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SUPPLEMENTAL BACKGROUND

FOR

§ FEB 88 - SSCI HEARING -- RE: INF Treaty

Please Return to Exec Staff

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

DCI/DDCI Executive Staff

1 February 1988

NOTE FOR: DCI

Attached is some supplemental background for your INF hearing on Wednesday. It covers former NATO Commander Rogers' line of attack on the INF Treaty and responses to his principal arguments. Also attached is a long letter from Jesse Helms written in 1985 which contains an exhaustive and typical range of Helms' assertions about CIA's inadequacies. We've responded to this letter point by point and Bob Gates thought that both the Helms' letter and our responses might be useful background in the event the Senator tries to put you on the defensive on the broader issues of CIA's competence and objectivity.

- TAB A Bernie Rogers' thesis about INF.
- TAB B An all-purpose response to General Rogers' thesis.
- TAB C A point-by-point response to General Rogers' thesis.
- TAB D Jesse Helms on CIA's objectivity and competence.
- TAB E Responses to Senator Helms' charges.

Attachments

JLM:gg



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~~TOP SECRET~~

Issue
1

Relations with Allies: *Does the INF Treaty strengthen or weaken NATO?*

General Bernard W. Rogers was the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) for eight years, having been elected to an unprecedented four terms. General Rogers was deeply involved with all of our NATO allies during the period of debate, planning, and deployment of NATO's INF. This experience gave him unique insight into the military and political needs of NATO. The following is excerpted from General Rogers' current article in Global Affairs.

Bernard W. Rogers **ARMS CONTROL AND NATO DETERRENCE**

One day after the 200th birthday of our Constitution, the president announced that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed in principle to conclude a treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) on a global basis. The coincidence of those two events seemed remarkably ironic.

On the one hand, the Preamble of our Constitution sets out six objectives which the government, formed by the Constitution, is expected to promote. Among them are:

- "to provide for the common defense" and
- "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." These two objectives are the basis for the highest moral imperative of our democratic government: to keep its people alive and free.

On the other hand, is the prospective INF reduction accord, in the long term, consistent with the best interests of the people governed by the Constitution?

To address that question is the purpose of this essay. I will discuss some aspects of NATO's strategy that impact on arms control negotiations; expand on NATO's mission of deterrence and its requirements; discuss arms control in general and the

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Issue

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Relations with Allies

prospective double-zero INF agreement in particular; list my concerns with the latter; and indicate what NATO must do if the agreement is implemented.

NATO Strategy

Among the many alliances that this nation has joined in order to secure its freedom, the most important is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of sixteen sovereign, independent nations. NATO was founded in 1949 as a body to deter further Soviet expansion to the west. But the Harmel Report, adopted by NATO in 1967, concluded that the alliance has *two* main functions:

- 1) To maintain adequate military strength and political cohesion to deter aggression and other forms of pressure, and to defend NATO territory if deterrence fails.
- 2) To pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.

In May 1984 the North Atlantic Council confirmed the continuing validity of the Harmel Report.

At about the time of Minister Harmel's report, the deterrent strategy of NATO was changed from "tripwire-massive retaliation" (which had become bankrupt) to "flexible response." Over the past twenty years the NATO nations have continually reaffirmed the viability of this war prevention strategy, which envisions three responses:

- 1) Direct defense to defeat an attack or to force the burden of escalation onto the shoulder of the aggressor.
- 2) Deliberate escalation on NATO's part, to include the possible first use of theater (non-strategic) nuclear weapons.
- 3) The general (strategic) nuclear response which, in the final analysis, is the guarantor of NATO's deterrence.

The flexible response strategy requires a triad of forces: con-

ventional, non-strategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear. After commencing in December 1983 to deploy the longer-range INF (LRINF) weapons — ground-launched cruise and Pershing II ballistic missiles—the major deficiency within the triad remains NATO's conventional forces. These have never been adequate to the task since budgetary constraints and the appeal of public and social programs have led NATO to mortgage its deterrence to the nuclear response.

Since the early 1970s, the gap between NATO's conventional force capabilities and those of the Warsaw Pact (WP) has been getting wider each year. The WP advantage is at least two to one in nearly every area of measurement and greater in most. With its mission, NATO does not need to match the WP one for one in any area of force comparison—tanks, howitzers, aircraft, ships—but it must not let the gap widen to the point where the military situation is beyond restoration for an alliance whose mission is the prevention of war. Should that situation occur, the Soviets would be able to achieve their objective of being able to intimidate, coerce, blackmail, and neutralize the West European nations without calling the WP troops out of their barracks. Or, as put better by another, be able "to gather the fruits of victory without the pains of war."

Should NATO fail in its mission of deterrence and be attacked conventionally by the Warsaw Pact, NATO forces would respond in an excellent manner. The problem is that these forces would only be able to fight conventionally for less than two weeks. Why? Because of an inability to sustain themselves in the light due to inadequate ammunition stocks, insufficient trained replacements for casualties, and lack of replacements for material losses on the battlefield, such as tanks. (The U.S. forces' sustainability is better than that of its allies—with the length of U.S. lines of communication it should be—but the United States also has deficiencies in all three areas cited.)

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With respect to a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact, the guidance to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) from his political authorities is: Before you, SACEUR, lose the cohesiveness of your defense you will (not "may") request the release of nuclear weapons. The reason? To signal to the WP that NATO is prepared to resort to nuclear weapons to defend itself, thereby trying to convince the pact to cease and desist in its attack. Under such circumstances, SACEUR would request the initial use of a limited number of land-based theater nuclear weapons upon militarily significant Soviet targets on Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact soil. Striking Soviet targets would send the message that the USSR would not be immune to NATO's response to pact aggression. Certainly at this stage SACEUR would not wish to request the use of nuclear weapons on targets on the territory of NATO nations.

NATO's Mission: Deterrence

Having discussed some aspects of NATO's strategy that impact on arms control negotiations, I wish to return to the mission of NATO: the deterrence of war. Deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, the Soviet Union. To be deterred from attack, or from exerting pressure through the threat of attack, the Soviet Union must perceive that the disadvantages it would suffer from aggression would be greater than any advantages it might accrue. In other words, it would receive greater pain than gain. It must be convinced that the consequences of its aggression would not be suffered solely by the victims of that aggression. The Soviets must always face the ultimate risk that pact aggression could result in NATO's first use of theater nuclear weapons, which might escalate further to a strategic nuclear exchange, the one thing the Soviets fear. The loss of twenty million citizens in World War II still preys on the minds of the Soviet people. Chernobyl confirmed the mental impact that would result from a strategic nuclear exchange.

The Soviets may doubt that NATO would resort to the first use of nuclear weapons, but they cannot be certain inasmuch as capitulation would be NATO's alternative. This Soviet uncertainty is an important factor in NATO's equation of deterrence.

If NATO is to make its full contribution to deterrence it must possess two key tools. They are set forth in NATO's "General Political Guidelines for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons." The first is the ability with land-based, theater nuclear weapons to hold at risk—with certainty—militarily significant targets deep in the Soviet homeland. The second is to have a number of escalatory options between NATO's disadvantaged conventional forces at one end of the force spectrum and U.S./U.K. strategic nuclear forces at the other end.

It was to provide these two tools, and thereby fill a gap in NATO's spectrum of deterrence, that NATO made the decision in 1979 to deploy the ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) (range: 1,500 miles) and the Pershing IIs (PIIs) (range: 1,100 miles) on West European soil. With the British Vulcan aircraft being retired, NATO had concluded by the end of the 1970s that the U.S. F-111 aircraft based in England—the only NATO aircraft with any chance of penetrating to Soviet territory—would no longer be adequate to qualify as the first tool. This conclusion was especially cogent in view of the increasing difficulty of manned aircraft to penetrate the massive and expanding WP air defenses. The two new NATO weapon systems also increased the number of escalatory options.

Arms Control

As I mentioned earlier, the Harmel Report concluded that one of the functions of the alliance is to seek a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union. Dialogue, détente, and arms control negotiations play a role in that function. I believe that dialogue at the highest level is important. Today it is being conducted with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who is charming, clever.

and charismatic. But he is also Russian and a Communist, something we should never forget. Further, Andrei Gromyko has reminded us that while Gorbachev smiles a lot, he has iron teeth. The West must be wary and not mistake the general secretary's rhetoric for substantive change in Soviet foreign policy; we have noted none to date. Gorbachev does seem intent upon domestic reforms that appear to be causing some internal tensions. In this regard, we should not let a lesson of history be lost on us; that is, autocratic regimes often find a rationale for external excursions in order to distract attention from internal difficulties.

Turning to the matter of arms control in general, I believe there are two cardinal principles to keep in mind during negotiations:

- 1) Accept no agreement that impacts adversely on the credibility of NATO's deterrence in the Soviet mind.
- 2) Arms control accords are not an end in themselves, but are a means to the end of greater security at less cost.

Further, when negotiating proposals are tabled, there are certain questions which should be asked as the proposals are evaluated. For the SACEUR, an international officer serving sixteen NATO nations, his overarching question must be: "What's best for NATO as a whole?" not, "What's best for any nation or group of nations?" Other questions to be asked include: Does the proposal lessen the threat? Does it improve NATO's response to the threat? Does it impact on NATO's continuum of escalation? Does it tend to make the Soviet Union a sanctuary? What is its impact on nuclear burden-sharing among the allies? Would it result in an overdependence on one of the remaining nuclear systems? What is the level of risk if the proposal is accepted? And whose risk is it—that of the United States?—of the West European nations?—or both?

Having reviewed some aspects of NATO's strategy as they relate to arms control, set forth some of the requirements for

credible deterrence, and taken a brief look at arms control in a general way, let me remind you of how NATO got to where it is today with respect to the potential INF accord. It was not easy.

From Two-Track to a Double-Zero

As I have mentioned, as the end of the 1970s approached, NATO's political authorities recognized the gap that had opened in NATO's spectrum of deterrence, what with the British Vulcan being retired and only the U.S. F-111 remaining as a theater system that could be perceived by the Soviets as lending credibility to NATO's deterrence. To fill that gap, NATO decided in December 1979 to deploy the 464 GLCMs and 108 P11 ballistic missiles in Western Europe. Although this deployment was "sold" to NATO's publics as a means to capture the SS-20s—utilizing the negotiating track of the two-track decision—the fact was that even without the SS-20s, the deployment was deemed necessary if the credibility of NATO's deterrence was to be kept sufficiently high. The fact that the SS-20s were being deployed in the late 1970s just made more urgent NATO's decision to get on with deploying the two LRINF systems by December 1983.

In the early 1980s many demonstrations against deployment were staged in a number of NATO nations. In order to dampen this opposition, the president, in 1981—at the behest of some allied leaders—proposed an agreement between superpowers to reduce to zero all LRINF weapons. Or, stated another way: If the Soviets would eliminate their SS-4 and SS-20 ballistic missiles, NATO would not deploy its GLCMs and P11s. No one then believed that the Soviets would accept such a proposal. (However, today there are some former disbelievers who now claim that they thought all along that the Soviets would accept it.) There were some of us in 1981 who stated that the president's proposal made a lot of sense politically, but not militarily. (I said then that "militarily, it gave me gas pains.") The proposal would have returned NATO to its posture of 1979, dependent again solely

upon the F-111 to undergird the credibility of its deterrence. Some of us also pondered at the time why it was that the Soviets did not jump at the zero-level LRINF proposal since the advantages were all in their favor.

I do wish to observe, however, that the zero-level LRINF proposal did have a dampening effect upon the demonstrated opposition to deployment of the U.S. LRINF systems.

The continued deployment on schedule of the GLCMs and PHs, beginning in December 1983, also brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table and has kept them there. They are especially worried about the Pershing II ballistic missiles, which can hold at risk important targets on Soviet soil with the certainty of penetrating WP air defenses and of striking with great accuracy within thirteen minutes of launch. With PHs deployed, the Soviets found themselves in the same posture in which they had held the West European nations for so many years—vulnerable to nuclear warheads launched from land-based theater systems. The USSR did not like it; and, as described by one of the senior members of the U.S. negotiating team, they set out to capture the PHs no matter what the price.¹

By early 1986 we started hearing noises that the latest Soviet leader, Gorbachev, might be leaning towards accepting the "unacceptable" proposal of 1981. Some wondered: Why now, after all those years? I believe that Henry Kissinger's explanation is on target: Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States for two decades and now foreign policy adviser to Gorbachev, convinced his boss that what you see from the Americans is what you get, and not something devious. Since the gains were all Soviet, Gorbachev started showing an interest in the single zero-level proposal.

With a possible agreement in the offering, some of us wanted to link full implementation of the elimination of LRINF weapons to a satisfactory agreement by the superpowers on reduced and

balanced conventional and chemical forces. As Lord Chalfont, chairman of the House of Lords All-Party Defense Group, has noted:

... the arms control agreements that have been reached over the past 25 years have all been based on one central assumption—that in the disarmament process it is dangerous to try to approach nuclear weapons and conventional forces separately. If they are ever to be eliminated, they must be reduced together, in a phased, controlled process.²

But the response we got to the suggestions of "linkage" revealed that the principle of preemptive concession would prevail: that is, "the Soviets won't agree to such linkage, so we won't try to get it."

Along came the Reykjavik Summit in late 1986 and, to their consternation, the West Europeans found that the fundamental elements of NATO's deterrent strategy had come very close to being negotiated away by the United States without consultation with its allies. Suddenly it dawned upon the West Europeans that the two superpowers might negotiate the fate of Western Europe over their heads and without their input. Living in Europe, I found it very interesting to observe how nervous the West Europeans became after Reykjavik and how they thanked Gorbachev for saving the West from itself.

In the aftermath of Reykjavik, many senior personnel in the governments of Western Europe realized how unwise it had been to promote the zero-level LRINF proposal. But after trying for six years to convince their people that zero-level was the course to pursue, how could governments walk the cat back and tell their people that they had misled them all that time? They could not and still retain any political credibility. So, like it or not, it became necessary for political credibility to take priority over the credibility of NATO's deterrence.

In February 1987, Gorbachev firmly hoisted NATO by its own petard when he openly accepted the zero-level LRINF proposal of 1981.

NATO, seeking a way out of the corner into which it had painted itself, cried out that it could not give up its GLCMs and PIIs while the Soviets still had shorter range INF (SRINF) weapons forward deployed—SS-22s and SS-23s—which would be able to strike most of the same SS-20 targets in Western Europe after the SS-20s had been eliminated. So, in April 1987, Gorbachev—true to form—told Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow that he would throw in the SRINF as well. After all, he pointed out, the Soviet Union was the only country that had any. And he was correct, inasmuch as the United States had withdrawn its Pershing IA ballistic missiles (range: 420 miles) from West Germany when it had deployed the PIIs.

With a *double-zero* accord now a possibility, the United States pressed its allies to make a quick decision on Gorbachev's zero-level SRINF proposal, suggesting they decide within three weeks. The United States also informed its allies that it would take to the negotiating table the position on the proposal that the allies desired. At the same time the United States made it clear that Gorbachev's proposal made sense, because if the allies did not agree with his proposal, they would, according to the United States, have to deploy a "new" SRINF missile on West European soil.

Some of us suggested to the West European allies that the better course of action would be to accept Gorbachev's previous proposal to destroy the forty-two Soviet SRINF systems that were forward deployed on non-Soviet territory and then match the Soviets at the level of their eighty remaining SRINF (or at an equal, lower level). This match could have been accomplished by removing one stage from the appropriate number of PIIs, thereby converting them to PIBs with a range of 440 miles. The


PIBs, resulting from converting PIIs *already deployed*, would not result in deployment of a "new" missile as described by the United States. We also advocated retaining and modernizing the seventy-two German PIAs.

Although the PIAs and PIBs could not hold at risk militarily significant targets on Soviet soil, they could at least hold such Soviet targets at risk in western Poland, East Germany, and much of Czechoslovakia. The Soviets would know that NATO would be capable of bringing pain to them, thus keeping the credibility of NATO's deterrence as high as possible in their minds, although not as high as with deployed PIIs that could strike the Soviet homeland.

I believe that West European allies missed a golden opportunity to halt the slide down the slippery slope of denuclearization of Western Europe at a range of 440 miles instead of 300 miles where agreement on double-zero will stop it, at least momentarily. But it was not to be. Before the British general election in early June 1987, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher accepted zero-level for SRINF. Her action astonished some in the French government who told me she had promised them she would not accept it.³ Then French President Francois Mitterrand also agreed with zero-level SRINF, this time to the consternation of some senior members of his government.⁴ Thus, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was left out on a limb, trying, as a minimum, to protect the seventy-two German PIAs from elimination, with the Free Democratic and Social Democratic parties feverishly sawing away at it.

The North Atlantic Council accepted the double-zero proposal during its meeting in Reykjavik in June 1987, arguing that third country systems (such as West Germany's) should not be included.

Although the chancellor tried bravely to salvage his country's PIAs, in the end, after what he described as having been urgent discussions with U.S. officials over the previous forty-eight hours,



he announced on August 26, 1987, that West Germany would destroy its seventy-two PIAs when the double-zero accord had been agreed to and implemented. Thus, one of the major obstacles to the Soviets accepting the double-zero accord was eliminated.

As for the ability to verify adequately any future agreement, Adelman has concluded:

Already verification requires more than national technical means, and already confidence in Soviet compliance with arms control is beginning to require more than any mere verification package can offer."

He also quotes the president's recent comment that "a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers."

Lord Chalfont admonishes that "arms control agreements that are either unverifiable or unenforceable will only serve the purposes of Soviet foreign policy."

Concerns About Double-Zero

First and foremost, I am concerned over the elimination of the PIIs, the theater-based system that the Soviets fear most. The PIIs, when coupled with the U.S. strategic nuclear forces, would keep the credibility of NATO's deterrence very high in the Soviets' mind. They could foresee the pain the West could bring to bear should the WP aggress. Secondly, elimination of the GLCMs and PIIs reduces the number of escalatory options available for use by the political authorities, should circumstances dictate. The total impact of losing these two key tools is that the credibility of NATO's deterrence is reduced in the Soviet mind, and the future security of the West—including the United States—will be affected.

Another concern is that the potential agreement puts NATO

on the slippery slope of denuclearization of Western Europe, which is what the Soviets want. Such denuclearization would make Western Europe safe for WP conventional aggression with no fear of nuclear escalation. More likely, however, in view of the imbalance in conventional forces, it would result in accelerating the achievement of the Soviet objective of neutralizing Western Europe without having to fire a shot. Such neutralization would impact adversely upon the United States.

The risk of starting down the slippery slopes of denuclearization is that it brings NATO from a range of 1,500 miles (GLCM) to a range of 300 miles for its theater land-based systems. This may well open the door—with the German people applying the pressure—to slide on down to a range of zero—total denuclearization. After all, the theater systems that will remain will generally be able to strike targets only on German territory—West and East German.

I am also concerned by the glib rationales being put forth by some persons to justify the double-zero agreement. One is: "The Montebello decision left 4,600 land-based nuclear warheads in Western Europe; surely that is plenty." However, when one strips away the 572 NATO LRINF weapons we would eliminate, what is the composition of the remainder? A few maritime nuclear depth charges with zero range. Hundreds of artillery-fired atomic projectiles with a range of 9 miles. About eighty Lance missiles with 66-mile range. (Both the artillery and the Lance would need to be sited well behind the front-line troops to reduce their vulnerability to enemy fire, thus reducing their effectiveness.) There would be the seventy-two FRG PIAs with a range of 420 miles which, as mentioned, will be eliminated. The other system remaining consists of bombs to be delivered by NATO aircraft (range: 180-200 miles), with the U.S. F-111 being the only one that could penetrate the WP air defenses. Should we expect these residual forces to conjure up a perception of pain in the Soviet mind? Hardly.

One might well declare: Does not this put NATO back where it was in 1979 when it decided the F-111 was not enough to fill a large gap in NATO's spectrum of deterrence? And one would be correct! One also might properly ask: "And what has changed since 1979 to cause NATO to conclude there is no longer a need to fill that gap, as the soon-to-depart GLCMs and PIAs did?" Answer: "Nothing"!

As noted, it is not a question of the number of land-based theater nuclear warheads remaining after the agreement. The real question is: "Will NATO retain the appropriate types of theater nuclear warheads remaining after the agreement. The real question is: "Will NATO retain the appropriate types of theater nuclear weapon platforms to enable it to place nuclear warheads on significant Soviet military targets, and do the Soviets believe that NATO can do it?" After the agreement is implemented the answer will be "no."

Another rationale often heard to justify double-zero INF is: "The Soviets are giving up over 1,550 warheads and the United States and West Germany only about 430; surely that is a good deal for NATO." Again, numbers only count if NATO has to fight. But for NATO, the name of the game is deterrence, the prevention of fighting, so long as its nations can retain their freedom. The fact is that the Soviets will be giving up only about 3 percent of their current nuclear warheads; almost all of the remaining 97 percent—thousands of warheads—can strike Western Europe if the Soviets wish. And fourteen of the sixteen NATO nations are in the Western European area. And what is NATO giving up? The one theater weapons system that, in the eyes of the Soviets, makes NATO's deterrent highly credible—the PI.

Some who argued most vigorously in 1977-79 against using the 400-plus warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) committed to SACEUR as a substitute for deploying

the LRINF are today claiming just as loudly that NATO should now use those SLBMs in order to "compensate" for eliminating the LRINF. Technically this is possible, but does it make any more sense now than it did eight years ago? The SLBMs are a key component of the U.S./U.K. *strategic* nuclear arsenal. Although Soviet surveillance can discriminate between the launching of land-based theater ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, it cannot differentiate between the 400-plus strategic SLBM warheads committed to SACEUR and the remainder of the SLBM warheads belonging to the strategic nuclear forces of the United States/United Kingdom. Especially is this so since there can be an intermingling of SACEUR assets and U.S. assets on the same submarine since there are ten nuclear warheads on each of the sixteen missiles deployed in a U.S. boat. If the Soviets sighted strategic SLBMs being launched and heading their way, how could they tell whether they were SACEUR's warheads being used for *theater* purposes or were part of a *strategic* nuclear lay-down by the two Western nuclear powers? They could not. Should the Soviets be geared to launch their strategic nuclear forces under attack, why should the United States and United Kingdom bear the risk of being devastated because NATO used *strategic* SLBMs for *theater* purposes? They should not. The SACEUR should continue to coordinate the use of the SLBMs committed to him with the employment of the other strategic nuclear weapons of the United States/United Kingdom, just as he has done for years.

Some have suggested that after the INF agreement the West should threaten to use any U.S./U.K. *strategic* system, no matter where based, to strike targets on Soviet soil should the WP stage a conventional attack on NATO. This smacks of the old, defunct "massive retaliation" strategy of the 1950s that NATO discarded because it was no longer credible by the late 1960s. Eliminating NATO's INF weapons does not make that strategy any more credible now.

Others have suggested that the U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) could be used to "compensate" for the loss of LRINF. Again, such use is technically feasible. But aside from the fact that the SLCMs—like their cousins, the GLCMs—are relatively slow flying, small, unmanned aircraft vulnerable to WP air defenses—as well as subject to other constraints that I will not detail—there is an overriding political reason for not compensating with SLCMs. I don't believe that it is politically credible for the West to be seen withdrawing nuclear weapons with one hand and replacing them with similar systems with the other. After all, if political credibility did not now have the highest priority, NATO would not be primed to eliminate all its LRINF.

To me it appears that the rationales offered by persons seeking to justify the prospective agreement suffer from either not being based on fact or logic, or they are transparent—or both.

My final concern is that NATO, following the apparent accelerated timetable of the United States, is about to sacrifice the long-term credibility of its deterrence on an altar of short-term political expediency and image enhancement of some of its leaders. And all because of a 1981 proposal that close analysis over time has proven we should not have offered, especially if we did not expect, or want, the Soviets to accept it. Unfortunately, when the full adverse impact of this accord is felt, today's leaders and their governments will be long gone. And who will bear the brunt of this short-term approach? The people of NATO's nations, especially those in Western Europe.

* * *
Summary/Conclusion
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I have concluded that:
1) The double-zero INF agreement will reduce the credibility of NATO's deterrence in the eyes of the Soviet Union, thus impacting adversely on Western security.

2) The INF agreement puts NATO on the slippery slope leading to the denuclearization of Western Europe, which is what the Soviets want.

3) The denuclearization of Western Europe would make that region safe for Soviet conventional aggression, or, more likely, result in the neutralization of Western Europe from the threat of WP conventional might.

4) NATO, prodded by the United States, is sacrificing the long-term credibility of its deterrence for short-term political expediency and the burnishing of the images of some of its leaders.

5) Even if the INF accord appears to be in the short-term interests of the United States, the long-term impact could be detrimental to the United States.

6) There are certain actions that NATO must and can take whether or not a double-zero accord is implemented, and its implementation only makes the undertaking of these actions all the more important.

7) It is doubtful that adequate resources will be forthcoming to implement the requisite actions.

8) Planning by NATO to use strategic nuclear weapons for theater purposes to "compensate" for the INF accord would not be credible to the Soviets and should not be to the West.

9) Whatever NATO does in the backwash of double-zero, it will not be able to raise the credibility of its deterrence in the eyes of the Soviets to the level that NATO's LRINF have done, especially the Pershing II.

Notes

1. Discussions during Bilderberg Meetings, April 24-26, 1987, Villa d'Este, Italy.
2. "A European Perspective," by Lord Chalfont, *World & I*, September 1987.
3. Discussions with senior French officials during my farewell calls as SACEUR, Paris, June 10, 1987.
4. *Ibid*
5. "Verification in an Age of Mobile Missiles," Kenneth T. Adelman, *World & I*, September 1987.
6. *Ibid*
7. *Ibid*
8. Lord Chalfont, "A European Perspective."
9. *Ibid*
10. *Ibid*

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RESPONSE TO GENERAL ROGERS ARTICLE ON INF TREATY

I will not comment on General Rogers comments on the adequacy of NATO deterrence and nuclear modernization plans, as these are matters that Admiral Crowe and Secretary Carlucci have already addressed and are in a position to provide the Committee with more detailed information than the Director of Central Intelligence. I have no doubt that some Europeans share General Rogers' fears that an INF Treaty could lead to the complete denuclearization of Europe and thereby undermine the credibility of NATO's Flexible Response strategy.

--However, **this is by no means a foregone conclusion**, as the Alliance maintains a broad range of conventional and nuclear systems and there is broad agreement among the allies that NATO must retain nuclear systems as part of its defense strategy. Also, Europeans believe that NATO's credibility as an effective Alliance rests as much on its ability to follow through with decisions like the 1979 deployment decision and ratification of the treaty as it does on military capabilities.

--More importantly, European officials across the political spectrum endorse the treaty and believe that **there is a far greater danger now of discrediting NATO's cohesion by not ratifying the treaty**. In such an event, General Rogers' fears about the Alliance may start coming to pass very quickly and with little that a US leadership perceived as vacillating could do about them.

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

85- 3911

October 2, 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In the past we have written to you seeking information about the long-standing problem at the Central Intelligence Agency regarding an apparent analytical bias which continuously under-estimates Soviet intentions and capabilities. Some have even characterized this bias as "pro-Soviet." We posed a series of questions, the answers to which would assist us in reviewing this problem, on April 25, 1985; to date no response has been received.

Now the problem has surfaced in public again. According to a recent newspaper article, the CIA's internal publication Studies in Intelligence, recently published a book review of a volume by two distinguished academic scholars on the topic of Soviet Disinformation. Soviet Disinformation is a very serious intelligence and political problem to which you, Mr. President, have personally called world-wide attention. Soviet Disinformation techniques are part of a larger intelligence problem which entails Soviet "Active Measures"—the so-called Maskirovka techniques of Camouflage, Concealment and Deception.

Yet according to the article attached, the review by CIA's publication reads as though it were written in Moscow. Instead of criticizing the analysis of the authors, it attacks the very concept that Maskirovka actually exists. Indeed, according to the information available, the CIA's review reads like a piece of disinformation itself, and appears to serve Soviet foreign policy interests. Of course, we do not have the actual text, so we ask that you supply the text to us. The article we seek is an unclassified review by Avis Boutell in Studies in Intelligence of the book Dezinformatsia by Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson.

It seems strange for the CIA to be attacking the serious analysis of Soviet Disinformation, when the CIA should be taking the lead in unmasking Soviet Disinformation. This appears to be part of the well-documented, much larger problem at CIA--the long-standing habit of the CIA of under-estimating Soviet intentions and military capabilities. America is now faced with the dangerous implications of Soviet military supremacy, as you have confirmed by at least eight statements you have made since 1982, and by the numbers and trends in comparative U.S.-Soviet armaments.

the President

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In the most important measures of military power, the gaps between U.S. and Soviet capabilities are growing larger, not smaller, despite your vigorous Defense Modernization Program. We are still losing ground to the Soviets—and these gaps will continue to widen over the next five years. In fact, we are over 38 billion dollars behind President Carter's Five Year Defense Program, as you pointed out on March 22, 1985. Thus the "correlation of forces" has indeed decisively shifted against the United States, as Soviet political and military leaders frequently assert.

The bias of the CIA for under-estimating Soviet intentions and capabilities over the last 25 years has already had a deleterious effect on U.S. national security. But the recent implications of information resulting from KGB defections suggests that we should inquire further into the problem of this bias. Accordingly, we therefore request answers to the following additional questions as soon as possible:

1. Why does the CIA produce single-source analysis of Soviet and Communist Chinese open publications such as is done by Foreign Broadcast Information Service?

2. Is there an internal CIA review process to identify possible pro-Soviet bias in published unclassified or classified analytical products?

3. Was the attached article mentioned above screened to detect its possible pro-Soviet bias? If not, why not? If so, why was it published under the official imprimatur of the CIA?

4. Is there a possible pro-Soviet bias in many CIA products over the past 20 years?

5. Is there any evidence of the influence of possible pro-Soviet penetrations, moles or bias in the preparation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence products on the Soviet Union over the past 20 years?

6. Has any important-intelligence analysis or evidence related to the Soviet Union ever been withheld or suppressed within or by the CIA? Did any of this intelligence evidence or analysis reveal Soviet deception? What is the Counterintelligence significance of the suppression of intelligence on Soviet deception?

7. Could a possible pro-Soviet bias have played a role in the prolonged and worsening CIA under-estimates of Soviet strategic forces in the 1960's and 1970's?

8. We have recent reports that the CIA:

a.) Has further down-graded Soviet Backfire bomber range

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- estimates;
- b.) Is negatively reassessing evidence of Soviet Biological and Chemical Warfare arms control violations;
 - c.) Is trying to change seismic verification methodology to make Soviet violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty disappear;
 - d.) Has down-graded the accuracy of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM in a belated attempt to disprove the B Team;
 - e.) Is denying and down-playing evidence of Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception (Maskirovka);
 - f.) Is denying the possibility of Soviet mole penetrations and deception in humint espionage channels;
 - g.) Has finally completed National Intelligence Estimate 11-11 on Soviet Strategic Deception after three years, but continues to deny Soviet SALT I negotiating deception on the size of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM, the range of the SS-N-8, the number of Soviet SLBMs in 1972, the "geographical asymmetries" rationale for Soviet SLBM superiority, Brezhnev's pledge not to build mobile ICBMs, Brezhnev's Backfire bomber pledge, Soviet-supplied Backfire bomber range data, and the Soviet SALT II Data Base.

Are these recent reports correct? Are they best explained by an under-estimative analytical bias, a possible pro-Soviet bias, bureaucratic incompetence, or all of the above?

9. Was John Paisley likely to have been a Soviet KGB mole inside the CIA, who may have been assassinated by the KGB in order to protect other CIA moles? What is the best assessment of Paisley's full career and death? Have traces of other CIA moles ever been detected?

10. Are reports that CIA has regressed into continued under-estimation of Soviet military spending correct?

11. Did the CIA miscount both the Soviet ICBM and SLBM totals, the main limitations, during SALT I? Did Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception play a role in causing these miscounts?

12. Did the CIA also fail to project either the heavy throw-weight of the SS-19 or the long range of the SS-N-8 at the time SALT I was signed in 1972? Was Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception involved in these under-estimates?

13. Has the CIA consistently under-estimated Soviet global objectives and misunderstood Soviet arms control objectives?

14. Can at least five years of the 10 year 1980-1990 U.S. "window of vulnerability" be attributed to under-estimates by CIA of Soviet ICBM accuracies?


In sum, we strongly agree with CIA Director Casey's initial assessment of the CIA's analytical track record made on February 13, 1981:

"The most frequent criticism is that our [CIA's] interpretations and assessments have shown a tendency to be overly optimistic, to place a benign interpretation on information which could be interpreted as indicating danger. It's our obligation to present conclusions which emphasize hard reality undistorted by preconceptions or by wishful thinking...I found in SALT I, for example, that some of the [CIA] judgements were soft. They leaned toward a kind of benign interpretation rather than a harder interpretation of assessing or viewing a situation as being more dangerous." (Emphasis added.)

We fear, however, that despite Director Casey's best efforts, the CIA's performance has not improved.

Thank you for your prompt response to these important questions. We also again request belated answers to our April 25, 1985 questions (letter attached.)

Sincerely,



Copies to:

Director, CIA --
Deputy Director for Intelligence --
Director CIA Counter-Intelligence --
National Intelligence Officer for Deception
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

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