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UNCLASSIFIED



Committee Hearings
of the
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

1162

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2 GILE

3 Select Committee to Investigate
4 Covert Arms Transactions with
5 Iran

(CIA CHIEF)

6 Deposition of [REDACTED]

7 Monday, April 13, 1987

8 U.S. House of Representatives

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The deposition of [REDACTED] was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., Monday, April 13, 1987, in Room H-128, The United States Capitol.

(CIA CHIEF)

Present were:

Thomas R. Smeeton, Minority Counsel, Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, U.S. House of Representatives.

Timothy Woodcock, Associate Counsel, Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, U.S. Senate.

[REDACTED] Assistant General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency.

[REDACTED] Legislative Liaison, Central Intelligence Agency.

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1 Whereupon,

(CIA CHIEF)

2

3 was called as a witness, and after being duly sworn, testified
4 as follows:

5

MR. WOODCOCK: I am Tim Woodcock, Associate

6

Counsel with the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military

7

Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. This

8

deposition is being taken pursuant to the request of the Senate

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Select Committee. Present is a member of the House Select

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Committee covering the same subject matter and no doubt the

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House will be making use of the information that you will be

12

imparting in the course of this deposition.

13

This deposition, of course, is being taken pursuant to

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an official inquiry of the Senate as well as an official

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inquiry of the House.

16

Let me start off -- thank you. The House representative

17

is giving me a card noting he is Thomas R. Smeeton. I

18

believe the reporter has that information already.

19

if we may, let me begin first by noting

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for the record that I provided you and the legal represen-

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tative from the CIA with a copy of the Senate rules and Senate

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resolution that creates our committee. I very much appreciate

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your willingness to come here on short notice for this

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deposition; and we understand that in so doing, you are

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accommodating us, and in a certain sense, we are accommodating

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
1 you in preventing you from having to return for a deposition
2 later this month.

3 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE


4 BY MR. WOODCOCK:

5 Q Let me ask you, sir, before we get into the sub-
6 stance of this to just generally outline your career with
7 the CIA.

8 A I came on board in



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13 Since then, I have served in various capacities in
14 Washington.





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16 Q You are currently ^{CIA} chief ^A ??

17 A I am currently chief 



18 Q
19 A
20 Q
21 A

22 Q  were you acting in your capacity
23 as chief  in late November of 1985?

24 A Yes.

25 Q And could you describe for us information that

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1 you received in that period of time relating to a -- from your
2 headquarters relating to an NSC -- that is, National Security
3 Council -- endeavor?

4 A At 0300 hours on the 22d November, I received a
5 message from the [redacted] communicator, our communicator [redacted]
6 [redacted], noting that there was a flash message that
7 required my immediate presence [redacted].

8 Q By 0300, you mean 3:00 a.m.; is that correct?

9 A 0300, 3:00 a.m.

10 Q What is a flash message?

11 A It's the highest message.

12 Q What did you do after receiving that information?

13 A I immediately went to [redacted], arriving about
14 0400, 4:00 a.m. Read my message, noted there was a second
15 message, directed by deputy also to come in and assist me.

16 Q Who was your deputy at that time?

17 A [redacted]

18 Q Could you spell that?

19 A [redacted]

20 Q Then what happened?

21 A Both of us stood by for the message directing
22 me on special assignment. It arrived. It directed me to
23 stand by to assist a Mr. Richard Copp who -- alias Richard
24 Copp whose true name was Brigadier General Richard Secord.

25 Q Was that part of the latter communication you

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1 received?

2 A Yes.

3 Q So that you knew shortly after you arrived that
4 the individual, Mr. Copp, was in fact Richard Secord; is that
5 correct?

6 A That is correct.

7 Q Was that a name you recognized at all?

8 A No.

9 Q What happened at that point?

10 A Well, the message told me to stand by and assist
11 Mr. Secord, Copp -- I'll call him Secord from now on -- who
12 was on personal assignment for the National Security Council.
13 I was to contact him at a given telephone number and assist
14 him as required.

15 Q Were you given any instructions with respect to
16 holding this message close?

17 A I was told not to discuss it with the ambassador.

18 Q Do you know from -- from whom or what office you
19 were receiving these messages?

20 A Yes. It was perfectly clear it was coming out
21 of the Chief of European division, Mr. Duane Clarridge.

22 Q He has the nickname of Dewey; is that correct?

23 A Dewey.

24 Q After receiving the message with respect to Mr.
25 Secord, what did you do?

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1 A I called the telephone number, turned out to be
2 a hotel. I asked for Mr. Copp's room, connected with it.
3 A female with an American accent answered the phone, told me
4 that Mr. Copp was not there, that he was at the office, and
5 gave me the phone number of the office.

6 Q Approximately what time is this?

7 A This would have been at 0430 hours.

8 Q What did you then do?

9 A I called the office.

10 Q What happened?

11 A I asked for Mr. Copp. Back up. A [REDACTED]
12 female, or male -- I am not sure which, because at different
13 times it was a male or a female. I asked for Mr. Copp. They
14 called Mr. Copp to the phone. I identified myself, told him
15 I was with [REDACTED] and had been directed to
16 contact him, and he was awaiting my call. He acknowledged
17 that. I gave him my phone number where I could be reached.
18 I asked what I could do at the time.

19 He said the only thing he needed at that time was to
20 verify the phone numbers of the prime minister and the foreign
21 minister. He said a very senior official will call them.

22 At that point he told me to stand by.

23 Q Let me stop you right there, if I may, for just
24 a moment.

25 You testified that this -- Mr. Secord wanted to confirm

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1 the numbers of these national officials; is that correct?

2 A Let me back off.

3 I made a mistake there. When I contacted Copp at 0430,
4 he said everything was under control and he would know better
5 by 0945 hours. He asked me to stand by, which I did.

6 At 9:00 o'clock, I called Copp and then the only
7 requirement was for him to give -- for me to assist him in
8 finding out the phone numbers ~~of~~ the prime minister and the
9 foreign minister. He said a very senior official will call
10 them.

11 Q I see.

12 A That was at 0900.

13 Q At this point he didn't have those numbers; is
14 that correct?

15 A That is correct. He had some numbers, but
16 apparently they weren't able to get through to them.

17 Q When you called Mr. Second for the first time
18 and a voice answered on the other end of the phone, did it
19 identify itself as being any company or was it just a
20 "hello"?

21 A Just "hello."

22 Q Did that condition obtain throughout your telephone
23 conversations with him?

24 A During the course of the conversations, it became
25 clear there was a gentleman by the name of [REDACTED] and later

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1 [REDACTED] and later [REDACTED]. So I reached the
2 conclusion it was an office or at least a room provided
3 by [REDACTED] to Copp to accommodate his activities.

4 Q Was that a name already known to you, [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]?

6 A It wasn't at the time, but I checked our files.

7 It soon became clear [REDACTED] was clearly identifiable
8 as [REDACTED].

9 Q Did [REDACTED] mean anything to you?

10 A Only from our files. [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] The files made it perfectly clear --

12 [REDACTED] The files made it perfectly clear [REDACTED] was
13 an arms merchant and [REDACTED] is the company he was working
14 for at that time.

15 Q So upon review of your files you concluded [REDACTED]
16 was an arms supplier; is that correct?

17 A That is correct.

18 Q Now following your conversation that you just
19 described with Mr. Secord where he asked your assistance
20 on the telephone numbers, what happened?

21 A I stayed [REDACTED] until 1:00 o'clock. At
22 that time Copp called, Secord called. He advised that
23 previously the foreign minister had approved an El Al
24 charter flight before going to Brussels, but he had not signed
25 the paper.

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1 Now, the morning of the 22 November, the foreign minister
2 was busy [REDACTED] The
3 foreign ministry is refusing to issue flight clearances until
4 after the foreign minister signed the paper. Secord advised
5 that the plane's departure from Israel's window was 20 minutes
6 away.

7 [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED]
10 I [REDACTED] pointed out negotiations with the foreign
11 ministry would be best handled by the charge who could approach
12 [REDACTED] at the highest level, the foreign minister --
13 the prime minister and guarantee confidentiality.

14 Q What did Secord say when you suggested that?

15 A He said he would recommend the same to Washington.
16 I made the same recommendation in a cable to my head-
17 quarters but was advised not to involve the charge.

18 Q Was any explanation given at that point?

19 A None was given. I assume it was because of the
20 operation's sensitivity.

21 Q At this point, and I am speaking with respect to
22 the 1:00 p.m. phone call you just described, you had not met
23 Secord face-to-face; is that correct?

24 A That is correct.

25 Q Did you have any information with respect to the

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1 nature of the NSC mission at this point?

2 A No, but in discussing [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED] I asked Secord on what basis I could justify
4 the urgency of the flight; and he said I was authorized to
5 use the phrase "humanitarian mission."

6 Q Did he say where he got that phrase?

7 A He did not.

8 Q Was there any other discussion at this 1:00 p.m.
9 phone call?

10 A With Secord, no.

11 Q Then what happened?

12 A After having reported to Washington and gotten my
13 answer back not to involve the charge [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]

15 Q [REDACTED]

16 A [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]

21 Q [REDACTED]

22 A [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]

25 Q [REDACTED]

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1 A [REDACTED] I called Copp, and I updated
2 him on the foregoing. He said that Washington had agreed to
3 bring in the charge. It turned out that Copp had some kind
4 of secure communication with Washington, and it was perfectly
5 clear he was communicating in advance of my traffic.

6 Q Let me stop you right there, if I may. How was
7 it that you knew that he had a secure communications system?

8 A He told me.

9 Q Was --

10 A I am not sure where along the way, but he would
11 be talking to an American voice in the background. There
12 was another American back there with equipment, and that
13 they -- there were messages going back and forth.

14 Q So that in your phone conversations with Secord,
15 you would say something to him, and he would relay it?

16 A I couldn't hear him relay it. I heard him talking
17 to someone in the background; and later, he would tell me what
18 Washington said.

19 Q He was relaying to you what Washington was saying?

20 A Yes.

21 Q All right. Sorry to interrupt there.

22 A Copp said the plane missed its window but was
23 standing by in Israel.

24 Q Then what happened?

25 A Nothing happened then until 4:00 o'clock in the

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1 afternoon. Copp called again, said the plane was airborne,
2 and had reached the go/no-go point around 1725 -- that is
3 5:25 -- hours, same day.

4 [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED] the ministry of foreign

6 affairs, [REDACTED] had decided to oppose the clearance

7 and would recommend the opposition of the clearance, denial

8 to the foreign minister. [REDACTED] the

9 political counsellor of the American Embassy, [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED] the day before visited the foreign ministry

11 and was told there had been a request for an American urgent

12 flight to -- [REDACTED] and that he stated he knew nothing

13 that would justify the mission, because he had nothing in

14 his channels.

15 Q That is to say [REDACTED] gave this response; is that

16 correct?

17 A To the foreign minister.

18 Q [REDACTED]

19 A [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]


24 Q Now at this point, have you involved the charge?

25 A I have not yet.

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At that time, Copp called me; and I told him of



He said he would call the

White House and request authority to bring [redacted] who was
the charge.

Q That is [redacted]?

A [redacted] into the activity.

Q What happened then?

A At this point I received a telephone call on the
international circuit from the chief of the European division,
Dewey Clarridge. It was a very bad connection, but he was
able to convey to me his approval to bring [redacted] into the
activity.

At that point, I did so. I called [redacted] and asked
him to stand by at the embassy, which he did. [redacted]

[redacted] I briefed him on the activity to date and
showed him all traffic to date.

Q Then what happened?

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1 A At 5:00 o'clock, [REDACTED] called [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] to get the foreign minister out of the
3 cabinet meeting. We stood by for the next hour waiting
4 for the foreign minister to come out of the cabinet
5 meeting. [REDACTED] called the foreign ministry several times,
6 [REDACTED] was standing by at the foreign ministry waiting
7 for the foreign minister to respond.

8 I informed Copp what we were doing. By this time, at
9 1800 hours -- 6:00 o'clock -- Copp said that the plane had had
10 to abort and return to israel. I asked Copp what to do next.
11 He said he would stand by for instructions.

12 Also, it became clear that the foreign minister was
13 not going to come out of the cabinet meeting to respond to
14 our request.

15 Q That is [REDACTED] you
16 had no doubt about that at that point?

17 A [REDACTED] didn't communicate it, but the foreign
18 minister's actions clearly indicated he was not going to
19 appear. He didn't.

20 Q Just not responsive; is that right?

21 A Yes.

22 Q So then what happened?

23 A By 7:00 p.m., the foreign ministry still had made
24 no decision. Copp at one point in the telephone conversation
25 noted that the National Security Council was considering how

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1 to recycle the mission. At the very same time, [REDACTED]
2 advised that the White House requested the phone numbers of
3 the foreign minister and the prime minister.

4 Q What happened at that point?

5 A I should make one thing clear. On [REDACTED]
6 request, I asked Washington -- my headquarters -- to find
7 out if the Secretary of State, Secretary of State Shultz,
8 was aware of the mission and if he approved [REDACTED] involve-
9 ment. Messages came back during this period saying the
10 Secretary of State and Ambassador Oakley were the only two
11 State officials who were aware of the mission, that they
12 concurred, and that all traffic should be kept in my channels.

13 Q Let me stop you right there. You made that inquiry
14 and communication came back to the effect that Shultz and
15 Oakley were aware of what was happening; is that correct?

16 A That is correct.

17 Q Now --

18 A They were aware of the mission.

19 Q All right... Were aware of the mission. Now who was
20 it that responded to you?

21 A It was coming from the office of Dewey Clarridge.

22 Q All right.

23 A Throughout this time, and I don't recall which
24 cables it was that it occurred, Poindexter's name was
25 frequently mentioned as the person who was in Washington

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1 responsible for heading up the activity.

2 Q Did you have an understanding as to who had apprised
3 Shultz and Oakley of this mission?

4 A No. If I recall correctly, the cables said,
5 "Poindexter advises that..."

6 Q So to the extent your belief would be that
7 Poindexter advised them, it would be based on that cable; is
8 that correct?

9 A Yes.

10 Q All right. What happened at that point?

11 A About 8:53 p.m. Copp advised that McFarlane was
12 trying to phone the foreign minister.

13 Q That is Robert McFarlane?

14 A That is correct. McFarlane at that time was in
15 Europe, had traveled from Brussels, where there had been a
16 NATO meeting, to Rome.

17 Q And did you learn whether McFarlane ever made that
18 contact?

19 A Let me make a point just before we get to that.

20 At 10:00 p.m., [REDACTED] called [REDACTED]. He noted
21 that the foreign ministry meeting had just concluded, but
22 no decision had been reached. [REDACTED] said the next
23 step is for [REDACTED] to send a formal diplomatic note to the
24 foreign ministry. The note should include characteristics
25 of aircraft, routes to and from [REDACTED] and cargo.

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1 Upon receipt, [REDACTED] said, the foreign ministry would
2 consider the request. [REDACTED] promised to have the note by
3 1100 hours on 23 November in [REDACTED] hands. [REDACTED] said
4 he would be in his office.

5 I informed Copp. He said he would allow time for my
6 report to reach Washington. Then he would contact them to
7 discuss the options.

8 At 11:00 p.m., we received a message directing [REDACTED]
9 to contact [REDACTED] and to note that McFarlane had just
10 talked with the foreign minister, who agreed to aircraft
11 clearance.

12 Q Now receiving this information, what did you do?

13 A Since it was 11:00 p.m. in the evening, knowing
14 [REDACTED] officialhood, [REDACTED] and I decided it would be
15 advisable to wait until the next morning to relay that message
16 to the foreign ministry.

17 Q I gather that means they are not night owls?

18 A Correct.

19 A So I gather you did then wait; is that correct?

20 A We did that.

21 Q Okay. Would you pick up again?

22 A At opening of business on 23 November, [REDACTED]
23 and I were still in the embassy. [REDACTED] contacted the
24 [REDACTED] the ministry of foreign affairs,
25 [REDACTED] who was the only foreign

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1 ministry official available at that time -- a senior
2 official -- and conveyed the above McFarlane message; that
3 is, that he -- McFarlane had talked with the foreign minister
4 who had agreed to aircraft clearance.

5 [REDACTED] was not aware of the telephone conversation,
6 and he opined that a diplomatic note would still be required
7 from the embassy.

8 [REDACTED] then prepared the diplomatic note and went to
9 the foreign ministry at 1130 hours on 23 November. He
10 presented the note to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

11 Q Then what happened?

12 A During this period, while [REDACTED] was at the
13 foreign ministry, I was primarily serving as a liaison
14 role at that point between Copp and [REDACTED]. Copp called
15 to advise of a new plan tentatively involving three flights
16 by two planes to arrive in [REDACTED] between 23 and 27 November.

17 Copp said he was having trouble arranging for the
18 planes for a [REDACTED] -- for [REDACTED] to Iran link. He said
19 that the president [REDACTED], a gentleman by the name of [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]
21 Q [REDACTED] is [REDACTED] national airline?

22 A Yes.

23 -- was stalling for some reason. He asked me to inter-
24 vene if I could. I said that I would try and get back to
25 him. Also, during that conversation, Copp asked me if I was --

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1 knew what was going on, if I had been briefed. I said that
2 no, the charge and I were in the dark; but we could make some
3 guesses. He suggested that we meet immediately, and I
4 suggested a parking lot at a nearby hotel.

5 Copp and I immediately separately went there. I picked
6 him up at the front door of the hotel; and he and I sat in
7 my car and talked around 11:30 for 10 minutes.

8 Q Could you relate the substance of that conversation,
9 please?

10 A Yes. Copp said his mission was clearly one whereby
11 missiles are being provided for hostages. I asked what kind
12 of missiles. He identified Hawk missiles. He noted that the
13 Iranians with whom they were dealing didn't trust him, that
14 he was operating under a very tight timeframe, and that he
15 appreciated anything that we could do to assist.

16 Q Let me go back and see if I can parse that statement
17 out a bit.

18 With respect to the Copp/Secord observation that this was
19 a deal involving Hawk missiles, did he tell you how he knew
20 that?

21 A He did not.

22 Q And the same question with respect to hostages?

23 A He did not.

24 Q Did he identify the hostages as being those in
25 Lebanon?

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1 A He did not.

2 Q Now the information with respect to the Iranians,
3 you said that Secord said that the Iranians didn't trust
4 him. Now who is it the Iranians didn't trust according to
5 Secord? Was it him personally?

6 A He did not expand on that. The impression was he
7 did not trust the Americans with whom he was dealing.

8 Q The Iranians did not trust the Americans?

9 A Did not, yes.

10 Q And there was no distinction drawn between
11 Secord and some other Americans, NSC members, whatever?

12 A No. No.

13 Q Was there more to the conversation then?

14 A Only that I expressed certain views of my own on
15 the -- on my behalf about how we could better assist him. I
16 pointed out to him this was the first time we had a chance
17 to have a secure conversation, so I couldn't have expressed
18 my concerns earlier.

19 I felt that [REDACTED], on whom he was obviously
20 relying, was a man whose reputation was such that I did not
21 think that the present [REDACTED] government would respond to
22 him; and that based on what I knew about him, based on our
23 records, he would not have been one we would have selected
24 to deal with or through.

25 I also pointed out to him that in dealing with foreign

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1 ministries, and getting aircraft clearances, there is far more
2 effective and secure if you do it through the established
3 channels rather than trying to come at them in different ways.

4 Secord seemed open-minded about this and indicated that
5 if they got involved in such a thing again, he would contact
6 us much more in advance and see if we could do a better job
7 of helping him than we had.

8 That was the end of the conversation.

9 Q Could you recount how it was up to that point you
10 were determined that [REDACTED] was involved?

11 A Yes. As I noted, his name was cited in different
12 stages during the course of our conversations.

13 Q By Secord?

14 A By Secord.

15 Q Did he --

16 A Calling him [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

17 Q Did he tell you what it was that [REDACTED] was doing
18 for him?

19 A He did not.

20 Q Did he refer to [REDACTED] as being present with him
21 or how did you gather -- did you determine anything --

22 A It was perfectly clear [REDACTED] was present with him
23 in the office; and in response to direct questions, Secord
24 said [REDACTED] had driven him to the meeting with me.

25 Q Thank you. Following this meeting with Secord,

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1 what did you do?

2 A I returned directly to the embassy.

3 Q And upon arriving at the embassy, what happened?

4 A I stood by -- I briefed the charge on what Copp
5 had told me. He briefed me on his visit to the foreign
6 ministry, where he had left a note. Both of us then stood
7 by at the embassy, awaiting the response from the foreign
8 ministry.

9 By 4:30 p.m., we had received no response. Finally,
10 at 6:00 p.m., we received a call from [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
11 told [REDACTED] a decision had been reached by the foreign
12 ministry; but before conveying the decision, the foreign
13 ministry would require a second note. It had to contain two
14 statements:

15 A. The operation had been undertaken for humanitarian
16 reasons; and

17 B. The operation is to free American hostages.

18 [REDACTED] said if the note were delivered forthwith,
19 decision would follow immediately.

20 The implication was the decision would be positive.

21 Q What did you do?

22 A None of the three of us, after consultation with
23 Copp -- [REDACTED] myself, and Copp -- had any difficulty with
24 the first point; but we all got hung up on, obviously,
25 the second point, putting it in writing in a diplomatic note.

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1 Copp decided to defer the problem to Washington.

2 Q Was that then communicated to Washington?

3 A Copp said he had communicated the situation to
4 Washington; and he at the same time advised that McFarlane
5 had been trying for the past two hours to reach the prime
6 minister but was not successful.

7 By 7:30 p.m., Copp advised Washington had responded and
8 that we could anticipate a negative response through my
9 channels to [REDACTED] request. At this time [REDACTED]
10 sent a cable recommending an alternate wording concerning the
11 Part B, concerning American hostages, because he believed
12 [REDACTED] at this point would accept virtually anything
13 we recommended.

14 But obviously the patience was running out in Washington
15 on this point, and we received an answer to [REDACTED] cable
16 that said -- simply said the charge should deliver a note to
17 [REDACTED] saying that we regret your government was unable
18 to fulfil the U.S. government request for this humanitarian
19 mission.

20 Q That was done, I take it?

21 A That was done. The charge delivered it to the
22 foreign minister, who was greatly troubled by the tone
23 and the brevity of the response; but he regretted that [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED] had not been able to respond and [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] and hadn't taken -- taken

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1 the proper actions to guarantee that appropriate protocol
2 and [REDACTED] sovereignty were met.

3 Q [REDACTED] let me ask you to take an overview,
4 if you would, of your discussions with Secord and ask you if
5 at any point Secord advised you as to why it was that [REDACTED]
6 had been chosen as a landing point or a clearance point?

7 A The subject never came up.

8 Q Following your conversation with Mr. Secord in your
9 car, as you have already described, did you take any formal
10 action with respect to that information?

11 A I did two things. I immediately wrote a round-
12 up report on what had happened that morning, because given
13 the timeframe, it would have been the opening of business
14 Washington time, 22 November. I sent a cable describing the
15 developments [REDACTED] on the morning of the 22d; and in
16 that cable, I referred to the conversation with Secord --
17 the meeting with Secord.

18 I secondly then sent a cable devoted exclusively to the
19 Secord conversation reporting it in detail.

20 Q Let me back you up. You have, therefore, two
21 points at which you are recounting the Secord conversation;
22 is that correct?

23 A I only noted the first cable that the meeting
24 took place; and in the second cable, I recounted the
25 substance.

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1 Q When did the first cable go out?

2 A It would have been close to 12:30.

3 Q On 23 November?

4 A On 23 November.

5 Q And then the second cable?

6 A By 1:00 o'clock.



7 Q By 1:00 o'clock. Same day?

8 A Yes.

9 Q Who would those have been directed to?

10 A All traffic was handled on one channel. That was
11 the eyes only channel, the chief of the European division.

12 Q Let me ask you just a little more generally, you
13 have served in Washington -- how do these cables express
14 themselves when they come in on the Washington side? Is there
15 a screen they appear on? Do they churn out on a teletype?

16 A No. This is a privacy channel. It is designed
17 to permit the exclusive communication between the ^{CIA} chief 
18  and the chief of division. As I recall it, a copy --
19 one copy goes to the chief of European division; two copies
20 go to the Office of the DDO; and there is no further
21 distribution.

22 It is completely outside of the normal records keeping
23 procedure.

24 Q But how do these messages appear? Are they in
25 solid, hard copy? As the expression goes?

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1 A Yes. They would be hard copies delivered to the
2 office of the chief of European division or the DDO in
3 envelopes.

4 Q Does the DDO or the chief, say in this case of the
5 European division, have an officer who stands by and reads
6 these things as they come in?

7 A His secretary would open the envelope, see that it's
8 slugged for the chief of European division, and deliver it
9 to him exclusively. If he wants to share it, he decided.

10 Q These two messages that you sent, I gather, were
11 sent to the chief of the European division and then office
12 of DDO; is that correct?

13 A All of this communication went to the chief of
14 European division with info copies to the DDO. Whether
15 the DDO ever sees it or not, I don't know. That would depend
16 on a screening procedure by his staff assistant.

17 Q You wouldn't necessarily know that unless
18 the DDO responded to you and referred to it?

19 A That's correct.

20 Q Having sent off these two cables, did you receive
21 any response to them?

22 A I can recall no specific response that was required
23 in these two. No, I can't.

24 Q You received -- did you have subsequent communica-
25 tions with Duane Clarridge's office?

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1 A Yes. All this traffic was to and from. Anything
2 I received from Washington that was giving me my instructions
3 would be from Clarridge.

4 Q There was no response commenting on those particular
5 cables in particular -- those particular cables?

6 A I recall none dealing with my conversation with
7 Secord. I recall none dealing with what was contained in my
8 round-up report.

9 Q Now I gather that you also informed the charge,
10 [REDACTED] that -- of your conversation with Mr. Secord?

11 A I did that. He and my deputy.

12 Q Did he also send any communications to your
13 knowledge out to the State Department in Washington?

14 A I have no knowledge whatsoever that he sent any
15 communications through his channels to the State Department.
16 I would doubt it very much, or he would have told me that he
17 had.

18 When the operation finished, what he did do is draft
19 a cable from himself, if I recall directly -- it was to
20 Poindexter. It was [REDACTED] telegram. He expressed
21 his concerns about the way the entire operation had been
22 handled. I think that I concurred fully with everything that
23 he said, and it went to Washington.

24 I know nothing from him other than that that went through
25 our channels.

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1 Q That is through your communications [REDACTED]?

2 A That is correct.

3 Q In your communications with Duane Clarridge, did
4 you reach any understanding at any point as to whether
5 Clarridge was handling this alone or whether he was handling
6 it with someone else?

7 A We didn't discuss it.

8 Q You were aware that it was an NSC mission. Were
9 you told at any point who in the NSC was handling it?

10 A The only name mentioned was Poindexter and, of
11 course, Secord on my end. And McFarlane, of course, was
12 in Europe.

13 Q Have you ever discussed this matter with Duane
14 Clarridge?

15 A No, I have not. I haven't seen him since the occa-
16 sion occurred.

17 Q I am not going to have this marked for the
18 record, but let me describe it for the record.

19 This is a cable dated December 4, 1986. It is addressed
20 to "Immediate Director." Subject is "[REDACTED] support to
21 NSC Mission, 22-27 November 85."

22 The cable comprises four pages with a total of six
23 paragraphs.

24 [REDACTED] I show you that cable now and ask you if
25 you recognize that?

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1 A Yes. I drafted it.

2 Q What is it precisely?

3 A It is my response to a query from the CIA's
4 inspector general for commentary on [REDACTED] activity in
5 connection with the NSC mission described.

6 Q Have you had an opportunity to review that cable?

7 A Yes, I have.

8 Q Is that cable an accurate description of your
9 involvement in the NSC mission?

10 A Yes, it is, with certain minor discrepancies.

11 Q If you can pick out any of those minor discrepan-
12 cies, would you do so and note them for the record?

13 A Yes. The primary one is I identified [REDACTED]
14 as being an employee of [REDACTED]. He is not an employee of
15 [REDACTED]. He is an officer of [REDACTED]. Both are arms firms.

16 That would be the major discrepancy.

17 Q Following this, did you ever have any other
18 dealings with Secord?

19 A No, I have not.

20 Q The two cables that you referred to that you issued
21 on 11/23 at 12:30 and 1:00 p.m., to your knowledge do they
22 exist in any form?

23 A The first cable containing the general round-up,
24 wind-up, round-up, does exist. I cannot find the second
25 cable.

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1 Q Do you know why that is?

2 A I have no idea. There are other cables missing.
3 We don't have a completely comprehensive file of all traffic;
4 but that's because of the nature of the channel used. It is
5 outside and is designed to be outside the records keeping
6 system.

7 Q And I gather that a record is not kept at your
8 [REDACTED] is that correct?

9 A No. As I noted in that incoming round-up for the
10 inspector general, in December 1985, I destroyed all copies
11 of all traffic including my [REDACTED] file.

12 Q Does your information on [REDACTED] indicate whether it
13 has any connection to Adnan Khashoggi?

14 A No.

15 Q One way or the other?

16 A No. We have very limited information on [REDACTED]

17 Q I also gather that Secord did not at any point
18 identify to you any of the individual persons on the Iranian
19 side of this transaction; is that correct?

20 A He did not.

21 Q Did he at all describe to you how it was he became
22 involved in this?

23 A He did not.

24 Q Did he tell you anything about how long he had been
25 involved in it?

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1 A He did not. I didn't even know he was not a
2 member of the National Security Council staff.

3 Q Did you assume that he was at that point?

4 A All I knew he was on special assignment to the
5 National Security Council. I assumed he was working for the
6 staff. I didn't know he wasn't.

7 Q Did he tell you that he wasn't?

8 A No, he didn't.

9 Q I gather he made no remarks about he had been called
10 in on short notice or anything like that?

11 A Nothing.

12 Q Did he provide you with any information on who
13 might be his contacts in Israel?

14 A He did not.

15 MR. WOODCOCK: I guess that is all I have.

16 Tom, do you have any questions?

17 MR. SMEETON: Maybe just a couple. I haven't seen the
18 material you have there. If I am redundant, interrupt me.

19 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE

20 BY MR. SMEETON:

21 Q With respect to these cables that you sent back to
22 headquarters regarding the shipment, as I recall you indicated
23 that Mr. Secord told you that weapons were involved.

24 A When I talked with Secord, he told me explicitly
25 that it was Hawk missiles.

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1 Q That information was then reflected in one of
2 those two cables that were sent back to headquarters in
3 Washington?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Was there any suggestion of a cover story indicating
6 that you should tell [REDACTED] it was oil drilling
7 equipment rather than weapons at any time?

8 A No. I was given no authorization to tell [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED] what the equipment was. I was only told that it
10 was -- just say it was for a humanitarian mission.

11 Q Do you have any insights as to why oil drilling
12 equipment might be mentioned as a possible cover story?

13 A No. I only heard of it from the media subsequently.

14 Q After the fact?

15 A Right.

16 Q You never heard about it in the context of any
17 of these discussions regarding the operation?

18 A That is correct.

19 Q With respect to [REDACTED] or any other arms man-
20 facturer [REDACTED], did the name Tom Clines ever come to
21 your attention?

22 A No.

23 MR. SMEETON: I think that's all I want to say.

24 MR. WOODCOCK: I have just one more question.

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1 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

2 Q [REDACTED] other than Duane Clarridge, was
3 anybody else in his office involved in this, to your knowledge?

4 A I have no knowledge of that.

5 Q I gather then that you received no cables back
6 from anybody else with anything other than Clarridge's name
7 on it; would that be right?

8 A That would be correct. If anyone else sent it
9 in that channel, they would have to indicate to me that it was
10 someone acting in his capacity; and I did not see that.

11 Q So all channels coming from the Washington side
12 were coming under Clarridge's signature; is that correct?

13 A Yes. Under the slug that indicates it's him
14 talking. Procedure would require if someone else was, it
15 would be -- they would put the slug and said, "From Acting
16 Chief Eur."

17 Q Now did your deputy chief [REDACTED] become involved
18 in this to any great degree?

19 A Only marginally. I had him, if I recall, only write
20 one cable. He may not even have read all the traffic; but
21 I did discuss some of the traffic with him.

22 Q Did he ever have any conversations with Secord?

23 A He did not. I handled all communications by
24 telephone, plus the one meeting.

25 Q Would that also apply to [REDACTED]?

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1 A That would be true.

2 Q So to your knowledge, you would have been the only
3 U.S. government person [redacted] dealing directly with
4 Secord on this matter?

5 A That is correct.

6 MR. WOODCOCK: Well, I think that concludes my questioning.

7 MR. SMEETON: Just a followup regarding your mentioning
8 of the apprising of State Department, specifically Mr.
9 Shultz and Mr. Oakley.

10 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
11 BY MR. SMEETON:

12 Q As I recall, at [redacted] request, you were
13 asked if you would determine who within the State Department
14 was so apprised; and you learned it was Mr. Shultz and Mr.
15 Oakley and nobody else in the Department of State?

16 A That is correct.

17 Q And did you get the impression that Mr. Shultz and
18 Mr. Oakley would okay such a transaction or just that they
19 were apprised?

20 A I think that my impression was the cable was
21 drafted in such a way as to indicate that they approved of
22 [redacted] actions, that they knew of the mission that was
23 happening.

24 MR. SMEETON: Okay.

25 [redacted] I have a point to clarify, if I may.

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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY [REDACTED]:

Q [REDACTED] if you would, since this has been discussed on the record, you indicated that there was one discrepancy which you corrected. Would you just take a quick look at this and tell me if you found any other discrepancies that you could correct for the record right now.

A The only other discrepancy I know, also the phrase [REDACTED] is used in the second place in here. That should also read [REDACTED]

Q And you are satisfied that is accurate, looking again at your cable?

A Yes, I am.

[REDACTED]: That's all.

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the deposition was concluded.]

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

DEPOSITION OF [REDACTED]

Wednesday, May 27, 1987

House of Representatives,
Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with
Iran,
Washington, D.C.

1161

The committees met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m.,
in Room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, Neil
Eggleston (Deputy Chief Counsel of House Select Committee)
presiding.


Present: W. Neil Eggleston, Deputy Chief Counsel;
Tim Traylor, Investigator, House Select Committee; Robert W.
Genzman, Associate Minority Counsel, House Select Committee;
Terry Smiljanich, Associate Counsel, Senate Select Com-
mittee; Timothy Woodcock, Associate Counsel, Senate Select
Committee; and George Taft, Counsel, Department of State.

Partially Declassified / Released on 22 June 1987
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by B. Reger, National Security Council

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1 Whereupon,



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3 was called as a witness by the Select Committees and, having
4 been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as
5 follows:

5

6 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT
7 COMMITTEE

7

8 BY MR. EGGLESTON:

8

9 Q [Redacted] for the record, my name is Neil
10 Eggleston, Deputy Chief Counsel for the House Select Com-
11 mittee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran.
12 Also present are two representatives of the Senate Select
13 Committee. Both committees were established pursuant to
14 resolutions and have various enacting rules. The State
15 Department was provided with copies of both the resolutions
16 and rules. If you want copies for any reason, we can
17 certainly provide them to you.

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31 The mandate of both the House and Senate Committees
32 which are now conducting joint hearings, is to investigate
33 the circumstances surrounding primarily the Iran affair,
34 but also the United States Government's involvement with the
35 contras. This is being conducted pursuant to those rules.
36 Let me just ask you at the outset to tell us a
37 little bit about your background in a very brief fashion.
38 If you could just tell me a little bit about your schooling


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
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A He was the ambassador, yes. During some of these

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1 days we'll talk about, he was out of the country, and I was
2 in charge.

3 Q You are the Deputy Chief of Mission?

4 A That is correct.

5 Q Pardon me, I have not done too much work in the
6 State Department. Others have done a lot. Is there a Chief
7 of Mission?

8 A The ambassador is called Chief of Mission.

9 Q You are the ranking person in his absence?

10 A That is right. The way the embassy is structured,
11 the American Embassy, it is a little different. The Deputy
12 Chief of Mission doesn't have a line responsibility. He,
13 like the ambassador, has general responsibility for all of
14 the functions of the mission. Therefore, he is prepared in
15 the ambassador's absence to take over.

16 Q

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18 A

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22 Q

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25 Q

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Q Let me ask you then -- now that I have established some background, let me ask you, as I indicated a moment ago off the record, the principal area I wanted to ask you questions about is the time period primarily, say, November 20 through the end of your own involvement in this particular operation. Could you just, without questions or promptings from me, relay the best you can recall what your involvement was when you arrived into the operation of the various functions that you performed.

A Yes. There was, I suppose, one event prior to my actual involvement that's worthy of note. On the 21 of November, the political consular, who was the Acting Deputy Chief of Mission since I was in charge at the time, was called over to the Foreign Ministry and was told that there was an American who claimed to be a retired General seeking  concurrence for transfer of arms to Iran, and the  was confused by this and wanted to know what our policy was since we had on many occasions told them our policy was to discourage such shipments.

The Acting DCM confirmed to the government that

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1 our policy was to discourage shipment of arms to Iran. We
2 reported that in a telegram, which I believe you have access
3 to.

4 Q That occurred on November 21?

5 A Yes. And I think we sent the report out the 22.

6 CIA CHIEF Now, on about noon on the 22, the [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED] came to me, and he said that he was involved
8 in a very difficult situation, it wasn't exactly how he
9 described it, and he needed my help and guidance, and he
10 said that he received instructions, I believe, the night
11 before or early in the morning to come in [REDACTED],
12 open up his communications and act upon whatever communica-
13 tions were received. The first telegram that he received
14 instructed him not to inform the ambassador.

15 He came in, he was told to get in touch with some-
16 one acting under a pseudonym at a local hotel or at a
17 telephone number which he assumed was a hotel, and to help
18 him. The pseudonym was R. Copp.

19 He called him and -- this is as related to me,
20 and probably not in the precision that it was related,
21 because it's been a year and a half -- but essentially he
22 was asked to assist with [REDACTED] in gaining
23 authorization for the arrival of aircraft bearing arms for
24 Iran, which would be transshipped in [REDACTED] to Iran. [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED] was not cooperating because they really

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1 didn't know what was going on, they were confused. At least
2 that was the sense of it.

3 ^{CIA CHIEF} [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED] the Foreign Minister, Prime Minister or someone
5 who worked in those offices to be helpful in this process.

6 [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED] He
9 didn't know how to go about it and didn't feel he would be
10 successful in any event.

11 He said he had told Headquarters that he would need
12 the help of the Charge to get these things done; if they
13 wanted it done, they should engage the Charge. I said to
14 him at that point that -- well, we both agreed it was an
15 astounding operation. But, beyond that, I said that I would
16 be prepared to cooperate, but first he needed authorization
17 to tell me what he had told me, and, second, I needed to know
18 that the Secretary of State knew about and approved the
19 operation.

20 Late that afternoon, I think about 5:00 o'clock or
21 so, he received -- all of this was in CIA channels -- he
22 received a telegram which was purportedly from John Poindexter
23 which asked that I be shown the communication and be asked to
24 pull out all the stops to get approval for the transit, and
25 he said the Secretary knew and approved of the operation and

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1 asked that State Department communications channels not be
2 used because only the Secretary and Assistant Secretary
3 Oakley were aware of the operation, given its obvious
4 sensitivity.

5 Based on that, I got in touch with [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] and
7 said I needed to talk to the Foreign Minister. He told me
8 the Foreign Minister was in a Cabinet meeting and was in-
9 accessible unless I could tell him that my request was coming
10 from the highest levels of the United States Government. I
11 said I could, based on the assumption this was, in fact,
12 from John Poindexter, who was National Security Adviser to
13 the President at the time.

14 He then explained to me why they had been negative
15 to this point. He went back over the contact that they had
16 received from a so-called retired American General and why
17 they had summoned our political consul, Acting DCM, to ask
18 him about our policy; and based on our reiteration of our
19 policy that we were trying to stop shipment of arms to Iran,
20 they had decided not to cooperate. This is just by means of
21 explanation.

22 Q Is this now your first contact?

23 A This is my first contact with [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED] the evening of the 22.

25 Q [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

A [REDACTED]

Q Okay.

A I did not talk to the Foreign Minister that evening. My interest in getting the cooperation of [REDACTED] was passed on to him, but I did not actually talk to him.

Late that evening, it was about 11:00 o'clock or so at night, I received a call from [REDACTED] CIA CHIEF He had received a telegram indicating that Robert McFarlane, who was then in Rome I was told, I am not sure, but he was in Europe in any event, had talked to the Foreign Minister on the telephone and that the Foreign Minister had agreed to facilitate the transshipment.

I was asked to get in touch with the Foreign Minister's staff and confirm that. I was unable to do so at that time.

At 7:00 o'clock the next morning, the 23, I was called again by [REDACTED] CIA CHIEF Whoever was sending him the telegrams back here was anxious that we get that confirmation as soon as possible because they wanted to go ahead with the operation. They asked I move as quickly as possible to get

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1 the confirmation.

2 Finally, mid-morning I was able to talk to [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED] the Foreign Ministry, who said he was
4 aware of a conversation but not aware of any commitment to
5 facilitate the shipment without a diplomatic note requesting
6 it and explaining the reasons for it.

7 I subsequently talked to the [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED] Foreign Minister who said the same thing, he said the
9 note needed to contain where the aircraft were coming from,
10 where they were going, the reasons for the operation and the
11 cargo. I communicated all of this, or [REDACTED] did,
12 back to Washington. We were authorized to deliver a note,
13 which, as I recall, and I am sure you have the text of it, it
14 was rather skimpy, it did not give details about cargo or
15 reasons. I can't remember, but it was by [REDACTED] it
16 didn't meet [REDACTED] request.

17 I took that over and delivered it to [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] the Foreign Ministry,
19 [REDACTED] Anyway, he
20 received the note, complained to me about the way we had
21 handled it, the whole operation, and noted at the time the
22 note didn't look like it met their needs.

23 That afternoon we went back and forth several
24 times between the Foreign Ministry and myself, between [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] and Washington, about how we might embellish upon

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the note to make it acceptable [redacted] The

[redacted] meanwhile were meeting rather regularly, the Foreign Minister meeting with the Prime Minister to decide whether or not they would cooperate.

[redacted]

By late afternoon, I had a good sense of what kind of note would meet [redacted] needs, it had to have some information about cargo, but it didn't have to be specific. It had to make some reference to humanitarian purposes, and it had to have the origin and ultimate destination of the cargo.

At this point, the second effort to put this operation together was running up against a deadline, as I understand it. That is, planes were in the area and on route [redacted] and had a turn-around time that was getting fairly short.

Sometime in the afternoon of Saturday, they turned around, and I guess whoever was running the operation back here decided they would do it some other way, because I received instructions to deliver a rather short and curt note that essentially said "thanks for not helping this humanitarian operation."

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1 I had a meeting with the Foreign Minister scheduled
2 for that evening, Saturday evening, about 7:00 o'clock, 7:30.
3 [REDACTED] meanwhile had been hard
4 at work, and they were at this point, as I understand it,
5 prepared to agree if we provided the information that they
6 requested.

7 I went to the meeting [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED]

9 Q That is the reason I asked you the question earlier.

10 A [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED]

12 We were not under the best conditions to meet

13 [REDACTED] I must say. Anyway, we met, there were
14 about five of us in the room. He had two staff members with
15 him. I showed him the note, and they were very upset because
16 it was in a sense impolite.

17 Also, we had turned them inside out for about 24
18 hours, and now we were simply saying "thanks, but no thanks",
19 we don't -- we are not proceeding down this track.

20 That's essentially it. I am sure there are gaps.
21 Maybe you can ask questions.

22 Q I will. There are actually not that many gaps.

23 Let me start by asking you if you could just go
24 over the telegram that you sent or that was sent on the 21.
25 This has been previously marked ERC-1. Maybe, so the record

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1 is clear, we should have it marked -- what are your full
2 initials?

3 A [REDACTED]
4 Q [REDACTED]-1.

5 (The following document was marked as [REDACTED] Exhibit
6 No. 1 for Identification.)

7 COMMITTEE INSERT

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BY MR. EGGLESTON:

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Q Let me show you [redacted]-1 and ask you, as best you can recall, if you can elaborate on this, the early conversation of the 21 about the contact between the Acting Deputy Chief of Mission with regard to this contact by the retired General.

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A Yes. As I said earlier, [redacted] who was Political Consular, was called over by the Deputy Political Director and told that an official from [redacted] dealing -- well, an arms dealer I guess [redacted], who, as I understand, by the way, is related to one of the officials in the Foreign Ministry, and that's why that contact was made. He was a brother-in-law. That's why the contact was made in that fashion -- had said that he was working in cooperation with a retired American General or a person who claimed to be a retired American General and that they wanted to arrange for the shipment of some arms to Iran.

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The Foreign Ministry, knowing of our general policy in this regard, was confused and they had asked [redacted] to come over and reiterate our policy essentially, which he did. We reported back the following day.

Q I take it, as of this time, the Acting Deputy Chief [redacted] did not know the name of the supposed retired American General?

A No.

Q Was there any indication whether the retired General

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1 had indicated this was a United States Government operation?

2 A My impression is yes, but I don't recall precisely.

3 Q Is this [redacted]-1 a telegram that you sent back to the
4 State Department here in Washington? Is this your cable
5 essentially?

6 A Yes. It was actually written by [redacted] I
7 saw it before it went out and approved it.

8 Q Let me just take a look at it and make sure there
9 is nothing in it I wanted to ask you about.

10 You may or may not know, based upon whether you
11 read the Tower Commission or all sorts of things, there came
12 a time when General Secord receives a letter signed by Colonel
13 North with a signature indication of Mr. McFarlane indicating
14 that Mr. Secord's services are needed with regard to a
15 particular operation. Did you ever see that letter during
16 the course of this time period?

17 A No, I didn't.

18 Q So he never showed it to you or to your knowledge
19 did not show it to [redacted]?

20 A To my knowledge, he did not. He certainly didn't
21 show it to me, because I have never met General Secord.

22 Q From your conversations with [redacted], do you
23 know whether he ever showed it to him?

24 A I do not know. I don't think he did.

25 Q This cable suggests that the Acting Deputy Chief of

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1 he doesn't know me.

2 Q You have never discussed these events with them?


3 A No.

4 Q Admiral Poindexter or similarly Mr. McFarlane?

5 A No.


6 Q Have you discussed the events of this week in
7 November, '85 with anyone else at the State Department?

8 It is kind of an open-ended question.

9 A Yes. The answer is yes, I have. I have discussed
10 it with, not in this detail, but with the Assistant Secretary
11 of State for 

12 Q 

13 A 


14 
15 Q Was that a contemporaneous conversation?

16 A No, it was not.

17 Q Do you recall when it was?

18 A Last summer. Nearly a year later.

19 Q But before all these events became public in
20 November, 1986?

21 A No, on the contrary. I do not believe I ever dis-
22 cussed it -- I am trying to think back. I assumed I had dis-
23 cussed this with  but I probably had not. I did not open
24 the subject up to any conversation with anybody in the State
25 Department. It was not public knowledge then, I simply didn't

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1 do it.

2 Q You were following instructions to only discuss it
3 with Oakley or --

4 A Exactly. The only other person I did discuss it
5 with was [REDACTED]. When he returned, I told him
6 what had occurred, and besides saying, "Thank God, I wasn't
7 here," he really didn't have anything to add. I feel fairly
8 confident he didn't discuss it with anybody at the State
9 Department.

10 Q [REDACTED]

11 A [REDACTED]

13 Q [REDACTED]

14 A [REDACTED]

15 Q [REDACTED]

16 A [REDACTED]

18 MR. EGGLESTON: I don't have any other questions.

19 BY MR. SMILJANICH:
CIA CHIEF

20 Q Did [REDACTED] ever put a name behind who at
21 Headquarters was giving instructions?

22 A Ever is a long time. He did afterwards. I am trying
23 to remember whether he did at the time. He explained the type
24 of channel he was receiving the instructions on, which was a
25 privacy channel, and it came from the operations side, but I

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1 don't know that he mentioned Clarridge's name.

2 Q What about after the fact?

3 A After the fact, yes.

4 Q Anyone else?

5 A No. I mean, I know that Clarridge, Deputy Director
6 of Operations, theoretically might have been involved, although
7 I also gather he may have been out of town at the time.

8 Q There are independent communication channels that
9 are available to you that run directly to the Secretary of
10 State, is that correct, as Charge?

11 A I could use State Department channels and have a
12 highly restricted distribution on this end, but none that I
13 would feel confident using under the circumstances at the
14 time.

15 Q So there is, in fact, no way in which you could have
16 directly communicated only with the Secretary of State and
17 no one else?

18 A Not at the time. I have a telephone now. But at
19 that time, we didn't have.

20 BY MR. WOODCOCK:

21 Q [REDACTED] I am Tim Woodcock with the Senate Com-
22 mittee. I am going to have to jump around a little bit, as
23 I was following these notes. The information that you first
24 received from [REDACTED] I take it [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] received it first --

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A That is correct.


Q That referred to a manager of the firm [redacted]?

A I believe that was [redacted].

Q So that from your understanding [redacted] was involved early on, as well as the person waiting in the VIP lounge?

A That is my understanding. I was not in the VIP lounge, so it is second-hand information.

Q [redacted]



A [redacted]

Q [redacted]

A [redacted]

Q. In his pre-hearing remarks, General Secord said that he personally had some reservations about the use of [redacted] because he said [redacted] was "not smooth". Do you know enough about [redacted] to know why he would be considered not smooth?

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1 A I have an impression that [redacted] is heavy-handed,
2 but that is an impression, not based on my knowledge. To my
3 knowledge, I haven't met the man.

4 Q When you say heavy-handed, what do you mean by that?

5 A Too direct, rather blunt, given to bluster.

6 Q Do you have knowledge at all of [redacted]?

7 A I have met [redacted].

8 Q He is also a partner in [redacted], is that correct?

9 A That is correct. I think he and [redacted] own equal
10 shares, perhaps. I am not sure. But he is partners with him.

11 Q Do you know of any involvement -- I am speaking
12 broadly here -- of Thomas Clines in [redacted]?

13 A I do not.

14 Q Do you know Thomas Clines?

15 A No.

16 Q Do you recall at what point you learned that Copp
17 was, in fact, Richard Secord?

18 A When [redacted] returned from the meeting with
19 him, which was sometime during the day of the 23rd.

20 Q Did the name Secord mean anything to you?

21 A No, it didn't.

22 Q When Ambassador [redacted] returned, you testified
23 you briefed him on the matter. Is it also true [redacted]
24 participated in that briefing?

25 A I am certain he did at ont point. Whether -- I

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1 can't recall whether I briefed the ambassador independently
2 first or we did it altogether. I am not sure. The normal,
3 of course, event would have been that I would have given him
4 a very brief summary of what happened and asked ^{CIA CHIEF} [REDACTED]
5 to go through it all. But I can't recall that's the way it
6 happened. It's a question of trust involved here.

7 I have very high regard for ^{CIA CHIEF} [REDACTED] as an
8 honest person, as a person of integrity, and I think that's
9 probably reciprocated. I wouldn't want you to read into what
10 I have said anything that suggests I have cut him out or he
11 is trying to cut me out of any conversation with the ambassador.
12 That was not the case.

13 Q Thanks.

14 Did ^{CIA CHIEF} [REDACTED] advise you that he was in regular
15 communication with Headquarters?

16 A Yes.

17 Q Did he advise you that he had relayed to Headquarters
18 the information that General Secord had told him about the
19 nature of the airplane mission?

20 A Yes.

21 Q Did he advise you of that on November 23 or long
22 after the fact?

23 A On November 23, [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED] and although I did not see all of those, I
25 did see some of them. He told me what was in them. Normally

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1 I saw them, and he provided a running account of what was
2 going on [redacted] to Headquarters.

3 Q Your understanding --

4 A Within that running account was the conversation
5 with Secord and the indication the aircraft would be carrying
6 Hawk missiles, yes.

7 Q You are referring to a running account, and I
8 gather that is the account [redacted] has given you. Is
9 that correct?

10 A No, I mean that he was giving Langley.

11 Q I want to divide this into two parts. There are
12 actual communications going to Langley from [redacted] is
13 that correct?

14 A Yes.

15 Q When you refer to a running account, that is what
16 you are referring to?

17 A Exactly.

18 Q With respect to the communication which [redacted]
19 made to Langley recounting the substance of the Secord
20 conversation, did he simply tell you about it, or did you
21 actually see it?

22 A I don't know.

23 Q You don't recall?

24 A No.

25 Q I gather some of the messages he sent out you

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1 actually saw, and others he told you about, is that correct?

2 A That is correct.

3 Q But I gather --

4 A  I can't recall I saw that.

5 Q That specific one?


6 A That is correct.

7 Q Your memory is clear, I gather, on the point he did
8 tell you contemporaneously with sending the message he had
9 communicated with Headquarters on the substance of the Secord
10 conversation.

11 A That's what I recall.

12 Q I gather -- you have already testified to this, just
13 to make it clear -- that conversation recounted the nature of
14 the cargo being Hawk missiles to the destination point being
15 Iran and the purpose being for the release of the hostages,
16 is that correct?

17 A That is correct.

18 Q Do you recall whether Ambassador  com-
19 municated any dismay to CIA after the fact about the manner
20 in which this whole operation had been handled?

21 A My impression is that he did not. He intended to,
22 he said he was going to. My impression is that he did not.

23 Q Now, was that at your suggestion, or was that his
24 idea?

25 A Well, he was appalled by it, let's put it that way,

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1 so I can't recall whether it was my suggestion or his idea,
2 but it could have been either.

3 Q You were in accord with it, is that correct?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Would that have gone -- if that communication had
6 been sent out, would that have gone to the Director of Central
7 Intelligence, Mr. Clarridge, or some other person?

8 A It would have gone to the Director of Central
9 Intelligence, because Ambassador [REDACTED] and the Director
10 were personal friends, as you probably know. Can I go off
11 the record for a second?

12 MR. EGGLESTON: Sure.

13 (Discussion off the record.)

14 BY MR. WOODCOCK:

15 Q Have you heard now, subsequently, through all these
16 events, whether Thomas Clines was even present in [REDACTED]
17 during these operations?

18 A I have read that he was. But I don't know by my
19 own knowledge. I have not talked to anybody in [REDACTED] that
20 says he was there. I never asked [REDACTED] whether he was
21 there, who was one of those two partners I have met.

22 Q Have you ever sought to confirm through your con-
23 tacts in [REDACTED] whether it was, in fact, General Secord who
24 went to the VIP lounge?

25 A No, I have not.

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1 Q Has anyone in [REDACTED] confirmed to you that this
2 attempted bribe, or whatever the attempted influence was, was
3 sought to be effected in the name of Robert McFarlane?

4 A No, I have heard nothing along those lines. I am
5 only vaguely aware of this concern about a possible bribe,
6 and certainly not in terms of utilizing Robert McFarlane's
7 name.

8 Q Did this incident which occurred [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED] have any lasting effect on
10 relations between the United States and [REDACTED]?

11 A That's a difficult assessment to make. It's
12 possible that it created some suspicion within the government
13 about how we deal with other governments. It also might have
14 had a concern this particular government had [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED] so it may have
16 complicated the relationship somewhat, but I can't be sure.
17 [REDACTED]

18
19 And I might add, if I can, for the record, that
20 that really accounts for why I did not seek further informa-
21 tion about who was really at the VIP lounge. As far as I
22 was concerned the event was over with, and we were better off
23 going ahead trying to build the relationship rather than
24 spend too much time worrying about what had happened.

25 Q I may have asked this question already, but let me

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1 ask again. Following this incident, did you come across,
2 through your sources in [REDACTED], any association of either
3 General Secord or Thomas Clines with [REDACTED] in subsequent
4 dealings?

5 A No, I was not aware of General Secord or Tom Clines,
6 Thomas Clines, being in [REDACTED] after that, until I read
7 about it in the press a few months ago.

8 Q Now, the same question only with respect to
9 association or involvement with [REDACTED] before the events of
10 November 22, 23 and 24, 1985...

11 A I am not sure what the question is.

12 Q The question being, did you come across information in
13 your contacts in [REDACTED] of association of General Secord
14 or Thomas Clines with [REDACTED] at any period before November 22,
15 23, or 24?

16 A No. At least none that I can recall, because I
17 wouldn't have recognized those names at the time, in any
18 event.

19 Q I am speaking -- this is after the fact, even up to
20 the present. Have you, through your [REDACTED] contacts,
21 received confirmation of the involvement of these people with

22 [REDACTED]

23 A I haven't.

24 Q Let me ask you the same tandem of questions with
25 respect to Albert Hakim. Is that a name you are familiar

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1 with through your contacts in [REDACTED]?

2 A No.

3 MR. WOODCOCK: I think that is all I have. Thank
4 you, sir.

5 BY MR. GENZMAN:

6 Q Regarding the curt note delivered to [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED], was that at the instructions of Admiral Poindexter?

8 A It was my assumption it was at the instructions of
9 Admiral Poindexter. It came through the CIA channel, and it
10 was purportedly under his instructions, yes.

11 Q And was the wording of that note also from Admiral
12 Poindexter according to your information?

13 A Yes, it was.

14 Q Was there any Department of State approval or
15 Secretary of State approval --

16 A No, there was not.

17 Q -- of the note?

18 A Not that I knew of. Once again, going back to the
19 basic operating thesis, that is I was operating on the basis
20 of my understanding given to me through CIA communications
21 that the Secretary knew and approved; therefore, that was
22 just an extension of that.

23 I might, if I can, sort of expand here. You asked
24 or Mr. Eggleston asked if I had ever discussed this with the
25 Secretary of State or with Assistant Secretary Oakley after

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1 that event. First of all, I don't really have many occasions
2 to meet with either one of them, and I have only been back
3 to the United States once since then, and that was last summer,
4 or twice last summer, I am sorry, briefly. To that point,
5 this had not become public knowledge, so I didn't discuss it
6 with anybody else.

7 My assumption still at that time was that they knew
8 and approved. I had no reason to believe otherwise, and,
9 therefore, I didn't seek an opportunity to raise it.

10 MR. GENZMAN: I have nothing further. Thank you.

11 MR. SMILJANICH: One last question.

12 BY MR. SMILJANICH:

13 Q Physically, when you received the wording of the
14 diplomatic note via VIP channels, did you take that or re-do
15 it?

16 A It is done on a standard diplomatic note format. It
17 was done by a secretary [REDACTED]

18 Q Did you retain a copy of that?

19 A Yes, I have a copy.

20 Q Back in [REDACTED]?

21 A Yes. I believe you have it. Do you not have the
22 context of it?

23 Q I don't know we have anything other than the CIA
24 cable itself.

25 MR. EGGLESTON: I don't know I have seen it in the
formal fashion.

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1 BY MR. SMILJANICH:

2 Q Was a copy of that ever sent to any office here at
3 the Department of State?

4 A No.

5 MR. EGGLESTON: I don't have anything further.

6 MR. WOODCOCK: Let me ask a couple questions.

7 BY MR. WOODCOCK:

8 Q When you received this terse note, would it be
9 fair to say you were concerned about the quality and tone
10 of the note?

11 A Yes. We appealed actually.

12 Q How was that done?

13 A As I recall, it was done in [REDACTED] ^{CIA} communications.
14 It is possible, however, and I don't know, it is possible
15 that -- because sometimes communications came via Secord.
16 He had his little radio. So some of the appeal might have
17 gone through those channels, or [REDACTED] ^{CIA (M/C)} might have talked
18 to Secord and said, "Look, we can probably get this done if
19 you do it this way" and -- but I don't really recall. We
20 did appeal, I appealed personally the tone of the note and
21 substance of the note. I thought we were throwing away an
22 opportunity to get it done if they really wanted it done.

23 Q You testified that you were instructed not to
24 communicate through State Department channels at the outset,
25 is that correct?

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1 A That is correct.

2 Q So your personal appeal was directed, to the best
3 of your recollection, either through CIA channels or through
4 Secord's communication device, is that correct?

5 A That is correct.

6 Q Who would that have been directed to, CIA Headquart-
7 ers?

8 A Yes, CIA Headquarters. Whoever was -- actually,
9 it was to the NSC as far as we were concerned. The in-
10 structions that came out [REDACTED] were this is a NSC
11 operation, or the NSC asks that you or instructs that you do
12 the following, as I recall the opening telegram. So all of
13 this was we were working for Admiral Poindexter as far as
14 we were concerned.

15 Q So under those circumstances, I gather, it would
16 have been inappropriate for you to have appealed to the
17 Secretary of State, is that correct?

18 A Yes. My assumption at that point would have been
19 the Secretary of State, although aware of the operation, was
20 not aware of the details at this point. Time was running
21 out. It wouldn't have been a reasonable thing to try to do.

22 Q Now, let me just ask a couple more questions. You
23 testified you never met Secord, is that correct?

24 A That is correct.

25 Q So, therefore, your knowledge of this communications

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CIA CHIEF

1 device he had is coming from [REDACTED], is that correct?

2 A That is right.

3 Q I gather, then, you were relying upon his representa-
4 tion this was a Secord communications device; is that correct?

5 A That is correct. The only reason that -- I mean,
6 we became aware, [REDACTED] and I became aware almost inad-
7 vertently Secord had his own communications device because
8 he was able to get things out of Washington we subsequently
9 got through CIA channels. He would be on the telephone
10 saying such and such is happening.

11 Q I take it there were points in this operation
12 where Secord was, as they say in the CIA, waiting in advance
13 of you and [REDACTED] is that correct?
CIA CHIEF

14 A I think that was the case most of the time. In
15 retrospect.

16 MR. WOODCOCK: I think that is all I have. Thank
17 you, sir.

18 MR. EGGLESTON: Thank you.

19 (Whereupon, at 10:32 a.m., the committees were
20 adjourned subject to the call of the chair.)

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