that is, after a draft treaty has been signed by the Executive branch. The result of this fitful process has been generally unsatisfactory in recent years. We seek to avoid a recurrence of the problems of the 1970's, when three successive arms control treaties, signed by three Presidents, were never approved for ratification by the Senate. These include the SALT II Treaty of 1979, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of

<sup>3</sup> The resolution and supporting statements are included at the conclusion of this report at Appendix C.

<sup>4</sup> Senators Moynihan and Wallop were unable to attend due to other pressing Senate business.



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1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976.

In fulfillment of our constitutional responsibility in providing advice and consent in the making of treaties, we believe it is necessary to become completely conversant concerning the particular issues under negotiation. We believe that such knowledge is critical to the understanding by the Senate of the issues involved, and that an intimate knowledge of the evolving issues will permit our negotiators to have the benefit of our advice and counsel, when appropriate, on a continuing basis during the course of the negotiations. We believe that the Senate will be in a far better position to evaluate any agreement which may be reached and that such agreement might benefit from the reactions of the Senate as it is being formulated. We also firmly believe that the interplay of ideas that has occurred and will continue to occur with the members of our observer team will be of assistance to our negotiators.

In the event that the negotiations fail, the Senate will be in a better position to understand and to make comprehensible to the American people just why that failure occurred. This is particularly important in light of the staggering complexity of the issues now being negotiated in Geneva.

*Chronology and Functioning of the Observer Group*

The philosophy underlying the creation of the Observer Group, and the mechanisms of coordination with the Executive branch necessary for its effective operation, were the subject of a series of resolutions, letters, and meetings from December 1984 to April 1985. In December 1984, Senate Majority Leader-elect Dole decided to introduce a resolution in the 99th Congress aimed at underscoring the strong support in the Senate for the President's arms control efforts. To emphasize the importance of this issue, Senator Dole planned to make this resolution the first substantive act of his leadership and to seek affirmative action on it the first day of the new Congress, January 3, 1985. Further, to demonstrate the bipartisan nature of the support which he believed existed in the Senate, Senator Dole early on sought the participation and cooperation in the effort of Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd.

Simultaneously, Senator Byrd was already pursuing the possibility of creating a Senate arms control observer group. His initial proposal in this regard was made by telephone to President Reagan on December 9, 1984. Senator Byrd suggested that a small, bipartisan group of Senators, recommended by the Senate leadership, be appointed as official observers on our delegation to any arms control negotiations which might result from the meetings to be held in Geneva between Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva on January 7-8, 1985. The reaction by the President was enthusiastic and positive, and Senator Byrd followed up this initial discussion with a letter to the President outlining his proposal on December 13, 1984.

In follow-up discussions, Senators Dole and Byrd agreed to meld their approaches in a single resolution, including the concept of an observer group. Senator Dole broached this idea with the Administration and, on January 2, 1985, Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Dam wrote to Senator Dole providing a positive Administration reaction to the proposal. He indicated that an Observer Group would be welcomed by the Administration and that the Group would be provided full briefings by our negotiators to any arms control talks which might emerge.

Further, he indicated that the Administration would seek to have the Senators meet on an informal basis with the Soviet delegates as well.

On the basis of this dialogue, the Senate passed S. Res. 19, sponsored jointly by Senators Dole and Byrd, on January 3, 1985, the first day of the 99th Congress.

Mr. HELMS. Madam President, as we all know by now, the official line—more delicately put, the official U.S. claim—is that this INF Treaty removes from Europe an entire class of nuclear weapons; that is to say, those with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

There used to be a song a long time ago intitled "But It Ain't Necessarily So," that song fits, because the preponderance of the evidence, for those who will take the time to analyze and assess this treaty, demonstrates clearly that this claim by the State Department and others is far from accurate.

A more nearly accurate assessment is that nuclear weapons will not—and I repeat, for the purpose of emphasis, will not—be reduced under the terms of this treaty. Indeed, this treaty permits the Soviets to remove aging delivery vehicles from their stockpile, to take the delivery vehicles out and bolt new and updated delivery systems onto existing warheads. That is not arms reduction.

The nuclear devices, of course, are the most expensive and difficult components to produce; and I emphasize that by the time this treaty is fully implemented, all of the U.S.-NATO strategic weapons in Europe will have been removed, and the Soviet Union nuclear forces targeted on Europe will have been fully modernize. Regardless of all the snake-oil claims made, that is a fact. The Soviet Union will be at least as powerful and, in fact, more formidable than ever.

The Soviet Union can defeat the purpose of the INF Treaty in two ways:

One, the Soviets can defeat the treaty by following its terms to the letter. The Soviets knew what they were doing when they negotiated this treaty. Will Rogers said a long time ago that the United States has never lost a war nor won a treaty.

Second, the Soviets can defeat this treaty by cheating, and they have developed that to a fine art, as all of us should know. But in this case, the Soviets probably will do both, at virtually no risk of being caught at it. Let me elaborate.

The Soviets can defeat the treaty's purpose simply by following its terms carefully. That is why the Soviets have been so eager to have this treaty ratified. The missiles to be eliminated are defined so restrictively that the old missile, the SS-20, is prohibited. But a new, enhanced version of virtually the same Soviet missile, known as the SS-25, is not prohibited. The point is that the SS-25 can do everything that the prohibited SS-20 can do, and then some. Because the treaty exempts missiles tested, even ones at a

longer range than 5,500 kilometers, the SS-25 is left untouched by this treaty. That is an acknowledged fact. It was brought up repeatedly during the consideration of the treaty by the Foreign Relations Committee and by the Armed Services Committee, and the proponents of the committee said, "So what?"

My response was, "So, a lot," because as already pointed out, the Soviets can even use the same nuclear weapons, and I am now talking about the warheads, removed from the SS-20's that are to be destroyed under the terms of this treaty.

The Soviets can also defeat the treaty's purposes by cheating. And who in this Senate will deny the long record of the Soviet Union at duplicity and cheating?

The Soviets have cheated massively on every previous arms control agreement, and no less than Ronald Reagan himself has said this repeatedly. I have a hunch that if Ronald Reagan were running for President this year, instead of finishing up his 8 years in the White House, he would be out on the hustings demanding that this treaty be rejected by the Senate.

In fact, the SS-25—and that is the missile that is not covered by this treaty—the SS-25 itself is a violation of the constraints of SALT II. It was established clearly in the committee hearings that we do not know how many SS-20's the Soviets have produced. We never will.

The astonishingly wide variation of estimates by our nine intelligence agencies on this question about the number of SS-20's produced by the Soviet Union makes it certain that we will never know when, or if, all of the SS-20 delivery vehicles have been destroyed. And bear in mind that no matter how many tubes are destroyed, if you want to describe them that way, the warheads will be removed, and they can be boited on the SS-25's. Now the warhead is the weapon.

The variation in our intelligence estimates, reportedly ranging from as low as 550 to at least 1,250, is far too wide to be accepted by a reasonable mind.

Under the treaty, the Soviets promise to destroy 650 SS-20 delivery vehicles. Yet if they do so, they could still have another 300 to 600 hidden as a covert force, according to evaluations reportedly emanating from the majority of our nine intelligence agencies.

I do not think many Americans understand that yet. Maybe not many Senators do.

But the notion that a covert missile force of that size would not be militarily significant represents, I think, the triumphant of hope over common sense.

Although some administration witnesses attempted to maintain that such a covert force would be militarily useless without the chance to test fire the missiles regularly to test reliabil-

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ity—tests supposedly, but only supposedly, detectable—no one has refuted President Reagan's own report that the Soviets had kept a similar covert force of more than 100 SS-16's for 8 years without the United States detecting either a test or the missiles themselves.

If the majority of our intelligence agencies are right about the numbers, I think we can be sure that the Soviets would not keep a covert missile force unless they had figured out not only how to keep it, but also how to keep it in readiness.

For this reason, the verification process in the treaty is virtually useless. The treaty contains only quantitative criteria for the missiles to be destroyed, with no qualitative criteria at all. Thus the Soviet missiles to be destroyed could be factory rejects or even dummies, as well as those old aging delivery vehicles that we expect them to destroy, delivery vehicles, not the weapons, because, remember, the warhead that will be removed from each of them can be bolted onto the SS-25 which is not covered by this treaty.

Furthermore, all of us talk about the onsite inspection that takes place under this treaty only at specific places chosen by the Soviet Union and which they have identified beforehand.

Now, I hardly think that any reasonable person would expect the Soviets to keep its covert missiles at a place they were going to tell us we could look.

Now, it is highly significant that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in its report to the Foreign Relations Committee, was extremely guarded in its assessment of the verifiability of this INF Treaty. The Intelligence Committee stated that the treaty was verifiable only with regard to those declared sites, but bear in mind that the Soviets are the ones doing the declaring.

This means that we can verify the treaty only at sites where there is scant possibility of a Soviet violation. It is the old shell game and the Soviets are good at it.

Other testimony showed that our chances of detecting a violation outside of those declared sites were about 1 to 10. We would have to be astonishingly lucky, or the Soviets would have to be incredibly careless, for us to detect a violation under those circumstances.

Finally, even if a violation were detected, the Soviets would suffer no consequences. No major arms control violation of the Soviets in the past has ever been corrected, not one time.

For example, the Soviets have deployed a prohibited nationwide ABM system including the capability to hand over incoming information to battle-management radars and interceptors. Yet our own State Department has declined for more than 7 months to implement the 5-year com-

pliance review mandated by the ABM Treaty because we would have to declare, do you not know, that the Soviet Union is engaged in a material breach of the ABM Treaty. And it is a credit to this Senate and to the distinguished chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee that my amendment yesterday was readily accepted and agreed to by them and approved by the Senate to require our Government to live up to the ABM Treaty in that regard.

So, that is what we run into with the State Department, the doubletalk, the reluctance.

Arms control without compliance is nothing more than an illusion. Yet this treaty contains no compliance regime whatsoever, except perhaps another useless commission where we could go and express a strong protest, and the Soviets say "ha, ha ha," and they have been saying "ha, ha, ha" every time we have gotten around to protesting their previous violations on previous treaties.

The Soviets' only obligation is that they come to the Commission meeting and they sit there and listen and we protest, and they go home and smile at each other and say, "We did it to them again."

The point is this: The Soviets have cheated and we have known it. They are cheating now and we know it. And they will continue to cheat. This treaty can have no other result. Yet the lack of a true compliance regime signals to the Soviets that we do not intend to take their violations seriously. Even if we did, there is nothing we could do about it.

The net effect then of the INF Treaty is to make both conventional and nuclear war more likely, not less likely. Even the threat of a conventional attack on Europe will have a profound effect on the social, political, and religious freedoms of Europe. The documented lack of freedom in Eastern Europe points to what could well happen in a Western Europe that is neutralized and intimidated by the elimination of the major NATO deterrents called for in the INF Treaty.

In the end, the treaty invites either global nuclear war or acquiescence to a future not worth looking forward to.

So that is why I have contended all along, having sat down right at the beginning when the treaty text was delivered to me in December, I concluded then that it is fatally flawed and I have not changed my opinion. And those flaws fall into two categories.

The first category consists of flaws which, on their face, defeat the principal object and purpose of the treaty. The second category consists of those which raise the potential for action which could defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. And, finally, there are issues of constitutional and international law which the Senate must consider, including something that has been absolutely obscured, and that is

the cost—the cost—to the American taxpayers of implementing this treaty.

Madam President, the fatal flaws which defeat the principal object and purpose of the treaty include the following:

First, the treaty permits the Soviets to modernize the delivery vehicles for the SS-20 warheads—thereby retaining the same nuclear capability against Europe—while eliminating the only assured nuclear deterrent possessed by NATO.

Second, the verification procedures of the treaty provide no certainty of discovering Soviet cheating, while—based on past Soviet performance and present evidence—the Soviets may indeed have up to twice as many SS-20's as they declare in the treaty. I have filed a top secret code word level annex to the Senate Foreign Relations report which is available to Senators and appropriately cleared staff in S-407 of the Capitol.

Third, the treaty is overbroad in that it blocks not only future developments in nuclear weapons technology but in conventional technology as well, a circumstance scarcely, if at all, considered by the negotiators, despite the fact that inventive technology is a major advantage of the United States. And that is what the Soviet Union was concerned about. Moreover, the treaty needlessly surrenders nonnuclear weapons technology based on ground-launched cruise missiles, in an illusory pursuit of verifiability—thereby giving up a relatively cheap and highly effective conventional deterrent weapon for the defense of Europe.

Fourth, the final data upon which the treaty is based will not be made available until 30 days after the treaty is ratified, thereby making it possible for the Soviets to make radical changes in the numbers of missiles to be destroyed, and defeating the already weak verification scheme.

Fifth, the very concept of the INF Treaty alone is untenable so long as the Soviets maintain large inventories of ICBM delivery vehicles and warheads that can substitute for the missiles to be eliminated. And bear in mind that the Soviets and the United States will destroy only the delivery system and not the warhead.

Until the START negotiations are completed and implemented, Western Europe will still be targeted by Soviet nuclear weapons, but will have nonnuclear deterrent for its own security. To maintain balanced reductions, I think that we should consider that the INF Treaty should not be ratified until START likewise is ratified.

Madam President, the cost of this treaty has not even been discussed in the debate thus far and scarcely touched upon, if at all, by the major news media of this country.

Now, I am going to offer an amendment to this treaty at some point, if it is ratified, that we begin to remove American servicemen and women and

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their dependents from Europe. The European leaders profess to be enthusiastically in favor of this INF Treaty. And I might add at the very time their subordinates and their defense people were coming to us and saying, "Boy, it's a terrible treaty." But they endorsed it because they are fearful of the protest movements in Europe. So they have endorsed it. Fine.

But I think it is about time for Europe to defend itself and to pay for it. Let us start bringing our men and women home and their dependents.

Now, I wonder how many Americans know how much the taxpayers of this country are paying to defend Europe. The figure is \$477 million a day; 60 percent, 60 percent of the Defense budget. So, we must consider that this treaty creates U.S. hostages in Europe at a cost of \$477 million per day.

There are only two good reasons to sign any arms control treaty. First, to reduce the risk of war and, second, to enhance the security of our country. Tragically, this treaty accomplishes neither purpose.

The Soviets enjoy a decisive 5-to-1 margin of superiority over our forces in Europe, on the basis of their strength in chemical and conventional warfare forces—five to one.

Winston Churchill once said, "Strength helps prevent war. Weakness invites aggression."

So I think it is self-evident that the danger of war is enhanced if the totalitarians in the Kremlin see an opportunity to dominate Western Europe at minimal military risk for themselves. With the removal and destruction of our Pershing II missiles, we will surrender our ability to retaliate effectively against Soviet aggression. We will no longer be able to hold at risk 2.5 million Communist troops, 40,000 Communist tanks, and 6,000 Communist fighter aircraft.

So with the elimination of our non-nuclear ground-launch cruise missiles, or GLCM's, as we call them, we will no longer be able to disrupt Soviet supply lines as a way of neutralizing the enemy's "blitzkrieg" strategy.

The Washington Times has pointed out that:

Warsaw Pact supply routes in Eastern Europe contain thousands of choke points, most or all of which could be disrupted with non-nuclear cruise missiles. Without those supply routes, Communist-bloc forces simply would be stranded in the field.

Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies already have created the basic structure—bridges, roads, storage depots, airfields and fuel supplies—necessary to mount a European invasion.

Mr. President, ratification of this treaty will not promote peace nor will it enhance our security, or that of our allies. Quite the contrary, it will require West Germany to deal with the new reality of Soviet dominance in Western Europe, 3 years from now, in 1991, when our deterrent force has been dismantled.

Today in 1988, 325,000 American military personnel and 300,000 of their

dependents are on the frontiers of freedom in West Germany. Today these men and women have a clearly defined mission—to deter and, if necessary, to defeat a Soviet-initiated attack on Western Europe. In 3 years, however, if the INF Treaty is ratified and implemented, those 625,000 Americans will have replaced our missiles as the main barrier to Soviet intimidation and aggression.

Instead of using Pershings and GLCM's, we will be required to ward off the Soviets with human hostages.

Mr. President, twice in this century our troops have been sent to fight "no win" wars, in Korea and in Vietnam. In both places, our Government's goal was not victory, but stalemate. Tens of thousands of our sons were sacrificed for the sake of State Department theories and diplomatic negotiations. Now in Western Europe we are once again about to sacrifice our children on the altar of arms control, détente, and so-called "limited war" to test those theories.

Instead of trusting in Almighty God and in our own strength, like Samson we will be shorn of that strength in order that we may embrace the new Delilah in the Kremlin.

Despite an unbroken record of Soviet cheating on every treaty we have ever signed with our Communist enemy, the United States Senate may be about to entrust the lives of our children and the security of our country to yet another worthless piece of paper signed by an adversary who uses arms control to disarm us, and to strengthen his own position.

Throughout my Senate career, which began 15 years ago in 1973, I have consistently voted for every proposal put before me to strengthen America's defenses and to protect our vital interests throughout the world. Yet NATO has not responded in kind.

While the countries of Western Europe were spending only 5.1 percent and less of their gross national product on their own defense compared to our 6.6 percent, the Senate was voting to assure that American would do more—not for their sakes, but for ours.

In 1986, every American was taxed on the average \$1,155 to pay for defense while West Germans were paying \$453 apiece, citizens of Spain \$113, the British \$488, the Portuguese \$90 apiece. We should pay to defend America, but we should not have to pay more to defend their countries than they are willing to pay to defend themselves.

President Eisenhower wrote in 1963, "I believe the time has come when we should start withdrawing some of the U.S. troops. One American division in Europe can show the flag as definitively as can several." In 1951, Eisenhower said if, in 10 years "all American troops stationed in Europe have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project (i.e., NATO) will have failed."

So long as Europe could not afford to defend itself, U.S. troops in Europe made sense, and NATO played a positive role in securing the West. But the troops were not intended to be permanently stationed in Europe. They were viewed as an emergency measure that would remain in force only until Europe recovered from World War II.

Twenty-five years later, we have not one division in Europe, but four.

I have always been willing to do what was necessary for NATO as long as it made sense for America. But it will no longer make sense for America to keep our troops and their dependents in Europe 40 years after the end of World War II at a cost of \$477,000,000 per day, if we are unprepared to defend those troops, and if they are not in a position to carry out successfully the mission to which they were originally assigned.

It would be unconscionable to leave our young people as hostages in Europe, knowing full well that if war breaks out, there is nothing America will or can do—and knowing full well that the Europeans will do nothing more than they have done in the past to provide for their own defense.

There is no question that the Europeans are economically equipped to provide for their own defense. They have more than ample people, money, and technology. But they have preferred to rely on the pocketbooks of American workers and the good will of the Soviet Union.

What is most amazing is the European political leaders have permitted themselves to be led like lambs to the slaughter, publicly supporting the INF Treaty while privately condemning it. But the lack of forthrightness on another continent is no excuse for the sacrifice of our children in another battle of Dunkirk in which the world watches as the surviving troops of the free world are hauled away in fishing boats.

There is no question, Madam President, that the Europeans are economically equipped to provide for their own defense. So I say let them do it. And remove from the backs of the American taxpayers the \$477 million a day that it costs us to provide them with their defense. The Europeans have more than ample people. They have more than ample money and technology. But they have preferred to rely on the pocketbooks of the American workers and the good will of the Soviet Union.

The decision by the United States Senate to ratify the INF Treaty will be a decision to abandon Western Europe to the strategic hegemony of our Soviet enemy and I am going to vote against ratification, even if I am the only Senator to do so.

I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Rhode Island.

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Mr. PELL. Madam President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from California.

Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee very much.

Madam President, today we embark on the Senate's first serious consideration of an arms control treaty in a good many years.

Efforts in the past decade to make progress in this area have been detailed or derided by arms control critics. But I see real signs of progress. A bipartisan spirit and approach to arms control and an improved climate in United States-Soviet relations give me cause for hope—hope for a world more free of tension, hope for a world free from the threat of nuclear war.

I believe we will, at long last, take a step in the right direction and ratify the INF Treaty—I trust before the forthcoming United States-Soviet summit.

The Senate—thanks in large part to the determination of the majority leader—has performed a service of historic dimension by withholding Senate consideration of the treaty until now.

He and Senators NUNN, BOREN, and others demanded that a number of problems had to be cleared up first. They have been cleared up.

I agree with the majority leader that the Senate must not be held to an arbitrary deadline for ratification. But we must face reality. The reality is that on May 29, President Reagan will meet with Soviet leader Gorbachev in Moscow.

The President should not go to that meeting empty handed. There is no longer any justification for even considering that he go empty handed. Now is the time for action. We should approve this treaty. And we should approve it without delay.

This treaty is a historic agreement. Not in its direct effort, which is a modest reduction of the superpowers' bloated nuclear arsenals, but in the hopeful signal and valuable experience it provides us for future arms control agreements.

The INF Treaty is precedent-setting in several respects. The inspection and verification provisions of this treaty are the most intrusive, detailed, and thorough that we have ever negotiated. This is a genuine breakthrough. And the most concrete example of glasnost I have seen. Opening the Soviet Union to on-site inspection eliminates a major obstacle to arms limitations and paves the way for dealing with the more difficult problems of monitoring deep reductions in strategic arms.

That is why it is so important to approve this treaty before the President goes to Moscow so that he will be able there to build on this foundation and move on to far more significant matters relating to arms and relating to the American-Soviet relationship. The possibility of greatly improving this relationship and turning it to peaceful

and constructive channels is now within reach.

The treaty is historic in other ways, too. It affects an entire class of nuclear weapons, eliminating a threat that has been in existence for decades.

And most importantly, this is the first agreement that does more than just slow the increase of weapons. It will require that the Soviet Union and the United States destroy a part of their arsenals.

Three Senate committees, comprising nearly half the Members of the Senate, have heard thousands of pages of testimony from dozens of expert witnesses on the ramifications of the INF Treaty.

I want to pay tribute to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator now managing this measure, this treaty on the floor, for his patience and diligence and hard and diplomatic work in guiding this treaty through not only the Foreign Relations Committee, but through the other difficulties and pitfalls that stood in its way before we finally arrived here on the floor. I welcome the opportunity to work with them.

The members of the Foreign Relations Intelligence, and Armed Services Committees have worked together to clarify ambiguities, to pin down definitions, and to urge the executive branch to remedy any potential discrepancies. We have poked and pried and dissected and questioned this treaty like no other. It is perhaps the most closely scrutinized treaty ever submitted for Senate consideration.

Given the complexity of this treaty and the accompanying protocols, it is remarkable there has been so little dispute over its specific substantive provisions. Those issues that have been raised, like recent clarifications on implementing the inspection procedures, have been resolved quickly and to our satisfaction. We have had a very capable negotiating team in Geneva, and a very capable Secretary of State at the helm.

I believe the language of this treaty is as clear as human language will allow. There can be no dispute about the essential facts: The Soviets will disable four times as many warheads as the United States. The treaty will establish the precedent of asymmetrical reductions. And our confidence in our ability to verify Soviet compliance is very high.

Even after this treaty is fully implemented, there will continue to be many, many areas for superpower competition. We have a long road to walk if we are to bring any semblance of control to the nuclear weapons competition.

But, if we are fortunate, the implementation of this agreement will mark the beginning of the end of this mindless race to build better, more efficient and more numerous methods of destruction. Perhaps we can soon begin to think of increasing our national security in terms of decreasing our arse-

nals, rather than adding ever more to the stockpile.

Some have said that the INF Treaty will help the Soviet Union. Of course it will. I've never heard of any nation that knowingly and without duress signs a treaty that is contrary to its own self-interest. I think we must pull ourselves out of the mindset that holds that anything good for the Soviet Union is necessarily bad for the United States. Increasing international security, even increasing the Soviets' sense of security, can indeed make America more secure as well.

It so happens that the treaty will help the United States as well as the Soviet Union. The fact is that the implementation of the treaty is overwhelmingly in our national interest. It is strongly supported by the citizens of this country.

It is also in the interest of our allies—not just in Europe but in Asia and the Pacific as well. It received the unanimous endorsement of NATO leaders and high praise from NATO defense ministers.

This treaty is a significant bipartisan achievement. I urge the Senate to ratify it without delay.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader.

Mr. DOLE. Madam President, first I would urge all Senators who would like to make opening statements: This is a good time to do it. We would like to get into the meat of the process on tomorrow. I am certain the manager, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and others, would like to move ahead.

We have been calling people on our side because today we enter the home stretch. We are finally on this treaty. There have been good reasons why we have not started before, and I think everybody has a right to be proud of a job well done. As I have said before, the Senate has played a constructive role.

We had a constitutional role to play. We played that role, as most recently demonstrated in testimony just yesterday before the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator PELL's committee, by Secretary Shultz. He had been back to Geneva negotiating with the Soviets, clarifying some areas that had been raised by who? By Members of the Senate. And now we have a better treaty than we had a week ago.

I would guess others will find mistakes. And I guess over the next 10 or 15 years there are going to be technical corrections and adjustments and understandings and resolutions of differences between Soviets and Americans.

I do not quarrel with anyone who wants to vote against consenting to ratification. They have a perfect right to do that. I know some will do that. Obviously, some will want to offer amendments to the text of the treaty, or others will want to offer reservations or amendments or statements or

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declarations to the Resolution of Ratification. As far as I know, no one quarrels with that. But the point is we ought to do it, and do it as quickly as we can.

I know of no one in this body who wants to deny the President a hard-earned right to take the Instruments of Ratification to Moscow with him. I do not know of anybody on the Democratic side or anyone on the Republican side who has not had enough time to understand the treaty. There have been thousands of detailed questions, hundreds of witnesses, scores of hearings in three different committees. Senators and staff from both sides of the aisle have worked long and hard.

I would guess there has never been a treaty that has been more closely scrutinized than the one before the Senate right now.

So I am going to stand here in a very positive way and predict that we are going to do this for the President—but not just for the President, for the country, for Democrats, Republicans, and Independents and all those people out there who may not be interested in politics, but who are concerned about their future, their children's future, and their grandchildren's future.

We are not doing this because it is in the Soviets' interests. We are doing it because it is in our national interests. I assume they have made the same judgment. They would not do it if it was not in their national interest.

We don't have to trust the Soviets, or trust Gorbachev, or trust anyone else. We have made a judgment. We have a lot of experts in this field who say that this is a good treaty, and it is in our interests. That is the bottom line.

## NEGOTIATING RECORD VALUABLE

Senators and staff on both sides have spent countless hours studying the negotiating record. I recall that when Senator NUNN first proposed Senate access to the negotiating record many were skeptical. In retrospect I believe this was a positive development which should be repeated for all major treaties because with the benefit of the record the Senate has been able to develop its own clear idea of what obligations the two parties proposed to undertake in the INF treaty.

## CONCRETE RESULTS

All the work was worth it. When I told President Reagan I would support the treaty and make an effort to lead the effort for ratification, I also told him that I believed the Senate could improve upon an already good product. As I have said a few moments ago, he did that just this past week, and we have done it in hearings, we have done it with statements, and we will continue to work in this constructive way. Senators NUNN and WARNER, and QUAYLE, and their Armed Services Committee colleagues led the way to defend and resolve the so-called futures issue. The result is a diplomatic

note signed by the United States and Soviet representatives which is going to be part of the treaty.

With Intelligence Committee insistence as backing, the administration was able to press the Soviets for quick resolution on the nine onsite inspection issues. Perhaps these were just some predictable glitches; perhaps not. But one way or the other the Soviets have been reminded that verification is of paramount importance to us. We want to be able to verify the terms and conditions of this treaty.

Again, we have a signed paper in hand. Chairman BOREN and Vice Chairman COHEN, and their colleagues are to be thanked for this.

Certainly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under the leadership of Senator PELL, Senator HELMS, Senator LUGAR, and others, has contributed to making a record.

## THE BIG PICTURE

So the Senate has made a difference but we have not reached the bottom line. I think the bottom line is to get this treaty behind us. It deserves our advice and consent. It ought to be backed by a big bipartisan majority.

I know there are already some saying, "Well, now, this is 1988; this is a political year; we don't want to do this or that because some party might benefit." The beneficiaries will be the American people. I think that is how it is going to be perceived.

This is a historic treaty, the first ever to reduce existing nuclear weapons. In fact, it eliminates two entire classes of them. Its verification provisions are unprecedented, with onsite inspection, and they are also effective. The Soviets have finally agreed to asymmetrical reductions. And finally, the treaty is a triumph for NATO cohesion.

I must say, when I was trying to make a judgment on the treaty, I called Margaret Thatcher. I did not know if she would take my call, but at that time I was ahead in Iowa and she took my call. We talked about the treaty because I wanted to hear it from her firsthand that she supported it, and she did.

I also talked to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who had the same response—enthusiastic support for the treaty. And I later talked to Prime Minister Goria of Italy, who was visiting the United States—and he was in support of the treaty.

## SUMMIT RATIFICATION DESIRABLE

So we have to work carefully and we have to work independently. We cannot be caught up by any artificial deadlines. We have worked carefully for nearly 4 months.

So as I have said, we have had Senators on three committees look at this carefully. Now there are other Members. They want to be here; they want to ask questions; they want to make statements; they want to offer whatever they are going to offer; they want to make their points. In fact, I have a few points of my own I hope to make,

and we will have the opportunity starting right now.

On the other hand, we do not live in a vacuum. This is not just some academic exercise. This is a real world issue of huge importance and the world is watching what we do. One of INF's biggest pluses is the boost it gives to the U.S. leadership and the NATO alliance, and that plus will be doubled with ratification at the upcoming summit.

Now, if this were incompatible with Senate responsibility, I would be the first to say, "slow down," but this is not the case. Next Wednesday will make 4 months since the treaty was transmitted to the Senate, and I cannot think of a better target date for advice and consent. That gives us 7 or 8 solid working days. We should work quickly but thoroughly through the amendments to the treaty text because I am certain most of my colleagues agree that such amendments, in most cases, are going to be unwarranted.

## DROP TREATY INTERPRETATION CONDITION

Then, in accordance with Senate procedure, we will turn to the treaty interpretation condition proposed by the Foreign Relations Committee as the first order of business on the Resolution of Ratification. I hope the authors of this provision agree that all the recent Senate good work on this point makes this exercise unnecessary.

Indeed, Senate action on the "futures" and onsite inspection issues involved looking behind administration testimony, studying the negotiating record, and insisting upon written clarifications agreed with the Soviets.

We cannot now credibly assert that the treaty's meaning is based only on its text and executive testimony. This notion derives neither from the Constitution, nor from practical experience. In reality, it is rooted only in our disagreement over another treaty, another treaty not even before us, but insistence upon it will certainly delay this treaty.

I do not believe that such delay is fitting to end the solid work we have done. So I think we have to put the other differences aside and spend our time on the INF issues.

## LET'S GET TO WORK

It is time to roll up our sleeves and finish our work, and, as other speakers have said, there is absolutely no reason, unless something pops up that nobody has thought of—and there have been a lot of pretty good minds, men and women, people in this country and outside this country that have looked at this treaty, looked at it with an eagle eye—there is no good reason why the President should not have this treaty to ratify in Moscow.

When Ronald Reagan steps off Air Force One and onto Russian soil, I want Mr. Gorbachev to know that he is facing a man with a solid backing of Congress and the American people. That is what this is all about.

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So I am going to be working closely with the majority leader, who I think has done an outstanding job, in making certain that we resolved some of these issues before coming to the floor. We have saved time this past week.

And I know that some of my colleagues, as I have said, have differences. That is fine. Some will raise valid points, just as valid points were raised on futures and on inspection and on other things. Maybe someone will find a real area that should be corrected. But I hope what we can do is to do what we have a reputation of doing around here, and that is being very constructive and not delaying. This is a Senate responsibility, but it is an issue that transcends this Chamber.

Oh, it is important to the President. But it is important to the American people. It is important to free people around the world. It is important to those who look to us for leadership all around the world. I think we will have ample time.

So in the next few days when we get into the nitty-gritty of this, we are going to have to stand up and be counted and move this treaty along. I pledge the President of the United States my support, and I am going to do what I can in the next several days to make certain that when he leaves the United States, he has what he needs in his pocket.

I will be happy to yield whatever time he may consume to the Senator from Idaho, but before I do, I also want to say, there is an excellent work on the Republican desks, which I am certain we can make available to the other side. It is a very objective, non-partisan analysis of the reports from the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence Committees on the treaty. It is a good summary, and I want to congratulate Rob Soofer who is a staffer of the Republican Policy Committee. I am certain we will be happy to make copies available to either side. It is a good summary that puts it all in perspective.

Mr. SYMMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. SYMMS. I thank the distinguished Republican leader for not only his remarks but his long service in this body and the other body and his prior service to his country that is a record matched by very few people who have served in this Senate.

I must say that it has been a privilege for me to be one of his supporters in his recent political endeavors and still one of his supporters. I hope to be on his team here in the Senate, even though on this particular issue when I take the floor, I am not coming down on the same side of the issue as our distinguished Republican leader.

Mr. President, in getting into my remarks, it is not the intention of this Senator to in any way delay the deliberations that the Senate must do in its

responsibilities to advise and consent and to eventually ratify this treaty.

My point is I wish to make my case to my colleagues in the best fashion I know how. Ultimately, we will have a vote, and I think there is much to do about the fact that the President should have this treaty with him, if it is going to be ratified, prior to the time he makes his journey to the Soviet Union.

I suppose that one might take the rather philosophical approach to it, whether you are for or against this treaty, that probably there will not be many votes changed by what is said here in this Chamber in the next 2 weeks.

I do think, historically looking at this, that in the course of history, it is rather irrelevant President Reagan has the treaty in his pocket to take to Moscow with him to meet the dictator of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev, or whether he does not. But I think also that it is probably not too significant in the course of history whether we vote on the treaty prior to his going or after he goes, unless there is something else that may come out, although I said all along I thought the time eventually was on the side of those people who are in opposition to this treaty.

But I think in many ways, it might be said that this was a fait accompli when the treaty was originally signed last December.

I might say one thing about President Reagan and his administration, who successfully negotiated this treaty: President Reagan demonstrated that it takes more than just rhetoric to have the confidence and credibility not only of our allies, but the respect of our adversaries; that it takes a strong political will.

That is probably the most important factor in negotiating with authoritarian governments for those of us who come from free societies, from the democratic process, from countries which aspire to democratic capitalism, personal freedom, human rights and human dignities. What we must remember is that the one single thing that is key and most important in negotiating with the dictatorships and the authoritarians and those people who stay in power by using oppression and tyranny and fear, such as the Soviet Union, that the best way to negotiate with them is from a position of strength.

So I think this President deserves the praise and admiration of all Americans because he negotiated from a position of strength.

I have to say that it was not the left-wing politicians in Europe from more liberal parties who made it possible for the Pershing II's and the cruise missiles to be deployed. It was not the more liberal politicians here in this body and in the other body who made it possible. It was the conservatives in America and people who knew that we had to deal from a position of strength

who gave the President the political will to use the political chips in Western Europe, to make those early deployments in his administration of the Pershing II and the cruise missile, that made it possible to get to the point where the Soviets would come to the table to sign an agreement to get weapons systems out of Europe that they felt were a deterrent to Soviet hegemony and to the ultimate Soviet goal of breaking up the NATO alliance and peeling West Germany off from the alliance if they could do it.

Strength is the key. It takes political will, it takes economic strength, and it also takes a commitment to military strength to back it up. It is common sense.

My basic political philosophy with respect to foreign policy is that you should support your friends and oppose your enemies. Pretty easy to understand, pretty simple to understand, and I think that the problem I have found with this entire process since this big rush toward arms control in this administration is that probably the most significant thing that has happened in the signing of the INF Treaty is the fact that we got away from that policy of supporting our friends and opposing our enemies.

We have strengthened the political parties that are more socialistic, more sympathetic to the Communist bloc nations, less sympathetic to personal freedom, less sympathetic to economic freedom, less sympathetic to democratic capitalism and have weakened the position of the political leaders in Europe who have been in support of President Reagan's general philosophy that has been growing around the world.

I think when one looks at the economic growth that we have enjoyed in this country in the past 6 years of uninterrupted recovery, that that also has had a sustaining effect as part of the political will, the military strength, and the economic strength that we have been able to enjoy in the West under the leadership of the President.

So I say to President Reagan that I have the highest respect for his ability to get to the point that we signed the INF Treaty and that the Soviets were willing to deal with them, Mr. President. But I do think that the future now is more uncertain because I think that the United States of America has, by taking this action, emboldened the political parties who were viewed as our adversaries and have weakened those people who we viewed as our friends in the long haul in politics in Europe.

But having said that, I said last December that I would lay aside my preconceptions and doubts that I had about the treaty, and approach the treaty's ratification with an open mind. Even though I had great skepticism, as my colleagues know, I had great skepticism of all of the love in

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that took place here in Washington. And I might just say with respect to that that I hope after this summit when President Reagan goes to Moscow that we in the United States, no matter who our President is, whether it is GEORGE BUSH, Michael Dukakis, or whoever, will encourage the administrations of the future to not have home and home series summits where great expectations are billed to the American people, that somehow, something must be accomplished every year.

I would much prefer to see the leader of the United States, the President of the United States of America, the leader of the free world, an elected official, meet with the leader of the Soviet Union, an oppressive society, in a neutral court so we do not have this opportunity for the Soviets—who are masters of using the free press that they could not give to their people in their country—but that we do not give them just a free ride to paint themselves in the picture that somehow everything has changed in the Soviet Union, and now that Gorbachev is in power they now have stopped state-supported terrorism, which they have not; that they have withdrawn from Afghanistan, which we pray that they will, but they have not; that they stopped funding Communist revolutionary governments in Central America, all across Africa, and creating hegemony and terrorism against innocent civilians in places like Pakistan and many other places in the world, which they are still doing.

I think in many ways we allow ourselves, because Americans in general love to think that everything is going to be all right because we are optimistic, we are goal oriented. So what happens is that election time is rolling around, the administration therefore decides that it is time to get a treaty because after all the President is going to be leaving town, and we will push for this. It happens with every administration no matter whether they are Republicans, Democrats or what. There is always a time constraint built into our constitutional system because we know under the Constitution how long a President will be in office, or how long at least he has to go back and face reelection.

There is a pressure on those of us from the West to make a deal just like here is a pressure on the Senate. Let no one make a mistake. There is a pressure on this Senate to allow the President the privilege to go to Moscow with that treaty, ratified or not ratified. But there is a pressure on the Senate to get out of the way, let the thing happen because otherwise there would be all kinds of stories written in the newspapers and in the television, in the radios and so forth, that somehow everything was going to get at River City because the Senate could not ratify the treaty on time.

So we do have this pressure. The Soviets do not have the same problem be-

cause if people start objecting too much in that country, they ship them off to Siberia. I would say to my colleagues the ultimate test, of course, of a free country, or a country that is really opening up, is that they stop killing people at the border if they choose to leave. And the ultimate test of a free society is you can liquidate your assets, get your money, get your passport and leave. As long as you live in a country that will allow that privilege, you are very, very lucky human beings. I think we should all count our blessings that we are blessed to live in this great land.

But anyway, Mr. President, I tried my best to be true to the promise that I would face this with an open mind. I listened carefully to a multitude of witnesses who testified before the Armed Services Committee, both pro and con. And I read and considered innumerable articles and reports concerning the treaty and the effects that it will have. But first and foremost I wanted to be convinced that the INF Treaty enhanced our national security, and was in the best interests of this Nation. I wanted to be convinced that we had reached a point in our relationship with the Soviet Union where we had achieved a mutual understanding based on openness, candor, and a point where the balance of terror was no longer considered a meaningful phrase.

I wanted to be convinced that the loss of more than 6½ billion dollars worth of American taxpayers' dollars had been spent on intermediate nuclear forces was equal to the gain and security represented by the treaty.

Finally, I wanted to be convinced that as a result of the treaty our future, the future of our alliances and our allies' future, indeed the future of the world as a whole, would be brighter and more secure.

Unfortunately, Mr. President, I am not convinced that is what has happened. All I have seen and heard from the proponents of the treaty can probably be summed up in the following manner. First, it will support our overall strategy by reducing risks. Second, it will strengthen our alliances. Third, it will decrease the Soviet military advantage. Finally, it will do all of this in a manner which provides assurances of verification.

All of us I think agree that the reduction of risk is a very, very important goal, a goal worthy of our best efforts. However, I have a difficult time with the treaty that purports to reduce the risks but lowers the point where a nuclear exchange is likely to take place, and also fails to address the overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority in Europe.

Mr. President, I filed minority views in the Armed Services Committee report. They are probably too lengthy. There is so much to say. I apologize to my colleagues because they are so lengthy. But at this point I just want to read one brief little page 82 from

that report about the conventional forces that the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact have over NATO.

The Soviet Warsaw Pact has a 2-to-1 advantage in main battle tanks; 2.3-to-1 advantage in heavy artillery; 1.3-to-1 advantage in armored personnel carriers; 1.2-to-1 advantage in tactical aircraft; 2.4-to-1 advantage in interceptor aircraft; 6-to-1 advantage in the intermediate range bombers; and a 25-to-1 advantage in chemical decontamination equipment. And get this, Mr. President, the Soviet Warsaw Pact has 700,000 tons to zero in modern deliverable chemical munitions.

I think we have some 10 or 11 air bases with the flexible reponse aircraft deployed in Europe that will have to take up part of the slack, for the lack of the Pershing II's and the Cruise missiles.

That is a tremendous burden that is puts on our tactical and our non-nuclear deterrence in Western Europe.

In my opinion, that means it in itself will increase the potential for a disastrous strategic exchange with the Soviet Union. It is not a reduction of the risk. It is a grievous miscalculation.

Why are we willing to accept a situation which permits our adversaries to retain their capability to engage the intermediate targets with their SS-24 and SS-25 mobile missile forces while we surrender only our own ground-based nuclear capability?

Many of my colleagues would cite our strategic missile force and our dual capable aircraft or even our sea-launched Cruise missiles as a way to offset our INF losses. But they do not acknowledge the inherent vulnerabilities of each of those systems which in my mind creates a serious question regarding the usefulness in the INF role.

Are we not being really less than candid when we suggest the use of strategic weapons to counter a Warsaw Pact attack against NATO without also admitting the tremendous risk of a follow-on strategic nuclear exchange?

Let us be honest about it. Do you believe we will fire an MX missile from the continental United States to retarget targets that now Pershing II missiles are capable of hitting? If you flip this on the other side of the coin, the Soviets can replace the SS-20's with SS-24's and SS-25's which they are going to retarget the same targets in Europe. So we do not have any targets in Europe that still are not under the same threat. But they still are firing those from the homeland of the Soviet Union into European targets, but not into United States targets. So we should think about that.

I want to point out another question. I visited Europe in January, visited with many of our military leaders, and asked them many questions about it. Of course, the party line there is that they can live with the INF if we modernize all our tactical and other

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weapons and keep our position strong enough to have a flexible response.

It is interesting to note, however, that Spain is trying to throw out 72 of our dual capable F-16 aircraft from there, and we will have to look for another home for them.

It is also interesting to note that when we state the case that we can use dual capable aircraft, I say to my colleagues, and particularly those who may not have thought through what a dual capable aircraft is, it is one that is used in a tactical battle but which still has the capability of the nuclear delivery system to use if all else fails.

If we have to withhold those aircraft from an ensuing land battle because we are fearful that we will lose them and we might have to have them, we only weaken the hands of our commanders who will need everything they can to stop the armored columns. So if aircraft are withheld from the initial land battle in order to be able to be held in reserve to conduct a nuclear strike, in my view we have complicated our ability to deal with that land battle as well as our need to achieve and maintain air superiority, and consequently increased the possibility of an early tactical nuclear exchange.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will suspend, the Chair points out that the time available to the Republican leader has expired.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I make an inquiry: Are we not on the debate of the INF Treaty?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. SYMMS. Are we under controlled time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are under controlled time.

Mr. SYMMS. Is there more time available for the Republican leader?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader's time has expired.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry: Are we starting on the same debate in the morning?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will return to this matter in the morning, without controlled time.

The Chair points out to the Senator from Idaho that there is time available on the majority side. The Chair does not know whether the majority will yield time. There is none remaining on the republican side.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, are we not really overstating the case to suggest the use of dual capable aircraft to redress the INF problem. After all, if those aircraft are withheld from the

initial land battle in order to conduct a nuclear strike, haven't we just complicated both our ability to deal with that land battle, as well as our need to achieve and maintain air superiority and consequently, increased the possibility of an early tactical nuclear exchange? Where then is the reduction in risk. I, for one, can't find it.

With regard to the premise that the treaty will serve to strengthen our alliances, I think it is very disturbing to note that many Europeans view the treaty as an unwelcome return to the insecurity of the seventies, when the only response available to NATO, in the event of a massive Soviet invasion of Europe, was a United States strategic nuclear attack on the Soviet homeland; an all or nothing response which most Europeans felt was a sham. Except, in the current case, the situation is even worse due to the tremendous increases in the quality and quantity of Soviet forces targeted against Western Europe.

In fact, the treaty not only dislocates the strategy of flexible response which has served NATO well for so many years, but it fails to address the massive Soviet land force advantage in central Europe. In my view, the only thing the treaty accomplishes in this area is the magnification of the Soviet Union's threat to Europe, while simultaneously diminishing NATO's ability to deter that threat.

Already voices in Western Europe can be heard hailing the treaty as the first step in the drive toward a European nuclear free zone. Political pressure has started to build in Germany to slow down, reevaluate, and possibly do away with the Montebello modernization program. Have not Gennescher, Shevarnadze, Hornecker, and others already met and begun discussion of eliminating all remaining nuclear weapons in both East and West Germany. Where then is the strengthening, the solidifying, the reinforcing nature of the treaty. I, for one, cannot find it. On the contrary, I believe the treaty calls into question the credibility of both our political and military commitments to Western Europe. As Mr. Benoist and many other prominent Europeans have recently concluded:

Far from enhancing Western security, we believe the INF Agreement would shift the military balance in favor of the Warsaw Pact and assist the Soviet Union in seeking to include political changes in the West favorable to its interests. At the same time, the proposed accord would diminish any incentive for the Soviet Union to make fundamental changes in its domestic and foreign policies. We are also fearful that it would weaken the credibility of the United States nuclear guarantee to Europe, sow discord within the alliance, and seriously erode the reputation and influence of the United States, upon which free societies remain critically dependent.

Now let us turn our attention to the proposition that the treaty decreases the Soviet's military advantage. Over the course of the last 40 years, we

have successfully deterred the Soviet from attempting a military conquest of Western Europe. That deterrent was the direct result of the Soviet perception of our strength and our willingness to use that strength on behalf of our NATO allies. Our willingness to develop an INF force and deploy it forward in Europe and our allies' willingness to base those weapons on their soil only served to further strengthen NATO, while reinforcing the credibility of our deterrent. With the adoption of the INF Treaty our "equalizer" is gone. Remember that General Rogers, in his testimony before the Armed Services Committee cautioned "keep in mind that for NATO's deterrent to be credible must conjure up in the Soviet mind perception of greater pain than gain from pact aggression" \* \* \* and then we went on to state that "what the Soviets are eliminating comprises only about 3 percent of their stockpile of nuclear warheads. Nearly all of the remaining 97 percent can be targeted against installations in NATO's rear areas, thereby keeping the risk high and on the backs of the West European people. And what does NATO give up? The very weapon system the Soviets fear most—the Pershing II—which puts the Soviet homeland and people in a similar posture of vulnerability and keeps high the credibility of NATO's deterrent." Where then is the decrease in the Soviet's military advantage? I, for one, cannot find it.

Any overlaying all of these issues is the real centerpiece of the INF Treaty; the verification clause. Please excuse me Mr. President, I misspoke. I did not mean to say verification. What I meant to say was trust, the trust clause, for that is what it means. Like many of my colleagues, I too was concerned with the meaning of verification so I went to what I considered to be the most authoritative source available—Webster's third new international dictionary. Webster's defines the word "verification" as—and I quote—"The act or process of verifying or the state of being verified; the authentication of truth or accuracy by such means as facts, statements, citation measurements, or attendant circumstances."

Using that definition as a basis, I viewed the report of the Select Committee on Intelligence entitled "Monitoring and Verification Capabilities" where I found the following admission: "with respect to assessing the accuracy of the numbers and locations of forces and systems declared by the Soviets the treaty's memorandum of understanding, the intelligence community has not resolved significant differences of view over the possibility that the Soviets may not have disclosed their entire inventory of nondeployed SS-20 missiles \* \* \* their potential military significance would, however, be short-lived. This is because of operational reliability and milita-