

Coalitions for America

cc: Anderson
3 Mar 87

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True

February 27, 1987

Mr. Robert Gates
Acting Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 7060
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

On behalf of Mr. Paul Weyrich allow me to extend an invitation to you to join him at our next Stanton Group meeting. As you are probably aware the Stanton Group meetings bring together leaders of conservative organizations which are committed to and working toward a strong national defense. The group routinely meets with policy leaders in Congress and the Administration. Thus far in 1987 we have met with former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Senator Jesse Helms, and Elliot Abrams of the State Department.

We generally have about 50 people in attendance and the setting is informal allowing for brief remarks followed by questions and answers. Admittance to these meetings is tightly regulated and all remarks are strictly off the record. It can honestly be said that this is the best possible forum for anyone to get in touch with the principle players in the conservative movement.

Our next meeting is on Thursday morning, March 12, from 8:30 to 10:30 AM at the Free Congress Foundation (721 2nd St., N.E.) in the Kingston room. Earlier contact with your office has indicated that 9:00 am would be best for your schedule, and that would certainly be fine. I would anticipate that 30 minutes of your time would be sufficient for meaningful interaction, although you are certainly welcome to stay longer.

Thank you for your consideration of this request. I believe that a meeting of this magnitude would be beneficial for you as well as for us. We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,



Curt Anderson
President



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February 26, 1987

Honorable Robert Gates
Acting Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

This is to confirm your scheduled appearance before the "Stanton Group," of conservatives at 9 a.m. on Thursday, March 12. This is a gathering of conservatives that meets every other Thursday under the aegis of Coalitions for America, of which Paul Weyrich is chairman. I understand that Paul is sending you a separate invitation.

The Stanton meetings are held specifically to discuss foreign policy and defense issues of interest to conservatives, and about fifty leaders or representatives of conservative groups normally are present. Guests frequently appear before the group, including recently Alexander Haig, Elliott Abrams, Pete Wilson and Malcolm Wallop.

At an earlier meeting I was concerned to hear you criticized on the following three points:

- Concern was expressed about the CIA estimates reported last year as showing Soviet weapons spending as being almost flat for a decade and unlikely to grow much in the next five years. This is seen by some as an attack on the justification for the Reagan defense program.
- Criticism was voiced about the reported revision by the CIA early last year of the mathematical multipliers used to calculate the yield of Soviet nuclear tests in a way that reduces the number of apparent Soviet violations of the TTBT.
- It was claimed that Stansfield Turner had said that you had inspired and helped him carry out the deep cuts in the Agency during the Carter administration.

In view of these allegations, you may want to say a few words on each of them by way of reassurance. But I think more important would be for you to say something about your background as a Soviet specialist, making it clear that you have no illusions about the nature of the communist threat.

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
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It might be useful to repeat some of the marvelous points about the Soviet military buildup and the dangers of a Soviet ABM breakout that you made in your San Francisco speech last November 25. I am sure that most of the Stanton participants had not seen or heard about those remarks. Your strong support of early deployment of SDI would be well received by this group. Similarly, your views on the Reagan Doctrine, as you expressed them to the Commonwealth Club, would be of interest to the Stanton participants.

Of course, your total appearance will only be for 20 to 30 minutes, including questions and answers, so in five to ten minutes of remarks there will only be time to touch on a few points, but I believe the ones mentioned above are the most important. This group can be very influential with conservative Members of Congress, thus, it is helpful when they understand what a person really stands for, as opposed to superficial impressions based on press reports.

I will meet you at the front entrance at 721 Second Street, N.E., which is two blocks down from the Heritage Foundation, just off Massachusetts Avenue, at 9 a.m. on March 12. I look forward to seeing you then.

Sincerely,



James T. Hackett
Editor
National Security Record

National Security Record

A Report on the Congress and National Security Affairs

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A Space-Based Defense in Seven Years

On March 23, 1983 Ronald Reagan announced a major research program to determine whether an effective non-nuclear defense of the American population against ballistic missiles could be built. Now, less than four years later, strategic defenses are emerging as a near-term reality.

A number of recent reports agree on one crucial point: that space-based defenses using existing technology are possible and deployable as early as 1994. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Lt. General James Abrahamson, director of the Pentagon's Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO), now agree with that timetable. They informed President Reagan of their views on December 17 and since then Secretary Weinberger has been discussing publicly the need to get on with the planning, development and testing of these technologies. To do so, funds must be included in the Defense budget for fiscal year 1989, which will be prepared by the Reagan administration, for a development program leading to deployment of strategic defenses (in contrast with the present SDI program of open-ended research).

This is startling news, because it generally has been assumed that space-based defenses would be the last to be built. Of the three or four layers of a comprehensive nationwide ballistic missile defense, it has been assumed by many that a ground-based point defense would be built first, followed by a ground-based mid-course defense. The boost-phase was expected to be most difficult and to take the longest time to develop. Now it is believed that development work on all three phases could begin at the same time, with deployment of the different layers occurring as the work progresses.

Point Defenses

Point defenses of specific high-priority targets have been possible all along. The U.S. built a ballistic missile point defense at Grand Forks, North Dakota, in the early 1970's to protect a Minuteman ICBM site. That ABM defense con-

sisted of a large phased-array radar and two layers of defensive missiles, the Spartan and the Sprint, which were designed to intercept incoming warheads with nuclear explosions both outside the atmosphere (Spartan) and inside (Sprint).

The Grand Forks site was deactivated in 1975 when Congress cut the funds to operate it. But the technology has long been known. The Soviet ABM defense of Moscow is based on the same technology—nuclear-tipped interceptor missiles defending in two layers. The Soviet interceptor missiles are known as the Galosh and Gazelle.

President Reagan ruled out the early deployment of point defenses, saying that he wanted to "defend people, not missiles." His orders were to seek a system that could defend the whole country and its entire population, and which would not require nuclear weapons to defend against nuclear weapons. To do this effectively, it was assumed from the outset that boost-phase defenses would have to be a key part of the program. This would require either putting weapons in space, or putting mirrors there to deflect ground-based laser beams. And it would depend for success on a very sophisticated and complex computerized battle-management system.

The Delta Experiment

As SDI research progressed, it became increasingly clear that much of the technology, including most of the new weapons, such as high-energy lasers and particle beams, could take decades to develop to an operational weapons capability. But the development of kinetic energy weapons technology proceeded much faster than expected.

The potential for kinetic energy weapons in the boost-phase was enhanced by a highly successful experiment with two satellites in space conducted by the Air Force last September. The so-called "Delta experiment" proved it is possible to track and target a rising ballistic missile from space with infrared sensors on satellites, despite problems caused by the exhaust

PAGE 1

*This is our
latest effort
to support SDI.*

plume of the missile. Put together in just 14 months, the experiment required one million lines of new computer code, which was written in less than six months. It worked perfectly the first time, demolishing the claims of so-called computer experts that computer programs of such complexity cannot be designed with assurance of success.

Another result of this experiment was the realization that kinetic-energy kill vehicles (small missiles that destroy their targets by whacking into them) can be directed by infrared sensors to strike a ballistic missile in the boost-phase. This means that the development and early deployment of a space-based, boost-phase defense, using existing technology, is now entirely possible and awaits only a political decision by the president.

The High Frontier Report

The first of the recent reports on the early deployment of such defenses was issued by High Frontier, the pro-SDI lobby, last October. After reviewing the available options, High Frontier's president, retired Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, presented his conclusions at a Capitol Hill press conference. Graham's report called for three layers of missile defenses, all using kinetic energy weapons. According to Graham, the initial operation of all three could be underway 7½ years from a deployment decision by the president.

Graham believes that his proposed system would deter a Soviet first strike and provide a "high degree" of protection for both the U.S. strategic deterrent and the U.S. population. He claims that it would provide near perfect protection against an accidental launch or a limited attack.

The High Frontier proposal consists of three layers:

- The terminal layer would be a ground-based point defense of high-priority targets (missile sites and command and control centers) with one of two systems: a high velocity cloud gun firing thousands of metal flechettes, or a swarmjet firing salvos of small rockets. Either would destroy incoming warheads on impact. Deployment could be underway in five years, with 200 locations defended at an estimated cost of \$2.6 billion.
- The mid-course layer would consist of either Lockheed's ERIS (Exoatmospheric Reentry Intercept System) or the similar VM-3 system developed jointly by Vought and Martin Marietta. ERIS would destroy warheads with kinetic energy intercepts as far as 2,500 miles away, providing a limited defense of the whole United States. Either system could be operational in five years. An initial site with 100 ERIS interceptors could be established at an estimated cost of \$3 billion.
- The third layer, a space-based boost-phase defense also using kinetic energy weapons, could follow one of two models. One would be an array of a thousand satellites armed with both homing intercept rockets and "cloud guns." High Frontier's other option is to deploy 1,125 satellites, each with eight small kinetic energy interceptors. Either system could be initially deployed in 7½ years at a cost of up to \$25 billion, including the rockets needed to lift the satellites into space.

General Graham concluded that the initial deployments of High Frontier's layered defense could be made over a period of five to eight years at a cost of about \$30 billion. The complete program would cost more, depending on the size of the total system. It would be 50 to 70 percent effective against a theoretical full attack of Soviet missiles, and much more effective against lesser but more realistic attack scenarios.

The Worden Report

In December, Lt. Colonel Simon (Pete) Worden, a Ph.D in astrophysics who made a reputation during the first two years of the SDI program as one of its driving forces, wrote an article for *National Review* that presents an insider's view of "what we can do and when we can do it." Now a senior research fellow at the National Defense University, Worden reached essentially the same conclusions as High Frontier. He also suggests three layers of kinetic-energy weapons:

- Worden's point defense would be based on FLAGE (Flexible Lightweight Agile Guided Experiment), firing rocket interceptors at warheads to destroy them by impact at altitudes up to ten miles. Worden claims that a system based on FLAGE technology could be in service by the early 1990's for a few billion dollars.
- For the mid-course layer, Col. Worden also proposes ERIS, the most advanced longer-range kinetic energy weapon system. He suggests that ERIS might be deployed in conjunction with HEDI (High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor), a much shorter-range interceptor, effective from 10 to 30 miles compared to 2,500 for ERIS. Worden claims that both ERIS and HEDI could be deployed in the early 1990's, together with a system of airborne infrared sensors and a point defense such as FLAGE, for about ten billion dollars.
- Worden's boost-phase defense would consist of small, space-based kinetic kill vehicles (SBKKVs), four or five to a satellite. He claims that such a system, with several thousand defending missiles, could be in place in space by 1995 at a cost of roughly \$20 billion.

The Marshall Report

Perhaps the most significant of the recent reports was issued on December 15 by the George C. Marshall Institute. Signed by five distinguished scientists and engineers,* the Marshall report found that a three-layer kinetic energy defense, including a space-based boost-phase component, could be deployed by 1994 with the first layer operational as early as 1992, if a decision to deploy is made this year. The Marshall report calculates that the three-layer defense would be well above 90 percent effective, or more than enough to make it impossible for an attacker to achieve his objectives.

The Marshall Institute report recommends the following principal components:

- A ground-based terminal defense based on the HEDI heat-seeking missile, which would destroy any warheads that escape the boost and mid-course defenses.
- ERIS is the system of choice for the mid-course, combined with an airborne optical system of infrared detectors to track the warheads. ERIS would provide a true area defense of much of the North American continent, although at present it has difficulty distinguishing warheads from decoys. This discrimination problem does not reduce ERIS's value as a defense against an accidental or limited launch, but improved discrimination capability would be important for ERIS if it is deployed as part of a comprehensive defense against a major assault.

* *Authors of the Marshall Institute Report: Frederick Seitz, past president, National Academy of Sciences; Robert Jastrow, former director, Goddard Institute for Space Studies; John Gardner, vice president for engineering, McDonnell Douglas Corp.; Edward Gerry, president of W.J. Schafer Assoc.; William Nierenberg, director, Scripps Institute of Oceanography.*

(Continued on page 6)

The Disarming of Canada

by Major John Hasek

The capability of the Canadian Armed Forces to defend the nation from even a low-intensity conventional threat has virtually disappeared over the past twenty years. Soviet strategies, echoed by the Canadian "peace movement," apparently have been steering Canada's defense policies without the policy makers being aware of it. Now the Soviet strategy is to shatter the solidarity of the Western Alliance by inducing Canada to pull out of both NATO and the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).

The decline of Canada's military capabilities began in the mid-sixties with the unification of the three services, a reduction in the size of the militia, the disbanding of the university officer training corps and a drastic reduction of the regular forces from 120 thousand to less than 75 thousand men (since up to 83,000). Canada's Europe-based NATO commitment was cut in half and the Canadian military was subordinated to the civil service. These steps seriously weakened the ties that bind the armed forces to the society they protect.

In the seventies the defense budget and even the very existence of the military were based on Canada's membership in NATO and NORAD. As a result, Canadian forces ceased to have an independent combat capability and now are able to function only as a part of the forces of larger allies.

Today we are witnessing the last phase of a concerted propaganda campaign to Finlandize Canada and sever its links to NATO and NORAD. After several years of psychological preparation, the mass appeal of the "peace" movement started with a recent nationwide television showing on the CBC of the National Film Board series entitled "Defense of Canada." This series of films casts doubt on the value of Canada's sacrifices in past wars, with the theme that those were foreign wars that had nothing to do with the defense of Canada. The series presented the view that Canada should be concerned only with the protection of its own sovereignty and should withdraw from NATO and NORAD.

Another part of this propaganda effort has been the unilateral disarmament campaign of the National Film Board. The NFB has produced a whole catalogue of "peace" films, the most famous of which are "If you Love this Planet" and "Speaking Our Peace." The first of these is virulently anti-American while the second is pro-Soviet propaganda. Yet another NFB film attacks the foundation of public support for the armed forces by attempting to destroy the reputation of Billy Bishop, Canada's most famous air ace.

The appearance of wide national support for Canadian neutrality is maintained by a network of "progressive" groups. In addition to their own agendas, these groups routinely incorporate in their public issuances anti-defense resolutions that are straight from the party line. For example, more than \$60 million in government funds goes to the support of a multitude of women's groups for which the umbrella organization is the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC). The committee's 1985 annual report describes its defense policies as calling for the withdrawal of Canada from NATO, NORAD and the U.S.-Canada defense agreement, a reduction of the defense budget by 50 percent, the declaration of Canada as a nuclear weapons free zone, and the rejection of any Canadian involvement in SDI.

Seemingly unconnected events in November 1986 show just how far this campaign for the neutralization of Canada has advanced. A conference in Edmonton on Canadian defense policy listed 27 speakers, debaters and moderators, yet only one was a critic of the Canadian "peace" movement. A resolution passed at this high-visibility conference called for the neutralization of Canada, the making of the entire country into a nuclear weapons free zone, and the denunciation of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

In Remembrance Day ceremonies across the country (comparable to Veterans Day in the U.S.), the theme that Canada's sacrifice had been in vain was apparent, as pacifists in white berets attempted to disrupt ceremonies. Then on November 14 the Ontario legislature passed by a large majority a motion to make the province a nuclear weapons free zone. Finally, the month ended with a national policy conference of the Liberal Party at which the participants resolved to make all of Canada a nuclear free zone and to review continued membership in the NATO Alliance.

Coming at a time when NATO is threatened by the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Britain by a possible future socialist government in that country, these events in Canada are serious psychological blows both to Canada's will to make the hard decisions necessary to meet its defense requirements and to the cohesiveness of the Western Alliance. And this "peace" campaign is reaching its peak, perhaps deliberately, just as the government is preparing to issue its first Defense White Paper in a decade and a half.

Networking by anti-defense non-governmental organizations such as the NAC creates enormous pressure on the government to play down defense requirements and to cut defense spending, while most conservative organizations are mute on these issues. With the help of the media, the "peace" groups are creating what may appear to the government to be a ground swell of opinion in favor of pulling Canada out of NATO and severing its defense relationship with the U.S. It is interesting that the intensification of this effort over the past year has coincided with the increased emphasis that Mikhail Gorbachev has placed on indirect and sophisticated propaganda against the West, since his accession to power in the Soviet Union.

The government's forthcoming White Paper, which is expected in March, must contest the idea promoted by the "peace" groups that Canada is a helpless hostage in a sea of nuclear worries, with only one possible option: withdrawal from the Western Alliance. The government must clearly identify current and possible future threats to Canada, take the steps necessary to re-establish confidence in the nation's armed forces, and explain the importance for Canada's security of its commitments to NATO and the U.S.-Canadian defense relationship. It is time for Prime Minister Mulroney's government to stand up and be counted on Canada's future role as a responsible partner in maintaining the security of the Western Alliance.

John Hasek is a retired Canadian Army officer, now an associate professor at the Canadian School of Management in Toronto.



Insiders Report

Tracking the Policy Process in Washington



News and Views from Washington

- The administration's trade promoters are engaged in a major effort to reduce the Defense Department's role in reviewing exports to assure that militarily useful technology is not transferred to the Soviet bloc. One insider complains that "the rope-sellers now are in full control of East-West trade policy." Some indicators:

- the issuance of a one-sided study by the National Academy of Sciences that proposes a major weakening of export controls;
- the issuance of new regulations by the Commerce Department to ease export controls on many technological products;
- the attempted exclusion of the Defense Department from an inter-agency committee that is reviewing export control regulations for the White House;
- State Department domination of the inter-agency working group that provides guidance to the U.S. delegation to the CSCE talks in Vienna on technology transfers;
- the continuing efforts by East-West trade officials on the National Security Council staff and in the State and Commerce departments to reduce controls on technology transfers to the Soviet Union; and
- sanctions against Poland soon will be lifted and the administration will restore most-favored-nation trading status to that communist military dictatorship.

All of this activity reflects the efforts of the "trade comes first" forces inside and outside the administration to blunt export controls and increase trade with the Soviets and their puppet regimes. An example of what this can mean was illustrated by a brief report in the February 4 *Wall Street Journal* that a U.S. firm, Combustion Engineering, Inc., had signed a letter of intent to form a joint venture with the Soviet Ministry of Oil Refining and Petrochemical Industries. The purpose would be to transfer engineering technology to the Soviets and to arrange co-production of oil industry instrumentation in the USSR.

- The Pentagon is giving a high priority to the development of defenses against Moscow's new tactical ballistic missiles that now threaten NATO and Israel, and which could be deployed against Japan and South Korea. Senator **Dan Quayle** (R-Ind) and others have long been urging the administration to take steps to counter the Soviet SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s that are being deployed in large numbers against NATO. This major research and development program will be run by a new U.S. Army office called the Joint Tactical Missile Defense Program Office, which could become a counterpart to the SDI Office.

The first step probably will be to upgrade the Patriot air defense missile, six thousand of which are being deployed to NATO, to give it the capability of intercepting the shorter-range missiles of the type the Soviets are now putting in the field. The FLAGE and HEDI projects, which are major terminal defense components of the SDI program, are ex-

pected to be given priority attention by the new office. Key components of the defense against tactical missiles still are likely to come from the SDI program, which is funding research on the surveillance, tracking, targeting and battle management systems that will be essential to ballistic missile defenses, whether strategic or tactical.

- The program recently launched by the State Department to lobby for more federal funds both for foreign aid and the State Department budget is picking up steam. Insiders report that AID Deputy Administrator **Jay Morris** has moved to a new office in the State Department to direct the lobbying effort. In support of this program the AID Information Resources Management Office is said to be preparing computer lists, by congressional district, of U.S. businesses and academic and other institutions that have benefitted from foreign aid programs. The idea is to generate pressure on Members of Congress from constituents who might lose contracts if foreign aid is cut. As part of the effort, the AID Office of Legislative Affairs is said to be helping set up a new trade association composed of companies that benefit from foreign aid.
- Amid reports that the deputy commander of the Palestine Liberation Organization had a friendly 4½-hour meeting with Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, Senate Minority Leader **Robert Dole** (R-Kan) and liberal Senator **Ted Kennedy** (D-Mass) both called for the closure of the PLO offices in Washington and New York. Closing the U.S. offices of the terrorist PLO, which are in constant contact with Soviet and East-bloc officials, enjoys wide bipartisan support. But the administration has taken no action, apparently because of bureaucratic concerns that there may not be adequate legal grounds for such a step. If justification is not found soon, look for an effort in Congress to pass legislation that would give the administration the legal grounds it needs.
- The anti-communist resistance in Angola, UNITA, claims to have downed 42 aircraft and helicopters since U.S. aid to the resistance began last year. As in Afghanistan, the U.S. shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles have been highly successful, forcing government planes and helicopters to fly higher and to be less aggressive in attacking resistance forces. As the Marxist MPLA regime shows increasing signs of failure, Moscow's enthusiasm for supporting its distant puppet seems to be waning. Although the Soviets have provided huge infusions of military equipment in the past, Soviet support is down considerably as the low world price of oil, Angola's main source of foreign exchange, cuts sharply into the government's ability to pay for arms. U.S. aid to the resistance, only \$15 million last year, should be increased to take advantage of the situation. In particular, more of the highly effective Stinger missile launchers, of which only 50 have been sent to UNITA, should be provided as soon as possible.

Trashing the B-1

When Congress and the Pentagon work together to come up with a major weapon that costs less than estimated, is being delivered ahead of schedule and really works as intended, one would expect congratulations all around. Instead, one of the best successes of U.S. procurement management, the B-1 bomber, is being systematically trashed.

Anti-B-1 articles began appearing late last year as the new planes entered on duty with the Strategic Air Command months ahead of schedule and hundreds of millions of dollars below estimated cost. Broad-sides against the B-1 have been authored by David Evans and Molly Moore in the *Washington Post* and Bruce Van Voorst in *Time* magazine. They all say pretty much the same thing. Evans and Van Voorst, who seems to have derived his *Time* piece largely from Evans' *Post* article, both describe the B-1 as a "flying Edsel," contending it is underpowered and overweight because of Air Force additions to the original design. The result, they write, is a weight gain of over 40 tons, which with other factors prevents the B-1 from climbing higher than 20,000 feet.

Moore adds that the plane does not handle well, describing a B-1 that bucked and pitched so much that aerial refueling was impossible. Van Voorst echoes Evans' claims that the plane is insufficiently maneuverable to fly at the low levels needed to penetrate heavily-defended Soviet airspace. The impression is that the B-1 does not work properly and will have to be fixed at great cost to the American taxpayer.

Here are a few facts about the B-1:

- *The 40-ton weight gain.* The original B-1A was designed to carry nuclear bombs, not cruise missiles or conventional bombs. Congress later mandated that the follow-on model, the B-1B, be able to deliver such weapons. The design changes made to meet these new requirements added only 7,000 pounds, or 3½ tons. But those changes enable the plane to carry 37 tons of bombs, missiles and fuel *more* than originally planned. Thus, for 3½ tons of additional weight the plane has gained 37 tons of carrying capacity, including 20 cruise missiles.
- *The B-1 can't fly over 20,000 feet.* When fully loaded, and a full load is almost twice that of the B-52, the B-1 is limited to lower altitudes. But high flying aircraft are increasingly vulnerable to Soviet air defenses, which is precisely why the B-1 was designed to fly low, at altitudes as low as 200 feet, at very high speed (mach .8). The B-1B fully meets those design specifications. Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry D. Welch, in responding to Evans' article, wrote that the B-1 "penetrates enemy airspace under all-weather conditions at markedly lower altitudes and at speeds 50 percent faster than the B-52. It carries a substantially larger bomb load, which it delivers with much improved accuracy, and it has a radar cross section a hundredth of that of the B-52."
- *The B-1 doesn't fly well.* The allegation that a fully loaded B-1 cannot maneuver around hills or other obstacles is simply wrong. At least some of the B-1 pilots compare its handling to the much smaller and lighter T-38 fighter-trainer. The criticisms also ignore the plane's future mission as a cruise missile carrier. When flying with 12 cruise missiles hanging under its fuselage and eight more internally, the B-1 would launch its missiles 1,500 miles or more from their targets and only then,

lighter and drag-free, drop to very low altitude to penetrate Soviet airspace to drop its bombs.

- *Fixing the B-1 will require massive cost overruns.* The Air Force is asking for \$600 million over the next two years to improve the B-1, but this is within the original cost estimate for the bomber. In 1981, when the Air Force projected a cost of \$20.5 billion for 100 B-1Bs, that estimate included money for "fixes" that were expected following flight tests. Therefore, the \$600 million currently budgeted for corrections and improvements still will not exceed the original cost estimate.
- *The B-1 has major design defects.* To listen to the critics, one would think that the B-1 could hardly get off the ground, that it is impossible to refuel and that its lack of maneuverability makes it dangerous in terrain-hugging flight. Author Evans writes, "It cannot be fixed."

The B-1 suffers from the kind of minor problems that occur in any complex new system. The turbulence that reportedly interfered with refueling was an isolated instance in the test program that has been corrected. And initial problems with the terrain-following radar were corrected with improved computer software.

The most significant problem has been poor performance of the defensive avionics used to jam enemy radar (electronic countermeasures). Both hardware and software changes are being made to improve the plane's ECM capability. Yet even with the current ECM problems, the B-1 can perform its mission effectively against present Soviet capabilities. In any event, overcoming enemy radar is a constant and shifting challenge that will require continuing attention as the Soviets strengthen their air defenses.

The criticism of the B-1 is similar to that made against almost every new weapon by opponents of defense spending. The article that seems to have started the current round was authored by David Evans, a former Pentagon management analyst who now works for Business Executives for National Security (BENS). By a strange coincidence, journalist Van Voorst's boss, Time Inc. chairman J. Richard Munro, is vice chairman of BENS. This left-leaning group appears to be a successor to an organization known as Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, which was supported by some of the same sponsors. And BENS has spun off another group known as Business Executives for Nuclear Arms Control.

Funded by leftwing activists such as Beverly Hills millionaire Harold Willens and businessman Stanley Weiss, BENS invites business executives and prominent personalities to conferences and dinners, trying to create a patina of bipartisan respectability. Yet BENS' agenda includes support for a nuclear freeze, a freeze in defense spending and a "more productive relationship" with Moscow. Having attacked the B-1, the MX missile, the new "Stealth" bomber and the 600 ship navy, BENS now is busy developing arguments against the Strategic Defense Initiative, which appears to be its next target.

Despite such critics, the B-1 will be America's first-line penetrating bomber into the 1990's and a high-speed cruise missile carrier well beyond. The bottom line was stated by General Welch, "The capability to penetrate Soviet airspace and locate and attack targets deep in the Soviet Union is an absolutely essential element of a credible deterrent force." And, he adds, the B-1 does the job.

A Space-Based Defense (Cont. from page 2)

- The crucial boost-phase defense would consist of space-based kinetic-kill vehicles, five to ten on each satellite, orbiting between 300 and 500 miles altitude. These SBKKVs, as they are called, would be fired at enemy missiles both during and after the several minutes of the boost-phase. The SBKKVs would be supported by sensor satellites, ten orbiting at between 500 and 1,000 miles altitude and four more in high geosynchronous orbit.

The comprehensive layered defense proposed by the Marshall Institute would consist of 11,000 SBKKVs, 10,000 ERIS interceptors and 3,000 HEDI interceptors. Assuming a massive Soviet attack of 1,200 ICBMs with 11,200 warheads and 90,000 decoys, the Marshall team estimates a boost-phase kill ratio of 76 percent, and for all three layers, 93 percent. But if effective decoy discrimination can be developed for the mid-course, the Marshall Institute claims that its proposed system could be more than 99 percent effective, fully meeting President Reagan's original goal of a comprehensive population defense.

In answer to the argument that Moscow will just build more missiles and overwhelm such defenses, the Marshall team observes that with no U.S. strategic defenses the Soviets now can allocate two warheads to each U.S. target with a high assurance of target destruction. But with defenses in place that are 90 percent effective, Moscow would have to assign 42 warheads to each target for high confidence of success. This would make any effort to overwhelm such defenses very expensive and highly implausible.

The Marshall Institute report concluded that a robust three-layer defense could be deployed at least initially in seven years, while the ERIS mid-course layer could start operating as early as 1992. The initial operating capability of the layered system could be achieved at an estimated cost of \$54 billion, while the fully-deployed system would cost on the order of \$121 billion.

Report Similarities

All three reports emphasize the importance of the boost-phase. The Marshall Institute lists three reasons why it is the most important component: first, the attacker cannot concentrate his attack on high-priority targets with confidence, whether or not individual targets are defended by point defenses, because he cannot tell which of his missiles will get through the boost-phase; second, a boost-phase defense greatly reduces the value of multiple warhead missiles, since if the missiles are destroyed on launch all the warheads are lost; and third, a boost-phase defense reduces potential complications in the mid-course from the use of decoys. Thus, a boost-phase defense is by far the most effective.

The three reports are remarkably similar in conclusions and recommendations, with wide variations appearing only in the cost estimates. While admittedly very rough, even the highest estimate for a fully deployed system is \$121 billion, which is only about 40 percent of one year's U.S. defense budget and a far cry from the trillion dollars mentioned by SDI opponents.

Conclusion

Secretary of Defense Weinberger has expressed "an unprecedented degree of confidence in our ability to intercept ballistic missiles." In January, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee that strategic defenses should be deployed "as soon as possible." In a February 3 meeting with President Reagan, Secretary Weinberger and National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci endorsed the early deployment of SDI, seeking a presidential decision to permit the Defense Department to follow the broad interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and move the SDI program from research to full scale engineering development.

Ronald Reagan now has what he said four years ago he wanted, an effective and affordable system of population defense against ballistic missiles. He should authorize its development and deployment without delay.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Jim Hackett (Heritage Foundation)

Paul Weyrich - Head of the Coalitions
for America (Stanton Group)

A coalition of conservative activists.

(about 50 people)

0900

on either 12 or 26 March
(no more than 20 minutes)

Location: 721 2nd Street, N.E.
(townhouse)

people like Haig/Abrams have
spoke before them.