

CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY

ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
NATIONAL CONVENTION
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I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO SUCH AN UNABASHEDLY FRIENDLY AUDIENCE. THIS IS A PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT TIME TO BE MEETING WITH FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS -- AND FRIENDS OF INTELLIGENCE -- AS WE CELEBRATE THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE CIA. I'VE BEEN ASKED TO SPEAK TODAY ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ESPECIALLY ITS ANALYTICAL/RESEARCH ARMS, AND THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY.

THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION ABOUT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY. SOME REPORTERS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE SITUATION IS TERRIBLE AND GETTING WORSE. IN FACT, I SUSPECT RELATIONS BETWEEN CIA AND THE ACADEMIC WORLD HAVE NEVER BEEN BETTER DESPITE SOME LINGERING MISUNDERSTANDINGS. ESPECIALLY GRATIFYING TO ALL OF US IS THE INTEREST IN THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE ITSELF. SUCH SCHOLARS AS ROY GODSON AT GEORGETOWN, BRAD WESTERFIELD AT YALE AND OUR OWN ALUM, SCOTT BRECKINRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, ALONG WITH A HOST

OF OTHERS, HAVE WRITTEN BOOKS, INSTITUTED COURSES, AND GENERALLY PROMOTED A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE INTELLIGENCE PLAYS IN THE MAKING AND IMPLEMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY.

MY REMARKS TODAY CENTER ON TWO SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS:

-- FIRST, PRESERVING THE LIBERTY OF THIS NATION IS FUNDAMENTAL TO AND PREREQUISITE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM; THE UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY CANNOT PROSPER AND PROTECT FREEDOM OF INQUIRY OBLIVIOUS TO THE FORTUNES OF THE NATION.

-- SECOND, IN DEFENDING THE NATION AND OUR LIBERTIES, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO HAVE RECOURSE TO THE BEST MINDS IN THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY. TENSIONS INEVITABLY ACCOMPANY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE AND ACADEME, BUT MUTUAL NEED AND BENEFIT REQUIRE RECONCILIATION OR ELIMINATION OF SUCH TENSIONS.

THE HISTORY OF CIA-UNIVERSITY RELATIONS

IN DISCUSSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY AND AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE, AND SPECIFICALLY THE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS SIDE OF INTELLIGENCE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO GO BACK TO ANTECEDENTS. IN THE SUMMER OF 1941, WILLIAM J. DONOVAN PERSUADED PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT OF THE NEED TO ORGANIZE A COORDINATED FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO INFORM THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT FAST MOVING WORLD EVENTS. HE PROPOSED THAT THE SERVICE "DRAW ON THE UNIVERSITIES FOR EXPERTS WITH LONG FOREIGN EXPERIENCE AND SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE OF THE HISTORY, LANGUAGES AND GENERAL CONDITIONS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES." PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AGREED AND CREATED THE OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION, LATER RENAMED THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, UNDER DONOVAN'S LEADERSHIP.

WHEN CIA WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, THIS PATTERN WAS REPEATED. WILLIAM LANGER OF HARVARD ESTABLISHED THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND ROBERT AMORY OF THE SAME UNIVERSITY WAS NAMED CIA'S DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE IN 1952, AND SERVED IN THAT CAPACITY FOR NEARLY TEN YEARS. OTHER ACADEMICIANS WHO JOINED INCLUDED: HISTORIANS SUCH AS LUDWELL MONTAGUE, SHERMAN KENT, JOSEPH STRAYER AND

DEFORREST VAN SLYCK; ECONOMIST MAX MILLIKAN, WHO ORGANIZED THE ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE EFFORT; ECONOMIST RICHARD BISSELL, WHO LATER HEADED THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE; AND EVEN WILLIAM SLOANE COFFIN WHO LEFT THE UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY TO JOIN CIA FOR THE DURATION OF THE KOREAN WAR BEFORE BECOMING CHAPLAIN AT YALE. HE IS QUOTED AS RECALLING THAT HE JOINED THE AGENCY BECAUSE "STALIN MADE HITLER LOOK LIKE A BOY SCOUT." IT WAS A COMMON REASON FOR ACADEMICIANS TO JOIN THE AGENCY IN THE EARLY YEARS.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY AND CIA WERE CORDIAL THROUGHOUT THE 1950S. THE COLD WAR WAS AT ITS HEIGHT AND FACULTY OR STUDENTS RARELY QUESTIONED THE NATION'S NEED FOR THE AGENCY AND ITS ACTIVITIES. SOME OF THE MOST NOTED UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS OF THE TIME SERVED ON A REGULAR BASIS AS UNPAID CONSULTANTS, HELPING CIA TO FORM ITS ESTIMATES OF PROBABLE TRENDS IN WORLD POLITICS.

THESE HALCYON DAYS WERE SOON TO CHANGE. THERE WAS SOME CRITICISM ON CAMPUSES OVER CIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BAY OF PIGS EXPEDITION IN 1961. BUT THE REAL DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN CIA AND THE ACADEME PARALLELED THE WRENCHING DIVISIONS IN THE COUNTRY OVER THE VIETNAM WAR, DESPITE CONTINUING ACADEMIC COOPERATION WITH THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE. THE DECLINE IN CIA-ACADEMIA TIES ACCELERATED WITH THE FEBRUARY 1967 DISCLOSURE IN RAMPARTS MAGAZINE THAT CIA HAD BEEN FUNDING THE

FOREIGN ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL STUDENT ASSOCIATION FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS.:

SENSATIONAL ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING BY CIA BECAME MORE FREQUENT IN THE MEDIA IN THE EARLY 1970S, CULMINATING IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION AND SUBSEQUENTLY BOTH THE CHURCH COMMITTEE IN THE SENATE AND THE PIKE COMMITTEE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. EVEN THE CHURCH COMMITTEE, HOWEVER, SO CRITICAL OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, RECOGNIZED THAT CIA "MUST HAVE UNFETTERED ACCESS TO THE BEST ADVICE AND JUDGMENT OUR UNIVERSITIES CAN PRODUCE."

SINCE THOSE DIFFICULT DAYS, THE AGENCY'S RELATIONS WITH THE ACADEMIC WORLD HAVE IMPROVED FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, INCLUDING DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD AND RECOGNITION IN THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY THAT CIA, TOGETHER WITH THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE, HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT AND USEFUL SUPPORTER OF AREA AND REGIONAL STUDIES AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE STUDIES IN THE UNITED STATES. THE AGENCIES OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS WELL AS THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAVE LONG BEEN A PRIMARY SOURCE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR SPECIALISTS IN THESE AREAS. THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY ALSO CONSULTED CLOSELY WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THEIR SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN TO WIN SUPPORT FOR A CONGRESSIONAL-APPROVED ENDOWMENT OF SOVIET STUDIES. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES INFORMALLY STRONGLY SUPPORTED THIS ENDEAVOR.

IN SOME AREAS OF RESEARCH, SUCH AS ON THE SOVIET UNION, OUR COOPERATION FOR NEARLY 40 YEARS HAS REMAINED BOTH CLOSE AND CONSTANT. THIS ALSO HAS BEEN THE CASE OFTEN IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE PRONOUNCED UPS AND DOWNS IN OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AND ALLIED SOCIAL SCIENCES, PARTICULARLY AMONG THOSE WITH EXPERTISE IN THE THIRD WORLD.

WHY CIA NEEDS ACADEME

THERE IS ONE CONSTANT IN THE HISTORY OF THIS RELATIONSHIP AND IN ITS FUTURE AS WELL: OUR NEED TO REACH OUTSIDE OUR BUREAUCRACY FOR FRESH IDEAS AND INSIGHTS AND THE OPPORTUNITY THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY HAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER INFORMED POLICYMAKING PROCESS BY COOPERATING WITH US. LET ME DESCRIBE HOW AND WHY.

IN JUST THE LAST DOZEN YEARS, WE HAVE BEEN CONFRONTED WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF NEW ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS AND ALSO HAVE HAD TO PAY ATTENTION TO PROBLEMS TOO LONG NEGLECTED. THE OIL EMBARGO OF 1973, THE SUBSEQUENT SKYROCKETING OF OIL PRICES AND NOW THEIR PLUNGE; THE RELATED DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM, THE GROWTH OF DEBT IN THIRD

WORLD COUNTRIES AND NOW REPAYMENT PROBLEMS; REVOLUTIONS IN IRAN, ETHIOPIA, AND NICARAGUA; THE FINAL PASSAGE OF EUROPEAN COLONIALISM FROM AFRICA, NEW SOVIET BEACHHEADS AND SURROGATES IN THE THIRD WORLD; CHANGING PATTERNS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE; AND THE GROWTH OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS NETWORKS AND TERRORISM ALL HAVE DEMONSTRATED VIVIDLY THAT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY IS GREATLY AFFECTED BY DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN ADDITION TO THE NUMBER AND CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

ACCORDINGLY, THE SUBJECTS WE DEAL WITH TODAY ARE STAGGERING IN THEIR DIVERSITY. THEY INCLUDE PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENORMOUS INDEBTEDNESS OF KEY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES; PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY AND HOW TO FORECAST THEM; HUMAN RIGHTS; NARCOTICS; THE ILLICIT ARMS MARKET; THE IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION FLOWS IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD; POPULATION TRENDS AND THEIR POLITICAL AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS; THE GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLY; WATER RESOURCES; ENERGY; TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER; TERRORISM; PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS; CHANGING COMMODITY MARKETS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES; AND OTHERS TOO NUMEROUS TO RECOUNT.

BUT NEARLY ALL OF THESE PROBLEMS HAVE SOMETHING IN COMMON: WHILE CIA HAS EXPERTS IN VIRTUALLY ALL SUBJECTS OF CONCERN, THERE IS A VAST RESERVOIR OF EXPERTISE, EXPERIENCE, AND INSIGHT

IN THE COMMUNITY OF UNIVERSITY SCHOLARS THAT CAN HELP US, AND THROUGH US, THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, BETTER UNDERSTAND THESE PROBLEMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR US AND FOR INTERNATIONAL STABILITY.

WITH THIS DIVERSITY OF ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN MIND, THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE SEVERAL YEARS AGO INITIATED AN INTENSIFIED EFFORT TO REACH OUT TO THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY, THINK TANKS OF EVERY STRIPE, AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY FOR INFORMATION, ANALYSIS AND ADVICE.

- SENIOR MANAGERS IN CHARGE OF EACH OF OUR SUBSTANTIVE AREAS WERE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE AN EXPANDED PROGRAM OF SPONSORSHIP OF CONFERENCES ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US AND TO ENCOURAGE PARTICIPATION OF OUR ANALYSTS IN SUCH CONFERENCES SPONSORED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR. SINCE 1982, CIA HAS SPONSORED MORE THAN 370 CONFERENCES, NEARLY ALL OF THEM INVOLVING CONSIDERABLE PARTICIPATION BY THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY AND TOUCHING ON MANY OF THE ISSUES I NOTED. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE RECORDED MORE THAN 2700 INSTANCES OF OUR ANALYSTS ATTENDING CONFERENCES SPONSORED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR
- AND DOING SO AS OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED CIA EMPLOYEES.

- WE HAVE INCREASINGLY TURNED TO THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY TO TEST OUR ASSESSMENTS IN WAYS CONSISTENT WITH

PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. WE HAVE HELPED SCHOLARS GET SECURITY CLEARANCES SO THAT THEY COULD EXAMINE THE ACTUAL DRAFTS OF OUR STUDIES. A GROWING PERCENTAGE OF OUR WORK IS REVIEWED BY SPECIALISTS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT -- IN THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY AND VARIOUS THINK TANKS, AND BY RETIRED SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, INDEPENDENT SPECIALISTS, AND OTHERS.

-- WE HAVE ESTABLISHED PANELS OF SECURITY CLEARED SPECIALISTS FROM BUSINESS AND THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY TO MEET WITH US REGULARLY NOT ONLY TO HELP IMPROVE SPECIFIC RESEARCH PAPERS BUT TO HELP DEVELOP NEW RESEARCH METHODS, REVIEW PERFORMANCE, AND HELP US TEST NEW APPROACHES AND HYPOTHESES.

-- OUR ANALYSTS ARE REQUIRED TO REFRESH THEIR OWN SUBSTANTIVE CREDENTIALS AND EXPAND THEIR HORIZONS BY OBTAINING OUTSIDE TRAINING AT LEAST EVERY TWO YEARS. THIS REQUIREMENT CAN BE MET THROUGH TAKING UNIVERSITY COURSES, PARTICIPATING IN BUSINESS OR OTHER OUTSIDE SPONSORED SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES, ATTENDING MILITARY TRAINING COURSES, AND SO FORTH.

OUR INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY TAKES SEVERAL FORMS:

- CONSULTING: THIS IS THE MOST PREVALENT. IT CAN BE FORMAL, UNDER A CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL IS PAID A SET GOVERNMENT RATE, OR IT CAN BE INFORMAL AND UNPAID -- AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN INTERESTED SPECIALISTS. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN IDEAS THAT CHALLENGE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM OR ORTHODOXY. WE KNOW WHAT WE THINK, BUT WE NEED TO KNOW WHAT OTHERS THINK ALSO.

- SPONSORSHIP OF CONFERENCES: WE GENERALLY ORGANIZE OUR OWN, BUT OCCASIONALLY WE CONTRACT WITH OTHERS TO ORGANIZE A CONFERENCE FOR US. AND, OF COURSE, OUR ANALYSTS ATTEND CONFERENCES SPONSORED BY BUSINESS, ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, THINK TANKS, AND UNIVERSITIES.

- RESEARCH: IN SOME AREAS, SCHOLARS IN UNIVERSITIES HAVE THE EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE TO CARRY OUT BASIC RESEARCH FOR US, FOR EXAMPLE, ON DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC SUBJECTS. THE RECENT CONTROVERSY AT HARVARD AND THE MEDIA HAVE FOCUSED ON THIS AREA OF COOPERATION. IN FACT, IT PRESENTLY IS A VERY MINOR

ELEMENT IN OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY. IT IS HARDLY A PROGRAM, AS RECENTLY ALLEGED, OF "COVERT FEES AND FELLOWSHIPS" WITH WHICH WE CAN "BUY SCHOLASTIC PRIORITIES."

- SCHOLARS IN RESIDENCE: WE HAVE HAD A SCHOLARS-IN-RESIDENCE PROGRAM FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS UNDER WHICH INDIVIDUALS FROM THE ACADEMIC WORLD CAN SPEND A YEAR OR TWO WORKING WITH US, WITH FULL SECURITY CLEARANCES, ON TOPICS OF INTEREST TO THEM AND US.

- INFORMATION: FINALLY, WE ARE INTERESTED IN TALKING WITH SCHOLARS WHO ARE WILLING TO SHARE WITH US THEIR IMPRESSIONS AFTER TRAVELING TO PLACES OF INTEREST OR PARTICIPATING IN EVENTS OF INTEREST ABROAD.

A PRINCIPAL FACTOR IN OUR PURSUIT OF CONTACT WITH SCHOLARS IS OUR PERCEPTION THAT QUALITY ANALYSIS ON THE INCREDIBLE RANGE OF ISSUES WITH WHICH WE MUST COPE REQUIRES NOT ONLY DOGGED RESEARCH BUT ALSO IMAGINATION, CREATIVITY, AND INSIGHT. LARGE ORGANIZATIONS, AND PARTICULARLY GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES, ARE NOT FAMOUS FOR THEIR ENCOURAGEMENT OF THESE CHARACTERISTICS -- ALTHOUGH THERE IS SURPRISINGLY MORE THAN YOU MIGHT THINK. SIMILARLY, TO RELY SOLELY ON INFORMATION FUNNELED THROUGH GOVERNMENT CHANNELS INEVITABLY WOULD CONSTRICT THE RANGE OF VIEWS AND INFORMATION NEEDED. WE ARE LOOKING FOR PEOPLE TO

CHALLENGE OUR VIEWS, TO ARGUE WITH US, TO CRITICIZE OUR ASSESSMENTS CONSTRUCTIVELY, TO MAKE US THINK AND DEFEND AND TO GO BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD WHEN WE HAVE MISSED SOMETHING IMPORTANT. IN SHORT, WE DON'T WANT SCHOLARS TO TELL US WHAT THEY THINK WE WANT TO HEAR. THAT WOULD MAKE OUR ENTIRE EFFORT POINTLESS.

FINALLY, THIS RELATIONSHIP IS NOT NECESSARILY A ONE-WAY STREET. I BELIEVE THAT MOST OBJECTIVE ACADEMICS WOULD AGREE THAT THERE IS MUCH TO LEARN FROM US. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT SCHOLARS, DEANS, AND INSTITUTIONS DON'T HAVE MAJOR CONCERNS ABOUT DEALING WITH US. THEY DO. SOME OF THESE CONCERNS REACH WELL BEYOND JUST CIA AND INVOLVE THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUTSIDE SOURCES OF FUNDS AND THE UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY. BELIEVE ME, QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PROPER "RULES OF ENGAGEMENT" SO TO SPEAK BETWEEN SCHOLARS AND UNIVERSITIES ON THE ONE HAND AND US ON THE OTHER CAN GET VERY COMPLICATED. BUT AFTER MUCH EXAMINATION AND STUDY WE HAVE PUT INTO PLACE SOME COMMON SENSE GROUND RULES WHICH I BELIEVE SERVE US AND THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY WELL.

CIA WILL PERMIT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OUR FUNDING OF RESEARCH THAT IS LATER INDEPENDENTLY PUBLISHED BY A SCHOLAR UNLESS (1) THE SCHOLAR REQUESTS PRIVACY OR (2) WE DETERMINE THAT FORMAL, PUBLIC ASSOCIATION OF CIA WITH A SPECIFIC TOPIC OR SUBJECT WOULD PROVE DAMAGING TO THE UNITED STATES. ANY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

OF CIA FUNDING WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF CIA OR OF THE US GOVERNMENT. I ASSUME, OF COURSE, THAT UNIVERSITIES ALSO WILL PRESS HARD FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF OTHER SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR RESEARCH.

WE EXPECT ANY SCHOLAR OR INDIVIDUAL WHO CONSULTS OR WORKS WITH US TO ABIDE FULLY BY THE RULES OF HIS OR HER HOME INSTITUTION IN TERMS OF REPORTING THE RELATIONSHIP WITH US. BUT, IN OUR VIEW, IT IS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INSTITUTION TO SET SUCH RULES AND TO ENFORCE THEM, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SCHOLAR TO COMPLY.

ACADEMIC CONCERNS ABOUT THE MODALITIES OF THE RELATIONSHIP IS ONE THING. BUT WE ALSO HAVE TO CONTEND WITH A VIEWPOINT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO RELATIONSHIP -- THAT OUR TWO ENTERPRISES SIMPLY ARE INCOMPATIBLE. SUCH ARGUMENTS AMOUNT TO A DIRECT CHALLENGE TO THE INTEGRITY OF OUR PROFESSION AND THE VALIDITY OF OUR MISSION AND WE MUST REBUT THEM.

ONE HEARS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SINCE, IN ADDITION TO COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, THE CIA IS ENGAGED IN COVERT ACTION AND A VARIETY OF OTHER "IMMORAL ACTS," ASSOCIATION OF A SCHOLAR WITH ANY PART OF CIA WOULD CORRUPT AND IMPLICATE BOTH THE SCHOLAR AND HIS OR HER UNIVERSITY. THE ANSWER TO THIS IS

FAIRLY OBVIOUS. ACTIVITIES AT CIA ARE CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE LAW, WITH THE APPROVAL OF APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES, AND WITH THE OVERSIGHT OF THE CONGRESS. THEY ARE ACTIVITIES MANDATED BY THE DECISIONS OF ELECTED OFFICIALS IN BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES. CONGRESS CAN AND DOES DENY FUNDS FOR LEGAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WITH WHICH THEY DISAGREE, THEREBY TERMINATING SUCH ACTIVITIES.

-- THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS A FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT OF THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, JUST LIKE THE MILITARY, USIA OR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. IF A SCHOLAR FINDS SOME ELEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY OR ACTIVITY INCONSISTENT WITH YOUR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT, I WOULD ENCOURAGE HIM FIRST TO DO ALL HE CAN TO TEST THE VALIDITY OF YOUR POSITION.

OF COURSE A SCHOLAR CAN DECLINE TO HAVE ANY ASSOCIATION WITH US AT ALL. BUT IN THIS CASE, THE DECISION WHETHER TO ASSOCIATE WITH US SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE INDIVIDUAL. ONE INDIVIDUAL'S FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION SHOULD NOT BE DENIED BECAUSE OF ANOTHER'S PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW. A UNIVERSITY STEPS ON PRECARIOUS GROUND AND ITSELF ENDANGERS ACADEMIC FREEDOM IF IT STARTS MAKING ARBITRARY RULES ABOUT WHICH ORGANIZATIONS A SCHOLAR MAY PARTICIPATE IN OR TALK WITH

-- AND, I WOULD ADD, ESPECIALLY IF ONE OF THOSE ORGANIZATIONS IS A BRANCH OF OUR SOCIETY'S OWN DEMOCRATICALLY CHOSEN GOVERNMENT.

THOSE WHO EMBRACE THE "INCOMPATIBILITY" THEORY ALSO OFTEN ASSERT THAT RESEARCH OR ANALYSIS UNDER CIA AUSPICES INEVITABLY COMPROMISES ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE HONESTY OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH. FOR EXAMPLE, ON DECEMBER 3RD OF LAST YEAR THE BOSTON GLOBE STATED "THE SCHOLAR WHO WORKS FOR A GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CEASES TO BE AN INDEPENDENT SPIRIT, A TRUE SCHOLAR." THESE ARE STRONG WORDS. IN MY VIEW THEY ARE ABSOLUTELY WRONG. BUT UNFORTUNATELY THIS VIEW CONTINUES TO CIRCULATE AND INDEED THE OBJECTIVITY OF CIA'S ANALYSIS HAS BEEN THE FOCUS OF SOME SHARP QUESTIONING IN RECENT MONTHS. LATE LAST MONTH, IN AN ADDRESS AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, I TRIED TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT REGARDING THE ROLE OF CIA ANALYSIS IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE GREAT PAINS WE TAKE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF OUR ANALYTICAL PROCESS.

LET ME TAKE A FEW MINUTES TO SUMMARIZE THE CASE I MADE AT PRINCETON. THERE IS NO CHARGE TO WHICH WE IN CIA ARE MORE SENSITIVE THAN THAT OF "COOKING" INTELLIGENCE -- OF SLANTING OUR REPORTING TO SUPPORT POLICY. EVERY DIRECTOR SINCE I JOINED CIA HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF THIS AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER. I BELIEVE IN VIRTUALLY ALL INSTANCES UNFAIRLY. FIRST, ONE MUST

UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL VIEWS: NATIONAL ESTIMATES ARE REVIEWED AND COORDINATED BY A DOZEN AGENCIES; CIA ASSESSMENTS ARE WIDELY REVIEWED INSIDE THE AGENCY BUT ALMOST NEVER EVEN SEEN BY THE DIRECTOR BEFORE BEING PUBLISHED AND CIRCULATED. AS NOTED EARLIER, ALL GO TO SEVERAL COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS, WHERE THEY ARE SCRUTINIZED.

THESE FORMAL ASSESSMENTS MUST BE DISTINGUISHED FROM PERSONAL VIEWS EXPRESSED BY INDIVIDUALS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE AGENCY, FROM ANALYST TO SENIOR OPERATIONS OFFICER TO DIRECTOR. MORE THAN ONCE, DCI CASEY (AND PROBABLY HIS PREDECESSORS) APPROVED AN ESTIMATE WITH WHICH HE DISAGREED PERSONALLY, AND SEPARATELY CONVEYED HIS PERSONAL VIEW TO POLICYMAKERS. LEST THIS RAISE EYEBROWS, I REMIND YOU THAT IN 1962 DCI MCCONE DISAGREED WITH THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON WHETHER THE SOVIETS MIGHT INSTALL MISSILES IN CUBA. HE TOLD PRESIDENT KENNEDY THEY WOULD, AND HE ALONE IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WAS RIGHT. AS LONG AS ALL POINTS OF VIEW ARE FAIRLY REPRESENTED AND REPORTED, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -- THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF INTELLIGENCE ADVISER -- IS ENTITLED (EVEN OBLIGATED) TO HAVE AND TO PUT FORWARD HIS OWN VIEW. AS PROFESSOR HENRY ROWEN OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY RECENTLY WROTE IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, "...A CIA DIRECTOR IS NOT SUPPOSE TO BE AN INTELLECTUAL EUNUCH."

IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE OVER THE YEARS THAT THE POLICYMAKERS' RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE THEY DISAGREE WITH OR FIND UNPALATABLE MOST OFTEN IS TO IGNORE IT; SOMETIMES, THEY WILL CHARACTERIZE IT AS INCOMPLETE, TOO NARROWLY FOCUSED OR AS INCOMPETENT (AND THEY ARE SOMETIMES RIGHT); AND OCCASIONALLY THEY WILL CHARGE THAT IT IS "COOKED" OR THAT IT REFLECTS A CIA BIAS. IN 21 YEARS IN INTELLIGENCE, I HAVE NEVER HEARD A POLICYMAKER (OR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT MATTER) CHARACTERIZE AS BIASED OR COOKED A CIA ASSESSMENT WITH WHICH HE AGREED. ON VIETNAM, VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY AND BEHAVIOR, ANGOLA, LEBANON, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMBARGOES OR SANCTIONS, AND OTHER ISSUES OVER THE YEARS, OUR ANALYSTS HAVE DRAWN CONCLUSIONS THAT DASH COLD WATER ON THE HOPES AND EFFORTS OF THE POLICYMAKERS. SOMETIMES WE HAVE BEEN WRONG, BUT ON PROBLEMS LARGE AND SMALL WE HAVE NOT FLINCHED FROM PRESENTING OUR HONEST VIEW.

THE PRESSURES CAN BE ENORMOUS. THIS IS WHERE THE INTEGRITY OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, BOLSTERED BY A NATURAL TENDENCY TO RESIST PRESSURE AND AN OFTEN ADVERSARIAL BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIP, COMES INTO PLAY TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ASSESSMENT. BUT OVERALL, YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE GIVE AND TAKE -- THE DIALOGUE -- BETWEEN POLICYMAKER AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON ISSUES IS NORMAL, HEALTHY, AND USUALLY IMPROVES OUR ASSESSMENTS AND MAKES THEM MORE USEFUL TO THE POLICYMAKER -- EVEN WHILE OBJECTIVITY IS PRESERVED. WE KNOW

THEY ARE OFTEN TRYING TO INFLUENCE AS ASSESSMENT, BUT THAT DOES NOT RENDER THEIR INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS IRRELEVANT OR OFF-LIMITS.

A FINAL THOUGHT. TO ATTEMPT TO SLANT INTELLIGENCE NOT ONLY TRANGRESSES THE DEEPEST ETHICAL AND CULTURAL PRINCIPLE OF CIA, WE ALL KNOW IT WOULD BE FOOLISH -- IT WOULD PRESUPPOSE A SINGLE POINT OF VIEW IN AN ADMINISTRATION AND WOULD IGNORE THE REALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL READERSHIP. INDEED, IN MY OPINION, THE SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH CONGRESS IS ONE OF THE SUREST GUARANTEES OF CIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY. AS DIRECTOR WEBSTER HAS SAID, "WE INTEND TO 'TELL IT AS IT IS,' AVOIDING BIAS AS MUCH AS WE CAN, OR THE POLITICIZATION OF OUR PRODUCT. POLICYMAKERS MAY NOT LIKE THE MESSAGE THEY HEAR FROM US, ESPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW. MY POSITION IS THAT IN THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WE WILL PROVIDE THEM FOR THE USE OF POLICYMAKERS. THEY CAN BE USED IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THEY CAN BE IGNORED, OR TORN UP, OR THROWN AWAY, BUT THEY MAY NOT BE CHANGED."

IN SHORT, WE ARE PROUD OF OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT OBJECTIVE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ACADEMIC FREEDOM DEPENDS ON NOT BEING BEHOLDEN TO ANY OUTSIDE INFLUENCE OR RIGID IDEOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS BUT ONLY TO THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. A SCHOLAR OR AN INTELLIGENCE ANALYST SHOULD BE FREE TO SEARCH

WHERE HE OR SHE WISHES AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRAINED BY ANY IMPROPER INFLUENCES, INCLUDING THE PREFERENCES OF COLLEAGUES OR PREVAILING CULTURAL WINDS.

CAN IMPROPER INFLUENCES COME TO BEAR ON INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS? OF COURSE. I'VE ALLUDED TO SOME EXAMPLES ALREADY. BUT IMPROPER INFLUENCE ALSO CAN BE EXERTED ON A SCHOLAR IN A NUMBER OF WAYS: FUNDING FROM CONTRACTS AND CONSULTANTSHIPS WITH BUSINESS, FOUNDATIONS AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS -- OR EVEN THE THREAT OF WITHHOLDING TENURE. AMERICAN ACADEMICS HAVE LONG CONSULTED WITH OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OF ALL STRIPES. IN LIGHT OF THIS, SINGLING OUT A US GOVERNMENT AGENCY AS A PARTICULAR THREAT TO HONEST INQUIRY REPRESENTS A DOUBLE STANDARD IF NOT OUTRIGHT HYPOCRISY.

CONCLUSIONS

I THINK I'VE SAID ENOUGH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I BELIEVE CIA HAS NOTHING TO BE ASHAMED OF IN COMPARING THE INTEGRITY AND OBJECTIVITY OF OUR RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS PROCESS WITH THAT OF ACADEMIA. LET ME CONCLUDE BY REITERATING THE NEED FOR COOPERATION.

THE WORLD IS INCREASINGLY COMPLEX. THE CHALLENGES TO THE SECURITY AND WELL BEING OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE INCREASINGLY DIVERSE AND SUBTLE. DIRECTOR WEBSTER AND I, AND OTHERS IN THE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND OUR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES BELIEVE THAT CONTACTS WITH UNIVERSITIES AND OTHERS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR ARE IMPERATIVE IF WE ARE PROPERLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO CARRY OUT OUR MISSION OF INFORMING, IMPROVING UNDERSTANDING, AND WARNING THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD -- THE SAME MISSION IDENTIFIED BY GENERAL DONOVAN AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT. OUR ABILITY TO CARRY OUT OUR MISSION, AS IN THE DAYS OF LANGER AND DONOVAN, DEPENDS ON VOLUNTARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THOSE OF US WHO CARRY THIS RESPONSIBILITY IN INTELLIGENCE, AND THOSE IN THE UNIVERSITY, BUSINESS, RETIRED MILITARY, AND OTHERS WHO CAN HELP US UNDERSTAND THESE CHALLENGES BETTER AND FORECAST THEM MORE ACCURATELY. OUR COUNTRY IS THE ULTIMATE BENEFICIARY.

CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION WITH CIA ON THE PROBLEMS THIS NATION FACES ABROAD DO NOT THREATEN ACADEMIC FREEDOM. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT FREEDOM OF INQUIRY IS LIMITED, A DESIRE TO RENDER PUBLIC SERVICE SOMETIMES TRAGICALLY THWARTED, AND OUR NATION DISADVANTAGED, BY THOSE WHO WOULD DENY A SCHOLAR'S WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN ASSESSING THE WORLD AROUND US.

THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT COERCE ANY SCHOLAR TO COOPERATE OR WORK WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OR CIA. BY THE SAME TOKEN, NO SCHOLAR SHOULD BE PREVENTED BY ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS OR COLLEAGUES FROM DOING SO. AND NONE

SHOULD HAVE TO WORRY THAT HIS OR HER REPUTATION WILL SUFFER
BECAUSE OF A PUBLIC-SPIRITED, PATRIOTIC WILLINGNESS TO HELP US
BETTER UNDERSTAND AND FORECAST DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD AFFECTING
OUR NATIONAL WELL-BEING AND THE FORCES THAT THREATEN OUR
FREEDOM.