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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI)

3 FEBRUARY 1988 - 1400 hours - 219 Hart

RE: INF

Please Return to Exec Staff

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Replaced with revised Q + A's (in separate binder)

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

January 20, 1988

The Honorable William H. Webster
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Judge Webster:

I am writing to confirm your appearance before the Committee on Foreign Relations to testify in regard to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Your testimony is scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, January 29, 1988, in Room S-407, the Capitol.

You will be appearing at the close of the first week of testimony before the Committee. Earlier in the week, the Committee will have heard from Secretary of State Shultz, former secretaries of state, the treaty negotiators and Ambassador Paul Nitze, who will deal with verification. I hope you will be accompanied by representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. You should be prepared to address the monitoring tasks the intelligence community will face and how well these tasks can be accomplished; the validity of the data provided by the Soviet Union and of our own related intelligence estimates; the role of confidence-building measures, including on-site inspection, in monitoring compliance; the resources the intelligence community has available and expects to have under current plans to monitor compliance; and potential military steps which the Soviet Union might take to compensate for the reductions required by the treaty.

Your oral presentation should be limited to 30 minutes, but you may submit a longer statement for the record. The oral presentation will be followed by questions and general discussion on this subject. It would be appreciated if you would submit copies of your prepared statement at least two working days in advance of the hearing. If you have any further questions, please let me know or have your staff call Bill Ashworth at 224-9033.

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I look forward to seeing you and hearing your views on this very important matter.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely,


Claiborne Pell
Chairman

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington D C 20505

ER 88-0308

January 25, 1988

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510


Dear Senator Helms:

I am responding to your letters of January 22, 1988 to General Odom and me. We have reviewed the highly sensitive classified information cited in the attachment to your letter. This information is, in fact, contained in a recent draft of Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 4/11-88. The information is substantively accurate, although the final wording in the published version will, in some cases, be slightly different. In some cases, the citations omit reference to important caveats and additional observations. These statements are excerpts from a much broader set of judgments and issues regarding the monitoring of the INF Treaty and, in my view, by themselves do not constitute a sufficient basis on which to draw conclusions about the overall monitorability of the Treaty. This volume of the NIE, which contains highly source-sensitive information, has not yet been published. The judgments and information therein have been briefed to policy officials, negotiators, and in response to requests from members of Congress and security-cleared staff. A summary has been published.

I and my colleagues from the Intelligence Community will be prepared to discuss the issues you have raised during my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 29. However, it is my understanding that intelligence monitoring capabilities will be discussed in detail in several

hearings scheduled by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I would ask you to consult with Chairman Pell, SSCI Chairman Boren, and SSCI Vice Chairman Cohen regarding the appropriate forum for detailed discussion of sensitive intelligence information regarding the monitorability of the INF Treaty.

Sincerely,



William H. Webster

cc: Senator Claiborne Pell,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Senator David L. Boren
Chairman, Senate Committee on Intelligence
Senator William S. Cohen
Vice Chairman, Senate Committee on Intelligence

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all of your handwritten notations
and am holding the previous version
in case you want to see what was
changed. Aside from deletion of the
last 4 paragraphs, changes were
non-substantive and minor.

Jim

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The "Bottom-Line Question"

Q. What is your judgment about the overall monitorability of the INF Treaty?

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* * * * *

25X1

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25X1

The "Cheating Issue"

1. Q. Do you not believe the Soviets will cheat on INF and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaties, given their past record of violating treaties?

25X1

The role of the Intelligence Community is to be keenly aware of all this background and analytical framework but not to enter into the monitoring process with hard and fast, pre-conceived conclusions as to whether the Soviets will cheat or not. Our job is to report and analyze as objectively as possible all relevant available intelligence.

2. Q. How carefully have you looked at how the Soviets might cheat? How many ways are there for them to cheat?

A. We have looked at many potential cheating scenarios, some in a general sense and others representative of particular types of cheating in more detail. There are an infinite number of possibilities for illegal activity and, therefore, we would not claim to have investigated each one, nor would we say that any particular scenario is the most likely. Analysts throughout the Community have identified a number of possibilities that seem unlikely and others that are more credible.

25X1
25X1

3. Q. What are the risks to the U.S. if the Soviets cheat?

A. The military risk assessments are in the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and should be addressed to their representatives.

25X1
25X1

4. Q. The Soviet "Maskirovka" program is very extensive and effective. How can you overcome this, and why has this not been outlawed in the treaties?

25X1

25X1

5. Q. Because the most likely cheating scenario for the INF Treaty is for the Soviets to deploy covertly SS-20s together with SS-25s, which we know that they have already done, can we detect and prevent such cheating under the terms of the Treaty?

25X1

Soviet Data

1. Q. What is the Intelligence Community's Assessment of the technical data provided by the Soviets in the Memorandum of Understanding?

25X1

2. Q. How can the differences between the Soviet data given us in November and December, 1987 be explained? Did the Soviets attempt disinformation and deception and outright falsification?

25X1

Some Key Substantive Issues

25X1

2. Q. Why are nuclear warheads explicitly exempted from elimination?

25X1

*read
background*

5. Q. What is the evidence for testing or deployment of an extended-range Scud missile?

Signatures

Our Estimate

1. Q. The Intelligence Community recently completed a National Intelligence Estimate on "U.S. Capabilities to Monitor Arms Control Limitations on Soviet Strategic Forces: (NIE 4/11-88)." What was the purpose of this Estimate? Who initiated it and when? Did all agencies participate fully in the preparation of this Estimate? What are the major areas of disagreement among agencies?
 - A. NIE 4/11 was initiated by the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs in the summer of 1986. Its original purpose was to update the arms control monitoring Estimate completed in 1983. As it became clear last summer that we were moving closer to an actual INF Treaty, we decided to treat our INF monitoring judgments separately from the more generic discussion in the main text of the Estimate, and we have done so in a separate volume (Volume III). All major intelligence agencies participated fully and were well-represented in our coordination process. This includes CIA, DIA, INR, NSA, and the military services. There are relatively few disagreements among agencies over the fundamental monitoring judgments in the Estimate. Finally, it should be noted that the judgments in the Estimate are consistent with the Community's views expressed often to the policymakers over the past few years.

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Intelligence Resources and Capabilities

1. Q. Are your resources, on-hand and planned, sufficient to do the INF monitoring job?

A. As I noted in my remarks, current fiscal restraints and future program cutbacks could possibly cause some of our monitoring needs to suffer, or be satisfied only at the expense of other national requirements.

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25X1



2. Q. The Intelligence Community has traditionally had responsibility for monitoring activities related to arms control treaties. Does the incorporation into the INF Treaty of on-site inspection and other cooperative measures change in any way this responsibility? Has there been any change in the community's organizations or procedures for monitoring INF?

A. The Intelligence Community will continue to have responsibility for monitoring the INF Treaty. My new Monitoring Manager will coordinate the activities of the various agencies involved and provide all-source, coordinated interagency monitoring assessments.

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Strategic Issues; Europe and Conventional Arms Control

1. Q. What do the allies think about the INF agreement?
 - A. West European allies have welcomed the agreement
 - As a visible sign of better East-West relations;
 - As a first successful step toward disarmament;
 - As a hopeful precedent for verification;
 - As evidence the U.S. is capable of a leading role in shaping a constructive relationship with Moscow.

Public welcome of the agreement has been wide and strong.

2. Q. Don't the allies have reservations?
 - A. Many senior officials in key allied countries harbor private reservations about the agreement's impact on European security.
 - That a double-zero accord weakens NATO's spectrum of deterrence and defense;
 - That it will weaken nuclear linkage between Europe and the U.S.;
 - That it will undermine NATO's strategy of flexible response;
 - That it portends a further American withdrawal from Europe;
 - That it will leave Europe vulnerable to Soviet conventional chemical and shorter-range nuclear forces.

But, despite these concerns, West European leaders -- without exception -- now support ratification of the treaty.

3. Q. How would Europeans view non-ratification of the INF agreement?

A. They would regard this as catastrophic.

-- As a severe downturn in East-West relations

-- As a cut-off of prospects for arms control

-- As a return to a more dangerous world with a greater Soviet threat

-- As evidence that the U.S. is incapable of a leadership role in handling East-West relations

4. Q. What are the chances of agreement on conventional arms reductions in Europe?


A. Not soon.

-- The long negotiation on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) has not produced agreement.

-- At the Vienna meeting between 16 Members of NATO and seven of the Warsaw Pact -- the "conventional stability talks" -- several issues still divide the two sides.

-- Alliance countries continue to be divided over the details of their proposal after the formal talks begin.

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PCI-10. ПАМ'ЯТА БЕЗ КОНТРОЛЮ

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
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РСД-Ю. Пусковой
контейнер

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ОТР-23. Ракета

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OTR-22. Транспортное
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
Q: Do you agree with the President's Finding of Soviet noncompliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)?

A: The question of noncompliance is a policy judgment, and the Intelligence Community is neutral on this issue.



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50.




25X1

51.

Q: Have you made your opinion on this matter clear to the Administration policy officials?

A: Yes.



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57.

Q: Are the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies really interested in new negotiations on conventional arms control?

A: The Warsaw Pact in June 1986 called for negotiations on reducing conventional ground and air forces--and tactical nuclear weapons--that exist in Europe from "the Atlantic to the Urals." It called for two stages of reductions that would result in cuts of up to 500,000 military personnel and their associated equipment by the early 1990s. Since February 1987, representatives from the seven Warsaw Pact and 16 NATO countries have been meeting in Vienna to formulate a mandate for the new negotiations--which the US refers to as "Conventional Stability Talks." The Soviets and their allies appear serious about beginning the new negotiations, but they are not pressing the West and have been willing to accept the pace of the "pre-negotiations" in Vienna that the West has set.

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58.

Q: Would the Soviets reduce their forces as part of a conventional arms control agreement? Why?

A: Yes.

- The Soviets would save money by such a reduction, because conventional forces cost a great deal (about 34 percent of the USSR's defense expenditures). How much money they would save would be determined by what and how much they reduced.
- They would reap political benefits in Europe by showing they do not present a threat. Already public opinion polls show that most West Europeans believe the military threat from the Warsaw Pact has diminished--or does not exist.
- They probably would benefit militarily, because a Soviet reduction would make it even more difficult for West European leaders to convince their parliaments--and their people--that it remains necessary to increase defense spending on modernizing military forces and equipment. The Soviets remain very concerned about matching or offsetting NATO's modernization programs.
- They might be able to "trade" cuts in their tank and artillery forces for cuts in NATO's helicopters and anti-tank weapons. The Soviets believe NATO has an advantage over the Warsaw Pact in these latter items of equipment.
- They almost certainly will be able to trade cuts in their forces for reductions in the West German Bundeswehr, because Bonn had made known that it must cut its military forces. The Soviets regard the Bundeswehr as their main potential foe in the conventional forces arena.
- They might be able to trade cuts in their forces for withdrawals of US forces.
- Ideally, from the Soviet's viewpoint, they might be able to trade reductions in Warsaw Pact Forces for cuts in NATO's air forces. The Soviets regard NATO's superior air forces as the greatest threat to the success of a Warsaw Pact conventional ground forces offensive in Europe.

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59.

Q: How do the Soviets regard the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks?

A: These talks have been going on in Vienna for 14 years, and the Soviets and their allies show no inclination to make any concessions that would bring them to a successful conclusion. In fact, various Soviet officials have stated that the talks are "dead," and the Warsaw Pact has proposed new negotiations that would replace MBFR. They proposed talks that would lead to large reductions of conventional forces in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The MBFR talks, of course, focus on a much more limited area--that is, Central Europe. The Soviets, however, do not want to bear the onus for breaking off the MBFR talks and seem content to exchange old arguments with the West until possible new negotiations replace the current talks.

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60.

Q: What are Soviet views on tactical nuclear weapons after INF? Are they about to spring a "Third Zero?"

A: The Soviets have just recently suggested a formula for dealing with "tactical nuclear weapon" systems (what the West calls "short-range nuclear forces," with ranges less than 500 kilometers) in Europe that would separate consideration of their nuclear components from consideration of their delivery means. Under this formula, the delivery means (aircraft, missiles and launchers, and artillery tubes) would be included in new talks on conventional forces in Europe, whose mandate is under discussion in Vienna, and the nuclear component (nuclear bombs, missile warheads, and artillery projectiles) would be discussed in future "corresponding negotiations," which they have said should not be put off for long.

This move seems to bring the Soviet position closer to NATO's view that armaments can be included in new conventional talks only to the extent that they use conventional munitions, and it could remove an obstacle to progress on the mandate. Although various Soviet spokesmen have advocated the elimination of tactical nuclear arms, they have done so in the broad context of the goal of a nuclear-free world, and have not yet specifically proposed "zeroing out" either the delivery means or the nuclear munitions. However, the formula recently suggested by the Soviets would permit them to call in the future for a "third zero"--to follow the present "double zero" elimination of medium and shorter range nuclear missile systems--on just the nuclear munitions. Such a proposal would serve the Soviet goal of "denuclearizing" Europe, while protecting Soviet interests in maintaining dual-capable delivery means as conventional weapon systems.

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63.

Q: What do the Allies really think about the INF accord?

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Despite these concerns, West European leaders--without exception--now support ratification of the treaty. Public opinion strongly favors the accord, making it politically risky for any government to voice concerns about the treaty's political or military implications. Given their publics' support, NATO leaders hope to gain credit with them, by pointing out that the agreement was the result of steadfast Alliance resolve to deploy INF systems in the face of leftist opposition. West European leaders also are softening their criticism of the accord for fear it could be used during the US Senate ratification debates to kill the treaty, which all Allies agree would be a catastrophe for the Alliance. They also view the INF verification provisions as precedent--setting and hope that the accord will lead to progress in other arms control areas, particularly in START and conventional stability talks in Europe.

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
64.

Q: Where do the Allies stand on negotiations over shorter-range nuclear forces (SNF)?

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25X1



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25X1

SECRET

65.

Q: What are the prospects for modernization of NATO SNF systems in the wake of an INF treaty?

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66.

Q: What are the chances of reaching an agreement on conventional arms reductions in Europe?

A: The sixteen members of NATO and seven members of the Warsaw Pact are meeting informally in Vienna to hammer out a Mandate for new conventional arms control negotiations--dubbed "conventional stability talks"--in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

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67.

Q: With the elimination of INF systems, many believe that NATO must do more in the conventional arena. Can the Allies do more?

A: Most allies have acknowledged the importance of improving their conventional defenses to rectify current East-West imbalances, but we do not believe that they will support a major increase in defense spending. Moreover, many European leaders doubt that their publics would tolerate large increases in defense spending at a time when the INF treaty is symbolizing a reduction in East-West tensions and holding out new opportunities for further arms reductions in Europe.

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68.

Q: After INF what are the next steps for the Europeans in arms control?

A: There is no clear consensus among the major allies on arms control priorities. At best they all endorse movement toward START and progress toward conventional and chemical weapons treaties.

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