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TAB I Fallout from the U.S. Denial of a Visa for Arafat. The Secretary may ask for your assessment of the reaction to the U.S. denial of a visa for Arafat to attend the UN General Assembly session in New York. In the talking points at TAB I the argument is made that Arafat himself views the denial as actually strengthening his position with our Western European allies and offering him a good chance of winning support for a General Assembly session in Geneva.

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Assessment of ISID's Military Policy for the Mujahedin

The following represents the Afghan Task Force's assessment of ISID's current military guidance to the Afghan Alliance. This should be caveated with the understanding that there is no direct command relationship between ISID and Mujahedin commanders nor is there any guarantee that Pakistani pressure to pursue a particular policy will be successful. The Mujahedin and their seven Peshawar leaders consistently demonstrate their independence of thought and action.

-- Increase military pressure on Afghan regime military garrisons and forces to include those located in cities.

-- Make every effort to avoid civilian casualties. Within the Kabul area since September 1988, ISID has restricted long range rockets to those commanders who have more accurate rocket launchers and directed them to attack only the airfield. This airfield continues to be used by the Soviets to support Soviet and regime combat operations.

-- Do not interfere with or harass the Soviet troop withdrawal. This has been a consistent ISID policy since the signing of the Geneva Accord. Despite Soviet propaganda to the contrary, there is no evidence to indicate that Soviet units have had significant problems withdrawing from Afghanistan.

It is important to recognize that the current Soviet military buildup of airpower in Afghanistan is not in response to Mujahedin military pressure on Soviet forces. The bombings are taking place in areas where there are no Soviet troops.

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Thu Dec 01 09:22:10 1988

LIBYA DENIES CHEMICAL ARMS FACILITY, WILL ATTEND CONFERENCE
ROME, Dec 1, Reuter - Libya denied U.S. accusations that it has the means to produce chemical weapons and said on Thursday it would attend an international conference in January banning their use.

Libyan number two Major Abdel-Salam Jalloud told a Rome news conference his country had neither the political will nor the ability to make nerve gas or other toxic weapons.

"This is an American lie. The United States makes up these lies because it is trying to prepare the world psychologically for new aggression against us," Jalloud said.

He said Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was willing to invite journalists and Western ambassadors to Libya to see for themselves that no such chemical facility existed.

He confirmed earlier reports that Tripoli would take part in a January 7-11 Paris conference of signatory states to the 1925 Geneva protocol on the non-use of chemical weapons.

Jalloud, ending a week-long visit to Italy to discuss bilateral relations, also criticised Washington's denial of a visa to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in order for him to address a United Nations debate on Palestine.


"It shows absolute contempt for all the people and nations of the U.N.," he said.

He said Libya had contacted all member states calling for the permanent transfer of the United Nations seat from its New York headquarters.

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
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30 November 1988



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TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

Soviet Union, Cuba, South Africa, Angola:

Attitudes Toward a Angola/Namibia Settlement

Angola, Cuba, and South Africa are meeting in Brazzaville, Congo this week in an attempt to finalize an agreement on a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and independence for Namibia. If this meeting is successful, the parties are scheduled to meet again at the United Nations to formally approve the accord. Nevertheless, we believe a heads of state meeting in New York in December to sign the agreement is unlikely. All the parties appear generally pleased with the current accord and--despite last minute maneuvering--appear intent on arriving at a final settlement.



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The View from Moscow

The Soviets have publicly expressed their pleasure with the outcome of the quadripartite talks and almost certainly see an agreement as favorable to their interests. Although the Soviet Union is not a party to the agreement, it has played an important and supportive role in the US brokered negotiating process and, on occasion, has acted to prevent the talks from stalling. We are not aware of any plans by Gorbachev, however, to meet at the UN with the heads of state of the countries involved in the talks.



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Moscow and Havana appear to be cooperating closely on reaching a settlement in Angola.

- The Soviets gave logistic, intelligence, and rhetorical support to the augmentation of Cuban troops in Angola over the past year. They also provided missiles, aircraft, tanks and other equipment to augmented Cuban forces in southwest Angola, and made additional military equipment deliveries to Cuba over the past year to replace Cuban equipment deployed to Angola.



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[REDACTED]

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There are some indications, however, suggesting that Moscow and Luanda have had some disagreements over the quadripartite talks.

- Gorbachev had stressed to dos Santos in late October that delaying a final agreement would make it more difficult to reach a favorable settlement, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] apparently believing that the proposals under discussion were the best that could be achieved.

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- [REDACTED] Moscow cut off subsidies of Cuban troops in Angola in early October, leaving the Angolans to pick up the tab. We believe this was an effort-- apparently successful--to induce the Angolans to be more cooperative in reaching an agreement. [REDACTED]

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Moscow probably does not see any benefit to holding direct discussions with UNITA leader Savimbi.

- Moscow has counseled Luanda to pursue national reconciliation and asked several African states to assist in addressing the issue. We believe, however, that the Soviets would prefer to avoid direct involvement in national reconciliation talks.
- A meeting with Savimbi also would probably complicate Soviet relations with Luanda, since the Angolans vehemently oppose any role for Savimbi in a settlement. [REDACTED]

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Cuban Attitudes

Cuban President Castro appears to be pleased with the agreement, especially since he has achieved his major goals--the end of South African involvement in Angola and movement toward Namibian independence.

- Castro probably believes that his role in achieving an end to Pretoria's involvement in Angola and Namibia has enhanced his image as a Third World leader and given Havana a voice in southern Africa regional politics.
- The withdrawal timetable allows for the retention of sufficient Cuban forces in Angola both to prop up the dos Santos regime and prevent South African backtracking. It also would permit a relatively rapid return home of Cuban forces, a domestically popular step. [REDACTED]

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Castro probably would be reluctant, however, to become involved in a multi-party meeting on Angola in New York.

- He would likely question the necessity of such a meeting, especially if it gave the appearance of legitimizing South Africa's apartheid government.

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[Redacted]

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-- Castro's intense dislike of Presidents Reagan and Botha also mitigate against his sharing the same platform with them. Moreover, he also may believe that his attendance at such a meeting could be upstaged by any Reagan-Gorbachev talks, a prospect his ego would find unpalatable. [Redacted]

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South African Outlook

South Africa is generally pleased with the negotiated settlement, which links total Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to implementation of the UN independence plan for Namibia. Most South African officials probably believe the agreement offers the best way of eliminating both the Cuban threat in southern Africa as well as the economic and military burden of Namibia.

-- Pretoria--concerned that the package may not be politically acceptable to South African whites, particularly the right wing opposition--can claim it achieved concessions from Cuba and Angola without trading on its own security. [Redacted]

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South Africa probably would support an all parties' conference in New York because it would provide President Botha with a rare opportunity to meet--and be seen with--top world leaders. Botha has tried to arrange a meeting with President Reagan for several years and the added bonus of General Secretary Gorbachev--and perhaps even President-elect Bush--would make the meeting a very attractive proposal. [Redacted]

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The South Africans, however, do not seem to be angling for a December meeting. South Africa apparently plans to sign the protocol in Brazzaville, but Botha wants to delay the formal signing ceremony in New York until mid-January, [Redacted]

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-- [Redacted]

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-- In the interim, Pretoria hopes to earn domestic and international capital from the Angola/Namibia accord, its reprieve last week of six antiapartheid activists on death row, and the announcement that prison restrictions on ANC leader Nelson Mandela will soon be relaxed.

-- There are indications that Foreign Minister Pik Botha plans to travel to several European capitals in December to champion South Africa's diplomatic achievements. Finance Minister du Plessis may seize this opportunity to encourage European bankers to roll over South African foreign debt. [Redacted]

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Angolan Concerns

Angola has been willing to move forward on an agreement for Cuban troop withdrawal because it believes that the accord will cut off UNITA from South African support, the insurgents' most important source of assistance.

- Separated from South African support, Luanda believes that it can deal serious military blows to UNITA during the period before Cuban forces are completely withdrawn from Angola, allowing them to negotiate with the insurgents from a position of strength. 


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Although Angola has presented a united front with Cuba at the negotiating table, it is probably unhappy with some details of the agreement.

- Because its own security is at stake and given its concerns about what it perceives as a growing UNITA threat, Luanda probably would have preferred a longer timetable than 27 months for the withdrawal of Cuban troops.
- Despite differences over the pace of the Cuban troop withdrawal, Angola has little choice but to follow the Cuban lead. Luanda will probably receive additional assurances of support from both Havana and Moscow to assuage its fears over entering into an agreement. 

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The Angolan Government would probably welcome the opportunity to take part in a multi-party meeting at the UN in order to capitalize on international exposure associated with the regional peace accord.

- Luanda likely calculates that its role in the peace process and the publicity surrounding a formal signing at the UN would improve its professed image as a moderate, nonaligned state.
- Luanda also probably believes that increased attention in international fora will undoubtedly improve its ability to attract badly needed Western loans and hopes to gain membership in the International Monetary Fund. 

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ANNEX: Soviet Relations with Cuba and Angola

Perestroika

Soviet ties with Cuba are currently quite tense over Havana's misuse of Soviet economic assistance and the country's deteriorating economy.

-- [redacted] one of Gorbachev's major purposes in visiting Havana is to assess for himself just how bad Cuba's economic situation is.

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-- We expect Gorbachev to use the visit to make clear his concern that Cuba needs to revitalize its economy. [redacted]

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Since Gorbachev came to power, Moscow has implemented a number of measures designed to cap assistance levels and strengthen its control over how Soviet aid is used.

-- Since 1985, we believe the Soviets have held oil deliveries to Cuba steady at 270 thousand barrels-per-day (b/d), despite Castro's requests for more. Due to the drop in the world market price of oil, this one step has caused the value of Soviet assistance (in constant US dollars) to Cuba to decline by about 20 percent from 1984 to 1987.

-- Moscow has tied development credits to specific aid projects so that Castro cannot divert the materials or funds to his pet projects. [redacted]

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Castro has compounded the problem by openly rejecting Soviet-style economic reform as inappropriate for Cuba.

-- His own reform program stresses moral suasion over material incentives to increase productivity. [redacted]

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The Soviets and Angolans, by contrast, do not appear to disagree over perestroika.

-- [redacted] the similarity between the Angolan economic and financial reorganization program and the USSR's perestroika. The Angolans, however, have embarked on little real economic reform. [redacted]

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On Other Areas of Foreign Policy:

-- The Cubans have joined Moscow in supporting the Esquipulas peace plan in Nicaragua and have praised Soviet arms control initiatives.

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-- Havana may have boycotted the Olympics to show its independence from Moscow--probably deliberately choosing an area that would not harm Soviet interests. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Havana mistakenly assumed that Moscow would boycott and took action without consulting the Soviets first, [REDACTED]

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Talking Points for the DCI

1 December 1988

Pakistan: Prospects for the Bhutto Government

Benazir Bhutto, named Prime Minister on 1 December, has not yet formed a governing coalition but should win a vote of confidence within the next week.

--Bhutto has 106 delegates in the new National Assembly but must gain at least 12 more votes to win a vote of confidence. Her two most likely coalition partners the Muhajir Quami Party (14 delegates) and a Sunni religious party, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (12 delegates), have proven unexpectedly difficult bargainers. The Muhajirs are holding out for recognition as a separate ethnic group, which would be unexceptable to Bhutto's Punjabi and Sindhi supporters, as well as the the Army. Both are likely to support Bhutto on the vote of confidence but may not join a Bhutto-led cabinet.

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Bhutto is likely to be tested quickly as prime minister. Whether she can govern successfully will depend on her ability to assuage the military, manage an unstable coalition, and cope with Pakistan's serious ethnic and sectarian problems.



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--To maintain military backing, Bhutto must honor commitments she gave General Beg that she would not change Pakistan's Afghanistan and nuclear weapons policies, interfere with the military budget and military personnel, reverse President Zia's Islamization reforms, or seek a rapprochement with India, US diplomats report.

--Bhutto will also face serious ethnic and sectarian problems. Bhutto's task will almost certainly be complicated by her need to

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preserve her support in Punjab, where more than half the party's National Assembly delegates were elected, without disappointing her supporters in Sind or alienating her Muhajir Quami Movement partners who are suspicious of each other as well as Punjabis.

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Bhutto is also likely to face serious difficulties in her relations with the United States.

--Bhutto's commitments to the military on nuclear weapons development suggest that she will prove no more flexible than past Pakistani leaders on nuclear nonproliferation.

--If her party does go into coalition in the North West Frontier Province with the Awami National Party, pressure at the provincial level for compromise on Afghanistan and quick--possibly involuntary--repatriation of Afghan refugees could mount.

--A North West Frontier Province coalition with the Awami Party, whose leader has denounced US-sponsored narcotics control programs and crop substitution projects, would almost certainly undercut our efforts to lessen the flow of narcotics from Pakistan.

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1 December 1988

**TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI
PROSPECTS FOR GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL REFORM PROGRAM**

This week's Central Committee plenum and Supreme Soviet session advanced President Gorbachev's political reform agenda, although the extent to which Gorbachev had to compromise is still unclear.

I. The Central Committee Plenum

Monday's plenum spelled out the role of the six party commissions created in September and named their memberships.

- o The commissions, whose members are drawn primarily from the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission, will be responsible for drafting policy papers for the Politburo.
- o The commissions effectively supplant the Secretariat, which had been managed by erstwhile "Second Secretary" Ligachev, and will help Gorbachev's efforts to shift authority from the party apparatus to elected officials.
- o Members of the commissions appear to represent a mix of reformist and conservative views, but Gorbachev has prominent supporters on each commission and should be able to manipulate them more successfully than he did the Secretariat.
- o The plenum also put the party's stamp of approval on legislative drafts before they were submitted to the Supreme Soviet, although Politburo member Medvedev indicated at a press conference that debate over the drafts was lively.

II. The Supreme Soviet Session

The Supreme Soviet session went relatively smoothly for Gorbachev, who in his opening speech emphasized the importance of checks and balances and tried to head off protests in the non-Russian republics.

- o Gorbachev said that while the powers of the president should be augmented, "excessive concentration of powers in one person" would be ruled out under the new system.
- o He acknowledged the legitimacy of some complaints from the non-Russian republics and supported increasing the representation of the republics in the new national legislature.

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- o Many non-Russian delegates favored greater republic autonomy. Nevertheless, most non-Russian speakers supported Gorbachev's position criticizing Estonia's declaration of "sovereignty."
- o Gorbachev succeeded in limiting criticism of the proposed reforms and set the stage for their approval at Thursday's closing session. Although the extent of compromise will not be known until the new laws have been published, Gorbachev announced that elections to the new Congress of People's Deputies--to which the president will be accountable--will be held on 26 March 1989 and the party plenum on nationalities will convene sometime in June.

III. Outlook

Despite Gorbachev's achievements this week, the success of his political reforms is not yet guaranteed.

- o It remains to be seen how the individual party commissions will function in practice, and whether Gorbachev and his allies on the commissions will be able to press the reform agenda ahead.
- o The transfer of power from party to state bodies has only been accomplished on paper; the actual shift will not occur overnight and will undoubtedly be accompanied by a fair amount of resistance in the party.
- o While non-Russians in the Supreme Soviet generally lent their support to the reforms, they are likely to keep pressure on Gorbachev to take additional measures to guarantee regional autonomy.



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Talking Points for the DCI

Arafat's Moves Following Visa Denial

01 December 1988

PLO Chairman Arafat wants to address a United Nations General Assembly session in Geneva--perhaps as early as mid-December--to build on growing international support for PLO moderation, keep PLO hardliners in check, and pressure the US to respond to PLO diplomatic moves.

--The denial of a US visa to Arafat has given PLO hardliners their first boost since Arafat's dominance of the moderate proceedings of last month's Palestine National Council in Algiers and made a diplomatic success for Arafat at the UN even more important if he is to contain internal critics of his moderate policy.

--Widespread European criticism of the US decision and aggressive Arab lobbying among UN members give Arafat a strong chance of winning support for a General Assembly session in Geneva.

Arafat's Strategy and Risks

PLO moderation--begun at last June's Arab League summit with the release of a conciliatory-sounding statement on policy toward Israel--is designed to earn Arafat a place at an international peace conference and produce tangible political gains from the year-old Palestinian uprising.

--Arafat almost certainly believes the US rejection of his visa application will strengthen support even among US allies in Europe for a direct PLO role in future peace talks.

--Arafat, however, will probably be reluctant to give an explicit recognition of Israel or unqualified acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338 at a Geneva session to avoid fueling hardline opposition and to preserve bargaining leverage with the US.

Implications for the US

Arafat almost certainly will continue to restrain his criticisms of the visa denial to avoid foreclosing a possible dialogue with the incoming US administration.

--He hopes such a dialogue will strengthen his position over PLO hardliners and assure his standing among Palestinians in the occupied territories.

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
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--Arab moderates with a major stake in a successful international peace conference--such as Egypt and Jordan--are likely to redouble their efforts to persuade Arafat to ignore pressure from PLO hardliners to backslide from the PNC's positions.



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