



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY**

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

Dr. Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

This is to confirm that you are scheduled to address the students and faculty of the National War College on Wednesday, December 10, from 8:30 to 10:00 a.m. (The audience will consist entirely of U.S. government employees cleared through the TOP SECRET level.) We would appreciate it if you would arrive at 8:10, so you will have a chance to have coffee with our Commandant, RADM Addams, who just completed a three-year tour as commander of the Mideast Force in the Persian Gulf.

As for your remarks themselves, it would be most helpful to us in our course on national security decisionmaking if you would address two subjects, the first of which is by far the more important for our purposes:

1.) The relationships between the intelligence community and senior national security policymakers. What kinds of problems arise, what sorts of pressures are brought to bear on the intelligence community as it seeks to provide accurate, timely, and useful information and analysis to those policymakers?


2.) The problems of coordinating collection and analysis among the many intelligence agencies and centers in the U.S. government. What makes coordination difficult? How well are policymakers served when uncoordinated intelligence reaches them? Can too much coordination obscure important differences within the community, and what problems can that cause for senior policymakers?

I realize this is an ambitious (perhaps too ambitious) agenda, but our students will benefit immeasurably from whatever first-hand insights you can provide.

Enclosed, for your reference, are the relevant sections of the syllabus for the course. If you or your staff have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me at 475-1935.

I look forward to meeting you on the 10th.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Albert C. Pierce". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

ALBERT C. PIERCE  
Professor of National  
Security Policy

## TOPIC 4: THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Tuesday  
9 December  
1330-1630 DR

Wednesday  
10 December  
0830-1000 L  
1330-1500 IS

### A. General

This section of the course has several objectives: 1.) to provide a capsule overview of the major intelligence agencies; 2.) to raise some fundamental questions about the nature, capabilities, and limitations of the intelligence business; 3.) to highlight several contemporary perspectives on the intelligence community; 4.) to examine the relationship between the providers of intelligence (i.e., the intelligence community) and the consumers of intelligence (the policy- and decisionmakers in the USG); and 5.) to analyze in depth one case study--the "discovery" of a Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba in 1979.

The principal focus will be on the relationship between the providers of intelligence and the consumers of intelligence. The providers are many--by design--but fragmented--despite the legislatively mandated coordinating role of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The theory behind the diversity of intelligence agencies is that policymakers are better served by having access to a range of competing centers of analysis. But as the KAL 007 incident (which we will examine more closely in Topic 5) seems to illustrate, the existence of many competing centers does not ensure that the most senior officials will have timely, full, and useful access to the analyses produced by these competing centers.

Even when senior officials do have access to different analyses of the same issue, there is the problem of how they resolve differences within the intelligence community. One good example is estimates of Soviet defense spending, where CIA and DIA traditionally differ. Secretaries of defense tend to resolve the differences by adopting the DIA--i.e., the higher--figures, and ignoring the esoterica of the methodologies which produced the two different estimates.

This leads to the problem of explicit or implicit pressures on various elements of the intelligence community to produce analyses consistent with senior officials' preconceived notions or policy preferences. There are plenty of potential opportunities for intelligence analysis to conflict with policy preference--ranging from verification of proposed or existing arms control agreements to the smuggling of arms to anti-government guerrillas in El Salvador. Overt pressure pops up from time to time, but perhaps group-think creeps in as well.

Two other important issues are raised in the KAL 007 incident. One is the trade-offs in giving senior officials intelligence that has not been fully analyzed and evaluated. To be sure, in a crisis, decisionmakers want as much intelligence as they can get as quickly as possible. Accuracy and thoroughness are often traded for

speed under these intense pressures, as in the premature use of hasty translations of taped conversations of the Soviet pilot who shot down KAL 007. A second, perhaps even more volatile, issue is the inadvertent or even deliberate public disclosure of sensitive intelligence information by senior officials--for example, statements about Japanese intelligence collection capabilities in the KAL 007 incident, or President Reagan's public remarks about communications intelligence intercepts regarding Libya and terrorists operating in Europe.

Especially when one looks at intelligence as an integral part of the national security decisionmaking process, these issues assume great importance. "Good judgment requires good information," Walt Rostow is said to have remarked once, "but good information doesn't guarantee good judgment."

## B. Issues for Consideration

### Topic 4A

1. Are "surprises"--sometimes also known as "intelligence failures"--inevitable? Why? What can be done to minimize them?

2. Some would argue that the most successful DCIs have been those who were personally closest to the Presidents they served, among the reasons being that close personal ties may help overcome the inherent suspicion of the intelligence world which many Presidents bring to the job. But aren't they also the DCIs who are most vulnerable to subtle pressures from the White House to "get on board" and support administration policies? How important is it for the DCI to be close to the President?

3. Granting the advantages of competing centers of analysis, do we have too many? Specifically, do the disadvantages--in terms of cost, overlap, inefficiency, compartmentalization--of having separate service intelligence organizations outweigh the advantages--being able to meet service-unique requirements? As, under the new DoD reorganization, the CJCS and the CINCs become more important and powerful, should more military intelligence be jointly (a la DIA, NSA) collected, analyzed, and produced, as opposed to the current system in which service intelligence agencies play large roles and exercise considerable independence?

### Topic 4B

1. In the Soviet "combat brigade" affair, what exactly went wrong where? Was this an "intelligence failure"? Or a decisionmaking disaster? Or both? What would you have done differently at various points in that situation--as Vance? Brzezinski? Carter? Church? Turner?

2. In her retrospective analysis of the 1977 Soviet "combat brigade" affair, Gloria Duffy concluded, "The primary image the U.S. presented to friends and foe alike...was one of painful confusion." Has our performance in crises since then been any better? And what should be done to make our performance better next time?

## C. Readings

There are three clusters of readings under Topic 4: The Role of Intelligence. In Topic 4A, the excerpts from Richelson's book should cover objective #1 on the previous page, and the piece by Betts #2. The selections from Turner's book



introduce the questions subsumed in objective #4, the relationship between providers and consumers of intelligence. The readings on the Soviet brigade (Topic 4B)--which consist largely of first-person accounts by the principals--constitute a case study (objective #5) of that critical and complex relationship. Lastly the short readings under Topic 4C introduce some aspects of the current debates within and about the intelligence community (objective #3).

#### Topic 4A

##### 1. Required

Read carefully for the issues and questions raised:

b. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," World Politics, Vol. XXI, No. 1, October 1978, pp. 61-89.

c. Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), pp. 113-127, 237-251.

##### 2. Optional

Skim the following to get a quick overview of the principal intelligence agencies:

a. Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 1-9, 11-41, 46, 95-98, 103-106.

#### Topic 4B

##### 1. Required

a. "2,300-Man Soviet Unit Now in Cuba," by the Associated Press, The Washington Post, August 31, 1979, reprinted in DoD Current News, August 31, 1979, pp. 1-2.

b. Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 358-364.

c. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York: Farrar-Straus-Giroux, 1983), pp. 344-353.

d. Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), pp. 229-236.

e. Gloria Duffy, "Crisis Mangling and the Cuban Brigade," International Security, Summer 1983, pp. 67-87.

Topic 4C

Optional

a. Patrick E. Tyler and David B. Ottoway, "Casey Enforces 'Reagan Doctrine' With Reinvigorated Covert Action," The Washington Post, March 9, 1986.

b. Patrick E. Tyler and David B. Ottoway, "Casey Strengthens Role Under 'Reagan Doctrine,'" The Washington Post, March 31, 1986.

c. Leslie H. Gelb, "Overseeing of C.I.A. by Congress Has Produced Decade of Support," The New York Times, July 7, 1986.

d. Michael R. Gordon, "C.I.A., Evaluating Soviet Threat, Often Is Not So Grim as Pentagon," The New York Times, July 15, 1986, reprinted in DoD Current News, July 16, 1986, pp. 7-8, 16.

86/87 NWC UNIT IV, Crs 2, T-4A, R-b

Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," World Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1978). Copyright © 1978 by Princeton University Press. Reproduced with permission of Princeton University Press for use in the courses of the National Defense University.

## ANALYSIS, WAR, AND DECISION:

### Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable

By RICHARD K. BETTS\*

**M**ILITARY disasters befall some states, no matter how informed their leaders are, because their capabilities are deficient. Weakness, not choice, is their primary problem. Powerful nations are not immune to calamity either, because their leaders may misperceive threats or miscalculate responses. Information, understanding, and judgment are a larger part of the strategic challenge for countries such as the United States. Optimal decisions in defense policy therefore depend on the use of strategic intelligence: the acquisition, analysis, and *appreciation* of relevant data. In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the products of intelligence services. Policy premises constrict perception, and administrative workloads constrain reflection. Intelligence failure is political and psychological more often than organizational.

Observers who see notorious intelligence failures as egregious often infer that disasters can be avoided by perfecting norms and procedures for analysis and argumentation. This belief is illusory. Intelligence can be improved marginally, but not radically, by altering the analytic system. The illusion is also dangerous if it abets overconfidence that systemic reforms will increase the predictability of threats. The use of intelligence depends less on the bureaucracy than on the intellects and inclinations of the authorities above it. To clarify the tangled relationship of analysis and policy, this essay explores conceptual approaches to intelligence failure, differentiation of intelligence problems, insurmountable obstacles to accurate assessment, and limitations of solutions proposed by critics.

#### I. APPROACHES TO THEORY

Case studies of intelligence failures abound, yet scholars lament the lack of a theory of intelligence.<sup>1</sup> It is more accurate to say that we lack

\* For corrections or comments whose usefulness exceeded my ability to accommodate them within space limitations, thanks are due to Bruce Blair, Thomas Blau, Michael Handel, Robert Jarvis, Klaus Knorr, H. R. Trevor-Roper, and members of the staff of the National Foreign Assessment Center.

<sup>1</sup> For example, Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case

a positive or normative theory of intelligence. Negative or descriptive theory—the empirical understanding of how intelligence systems make mistakes—is well developed. The distinction is significant because there is little evidence that either scholars or practitioners have succeeded in translating such knowledge into reforms that measurably reduce failure. Development of a normative theory of intelligence has been inhibited because the lessons of hindsight do not guarantee improvement in foresight, and hypothetical solutions to failure only occasionally produce improvement in practice. The problem of intelligence failure can be conceptualized in three overlapping ways. The first is the most reassuring; the second is the most common; and the third is the most important.

1. *Failure in perspective.* There is an axiom that a pessimist sees a glass of water as half empty and an optimist sees it as half full. In this sense, the estimative system is a glass half full. Mistakes can happen in any activity. Particular failures are accorded disproportionate significance if they are considered in isolation rather than in terms of the general ratio of failures to successes; the record of success is less striking because observers tend not to notice disasters that do not happen. Any academician who used a model that predicted outcomes correctly in four out of five cases would be happy; intelligence analysts must use models of their own and should not be blamed for missing occasionally. One problem with this benign view is that there are no clear indicators of what the ratio of failure to success in intelligence is, or whether many successes on minor issues should be reassuring in the face of a smaller number of failures on more critical problems.<sup>2</sup> In the thermo-nuclear age, just *one* mistake could have apocalyptic consequences.

2. *Pathologies of communication.* The most frequently noted sources of breakdowns in intelligence lie in the process of amassing timely

of the Cuban Missiles," *World Politics*, xvi (April 1964), 455, 465-66; Harry Howe Ransom, "Strategic Intelligence and Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, xxvii (October 1974), 145.

<sup>2</sup> "As that ancient retiree from the Research Department of the British Foreign Office reputedly said, after serving from 1903-50: 'Year after year the worriers and fretters would come to me with awful predictions of the outbreak of war. I denied it each time. I was only wrong twice.'" Thomas L. Hughes, *The Fate of Facts in a World of Men—Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 233, December 1976), 48. Paradoxically, "successes may be indistinguishable from failures." If analysts predict war and the attacker cancels his plans because surprise has been lost, "success of the intelligence services would have been expressed in the falsification of its predictions," which would discredit the analysis. Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War," *World Politics*, xxviii (April 1976), 378.

data, communicating them to decision makers, and impressing the latter with the validity or relevance of the information. This view of the problem leaves room for optimism because it implies that procedural curatives can eliminate the dynamics of error. For this reason, official post mortems of intelligence blunders inevitably produce recommendations for reorganization and changes in operating norms.

3. *Paradoxes of perception.* Most pessimistic is the view that the roots of failure lie in unresolvable trade-offs and dilemmas. Curing some pathologies with organizational reforms often creates new pathologies or resurrects old ones;<sup>3</sup> perfecting intelligence production does not necessarily lead to perfecting intelligence consumption; making warning systems more sensitive reduces the risk of surprise, but increases the number of false alarms, which in turn reduces sensitivity; the principles of optimal analytic procedure are in many respects incompatible with the imperatives of the decision process; avoiding intelligence failure requires the elimination of strategic preconceptions, but leaders cannot operate purposefully without some preconceptions. In devising measures to improve the intelligence process, policy makers are damned if they do and damned if they don't.

It is useful to disaggregate the problem of strategic intelligence failures in order to elicit clues about which paradoxes and pathologies are pervasive and therefore most in need of attention. The crucial problems of linkage between analysis and strategic decision can be subsumed under the following categories:

1. *Attack warning.* The problem in this area is timely prediction of an enemy's immediate intentions, and the "selling" of such predictions to responsible authorities. Major insights into intelligence failure have emerged from catastrophic surprises: Pearl Harbor, the Nazi invasion of the U.S.S.R., the North Korean attack and Chinese intervention of 1950, and the 1973 war in the Middle East. Two salient phenomena characterize these cases. First, evidence of impending attack was available, but did not flow efficiently up the chain of command. Second, the fragmentary indicators of alarm that did reach decision makers were dismissed because they contradicted strategic estimates or assumptions. In several cases hesitancy in communication and disbelief on the part of leaders were reinforced by deceptive enemy maneuvers that cast doubt on the data.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Compare the prescriptions in Peter Szanton and Graham Allison, "Intelligence: Seizing the Opportunity," with George Carver's critique, both in *Foreign Policy*, No. 22 (Spring 1976).

<sup>4</sup> Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford: Stanford

2. *Operational evaluation.* In wartime, the essential problem lies in judging the results (and their significance) of interacting capabilities. Once hostilities are under way, informed decision making requires assessments of tactical effectiveness—"how we are doing"—in order to adapt strategy and options. In this dimension, the most interesting insights have come from Vietnam-era memoirs of low-level officials and from journalistic muckraking. Again there are two fundamental points. First, within the context of a glut of ambiguous data, intelligence officials linked to operational agencies (primarily military) tend to indulge a propensity for justifying service performance by issuing optimistic assessments, while analysts in autonomous non-operational units (primarily in the Central Intelligence Agency and the late Office of National Estimates) tend to produce more pessimistic evaluations. Second, in contrast to cases of attack warnings, fragmentary tactical indicators of *success* tend to override more general and cautious strategic estimates. Confronted by differing analyses, a leader mortgaged to his policy tends to resent or dismiss the critical ones, even when they represent the majority view of the intelligence community, and to cling to the data that support continued commitment.<sup>6</sup> Lyndon Johnson railed at his Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) at a White House dinner: "Policy making is like milking a fat cow. You see the milk coming out, you press more and the milk bubbles and flows, and just as the bucket is full, the cow with its tail whips the bucket and all is

University Press 1962); Barton Whaley, *Codeword Barbarosa* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press 1973); Harvey De Weerd, "Strategic Surprise in the Korean War," *Orbis*, vi (Fall 1962); Alan Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (New York: Macmillan 1960); James F. Schinabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army 1972), 61-65, 83-85, 274-78; Michael I. Handel, *Perception, Deception, and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War* (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations, Jerusalem Paper No. 19, 1976); Shlaim (fn. 2); Abraham Ben-Zvi, "Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks," *World Politics*, xxvii (April 1976); Anus Perlmuter, "Israel's Fourth War, October 1973: Political and Military Misperceptions," *Orbis*, xix (Summer 1975); U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Intelligence [hereafter cited as HSCJ], *Hearings, U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: The Performance of the Intelligence Community*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975; Draft Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, published in *The Village Voice*, February 16, 1976, pp. 76-81.

<sup>6</sup> David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House 1972); Morris Blachman, "The Stupidity of Intelligence," in Charles Peters and Timothy J. Adams, eds., *Inside the System* (New York: Praeger 1976); Patrick J. McGarvey, "DIA: Intelligence to Please," in Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, eds., *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective* (Boston: Little, Brown 1973); Chester Cooper, "The CIA and Decision-Making," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 50 (January 1972); Sam Adams, "Vietnam Cover-Up: Playing War With Numbers," *Harper's*, Vol. 251 (June 1975); Don Oberdorfer, *Tet!* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1971). For a more detailed review, see Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1977), chap. 10.

spilled. That's what CIA does to policy making."<sup>6</sup> From the consensus-seeking politician, this was criticism; to a pure analyst, it would have been flattery. But it is the perspective of the former, not the latter, that is central in decision making.

3. *Defense planning.* The basic task in using intelligence to develop doctrines and forces for deterrence and defense is to estimate threats posed by adversaries, in terms of both capabilities and intentions, over a period of several years. Here the separability of intelligence and policy, analysis and advocacy, is least clear. In dealing with the issue of "how much is enough" for security, debates over data merge murky into debates over options and programs. As in operational evaluation, the problem lies more in data mongering than in data collecting. To the extent that stark generalizations are possible, the basic points in this category are the reverse of those in the previous one.

First, the justification of a mission (in this case, preparedness for future contingencies as opposed to demonstration of current success on the battlefield) prompts pessimistic estimates by operational military analysts; autonomous analysts without budgetary axes to grind, but with biases similar to those prevalent in the intellectual community, tend toward less alarmed predictions.<sup>7</sup> Military intelligence inclines toward "worst-case" analysis in planning, and toward "best-case" analysis in operational evaluation. (Military intelligence officials such as Lieutenant General Daniel Graham were castigated by liberals for underestimating the Vietcong's strength in the 1960's but for overestimating Soviet strength in the 1970's.) Air Force intelligence overestimated Soviet air deployments in the "bomber gap" controversy of the 1950's, and CIA-dominated National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) underestimated Soviet ICBM deployments throughout the 1960's (overreacting, critics say, to the mistaken prediction of a "missile gap" in 1960).<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Quoted in Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1973), 103.

<sup>7</sup> Betts (fn. 5), 160-61, 192-95. On bias within CIA, see James Schlesinger's comments in U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities [hereafter cited as SSCJ], *Final Report, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, Book I, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, 76-77.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Book IV, 56-59; William T. Lee, *Understanding the Soviet Military Threat: How CIA Estimates Went Astray* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Agenda Paper No. 6, 1977), 24-37; Albert Wohlstetter, "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 15 (Summer 1974); Wohlstetter, "Rivals, But No Race," *Foreign Policy*, No. 16 (Fall 1974); Wohlstetter, "Optimal Ways to Confuse Ourselves," *Foreign Policy*, No. 20 (Fall 1975). There are exceptions to this pattern of military and civilian bias: see *ibid.*, 185-88; Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, USA (Ret.), "The Intelligence Mythology of Washington," *Strategic Review*, iv (Summer

Second, in the context of peacetime, with competing domestic claims on resources, political leaders have a natural interest in at least partially rejecting military estimates and embracing those of other analysts who justify limiting allocations to defense programs. If the President had accepted pessimistic CIA operational evaluations in the mid-1960's, he might have withdrawn from Vietnam; if he had accepted pessimistic military analyses of the Soviet threat in the mid-1970's, he might have added massive increases to the defense budget.

Some chronic sources of error are unique to each of these three general categories of intelligence problems, and thus do not clearly suggest reforms that would be advisable across the board. To compensate for the danger in conventional attack warning, reliance on worst-case analysis might seem the safest rule, but in making estimates for defense planning, worst-case analysis would mandate severe and often unnecessary economic sacrifices. Removing checks on the influence of CIA analysts and "community" staffs might seem justified by the record of operational evaluation in Vietnam, but would not be warranted by the record of estimates on Soviet ICBM deployments. It would be risky to alter the balance of power systematically among competing analytic components, giving the "better" analysts more status. Rather, decision makers should be encouraged to be more and less skeptical of certain agencies' estimates, depending on the category of analysis involved.

Some problems, however, cut across all three categories and offer a more general basis for considering changes in the system. But these general problems are not very susceptible to cure by formal changes in process, because it is usually impossible to disentangle intelligence failures from policy failures. Separation of intelligence and policy making has long been a normative concern of officials and theorists, who have seen both costs and benefits in minimizing the intimacy between intelligence professionals and operational authorities. But, although the personnel can be segregated, the functions cannot, unless intelligence is defined narrowly as the collection of data, and analytic responsibility is reserved to decision makers. Analysis and decision are interactive

1976), 61-62, 64; Victor Marchetti and John Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Knopf 1974), 309.

<sup>9</sup> The U.S. intelligence community includes the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency, the intelligence branches of each military service, the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the intelligence units of the Treasury and Energy Departments, and the FBI. Before 1973, coordination for national estimates was done through the Office of National Estimates, and since then, through the National Intelligence Officers. The Intelligence Community Staff assists the Director of Central Intelligence in managing allocation of resources and reviewing the agencies' performance.

rather than sequential processes. By the narrower definition of intelligence, there have actually been few major failures. In most cases of mistakes in predicting attacks or in assessing operations, the inadequacy of critical data or their submergence in a viscous bureaucracy were at best the proximate causes of failure. The ultimate causes of error in most cases have been wishful thinking, cavalier disregard of professional analysts, and, above all, the premises and preconceptions of policy makers. Fewer fiascos have occurred in the stages of acquisition and presentation of facts than in the stages of interpretation and response. Producers of intelligence have been culprits less often than consumers. Policy perspectives tend to constrain objectivity, and authorities often fail to use intelligence properly. As former State Department intelligence director Ray Cline testified, defending his analysts' performance in October 1973 and criticizing Secretary Kissinger for ignoring them:

Unless something is totally conclusive, you must make an inconclusive report . . . by the time you are sure it is always very close to the event. So I don't think the analysts did such a lousy job. What I think was the lousy job was in bosses not insisting on a new preparation at the end of that week [before war broke out]. . . . the reason the system wasn't working very well is that people were not asking it to work and not listening when it did work.<sup>10</sup>

## II. BASIC BARRIERS TO ANALYTIC ACCURACY

Many constraints on the optimal processing of information lie in the structure of authority and the allocation of time and resources. Harold Wilensky argues persuasively that the intelligence function is hindered most by the structural characteristics of hierarchy, centralization, and specialization.<sup>11</sup> Yet it is precisely these characteristics that are the essence of any government. A related problem is the dominance of operational authorities over intelligence specialists, and the trade-off between objectivity and influence. Operators have more influence in decision making but are less capable of unbiased interpretation of evidence because they have a vested interest in the success of their operations; autonomous analysts are more disinterested and usually more objective, but lack influence. Senior generalists at the policy level often distrust or discount the judgments of analytic professionals and place more weight on reports from operational sources.<sup>12</sup> In response to this

<sup>10</sup> HSCI, *Hearings* (fn. 4), 656-57.

<sup>11</sup> Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence* (New York: Basic Books 1967), 42-62, 126, 179.  
<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, *passim*. The counterpoint of Cooper (fn. 5) and McGarvey (fn. 5) presents a perfect illustration.

phenomenon, the suggestion has been made to *legislate* the requirement that decision makers consider analyses by the CIA's Intelligence Directorate (now the National Foreign Assessment Center) before establishing policy.<sup>13</sup> Such a requirement would offer no more than wishful formalism. Statutory fiat cannot force human beings to value one source above another. "No power has yet been found," DCI Richard Helms has testified, "to force Presidents of the United States to pay attention on a continuing basis to people and papers when confidence has been lost in the originator."<sup>14</sup> Moreover, principals tend to believe that they have a wider point of view than middle-level analysts and are better able to draw conclusions from raw data. That point of view underlies their fascination with current intelligence and their impatience with the reflective interpretations in "finished" intelligence.<sup>15</sup>

The dynamics of decision are also not conducive to analytic refinement. In a crisis, both data and policy outpace analysis, the ideal process of staffing and consultation falls behind the press of events, and careful estimates cannot be digested in time. As Winston Churchill recalled of the hectic days of spring 1940, "The Defence Committee of the War Cabinet sat almost every day to discuss the reports of the Military Co-ordination Committee and those of the Chiefs of Staff; and their conclusions or divergences were again referred to frequent Cabinets. All had to be explained or reexplained; and by the time this process was completed, the whole scene had often changed."<sup>16</sup> Where there is ample time for decision, on the other hand, the previously mentioned bureaucratic impediments gain momentum.<sup>17</sup> Just as information processing is frustrated by constraints on the time that harried principals can spend scrutinizing analytic papers, it is constrained by the funds that a government can spend. To which priorities

<sup>13</sup> Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, *Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection* (New York: Basic Books 1976), 204.

<sup>14</sup> Quoted in SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), 1, 82.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 267, 276; SSCI, *Staff Report, Current Action in Chile 1963-1973*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 48-49. The Senate Committee deplored the tendency of decision makers to focus on the latest raw data rather than on refined analyses, a practice that contributed to the intelligence failure in the 1974 Cyprus crisis. SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), 1, 443. But the failure in the October War was largely due to the *reverse* phenomenon: disregarding warning indicators because they contradicted finished intelligence that minimized the possibility of war. HSCI Draft Report (fn. 4), 78; Ben-Zvi (fn. 4), 386, 394; Perlmutter (fn. 4), 453.

<sup>16</sup> Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1948), 587-88.

<sup>17</sup> "Where the end is knowledge, as in the scientific community, time serves intelligence; where the end is something else—as in practically every organization but those devoted entirely to scholarship—time subverts intelligence, since in the long run, the central institutionalized structures and aims (the maintenance of authority, the accommodation of departmental rivalries, the service of established doctrine) will prevail." Wilensky (fn. 11), 77.

should scarce resources be allocated? The Schlesinger Report of 1971, which led to President Nixon's reorganization of U.S. intelligence, noted that criticisms of analytic products were often translated into demands for more extensive collection of data, but "Seldom does anyone ask if a further reduction in uncertainty, however small, is worth its cost."<sup>18</sup> Authorities do not always know, however, which issues require the greatest attention and which uncertainties harbor the fewest potential threats. Beyond the barriers that authority, organization, and scarcity pose to intelligence lie more fundamental and less remediable intellectual sources of error.

1. *Ambiguity of evidence.* Intelligence veterans have noted that "estimating is what you do when you do not know,"<sup>19</sup> but "it is inherent in a great many situations that after reading the estimate, you will still not know."<sup>20</sup> These observations highlight an obvious but most important obstacle to accuracy in analysis. It is the role of intelligence to extract certainty from uncertainty and to facilitate coherent decision in an incoherent environment. (In a certain and coherent environment there is less need for intelligence.) To the degree they reduce uncertainty by extrapolating from evidence riddled with ambiguities, analysts risk oversimplifying reality and desensitizing the consumers of intelligence to the dangers that lurk within the ambiguities; to the degree they do not resolve ambiguities, analysts risk being dismissed by annoyed consumers who see them as not having done their job. Uncertainty reflects inadequacy of data, which is usually assumed to mean *lack* of information. But ambiguity can also be aggravated by an *excess* of data. In attack warning, there is the problem of "noise" and deception; in operational evaluation (particularly in a war such as Vietnam), there is the problem of overload from the high volume of finished analyses, battlefield statistics, reports, bulletins, reconnaissance, and communications intercepts flowing upward through multiple channels at a rate exceeding the capacity of officials to absorb or scrutinize them judiciously. (From the CIA alone, the White House received current intelligence dailies, Weekly Reports, daily Intelligence Information Cables, occasional Special Reports and specific memoranda, and analyses from the CIA Vietnam Working Group.) Similarly, in estimates for defense planning, there is the problem of innumerable and endlessly refined indices of the strategic balance, and the

<sup>18</sup> Quoted in SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), 1, 274.

<sup>19</sup> Sherman Kent, "Estimates and Influence," *Foreign Service Journal*, XLVI (April 1969), 17.

<sup>20</sup> Hughes (fn. 2), 43.

2. *Ambivalence of judgment.* Where there are ambiguous and conflicting indicators (the context of most failures of intelligence), the imperatives of honesty and accuracy leave a careful analyst no alternative but ambivalence. There is usually *some* evidence to support *any* prediction. For instance, the CIA reported in June 1964 that a Chinese instructor (deemed not "particularly qualified to make this remark") had told troops in a course in guerrilla warfare, "We will have the atom bomb in a matter of months."<sup>21</sup> Several months later the Chinese did perform their first nuclear test. If the report had been the only evidence, should analysts have predicted the event? If they are not to make a leap of faith and ignore the data that do not mesh, analysts will issue estimates that waffle. In trying to elicit nuances of probability from the various possibilities not foreclosed by the data, cautious estimates may reduce ambivalence, but they may become Delphic or generalized to the point that they are not useful guides to decision. (A complaint I have heard in conversations with several U.S. officials is that many past estimates of Soviet objectives could substitute the name of any other great power in history—Imperial Rome, 16th-century Spain, Napoleonic France—and sound equally valid.) Hedging is the legitimate intellectual response to ambiguity, but it can be politically counterproductive, if the value of intelligence is to shock consumers out of wishfulness and cognitive insensitivity. A wishful decision maker can fasten onto that half of an ambivalent analysis that supports his pre-disposition.<sup>22</sup> A more objective official may escape this temptation, but may consider the estimate useless because it does not provide "the answer."

3. *Atrophy of reforms.* Disasters always stimulate organizational changes designed to avert the same failures in the future. In some cases these changes work. In many instances, however, the changes persist formally but erode substantively. Standard procedures are constant. Dramatic failures occur only intermittently. If the reforms in procedure they have provoked do not fulfill day-to-day organizational needs—or

<sup>21</sup> CIA Intelligence Information Cable, "Remarks of the Chief of the Nanking Military Academy and Other Chinese Leaders on the Situation in South Vietnam," June 25, 1964, in Lyndon B. Johnson Library National Security Files, Vietnam Country File [hereafter cited as LBJL/NSF-VNCF], Vol. XII, item 55.  
<sup>22</sup> See for example, U.S. Department of Defense, *The Senator Gravel Edition: The Pentagon Papers* (Boston: Beacon Press 1971) [hereafter cited as *Pentagon Papers*], Vol. II, 99; Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake* (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown 1972), 364; Special National Intelligence Estimate 53-64, "Chances for a Stable Government in South Vietnam," September 18, 1964, and McGeorge Bundy's covering letter to the President, in LBJL/NSF-VNCF, Vol. XIII, item 48.

dependence of assessments of capabilities on complex and variable assumptions about the doctrine, scenarios, and intentions that would govern their use.

Because it is the job of decision makers to decide, they cannot react to ambiguity by deferring judgment.<sup>23</sup> When the problem is an environment that lacks clarity, an overload of conflicting data, and lack of time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity abets instinct and allows intuition to drive analysis. Intelligence can fail because the data are too permissive for policy judgment rather than too constraining. When a welter of fragmentary evidence offers support to various interpretations, ambiguity is exploited by wishfulness. The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.<sup>24</sup> (This point should be distinguished from the theory of cognitive dissonance, which became popular with political scientists at the time it was being rejected by psychologists.)<sup>25</sup> There is some inverse relation between the importance of an assessment (when uncertainty is high) and the likelihood that it will be accurate. Lyndon Johnson could reject pessimistic NIE's on Vietnam by inferring more optimistic conclusions from the reports that came through command channels on pacification, interdiction, enemy casualties, and defections. Observers who assume Soviet malevolence focus on analyses of strategic forces that emphasize missile throw-weight and gross megatonnage (Soviet advantages); those who assume more benign Soviet intentions focus on analyses that emphasize missile accuracy and numbers of warheads (U.S. advantages). In assessing the naval balance, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld focused on numbers of ships (Soviet lead), and Congressman Les Aspin, a critic of the Pentagon, focused on total tonnage (U.S. lead).

<sup>21</sup> The textbooks agree, of course, that we should only believe reliable intelligence, and should never cease to be suspicious, but what is the use of such feeble maxims? They belong to that wisdom which for want of anything better scribbles of systems and compendia resort to when they run out of ideas." Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976), 117.

<sup>22</sup> Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970), 132; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976), chap. 4; Floyd Allport, *Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure*, cited in Shlaim (fn. 2), 358. Cognitive theory suggests that uncertainty provokes decision makers to separate rather than integrate their values, to deny that inconsistencies between values exist, and even to see contradictory values as mutually supportive. John Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974), 105-8.

<sup>23</sup> See William J. McGuire, "Selective Exposure: A Summing Up," in R. P. Abelson and others, eds., *Theories of Cognitive Consistency* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1968), and Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: Free Press 1977), 213-14.



## III. THE ELUSIVENESS OF SOLUTIONS

If they do not atrophy, most solutions proposed to obviate intelligence dysfunctions have two edges: in reducing one vulnerability, they increase another. After the seizure of the *Pueblo*, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was reprimanded for misplacing a message that could have prevented the incident. The colonel responsible developed a careful microfilming operation in the message center to ensure a record of transmittal of cables to authorities in the Pentagon. Implementing this check, however, created a three-to-four hour delay—another potential source of failure—in getting cables to desk analysts whose job was to keep reporting current.<sup>29</sup> Thus, procedural solutions often constitute two steps forward and one step back; organizational fixes cannot transcend the basic barriers. The lessons of Pearl Harbor led to the establishment of a Watch Committee and National Indications Center in Washington. Although this solution eliminated a barrier in the communication system, it did not prevent the failure of timely alert to the Chinese intervention in Korea or the 1973 October War, because it did not eliminate the ambiguity barrier. (Since then, the Watch Committee has been replaced by the DCI's Strategic Warning Staff.) DIA was reorganized four times within its first ten years; yet it continued to leave most observers dissatisfied. The Agranat Commission's review of Israel's 1973 intelligence failure produced proposals for institutional reform that are striking because they amount to copying the American system of the same time—which had failed in exactly the same way as the Israeli system.<sup>30</sup> Reform is not hopeless, but hopes placed in solutions most often proposed—such as the following—should be circumscribed.

1. *Assume the worst.* A common reaction to traumatic surprise is the recommendation to cope with ambiguity and ambivalence by acting on the most threatening possible interpretations. If there is *any* evidence of threat, assume it is valid, even if the *apparent* weight of contrary indicators is greater. In retrospect, when the point of reference is an

<sup>29</sup> McGarvey (fn. 26), 16.

<sup>30</sup> Shlaim (fn. 2), 375-77. The proposals follow, with their U.S. analogues noted in parentheses: appoint a special intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister (Director of Central Intelligence) to supplement the military chief of intelligence; reinforce the Foreign Ministry's research department (Bureau of Intelligence and Research); more autonomy for non-military intelligence (CIA); amend rules for transmitting raw intelligence to research agencies, the Defense Minister, and the Prime Minister (routing of signals intelligence from the National Security Agency); restructure military intelligence (creation of DIA in 1961); establish a central evaluation unit (Office of National Estimates). On the U.S. intelligence failure in 1973, see the HSCI Draft Report (fn. 4), 78-79.

if, as often happens, they complicate operations and strain the organization's resources—they fall into disuse or become token practices. After the postmortem of North Korea's downing of a U.S. EC-121 monitoring aircraft in 1969, there was, for several months, a great emphasis on risk assessments for intelligence collection missions. Generals and admirals personally oversaw the implementation of new procedures for making the assessments. Six months later, majors and captains were doing the checking. "Within a year the paperwork was spot-checked by a major and the entire community slid back to its old way of making a 'quick and dirty' rundown of the JCS criteria when sending in reconnaissance mission proposals."<sup>31</sup> The downing of the U-2 over the Soviet Union in 1960 and the capture of the intelligence ship *Pueblo* in 1968 had been due in part to the fact that the process of risk assessment for specific collection missions, primarily the responsibility of overworked middle-level officers, had become ponderous, sloppy, or ritualized.<sup>32</sup> At a higher level, a National Security Council Intelligence Committee was established in 1971 to improve responsiveness of intelligence staff to the needs of policy makers. But since the subcabinet-level consumers who made up the committee were pressed by other responsibilities, it lapsed in importance and was eventually abolished.<sup>33</sup> A comparable NSC committee that *did* serve tangible day-to-day needs of consumers to integrate intelligence and policy—the Verification Panel, which dealt with SALT—was more effective, but it was issue-oriented rather than designed to oversee the intelligence process itself. Organizational innovations will not improve the role of intelligence in policy unless they flow from the decision makers' views of their own needs and unless they provide frequent practical benefits.

None of these three barriers are accidents of structure or process. They are inherent in the nature of intelligence and the dynamics of work. As such, they constitute severe constraints on the efficacy of structural reform.

<sup>31</sup> Patrick J. McGarvey, *CIA: The Myth and the Madness* (Baltimore: Penguin 1974), 16.

<sup>32</sup> David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The U-2 Affair* (New York: Random House 1962), 56, 176, 180; Trevor Armbrister, *A Matter of Accountability* (New York: Coward-McCann 1970), 116-18, 141-45, 159, 187-95; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Report, Inquiry Into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents* [hereafter cited as *Pueblo and EC-121 Report*], 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 1622-24, 1650-51; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Inquiry Into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents* [hereafter cited as *Pueblo and EC-121 Hearings*], 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 693-94, 699-700, 703-7, 714, 722, 734, 760, 773-78, 815-16.

<sup>33</sup> SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 61-62; HSCI Draft Report (fn. 4), 82.

actual disaster attributable to a mistaken calculation of probabilities, this response is always justifiable, but it is impractical as a guide to standard procedure. Operationalizing worst-case analysis requires extraordinary expense; it risks being counterproductive if it is effective (by provoking enemy countermeasures or pre-emption), and it is likely to be ineffective because routinization will discredit it. Many Israeli observers deduced from the 1973 surprise that defense planning could only rest on the assumption that no attack warning will be available, and that precautionary mobilization should always be undertaken even when there is only dubious evidence of impending Arab action.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, American hawks argue that if the Soviets' intentions are uncertain, the only prudent course is to assume they are seeking the capability to win a nuclear war.

In either case, the norm of assuming the worst poses high financial costs. Frequent mobilizations strain the already taut Israeli economy. Moreover, countermobilization can defeat itself. Between 1971 and 1973, the Egyptians three times undertook exercises similar to those that led to the October attack; Israel mobilized in response, and nothing happened. It was the paradox of self-negating prophecy.<sup>32</sup> The Israeli Chief of Staff was sharply criticized for the unnecessary cost.<sup>33</sup> The danger of hypersensitivity appeared in 1977, when General Gur believed Sadat's offer to come to Jerusalem to be a camouflage for an Egyptian attack; he began Israeli maneuvers in the Sinai, which led Egypt to begin maneuvers of its own, heightening the risk of accidental war.<sup>34</sup> To estimate the requirements for deterrence and defense, worst-case assumptions present an open-ended criterion. The procurement of all the hedges possible for nuclear war-fighting—large increments in offensive forces, alert status, hardening of command-control-and-communications, active and passive defenses—would add billions to the U.S. defense budget. Moreover, prudent hedging in policy should be distinguished from net judgment of probabilities in estimates.<sup>35</sup>

Alternatively, precautionary escalation or procurement may act as self-fulfilling prophecies, either through a catalytic spiral of mobiliza-

<sup>31</sup> Shlaim (fn. 2), 379; Handel (fn. 4), 62-63.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.

<sup>33</sup> Shlaim (fn. 2), 358-59. The Israeli command estimated a higher probability of attack in May 1973 than it did in October. Having been proved wrong in May, Chief of Staff Elazar lost credibility in challenging intelligence officers, complained that he could no longer argue effectively against them, and consequently was unable to influence his colleagues when he was right. Personal communication from Michael Handel, November 15, 1977.

<sup>34</sup> *Washington Post*, November 27, 1977, p. A17.

<sup>35</sup> Raymond Garthoff, "On Estimating and Impugning Intentions," *International Security*, II (Winter 1978), 22.

tion (à la World War I) or an arms race that heightens tension, or doctrinal hedges that make the prospect of nuclear war more "thinkable." Since evidence for the "action-reaction" hypothesis of U.S. and Soviet nuclear policies is meager, and arms races can sometimes be stabilizing rather than dangerous, the last point is debatable. Still, a large unilateral increase in strategic forces by either the United States or the Soviet Union would, at the least, destroy the possibility of gains desired from SALT. A surprise attack or defeat make the costs of *underestimates* obvious and dramatic; the unnecessary defense costs due to *overestimates* can only be surmised, since the minimum needed for deterrence is uncertain. Worst-case analysis as a standard norm would also exacerbate the "cry wolf" syndrome. *Unambiguous* threat is not an intelligence problem; rather, the challenge lies in the response to fragmentary, contradictory, and dubious indicators. Most such indicators turn out to be false alarms. Analysts who reflexively warn of disaster are soon derided as hysterical. General William Westmoreland recalled that the warnings that had been issued before the 1968 Tet Offensive were ignored. U.S. headquarters in Saigon had each year predicted a winter-spring offensive, "and every year it had come off without any dire results. . . . Was not the new offensive to be more of the same?"<sup>36</sup>

Given the experience of intelligence professionals that most peacetime indicators of suspicious enemy activity lead to nothing, what Colonel who has the watch some night will risk "lighting up the board" in the White House simply on the basis of weak apprehension? How many staffers will risk waking a tired President, especially if they have done so before and found the action to be needless? How many distracting false alarms will an overworked President tolerate before he makes it clear that aides should exercise discretion in bothering him? Even if worst-case analysis is promulgated in principle, it will be compromised in practice. Routinization corrodes sensitivity. Every day that an expected threat does not materialize dulls receptivity to the reality of danger. As Roberta Wohlstetter wrote of pre-Pearl Harbor vigilance, "We are constantly confronted by the paradox of pessimistic realism of phrase coupled with loose optimism in practice."<sup>37</sup> Seeking to cover all contingencies, worst-case analysis loses focus and salience; by providing a theoretical guide for everything, it provides a practical guide for very little.

<sup>36</sup> Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1976), 316. See the postmortem by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, quoted in Herbert Y. Schandler, *The Unmaking of a President* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977), 70, 76, 79-80.

<sup>37</sup> Wohlstetter (fn. 4), 69.

2. *Multiple advocacy.* Blunders are often attributed to decision makers' inattention to unpopular viewpoints or to a lack of access to higher levels of authority by dissident analysts. To reduce the chances of such mistakes, Alexander George proposes institutionalizing a balanced, open, and managed process of debate, so that no relevant assessments will be submerged by unchallenged premises or the bureaucratic strength of opposing officials.<sup>38</sup> The goal is unobjectionable, and formalized multiple advocacy certainly would help, not hinder. But confidence that it will help systematically and substantially should be tentative. In a loose sense, there has usually been multiple advocacy in the U.S. policy process, but it has not prevented mistakes in deliberation or decision. Lyndon Johnson did not decide for limited bombing and gradual troop commitment in Vietnam in 1965 because he was not presented with extensive and vigorous counterarguments. He considered seriously (indeed solicited) Under Secretary of State George Ball's analysis, which drew on NIE's and lower-level officials' pessimistic assessments that any escalation would be a mistake. Johnson was also well aware of the arguments by DCI John McCone and the Air Force from the other extreme—that massive escalation in the air war was necessary because gradualism would be ineffective.<sup>39</sup> The President simply chose to accept the views of the middle-of-the-road opponents of both Ball and McCone.

To the extent that multiple advocacy works, and succeeds in maximizing the number of views promulgated and in supporting the argumentative resources of all contending analysts, it may simply highlight ambiguity rather than resolve it. In George's ideal situation, the process would winnow out unsubstantiated premises and assumptions about ends-means linkages. But in the context of data overload, uncertainty, and time constraints, multiple advocacy may in effect give all of the various viewpoints an aura of empirical respectability and allow a leader to choose whichever accords with his predisposition.<sup>40</sup> The

<sup>38</sup> George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (September 1972). My usage of the term multiple advocacy is looser than George's.

<sup>39</sup> Henry F. Graff, *The Tuesday Cabinet* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 68-71; Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, forthcoming), chap. 4; Ball memorandum of October 5, 1964, reprinted as "Top Secret: The Prophecy the President Rejected," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 230 (July 1972); McCone, memorandum of April 2, 1965, in LBJL/NSF:VNCF, Troop Decision folder, item 14b.

<sup>40</sup> Betts (fn. 5), 199-202; Schandler (fn. 36), 177. George (fn. 38), 759, stipulates that multiple advocacy requires "no major maldistribution" of power, influence, competence, information, analytic resources, and bargaining skills. But, except for resources and the right to representation, the foregoing are subjective factors that can rarely be equalized by design. If they are equalized, in the context of imperfect data and time

efficacy of multiple advocacy (which is greatest under conditions of manageable data and low ambiguity) may vary inversely with the potential for intelligence failure (which is greatest under conditions of confusing data and high uncertainty). The process could, of course, bring to the surface ambiguities where false certainty had prevailed; in these cases, it would be as valuable as George believes. But if multiple advocacy increases ambivalence and leaders do *not* indulge their instincts, it risks promoting conservatism or paralysis. Dean Acheson saw danger in presidential indecisiveness aggravated by debate: "I know your theory," he grumbled to Neustadt. "You think Presidents should be warned. You're wrong. Presidents should be given confidence."<sup>41</sup> Even Clausewitz argued that deference to intelligence can frustrate bold initiative and squander crucial opportunities. Critics charged Henry Kissinger with crippling U.S. intelligence by refusing to keep analysts informed of his intimate conversations with foreign leaders.<sup>42</sup> To do so, however, would have created the possibility of leaks and might thereby have crippled his diplomatic maneuvers. It is doubtful that Nixon's initiative to China could have survived prior debate, dissent, and analysis by the bureaucracy.

It is unclear that managed multiple advocacy would yield markedly greater benefits than the redundancy and competitiveness that have long existed. (At best it would perfect the "market" of ideas in the manner that John Stuart Mill believed made liberalism conducive to the emergence of truth.) The first major reorganization of the American intelligence community in 1946-1947 emphasized centralization in order to avert future Pearl Harbors caused by fragmentation of authority; the latest reorganization (Carter's 1977 extension of authority of the Director of Central Intelligence over military intelligence programs) emphasized centralization to improve efficiency and coherence. Yet decentralization has always persisted in the overlapping division of labor between several separate agencies. Recent theorists of bureaucracy see such duplication as beneficial because competition exposes disagreement and presents policy makers with a wider range of views. Redundancy inhibits consensus, impedes the herd instinct in the decision process, and

pressure, erroneous arguments as well as accurate ones will be reinforced. Non-expert principals have difficulty arbitrating intellectually between experts who disagree.

<sup>41</sup> Quoted in Steinbruner (fn. 22), 332.

<sup>42</sup> Clausewitz (fn. 21), 117-18; HSCI, *Hearings* (fn. 4), 634-36; William J. Barnard, "Intelligence and Policymaking in an Institutional Context," in U.S. Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy [hereafter cited as Murphy Commission], *Appendices* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., June 1975), Vol. VII, 32.

thus reduces the likelihood of failure due to unchallenged premises or cognitive errors. To ensure that redundancy works in this way, critics oppose a process that yields coordinated estimates—negotiated to the least common denominator, and cleared by all agencies before they are passed to the principals. George's "custodian" of multiple advocacy could ensure that this does not happen. There are, of course, trade-off costs for redundancy. Maximization of competition limits specialization. In explaining the failure of intelligence to predict the 1974 coup in Portugal, William Hyland pointed out, "if each of the major analytical components stretch their resources over the same range, there is the risk that areas of less priority will be superficially covered."<sup>43</sup>

The problem with arguing that the principals themselves should scrutinize numerous contrasting estimates in their integrity is that they are constantly overwhelmed by administrative responsibilities and "action items"; they lack the time to read, ponder, and digest that large amount of material. Most intelligence products, even NIE's, are never read by policy makers; at best, they are used by second-level staffers as background material for briefing their seniors.<sup>44</sup> Consumers want previously coordinated analyses in order to save time and effort. In this respect, the practical imperatives of day-to-day decision contradict the theoretical logic of ideal intelligence.

3. *Consolidation.* According to the logic of estimative redundancy, more analysis is better than less. Along this line of reasoning, Senate investigators noted critically that, as of fiscal year 1975, the U.S. intelligence community still allocated 72 percent of its budget for collection of information, 19 percent for processing technical data, and less than 9 percent for production of finished analyses. On the other hand, according to the logic of those who focus on the time constraints of leaders and the confusion that results from innumerable publications, quantity counteracts quality. The size of the CIA's intelligence directorate and the complexity of the production process "precluded close association between policymakers and analysts, between the intelligence product and policy informed by intelligence analysis."<sup>45</sup> For the sake of clarity and acuity, the intelligence bureaucracy should be streamlined.

<sup>43</sup> HSCI, *Hearings* (fn. 4), 778.

<sup>44</sup> SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), IV, 57; Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1956), 40. During brief service as just a low-level staff member of the National Security Council, even I never had time to read all the intelligence analyses relevant to my work.

<sup>45</sup> SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 344, and IV, 95 (emphasis deleted).

This view is consistent with the development of the Office of National Estimates (ONE), which was established in 1950 and designed to coordinate the contributions of the various organs in the intelligence community for the Director of Central Intelligence. DCI Walter Bedell Smith envisioned an operation of about a thousand people. But William L. Langer, the scholar Smith imported to organize ONE, wanted a tight group of excellent analysts and a personnel ceiling of fifty. Langer prevailed, and though the number of staff members in ONE crept upwards, it probably never exceeded a hundred in its two decades of existence.<sup>46</sup> Yet ONE could not eliminate the complexity of the intelligence process; it could only coordinate and integrate it for the production of National Intelligence Estimates. Other sources found conduits to decision makers (to Cabinet members through their own agencies, or to the President through the National Security Council). And some policy makers, though they might dislike the cacophony of multiple intelligence agencies, were suspicious of the consolidated NIE's, knowing that there was pressure to compromise views in order to gain agreement. Over time, the dynamics of bureaucracy also blunted the original objectives of ONE's founder. From a cosmopolitan elite corps, it evolved into an insular unit of senior careerists from the CIA. The National Intelligence Officer system that replaced ONE reduced the number of personnel responsible for coordinating NIE's, but has been criticized on other grounds such as greater vulnerability to departmental pressures. Bureaucratic realities have frustrated other attempts to consolidate the intelligence structure. The Defense Intelligence Agency was created in 1961 to unify Pentagon intelligence and reduce duplicative activities of the three service intelligence agencies, but these agencies regenerated themselves; in less than a decade they were larger than they had been before DIA's inception.<sup>47</sup>

The numerous attempts to simplify the organization of the analytic process thus have not solved the major problems. Either the streamlining exercises were short-lived, and bureaucratization crept back, or the changes had to be moderated to avoid the new dangers they entailed. Contraction is inconsistent with the desire to minimize failure by "plugging holes" in intelligence, since compensating for an inadequacy usually requires *adding* personnel and mechanisms; pruning the structure that contributes to procedural sluggishness or complexity may create lacunae in substantive coverage.

<sup>46</sup> Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars* (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis 1976), 20.

<sup>47</sup> Gilbert W. Fitzhugh and others, *Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense. By the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., July 1970), 45-46.

4. *Devil's advocacy*. Multiple advocacy ensures that all views held by individuals within the analytic system will be granted serious attention. Some views that should receive attention, however, may not be held by anyone within the system. Virtually no analysts in Israel or the United States believed the Arabs would be "foolish" enough to attack in 1973. Many observers have recommended institutionalizing dissent by assigning to someone the job of articulating apparently ridiculous interpretations to ensure that they are forced into consideration. Establishing an official devil's advocate would probably do no harm (although some argue that it may perversely facilitate consensus-building by domesticating true dissenters or providing the illusory comfort that all views have been carefully examined;<sup>48</sup> worse, it might delude decision makers into believing that *uncertainties* have been resolved). But in any case, the role is likely to atrophy into a superfluous or artificial ritual. By the definition of the job, the devil's advocate is likely to be dismissed by decision makers as a sophist who only makes an argument because he is supposed to, not because of its real merits. Institutionalizing devil's advocacy is likely to be perceived in practice as institutionalizing the "cry wolf" problem; "There are limits to the utility of a 'devil's advocate' who is not a true devil."<sup>49</sup> He becomes someone to be indulged and disregarded. Given its rather sterile definition, the role is not likely to be filled by a prestigious official (who will prefer more "genuine" responsibility); it will therefore be easier for policy makers to dismiss the arguments. In order to avert intelligence failures, an analyst is needed who tells decision makers what they don't want to hear, dampening the penchant for wishful thinking. But since it is the job of the devil's advocate to do this habitually, and since he is most often wrong (as would be inevitable, since otherwise the conventional wisdom would eventually change), he digs his own grave. If the role is routinized and thus ritualized, it loses impact; but if it is not routinized, there can be no assurance that it will be operating when it is needed.

Despite the last point, which is more important in attack warning than in operational evaluation or defense planning, there is a compromise that offers more realistic benefits: *ad hoc* utilization of "real devils." This selective or biased form of multiple advocacy may be achieved by periodically giving a platform within the intelligence process to minority views that can be argued more persuasively by prestigious analysts outside the bureaucracy. This is what the President's Foreign Intelli-

<sup>48</sup> Alexander George, "The Devil's Advocate: Uses and Limitations," Murphy Commission, *Appendices* (in. 42), II, 84-85; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception* (in. 22), 417.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 416.

gence Advisory Board and DCI George Bush did in 1976 by commissioning the "Team B" critique of NIE's on Soviet strategic objectives and capabilities. Dissenters within the intelligence community who were skeptical of Soviet intentions were reinforced by a panel of sympathetic scholars, with a mandate to produce an analysis of their own.<sup>50</sup> This controversial exercise, even if it erred in many of its own ways (as dovidish critics contend), had a major impact in promoting the re-examination of premises and methodology in U.S. strategic estimates. The problem with this option is that it depends on the political biases of the authorities who commission it. If it were balanced by a comparable "Team C" of analysts at the opposite extreme (more optimistic about Soviet intentions than the intelligence community consensus), the exercise would approach regular multiple advocacy, with the attendant limitations of that solution. Another variant would be intermittent designation of devil's advocates in periods of crisis, when the possibility of disaster is greater than usual. Since the role would then be fresh each time, rather than ritualized, the advocate might receive a more serious hearing. The problem here is that receptivity of decision makers to information that contradicts preconceptions varies inversely with their personal commitments, and commitments grow as crisis progresses.<sup>51</sup>

5. *Sanctions and incentives*. Some critics attribute intelligence failures to dishonest reporting or the intellectual mediocrity of analysts. Suggested remedies include threats of punishment for the former, and inducements to attract talent to replace the latter. Other critics emphasize that, will or ability aside, analytic integrity is often submerged by the policy makers' demands for intelligence that suits them; "the NIEs ought to be responsive to the evidence, not the policymaker."<sup>52</sup> Holders of this point of view would institutionalize the analysts' autonomy. Unobjectionable in principle (though if analysts are totally unresponsive to the consumer, he will ignore them), these implications cannot easily be operationalized without creating as many problems as they solve. Self-serving operational evaluations from military sources, such as optimistic reports on progress in the field in Vietnam or pessimistic strategic estimates, might indeed be obviated if analysts in DIA, the service intelligence agencies, and command staffs were credibly threat-

<sup>50</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report, The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Capability and Objectives*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978; *New York Times*, December 26, 1976, pp. 1, 14; *Washington Post*, January 2, 1977, pp. A1, A4.

<sup>51</sup> George H. Poter, "The Intelligence Gap: Hypotheses on the Process of Surprise," *International Studies Notes*, II (Fall 1976), 15.

<sup>52</sup> Cline (in. 46), 140.

ened with sanctions (firing, nonpromotion, reprimand, or disgrace). Such threats theoretically could be a countervailing pressure to the career incentives analysts have to promote the interests of their services. But, except in the most egregious cases, it is difficult to apply such standards without arbitrariness and bias, given the problem of ambiguity; it simply encourages an alternative bias or greater ambivalence. Moreover, military professionals would be in an untenable position, pulled in opposite directions by two sets of authorities. To apply the sanctions, civil authorities would have to violate the most hallowed military canon by having civilian intelligence officials interfere in the chain of command. In view of these dilemmas, it is easier to rely on the limited effectiveness of redundancy or multiple advocacy to counteract biased estimates.

Critics concerned with attracting better talent into the analytic bureaucracy propose to raise salaries and to provide more high-ranking positions (supergrades) to which analysts can aspire. Yet American government salaries are already very high by academic standards. Those who attribute DIA's mediocrity (compared to CIA), to an insufficient allocation of supergrades and a consequent inability to retain equivalent personnel are also mistaken; as of 1975 the difference in the grade structures of DIA and CIA had been negligible.<sup>53</sup> And the fact that CIA analysts cannot rise to a supergrade position (GS-16 to 18) without becoming administrators is not convincing evidence that good analysts are underpaid; GS-15 salaries are higher than the maximum for most tenured professors.

Non-military analysts, or high-ranking soldiers with no promotions to look forward to, have fewer professional crosspressures to contend with than military intelligence officers. But an analyst's autonomy varies inversely with his influence, and hortatory injunctions to be steadfast and intellectually honest cannot ensure that he will be; they cannot transcend political realities or the idiosyncrasies of leaders. Richard Helms notes that "there is no way to insulate the DCI from unpopularity at the hands of Presidents or policymakers if he is making assessments which run counter to administrative policy. That is a built-in hazard of the job. Sensible Presidents understand this. On the other hand they are human too." Integrity untinged by political sensitivity courts professional suicide. If the analyst insists on perpetually

<sup>53</sup> SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 352. A valid criticism is that military personnel systems and promotion standards penalized intelligence officers, thus encouraging competent officers to avoid intelligence assignments. This situation was rectified in the service intelligence agencies by the early 1970's, but not within DIA. *Ibid.*; Betts (fn. 5), 196-97.

bearing bad news, he is likely to be beheaded. Helms himself succumbed to policy makers' pressures in compromising estimates of the MIRV capabilities of the Soviet SS-9 missile in 1969, and the prospects for Cambodia in 1970.<sup>54</sup> The same practical psychological constraints are reflected in an incident in which Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt, who had already infuriated Nixon and Kissinger several times with his strategic estimates, was determined to present yet another unwelcome analysis; Secretary of Defense Schlesinger dissuaded him with the warning, "To give a briefing like that in the White House these days would be just like shooting yourself in the foot."<sup>55</sup>

6. *Cognitive rehabilitation and methodological consciousness.* The intertwining of analysis and decision and the record of intelligence failures due to mistaken preconceptions and unexamined assumptions suggest the need to reform the intelligence consumers' attitudes, awareness, and modes of perception. If leaders were made self-conscious and self-critical about their own psychologies, they might be less vulnerable to cognitive pathologies. This approach to preventing intelligence failure is the most basic and metaphysical. If policy makers focused on the methodologies of competing intelligence producers, they would be more sensitive to the biases and leaps of faith in the analyses passed to them. "In official fact-finding . . . the problem is not merely to open up a wide range of policy alternatives but to create incentives for persistent criticism of evidentiary value."<sup>56</sup> Improvement would flow from mechanisms that force decision makers to make explicit rather than unconscious choices, to exercise judgment rather than engage in automatic perception, and to enhance their awareness of their own preconceptions.<sup>57</sup>

Unlike organizational structure, however, cognition cannot be altered by legislation. Intelligence consumers are political men who have risen by being more decisive than reflective, more aggressive than introspective, and confident as much as cautious. Few busy activists who have achieved success by thinking the way that they do will change their way of thinking because some theorist tells them to. Even if they could be forced to confront scholarly evidence of the dynamics of misperception, it is uncertain that they could consistently internalize it. Preconception cannot be abolished; it is in one sense just another word for "model" or

<sup>54</sup> SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 77-82. See also U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, National Security Act Amendment*, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, 14-24.

<sup>55</sup> Zumwalt, *On Watch* (New York: Quadrangle 1976), 459.

<sup>56</sup> Wilensky (fn. 11), 164.

<sup>57</sup> Jervis, *Perception and Misperception* (fn. 22), 181-87.



"paradigm"—a construct used to simplify reality, which any thinker needs in order to cope with complexity. There is a grain of truth in the otherwise pernicious maxim that an open mind is an empty mind. Moreover, the line between *perception* and *judgment* is very thin, and consumers cannot carefully scrutinize, compare, and evaluate the methodologies of competing analyses, for the same prosaic reason (the problem of expertise aside) that impedes many proposed reforms: they do not have the *time* to do so. Solutions that require principals to invest more attention than they already do are conceptually valid but operationally weak. Ideally, perhaps, each principal should have a Special Assistant for Rigor Enforcement.

Although most notable intelligence failures occur more often at the consuming than the producing end, it is impractical to place the burden for correcting those faults on the consumers. The most realistic strategy for improvement would be to have intelligence professionals anticipate the cognitive barriers to decision makers' utilization of their products. Ideally, the Director of Central Intelligence should have a theoretical temperament and personal skills in forcing unusual analyses to the attention of principals; he might act as George's "custodian" of the argumentation process. To fulfill this function, the DCI should be not only a professional analyst and an intellectual (of the twelve DCI's since 1946, only James Schlesinger met those criteria, and he served for only three months), but also a skilled bureaucratic politician. These qualifications seldom coincide. The DCI's coordinating staff and National Intelligence Officers should be adept at detecting, making explicit, and exposing to consumers the idiosyncracies in the assessments of various agencies—the *reasons* that the focus and conclusions of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research differ from those of DIA, or of naval intelligence, or of the CIA. For such a procedure to work, the consumers would have to favor it (as opposed to negotiated consensual estimates that would save them more time). There is always a latent tension between what facilitates timely decision and what promotes thoroughness and accuracy in assessment. The fact that there is no guaranteed prophylaxis against intelligence failures, however, does not negate the value of incremental improvements. The key is to see the problem of reform as one of modest refinements rather than as a systematic breakthrough.

#### IV. LIVING WITH FATALISM

Organizational solutions to intelligence failure are hampered by three basic problems: most procedural reforms that address specific

pathologies introduce or accent other pathologies; changes in analytic processes can never fully transcend the constraints of ambiguity and ambivalence; and more rationalized information systems cannot fully compensate for the predispositions, perceptual idiosyncrasies, and time constraints of political consumers. Solutions that address the psychology and analytic style of decision makers are limited by the difficulty of changing human thought processes and day-to-day habits of judgment by normative injunction. Most theorists have thus resigned themselves to the hope of marginal progress, "to improve the 'batting average'—say from .275 to .301—rather than to do away altogether with surprise."<sup>58</sup>

There is some convergence in the implications of all three ways of conceptualizing intelligence failures. Mistakes should be expected because the *paradoxes* are not resolvable; minor improvements are possible by reorganizing to correct *pathologies*; and despair is warranted because, seen *in perspective*, the record could be worse. Marginal improvements have, in fact, been steadily instituted since World War II. Although many have indeed raised new problems, most have yielded a net increase in the rationalization of the system. The diversification of sources of estimates of adversaries' military power has grown consistently, obviating the necessity to rely exclusively on military staffs. The resources and influence of civilian analysts of military data (principally in the CIA's Office of Strategic Research but also in its Directorate of Science and Technology) are unparalleled in any other nation's intelligence system. At the same time, the DCI's mechanism for coordinating the activities of all agencies—the Intelligence Community Staff—has grown and become more diverse and representative, and less an extension of the CIA, as more staffers have been added from the outside. In 1972, a separate Product Review Division was established within the staff to appraise the "objectivity, balance, and responsiveness" of intelligence studies on a regular basis. It has conducted postmortems of intelligence failures since then (the Yom Kippur War, the Cyprus crisis of 1974, the Indian nuclear test, and the seizure of the *Mayaguez*).<sup>59</sup> (Previously, postmortems had been conducted by the analysts who had failed, a procedure that hardly guaranteed objectivity.)

<sup>58</sup> Knorr (fn. 1), 460.

<sup>59</sup> SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 276, and IV, 85; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1977, 515-621; *Washington Post*, February 15, 1977, p. A6; Paul W. Blackstock, "The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Administration," *Armed Forces and Society*, 1 (February 1975), 238.

Within the Pentagon, capabilities for estimates relevant to planning were enhanced with the establishment of an office for Net Assessment, which analyzes the significance of foreign capabilities in comparison with U.S. forces. (CIA, DIA, and NIE's only estimate foreign capabilities.) Civilian direction of military intelligence was reinforced by an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence after the 1970 recommendation of the Fitzhugh Commission, and an Under Secretary for Policy in 1978. Experiments in improving communication between producers and consumers have been undertaken (such as, for example, the testing of a Defense Intelligence Board in late 1976). The dominance of operators within the intelligence community has also waned—especially since the phasing out of paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia and the severe reductions in size and status of CIA's covert action branch that began in 1973. Dysfunctions in the military communications system, which contributed to crises involving intelligence collection missions in the 1960's (the Israeli attack on the U.S.S. *Liberty* and North Korea's seizure of the *Pueblo*) were alleviated (though not cured) by new routing procedures and by instituting an "optimal scanning system" in the Pentagon.<sup>60</sup> Statistical analyses of strategic power have become progressively more rigorous and comprehensive; as staffs outside the executive branch—such as the Congressional Budget Office—have become involved in the process, they have also become more competitive.<sup>61</sup>

Few of the changes in structure and process have generated more costs than benefits. (Some critics believe, however, that the abolition of the Office and Board of National Estimates and their replacement with National Intelligence Officers was a net loss.) But it is difficult to prove that they have significantly reduced the incidence of intelligence failure. In the area of warning, for instance, new sophisticated coordination mechanisms have recently been introduced, and since the institution at the time of the 1974 Cyprus crisis of DCI "alert memoranda"—"brief notices in a form which cannot be overlooked"<sup>62</sup>—no

<sup>60</sup> Joseph C. Goulden, *Truth is the First Casualty* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1969), 101-4; Phil G. Goulding, *Confirm or Deny* (New York: Harper & Row 1970), 130-33; 269; *Pueblo and EC-121 Hearings* (fn. 27), 646-47, 665-73, 743-44, 780-82, 802-3, 865-67, 875, 880, 897-99; *Pueblo and EC-121 Report* (fn. 27), 1654-56, 1662-67; Armbrister (fn. 27), 196ff, 395; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Report, Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications: Phase I*, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, and *Phase II*, 2d sess., 1972.

<sup>61</sup> See, for example, James Blaker and Andrew Hamilton, *Assessing the NATO/Warning Pact Military Balance* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, December 1977).

<sup>62</sup> SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 61; Thomas G. Belden, "Indications, Warning, and Crisis Operations," *International Studies Quarterly*, XXI (March 1977), 192-93.

major warning failure has occurred. But the period of testing is as yet too brief to demonstrate that these adaptations are more effective than previous procedures. In the area of operational evaluation, it is clear that there was greater consciousness of the limitations and cost-ineffectiveness of aerial bombardment during the Vietnam War than there had been in Korea, due largely to the assessments made by the offices of Systems Analysis and International Security Affairs in the Pentagon and Secretary of Defense McNamara's utilization of CIA estimates and contract studies by external analytic organizations.<sup>63</sup> Yet this greater consciousness did not prevail until late in the war because it was not a consensus; Air Force and naval assessments of bombing effectiveness contradicted those of the critical civilian analysts. Nor has the elaboration and diversification of analytic resources for strategic estimates clearly reduced the potential for erroneous planning decisions. Determination of the salience and proper weight of conflicting indicators of strategic power and objectives or of the comparative significance of quantitative and qualitative factors is inextricable from the political debate over foreign policy: uncertainties always remain, leaving the individual's visceral fears or hopes as the elements that tilt the balance of judgment.

Although marginal reforms may reduce the probability of error, the unresolvable paradoxes and barriers to analytic and decisional accuracy will make some incidence of failure inevitable. Concern with intelligence failure then coincides with concern about how policy can hedge against the consequences of analytic inadequacy. Covering every hypothetical vulnerability would lead to bankruptcy, and hedging against one threat may aggravate a different one. The problem is thus one of priorities, and hedging against uncertainty is hardly easier than resolving it. Any measures that clarify the cost-benefit trade-offs in policy hedges are measures that mitigate the danger of intelligence failure.

<sup>63</sup> *Pentagon Papers*, IV, 111-12, 115-24, 217-32. CIA critiques of bombing results began even before the Tonkin Gulf crisis. CIA/OCI, Current Intelligence Memorandum, "Effectiveness of T-28 Strikes in Laos," June 26, 1964; CIA/DDI, Intelligence Memorandum, "Communist Reaction to Barrel Roll Missions," December 29, 1964. But ambivalence remained even within the CIA, which occasionally issued more sanguine evaluations—e.g., CIA Memorandum for National Security Council, "The Situation in Vietnam," June 28, 1965 (which McGeorge Bundy called directly to the President's attention), and CIA/OCI, Intelligence Memorandum, "Interdiction of Communist Infiltration Routes in Vietnam," June 24, 1965. (All memoranda are in LBJ/NSF-VNCF, Vol. I, item 5, Vol. III, items 28, 28a, 28b, Vol. VI A, items 4, 5, 8.) See also *Pentagon Papers*, IV, 71-74. See also the opposing assessments of the CIA, the civilian analysts in the Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs in NSSM-1 (the Nixon Administration's initial review of Vietnam policy), reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, Vol. 118, part 13, 92d Cong., 2d sess., May 10, 1972, pp. 16749-836.



One reasonable rule in principle would be to survey the hypothetical outcomes excluded by strategic premises as improbable but not impossible, identify those that would be disastrous if they *were* to occur, and then pay the price to hedge against them. This is no more practicable, however, than the pure form of worst-case analysis, because it requires willingness to bear and inflict severe costs for dubious reasons. Escalation in Vietnam, after all, was a hedge against allowing China to be tempted to "devour" the rest of Southeast Asia. The interaction of analytic uncertainty and decisional prudence is a vicious circle that makes the segregation of empirical intelligence and normative policy an unattainable Platonic ideal.

In the simplest situation, the intelligence system can avert policy failure by presenting relevant and undisputed facts to non-expert principals who might otherwise make decisions in ignorance. But these simple situations are not those in which major intelligence failures occur. Failures occur when ambiguity aggravates ambivalence. In these more important situations—Acheson and Clausewitz to the contrary—the intelligence officer may perform most usefully by *not* offering the answers sought by authorities, but by offering *questions*, acting as a Socratic agnostic, nagging decision makers into awareness of the full range of uncertainty, and making the authorities' calculations harder rather than easier. Sensitive leaders will reluctantly accept and appreciate this function. Most leaders will not; they will make mistakes, and will continue to bear the prime responsibility for "intelligence" failures. Two general values (which sound wistful in the context of the preceding fatalism) remain to guide the choice of marginal reforms: anything that facilitates dissent and access to authorities by intelligence producers, and anything that facilitates skepticism and scrutiny by consumers. The values are synergistically linked; one will not improve the use of intelligence without the other. (A third value, but one nearly impossible to achieve, would be anything that increases the time available to principals for reading and reflection.)

Intelligence failures are not only inevitable, they are natural. Some are even benign (if a success would not have changed policy). Scholars cannot legitimately view intelligence mistakes as bizarre, because they are no more common and no less excusable than academic errors. They are less forgivable only because they are more consequential. Error in scholarship is resolved dialectically, as deceptive data are exposed and regnant theories are challenged, refined, and replaced by new research. If decision makers had but world enough and time, they could rely on this process to solve their intelligence problems. But the press

of events precludes the luxury of letting theories sort themselves out over a period of years, as in academia. My survey of the intractability of the inadequacy of intelligence, and its inseparability from mistakes in decision, suggests one final conclusion that is perhaps most outrageously fatalistic of all: tolerance for disaster.

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T E N

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*Analysis:*  
*What It All Means*

THE ANALYTIC BRANCH of the CIA is given to tweedy, pipe-smoking intellectuals who work much as if they were doing research back in the universities whence many of them came. It probably has more Ph.D.'s than any other area of government and more than many colleges. Their expertise ranges from anthropology to zoology. Yet, for all that, they can be wrong.

On November 11, 1978, an envelope came to CIA Headquarters in Langley from the White House with instructions that it be opened by me personally. I found in it a short, handwritten note from President Carter:

To Cy, Zbig, Stan: I am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence. Assess our assets and as soon as possible give me a report concerning our abilities in the most important areas of the world. Make a joint recommendation on what we should do to improve your ability to give me political information and advice. J.C.

Although this was addressed to the Secretary of State and the President's National Security Adviser, as well as myself, it was obviously an implied complaint to me about our intelligence-reporting on Iran.

The President's note was a hard blow. Just a week earlier, in a private conversation, he had told me that I was doing a fine job

and that he wanted me to stay in it a long time. It was uncharacteristic of Jimmy Carter to flipflop this way. I suspected that Zbig Brzezinski was behind it. My suspicions were strengthened a few days later, when, despite the precautions taken to deliver the note privately, a story about it appeared in three newspapers simultaneously. I knew I had been set up as the scapegoat. When the Shah did fall, two months later, the easy explanation was that it was an "intelligence failure." A few years later Brzezinski confirmed my suspicion when he revealed in his book on the Carter presidency that he had "suggested" that the President write the note.<sup>1</sup> In fact, I had more than a suspicion at the time. Just a few weeks after the note arrived, I learned from a newsman that he was one of three journalists who had been called into the White House separately on the same day and actually shown the President's note — except that the heading had been changed to read only "To Stan."

Was there an intelligence failure over Iran that warranted Brzezinski's reaction? The answer is both yes and no. To the extent that it was yes, it was not the kind of failure Brzezinski meant. The complaint implicit in the memorandum he suggested to the President was that we had not warned that the Shah would be in as much trouble as he was by that time. Predicting revolutions, like the one against the Shah, or coups or surprise electoral reverses at the last minute will always be a chancy matter in intelligence work, as it is with the media, the business community, and scholars. Intelligence reporting on political affairs deserves to be judged on more than short-term forecasting. It is also more useful, because the policy-makers may have time to take corrective action. Still, the answer to the question of whether there was an intelligence failure in the matter of the Shah is partly yes; the CIA could have done a better job of emphasizing the deep currents that were running against him. This should have been done over the previous three or four years. Only then would there have been any real chance of our getting the Shah to change his course. Well before the President wrote his note, it was too late.

There were at least two fundamental and significant matters that we, and the Nixon and Ford administrations before us, had

1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Principle and Power: Memories of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), p. 367.

failed to identify and appreciate adequately. One was the extent of the dissatisfaction with the Shah and the other was the growing appeal of a renewed Islamic religious fundamentalism. We knew the Islamic mullahs resented the Shah's emphasis on secular education, his permitting activities that violated religious doctrine, such as Western-style dress and Western entertainment, and his curtailing some of the government's subsidy to the mullahs. We realized too that secular aspirants to political power resented the Shah's tight, personal control of the country's politics. And we knew that the merchant class expected a greater share in the nation's growing economic opportunities. What we didn't foresee was that all these groups would coalesce under a seventy-nine-year-old cleric then in exile in France, the Ayatollah Khomeini. Once the Shah had been deposed, the glue holding together these various factions disappeared. They began to fall apart, but the power of fundamentalism kept the revolution going. And to our surprise, the Islamic fundamentalists were strong enough to come out on top of all the dissident factions.

What compounded our failure to collect enough information about the dissidents and to appreciate the combined appeal of Islamic fundamentalism and Khomeini's personal charisma was that some of the CIA's key analysts were hung up on the durability of the Shah. The most basic reason for such a shortsighted view was that we were working from an erroneous premise. What we all saw in Iran in the autumn of 1978 was a Shah who, although beleaguered, still had control of a powerful army, police force, and secret intelligence service, the SAVAK. Our assumption was that if the dissident movements began to get out of control, the Shah would simply step in with whatever amount of force was necessary to control them. He never did that. Perhaps he was so out of touch with his own country that he did not appreciate how serious the situation was until corrective action would have caused too much bloodshed. Or perhaps he could not face difficult decisions because he knew he was dying. Whatever the explanation, our assumption that he would not hesitate to employ whatever force he needed was dead wrong. U.S. policy in that area of the world was so dependent on the Shah that it was all too easy for us to assume that he would do what was necessary to play the role we had in mind for him.

Thus, the answer to the question of an intelligence failure is also no, because it was partly a failure by the policy-makers. Intelligence had been providing some warnings. President Carter, for instance, just a year before the issuance of the memorandum, had arranged a private, one-on-one meeting with the Shah during the latter's visit to Washington. The President counseled the Shah to think carefully about liberalizing the political structure in Iran; pointing out that we saw some problems ahead. The Shah scoffed at the suggestion. In short, though we in intelligence were not sounding the alarms loudly enough, the policy-makers were not uninformed about the Shah's problems. From President Nixon on, they either did not or could not get through to the Shah.

To place in perspective the question of intelligence failure, we should note that there is little evidence that Middle East scholars and reporters were more attuned to the trends in Iran than was the CIA. The articles in academic journals and in the newspapers at the time revealed a bias like ours toward the Shah. In general, though, academics and reporters have one big advantage over CIA analysts: there is a good deal of sharing of views between them. In the CIA wide-ranging debate and exchange of ideas is not nearly so easy because of the necessary controls on the highly secret data CIA analysts use. CIA analysts are disinclined to test their theories and conclusions on people outside the Agency, who work from a less complete set of data. This problem of secrecy is genuine, but of more influence is an inherent reluctance in the CIA to go outside for second opinions. It is time-consuming to find a qualified academic willing to associate with the CIA and to make the arrangements for his security clearance. Beyond that, CIA analysts, who live day by day in a rarefied atmosphere of secret information, tend to be patronizing of outsiders, even those who are given most of the security clearances. They are not viewed as having the same depth of background as the analysts, who deal with the secret data daily.

As I watched great quantities of highly classified information cross my desk, I realized that there was excessive emphasis on the use of secret data as opposed to open information. Secret information is often highly relevant to two of the three basic categories of intelligence reports, but not nearly as much to the third — and

the situation in Iran was in that category. The first category is the warning of an impending event, like the outbreak of war, a coup, or a terrorist attack. Secret photographs of military forces on the move or electronic intercepts of signals to military commanders or reports from agents who have penetrated a military headquarters are often the best or only tipoff. The second category is status reports on events in progress, like a battle, a negotiation, or an attempted revolution. In such a case, much of the relevant information is likely to be public, but it may well also take secret photos or a spy inside the negotiating team to help us keep close track of what's going on. The third category is the long-range forecasting of political, economic, and military trends. Here, so many diverse factors must be taken into account that the secret ones are relatively less important. In the case of Iran's Islamic revolution, for instance, there was relatively little secret information that was pertinent. There was no master revolutionary plan that spies could steal, no single revolutionary headquarters in which to place an agent. It was, then, a situation of a nearly spontaneous societal upheaval, and outside observers with no access to secrets could have been very useful in checking on the CIA's analysis. Most of the evidence about what was going to happen was available right on the surface. Just plain scholarly research on Iran from about 1970 onward should have forecast the problems the Shah would encounter, if not their exact timing. But secret reports, with their aura of mystery, often tend to crowd out just that kind of scholarly, unclassified work as well as respect for the scholars, businessmen, and others who do it.

If the CIA is reluctant to call for outside advice, another way to solicit it is to publish as much CIA analysis as can be declassified. It will be subjected to wide scrutiny and comment. When I first arrived at the CIA I had a strong inclination to do this for two other reasons. I felt that if the work was good, giving it to the public could only help restore confidence in the CIA. Clearly it is impossible for the CIA to attempt to raise public confidence by revealing very much about how successful our spies are. There are secrets in analytic work, too, that cannot be revealed, but they are more manageable. We can declassify a piece of analysis if we take several precautions. One is to guard against giving away some exclusive information that only we have and that gives us an

advantage over someone else — for example, what that other person's position is going to be at tomorrow's negotiation. Another is to remove any clues that point directly to the technique we used to collect it — for example, whether our agent was one of only three or four people present at a particular conversation, information that could point a finger right at him. My second reason for wanting to release more analysis was the conviction that a well-informed citizenry is the cornerstone of a democratic system. Before the Iranian crisis I encouraged more open publication, even in the face of strong resistance from many quarters in the CIA. After that crisis, my resolve to continue was much reinforced.

Actually, my initial plunge into publishing unclassified intelligence came as a result of a remark by President Carter in a television address on the world energy crisis in April of 1977. He quoted some unclassified statistics from a classified report we had sent him. The media wanted to see the full report. We went through it and found that after extracting indicators of our sources we could publish it, and we did.

The report was criticized by a number of nongovernment experts in energy matters, as I hoped it would be. I asked some of them to come to Langley to talk with us. A few of these people pointed out that we had overlooked something. Others, we could tell, were working from less reliable information than we were. All of the interchanges, though, were helpful to the analysts. They were also helpful to me in that I came away more confident of our analytic team and more understanding of where its strengths and weaknesses lay.

Another early publication I had declassified was on Soviet civil defense. I had heard so many exaggerated stories about how well the Soviets are prepared to shelter their people against nuclear attack that I considered this a useful topic to get out in the open. Study showed that only 5 to 10 percent of the Soviet urban population could be sheltered, and that percentage was declining as more people moved into cities. The plans to evacuate the other 90 to 95 percent were untested and did not acknowledge the near impossibility of evacuating eight million people from a city like Moscow in the middle of a Russian winter. I felt the public needed to know these things to assess properly the debate that was going on.

The major hazard in publishing unclassified intelligence, and one that the CIA analysts constantly raised with me, was that it's difficult to draw the line on what should or should not be released. If information supports an administration's policy, people will suspect it has been slanted to that purpose. If it undercuts policy, the administration will not appreciate its release. Good policy should be able to withstand objective criticism, but situations do arise when the analysis that supports the current policy cannot be declassified, though the analysis that undercuts it can.

It wasn't long before I ran into flack at the White House over what we were releasing. When we issued the study of the Polish economy, alluded to earlier, it showed that the sizable funds Poland had borrowed from the West were not improving the economy's performance enough even to service the debt. Poland was a poor credit risk. At that very time, though, the White House was urging U.S. banks to lend more to Poland. Brzezinski, a Pole by birth, was livid because this report had been circulated. He argued that it was unconscionable for one element of the administration to undermine the President's policies; that by the very act of publishing unclassified reports, I was entering into the policy process; and that the DCI was not in the business of publishing unclassified, objective intelligence on his own. Brzezinski wanted to establish firm White House controls over what the CIA could release to the public. I feared that if the White House staff could stop the publication of unclassified intelligence inimical to administration policy, what next? Would they suppress information damaging to their partisan political interests? Could they tell us not to inform the Congress when intelligence was contrary to an administration policy?

Of course I could sympathize with Brzezinski's not wanting me to undercut the President's policies. I really preferred not to. It would have been easy simply to publish nothing, and that's what the professionals at the CIA wanted. Like the espionage people, the analysts were trying to avoid criticism. They were, though, subjected to more of that when we published a second study on energy, in the summer of 1977. This one concluded that oil production in the Soviet Union would start declining in the early 1980s. The outside experts who differed were eventually proved right. Production did not decline as rapidly as we had forecast.

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Our report was wrong not because of faulty work, but because the Soviets changed their tactics after the report came out. They found ways to postpone the decline. But the prediction made in the report now appears to be coming true, a few years behind schedule. In any event, the report was useful in drawing attention to the serious problems that exist in Soviet oil production and that cannot be postponed indefinitely.

The differences between my view and that of the White House staff were not always a matter of my wanting to publish and their not wanting me to; there were also pressures toward publishing what would help the President. Once, I received a memo from Brzezinski requesting that I declassify an intelligence report that would provide ammunition against congressional critics of the President's Middle East policy. His memo indiscreetly requested that we declassify the report with "as few changes as possible." Since Brzezinski's memo was unclassified, I was afraid that in leaky Washington one day I would be before Congress and a congressman would attempt to discredit my testimony by producing this memo to show that I had acceded to politically motivated pressures from the White House to declassify information. I went through some bureaucratic nonsense in this instance to protect against that. I directed the CIA analytic staff in writing not to cut any corners when considering what could be declassified. When the sanitized version came back to me, I took out two more borderline items, just to ensure that we could never be accused of caving in to pressure. The White House was repeatedly insensitive, as in this case, to the importance of protecting the apolitical credibility of intelligence. And this despite the fact that Brzezinski was one of the strongest supporters of intelligence in the administration. Any number of times he came to my rescue when the NSC was about to do something that would have harmed intelligence capabilities.

Still, though I faced problems in both the White House and the CIA, I persisted in trying to open up the CIA's analytic work, because doing so clearly met a need. The Defense and State Departments publish declassified intelligence analyses regularly. Even with the best intentions, their interpretations are bound to be colored by their espousal of programs and policies. How can it be otherwise? Over and over I found myself defending the right of

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the CIA to publish the same kind of information when it could do so without pressures to slant the interpretation of events.

Independence of interpretation is one of the greatest advantages we have over Soviet intelligence. In a totalitarian society an analyst cannot afford to reach conclusions that would contravene the basic tenets of Marxism or Communist Party policies. We sometimes actually watched Soviet officials stationed abroad tailor their reporting to Moscow for fear of being accused of adopting noncommunist outlooks. In April 1978, the number two man in the Soviet delegation to the United Nations, Andrei Schevchenko, defected to the United States. Some months later, when I had dinner with him, he confirmed that even very senior Soviet diplomats hesitate to report frankly.

In contrast, our insistence that intelligence analysis be totally divorced from policy considerations is one of the great strengths of our system and one of our advantages over the KGB. It is, of course, a disservice to the nation if intelligence is warped to tell the policy-makers what they want to hear. Skewed intelligence-reporting can not only result in a bad decision in a particular instance, but can also erode confidence in all intelligence analysis. The Reagan administration has been plagued by inferences that analysts have been pressured improperly. In September, 1982 the House Committee on Intelligence issued a report that said in part:

Taken as a whole, intelligence on Central America is strong, and its task is both difficult and particularly important. The criticisms voiced in this report must be seen in that context. The basic concern is that tendentious rhetoric, including occasionally overimagination and misstatement, can drive out some of the needed collection and analysis. This may occur in a context in which intelligence users demand reinforcement more than illumination, but this fact does not absolve the intelligence producer from responsibility of quality. The influence of consumer desires for "ammunition" rather than analysis can be subtle or forceful, but its effect upon the intelligence process can become costly. Therefore, it deserves the constant watchfulness of intelligence professionals.<sup>2</sup>

2. Intelligence Performance on Central America: Achievements and Selected Instances of Concern, Staff Report of Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, September 22, 1982.

to his views. He had taken a copy of his highly classified report and delivered it, by coincidence, to my former mentor, Admiral Zumwalt, who in this instance shared Sullivan's view. Zumwalt at the time was out of government. He suggested that Sullivan give the report to an aide to Senator Henry Jackson, Richard Perle. Perle presumably would at least store it in a classified safe. Fortunately, Sullivan came up for a random polygraph test at just that time. He confessed to having given away this report. I had to fire him, and Scoop Jackson reprimanded Perle in my presence.

Preserving the right of analysts to hold differing views from those of their superiors is very important. When analysis is being done, there must be constant discussion between the analyst and his supervisors. Early drafts are usually modified some as they move up the line and are reviewed by superiors who have their own interpretations and perhaps more experience as well. Because only a single report will go to the policy-makers, there can be strong feelings about whose interpretation is most appropriate. Sometimes a persuasive or stubborn analyst will prevail in having his view be that of the report. At other times some superior, up to and including the DCI, will insist on inserting his opinion. Often there will be a compromise: the report will present one view but will include others as minority views. It is never easy, though, to decide how many minority views warrant the attention of the busy policy-makers for whom most reports are intended.

As important as it is for analysis to remain free of any influence of policy-makers, I found that the CIA's approach to the independence of analysis was frequently carried to extremes. Sometimes doing the best work possible was placed ahead of meeting deadlines. The result was analyses that were not always timely or directly relevant to the needs of policy-makers. When I once complained that a particular CIA report was late, I was told that the analysts were holding it back because they could make it a much better report if they had another week to work on it. I pointed out that, as they knew, the President would be making decisions in this area before another week went by. Doing the best possible job of research had become an end of greater importance than producing a report of timely usefulness to the policy-maker.

On another occasion, just a few months after I took office, the

Then in mid 1984 two senior analysts on Central America resigned from the CIA and levied allegations of political pressure on their analytic work. The fact that DCI Casey was constantly being reported in the press as a major force on this side or that of key policy issues, rather than observing the strict neutrality on policy matters that all previous DCIs observed, added to the impression of possible bias in intelligence-reporting. The greatest long-term danger that these various allegations present, whether they are justified or not, is that truly good analysts, like academics, will not remain in an organization that does not respect their freedom to report results as they see them.

Yet I can feel some sympathy for Casey in his problems with the Central American analysts who resigned. I had two cases of analysts who felt strongly about their right to stick to their guns. A few days after I became DCI, I was asked to sign an important study comparing South and North Korean military forces. Although much of it was new to me, I could tell, as a naval officer, that the presentation of naval forces was misleading. It compared numbers of units only. The North Koreans had a large number of very small ships; the South Koreans had a smaller number of much larger, more powerful ships. I marked up the draft one evening at home to show how to avoid creating an erroneous impression of South Korean naval inferiority. The next night the report came back to me again in as misleading a form as the original. The exchange went on for three days, including oral explanations by me to the analyst. It was clear that she and her supervisors felt that no one should influence the analysis, including me, even though I was to sign the report and felt as bound by the belief in independence from policy as they. I prevailed but quickly grew weary of fighting this kind of misplaced zeal for independence even in the face of error.

In the other instance an analyst, David Sullivan, became overly sensitive to efforts of his superiors to modify his conclusions. He felt that he had reached a set of conclusions of seminal importance to the country, and that his superiors were attempting to quash those views out of ideological bias. In fact, his superiors sincerely believe that he had been driven by ideological bias more than by logic. Sullivan professed later that he feared that all copies of his important work would be destroyed by those opposed

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I also sensed that the CIA shied away from probabilities because of a lack of familiarity with handling them. In fact, probabilities are just one of a number of analytic techniques I was surprised to find that the CIA did not employ adequately. Nor was it as much in the forefront of developing new analytic methodologies as it should have been. The problem was the difficulty any large bureaucracy has in being innovative. As the analysts who should have been developing new methodologies became more senior, they were forced to be managers more and analysts less. As they fell behind in their own ability to stay abreast of new theories, they resisted letting their subordinates employ new methods they did not understand. To offset the inevitable emphasis on management as people rose in rank, we created as many positions of "senior analyst" as we could. These individuals were able to advance without assuming managerial duties. We could not afford, however, to take too many people out of the managerial stream, or the pool of potential senior managers would have been too small.

A lack of specialized analytic skills also hurt in the Iranian situation. We had an ample number of political scientists to interpret reports on what the politically informed segment of the country was saying. But the skills of sociologists and anthropologists would have been more useful in detecting the kind of societal upheaval that occurred. Such people are best equipped to analyze attitudinal undercurrents and to estimate the depth of feeling behind them. We didn't have enough of that talent. And the need for sociologists and anthropologists in the Iranian crisis is just one example. Throughout U.S. intelligence there are growing opportunities to use new analytic skills. In recent years we have been forced to expand coverage into topics not previously of great concern: the production and shipment of narcotics, international terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, verification of arms agreements, trade in armaments, agricultural crop forecasting, energy sources and consumption, and arm's-length psychological assessments of foreign leaders. There is also a need for more expertise in previously neglected geographical areas. Only six times since World War II have we sent military forces into combat. They were all in previously little-known countries: Korea, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran, and Grenada. It

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President asked me for a study of the economies of the Middle East. He wanted to know specifically what the potential for economic benefit would be if Israel and the Arab world made peace and pursued a common policy of economic cooperation. Obviously the President wanted to give the countries involved some idea of what each could gain from making peace. It seemed to me an exceptional opportunity to impress the new President with the kind of work the CIA could produce. Not so. The analysts balked at researching what they considered an infeasible idea — that in the foreseeable future there could be broad economic cooperation between Israel and the Arabs. They feared that someone would distort the message and believe the CIA thought this economic forecast could be actually realized. Protecting the Agency's intellectual credibility and its freedom from being pressured into doing an analysis in which it didn't believe was more important to them than being responsive to the President. The best I could get them to produce was a vacuous, densely hedged report of little value.

The intelligence problem with Iran also pinpointed for me a couple of other difficulties. One was the inherent conservatism of a large bureaucracy. For instance, it would have been helpful to use confidence numbers to express our opinion of the probability of the Shah's survival. The analysts could have said, "Our confidence that the Shah will survive another X years is 75 percent." Instead, they preferred the categorical: "The Shah will survive another X years." This aversion to expressing results on a quantified basis had its genesis in past accusations that the Agency had "waffled" its conclusions. If a confidence level was expressed as 60/40 or 50/50, the customers would accuse the Agency of being unwilling to take a stand one way or the other. And because decision-makers would not find a 60/40 estimate weighted enough to help them select one policy over another, they could ignore the intelligence and simply follow their own predilections. Thus, the analyst felt his efforts were wasted. It need not have been that way, however. If the analysts had explained the reasons for the 60 percent probability and, again, for the 40 percent probability, the decision-maker could have applied his own judgment as to which set of reasons struck him as more cogent. But that kind of analytic work takes a lot of effort.



takes years for an analyst to understand foreign countries like these well enough to assess societal trends that could lead to wars of the sort we've found ourselves involved in over the past forty years.

The CIA also needs to invest in developing expertise in countries that may not be of great interest to us now. We must not wait until a crisis is on us. We were caught short in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Because we are not likely to be able to predict just where the next Iran or Vietnam will be, some analysts must study countries of relatively little interest to the United States today. The CIA's analytic branch strongly resists allocating scarce talent in this manner. The demand for more and better intelligence on whatever they've been working on for years is almost insatiable. Rearranging priorities is frightfully difficult and not without risk. The only alternative is for the analytic branch to grow continuously. It could use some growth today, but unless the branch has a better sense of priorities, growth could be infinite and undirected.

The analytic branch's biggest problem is not size, however, but prestige within the Agency. Its reputation on the outside is deservedly high. The Church Committee stated that the CIA's analytic branch "is by far the best analytic organization for the production of finished intelligence within the government."<sup>3</sup> Its prestige inside the Agency is clearly second to that of the espionage branch. In part, that's because only a few DCIs have given analysis more than passing attention. Most of them were either former members of the espionage branch or were captivated by it.

In part because of this, it became clear to me that the collection of intelligence, by both human and technical means, was in relatively better shape than the analysis of the information collected. Our greatest weakness was the interpretation, not the collection, of data. The more I was convinced of this, the more I emphasized my interest and participation in the analytic work. Several times a week I would call for a round table discussion with groups of ten to fifteen analysts. Sometimes the session was to prepare me for a meeting at the White House; sometimes it was to educate me on some topic on which I felt ill-informed. I always asked that junior

3. Final Report, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Chapter XII, April 26, 1976.

as well as senior analysts be included. I wanted to get fresh ideas and to expose the younger people to high-level discussions in the hope that they might be inspired to make their work with the Agency a career.

It will take a long time for the analytic branch to achieve the prestige of the espionage branch. It is not a question of downgrading espionage, but of recognizing that all the branches contribute to the final product. To ensure that the product is as good as it can be, each branch must play as part of a team, not independently, as is too often the case now. There is no place for elitism in such serious and important work.

TWENTY-ONE

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*Unbalanced Competition in Analysis*

**NEXT THURSDAY** we're going to have a meeting of the Special Coordinating Committee to review your proposed testimony to the Senate on the verifiability of SALT II, Stan," David Aaron announced to me in late August 1979. David, a young, bright Mondale protégé, was assistant to Zbig Brzezinski. He consistently used his agile mind to develop logical reasons for doing things the way the administration wanted them done. That was his job, and he was good at it. In this case he was worried that I would be too independent and say things in my testimony that would hurt the chances for ratification of SALT II. Brzezinski, Hamilton Jordan, and Lloyd Cutler (a prominent Washington attorney who had been brought into the White House especially to shepherd SALT II through the Senate) were also worried about me. They may have suspected that I shared the reservations of many military men that another arms control agreement with the Soviets would weaken resolve in the United States to maintain an adequate nuclear deterrent of our own. If so, they were wrong.

They were particularly concerned about what I would say, because my testimony was going to be important. As much as anything else, the fate of the SALT II treaty hinged on whether the Senate believed we could verify Soviet compliance. As Director of Central Intelligence, my testimony was bound to carry a great

deal of weight, since it is through our intelligence apparatus that most checks are made. The treaty itself stipulated that neither side would interfere with the other's "technical means of verification," by which it meant primarily photographic satellites. Those satellites are the most important part of our system for keeping track of the Soviet's nuclear arsenal. Satellites tell us how many large intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarines, and bombers the Soviets have and a good deal about their size. We also use electronic intercepts, especially of telemetry. Telemetry is the means by which performance data generated inside a test missile are signaled back to its launch pad so that the engineers can monitor the missile's performance in flight. Because the data sent by telemetry can tell us a great deal about the missile's inner workings, they help us verify specifications covered in a treaty, like a missile's total carrying capacity, or "throw weight." Almost all other collection techniques are used as well, including human espionage. What is required for verification as much as anything, though, is great analytic skill in piecing together many small fragments of information. I was repeatedly impressed by the ability of CIA analysts to do this with enormous skill. My testimony would center on how effectively the Intelligence Community, using all these resources, could detect and deduce what the Soviets were doing.

Specifically, that meant testifying about our ability to check on a whole series of individual treaty provisions. For instance, there is very little doubt in our minds about how many large, 200,000-pound ICBMs the Soviets have; they are hard to hide from satellite photography. But it is more difficult to determine whether each of those ICBMs has one, ten, or thirty warheads hidden inside. We cannot x-ray the missile's nose cone from a satellite. We can watch it being tested and we can deduce from other indicators, like its estimated throw weight, how many warheads it is capable of carrying. We may, then, say that we have better than 95 percent confidence that we know how many ICBMs the Soviets have, but considerably less than 95 percent confidence that we know how many total ICBM warheads they have if they have placed more warheads on their missiles than allowed. For every provision of the treaty there is a similar confidence level for detecting small-, medium-, and large-scale cheating.

The White House people were alarmed that I was planning to tell the Senate just what those confidence numbers were. It was not so much that the numbers would be low as that I would have to disclose that there were many ways in which the Soviets might be able to cheat. The only means I had for calculating whether the Soviets could cheat was to figure out the different ways they might attempt it. I had a team of experts pretend they were malicious, scheming Soviets and think up techniques for cheating. One idea they came up with to hide the construction of new ICBM silos was to build them inside large buildings and plan to fire the missiles through the roofs. I was prepared to say that I had X percent confidence that they could not secretly build more than a hundred missile silos inside buildings without our detecting what was going on, and that our confidence would be  $X + Y$  percent by the time they got to two hundred. Some such schemes for cheating were almost impossible to carry out and others would benefit the Soviets very little. Still, there was no way I could give a reliable view of our ability to check on cheating if I didn't study every such possibility thoroughly. What worried David Aaron and others was that the senators might gain the impression that cheating was highly probable because there were so many theoretical opportunities. I could see that that was a risk, but it would be small compared with the risk of undermining the treaty if some opponent of it thought of a way to cheat that I had not addressed and raised with the Congress. The credibility of our whole position on verification could be questioned.

Still another alarm went off in the White House over a distinction I emphasized between "monitoring" and "verifying" the treaty. Monitoring is the gathering and evaluating of information about Soviet military programs related to the treaty, including programs that are forbidden. Verification is our determining whether those Soviet programs comply with the treaty sufficiently for us to consider the treaty intact. Many treaty provisions are not black or white; that is, it is not simply a question of whether or not the Soviets are complying. That's largely because there is often ambiguity in the wording of the agreement (and without those ambiguities we or the Soviets might have rejected the treaty). It is also the case that sometimes there is uncertainty in our measurements. We may, for instance, be able to measure only

to plus or minus 10 percent on some values. If, then, we should detect the Soviets "cheating" by 10 percent or less, we may not know whether the discrepancy is theirs or ours. Verification, then, involves judgments about the interpretation of the treaty, about how much we can count on the accuracy of our monitoring systems, and about how serious it would be for the United States if there were cheating at various levels. Let's go back to the example of Soviet cheating by building ICBMs inside buildings. How serious would it be if they added a hundred ICBMs before we could be 95 percent confident of detecting it? That's a question that can be answered only by political leaders, because the answer depends on an assessment of how much advantage the Soviets would get if they could increase the number of their ICBMs by a hundred. And what we could do if we suddenly found they had done that.

Such matters are judgments about what combination of enemy moves and our countermeasures will leave our country safe. If, as DCI, I made the judgment that a 95 percent probability of detecting the construction of a hundred ICBMs inside buildings constituted "adequate verification," I would be taking sides on a policy issue. What constitutes security for our country and what warrants our taking some risks in return for the benefits of a treaty are not matters of intelligence. The imperative of keeping intelligence separate from policy ruled out my making such judgments.

In the case of SALT II, President Carter heard from me how well we could monitor the treaty. Then he weighed the risks of possible Soviet cheating against the benefits of the treaty and decided that it was adequately verifiable. If I had supported his judgment in my testimony to the Senate, I could have been suspected of coloring my evaluation of our monitoring capabilities to support the President's policy decision on verifiability. Since verification was the heart of the Senate debate, any doubt about my objectivity in assessing our monitoring capabilities could have doomed the treaty. Thus, although I personally supported the treaty and believed it was adequately verifiable, I could not risk saying so, even in private, lest someone quote me in public.

The White House didn't see it this way at all; hence this meeting of the SCC, a subcommittee of the National Security Council, to review my testimony. At a personal level, it was insulting to an

agency head to have his testimony subjected to this kind of advance scrutiny. The excuse was that, though I was the administration's spokesman on verification, others would be questioned on it also, and we should understand each other's views lest avoidable contradictions develop. But the real reason was clearly to get me under control and to push me to testify that the treaty was adequately verifiable.

The treaty was the administration's premier item of foreign policy at this point and the White House was doing everything possible to ensure that it didn't fail. I felt equally strongly that I must not let myself be pressured. I considered it my responsibility to give the Senate just as complete and objective a view of our monitoring capabilities as I had given the President. In our government, both the President and the Senate must decide on whether a treaty is in the national interest. Both needed objective information on whether we could detect Soviet cheating. If I slanted my testimony to help the administration sell SALT II, I would be hurting the ability of Congress to play its proper role.

I weathered the SCC meeting because I had done more extensive homework on monitoring than anyone else in the room and because I stubbornly insisted that the Senate needed my estimates of where the Soviets could cheat. In fact, once the senators had grasped the monitoring data, verification ceased to be the main issue. They understood that there were many uncertainties and that much cheating could go on, undetected. They also understood that no single case of possible undetected cheating could significantly affect the balance of military power. Any form of wholesale cheating that would upset the strategic balance could be detected quite early. Although he never said so directly, I suspected that the President was thoroughly annoyed by my stand on what I would and would not say about verification. His staff had not given him both sides of the story. The ending was happy, though, and when the verification issue had been defused, the President and Vice President both thanked me profusely.

Pressures like this on the DCI to make intelligence support policy are not unusual, but they are almost always blatant. That's because they have to come from someone without authority over the DCI. His only boss is the President. If a President ever pressured a DCI to bias his intelligence reports, the DCI would have

no option other than to resign. Pressures on the DCI by outsiders, then, have to be those of persuasion, not threat. In contrast, the chiefs of departmental intelligence agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, can be pressured by many different individuals. The implied threat is that the boss (that is, the Secretary of Defense or one of his assistants) will take it out on you if you do not fall into line. Policy-makers exert such pressures because they are eager not to have some intelligence report floating around that can be used to torpedo their programs or policies. One way to ensure against analysts giving in to such pressures is to get separate opinions on important subjects, in the hope that a conclusion reached under pressure will stand out like a sore thumb.

One can get several opinions by engaging outside consultants or advisory panels to review analytic work. Or even by having some analytic work duplicated by outside contractors, which may produce a fresh viewpoint. Either kind of outside scrutiny can be very useful, though there are limits. Even though outsiders may be given adequate security clearances, insiders always feel they have a more authoritative view because of their greater intimacy with the fuller range of secrets.

Thus, the principal source of second opinions has always been competitive analysis within the Intelligence Community. That's achieved by having as many of the analytic agencies of the Intelligence Community as have competence on a topic pitted against each other. If the topic is political trends, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research would probably lead the analytic effort, but the CIA and the DIA would also present views. If the subject is economics, the CIA would have the strongest capabilities and would guide the study, but the Departments of State, Treasury, and Energy would also participate. On military matters the DIA would be in charge, but the CIA would play a major role, and the State Department would join on nontechnical issues. To reap the benefits of such analytic competition, we permit each organization to publish any of its own analyses that it wants. For instance, the CIA, the DIA, and State each publishes a daily report interpreting the latest intelligence reports. In addition, competition in analysis is formalized in intelligence reports that are collaborative efforts of the entire Intelligence Community, the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).

NIEs are written jointly by as many of the intelligence agencies as have competence in a given subject. They are coordinated by a modest-sized staff of analysts known as the National Intelligence Council, which is part of the Intelligence Community organization, not of the CIA. The ostensible purpose of this group is to present decision-makers with the Intelligence Community's best view on important topics. Without some such vehicle, a President might find separate pieces of analysis on the same topic arriving on his desk at different times. In a sense, that's competition in analysis, but it needs to be organized. In the NIE process, the Community attempts to resolve its differences before it presents an analysis to the President or whoever else is concerned. When it cannot resolve differences, an NIE at least lays out the differing views in one place.

The number of NIEs published each year varies with the inclination of the DCI and the state of world affairs. A topsy-turvy world may call for more NIEs, though they generally concentrate on long-range problems; interpretation of immediate events is left to departmental reporting. Topics may be the balance of strategic nuclear forces between the United States and the USSR, the conventional military balance in Europe, the prospects for improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and China, the outlook for cohesiveness within the Atlantic Alliance, or the significance of the third world's international debt problems.

The entire Community comments on the drafts as they are produced. Then the heads of all of the analytic agencies meet in what is known as the National Foreign Intelligence Board to discuss each NIE. This is an opportunity for each agency head to try to convince the DCI of his viewpoint when there are differences. In the end the DCI must decide which view the NIE endorses and which dissenting views are also represented. Thus, though the NIE process resembles the work of a committee, the final product is that of the DCI, whose opinion always prevails. It has to, or it would be one of committee compromise, too watered down to be of value.

In fact, the value of NIEs is bound to be limited, because writing them requires so many compromises. There is a natural tendency in any process like this one to attempt to narrow differences and end up with a consensus report. After endless hours of argu-

ing over an idea, or even over a word or two, people tend to compromise simply to get on with the drafting. Compromises, though, can often produce a wrong result. If one group has evidence that a war will start on Monday and another that it will be Friday, a compromise on Wednesday, for which there is no evidence, is almost bound to be wrong. Intelligence analysis heavily flavored by compromise is apt to contain conclusions that are so innocuous that they are of no value to the decision-maker. And the NIE, though an important vehicle for expressing competitive views, is a costly and inefficient one, because so much valuable analytic talent is consumed in negotiating rather than in analyzing. If NIEs are worth the effort, it is because they force healthful interaction within the Intelligence Community, not so much because they produce useful material for policy-makers to read. For instance, in disagreements, the NIE process forces analysts who hold contrary positions to explain them to their peers. Such a process improves not only the NIE in question, but the quality of the long-term analytic effort.

The most valuable NIEs are those which present differences of substance clearly. Alternative views can be presented and evaluated. The one or two key points on which a difference of opinion hinges will, it is hoped, have been identified so that the reader can apply his own judgment. An NIE may state that "the DIA believes we would have X days of warning of a Warsaw Pact surprise attack on NATO with conventional forces, the CIA believes it would be Y days, and the difference between the two is that the DIA is relying on overhead reconnaissance photography to tell us when additional troops move forward, whereas the CIA is counting on informants inside the Eastern bloc." The reader would then weigh his confidence in photography against spies and decide whether he wanted to count on X or Y days of warning, or something in between.

Sometimes such differing views are best presented as part of the text; sometimes as footnotes. Some Presidents, such as President Reagan, I suspect, will want a straightforward conclusion set forth by the DCI with as few dissenting views as possible. In such a situation, the dissenting views are best presented in footnotes. The reader can easily ignore them if he wants, but they are available for those who want to study them. Jimmy Carter wanted to

read every detail of each difference and come up with his own conclusion. For someone like him, it is best to include dissenting opinions right in the text of the NIE, alongside the DCI's view. However dissent is presented, it will be useful only if it is directed to the right issues. Unfortunately, it was my experience that many of the differences raised by the agencies of the Defense Department in writing NIEs were ones that affected only Defense's interests, such as whether or not the intelligence report would support or hurt the rationale for buying some piece of military hardware. A debate of that sort may be of little importance to the President, the Secretary of State, or others.

The major weakness of the NIEs, however, derives from the different levels of competence of the analytic agencies, primarily the CIA, the DIA, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). The INR is much smaller than either of its competitors, but in my view it has always done the best political analysis. In part this is because it is close to its customers in the State Department and provides analysis that directly supports their needs. In contrast, the CIA's customers are everywhere in the Washington area except at Langley; that is, they are in the White House, the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, and elsewhere. Thus, the CIA's analysis tends to have an academic flavor. Occasionally, because of the proximity to its customers who make policy, the INR has been biased in favor of some State Department policy position, but it is remarkably free of the influence of policy considerations.

A greater problem, I found, was the tendency of the INR to attempt to offset an expected DIA bias. Both the INR and the CIA expected the DIA to exaggerate the Soviet Union's military strength and intentions. I do not mean to imply that the DIA deliberately distorted the facts. But when data about whether the Soviets had a particular military capability were inconclusive, the DIA would always credit them with having it. Or when we knew that the Soviets had a certain capability but did not know how good it was, the DIA would "mirror-image" it; that is, they would assume that the Soviets' capability was just as good as ours. One way or another, just by calling all the shots on the high side, the DIA would usually come up with a more menacing view of Soviet military potential than did the nonmilitary agencies. Both the

CIA and the INR tended to exaggerate in the other direction in order to compensate. Other than that, the INR's only serious weakness was that it did not have sufficient manpower to cover all of the topics on which its views would have been helpful. Even today, it could use more staff to advantage, but wherever it does have the talent to compete, it can play a valuable role.

The CIA has adequate resources to cover all of the topics of NIEs. It does not have an obvious policy bias, since the Agency has no policies to protect, though many people believe there is an institutional bias. James Schlesinger, several years after his brief stint as DCI, stated, "In fact, the [CIA's] intelligence directorate tends to make a particular type of error systematically in close harmony with the prevailing bias in the intellectual community."<sup>1</sup>

Schlesinger was joining with most critics of the CIA's analysis in saying that there is a bias toward the liberal viewpoint or the view in vogue in the academic community. I found that this was the case occasionally in political analysis, but there were about as many instances of bias in the opposite direction. For instance, in military analysis the CIA had a reputation for underestimating enemy strength. It has done that, but more because it knew that the DIA would almost always do the opposite than for any ideological reason. There are also areas of military analysis where I found the CIA inclined to overestimate simply because it had been so criticized for its past underestimations. In short, biases or fixations are bound to develop in an organization like the CIA, but I believe that they are changing biases, based on personalities, on the Agency's past record, and on expected reactions in the DIA, not on a permanent institutional outlook. That, and the capability of the CIA to cover well almost all areas of analysis, make the CIA the key player in the use of competitive analysis. Only in those areas where, as noted earlier, the military and the NSA contrive to exclude the CIA from the necessary data, is the CIA's analysis not likely to be competitive.

The much more serious problem that I saw with competitive analysis was the inability of the DIA to measure up to the competition. There were two reasons for this: an insufficient number of

1. Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Book I, p. 76, February 2, 1976.

competent people and an inability to withstand Defense Department pressures to support its policies. The DIA was formed from scratch in 1964. The idea was that each of the four intelligence arms of the military services would be reduced in size in order to provide the staff for the DIA. That was done, but the services hung on to as many of their best people as they could and gave the remainder to the DIA. In addition, in less than four years the service intelligence organizations had grown back to at least their former size and were attracting the better people. Military officers, in particular, prefer to be assigned to their service intelligence organization, because that does more for their prospects for promotion. Also, the DIA is a very complex bureaucracy. It works for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI. It is staffed partly by military officers, who rotate in and out and have natural loyalties to their service, and in part by civilians, who have great influence because they have permanent assignments. The DIA is bound to be pushed and pulled by these competing demands and influences. As a result, military intelligence officers find the DIA's internal politics stifling. As long as there are four separate service intelligence organizations that command higher loyalty and are not so bound up in bureaucracy, the better analysts are going to avoid going to the DIA. In my view, only if the service intelligence organizations are disbanded permanently is there hope for measurably improving the DIA's capabilities. There is no serious need for those four separate organizations that the DIA could not fill.

The pressures of policy influence are an even more serious hazard to the DIA's playing a competitive role. In the DIA, the rule of intelligence's independence from policy runs headlong into the more basic rule of the American military, responsiveness to command. The military officer feels free to express his views to his commander, but when the commander has decided, the subordinate stops questioning and supports his superior in every way possible. The military commander has the final word once he has made up his mind. Thus, the military intelligence officer who attempts to interject analyses that run counter to the decisions of his superiors risks being considered disloyal. It is difficult to overstate the amount of pressure the military hierarchy can impose to get its way; it can even pressure military intelligence specialists to

abandon the code of clear, unbiased reporting of facts in favor of the military one of loyal support of the commander's decision.<sup>2</sup> It would hardly be fair not to point out that the budgetary process in our country virtually forces the military to use intelligence to overstate the threats they must be ready to counter. If each military service does not exaggerate the threat, it is almost certain to have its budget cut. The issues of military intelligence estimates, then, are issues of bureaucratic budget politics as well as of intelligence.

Largely as a result of these budget pressures, I found the DIA's participation in the NIE process less than useful. When the DIA disagreed with parts of an NIE, it was almost impossible to get an explanation. I always wanted to place the DIA reasons for dissent right alongside my view in the body of the NIE. What I hoped for in a case like the previous example I cited was something like "The DIA does not agree that we will have Y days of warning of a surprise attack in Europe, because it does not believe the CIA's network of agents can transmit warnings in a sufficiently timely manner. Instead, it believes that we will have to wait until overhead reconnaissance conclusively reveals the movement of forces into forward positions, but that will be only X days from the initiation of hostilities." What I consistently received instead was something like "The DIA disagrees with the conclusion that we will receive Y days of warning and believes we will receive only X."

An actual example of this was a running battle I had with the DIA over estimates of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. It began a few weeks after I took office. I was presenting the CIA's annual briefing on this subject to the Armed Services Committee of the House. I methodically laid out the number of ICBMs of various types that the Soviets and the United States each had, and of

2. An example of this came to light in February 1985, during the testimony in the suit brought by General William C. Westmoreland against CBS TV. As reported on p. 1 of the *Washington Post* on February 18 by Eleanor Randolph, "According to sources close to the case, some of Westmoreland's friends, attorneys and financial backers suggested that he drop the case after testimony last week by retired Army colonel Gains B. Hawkins, who was Westmoreland's chief of Order of Battle estimates. Hawkins said that in 1967 when he told Westmoreland about high enemy troop estimates, the general called the new numbers 'politically unacceptable.' As a result, Hawkins said, he ordered his intelligence officials to cut their enemy estimates, as the CBS broadcast had said." The case was, in fact, dropped.

bombers, submarines, and so on. An intelligent young congressman from New York, Tom Downey, interrupted. He said that all these numbers weren't very helpful. What he wanted to know was what each side could do with these weapons. He asked if I had studied the formula for measuring the potential destructiveness of any nuclear weapon.

There is a formula for describing what each existing nuclear arsenal could theoretically destroy, in terms of hardened targets that take a lot of power to kill or of cities that almost any nuclear weapon can devastate. Using that formula, we could compare our arsenal and the Soviets' in terms of what each could do if unleashed against hard targets or cities. That was much more useful than a simple statistical comparison of numbers of weapons. We could calculate how much of our nuclear potential would survive if the Soviets conducted a surprise attack on us that destroyed all of our missiles, submarines, and bombers they could locate. Then we could compare what we would have left after absorbing that blow with what the Soviets would have remaining, considering all the weapons they had used in the initial attack on us, again in terms of capability to destroy either hardened targets or cities. This was just what Downey wanted. It showed clearly what sort of advantage each side had under different circumstances. Unfortunately, this kind of analysis did not produce the answers the Pentagon wanted in order to justify its programs, most specifically the MX ICBM. And so a fight began.

For the next three years the DIA argued over and over again that this analytic technique was invalid. They never said why, but one year they did a thorough study of their own to prove their point. Unfortunately for them, the results were nearly identical with the CIA's. When I asked them to put those results in that year's NIE on the strategic balance and compare the differences with the Downey-inspired approach, they declined. They fell back on an old canard: that my preferred form of analysis was a "net assessment," which was beyond the proper role of intelligence.

Net assessment is military jargon for a comparison of the capabilities of some category of U.S. military forces with those of another power. Inside the Pentagon there is a strict rule that intelligence organizations make such comparisons only in num-



bers of units, not in any other measure of capability. That's because the policy-makers are dominant there. They don't want intelligence people to compare our tanks with those of the Soviet Union in a way that suggests that American tanks are better than the Soviets'. That could lead Congress to conclude that we do not need to buy more tanks, even if we have fewer than the Soviets have. It certainly is outside the proper sphere of intelligence to pass judgment on a policy issue such as how many tanks we need, but it is not helpful to talk only about numbers of tanks when we have many data for comparing the capabilities of ours with those of the Soviets'. Military policy-makers feel safer, though, if intelligence reports are limited to static comparisons of numbers of units or items of equipment, but they do make dynamic comparisons on their own through the use of war games.

A war game not only compares what various forces can do in combat; it uses players on both sides to make decisions and references aided by computers to judge outcomes. I agree that intelligence organizations should not conduct their own war games in which they decide what tactics our military commanders and their opponents would employ and what the final results may be. But in between war games and static comparisons there is legitimate room for quasi-dynamic comparisons by the Intelligence Community of U.S. and enemy capabilities. For example, there can be a purely static comparison of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces that counts only numbers and types of weapons on each side. There also can be the quasi-dynamic comparison I described that compares the theoretical capability of both arsenals to destroy hard targets and cities in a surprise attack and after absorbing a surprise attack. Or there can be a war game that hypothesizes a specific war situation and estimates exactly what the Soviets and we would do and what the destruction would be on both sides.

The problem is where to draw the line on intelligence analysis. The more factors a quasi-dynamic analysis takes into account, the more it moves toward being a war game. It is easy for the military to believe they should draw the line so that there is no chance that an intelligence analysis can come to a conclusion that would jeopardize their programs and policies. That's just what they do. They can clearly impose their will on military intelligence. Thus, it was always a struggle to get the military's cooperation if the CIA in-

tended to do more than static comparisons. We made progress as time went by, especially as the result of cooperation from General David Jones, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But unless it is directed from the top by someone like Jones, the military will work their will by refusing to give the CIA sufficient data on U.S. forces to allow the Agency to make useful comparisons. The withholding of data on the Soviet Navy I noted previously is a case in point. Another is the case of a study by the CIA of Soviet electronic countermeasure capabilities I once received. My first question was "Do the Soviets have the capability to counter our electronics?" The answer was "We don't know enough about our own electronics capabilities to tell. We only know what the Soviets can do, but not how effective it would be!" That kind of study is not very helpful and shows why the CIA's ability to do military analysis is much less than it should be.

On some military subjects there is no useful competitive analysis, because the DIA's work is vitiated by policy considerations and the CIA's is not much better, owing to a lack of information about U.S. capabilities. The record also shows that inside the military the DIA seldom disputes assessments by the individual services in their areas of specialty. That is to avoid political wrangling. The nation is badly exposed when only the U.S. Navy studies some aspects of the Soviet Navy, or the Air Force the Soviet Air Force.

A new technique of competitive analysis was attempted in 1976. This was the so-called A Team, B Team competition. Two analytic groups were organized to study U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities. Team A was the CIA's normal analytic group on this subject. Team B was composed of outsiders with a right-wing ideological bent. The intention was to promote competition by polarizing the teams. It failed. The CIA team, knowing that the outsiders on B would take extreme views, tended to do the same in self-defense. When B felt frustrated over its inability to prevail, one of its members leaked much of the secret material of the proceedings to the press. My reluctance to use this team approach was criticized, but I believe that pitting extremists against one another can only lead to poor results. Instead, extremist views should be permitted to emerge from the analytic effort and be included as a minority view in the report.

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# 1 INTELLIGENCE

Informed policymaking and decisionmaking requires adequate information and analysis. Only if policymakers and decisionmakers are sufficiently informed about the state of the world and the likely consequences of policies and actions can they be expected to make intelligent judgments. If their responsibilities have foreign aspects, they will require the acquisition and analysis of foreign intelligence information.

The individuals with the most prominent need for foreign intelligence are those concerned with national security policymaking and decisionmaking. Hence, those involved in foreign and defense policy—the President, the National Security Council (NSC), the State Department, and the Defense Department (DOD)—are the most visible consumers of foreign intelligence.

However, there are many other policymakers who have a need for foreign intelligence, just as there are ways other than political or military action that foreign governments or groups can affect the U.S. national security or public welfare. This has become particularly evident in recent years. Edward Boland, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, has noted that “many believe in fact that energy and related economic problems can threaten us more deeply and affect our national security more rapidly than any change in the military picture short of war.”<sup>1</sup> Clearly, the availability of energy resources as well as the stability of the dollar can be influenced by the actions of foreign governments or groups.

As a result, there are many government agencies that engage in intelligence activities. As will be seen in the chapters that follow, these departments and agencies extend well beyond those involved in foreign and defense policy to include units of the Commerce, Energy, and Treasury Departments among

others. Before turning to the examination of these agencies and offices, it would be useful to examine the various types of intelligence activities—collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action—as well as the utility and type of intelligence that can be gathered and produced.

## INTELLIGENCE

Strictly speaking, intelligence can be defined as “the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operation which is immediately or potentially significant for planning.”<sup>2</sup>

Collection can be defined as the purposeful acquisition of any information that might be desired by analyst, consumer, or operator. Collection activity can take any one of several overlapping forms: open source collection, clandestine collection, human source collection, or technical collection. Open source collection includes the acquisition of material in the public domain: radio and television broadcasts, newspapers, magazines, technical and scholarly journals, books, government reports, and reports by foreign service officers and defense attachés concerning public activities. The extent to which open source collection yields valuable information will vary greatly with the nature of the targeted society and the subject involved. The information might be collected by human sources—individuals who purchase the books and journals or observe public events—or by technical resources—recordings of television and radio programs.

Clandestine collection involves the acquisition of data that are not publicly available. As with open source collection, both human and technical resources may be employed. The traditional human spy may be employed to provide vast quantities of sensitive political and military information. Alternatively, technical systems can be used to photograph military installations or intercept strategic communications.

Great secrecy and sensitivity are more characteristic of human source clandestine collection. Although much technical collection is also clandestine, secrecy is not always as vital as in the case of human collection. Thus, the United States and Soviet Union are well aware of, if not totally informed of, each other's satellite reconnaissance programs. Even in the absence of a SALT or START agreement prohibiting concealment and deception measures with respect to certain activities, some of these activities would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conceal from technical collectors. In such cases, the ability to collect effectively the required data does not depend on its being done clandestinely.

Analysis involves the integration of collected information or raw intelligence from all sources into finished intelligence. The finished intelligence product might be a simple statement of facts, an estimate of the capabilities of another

nation's military forces, or a projection of the likely course of political events in another nation.

Strictly speaking, intelligence activities involve solely the collection and analysis of information and its transformation into intelligence, but several other activities have come to be considered examples of intelligence activity—specifically, counterintelligence and covert action.

Counterintelligence is the acquisition of information or activity designed to neutralize hostile intelligence services. These activities might involve espionage against hostile services, debriefing of defectors, and analysis of the methods of operation of the hostile services. They might also involve the direct penetration and disruption of those services and their activities.

Covert action is also known as “special activities,” “secret political action” (Britain), and “active measures” (Soviet Union). Covert action can be defined as any operation or activity designed to influence foreign governments, persons, or events in support of the sponsoring government's foreign policy objectives while keeping the sponsoring government's support of the operation a secret. Thus, while in the case of clandestine collection the emphasis is on keeping the activity secret, the emphasis in covert action is on keeping sponsorship secret.

There are several distinct types of covert action: black propaganda (propaganda that purports to emanate from a source other than the true one); gray propaganda (in which true sponsorship is not acknowledged); paramilitary or political actions designed to overthrow or support a regime; support (aid, arms, training) of individuals and organizations (newspapers, labor unions, political parties); economic operations; and disinformation.<sup>3</sup>

## THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

It is important to put the collection and analysis activities conducted by various intelligence units into proper perspective—one that relates these activities to the requirements and needs of the decisionmakers and the use made of the finished intelligence product. This is done through the concept of the “intelligence cycle.”

The intelligence cycle is the process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to policymakers. Generally, it comprises five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, production and analysis, and dissemination.<sup>4</sup>

Planning and direction involves the management of the entire intelligence effort, from the identification of the need for data to the final delivery of an intelligence product to a consumer. The process is initiated by requests or requirements for intelligence on certain subjects based on the needs of the customers—the President, Department of State, DOD, or others. In some cases, the requests and requirements become institutionalized. Thus, the President does

not need to remind the intelligence community to collect information on Soviet strategic forces.

Collection, as indicated above, involves the gathering of raw data from which finished intelligence will be produced. The collection process involves open sources, clandestine agents, and technical systems. Processing is concerned with the conversion of the vast amount of information coming into the system to a form more suitable for the production of finished intelligence. It involves language translation, decryption, and sorting by subject matters as well as data reduction—interpretation of the information stored on film and tape through the use of photographic and electronic processes.

Production and analysis refers to the conversion of basic information into finished intelligence. It includes the integration, evaluation, and analysis of all available data and the preparation of various intelligence products. The "raw intelligence" that is collected may often be fragmentary and at times contradictory, requiring specialists to give it meaning and significance.

The final step in the cycle is dissemination. This involves the distribution and handling of the finished intelligence to the consumers—the policymakers (and operators) whose needs triggered the process.

Like any model, this outline of the intelligence cycle is a simplification of the real world. As noted above, certain requirements become "standing requirements." Similarly, policymakers will not specify, except in rare cases, specific items of information. Rather, they will indicate a desire for reports on, for example, Chinese strategic forces or the political situation in Egypt, the collection agencies being given the responsibility of determining how to obtain the information necessary to prepare such reports. Finally, the collection agencies will have a certain internal need to acquire information to provide for their continued operation—information related to counterintelligence and security and information that will be useful in potential future operations.

#### THE UTILITY OF INTELLIGENCE

The utility of intelligence activity, here narrowly construed to mean collection and analysis, depends on the extent to which it aids national decisionmakers. Two questions arise in this regard: In what ways does intelligence aid decisionmakers, and what attributes make intelligence useful? With respect to the first question, four distinct areas exist in which intelligence can be useful to national decisionmakers: policymaking, planning, conflict situations, and warning.

In their policymaking roles, national decisionmakers set the basic outlines of foreign, defense, and international economic policy. Their need for intelligence in order to make sound decisions is summed up in the report of the Rockefeller Commission:

Intelligence is information gathered for policymakers in government which illuminates the range of choices available to them and enables them to exer-

cise judgment. Good intelligence will not necessarily lead to wise policy choices. But without sound intelligence, national policy decisions and actions cannot effectively respond to actual conditions and reflect the best national interests or adequately protect . . . national security.<sup>5</sup>

In addition to its value in policymaking, intelligence is vital to the specific decisions needed to implement policy and decisions that might be labeled planning decisions. Such decisions involve the building and deployment of new weapons systems, the development of strategic war plans (in the case of the United States, the Single Integrated Operational Plan or SIOP), suspension or resumption of foreign aid, and the employment of trade restrictions. Here intelligence might be able to tell the decisionmaker the likely or expected effects of such actions, including the reactions of those nations toward which a particular decision is directed. Thus, Zbigniew Brzezinski has written that President Carter's decision to embargo grain sales to the Soviet Union was based in part on the Agriculture Department's estimate that no other country could replace the United States as a major seller to the Soviet Union—"a conclusion which within days was shaken by Argentina's announcement that it would partially replace the American grain shipment." In another case, the Carter administration went ahead with a planned sale of planes to Saudi Arabia partially on the basis of intelligence indicating that if the United States backed out of the deal the Saudis would simply buy French planes.<sup>6</sup>

Conflict situations in which intelligence is of value need not be exclusively of a military nature. Any situation where nations have at least partially conflicting interests, such as in arms control negotiations, trade negotiations, or international conferences, would qualify. Intelligence can indicate how far the other negotiator can be pushed and the extent to which a position must be modified for it to be adopted.

Warning is also a prime benefit of intelligence. Warning might concern military or other action to be taken against the decisionmaker's own government or nation or against a country the fate of which concerns the decisionmaker. The warning mission requires, to the greatest extent possible, the monitoring of the adversary nation's armed forces. For the United States, this means monitoring the status of the entire range of Soviet forces—knowing the numbers deployed, their locations, and usual pattern of activity, and notifying the proper authorities in the event of major anomalies. On the basis of advance notice, defenses can be prepared, responses considered and implemented, and preemptive actions (diplomatic or military) taken to forestall or negate action.

The overall utility of intelligence in regard to military matters was concisely summarized by the Eisenhower administration's Technological Capabilities Panel:

If intelligence can uncover a new military threat, we may take steps to meet it. If intelligence can reveal an opponent's specific weakness, we may prepare to exploit it. With good intelligence we can avoid wasting our resources by arming for the wrong danger at the wrong time. Beyond this, in the broadest

sense, intelligence underlies our estimate of the enemy and thus helps to guide our political strategy.<sup>7</sup>

The utility of intelligence, in addition to being dependent on its addressing relevant subjects, is also dependent on its having the attributes of quality and timeliness. Unless all relevant information is marshaled when assessing intelligence on a subject, the quality of the finished product might suffer. Covertly obtained intelligence should not be assessed in isolation from overtly obtained intelligence. As Professor H. Trevor-Roper observed:

Secret intelligence is the continuation of open intelligence by other means. So long as governments conceal a part of their activities, other governments, if they wish to base their policy on full and correct information, must seek to penetrate the veil. This inevitably entails varying methods.

But, however the means may vary, the end must still be the same. It is to complement the results of what for convenience, we may call "public" intelligence: that is, the intelligence derived from the rational study of public or at least available sources. Intelligence, in fact, is indivisible.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to being based on all relevant information, the assessment process must be objective. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the U.S. Senate in 1973: "Anyone concerned with national policy must have a profound interest in making sure that intelligence guides and does not follow, national policy."<sup>9</sup>

Further, intelligence must reach decisionmakers in good time for them to act decisively. Intelligence as foreknowledge has always had particular relevance in military matters. It can give the military commander or domestic policymaker the great advantage of not being taken unaware—an advantage the value of which was recognized by Sun Tzu 2,500 years ago: "The reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge."<sup>10</sup>

#### VARIETIES OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

To understand how specific varieties of intelligence can be useful to government officials one need only consider the components of those varieties. To begin, one might identify several general categories of intelligence—political, military, scientific and technical, economic.

Political intelligence will include intelligence about both a nation's foreign policy and its domestic politics. Clearly, the foreign policies of other nations have an impact on the United States. A variety of issues might be involved: support of the United States on a U.N. issue, a nation's relations with the Soviet Union or Cuba, attitudes and policies concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, the support of revolutionary groups, or leadership perceptions of the United States.

The domestic politics of other nations—whether friendly, neutral, allied, or hostile—is also of significant concern to the United States since the resolution of domestic political conflict can have a direct effect on foreign policy. The outcome of such conflict—whether by coup, election, or civil war—can affect the orientation of that nation in the world, the regional balance of power, the accessibility of critical resources to the United States, or the continued presence of U.S. military bases.

Thus, the outcome of elections in Spain and Greece may affect those countries' continued participation in NATO and the status of major U.S. military bases. Likewise, the resolution of the internal conflict in Iran deprived the United States of several assets: oil, a military ally, and critical intelligence bases from which Soviet missile telemetry could be intercepted. Similarly, the extent of the nationality problem in the Soviet Union can have a significant effect on its Middle Eastern policy as well as its ability to maintain high manpower levels in the armed forces.<sup>11</sup>

Military intelligence is useful and required with respect to a wide variety of situations. The United States, in order to determine its own requirements in strategic weapons, must know the nature of Soviet strategic forces (numbers of delivery vehicles and warheads; their yield, accuracy, and reliability) as well as the characteristics of the Soviet target base (numbers, blast resistance, locations). Much of this information is also vital to the negotiation and monitoring of arms limitation agreements. The same basic requirements exist with respect to conventional forces. The size and capabilities as well as the location and readiness of Warsaw Pact forces must be continually monitored—either as a guide to NATO planning requirements or as a means of warning against possible attack or as a means of monitoring a Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) agreement.

Scientific and technical intelligence includes both civilian- and military-related scientific and technical development. A nation's ability to produce steel or oil may influence both that country's stability and U.S. fortunes. In many cases, technological developments that occur in the civilian sector have military applications. Areas such as computer technology, ball bearing production, mirrors and optical systems, and lasers all have significant military applications. Hence, intelligence concerning a nation's progress in those areas or its ability to absorb foreign-produced technology in those areas is relevant to its potential military standing.

One aspect of scientific and technological intelligence that has been of constant concern for over thirty years is atomic energy intelligence. Whether the announced purpose of a nation's atomic energy activities has been civilian or military, those activities have received high intelligence priority. In addition to the obvious need to determine if a foreign government is developing nuclear weapons independent of U.S. government actions, there has also been a perceived need to acquire secret intelligence in support of decisionmaking concerning ap-

plications for nuclear technology exports. Thus, the first Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) noted in 1947 that the United States "cannot rely on information submitted by a licensee" and that it was necessary to the United States to "determine actual use, [to] endeavor to discover secondary diversions."<sup>12</sup>

Economic intelligence is also of great importance. The activities of, for example, OPEC and the Common Market are matters of concern to U.S. national security and economic policy officials. In 1975 the DCI noted that economic intelligence of value to U.S. policymakers includes "topics such as the activities of multi-national corporations, international development programs, regional economic arrangements and the workings of international commodity markets."<sup>13</sup> Specific areas of interest included:

- Rates of production, consumption, pricing of raw materials and energy sources, and international commodity arrangements as a means to share the burden of price fluctuation between producers and consumers of primary commodities.
- Price and nonprice restrictions on international trade.
- The international payments mechanism and the coordination of national fiscal monetary policies.<sup>14</sup>

With regard to any one nation, U.S. officials may have a need for intelligence concerning all aspects of domestic and foreign affairs. In the case of the Soviet Union, intelligence of value would include (but by no means be limited to) intelligence concerning the forthcoming grain harvest, ethnic problems in the armed forces, strategic weapons systems deployed and under development, Soviet oil production, Chernenko's consolidation of power, and Soviet negotiating strategy for START. With regard to the Middle East, U.S. officials would need intelligence concerning the health of the Israeli Prime Minister, the ability of the Likud coalition to remain in power, Israeli plans for future settlements on the West Bank, Arab government support for the PLO, the internal stability of the Saudi and Egyptian regimes, the willingness of various Arab governments to recognize Israel's right to exist, and the military capabilities of all nations in the region.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

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8. Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Philby Affair - Espionage, Treason and Secret Services* (London: Kimber, 1968), p. 66.
9. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973). For evidence that Kissinger did not always follow his own advice, see Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit, 1983), pp. 529-560.
10. Samuel Griffith, trans., *Sun Tzu, The Art of War* (London: Oxford Press, 1963), p. 144.
11. See Jeremy Azrael, *Emergent Nationality Problems in the USSR* (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, 1977).
12. Sidney Souers, "Atomic Energy Intelligence," *RG 218 Joint Chiefs of Staff, File 131*, July 1, 1947, Modern Military Branch, National Archives.
13. "Director of Central Intelligence Perspectives for Intelligence 1976-1981," *Covert Action Information Bulletin* 6 (October 1979): 13-24.
14. *Ibid.*

## **2 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS**

The activities of the U.S. intelligence services are similar to the intelligence services of many other nations—collection and analysis, covert action, and counter-intelligence. However, the extent of these activities and the methods employed, especially with respect to technical collection, far surpass those of every other nation except the Soviet Union.

The United States collects information via reconnaissance satellites, aircraft, ships, signals intelligence stations, radar, and underseas surveillance as well as via the traditional overt and clandestine human sources. The total cost of these activities is well in excess of \$10 billion per year.

Given this wide range of activity and the large number of intelligence consumers, it is not surprising that a plethora of organizations are involved in intelligence activities. The exact number of members of the U.S. intelligence community is somewhat ambiguous or subjective. Some organizations are clearly members—the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In addition, each of the major military services (Army, Navy, Air Force) has its own intelligence community, with several distinct subordinate organizations reporting to an assistant chief of staff for intelligence. Further, there are other agencies and offices that perform intelligence functions either marginally related to the production of national security intelligence or intelligence in support of foreign economic and trade policy formulation.

Three organizations are considered national intelligence organizations: the NRO, the NSA, and the CIA. They perform intelligence functions for the entire

government (rather than just a department). Their activities provide intelligence for national-level policymakers and they are responsive to direction by supra-departmental authority.

#### NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

The NRO manages satellite reconnaissance programs for the entire U.S. intelligence community. These programs involve the collection of photographic and signals intelligence via satellite. The specific programs involved include the Air Force's Keyhole-8 and Keyhole-9 photographic reconnaissance satellites, the CIA's Keyhole-11 (KH-11) photographic reconnaissance satellites, and Rhyolite signals intelligence satellites as well as the Navy Space Project's White Cloud ocean surveillance satellite.

The NRO has a broad range of functions. It has participated in various policy committees, such as the NSAM 156 committee established by President Kennedy in 1962 to review the political aspects of U.S. policy on satellite reconnaissance.<sup>1</sup> It has also played a significant role in drawing a curtain of secrecy around the reconnaissance program. Thus, in a memorandum to President Kennedy concerning the SAMOS II (Satellite and Missile Observation System), the Air Force's first photographic reconnaissance satellite) launch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Arthur Sylvester noted that the material to be made available to newsmen concerning the launch and the program "represents a severe reduction from what had previously been issued." Sylvester further stated that "Dr. Charyk [Director of NRO] has reviewed those changes and is satisfied that they meet all his security requirements and those of his SAMOS Project Director, Brigadier General Greer."<sup>2</sup> More recently, the NRO has been heavily involved in developing security regulations concerning the release of information concerning military satellite payloads to be placed in orbit by the Space Transportation System (STS).

The NRO is also responsible for the routine operation of the satellites, including maneuvers such as turning them on and off and facing them toward or away from the sun.<sup>3</sup> More importantly, the NRO implements and helps prepare a joint reconnaissance schedule that details the assignment of reconnaissance systems to targets.<sup>4</sup>

Although the NRO has existed under the "cover" of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Office of Space Systems, it is, as its name indicates, a national-level organization. And, in fact, it is directly supervised by one of two National Executive Committees chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the National Reconnaissance Executive Committee.<sup>5</sup>

The NRO came into existence on August 25, 1960 after several months of debate within and among the White House, Department of Defense (DOD), Air Force, and CIA concerning the nature and duties of such an organization. Its creation was a response to various problems plaguing the early missile and satel-

lite programs as well as to the May 1, 1960 shooting down of a U-2 over the Soviet Union.<sup>6</sup> As a result of this latter event, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force sought a revised program to exploit as early as possible any reconnaissance data that could be obtained from SAMOS test flights. On June 10 President Eisenhower asked Secretary of Defense Gates, Jr. to re-evaluate the program and brief the National Security Council (NSC) on intelligence requirements, the technical feasibility of meeting those requirements, and the DOD's plans.<sup>7</sup>

Gates in turn appointed a panel of three - Dr. Joseph Charyk, Undersecretary of the Air Force; John H. Rubel, Deputy Director of the Defense Directorate of Research and Engineering; and Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, the President's science adviser. The eventual product of their work was their briefing of August 25 which was followed, according to an official Air Force history, by "a key decision by the NSC and the President which, eliminating previous uncertainties, signaled the start of a highest priority program reminiscent of the wartime Manhattan Project effort" - the creation of the NRO.<sup>8</sup> The NRO superseded an office (the Directorate of Advanced Technology) that coordinated satellite development for the Air Force Chief of Staff.<sup>9</sup>

The national-level character of the organization was a major point of importance to those involved in its formation. Thus, George Kistiakowsky, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, noted that it was important "that the organization have a clear line of authority and that on the top level direction be of a national character, including OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and CIA and not the Air Force alone."<sup>10</sup> One reason such a framework was desired was to be certain that the utilization of the photographic "take" not be left solely in the hands of the Air Force.<sup>11</sup>

The existence of an office known as the National Reconnaissance Office was kept secret from the U.S. public and most of the rest of the government for thirteen years, until 1973. An obscure reference to its creation, but not its name, appeared in the September 12, 1960 issue of *Aviation Week*. In that issue it was noted that "development of SAMOS is being moved directly under the Secretary of the Air Force. . . . Brig. Gen. Richard B. Curtin will head SAMOS development in the new office."<sup>12</sup>

The first public revelation of the NRO's existence came in 1973 as the result of an error made in editing a Senate Committee report. The name National Reconnaissance Office was, by error, not deleted from a list of intelligence agencies that the committee recommended should make their budgets public.<sup>13</sup> The slip led to a fairly extensive article in the *Washington Post* a few months later in which the NRO's functions, budget, and cover were discussed.<sup>14</sup> The following year the CIA lost in its attempt to have a similar discussion deleted from Mar-chetti and Marks's *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*.

The NRO is still officially considered a secret or "black" institution, at least by the NRO and the DOD. References to it in the *Department of Defense Annual Report* and Executive Orders are to offices charged with "the collection of



specialized foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs." The closest an executive branch document has come to admitting the existence of the NRO was the report of the Murphy Commission, which referred to "a semi-autonomous office within the Defense Department with the largest budget of any intelligence agency that operates overhead reconnaissance programs for the entire intelligence community."<sup>15</sup> At the same time, the CIA's Publication Review Board cleared for publication two books by former high CIA officials, including former Director William Colby, that referred to the organization.<sup>16</sup>

Headquarters of the NRO is located at 4C-956 in the Pentagon, which is officially the Office of Space Systems and subordinate to the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for Space Systems.<sup>17</sup> Both the Director, Office of Space Systems and the Deputy Under Secretary are high-ranking officials of the NRO.

Traditionally, the Director is the Under Secretary of the Air Force. The NRO's first Director, Joseph Charyk, held the position at the same time that he was Under Secretary of the Air Force, as did Hans Mark in the Carter administration. The only apparent exception to this rule was the appointment of Robert J. Hermann as successor to Mark while he was Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research, Development, and Logistics. This break in tradition was apparently due to the lack of knowledge of Antonia Chayes, Mark's successor as Under Secretary, concerning reconnaissance matters.<sup>18</sup> Hermann, on the other hand, had served as chief of W Group in NSA, the unit charged with conducting intercept operations.<sup>19</sup> The break with tradition was only temporary, as the Under Secretary of the Air Force appointed by the Reagan administration, Edward C. Aldridge, became the NRO's most recent Director.

As noted above, the NRO is responsible for managing the entire satellite reconnaissance effort. At the same time, it is known that the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology is heavily involved in reconnaissance satellite development through its Office of Development and Engineering and its Office of SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) Operations.<sup>20</sup> Specifically, it is these offices that appear to have been responsible for the development of the KH-11 and Rhyolite satellites.<sup>21</sup> Likewise, development of Navy satellites, including the White Cloud ocean surveillance satellite, is the responsibility of the Navy Space Project of the Naval Electronics Systems Command (NAVALEX). Thus, these offices constitute subordinate units of the NRO as well as of their own agencies.

Another unit that is a subordinate unit of the NRO is the Air Force Special Projects Office, located at the Space Division in El Segundo, California. Thus, in discussing the appointment of a new Special Projects Director to head that office, *Aviation Week and Space Technology* noted that

the special projects group has the responsibility for gathering satellite strategic reconnaissance data for use by national intelligence organizations. It directs the design, development and procurement of photographic and other types of military reconnaissance satellites and their subsystems, operating under an annual budget of \$250 to \$350 million. The group is resident . . .

at the Air Force's [Space Division] but reports directly to the Secretary of the Air Force.<sup>22</sup>

Location of an NRO component in El Segundo allows direct and frequent contact with the corporations that develop and build reconnaissance satellites—TRW, Hughes, and Lockheed—as well as with the Aerospace Corporation, which serves in an advisory capacity.

The NRO's present budget appears to be in the \$3 to \$4 billion range.<sup>23</sup> The number of people employed by the NRO is not known, but it is probably small compared to the other national intelligence agencies.

### NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

After the NRO, the NSA is the most secret (and secretive) member of the U.S. intelligence community. The predecessor of NSA, the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) was established within the DOD on May 20, 1949 by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, who made it subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>24</sup> AFSA had little power to direct the activities of the service cryptological elements, its functions being defined in terms of what the service elements did not do.<sup>25</sup>

On October 24, 1952, President Harry S. Truman, in a Top Secret eight-page memorandum (now partially declassified) entitled "Communications Intelligence Activities," to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, abolished the AFSA and transferred its personnel to the newly created NSA.<sup>26</sup> The Truman Directive had its origins in a memo sent by Walter Bedell Smith to National Security Council Executive Secretary James B. Lay on December 10, 1951 stating that "control over, and coordination of, the collection and processing of communications intelligence have proved ineffective" and recommending a survey of communications intelligence activities.<sup>27</sup> This proposal was approved on December 13, 1951; the study authorized on December 28, 1951; and the report completed by June 13, 1952.<sup>28</sup> The report, known as the "Brownell Committee Report," surveyed the history of U.S. communications intelligence activities and suggested the need for a much greater degree of coordination and national-level direction.<sup>29</sup> As the change in the security agency's name indicated, the role of the NSA was to extend beyond the armed forces. Thus, the NSA is considered to be "within but not part of DOD."<sup>30</sup>

The charter for the NSA is National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 6. In its most recently available form, NSCID 6 of February 17, 1972, "Signals Intelligence," directs the NSA to produce intelligence "in accordance with the objectives, requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence and the United States Intelligence Board."<sup>31</sup> The Directive also authorizes the Director of the NSA "to issue direction to any operating elements engaged in SIGINT operations such instructions and assignments as are

required. All instructions issued by the Director under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be mandatory, subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense."<sup>32</sup>

In regard to the scope of SIGINT activities which comprise Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), the Directive further states that

COMINT activities shall be construed to mean those activities which produce COMINT by interception and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means, with specific exception stated below and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Interception comprises range estimation, transmitter operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of those processes, and the reporting of the results.

COMINT and COMINT activities are defined herein shall not include (a) any intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda broadcasts, or (b) censorship.

ELINT activities are defined as the collection (observation and recording) and the processing for subsequent intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources. ELINT is the technical and intelligence information product of ELINT activities.<sup>33</sup>

Although created in 1952, it was not until 1957 that the NSA's existence was officially acknowledged in the *U.S. Government Organization Manual* as a "separately organized agency within the Department of Defense" that "performs highly specialized technical and coordinating functions relating to national security."<sup>34</sup> Despite the lack of official acknowledgment, the NSA's existence was a matter of public knowledge from at least mid-1953. In that year the Washington newspapers ran several stories concerning the construction of its new headquarters at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.<sup>35</sup> In late 1954 the NSA was again in the news when an NSA employee was caught taking secret documents home, apparently with the intention of transmitting them to the Soviet Union.<sup>36</sup>

NSCID 6 defines the extent of the NSA's SIGINT mission. The NSA has another mission: Communications Security (COMSEC). In its COMSEC role it creates, reviews, and authorizes the communications procedures and codes of eighteen government agencies, including the State Department, DOD, CIA, and FBI.<sup>37</sup> This role includes development of secure data and voice transmission links on such satellite systems as the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) and the Satellite Data System (SDS).<sup>38</sup> Likewise, FBI agents use a special scrambler phone for sensitive communications that requires a different code each day from the NSA.<sup>39</sup> The NSA's COMSEC responsibilities also include ensuring communications security for strategic weapons systems such as the Minuteman and MX missiles, so as to prevent unauthorized intrusion, interference, or jamming. In addition, the NSA is responsible for developing the codes

by which the President must identify himself in order to authorize a nuclear strike.<sup>40</sup> In fulfilling these responsibilities, the NSA produces documents such as the *National COMSEC Plan for Fixed Plant and Strategic Communications* (1977) and the *National COMSEC Plan for Space Systems and Nuclear Weapons Systems* (1972).

The NSA's COMSEC responsibilities also include more mundane activities. One such activity is data-processing security, ensuring that unauthorized individuals or governments are not able to tap into data banks. The data banks to be protected from such intrusion include both government and private data banks, regardless of whether they hold classified data. Thus, the NSA has created a Computer Security Center to cooperate with business organizations in evaluating methods for preventing unauthorized access to computer systems.<sup>41</sup>


Just as the NSA's communications security role extends far beyond the traditional code-making role, so its signals intelligence role extends far beyond the code-breaking role and is directed at gathering foreign military, political, and economic intelligence. This intelligence concerns not only the Soviet Union and other hostile nations but Third World and allied nations.

Signals intercepted may include diplomatic communications, conversations between military personnel and among military-political leaders as well as commercial communications. Thus, in the early 1970s the NSA managed, via a Moscow embassy listening post, to intercept the radio-telephone conversations conducted by Soviet leaders when they were in their limousines.<sup>42</sup> At the same time, the NSA is alleged to intercept personal and commercial international communications transmitted via satellite, transatlantic cables, and microwave telephone links, including INTELSAT/COMSAT and the London-Paris phone links.<sup>43</sup>

In pursuit of military intelligence concerning the Soviet Union and other countries, the NSA monitors the electronic emissions of radars and aircraft, the telemetry of missiles, the signatures of Soviet submarines, and the data transmitted by Soviet spacecraft. Thus, in 1967 the NSA monitored the conversation between Premier Alexei Kosygin and Cosmonaut Vladimir M. Komarov, who had been informed by Soviet ground control that the braking parachutes designed to bring his spacecraft safely to earth were malfunctioning and there was no hope.<sup>44</sup>

Clearly, the NSA provides intelligence relevant to a wide range of government activities. COMINT provides data of use in analyzing possible courses of action of foreign governments and in determining negotiating strategy, whether in regard to military or economic negotiations. Thus, the NSA apparently obtained advance warning of the Arab attack on Israel in 1973 as well as knowledge of the Soviet bargaining position in SALT I.<sup>45</sup> ELINT helps determine the order of battle and capabilities of foreign forces, both conventional and strategic. Intelligence about foreign radar systems is useful in pinpointing their location and developing electronic countermeasures (ECMs). On the basis of intelligence

Figure 2-1. Organization of the National Security Agency.



Source: James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America's Most Secret Agency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1982), pp. 56-117.

about foreign radars, NSA prepares Emitter Programs Listings (EPLs) detailing radar frequencies and locations.<sup>46</sup> Identification of Soviet submarines by their signatures is a significant aid to antisubmarine and undersea surveillance activities.

NSA headquarters at Fort Meade houses somewhere between 20,000 and 24,000 employees.<sup>47</sup> As indicated in Figure 2-1, it is divided into several offices/organizations, the three most prominent being the Office of Signals Intelligence Operations, the Office of Communications Security, and the Office of Research and Engineering.<sup>48</sup> The Office of Signals Intelligence Operations has three production units responsible for different geographical areas. A Group is responsible for the Soviet Union and its satellites. Within A Group the A2 Office

is responsible for the Soviet Union and A3 for Soviet satellites. Within the A3 Office the A31 Division (or Northern European Communist Division) is responsible for Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, the A32 Division (South European Communist Division) being responsible for Hungary and Bulgaria (A-321), Yugoslavia and Albania (A-322), and Rumania (A-323). B Group is responsible for China, Korea, Vietnam, and the rest of Communist Asia, and G Group is responsible for all other nations (it used to be known as ALLO), both Third World and allied.

The Office of Communications Security is responsible for COMSEC with respect to the various forms of communications discussed above—diplomatic communications, sensitive secure phone links, satellite voice and data transmissions, and data processing. The Office of Research and Engineering has the responsibility for developing the techniques and equipment necessary for conducting intercept operations, breaking codes, and ensuring secure U.S. codes. The Office's Mathematical Research Techniques Division explores code-breaking possibilities. The Intercept Equipment Division concentrates on developing the equipment required for the NSA's COMINT and ELINT intercept programs. The Cryptographic Equipment Division seeks to develop secure coding machines.

In addition to the three main offices there are several others of importance. The Office of Telecommunications and Computer Services is responsible for both computer support and the functioning of the NSA's communications network, the Digital Network-Defense Special Security Communications System (DIN/DSSCS). Information transmitted on this system, via the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), includes intercepts from overseas stations. The Office of Installations and Logistics is responsible for overseas housing, disposal of classified waste, construction of facilities at Fort Meade, and procurement of computers. The Office of Administration has a variety of functions including personnel matters, training, employment, and security—the latter being handled by the Office of Security, MS.

Other offices of importance are the Office of Plans and Policy and the Office of Programs and Resources. The Office of Plans and Policy serves as a staff for the Director with the Deputy Director for Plans and Policy serving as a Chief of Staff. The Office of Programs and Resources is charged with the management and allocation of SIGINT/COMSEC resources, most specifically with the preparation of the Consolidated Cryptographic Program (discussed in Chapter 14).

The size of the NSA budget has been variously estimated at \$1.2 billion, \$3 billion, and \$10 billion.<sup>49</sup> The disparities may be a function of one-time equipment purchases and the difference between NSA headquarters budget and the total NSA-controlled SIGINT/COMSEC budget. The latter budget would incorporate the funds spent under the direction of the NSA's "other half," the Central Security Service (CSS). The CSS is responsible, in theory, for supervising and directing the activities of the Service Cryptological Authorities (SCAs)—the Army Intelligence and Security Command, the Air Force Electronic Security

Command, and the Naval Security Group Command. The CSS function of the NSA, with the Director of the NSA serving simultaneously as Chief of the CSS, was established in 1971 in order "to provide a unified, more economical and more effective structure for executing cryptologic and related operations presently conducted under the Military Departments."<sup>50</sup> There is however, at present, no separate CSS Staff.<sup>51</sup>

In addition to performing tactical COMSEC and SIGINT missions, the SCAs provide personnel to man strategic SIGINT collection facilities in the United States and overseas. Assuming that the SCAs employ approximately equal numbers of personnel, the total number of NSA/SCA personnel is in the 50,000 to 60,000 range, and the overall budget for NSA-directed SIGINT and COMSEC activities is in the \$5 to \$10 billion range.

#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. central intelligence organization that had been created for the conflict - the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) - was disbanded. Several branches of the organization were distributed among other departments of the government. Thus, the X-2 (counterintelligence) and Secret Intelligence Branches were transferred to the War Department as the Strategic Services Unit, and the Research and Analysis Branch was relocated in the State Department.<sup>52</sup>

Shortly afterward, however, President Truman found himself deluged by intelligence reports from several government agencies and set up the National Intelligence Authority and its operational element, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), to coordinate and collate the reports.<sup>53</sup> The CIG served as a coordinating mechanism as well as having some responsibility for intelligence collection.<sup>54</sup>

As part of the general consideration of national security needs and organization, the question of intelligence organization was addressed in the National Security Act of 1947. The Act established the CIA as an independent agency within the Executive Office of the President to replace the CIG. According to the Act, the CIA was to have five functions:

1. to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as related to national security;
2. to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the government as relate to national security;
3. to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and to provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities;

4. to perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally; and
5. to perform other such functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.<sup>55</sup>

The CIA was to have no domestic role or powers of arrest.

The provisions of the Act left a great deal of room for interpretation. Thus, the final provision (5) has been cited as authorizing covert action measures. Whatever the intentions of Congress in 1947, the CIA developed in accord with a maximalist interpretation of the Act. Thus, the CIA has become the primary U.S. government agency for intelligence analysis, clandestine human intelligence collection, and covert action. As noted above, it has played a major role in the development of overhead reconnaissance systems, such as the U-2, KH-11, and Rhyolite. Additionally, the Director of the CIA is also Director of Central Intelligence and is responsible for managing the activities of the entire intelligence community.

In addition, under President Reagan's 1981 Executive Order 12333, the CIA is permitted to collect "significant" foreign intelligence secretly within the United States if that effort is not aimed at learning about the domestic activities of U.S. citizens and corporations. The order also gives the CIA authority to conduct, within the United States, "special activities" or covert operations if approved by the President that are not intended to influence U.S. political processes, public opinion, or the media.<sup>56</sup>

Headquarters of the CIA is in Langley, Virginia, although it has many offices and over 3,000 employees scattered around the Washington area.<sup>57</sup> In 1983 it had between 16,500 and 20,000 employees in the Washington area and a budget of \$800 million.<sup>58</sup> It is divided into four major components, each headed by a Deputy Director, and six offices directly subordinate to the Director and Deputy Director. The offices are those of the General Counsel, the Inspector General, the Comptroller, Equal Employment Opportunity, Director of Personnel, and Director of Policy and Planning. The major components are the Directorate of Administration, the Directorate of Operations, the Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Directorate of Intelligence. Thus, the general structure of the CIA is that depicted in Figure 2-2.

Within the Directorate of Administration are eight offices which perform a wide range of administrative services: the Office of Communications, the Office of Logistics, the Office of Security, the Office of Training and Education, the Office of Finance, the Office of Data Processing, the Office of Medical Services, and the Office of Personnel.<sup>59</sup> The Office of Communications, with over 2,000 employees in 1973, maintains facilities for secret communications between CIA headquarters and overseas bases and agents.<sup>60</sup> Presumably, this includes control over the CIA Pyramid type agent communications satellites.<sup>61</sup>

The Office of Logistics operates weapons and other warehouses in the United States as well as supplying office equipment.<sup>62</sup>


The Office of Security is responsible for the physical protection of CIA installations, overt and covert, at home and abroad. It also administers polygraph tests to applicants and contractor personnel.<sup>63</sup> The Office of Finance maintains field units in Hong Kong, Beirut, Buenos Aires, and Geneva with easy access to monetary markets. It is also responsible for payroll and maintaining centralized financial records.<sup>64</sup> The Office of Medical Services provides cleared psychiatrists and physicians to treat agency officers.<sup>65</sup> The Office of Personnel is responsible for recruitment and maintenance of personnel files and with the Office of Training and Education operates CIA training facilities, including the main facility, "The Farm," at Camp Peary, Virginia.<sup>66</sup> Along with the Office of Medical Services and the Office of Security, it shares the responsibility for screening applicants. In response to the statement of personnel needs from agency components, it prepares an Advanced Staffing Plan for the ensuing fiscal year, listing the total personnel requirements by category of personnel and occupation job titles.<sup>67</sup> The Office of Training and Education conducts over sixty courses on world affairs, management theories and techniques, foreign languages, and intelligence evaluation and production.<sup>68</sup>

The Directorate of Operations, formerly the Directorate of Plans, is in charge of clandestine collection and covert actions (special activities). It is organized into various headquarters staffs, area divisions, and support divisions. The headquarters staffs are the Foreign Intelligence Staff; the Counterintelligence Staff; Covert Action Staff; Staff D; Central Cover Staff (formerly Cover and Commercial Staff); and the Evaluation, Plans, and Design Staff.

The Counterintelligence Staff (CIS) is responsible for offensive counterintelligence operations - penetration of hostile services, collection and analysis of information concerning such services, and the debriefing of defectors. Through its Operational Approval Branch, the CIS can "cast a vote" concerning proposed recruitments by an area division.<sup>69</sup> Among its analysis functions, the CIS prepares surveys of 50 to 100 pages concerning the structure, history, key personnel, and operations of foreign intelligence services, both hostile and friendly. At the height of its influence, under James Jesus Angleton, it had about 200 employees. After Angleton's dismissal at the end of 1975, the size of the staff was radically reduced and assignment to the staff made a temporary tour of duty. Operational counterintelligence responsibility was assigned to the geographical divisions of the directorate.<sup>70</sup>

The Foreign Intelligence Staff is responsible for checking the authenticity of sources and information; screening clandestine collection requirements; and reviewing the regional divisions projects, budget information, and operational cable traffic.<sup>71</sup> The responsibilities and authorities of the Foreign Intelligence Staff were summarized by a former head of the Staff, Peer de Silva:

The Foreign Intelligence Staff had a continuing responsibility for monitoring intelligence collection projects and programs carried out abroad. These oper-



Primary Source: CIA, CIA Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980).

Figure 2-2. Organization of the Central Intelligence Agency.

ations and collection programs were of course controlled and directed by the area divisions concerned; the FI Staff simply read the progress charts on the various projects (or the lack of progress) and played the role of determining which intelligence collection programs should be continued, changed or terminated. With the exception of a few individual operations of special sensitivity, this FI Staff function was worldwide.<sup>72</sup>

The Covert Action Staff, in cooperation with the area divisions, develops the plans for covert action operations which have included: (1) political advice and counsel; (2) subsidies to an individual; (3) financial support and "technical assistance" to political parties; (4) support to private organizations, including labor unions and business firms; (5) covert propaganda; (6) private training of individuals and exchange of persons; (7) economic operations; (8) paramilitary or political action operations designed to overthrow or support a regime; and (9) attempted assassinations.<sup>73</sup> Thus, during the presidency of Salvador Allende the Covert Action Staff might have devised an article uncomplimentary to Allende in cooperation with the Chilean desk of the Western Hemisphere Division. A CIA front, such as Forum World Features in London, would then be used to write and transmit the article.<sup>74</sup>

Staff D is in charge of bugging, wiretapping, and COMINT activities in support of other government agencies. Thus, the U.S. Secret Service regularly tasks the CIA to provide real-time communications intelligence close support to the Secret Service during the foreign travel of the President. The CIA monitors on-the-scene local, foreign military, and internal security support elements responsible for the physical protection of the President.<sup>75</sup> In 1973, at the request of the NSA, the staff monitored telephone conversations between the United States and Latin America for a period of three (or six) months in an effort to identify narcotics traffickers.<sup>76</sup> On another occasion, Staff D apparently gave money to a code clerk working in the Washington embassy of a U.S. ally for supplying information that assisted in breaking the Allies' code.<sup>77</sup> At one time, Staff D also housed the CIA "Executive Action" capability, ZR/RIFL.<sup>78</sup>

In addition to the operational staffs are two support and evaluation staffs. The Central Cover Staff is the apparent successor to the Operational Services Division, which supplied cover for agents under nondiplomatic cover. The Central Cover Staff may also set up CIA proprietary organizations business organizations that serve as cover for CIA operations.<sup>79</sup>

The Evaluation, Plans, and Designs Staff (EPDS) does much of the bureaucratic planning and budgeting for the Directorate for Operations. It also serves as a catchall staff for "unwanted" elements of other staffs and offices. Thus, the International Communism Branch of the Counterintelligence Staff was transferred to EPDS as a result of the downgrading of the stature of the CIS.<sup>80</sup>

Actual implementation of staff-planned activities are generally the responsibility of the area divisions, of which there are nine: Soviet Bloc, Western Hemisphere, European, East Asia, Africa, Near East, Special Operations, Foreign Re-


sources, and Domestic Collection.<sup>81</sup> Each of the regional area divisions has staffs for support, covert action, counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence. In addition, each division is broken down into branches and desks representing ever more specific geographic areas. The Special Operations Division handles paramilitary activities such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, CIA secret armies in Laos and Vietnam, and the present efforts directed at the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The Foreign Resources Division was created in 1963 as the Domestic Operations Division and given the responsibility for "clandestine operational activities of the Clandestine Services conducted within the United States against foreign targets."<sup>82</sup> The present functions of the Division are to locate and recruit foreign nationals residing in the United States who are of special interest to cooperate with the CIA abroad.<sup>83</sup>

The Domestic Collection Division (DCD), known until 1973 as the Domestic Contact Service (and part of the Directorate of Intelligence until then), openly collects intelligence from U.S. residents who have traveled abroad. The intelligence concerns a wide variety of subjects, primarily of an economic and technical nature.<sup>84</sup> One of the DCD's continuing responsibilities is the resettlement of defectors.<sup>85</sup>

An organizational chart of the Directorate of Operations is shown as Figure 2-3. As of 1973 the Directorate had 6,000 employees and a budget of \$440 million. About \$260 million was spent on covert action, and 4,800 employees were located in the area divisions.<sup>86</sup> Cutbacks by Directors James Schlesinger and Siansfield Turner reduced personnel by about 2,000, but Director William Casey, appointed in 1981, restored many of the slots eliminated by Schlesinger and Turner.<sup>87</sup>


The Directorate of Intelligence, known from 1978 to 1981 as the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC), is the primary U.S. government organization for intelligence analysis. As such, it has been the unit primarily responsible for preparing the various National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates, the most important of these being the yearly NIE-11-3/8 on Soviet strategic forces. As shown in Figure 2-4, the present structure of the Directorate includes three staffs (Management and Analysis Support, Arms Control Intelligence, and Collection Requirements and Evaluation), five regional offices and five functional offices, and one independent center. Regional offices such as the Office of Soviet Analysis were created by grouping Soviet analysts from all areas of research—political, military, economic, agricultural, and sociological. The functional offices—the Office of Global Issues, the Office of Imagery Analysis, the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research, the Office of Central Reference, the Office of Current Operations—are, with one exception (Global Issues), carryovers from the NFAC organizational framework, which was strictly functional. In 1981 an independent (within the Directorate) center, the Technology Transfer Assessment Center, was established to coordinate the production of technology transfer intelligence.<sup>88</sup>

Figure 2-3. Organization of the Directorate of Operations.



Source: Victor Marchetti and John Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Knopf 1974), pp. 58-86; U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Prepublication Review and Secrecy Arrangements* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 10; Interview with author.

Figure 2-4. Organization of the Directorate of Intelligence.



Source: Private information.

A more instructive picture of the Directorate of Intelligence's functions and actual output can be obtained by noting that the Office of Global Issues is concerned with subjects such as narcotics, international terrorism (via the Office's Center for Insurgency, Instability, and Terrorism), and human rights and by considering the functions of the NFAC offices as they stood in April 1979. At that time NFAC consisted of nine offices, an Operations Center, and a Publications and Presentations Group.<sup>89</sup>

The Office of Central Reference provided (and still provides) data in the form of directories of foreign government officials, lists of organizations and of public appearances by foreign officials, and biographies of interest. Among its publications have been "Dmitry Ustinov: USSR Minister of Defense," "The Leadership of the USSR Academy of Science," and "Directory of Officials of the People's Republic of China."

The Office of Imagery Analysis was created in 1961 as the Imagery Analysis Service to give the CIA a photo imagery analysis capability apart from the CIA-run National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), which was to serve the entire intelligence community.<sup>90</sup> The Office of Strategic Research (OSR) was responsible for military intelligence matters. It was primarily concerned, through its Strategic Evaluation Center, with Soviet strategic forces. OSR publications included "Chinese Defense Spending 1965-1979," "A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities 1968-1978," and "The Egyptian Arms Industry."

The Office of Political Analysis (OPA) was concerned with all aspects of political activity—the outcome of elections, terrorism, the standing of political parties, the political power of factions, and the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy. OPA publications have included "Patterns of International Terrorism," "Profile of Violence: An Analytical Model," and "A Guide to Political Acronyms." The Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research studied demographic, cultural, and social questions. Its publications included "Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe," "The Refugee Resettlement Problem in Thailand," "Relating Climate Change to Its Effects," and "Pakistan: The Ethnic Equation."

The Office of Scientific and Weapons Research was formed by merging the Office of Scientific Intelligence and Office of Weapons Intelligence. Its primary concern is with the analysis of foreign weapon systems—the number, type, quality, and capability. The Office of Economic Research examined a wide variety of economic subjects, particularly those concerning major issues such as the availability of oil and other crucial resources, economic policies, and currency stability. Its publications included "The World Oil Market in the Years Ahead," "Arms Flows to LDC's: U.S.-Soviet Comparisons 1974-1977," "Korea: The Economic Race Between North and South," "USSR: The Long Term Outlook for Grain Imports," "China: In Pursuit of Economic Modernization," and "Soviet Strategy and Tactics in Economic and Commercial Negotiations with the United States."

The Office of Current Operations is in charge of the Operations Center, which maintains watch over incoming data from a variety of collection assets and can inform higher authorities if incoming intelligence indicates a crisis situation is developing.

The Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) was created in 1962 as the Directorate for Research and was given its present name in 1963. At that time, various CIA offices dealing with technical intelligence collection were consolidated into one unit.<sup>91</sup> The DS&T has undergone several reorganizations and has gained and lost responsibilities in the twenty years since it was created. Both the Directorate of Intelligence and the Directorate of Operations have at times disputed actual or planned DS&T control of various offices and divisions. Thus, at various times the Directorate has been assigned scientific intelligence analysis functions to the dismay of the Directorate of Intelligence. At one time, the Directorate controlled the Office of Weapons Intelligence (formed by merging the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center with certain functions of the Office of Scientific Intelligence).<sup>92</sup>

In 1973 the NPIC was transferred to the DS&T from the Directorate of Intelligence. The NPIC is the successor to a series of CIA photo interpretation units first set up in 1953 as the Photographic Intelligence Division (PID) with thirteen interpreters. In 1958 the PID was merged with a statistical analysis division of the Office of Current Intelligence to form the Photographic Interpretation Center.<sup>93</sup> Under the provision of NSCID 8 of 1961 and its successors, the NPIC is run by the CIA as a "service of common concern" serving the entire intelligence community.<sup>94</sup> It presently has over 1,000 photo interpreters and is located in Building 213 of the Washington Navy Yard at 1st and M Streets.<sup>95</sup>

In addition to the NPIC, the DS&T presently directs the activities of the previously mentioned Office of Development and Engineering and Office of SIGINT Operations as well as the Office of Research and Development, the Office of Technical Service, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The Office of Development and Engineering is the successor to a long line of CIA components involved in overhead reconnaissance R&D. The first such CIA component was created in 1954 to develop the U-2 and was named the Development Project Staff. It subsequently became known as the Office of Special Activities, the Office of Special Projects and, in 1973, the Office of Development and Engineering.<sup>96</sup>

The Office of Technical Service was previously the Technical Services Division (TSD) of the Directorate of Operations. It was acquired by the DS&T in 1973—an acquisition that took over ten years. When the DS&T was formed its leadership argued that the TSD should be brought under its control—a suggestion resisted by the leaders of the Operations (then Plans) Directorate, who argued that the division should be close to its consumers, the men in Plans. The TSD was transferred to the DS&T as part of a series of transfers and changes initiated by William Colby.<sup>97</sup>



The Office of Signals Intelligence Operations is involved in all forms of SIGINT R&D, including, as noted above, reconnaissance satellite development. However, CIA SIGINT activities include much nonstrategic collection, such as airborne collection in Central America.

A second service of common concern run by the DS&T is the FBIS, which monitors the public radio and television broadcasts of foreign nations and prepares summaries of those broadcasts of interest for use by intelligence analysts and officials.<sup>98</sup> The FBIS dates back to 1941, when the Federal Communications Commission established the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service at the request of the State Department.<sup>99</sup> From that point on, the U.S. government has had an organization to "record, translate, analyze and report to other agencies of the government on broadcasts of foreign origin."<sup>100</sup>

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### 3 DEFENSE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to the national intelligence organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD)—the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Security Agency (NSA)—there are several agencies that are department-level agencies, their primary function being to satisfy intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense and DOD components.

Two of these agencies can trace their origins to the centralization trend that began at the end of the Eisenhower administration and continued through the early 1970s—the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Mapping Agency. Another is more recent: the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center. Other organizations examined are the Special Operations Division of the J-3 section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the possibly defunct Defense Special Plans Office.

#### DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was one manifestation of the trend toward centralization that began in the Eisenhower administration and reached its peak in the Kennedy administration. The Eisenhower administration concluded in the late 1950s that a consolidation of the services' general intelligence activities (defined as all non-SIGINT, nonoverhead, nonorganic intelligence activities) was needed.<sup>1</sup> This belief was, according to one analyst, a by-product of the missile gap controversy of the late 1950s.

Faced with the disparate estimates of Soviet missile strength from each of the armed services which translated into what have been called self-serving budget requests for weapons for defense, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) created a Joint Study Group in 1957 to study the intelligence producing agencies. In 1960 this panel returned various recommendations among which were proposals for the consignment of the defense departments to observer rather than member status on the Intelligence Board and the creation of a coordinating Defense Intelligence Agency which would represent the armed services as a member of the USIB.<sup>2</sup>

The JCS disagreed over form. They were concerned with preserving the responsiveness of the service efforts to the military's tactical intelligence requirements. Thus, they preferred a "Joint Military Intelligence Agency" subordinate to them, within which the independence of the several military components, and hence their sensitivity to the needs of the parent service, would be retained. Kennedy administration Defense Secretary Robert McNamara wanted a much stronger bond - one that would allow for better utilization of service assets to support policymakers and force structure planners as well as to achieve management economies.<sup>3</sup>

The agency that emerged was a compromise between those opposing viewpoints. DIA reports to the Secretary of Defense but does so through the JCS. As a result, the Joint Staff Director for Intelligence (J-2) was abolished, as was the Office of Special Operations, the small intelligence arm of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>4</sup>

The DIA was established by a DOD Directive (DOD 5105.21) on August 1, 1961. The Directive made DIA responsible for:

1. organizing, directing, managing, and controlling Department of Defense intelligence resources assigned to or included within DIA;
2. reviewing and coordinating those Department of Defense intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the military departments. Guiding the conduct and management of such functions as will be developed by the Director, DIA, for review, approval, and promulgation by the Secretary of Defense;
3. supervising the execution of all approved plans, programs, policies and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA;
4. obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of Department of Defense intelligence resources. This includes analysis of those DOD intelligence activities and facilities which can be fully integrated and collocated with non-DOD intelligence organizations;
5. responding directly to priority requests levied upon the Defense Intelligence Agency by the USIB; and
6. satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major components of the Department of Defense.<sup>5</sup>

In 1964-1965 DIA was assigned several additional functions:


1. the photographic intelligence functions previously performed at the Washington level by separate armed services; the new responsibilities of DIA were to establish and operate facilities for military photographic processing, printing, interpretation, analysis and library intelligence services for the entire defense establishment;
2. the consolidation of intelligence dissemination so that the DIA became the agency for communicating both raw and "finished" intelligence, from Defense and non-Defense sources, to the entire defense establishment and to authorized non-DOD and international organizations;
3. the management of all automated, data-handling projects and services of the Department of Defense, including plans for validation of information, assignment of data handling tasks and priorities, and the development of policies and programs guidance for all Defense automated data processing for intelligence purposes. The program is decentralized at the operational level within the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
4. a program of classified "extraordinary military activities."<sup>6</sup>

Since its creation, DIA has undergone numerous reorganizations (four between 1961 and 1970) and has been subjected to severe criticism by several commentators. The criticism has been directed at the quality of its intelligence output as well as its inability to supervise effectively and constrain the growth of the service intelligence components.<sup>7</sup>

Abolition of the DIA has often been suggested, including by the Pike Committee.<sup>8</sup> Such an outcome is not a likely prospect, and the DIA continues to be the prime intelligence component of the DOD with respect to strategic intelligence matters. Thus, the DIA takes part in the formulation of the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates on such topics as Soviet strategic forces and terrorism. It also serves as the validating authority for much of the work done by service intelligence components such as the Air Force Systems Command's Foreign Technology Division. Additionally, it is responsible for production of the Target Data Inventory (TDI), which is a data bank containing all the facilities that U.S. strategic nuclear planners might want to target. The TDI serves as the data base from which the National Strategic Target List and ultimately the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) is drawn.<sup>9</sup>

The DIA also engages in R&D Test and Evaluation programs related to intelligence technology. In its Fiscal Year 1982 request, the DIA specified four areas of research: crisis management, scientific and technical intelligence, automated data-processing capabilities, and collection management capabilities. Specifically, it requested funding to develop an automated system to "support timely analysis of Indicator and Warning Intelligence" as well as funding to "develop methodology and data bases to accommodate added intelligence requirements as a direct result of . . . U.S. policy regarding nuclear targeting in PD #59." The

Figure 3-1. Organization of the Defense Intelligence Agency.



Source: *Department of Defense Telephone Directory* (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1984), pp. 0-11-0-14.

DIA also requested \$0.7 million for development of the Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System.<sup>10</sup> In its request for the 1983 Fiscal Year, it sought funds for a real-time technical data collection effort designated SUDDEN DAWN as well as for an electro-optical collection program designated STEEL EYE.<sup>11</sup>

Organizationally, the DIA consists of, in addition to various minor offices, the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) Staff, five independent directorates, and an Office of Security, as shown in Figure 3-1.<sup>12</sup> The Director of the GDIP directs the GDIP Staff in preparing, with military service and Central Intelligence Agency collaboration, the budget estimates for the GDIP (discussed in Chapter 13). Further, it tasks organizations under its direction to fulfill GDIP objectives.

The Directorate for Intelligence and External Affairs is divided into five divisions: the Director's Staff Group Division, the Military Operational Support Division, the Legislative and Public Affairs Division, the Foreign Liaison Division, and the International Negotiations Support Division (with Strategic Nego-

tiations and Regional/Special Negotiations Branches). The Directorate is the DIA's link to the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the rest of the intelligence community, and DIA customers outside the intelligence community including negotiating teams (SALT, START, MBFR). It also handles liaison with such defense intelligence organizations as Australia's Joint Intelligence Organization and Britain's Defense Intelligence Staff.

The Directorate for Resources and Systems is divided into five directorates: Defense Intelligence Systems, Technical Services and Support, DIA Systems, Human Resources, and Communications. The Directorate for Defense Intelligence Systems manages and coordinates all DOD information systems programs and the interface of such systems with intelligence community and DOD systems. It also handles the dissemination of research and storage and retrieval functions. This includes the indexing of all aerial imagery and maintenance of automated index files of all DOD and nationally acquired imagery held in the DIA's central DOD depository.

The Directorate of Human Resources is the personnel office, and the Directorate of Communications provides overall management of the worldwide Special Intelligence Communications (SPINTCOMM) portion of the Defense Special Security Communications Systems (DSSCS). The Directorate for Technical Services and Support provides central reference, photo processing, and presentation support.

The Directorate for JCS Support consists of four directorates: the Directorate for OJCS Intelligence Support, the Directorate for Current Intelligence, the Directorate for Indications and Warning (I&W), and the Directorate for NMIC Operations. The Directorate for OJCS Intelligence Support has primary responsibility for all actions (within capabilities) assigned to the DIA by JCS/OJCS and maintains liaison with the NSA/CSS (Central Security Service) to ensure participation in pertinent Joint Staff actions. Additionally, it provides personnel to the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP). The Directorate for Current Intelligence provides all-source DOD and national-level current indications and warning intelligence as well as preparing Defense Intelligence Notices and Weekly Intelligence Summaries. The Directorate for I&W consists of three divisions: I&W Operations, Development and Implementation, and ELINT (Electronics Intelligence). Whereas the Current Intelligence Directorate focuses on producing indications and warning related to finished intelligence, the I&W Directorate is concerned with the methods of producing the raw I&W data. The Directorate for NMIC Operations is responsible for running the National Military Intelligence Center portion of the National Military Command Center.

The Directorate for Management and Operations is divided into three directorates: the Directorate for Collection Management, the Directorate for Attachés and Training, and the Directorate for Plans and Policy. The Directorate for Collection Management (which consists of five divisions—Current Operations, Requirements and Evaluation, Human Resources, Imagery, and SIGINT and Tech-

nical Sensors) manages, levies, and evaluates all intelligence collection and processing requirements of the DOD, including HUMINT (Human Intelligence), Imagery, SIGINT, and technical sensors. It also manages and coordinates DOD imagery processing and exploitation activities. It provides a single DIA focus for coordination and support of national and departmental reconnaissance activities. In this regard, it operates the Collection Coordination Facility (CCF) for interactive tasking of collection systems and maintains liaison with the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) and other reconnaissance authorities.

The Directorate provides for DIA participation in the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC). DEFSMAC is run jointly with the NSA and is located at Fort Meade, Maryland. Created in September 1966, the function of DEFSMAC is to provide warning of missile and space launches with the objective of allowing U.S. intelligence assets to be targets on those launches.<sup>13</sup> DEFSMAC may also serve as the site for receipt of KH-11 photography.<sup>14</sup>

The Directorate for Attachés and Training runs DIA training and education programs (e.g., the Defense Intelligence School) as well as the Defense Attaché System. Defense attachés are accredited diplomats, as well as military officers, stationed at U.S. embassies throughout the world. Their functions include interaction with the military of friendly host countries and the overt collection of defense intelligence in whatever country they are stationed.

In some cases, attachés have been involved in clandestine collection activities. Several instances of congressional testimony by DIA officials hint at such activities - in one case, the Deputy Director of the DIA explicitly stated that the DIA conducted covert operations.<sup>15</sup> One of the items allegedly lost in the raid on the U.S. embassy in Iran was a SECRET-RODCA computer print-out that listed the true identities of all DIA sources and agents in the country as well as records of Operation Gray Pan - a joint CIA-DIA plan to steal a Russian-made anti-aircraft gun and armored personnel carrier that the Soviets had sold to the Iranian army in 1978.<sup>16</sup> Also, a U.S. attaché assassinated in France in early 1982 was targeted "for a specific reason," according to one U.S. diplomat, and had a long history of intelligence assignments.<sup>17</sup> Whatever the situation in the past, President Reagan's approval of National Security Decision Directive-138 of April 2, 1984 authorized the DIA to employ intelligence agents to collect information concerning terrorism.<sup>18</sup>

The Directorate for Plans and Policy consists primarily of the Plans and Policy Division with offices for national intelligence and tactical intelligence programs.

The Directorate for Foreign Intelligence is the branch of the DIA responsible for production of finished intelligence. Under the Vice Director of Foreign Intelligence are the Defense Intelligence Officers (DIOs) as well as the Directorates for Estimates, Scientific and Technical Intelligence, and Research. DIOs communicate with National Intelligence Officers in substantive matters of prime interest to the DOD. There are DIOs for East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, the Middle East and South Asia, European and Soviet Political/Military Af-

fairs, General Purpose Forces and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), Africa, Strategic Programs, and Defense Intelligence Commentary.

The Directorate for Estimates produces all intelligence estimates for the use of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the JCS, and the DOD contribution to National Intelligence Estimates. It produces long-range threat forecasts and provides intelligence support for the DOD acquisition process. It initiates estimates of future trends in foreign force structures, weapons systems, overall military capabilities, strategy, and defense policy to alert national and DOD planners and decisionmakers to developments that might affect U.S. national security.

The Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, with four divisions - Nuclear Energy, Weapons and Systems, Strategic Defense, Command and Control, and Space and Research and Technologies - reviews and validates requirements and establishes production priorities for scientific and technical intelligence. It develops, manages, and technically directs DOD wide production and produces or tasks the scientific and technical intelligence, integrating it to provide selected assessments of combined military threat systems capabilities. It also maintains liaison with other elements of the DIA, other DOD agencies, the CIA, and other government elements to coordinate scientific and technical intelligence activities.

The Directorate of Research produces all-source finished military intelligence on orders of battle, military doctrine, strategy and tactics, C<sup>3</sup>, equipment and logistics, biographies, and economics and material production and assistance programs. Its biographies focus on military and civilian defense leadership in allied, neutral, and hostile countries. The Directorate also produces substantive intelligence, estimates and special studies, and I&W intelligence. Among the six Directorates of Research divisions is the Operational and Target Intelligence Support Division, the Strategic Targeting Branch and Target Support Branch of which formulate target intelligence policies and plans. Finally, it exploits multi-sensor imagery and produces imagery-derived intelligence, participating in the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) and the development of exploitation equipment.

The Office of Security is divided into a Counterintelligence Division, a Counterterrorist Threat Branch, a Security Division, and a Compartmented Security Policy Division. The Compartmented Security Policy Division is responsible for establishing policy with regard to the three major categories of codeword clearances relating to intelligence systems and their products - Special Intelligence (SI), Talent-Keyhole (TK), and Byeman (B). The office provides counterintelligence and counterterrorist staff support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and JCS, produces counterintelligence and terrorist threat studies, and coordinates the counterintelligence production of the military departments.

As of 1978, DIA had 4,300 to 5,500 employees (including 1,000 attachés) and a budget in the \$200 to \$250 million range.<sup>19</sup>

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## **6 CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS**

The bulk of U.S. intelligence resources—whether in terms of personnel or dollars—lies in the hands of the national and military intelligence organizations. At the same time, several civilian executive departments have offices that collect and analyze intelligence with respect to either foreign political and military affairs, economic affairs, or narcotics. In some cases, the intelligence units are very small and their main purpose is to serve as liaison with the larger intelligence units, making them aware of their department's intelligence requirements and transmitting intelligence from the larger units to the appropriate department offices. Thus, in addition to the State and Energy Departments, the Commerce, Treasury, and Justice Departments all maintain units with foreign intelligence responsibilities.

### **STATE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE**

With dissolution of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), its research and analysis functions were transferred to the State Department. Those functions were carried out by the Interim Research and Intelligence Service. Since then there have been two name changes and many more reorganizations. It has been designated the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) since 1957.<sup>1</sup>

The Bureau engages in no collection activity beyond reporting through normal diplomatic channels and open source collection. However, it performs a variety of functions on operational matters in the liaison area between the Department of State and the community to ensure that the actions of other intel-



ligence agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, are in accord with U.S. foreign policy.<sup>2</sup>


In terms of its production functions, the INR faces in two directions. One direction is outward, where it is involved in interagency intelligence production efforts - National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIIEs). The second direction is inward - toward the State Department internal organization. In this role it prepares a variety of intelligence products. The *Morning Summary* is prepared in collaboration with the Department's Executive Secretariat. It is designed to inform the Secretary of State and his principal deputies of current events and current intelligence. It prepares a variety of regional and functional summaries as well as single-subject reports under three different titles.<sup>3</sup>

The Director of the INR holds rank equivalent to an Assistant Secretary and is assisted by four Deputy Assistant Secretaries who directly supervise the INR's sixteen offices.<sup>4</sup> The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research is the second-ranking individual in the Bureau. He or she supervises the Office of the Executive Director and Office of Intelligence Support. The Office of the Executive Director handles personnel, budget and finance, and general administrative support for the Bureau. The Office of Intelligence Support is the State Department's center for the receipt of intelligence information, in whatever form, and for its processing and dissemination under security safeguards.<sup>5</sup>

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Current Analysis supervises six geographic offices and the Offices of Politico-Military Analysis. The geographic offices are the Offices of Analysis for Africa, Inter-American Affairs, East Asia and the Pacific, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the Near East and South Asia. The primary function of the Current Analysis Offices is to produce analyses of developments and issues that are, or will be, of concern to the policymaker. They are responsible for preparing the regional and other special summaries and for preparing INR contributions to communitywide estimates and assessments. Current Analysis personnel also conduct longer range studies and assessments under the direction and guidance of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Assessments and Research.<sup>6</sup>

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Assessments and Research has the primary responsibility for the Bureau's long-range analytical studies. He is responsible for the Office of Long Range Assessments and Research, the Office of Economic Analysis, the Office of the Geographer, the Office of Global Issues, and the Reports Coordination and Review Staff. The Office of Long Range Assessments and Research prepares its own long-range assessments on selected topics, contributes on occasion to assessments on selected topics, contributes on occasion to assessments prepared elsewhere in the Bureau, and commissions contractors and consultants for those projects that cannot be done in the INR. The Office of Economic Analysis produces reports for policymakers on current and

Figure 6-1. Organization of the Bureau of Intelligence Research.



Source: INR (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1983).

longer range issues involving international economic concerns such as foreign economic policies, business cycles, trade, financial affairs, food, population, energy, and economic relations between the industrialized countries and the developing nations.<sup>7</sup>

The Office of the Geographer prepares studies of policy issues associated with physical, cultural, economic, and political geography, emphasizing the law of the sea, U.S. maritime issues, and international boundaries and jurisdictional problems. The Global Issues Staff produces finished intelligence on selected transnational, regional, and global topics including science and technology, narcotics, human rights and refugees, oceans, and the environment. The Reports Coordination and Review Staff is responsible for the final production of the INR's formal reports. It is responsible for editorial review, format, printing, and distribution.<sup>8</sup>

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Coordination supervises the Office of Intelligence Liaison, the Office of Intelligence Coordination, and the Office of Intelligence Resources. The Office of Intelligence Liaison works with intelligence agencies on human collection efforts and coordinates proposals for special political (covert) activities. Its basic responsibility in connection with those programs is to ensure "thorough consideration of their support of and implications for U.S. foreign policy."<sup>9</sup> The Office also handles defector cases and requests for biographic data and other intelligence agency documents and conducts briefings on intelligence matters for Department officers going to and returning from overseas posts. It also handles liaison with designated foreign intelligence representatives.

The Office of Intelligence Resources provides staff support, representation, and coordination for the Department's interests in the National Foreign Intelligence Program and budget. It works with other intelligence community agencies; concerned areas of the Department; and overseas missions in planning, tasking, deploying, and evaluating technical collection activities. It also advises Department officers on the use of intelligence produced by major technical systems.<sup>10</sup> An organization chart for INR is shown as Figure 6-1.

#### DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE INTELLIGENCE

Department of Commerce participation in intelligence activities has been heightened in recent years by many factors—most recently, the concern over technology transfer operations. Such operations require intelligence concerning (1) those who wish to acquire such technology, (2) those who may attempt or are attempting to provide it, and (3) its accessibility, particularly with respect to dual use of civilian technology. Additionally, the Export Administration Act requires that restrictions be placed on technology transfers only if there is no sufficient foreign availability.

### FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

The responsibilities of the FBI are predominately in the criminal law enforcement and domestic counterintelligence areas, the latter responsibilities being performed by the Bureau's Intelligence Division. The Intelligence Division also does have some present-day responsibility with regard to collection of foreign intelligence in the United States.

Over the years the FBI has tried to expand its role in the foreign intelligence area. In 1939 President Roosevelt gave responsibility for the collection of intelligence in the Western Hemisphere to the FBI, which created a Special Intelligence Service (SIS) for this function. The SIS had approximately 360 agents, mostly in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil.<sup>33</sup> Although it was stripped of this function after the war, the Bureau maintained representatives as Legal Attachés in ten embassies as of 1970. The Attachés' official function was to be a liaison with national police forces on matters of common concern and to deal with Americans who found themselves in trouble with the law. In 1970 the Bureau expanded from ten to twenty the number of embassies with FBI representation and instructed agents to collect foreign intelligence, particularly interesting intelligence being slugged with the designation HILEV (High Level) by overseas agents. Some such material was distributed to high officials—for example, Henry Kissinger—outside normal intelligence channels.<sup>34</sup> In the aftermath of Director J. Edgar Hoover's death and FBI revelations, this program was terminated, and FBI representation abroad was reduced to fifteen embassies.

At least one recent instance of an FBI attempt to engage in foreign clandestine collection has come to light. During the investigation of the murder of former Chilean Defense Minister Orlando Letelier, the FBI operated an undercover informer in Chile, codenamed "Gopher." Gopher told the FBI that the right-wing Partia y Libertad had contracted with Chilean narcotics traffickers to murder Letelier. Gopher turned out to be a former DEA informant who had been terminated and blacklisted years earlier for double dealing, misrepresentation, and moral turpitude.<sup>35</sup>

Despite its failure to acquire a significant *overseas* role in the collection and production of foreign intelligence, the FBI is involved in domestic activities designed to generate foreign intelligence. Thus, Executive Order 12333 allows the FBI to:

Conduct within the United States, when requested by the officials of the intelligence community designated by the President, activities undertaken to collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other agencies within the intelligence community.<sup>36</sup>

In the past such activities have included wiretapping and break-ins. According to Marchetti and Marks, the FBI has operated wiretaps against numerous foreign embassies in Washington. FBI agents regularly monitored the phones in the offices of all Communist governments represented in Washington. Additionally, the phones in the offices of non-Communist governments are tapped, especially when those nations are engaged in negotiations with the United States or when significant developments are taking place in the countries.<sup>37</sup> This has included the phones of an allied Trade Mission in San Francisco.<sup>38</sup> In addition, the FBI has conducted break-ins at foreign embassies to obtain cryptanalytical and other foreign intelligence.<sup>39</sup>

#### FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

The Federal Research Division (FRD) of the Library of Congress analyzes open source information concerning foreign military activities. Although part of the Library of Congress, it is also under the jurisdiction of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). As a military intelligence unit, it participates along with the DIA and the military services in the General Intelligence Career Development Program.<sup>40</sup>

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
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From The Washington Post, August 31, 1979, "2,300-Man Soviet Unit Now in Cuba," by the Associated Press. Reprinted in Current News, August 31, 1979, pp. 1-2. Reproduced for use in the courses of the National Defense University.



# CURRENT NEWS



August 31, 1979

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## 2,300-Man Soviet Unit Now in Cuba

### Church Says U.S. Confirms Presence Of Combat Brigade

BOISE, Idaho, Aug. 30 (AP)—Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) said tonight that American intelligence units have confirmed the existence of a Soviet brigade of ground combat troops in Cuba.

Church said that means that between 2,300 and 3,000 Soviet troops are now on the island. He called on President Carter to insist on "the immediate withdrawal of all Russian combat troops from Cuba."

"The United States cannot permit the island to become a Russian military base, 90 miles from our shores, nor can we allow Cuba to be used as a springboard for Russian military intervention in the Western Hemisphere," Church said.

He said he has been advised by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance that the Soviet Embassy in Washington has been asked for a full explanation. He said no answer had been received.

Church said he and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee had heard reports about Soviet troop buildup for several weeks. He said the reports were not substantiated until a couple of days ago.

In July, Defense Secretary Harold Brown is known to have told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee secretly that U.S. intelligence had detected a "brigade command structure," namely, headquarters and support personnel, but had no evidence that the troops to fill out the brigade were in Cuba.

Subsequently, Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.) wrote to President Carter and made several public calls for an explanation by the administration. Stone, who has said he has not had a satisfactory response, charged that failure of the Soviets to adhere to agreements about their military personnel in Cuba could cast doubt on the credibility of Soviet assurances about observing the strategic arms limitations treaty (SALT).

At the time the so-called command structure was detected, U.S. intelligence community sources said they did not know what the possible purposes might be for a Soviet brigade in Cuba.

Agreements reached shortly after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 allowed the presence of Soviet military advisers in Cuba. "But the buildup of Soviet groundtroops to brigade strength has not been reported until recently," Church said.

Church said the presence of Soviet ground forces in Cuba does not pose the immediate threat that the 1962 missile buildup did. But, he said: "Russian combat units do not belong in Cuba. The president must make it clear, we draw the line on Russian penetration of this hemisphere."

Church said he did not know why the troops were in Cuba. He said that was one of the questions asked of the Soviet embassy.

86/87 NWC UNIT IV, Crs 2, T-4B, R-b

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HARD CHOICES

## THE SOVIET BRIGADE IN CUBA

As the Senate SALT hearings progressed over the summer, another issue slowly developed within the intelligence community and then burst dramatically on the political landscape. Once again the Soviet-Cuban connection diverted attention from more important questions and hurt us. This was the belated "discovery" by the intelligence agencies of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. When this was made public, it provoked a political storm and delayed Senate consideration of the treaty long enough for it to be overtaken and shelved as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Because of Cuban military involvement in Angola and Ethiopia and the Mig-23 flareup of late 1978, feelings about Cuba and its relations with the Soviet Union ran high in the administration. In April 1979, Brzezinski had asked the intelligence agencies to reanalyze available information about Soviet military activities on the island. In May, Brown also had begun to express concern about stepped-up Soviet military activity in the Caribbean and had urged that we consider a broad range of political, military, and diplomatic countermeasures. I was uneasy. Knowing the domestic political volatility of anything having to do with Cuba, I had little doubt that any issue involving it would be distorted. As a nation, we seemed unable to maintain a sense of perspective about Cuba, and tended to inflate Castro's influence. Ironically, we had been in direct contact with Cuban leaders for some time through highly secret channels and had made modest progress in alleviating certain bilateral problems relating to political prisoners, refugees, and better family access by Cuban-Americans.

On July 17, Florida Senator Richard Stone alluded in a public hearing on the SALT Treaty to the threat that Soviet combat troops in Cuba would pose. Later, he called on the administration to come forward with what it knew about any Soviet combat personnel based on the island. Stone wanted to know whether such forces would constitute a violation

CYRUS VANCE

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of the understandings we had with the Soviet Union, dating from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and after, regarding Soviet military presence in Cuba. He was evidently well informed about the intelligence community's ongoing review of information on Soviet military activities in Cuba. Stone requested and was given a detailed classified intelligence briefing on July 24. He showed particular interest in whether we had information about a Soviet brigade command structure in Cuba. That afternoon he wrote to the president referring to such a possibility.

On January 27, 1978, during consideration of the Panama treaties, Carter had written Stone that, "... it has been and will continue to be the policy of the United States to oppose any efforts, direct or indirect, by the Soviet Union to establish military bases in the Western Hemisphere." Carter's letter had been important in gaining Stone's vote for the Panama treaties. It is possible that the Florida senator, currently struggling for reelection, saw a similarly firm Carter response to his question concerning the possibility of Soviet combat forces in Cuba as a way to reduce the political liability he had incurred by that vote. On July 25, Stone met with Vice-President Mondale and strongly urged that the administration take firm action. Stone argued that Soviet combat forces in Cuba would constitute a basic violation of a 1970 refinement of the 1962 understanding. He contended that the Soviets must be challenged or they would conclude they could violate agreements with us, such as SALT, without serious risk. Mondale ordered intelligence activities directed at Cuba stepped up in the hope that we could get a clearer picture of what was involved.

What had piqued Stone's interest in July was accumulating evidence, turned up in the intensified intelligence analysis Brzezinski had ordered, that there might be a Soviet unit of approximately brigade size and structure in Cuba. However, available data were ambiguous and fragmentary. It was not yet possible to determine whether any of the several thousand Soviet military personnel who had long been in Cuba in a training capacity were organized into a "combat" force. In a report on July 26, I was informed that the most the intelligence community could conclude was that there was a Soviet ground force unit in Cuba. The intelligence analysts were not prepared to say whether it was a combat force, a training structure for Cuban forces, or a facility for Soviet development and testing of tropical combat tactics.

The facts at that point were: neither the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding banning offensive nuclear weapons or delivery systems from Cuba nor the 1970 prohibition on Soviet submarine bases covered Soviet ground forces; Soviet military personnel had been advising and training Cuban forces since at least 1962; as far as the intelligence community could tell there had been no substantial increase in the Soviet military presence; there were reports of some Soviet combat, as distinguished from logistical or administrative, personnel; and there was evi-



dence, as yet inconclusive, that these combat troops might be organized as a brigade. On July 27, at the request of the White House, I wrote to Senator Stone that there was "no evidence of any substantial increase of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years or the presence of a Soviet military base."

At the end of July we found ourselves in a most difficult position. The Senate SALT hearings would soon be recessed for several weeks. Rumors of a Soviet brigade in Cuba were spreading, but there was doubt such a brigade existed. The intelligence experts could provide no solid information on size, composition, purpose, or even how long it might have been in Cuba. Senator Stone, a Foreign Relations Committee member with an intense interest in Cuba, had seized the issue. Stone had stated in closed-door discussions that if there was a Soviet combat unit in Cuba, the administration must deal with it resolutely.

I agreed that the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba would be a serious matter and would have to be made an issue in our bilateral relations with Moscow. On July 27, even though intelligence on the brigade was still inconclusive, I had Marshall Shulman meet with a senior Soviet embassy official to warn them that the presence of a combat unit in Cuba would inflame U.S.-Soviet relations at a critical moment in the Senate debate on the SALT II Treaty.

The brigade matter escaped the headlines through the month of August. Meanwhile, intelligence surveillance of the island was further augmented. On August 25, my staff reported that the intelligence was now sufficient to conclude that there was a Soviet motorized rifle brigade in Cuba, and that it had recently participated in field maneuvers as a combat unit. The unit, they said, consisted of some 2,000 to 3,000 men and appeared to have been in Cuba since at least 1975 or 1976. Its precise mission was still uncertain.

My judgment was that it was highly unlikely that the Soviets would agree to withdraw the brigade, if this became a public issue. Moreover, we would not be on solid ground in claiming the brigade violated the understandings on Cuba, since they did not cover Soviet ground forces. While past American administrations had frequently complained about the numerous Soviet military personnel on the island since 1962, none had made their presence an issue of compliance with the understandings. Given the intense political interest in Cuba, there was no doubt this new intelligence would be leaked very quickly. Little time remained for diplomacy to defuse the issue before it became a "crisis." Unfortunately, Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin was on leave in Russia, and I did not want to try to deal with such a sensitive question through second-level Soviet officials. I asked our ambassador in Moscow to urge Dobrynin's immediate return to Washington.

On August 28, my staff, in close consultation with the NSC, developed a plan to brief by telephone key members of Congress. We would outline

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the recent intelligence and tell them that we had lodged a strong protest with the Soviets underlining our serious concern. On August 29, Under Secretary David Newsom called in the Soviet chargé d'affaires. Newsom said that we were aware of the brigade and requested an explanation of its presence. He emphasized the harm it could cause to U.S.-Soviet relations unless quickly resolved.

On August 30, as planned, the calls to the Senate and House leaders were made. We explained the facts and that we had just learned a well-known defense journal with close ties to the intelligence community had this information and might publish it within a few days. All reacted calmly, except for Senator Frank Church. Church was in Idaho, fighting for his political life against a powerful assault by strident right-wing political action groups which were focusing largely on his alleged softness on defense and his support for the SALT Treaty. Church was being embarrassed by a news clip of a trip he had made to Cuba in which he was pictured with Fidel Castro.

Church's reaction, Newsom told me, was that revelation of the existence of a Soviet brigade would "sink SALT." Church then called me and said he believed it essential that someone in authority make the information public immediately, before it was leaked in some distorted form without any explanation or clarification. I told him that we did not intend to make any statement until we had more information. He asked me what would happen if he made a statement. I told him that it would be harmful, but I acknowledged to him that he was the only one who could make the decision. My expectation was that Church would say nothing, and that there would be no public discussion.

This proved to be incorrect. That same evening, Senator Church broke the story and called on President Carter to demand that the brigade be withdrawn immediately. A few days later he added that SALT probably could not be ratified unless the Soviets agreed to remove the brigade. Thus, before we had a chance to pursue quiet diplomacy, a hard line on the brigade had been drawn. There were others who echoed his call for linking the SALT Treaty to removal of the brigade. Church postponed resumption of the SALT hearings and asked me to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee on September 5 to discuss the brigade.

From my point of view, the brigade was an important issue that demanded a satisfactory resolution, but it was not sufficiently serious to warrant a "crisis" atmosphere, and definitely not a reason to interfere with the ratification of the SALT Treaty. Nevertheless, in the political climate of late 1979, a rational separation of the brigade issue and SALT was not possible. The president and I agreed that a firm but realistic stand was necessary.

I hoped that we still might be able, through Dobrynin, to persuade Brezhnev and Gromyko to take some helpful steps, such as removing the

command structure and heavy weapons from the unit. If they would do so, we might resolve the brigade issue without fatally damaging SALT ratification.

Before leaving for Capitol Hill on September 5, I held my regularly scheduled press conference. In preparation for it, I discussed with my staff how to handle the inevitable question: "What are you going to do about the Soviet combat brigade?" To preserve negotiating flexibility while conveying seriousness, I decided to respond that we would require a change in the status quo.

When asked the question at the press conference, I replied, "I will not be satisfied with the maintenance of the status quo." My reply sounded stronger than I intended, and was widely interpreted to imply that we would demand removal of the brigade. What I meant was that changes in the armament, structure, and function of the brigade could allay our concerns about its combat capability. Later I met with the president, who agreed that the formulation I had used was consistent with our discussions. But in hindsight, I regret not having used words less open to misinterpretation.

That afternoon I went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and testified at length on the issue of the brigade. After that appearance, the committee agreed to resume its SALT hearings while I pursued discussions of the brigade issue with the Soviets. This was welcome news. We wanted the ratification struggle concluded before the end of the year, if at all possible.

Throughout the next three weeks, I met half a dozen times with Dobrynin and twice with Gromyko to discuss unilateral Soviet measures that would alter the status quo and resolve our concerns. I was unsuccessful. At the same time, I and others in the administration pressed the intelligence community to provide answers to further questions about the brigade, particularly its exact mission and how long it had been in Cuba. There were disturbing discrepancies in what the various agencies had been reporting, and it seemed increasingly possible that the brigade had not been surreptitiously inserted into Cuba recently. Closer examination of records revealed that earlier American administrations had known of Soviet ground units in Cuba and had not regarded them as worth concentrated intelligence surveillance. In 1962 the president and his advisers had wanted the ground units removed along with the missiles and the bombers. However, they did not press the matter, and the ground units remained. The more resources the intelligence community devoted to the brigade matter, the farther back in time information about it went—eventually all the way to 1962. Appallingly, awareness of the Soviet ground force units had faded from the institutional memories of the intelligence agencies. It was a very costly lapse in memory.

By late September it was evident that the unit in question had almost certainly been in Cuba continuously since 1962. Part of the damage done

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by the brigade issue was the misleading initial impression that it had been secretly introduced into Cuba only a few years before in a new and defiant Soviet challenge to our interests in the Caribbean. Much was made of this until, by mid-September, intelligence reports made clear it had been present in Cuba well before 1975.

The newly unfolding facts did not resolve all our problems. I proposed in the talks with Dobrynin and Gromyko that the Soviets remove the brigade headquarters, heavy equipment, and weapons, and discontinue its field exercises. They refused, insisting that it had been in Cuba unchanged in its function as a training unit for over seventeen years. They said it had nothing to do with the 1962 understanding, and that the United States had no right to request any gesture from Moscow. However, on September 27, Brezhnev wrote to Carter affirming that the unit in question was a "military training center," and that the Soviet Union had "no intention of changing its status as such a center in the future." The Soviets deemed this assurance a significant undertaking, not required of them by the Cuba understandings, which we could use to close off the issue.

After a second meeting with Gromyko on September 27 in New York, I concluded that the Soviets would not do more.

Lloyd Cutler and Hedley Donovan suggested that we recommend to the president that he invite a group of senior statesmen to meet with us to appraise the evidence and either verify or question the initial conclusion of the intelligence community that the brigade was a recent strengthening of the Soviet forces in Cuba. These men could also advise us as to what we should demand of the Soviets in terms of a change in the status quo, and whether we should link further efforts on SALT ratification to a satisfactory resolution of the brigade issue.

I agreed with Lloyd and Hedley's suggestions, and we recommended this course of action to the president, who concurred. The panel of Wise Men included a broad cross-section consisting of sixteen former Republican and Democratic senior State, Defense, CIA, and White House officials.\* The panel met at the White House on September 29 and 30.

After receiving briefings from a number of administration officials, including myself, the group, although not unanimously, came to the following general conclusions. First, that they were highly skeptical that the brigade had recently been moved into Cuba. They concluded that the discovery of the brigade was in fact the rediscovery of the brigade that had been there since 1962, and that in reporting the incident they had mistakenly interpreted it as a new development. Second, that the brigade posed no threat to the United States. Third, that our response

\* George W. Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Clark Clifford, Roswell L. Gilpatric, W. Averell Harriman, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Henry Kissinger, Sol Linowitz, John J. McCloy, John A. McCone, David Packard, William Rogers, Dean Rusk, James R. Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft, and William Scranton.

should be measured and that we should accept minor changes in the status quo as satisfactory. And fourth, that we should not link SALT and the brigade issue. This advice was most helpful to the president and to me in shaping our response.

After the meeting, I recommended to the president that, in addition to announcing Brezhnev's September 27 assurances, we should also take a number of measured unilateral actions. These included increased surveillance of Cuba, increased economic and military assistance to Caribbean nations, and a larger regional U.S. military presence. I urged that these steps be announced publicly in connection with the brigade issue and not aimed at the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship. I told the president, as did Lloyd Cutler, that I favored treating the problem as a serious but isolated incident. My strong advice to the president was that we put the brigade issue behind us quickly and move on to the ratification of SALT. Letting the brigade matter drag on was doing serious damage to relations with our allies and friends, who were feeling that we had lost our sense of proportion. On October 1, the president spoke to the nation along the lines we had discussed.

After the president's address the brigade matter faded rapidly, although it lingered as a problem in the ratification debate. Politically, the administration had been seriously hurt by the episode.

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**POWER AND PRINCIPLE**

### *SALT Aborted*

By late summer of 1979, our campaign on behalf of SALT ratification was making steady progress. Lloyd Cutler was ably orchestrating our congressional efforts, and the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were generating wider understanding of the treaty's benefits to U.S. security. Even such prominent opponents as Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig tended to concentrate their arguments more on the need for a larger U.S. defense effort than on actual criticism of the SALT agreement.

I was encouraged. I wanted SALT ratified, but I wanted also a larger U.S. defense effort. The campaign to ratify SALT, and particularly the

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position taken by its opponents, was thus creating favorable conditions for a shift in our national priorities toward greater efforts in the national security area. SALT, rather than being the vehicle for acquiescent accommodation with the Soviet Union, was becoming the catalyst for a more assertive posture.

During this period I continued my meetings with Senators Byrd and Nunn to solicit their support for SALT, and also to develop with them a shared approach to our defense policy. Brown also worked hard to influence the President's thinking, and he at times even irritated the President with his insistent arguments that more money needed to be spent for national defense.

The President himself also grew more sympathetic to the case for a larger defense effort. The experience of dealing with the Soviets, and the series of NSC meetings and memoranda stressing the increasing Soviet threat, had a growing impact, even though domestically oriented advisers, notably Mondale and Eizenstat, kept pressing him in the opposite direction. On September 13, the President told me that he was going to discuss SALT and the defense budget with Senator Nunn and he requested some talking points. "I gave him a brutally frank memorandum. I said he's got to sit down with Nunn and talk to him like two Georgians who are willing to talk turkey and who can therefore be totally uninhibited. He should tell Nunn that he is the first Southern President and that Nunn can now make the difference between his reelection and defeat. If Nunn goes for defeat of SALT he (Carter) will also be rejected. At this stage, Nunn doesn't have to endorse SALT but can help stem the tide against SALT. In return Carter later on would be willing to give him more than 3 percent [increase in the defense budget] and it will . . . look like a Nunn victory." The President called me around 6 p.m. to say that the meeting went quite well and that Nunn had agreed to help. This was a major coup.

But while we were intensifying our efforts to obtain ratification of SALT, the Soviets continued to engage in activities which were, to put it mildly, less than helpful. Throughout the year, they continued the buildup of their military presence in Vietnam and increased their support for Vietnamese aggressiveness in Cambodia. We repeatedly registered our concerns with the Soviets, to the point of even warning them that their actions might have some impact on the nature of the American-Chinese relationship. On my initiative, in late January the State Department conveyed an oral message to the Soviets through Dobrynin. This message was repeated in a letter from President Carter to Brezhnev several weeks later. We reminded Moscow of its special responsibility for Hanoi's action and stressed that continued Vietnamese aggression could lead to "serious problems" for the U.S.S.R. These warnings went unheeded.

Our concern over Soviet activity in Vietnam, compounded by the

persisting irritation over the Soviet sponsorship of the Cuban military proxy in Africa, was further aggravated by indications of intensifying Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. In late March 1979, I instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to generate more information regarding the nature and extent of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, and by early fall more formal meetings were held under NSC auspices to assess the scope and thrust of the Soviet involvement. I also registered our serious concern over this issue in my conversations with Dobrynin.

One cannot deny that Soviet activities worldwide were greatly complicating our efforts to ratify SALT, thereby producing the linkage which was so strongly denied earlier by State. Our ratification difficulties, however, were greatly and almost fatally compounded by a new issue, that of the Soviet troops in Cuba, which surfaced suddenly in late summer.

There had been some fragmentary intelligence earlier to the effect that the Soviet military presence in Cuba was growing. In late 1978 and early 1979, intelligence sources reported increased numbers of Soviet-flown MiGs in Cuba, and we raised the issue in oral messages to the Soviets. In late 1978, I obtained the President's approval for SR-71 flights over Cuba to obtain harder evidence. But we detected no firm evidence of any qualitative change, or of any violation of previous U.S.-Soviet understandings. Moreover, the State Department was not inclined to be very responsive. For example, on November 24, I had lunch with Vance and Brown in the Situation Room. "These are usually very friendly and amiable sessions but this one was a little tense. The reason for it was that first we discussed the MiG issue, the MiGs in Cuba. Cy was for doing as little as possible on the subject. He obviously feels very gingerly about the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We didn't resolve it because Harold was supposed to take the lead on this issue. I promised him privately and separately that I would support him; he was not very forceful. When I brought up the question why the MiGs are considered defensive weapons and we are prepared to accept that definition, but the Harriers which the British might be selling to the Chinese are not defensive even though they have less capability than the MiGs, Cy practically collapsed. He said that if we ever come to the day when we ourselves support arms for China this Administration will have one person less in it."

During 1979, I raised on several occasions the need for more sustained U.S. pressure on Cuba and on the Soviet Union, but relatively little progress was made, especially with all of us heavily preoccupied with both SALT and the Middle East. The situation changed rather dramatically during the summer. In late July, I saw the first report that the Soviets might have a unit in Cuba, and I alerted the President to this on July 24, pointing out that it could have serious repercussions for SALT. A few days later, I sent a crisply worded memorandum to



Stan Turner, the Director of the CIA, requesting the Agency to step up its collection efforts on Cuba. I was frustrated by the absence of adequate intelligence reporting.

Within the next two weeks, we obtained harder and harder evidence. On August 14, "I briefed the President in the morning on the fact that according to intelligence reports there is now an actual Soviet brigade in Cuba, with headquarters and regular organization and that in fact it is scheduled to hold firing exercises within a week. I told him that this is an extremely serious development which could most adversely affect SALT. The President looked quite concerned. . . . I told him also that I would be coming back with a Vance-Brown-Brzezinski recommendation." In the afternoon of the same day, I held a meeting with Vance and Brown, for which earlier I had submitted a memorandum urging concerted action directed at putting more pressure on Cuba. "Brown came back with my Cuba memo rather beefed up, Vance came back with my Cuba memo rather diluted," and we agreed to discuss this issue further, especially if harder evidence becomes available.

I instructed my staff to continue interagency work in order to develop wider bureaucratic consensus for a response to the Cuban problem. In the meantime, since no additional information was coming in, and since the President was leaving on his summer vacation, I decided to take a few days off myself and went to Vermont with my family. In my absence, the sub-SCC committee met on August 29, and the State Department proposed a demarche to the Soviets on the alleged Soviet brigade in Cuba. My staff objected, on the grounds that this course of action could immediately precipitate a Soviet denial, thereby making it more difficult for the Soviets to change their position later on. The group decided that Secretary Vance would be asked to discuss this issue by telephone with me and with Acting Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor (for Brown also was away on his summer holiday).

Vance did not call me, but I was called by my deputy, David Aaron. I asked him to defer any action on this issue until I had returned to Washington around Labor Day, so that Vance, Brown, and I could consult with the President. Much to my amazement, I learned shortly thereafter that Under Secretary of State David Newsom, acting apparently on Vance's instructions, proceeded to brief Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on the subject of the Soviet troop presence in Cuba, but Newsom failed to instruct Church how to deal with the matter in public. Secretary Vance apparently felt that the information would leak out and that it would be more prudent to inform Church beforehand.

The result was disastrous: Church, running for reelection in Idaho and attempting to correct his previous image as a dove, immediately convened a rather bellicose press conference on the subject. The issue was thus out in the open, even though at this stage we had neither

concluded our intelligence review nor formulated any agreed policy. A stream of front-page headlines, such as the *New York Times's* "Church Says Soviet Tests U.S. Resolve on Troops in Cuba—Asks Immediate Withdrawal," only served to heighten the sense of crisis. I met with the President immediately on my return to the White House on September 4, and as my notes of that evening indicate, I told him that in my view there was no immediate strategic threat, that we should work quietly but firmly to resolve the issue with the Soviets, and that it would be best if Vance talked it over with Gromyko. Perhaps we could give the Soviets a way out by suggesting to them that this brigade was on a training mission and that would provide the basis for its withdrawal.

My discussion with the President was followed by a PRC meeting, convened on this subject under Vance's chairmanship. Heretofore (and also thereafter) all crises were handled by the SCC, under my chairmanship. However, it was evident that State wished to assert itself on this subject, perhaps bearing in mind the large spate of publicity (generated both by China and by our tougher line on the Soviets) alleging that I was dominant in foreign policy. As a consequence, established procedures were not followed. The PRC typically was a much larger meeting than an SCC, and its staffing was then done by a sub-PRC group, headed in this case by David Newsom. At the meeting, to my astonishment, Vance took the categorical position that "we must have withdrawal" of the Soviet forces. Cutler, whom Vance invited to the meeting as an ally, added that "our position with the Senate must be that if it is a base, we will ask the Soviets to take it out."

I took the position that we should stress Cuban activism worldwide on behalf of Soviet interests as the main problem, that we should hint to the Soviets that we will intensify our relationship with the Chinese if the Soviets are not cooperative, but that "the Soviets will not tolerate a public humiliation in Cuba or a reliving of the 1962 missile crisis." I went on to argue that we should intimate that we were not necessarily calling for a formal withdrawal of the brigade from Cuba, but rather for disaggregation of the allegedly combat-ready brigade and a non-continuation of brigade headquarters. I added that in view of the possibility that the Soviet brigade might have been in Cuba for a number of years and in view of the fact that we had not contested it before, it seemed hard to demand publicly that the Soviets all of a sudden withdraw the brigade. On the morning of Wednesday, September 5, I briefed the President, telling him that "at the PRC meeting surprisingly Cy was arguing that we had to demand a withdrawal of the brigade and I was saying that this is an excessive demand and that its disaggregation would suffice, given the fact that [probably] it has been in Cuba for a number of years." During the next several days, I continued making these points to the President; for example, saying to him (on September 8) that we should be tougher privately than publicly.

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Vance took the opposite position. Publicly he assumed an extremely tough stance, whereas privately he moved gradually toward a softer position. He went on public record demanding the withdrawal of the brigade, adding that "the status quo is unacceptable." Presumably he felt that a tough public posture would protect SALT. I immediately went to the President and told him that in my view we should consider the problem to be analogous to the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961 and not to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In other words, while the wall was also "unacceptable," we had no choice but to live with it. With the President's permission, I used the same analogy publicly with the press, hoping thereby to take the sting out of Vance's categorical assertion, especially since I had little expectation of a Soviet backdown and I did not wish the United States to be embarrassed publicly.

In the meantime, our internal debate continued to rage. Vance relied heavily on support from Lloyd Cutler, and I balanced that by inviting Presidential adviser Hedley Donovan, who had a distinctly more hawkish outlook, into the Situation Room. These additions made it even more difficult to reach agreement, especially since neither Cutler nor Donovan was very familiar with foreign policy issues. Cutler would opine at length, while Donovan would not say a word. On another occasion, finding the PRC under Vance's chairmanship filled with his more dovish State Department associates, notably Newsom and Shulman, I quickly got in touch with the President and urged him to participate himself in the discussion. The President's unexpected arrival in the Situation Room automatically transformed the meeting into a formal NSC session. This required the departure of the lower-level officials, and the President then asked me, in my capacity as director of the NSC, to report on the discussion that had taken place so far and to spell out the agenda for the rest of the meeting.

Throughout this period, Brown and I collaborated very closely, seeking to obtain a policy decision which would put primary emphasis on the worldwide thrust of Soviet assertiveness and thus deemphasize the Cuban issue itself. In contrast, Vance, Cutler, and Mondale increasingly pressed for confining the issue to Cuba itself, arguing that the wider approach would spell the doom of SALT. I gained also the support of Powell and Jordan, and I felt increasingly encouraged. I also briefed Rosalynn Carter on the subject, and she took, as I expected, a very hard stand. (See also p. 32.)

By the third week of September, the President had decided to give a major speech on the subject, because national concern had greatly increased. It was stimulated particularly by belligerent statements by various senators, all of them demanding U.S. action, some comparing the problem to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and most saying that SALT would not go forward unless the issue was resolved in a manner satisfactory to the United States. The President instructed me to start

preparing the speech, and I did so with special emphasis on the wider character of Soviet activities in the Third World, stressing that these were not compatible with a stable detente. I also gave the President a memo in which I urged him to stress the need for defense increases, without any reference to SALT; to be very explicit in condemning Soviet-Cuban activities in the Third World; to intensify our worldwide efforts to ostracize Cuba, especially by putting pressure on our Western European allies; to develop a dialogue with China on sensitive technology and military issues; and to increase Voice of America broadcasts to Soviet minorities. I felt that with such a policy we might, first of all, have some credibility with the Soviets, and secondly, we would be in a better position to argue that SALT should be ratified because it was confined to the strategic area and was not a symptom of broader U.S. weakness.

The turning point, but not the one for which I had hoped, occurred on September 23. "Today in the evening after a concert at the White House, on my way home I was called back to the White House to meet with the President in the Oval Office. When I walked in he was sitting there with Vance and Byrd. The basic message: Byrd had been to see Dobrynin and had told Dobrynin that SALT would be jeopardized unless the Soviets are in some fashion accommodating. Dobrynin told Byrd that they cannot be because the issue is a phony one. They have been in Cuba for a long time and there is no reason for them to accommodate. Byrd told the President the issue indeed is a phony one and that we have to find some way to get off it in order to save SALT. He said that we have to cool our rhetoric, and he expressed disagreement with what the *New York Times* cited me as saying and also with what earlier the President and Vance had said about the status quo not being acceptable. The President was deeply perplexed. Cy Vance and the President pressed Byrd on how SALT can be saved." It was clear to me that the President was very impressed by what Byrd had told him and deeply concerned that he was about to lose SALT. Within the next few days it became evident that the wider approach would not prevail and that any reaction would be limited to Cuba, perhaps with some cosmetic language on the wider strategic issues.

To make matters worse, Cutler persuaded the President to convene a group of senior statesmen to give him advice on the subject. I objected strongly and told the President that Kennedy, Nixon, and Truman had never consulted with outside panels before they made their decisions and that Johnson had convened panels largely in order to browbeat them into support of his own policies. But the group did meet, and then widely circulated reports of the Administration's alleged disarray. In the meantime, our discussions on the draft of the President's speech became sharper. At one point Cutler said to Brown and me that to consider any options pertaining to the Soviet Union is deliberately to

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revive the Cold War, and he was backed by Fritz Mondale. In later sessions on the speech, Brown and I succeeded in injecting somewhat tougher lines, dealing with Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa, but by and large the speech that was eventually delivered by the President was an attempt to disengage the United States from the issue. I was particularly irritated by the fact that Cutler told some people in the White House that he succeeded in cutting from the speech the words "Soviet adventurism," because, according to him, the word "adventurism" was a foreign one.

In his television address to the nation on October 1, the President declared that the Soviet brigade in Cuba was a matter of serious concern to the United States, but posed no direct threat. The President pointed out that it was indeed a combat brigade, Soviet denials notwithstanding. The Soviets reconfirmed the 1962 bilateral understandings made after the Cuban missile crisis, but would not change the status of the brigade. He said that the U.S. response would be measured and effective and announced the creation of a special Latin American Military Command to monitor Cuba and coordinate military exercises in the region; increased economic assistance to Central America; and intensified vigilance against Soviet and Cuban activities worldwide. The part of the speech that attracted the most attention in the press, however, was the President's statement that there was "no reason for a return to the Cold War." The President concluded that the real danger was the threat of nuclear destruction and urged ratification of SALT II.

After the President delivered his speech, a small champagne party was held to celebrate the occasion and also his birthday. Neither Donovan nor I attended, for we both felt that his speech was a significant, but unfortunate, turning point in our political fortunes. Indeed, this was the only time that I ever thought seriously of the possibility of resigning. I felt so deeply about this that on October 4 I made what probably were the most disagreeable comments I ever made to the President in the course of our years; namely, that for the first time since World War II the United States told the Russians on several different occasions that we take great exception to what they are doing, that there will be negative consequences if they persist in their acts, be it in Vietnam or in Iran or in the Middle East or in Africa, and more recently in Cuba, and then we did nothing about it. I said that the way we handled this matter could be dangerous for the future because the Russians could miscalculate, and that is exactly what happened with Khrushchev and Kennedy. (Obviously, I overstated my case because of pent-up frustration, but that is how I felt at the time.)

The President looked quite furious, and told me that he had no intention of going to war over the Soviet brigade in Cuba. I responded by saying that I did not advocate that we go to war, but that we lay it on the line more explicitly in regard to Soviet adventurism around the

world. I felt that I owed it to the President to be honest, especially since I once told him that I strongly believed that my usefulness to him would come to an end at the moment at which I no longer spoke frankly. And it is to the President's great credit that never during the four years did he discourage me from doing so.

Shortly thereafter I gave the President a more formal postmortem on the Cuban brigade issue. I pointed out that the matter was badly handled, in part because the management of the issue was taken over by State (which itself had inexcusably precipitated the crisis by premature briefings), with large discussion sessions, lack of precision in goals, and deliberate disregard of established procedures for crisis management. Only when the President himself was injected did the NSC machinery function in order to develop for him the needed options. Moreover, the PRC did not function regularly, and instead various other advisers were brought into the process, resulting in changing membership and repetitive discussions. I also strongly objected to the creation of the "senior statesmen" group by Cutler, which contributed little to our discussion but which conveyed publicly the impression of an Administration badly floundering. I urged the President to permit me to manage any such future difficulties through the SCC process, on the basis of established procedures.

I was also not satisfied with my own performance. I was handicapped in being away when Vance and Newsom surfaced the issue, but after my return I simply should not have permitted the crisis to be handled in the unwieldy, excessively large, and State Department-dominated PRC. I should have insisted on my prerogative, convened the SCC, and, if necessary, had a showdown on the procedural issue. Secondly, and more importantly, I should have judged more accurately the extent of the President's concern for SALT and I might have served the President's interests better if I had concentrated my efforts on dampening down the whole issue, even after Vance's "it is unacceptable" statement. Though I did tell Carter not to stress it publicly, and though I did warn him that it was probably a phony issue, I felt instead that the President (especially since the senators had already galvanized public concern) should use the crisis to establish his credentials as a tough-minded, Truman-type leader, focusing the spotlight on the Soviet use of the Cubans to promote Soviet strategic interests in the Third World. Admittedly, this could have had the effect of further reducing the chances of SALT's ratification, but my feeling was that the Soviets were not giving us much choice.

In any case, the Cuban crisis shook public confidence in the Administration and it heightened public hostility toward the Soviet Union. It also deprived us of momentum in the SALT ratification process. Approximately one month of time was lost, and it became increasingly clear that the ratification of SALT would have to slip until the end of

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the year or perhaps into early 1980. In the meantime, Soviet activities in Afghanistan continued to be stepped up, with the Soviets persistently ignoring our direct and indirect expressions of concern. Moscow also exacerbated the situation in Iran with a program of clandestine broadcasting into that country, carrying strident anti-American propaganda. I resumed my efforts to obtain approval for a wider but informal dialogue with the Soviets, continuing to feel, as I did throughout 1978 and 1979, that we needed to discuss on a more sustained basis the nature of our relationship, not confining ourselves to highly formal negotiations. Dobrynin and I had previously agreed that they would be useful, and my thought was that perhaps a two- or three-day informal meeting, in which both Vance and I could take part, would enable us to discuss more directly with our Soviet counterparts what can and cannot be tolerated by either side. I suspected that the Soviets were being assertive because they felt that they could have their cake and eat it, too, and thus did not believe that at some point the United States would clearly draw the line. In effect, there was neither dialogue nor deterrence in our relationship.

I met for lunch with Dobrynin on November 12, and I stressed to him our concerns about Soviet behavior, while attempting to convince him that their perception of a divided Administration was misleading. More importantly, I stressed to him that the Soviet Union, willy-nilly, might be re-creating the unfortunate experience of Imperial Germany. I reminded him that Imperial Germany was determined to avoid encirclement from East and West, yet its assertive policies eventually generated not only the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France but also the alliance between France and Imperial Russia. Today, Soviet policies were generating growing anxiety, and this could have the effect of creating an alliance, spanning the United States, Western Europe, some friendly countries in the Middle East, and even Japan and China. I had the impression that Dobrynin was concerned but powerless.

Any possibility of a serious U.S.-Soviet discussion came to an abrupt end at Christmas. That very afternoon we started receiving intelligence reports that the Soviets were airlifting troops into Kabul and deploying them throughout the city. My military assistant, General Bill Odom, kept me posted, and at 6 p.m. on Christmas Day I called the President at Camp David to inform him that the Soviets had made their move. Shortly thereafter, a full-scale Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was underway. SALT disappeared from the U.S.-Soviet agenda and the stalemated relationship became openly antagonistic.

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TWENTY

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*Intelligence Reporting Run Amuck*

**TECHNOLOGY HAS SO INCREASED** the amount of information we can acquire that a whole new set of problems has resulted. On the one hand, analysts are inundated with data and must find ways to filter, store, and retrieve what is significant. On the other hand, analysts must be concerned with whether they are receiving everything that is collected in their area of interest; with whether the members of the Community — the CIA's espionage branch, the NSA, the Defense organizations responsible for overhead reconnaissance, the CIA's electronic surveillance component, the State Department's diplomatic-reporting system, the FBI's foreign intelligence branch, the Defense Intelligence Agency's attachés, the intelligence organizations of the military services, and the intelligence offices of the Departments of Treasury and Energy and the Drug Enforcement Agency — all share what they collect. An unfortunate example of information not being shared adequately came in the summer of 1979. It led to the most serious intelligence failure of my tenure. The failure to forecast the fall of the Shah earlier that year was of far less significance than our mishandling of the report that a "combat brigade" of Soviet troops was in Cuba. Had we predicted the Shah's fall from power even six or seven months ahead of time, there was little the United States could have done to prevent it. The reporting on the combat



brigade, however, did play a direct part in scuttling the SALT II arms control treaty with the Soviet Union.

In June 1979 President Carter had met with President Brezhnev and signed the SALT II treaty. The Senate was preparing to hold its initial hearings on ratification when, on July 18, the *Washington Star* reported, "Sen. Richard Stone, D-Fla., yesterday said Soviet combat troops may be in Cuba in violation of the agreement that ended the Cuban missile crisis in 1962." The obvious implication was that if the Soviets could not be trusted to abide by an old agreement, the Senate should not ratify a new one with them. While SALT II was stalled over this issue, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, in December 1979, and the treaty was scuttled. If the leak had been the truth, its effect on the treaty might have been justifiable. But it was not. The chain of events it triggered was unfortunate.

That chain actually began in the spring of 1979, when Brzezinski directed a review of all intelligence on Soviet military activities in Cuba. He was concerned about increasing Soviet and Cuban activities in Central America. In response, I told the Intelligence Community to review files for information that may have been overlooked. In early July the NSA came up with something old but new. What was old was a conclusion buried in its files that the Soviets in Cuba had a unit designated a "brigade." What was new was that this conclusion had never been shared with the rest of the Intelligence Community. Some of the clues the NSA used to reach this conclusion came from its own signals intelligence, some from photo and espionage information given it by other agencies.

The United States was well aware that the Soviets had a sizable training mission assisting the Cuban military. What the new White House-directed search did was remind the NSA that one unit in that training mission was referred to by the Soviets as a brigade. On the grounds that the term "brigade" is normally associated with combat units, rather than with training, the NSA jumped to the conclusion that the unit had a combat function. That was a big inference from a sparse fact or two. To emphasize its conclusion, it coined the term "combat brigade" to identify the unit as what it thought it was.

Next, the NSA published the conclusion as part of its daily dis-

tribution of new, raw intelligence data. When readers saw the designation "combat," they imagined a unit preparing to move out of Cuba and go to war in Central America. We were already worried about Nicaragua, whose government was on the verge of collapse. Because intelligence had never before reported a Soviet combat unit in Cuba, people assumed that the brigade had just arrived. It looked like a threatening move made by the Soviets just after they had signed a treaty with us.

The NSA report was hardly out before it found its way to Senator Stone. This was a deliberate leak by someone in the Executive Branch; the report had not been distributed to the Congress. Stone, with a large constituency of anti-Castro Cuban refugees, had reason to stay alert to developments in Cuba. He also had a constituency of conservative Floridians who disliked his having voted for the Panama Canal Treaty in 1978. To placate both constituencies as he faced an uphill battle for re-election in 1980 (a battle that he lost), he needed an opportunity to demonstrate that he could be tough on the Soviets and the Cubans.

On the morning of July 17, at a public hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Stone alluded to the fact that he had intelligence on a previously undisclosed Soviet military presence in Cuba. Later that day in a secret hearing he pressed Harold Brown, myself, and several others for more details. Brown stated that "there is no evidence of any increase in the size of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years." I agreed with that. Brown went on, though, to assert that "intelligence does not warrant the conclusion that there are any other significant Soviet military forces in Cuba" besides a training group. This went a good bit further than I thought warranted, in view of the NSA's categorical assertion that there were Soviet combat forces in Cuba. The rest of the Intelligence Community, though, had just begun to check on the NSA's opinion.

In the meantime, the quotation appeared in the *Washington Star*, clearly leaked from the secret hearing. ABC's Ted Koppel covered the story a day later; John Scali on the same network discussed it a few days after that. Fortunately, it was not picked up anywhere else and faded from public attention. That gave us in the Intelligence Community some breathing space. We were glad to have that, because we were not only reviewing files, but had

new intelligence that the brigade was going to participate in a special field exercise in early August, just a few weeks away. If we could watch that exercise, we might learn something new and more conclusive. We, of course, did just that. What we learned was that this unit was doing field training on its own, not simply training Cubans. That was a possible indication that it was preparing for combat. If this kind of training had taken place before, we had not detected it.

Our surveillance of the Soviet brigade's exercise was a satisfying contrast to the yam patch incident of two and a half years earlier. This time the teamwork was superb. One technical sensor gave the initial clue, a second was keyed to that, and so on, until we had a very good picture of what was taking place. The Intelligence Community could be justifiably proud of its performance. That pride strengthened the conviction that the NSA was correct in saying that this unit was different from anything we'd seen before. A few days after the exercise, the CIA published an independent evaluation saying that the unit was indeed a combat brigade.

The CIA's confirmation threw the administration into as much panic as can be generated in Washington in mid August, when most officials are away on vacation. Cyrus Vance, still on holiday, immediately recognized that when the word got out, the SALT treaty would be in trouble. He was right. The CIA's report was published in the widely distributed National Intelligence Daily. Because the subject was sensitive, the CIA took the unusual step of checking with the staff of the National Security Council before publishing. Approval was given. On August 29, less than a week after the item appeared in the NID, Clarence Robinson, a writer for *Aviation Week* magazine, phoned Richard Baker, on the staff of David D. Newsom, the Under Secretary of State, for confirmation of a story he had heard about a new Soviet military unit in Cuba. It was clear that he had a copy of the item from the NID. Baker told Robinson that the State Department had no comment.

Newsom immediately contacted Vance for permission to notify key members of Congress that the story was bound to come out soon. Congress was in recess, and the lawmakers, some of them overseas, had to be reached by phone. Newsom urged each one not to let the story get blown out of proportion. All of them took the news as a matter of course except Senator Frank Church of

Idaho (who had been chairman of the Senate committee that investigated allegations of intelligence abuses). Church was rather more liberal than his Idaho constituents. Like Stone, he was facing a tough battle for re-election in 1980 (which he also lost). He too was looking for ways to show that he could be more firm with the Soviets than most of the people of Idaho thought he was. He immediately saw that going public with the information Newsom had given him was a good means for doing that. He asked Newsom if he could. Vance, who was resigned to the item's imminent release and knew that he needed the support of Church, as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to get the SALT II treaty approved, acquiesced. Church called a press conference. *Aviation Week* had gone to press before Church's press release but, ironically, did not run the story. The editors apparently did not feel they had sufficient confirmation to print it. Thus, the administration had more time to deal with the problem than it realized. Vance could have restrained Church for a little while anyway.

Instead, Church at once took the position that the Senate should postpone debate on SALT II until the Soviets withdrew the brigade. More than a month was consumed in the attempt to work out some arrangement with the Soviets that would satisfy the Senate. The Soviets were not flexible. On October 2, unmoved by a major presidential speech on the subject the night before, the Senate voted to postpone consideration of SALT II until the President assured them that Soviet troops in Cuba were not engaged in a combat role. On December 25 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and all consideration of ratifying SALT II ceased. Whether the Senate would have ratified it if there had not been the delay over the combat brigade, we can only speculate.

The unnecessary panic in the White House and State Department about notifying Congress and mollifying Senator Church was harmful. The issue became hot before they were ready to handle it. It turned out that in 1963 the Kennedy administration had agreed to a Soviet brigade's remaining in the location where we identified the combat brigade in 1979. The White House and State Department had lost track of that. With some research into this history, State should have been able to present the intelligence to the Congress and the public in a less alarming light. The CIA and the NSA had in their files reports going back to the late

1960s that used the term "brigade" in connection with Soviet activities in Cuba. These too had been forgotten. As a piece or two of this old information emerged at the NSA, it was not illogical to conclude that the brigade had a combat function, especially after it was seen doing independent, combat-type training. That, however, was not the only possible conclusion that could have been drawn. It could have been a unit that provided an opportunity for the several thousand Soviet soldiers in Cuba to get occasional refresher courses in basic soldiering skills, such as driving tanks or firing artillery. Or the brigade could have been preparing to put on a demonstration for the Cubans. Our playing up this combat training exercise as something new was misleading. It was new to us, but such exercises might have been going on unnoticed. After all, we detected the one in August only because we had begun paying special attention to the brigade and because the Intelligence Community's collection effort had been particularly well coordinated in predicting and tracking the exercise.

The NSA bears most of the blame in the case of the Soviet brigade, but the rest of the Intelligence Community did not respond well once the NSA's report was out. Professional jealousy was at work. The NSA had got a scoop. The CIA and the others feigned a lack of interest in the report until it became obvious that it was too significant to ignore. That, I believe, is the only explanation for the CIA's dragging its feet in searching its files and discovering that it too knew there had been a brigade in Cuba for a long time. Most of all, though, everyone became defensive.

In part this was because analysts dug in their heels at what they perceived as pressure from policy-makers to play down the significance of the brigade. In part it was reluctance to admit error and weaken the Community's credibility in outsiders' eyes. The *Washington Post* in a retrospective on this crisis summed it up well: "Intelligence officials later explained that the 'Soviet combat brigade' was so described to distinguish it from a training outfit. Once the words had been repeated in internal documents with wide circulation and even public statements, 'we can't back off' an inquiring official was told."<sup>1</sup>

Why did the Intelligence Community present an incomplete

1. Don Oberdorfer, "Cuban Crisis Mishandled," *Washington Post*, October 16, 1979, p. 14.

picture on the brigade? The fundamental mistake was in the NSA's doing its own analysis. The next was in publishing it. The NSA is mandated to collect intelligence, not to analyze it. It must do enough analysis about what it has collected to decide what it should collect next. In intelligence jargon this level of analysis is termed "processing." Processing is regularly stretched by the NSA into full-scale analysis. In this instance, the abuse of processing was flagrant. The NSA's first report on the brigade was based on old information that had previously been processed. Having re-discovered it, the NSA had the responsibility to turn it over to the analysts at the CIA, the DIA, and State for evaluation. This is not purely a matter of bureaucratic turf. Although the NSA has excellent analysts to do its processing, it does not have the range of analytic talent needed for responsible analysis, nor all of the relevant data from the other collecting agencies needed for a comprehensive job. The NSA's analysis is bound to be biased in the direction of what signals intercepts tell, and is less likely to take account of photographic or human intelligence. The NSA and other collecting agencies also do not have the consistent contact with policy-makers that the analytic agencies do. In this case, it meant that the NSA was not sensitive to how the policy-makers would interpret the term "combat."

A dangerous side effect of the NSA's regular transgression from processing into analysis is that it leads to deliberate withholding of raw information from the true analytic agencies. The NSA wants to get credit for the scoop. Even when the NSA does release information promptly, it is frequently so digested that other analysts can't use it. The NSA excuses these practices by saying that it must protect its methods of collecting data. It is true that the NSA's collection techniques must be carefully protected and therefore that the information it gathers must be handled very carefully. If, for instance, a report of a particular telephone conversation ever got back to the two people who had it, they might conclude that their phones were tapped or that one of them was a traitor. On the other hand, if the NSA's report of that conversation was too sterile, analysts would not give it much credence. There is a fine line to be drawn here, but there is no question in my mind that the NSA regularly and deliberately draws that line to make itself look good rather than to protect secrets. Somehow

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the point does not get through at the NSA, any more than it does at the CIA's espionage branch, that it hurts the overall intelligence effort if a collecting agency does not properly share its information. And when it delays sharing until it can give the information directly to the decision-makers, we run into the very kind of problem we've seen with the Soviet brigade.

The NSA, with its military orientation, also collaborates with the military services to keep the CIA out of the analysis of major military issues. For instance, on joining the CIA I quickly recognized that the Agency was not up to date on the latest developments about some very secret aspects of the Soviet Navy. I went to the Secretary of the Navy, Graham Claytor, and explained the benefit to the Navy of having a second opinion on what was happening with the Soviet Navy. Graham immediately agreed to try to get the Navy to release more data to the CIA. Over a period of years, the two of us were able to open the door only a small crack. Many of the needed data were collected by Navy ships and aircraft, not by intelligence elements under the tasking control of the DCI. The material collected was therefore technically outside the DCI's jurisdiction. Some of it, though, was electronic intercept material processed by the NSA for the Navy. I directed Vice Admiral Bobby Inman, Director of the NSA, to share that information with the CIA. He said he could not, because the Navy contended that it was tactical, not national intelligence. The Navy had placed it in a special code word compartment to which the CIA did not have access. This, of course, was a bureaucratic ruse, and the loser was the United States. Not only is it highly desirable to have two views on any subject, but the Navy has vested interests that may well bias its interpretation. For example, if the performance of Soviet ships and submarines is seen as being poor, the Congress may feel that we don't need a big Navy after all; if the Soviet Navy is seen as being highly capable, the Congress may also not want a large Navy because it would be too vulnerable.

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## Crisis Mangling and the Cuban Brigade

Gloria Duffy

The furor over a supposed brigade of Soviet combat troops, discovered in the fall of 1979 to be stationed in Cuba, should have been no more than a minor controversy within the U.S. intelligence community. Instead, an intense diplomatic storm ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Revelation of the particular data on Soviet troops in Cuba which surfaced in 1979 would have stirred little public concern at any other time, but the information came to light in the volatile political environment of the Carter Administration's third year in office, as the Administration's management of relations with the Soviet Union came under mounting attack. In this atmosphere, a minor and inconclusive piece of intelligence became a political issue. The crisis which grew from public disclosure of the brigade discovery had disproportionate effects on the debate over ratification of the SALT II treaty, the course of U.S.-Soviet relations, and Soviet perceptions of American will and leadership. As Cyrus Vance recently said of the crisis:

"... I think it clearly hurt the ratification process, without any doubt. There was an erosion of the support for SALT prior to the Cuban brigade issue, but clearly it was a real blow that set us back substantially."<sup>1</sup>

Most contemporary historians date the present chill in U.S.-Soviet relations from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. But in many ways, the brigade affair four months earlier was the turning point towards a higher level of hostility between the superpowers.

Those aware of the brigade crisis universally regard the incident as a low point in Carter Administration foreign policy, and perhaps even in the history of U.S.-Soviet relations. Ray Cline, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the Kennedy years, dubbed the incident at the time an exercise in "crisis mangling," rather than crisis management. And the Inter-

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1. Interview with Robert Scheer in Scheer's *With Enough Shovels* (New York: Random House, 1982), p. 226.

national Institute for Strategic Studies even more contemptuously demoted the episode to a "storm in a teacup" in its annual review of politico-military events. Beyond the impression that a sequence of events took place which was confusing and perhaps badly managed by the United States, however, no one is quite certain exactly what came to pass and why. Earlier incidents involving the issue of Soviet forces in Cuba—the 1962 missile crisis, the 1969-70 controversy over Soviet naval facilities at Cienfuegos, and even a minor debate in 1978 about Soviet MiG-23 aircraft on the island—have been studied and mired for their significance. But the brigade incident remains a question mark for many of the individuals who made American foreign policy at the time, not to mention for the public. What really happened? Was there a combat brigade in Cuba? Why did the United States negotiate at length with the Soviets on the issue? What did the Carter Administration ask the Soviets to do about the brigade, and how did the Russians respond? What were the effects of the event, and what lessons are to be learned?

A closer look at the incident reveals some aspects contrary to the conventional wisdom. Even those most informed about the brigade affair vilify former Idaho Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1979, as the main American alarmist about the brigade, hence the executioner of the SALT II treaty. Church announced the discovery of the brigade to the public, then linked Senate approval of SALT II to removal of the force. Fearing for his own political survival in the atmosphere of a conservative ground swell in American politics in 1979, his detractors say, Church showed a lack of statesmanship in his excited reaction to news of the Soviet force.

A more precise examination, however, shows a more complicated picture. Church's acts were only the final, consummating links in a chain of missteps already solidly forged and firmly welded by other officials, notably White House National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, President Carter, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

The brigade affair illustrates the way in which accidents in circumstance, as well as deficiencies in foreign policy leadership, can turn the course of events. The timing of a leak of intelligence information during the August recess in Washington led the brigade issue to be first aired in public by Senator Church, while he was at home in Idaho on a campaign swing. The political pressure on Church in his home state encouraged him to link SALT ratification to removal of the brigade.

Incomplete intelligence and records of the history of Soviet-American disputes over Cuba led to confusion in both the intelligence community and the State Department about whether the brigade was a new phenomenon and whether it was objectionable to the U.S. The ways in which Carter Administration officials and Senator Church chose to phrase their statements about the brigade committed the U.S. to the untenable demand that the Soviets either remove or alter the force. Misperceptions of Soviet interests led to fruitless negotiations, and President Carter's inability to take a strong role in the crisis allowed the initiative to slip away from the Administration.

But the fundamental reason that some partial and misleading information about a Soviet force in Cuba precipitated a political storm was the general aura of controversy surrounding arms control and U.S. relations with the Soviet Union in 1979. Criticism of SALT and foreign policy had put the Carter Administration on the defensive. This siege mentality caused Secretary Vance and the President to turn the brigade incident into a test of American will to deal with the Soviet Union. However, the brigade issue was not a rational or appropriate choice for a battle of wills with the Soviet Union, since the U.S. had neither conclusive evidence about the Soviet force nor any inducement to offer to the Soviets to remove or change the force. In the end, the outcome of this politically induced crisis was counterproductive to the goal of demonstrating American resolve. The primary image the U.S. presented to friends and foes alike through the brigade incident was one of painful confusion.

#### Historical Background

The history of the brigade affair has two parts: the background of the Soviet troop contingent itself, and the political developments which led to the incident's escalation into a crisis. The first story dates back to the missile crisis in 1962. About 17,000 Soviet troops and technicians remained in Cuba after that crisis.<sup>2</sup> These included four heavily armed combat groups, according to a 1963 report by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, totalling roughly 5,000 men.<sup>3</sup> Each group was stationed in a different camp, and each had

2. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, *Hearings on Military Posture and Authorization of Appropriations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives* (January 30, 1963), p. 256.

3. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, *Interview, Meet the Press, NBC-TV, January 27, 1963*. Reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, February 18, 1963, p. 245.

been charged with a distinct role, such as air defense, related to the Soviet missile deployment the year before.

The Kennedy Administration kept careful track of Soviet forces in Cuba in the months immediately following the missile crisis. President Kennedy and other officials indicated publicly that U.S. policy was to secure removal of the remaining combat troops. In his November 20, 1963 press conference, the President specified that "the importance of our continued vigilance is underlined by our identification of a number of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba, although we are informed that these and other Soviet units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems and will also be withdrawn in due course."<sup>4</sup>

Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted on January 27, 1963, "We have seen some outtraffic of Soviet military personnel in recent weeks, but we are very much interested in the continuation of that outtraffic."<sup>5</sup> As a matter of policy, Rusk added, "we must anticipate that these forces would be removed."<sup>6</sup> At a press conference on February 28, 1963, Secretary McNamara confirmed the Secretary of State's policy commitment against Soviet combat forces in Cuba: "I think that this Administration indicated before that we will not accept operations in this Hemisphere, combat operations, by Soviet military personnel."<sup>7</sup>

Early in 1963, Secretary of Defense McNamara noted in public that some of the military equipment associated with these units had been moved out of Cuba.<sup>8</sup> Then, in April, the President announced the departure of 4,000 more Soviet troops during the month of March, leaving 13,000-14,000 men on the island.<sup>9</sup> In June, a State Department spokesman estimated that 12,500 Soviet troops still remained in Cuba. The *New York Times* reported that top Administration officials expected the Soviets to keep a "residual" military force of perhaps 10,000 men in Cuba indefinitely.<sup>10</sup>

But in truth, the Kennedy Administration was not entirely certain how many Soviet troops remained in Cuba, nor precisely what missions they were

assigned. Those troops kept a low profile in the years following the missile crisis, reportedly holding radio traffic to a minimum and avoiding identifiable military insignia. Lacking on-site intelligence, the U.S. could only assemble indirect information on the status of the troops. The Kennedy Administration and its successors simply came to assume over time from the available evidence that the Soviets had removed all the troops. As one State Department official who had responsibility for keeping track of Soviet military activities at the time put it, "our surveillance recorded lots of young men in identical sport shirts on ships going out of Havana."

In the aftermath of the missile crisis, the U.S.S.R. also set up a mission of several thousand military advisers in Cuba, to train Cuban forces in the use of equipment exported from the U.S.S.R. and to affirm the Soviet military relationship with the Castro regime. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the intelligence community presumed these advisers were the only Soviet troops on the island. The combat forces left in the early 1960s were lost in the fog of the large influx of Soviet advisers in later years, and the issue of Soviet ground troops in Cuba dropped out of public sight.

### The Brigade Crisis

#### BRZEZINSKI LAYS THE FOUNDATION: SEEK AND YE SHALL FIND

The chain of events which led to the 1979 brigade crisis began in Carter's National Security Council staff. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's distress about Soviet-Cuban cooperation in military ventures in the Third World had increased steadily since the Soviet airlift of Cuban troops into the Ogaden region of North Africa in 1977. Cuban-Soviet assistance in the South Yemeni invasion of North Yemen in December 1978 and involvement in the Nicaraguan revolution and insurgencies in Grenada and El Salvador in early 1979 only heightened his concern. Brzezinski viewed U.S. restraint in confronting these Soviet activities as destructive. He maintained that the perception of American acquiescence to these expeditions was eroding the image of U.S. strength and commitment to its interests abroad. Brzezinski, feeling that Secretary of State Vance, a principal advocate of restraint within the government, was a "weak person" when it came to dealing with the Soviet Union, thus sought subtle ways for the U.S. to unravel the Soviet-Cuban connection.

A summit to sign the SALT II treaty, the first meeting between Soviet and American heads of state since 1974, was planned for the summer of 1979. In

4. President John F. Kennedy, News Conference, November 20, 1962. Reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, December 10, 1962, p. 874.

5. Secretary of State Rusk, *Department of State Bulletin*, p. 245.

6. *Ibid.*

7. Robert McNamara, Press Conference, February 28, 1963, transcript, p. 2.

8. Robert McNamara, "Special Cuba Briefing," U.S. Department of State, February 6, 1963, transcript, p. 39.

9. "Russians in Cuba Now Put at 12,500," *The New York Times*, June 20, 1963.

10. *Ibid.*

early 1979, Brzezinski's primary military adviser on the N.S.C. staff, Colonel William Odom, decided to try to find a way for the U.S. delegation to bring the issue up directly with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. So in March 1979, Odom drafted a request to C.I.A. Director Stansfield Turner, and later one to heads of the other intelligence agencies, signed by Brzezinski. The memos ordered an assessment of the size, location, capabilities, and purposes of Soviet forces in Cuba, among other Soviet-Cuban military missions in various regions of the world.

U.S. intelligence had obtained photographs in early 1978, showing modern Soviet military equipment located near Lourdes, 60 miles southwest of Havana. The Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency had concluded that the equipment was destined for Cuban forces as part of the regular process of modernization of the Cuban military underway since the mid-1970s, and that troop bivouac areas nearby were Cuban camps.

But the intelligence drive at Brzezinski's behest yielded several new pieces of information. KH-11 satellite pictures revealed tents placed in the troop encampments near Lourdes in patterns standard for Soviet, and not Cuban, troop deployments.<sup>11</sup> Monitoring the "housekeeping," or administrative communication channels of Soviet and Cuban military units from April through June 1979, the National Security Agency (N.S.A.) unearthed Russian language references to a Soviet unit stationed at the two sites southwest of Havana as a "brigada." Intelligence and military experts regarded a brigade as a highly irregular way to structure a training unit, which was assumed to represent the only Soviet troops in Cuba.

A study completed in mid-June 1979, based upon a retrospective search of N.S.A. files, concluded that a Soviet brigade headquarters existed in Cuba as a unit separate from the acknowledged Soviet advisory group.<sup>12</sup> Given uncertainty about the mission of this unit, Army Intelligence and N.S.A. argued that all possible functions should be considered, including guarding nuclear weapons and conventional combat. C.I.A. chief Turner, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. General Eugene Tighe, and the heads of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research and Air Force and Navy Intelligence disagreed.<sup>13</sup>

11. *Wilmington News-Journal*, September 8, 1979, p. 1.

12. Don Oberdorfer, "Chapter I: 'Brigada': Unwelcome Sight in Cuba," *The Washington Post*, September 9, 1979, p. 1.

13. *Ibid.*

C.I.A. Director Stansfield Turner preferred a more moderate view of the new information about Soviet forces in Cuba. On July 12, the intelligence community released a coordinated interim report, which stated that a Soviet force was present as an entity separate from the advisory group, but did not confirm the size, organization, or mission of the force. Reports persist that Turner ordered Army Intelligence and N.S.A. to abandon their more alarmist speculation about the brigade. In response, President Carter ordered stepped-up surveillance of Cuba to determine the nature and purpose of the unit.<sup>14</sup>

#### CONCERN SPREADS TO THE SENATE AND THROUGH THE ADMINISTRATION

Had the political atmosphere been less volatile, the probe might have proceeded methodically to its conclusion. Instead, pressure from advocates of a more adversarial approach to dealing with the Soviet Union swept the investigation out of the intelligence community and into the political arena.

Democratic Senator Richard Stone, mindful of a large Cuban emigré population among his Florida constituency, took a particular interest in Soviet activities in the Caribbean. As a swing vote in the Panama Canal Treaty debate, Stone had managed to elicit a public commitment from President Carter in January 1978 against Soviet military bases in the Western hemisphere.<sup>15</sup> A member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Stone also opposed the SALT II treaty, and was certain that the Carter Administration was underrating the Soviet military threat to the U.S. in order to promote the treaty.

On his way to an open Foreign Relations Committee hearing on SALT II on July 17, 1979, Stone was pulled aside by a member of his staff. The aide told Stone that he had overheard a conversation between members of the executive agency staffs who were present, apparently discussing the June N.S.A. report. What they had said indicated that the intelligence community knew of the existence of a Soviet combat force in Cuba.

Stone lost no time in using the information. As soon as the hearing began, Stone asked witnesses Admirals Moorer and Zumwalt whether "a direct or indirect effort to establish a military base would be established by the introduction of a large number of combat troops of the Soviet Union into Cuba."

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Hearings and Markup on the Panama Canal Treaties*, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 95th Congress, Second Session, Vol. VI (January 26, 27, 30, 1978), p. 101.



Vance's denial was released, State Department Special Adviser on Soviet Affairs Marshall D. Shulman called on Soviet Deputy Ambassador Bessmertnykh in Washington. Shulman noted to Bessmertnykh that the Soviets would have heard press reports that the U.S. had evidence that organized Soviet combat troops were in Cuba. The U.S. was watching developments in Cuba very closely, Shulman told the Soviet diplomat. The U.S., he said, would be very concerned if there were a Soviet base in Cuba, and U.S. concern was "not theoretical."

Shortly thereafter, the monitoring of voice communications between the Soviet force and Cuban command centers in Havana arranging Soviet use of Cuban military maneuvering areas yielded details of a planned field exercise by the brigade.<sup>19</sup> On August 17, U.S. reconnaissance satellites took photographs of a Soviet force equipped with tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, in maneuvers bearing no apparent relation to training Cuban forces.

On August 23, President Carter was informed of the new intelligence, when he stopped off in Hannibal, Missouri during a vacation on a Mississippi riverboat. On August 27, this observation, identifying a combat brigade, was reported in the *National Intelligence Daily* (N.I.D.), a classified internal report with a circulation of over 200 individuals and offices within the U.S. government.<sup>20</sup> The strength of between 2,000 and 3,000 men and the structure of the unit were deduced from existing intelligence about other Soviet brigades in East Germany and the Soviet Far East, in the absence of direct evidence.

The N.I.D. was the first document to refer to the Soviet unit unequivocally as a combat force. There was no data, however, aside from the circumstantial evidence of the maneuver, on the basis of which to conclude that the Soviet unit was intended for combat use. No firm criteria had been established within the intelligence community to distinguish a combat unit from another type of force. The author of the N.I.D. simply chose the term by default, reasoning that if the brigade were not clearly a training contingent, then it must be a combat unit. A high-ranking intelligence officer who would have had the opportunity to revise the N.I.D. before it was released, had he not been out of town on the day it was prepared, says that he would have edited out or qualified the "combat" designation.

19. Oberdorfer, "Chapter 1."

20. Martin Schram, "Response: Avoiding a Crisis Tone," *The Washington Post*, September 9, 1979, p. 18.

That afternoon, the Committee went into a closed session to discuss verification of SALT II. Stone asked Administration officials present to confirm or deny his rumor, under threat of his walking out the door and announcing to the waiting press all he had been told by his aide. C.I.A. Director Turner denied the intelligence community had found anything new in Cuba. But Vice Admiral Bobby Inman, chief of the National Security Agency, did not deny Stone's charge.

Committee Chairman Frank Church listened to the assurances of Defense Secretary Harold Brown, D.I.A. Chief Tighe, and White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler. Secretary Brown offered to put his position in writing. Fearing that Stone would release his allegations and seeking to avoid rumors damaging to SALT, Church promptly issued a Committee statement, from which only Senator Stone dissented:

In response to a question about the presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba, Secretary Brown advised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there is no evidence of any substantial increase in the size of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years. Apart from a military group that has been advising the Cuban Armed Forces for 15 years or more, our intelligence does not warrant the conclusion that there are any other significant Soviet military forces in Cuba.<sup>16</sup>

Stone then contacted the White House and Secretary of State Vance, asking for increased surveillance of Cuba and a formal response on the troop issue. Vance wrote Stone a letter on July 27, paraphrasing Secretary Brown's position: "There is no evidence of any substantial increase of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years or of a Soviet military base. Apart from a military group that has been advising the Cuban armed forces for 15 years or more, our intelligence does not warrant the conclusion that there are other significant Soviet forces in Cuba."<sup>17</sup> Few newspapers reported Stone's charge on July 18, and the matter quickly disappeared from public view.<sup>18</sup>

Contrary to his public expression, however, Secretary Vance decided to take the matter up with the Soviets. On July 27, the same day Secretary

16. "Statement Issued by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Jacob Javits (R-New York), Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Foreign Relations, Media Notice (July 17, 1979).

17. "Texts of Letter and Statements by Vance and Carter," *The New York Times*, September 6, 1979, p. 7.

18. *The Washington Star*, July 18, 1979, p. 4.

An interagency meeting, attended by Secretaries Vance and Brown, Brzezinski, and senior intelligence officials, was held at the White House on August 28th. The decision at the meeting was to downplay the significance of the brigade by avoiding public disclosure as long as possible, and to pursue the matter privately with the Soviets through diplomatic channels. Accordingly, Under Secretary of State David Newsom called chargé d'affaires Vladilen Vasev at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. He informed Vasev that the U.S. now had conclusive evidence of the brigade, and that it was a matter of great concern to the U.S.

On August 29, the contents of the N.I.D. were leaked to the magazine *Aviation Week and Space Technology* and to the *Copley News Service*. The one or more individuals who leaked the N.I.D. remain well hidden. In attempting to guess who leaked, one is left with the question a prosecutor uses to distinguish among suspects in a criminal investigation: who had the motive? The most likely motivation for leaking the document would have been dissatisfaction with Soviet behavior, SALT II, and the Carter State Department's approach to dealing with the Soviets. Among those who had access to the N.I.D., this points to an anti-SALT Senator's staff or to the N.S.C. Another reason for leaking might have been objection to the June intelligence report, which would indicate either Army Intelligence or N.S.A.

An *Aviation Week* staff writer telephoned the office of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom for confirmation, threatening immediate publication. An interagency meeting of undersecretaries and assistant secretaries was called at the State Department on August 30 to decide how to cope with the leak. To both allay a sense of crisis and protect SALT, the decision was made that State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III would make a short announcement the next day, while Under Secretary Newsom would alert Congressional leaders.

#### ENTER SENATOR CHURCH

When he called the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to speak with Chairman Frank Church, Newsom reached a clerk, the only staff member on call while the senators and senior staff were in various parts of the world on fact-finding trips and vacations. The clerk directed Newsom to phone Church at his home in Idaho. Newsom told Church that U.S. intelligence had uncovered evidence in Cuba of a Soviet combat brigade. Church asked how large the brigade was and how long it had been there. The brigade was

between 2,000 and 3,000 men, Newsom replied. Not all the data was in on the force, he cautioned, and the unit could have been in Cuba for some time. The Administration believed it to be a new development that these troops seemed to have no advisory role and to be a self-contained Soviet unit. Newsom explained that he was advising Church because the Senator could expect to read about the new developments in the newspapers within 24 to 48 hours.

Staff members arriving at Church's home for dinner that evening found the Senator sitting in a chair by the door, hands folded, with a sorrowful look on his face. "You won't believe this," he said, "but there's a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, exactly the opposite of what the Administration told us 30 days ago." For the next two hours, Church and his staff debated how to handle the matter. Despite his careful management as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, strong opposition to the SALT II treaty had been manifested through hearings held in July and early August. Church worried that Senator Stone, Minority Leader Howard Baker, and other senators would launch into frank opposition to the treaty if the brigade became public through a press leak, since the presence of the force could cast doubt on the reliability of the Soviets, the credibility of the Carter Administration, and the detection capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community.

One of Church's formative experiences as a junior senator had been the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Senator Kenneth Keating had been the target of Cuban emigré pressures and intelligence community leaks alleging the presence of missiles in Cuba in 1962, just as had Senator Stone about the brigade in 1979. Under assurances from the Kennedy Administration, Church had voiced the Administration's denials in the Senate in the late summer of 1962 that any offensive Soviet missiles had been placed in Cuba.

When the U-2 reconnaissance flights finally exposed the missile sites, Church was left out on a limb. Kennedy personally rescued the young Senator by appointing him to accompany United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson to the U.N. as a Senate Foreign Relations Committee delegate, to present the case there against the Soviet missile deployment. So reminiscent was the sequence of events in 1979 of the 1962 crisis that it reawakened what one former Church associate calls "tribal memories" in the Senator.

Church and his staff felt that in order to prevent a crisis on the order of 1962 and to encourage a successful diplomatic solution with the U.S.S.R. on the model of the dealings over Soviet submarine facilities at Cienfuegos in

On September 4, Senator Church cancelled the Foreign Relations Committee hearing on SALT II to hold closed interrogations of Administration witnesses about the brigade. At the end of this first day of hearings, in response to a reporter's question, Church firmly tied the Cuban issue to SALT II. "There is no likelihood whatever that the Senate would ratify the SALT II Treaty as long as Russian combat troops remain stationed in Cuba," he said, stating what he thought was a political fact.<sup>21</sup> The press took his statement as a firm commitment.

A State Department staff meeting was called on September 4 to hammer out the Department's position on the brigade. The Department had conducted a review of the U.S.-Soviet interaction over Soviet forces in Cuba since 1962, and particularly U.S. statements on record about Soviet ground forces. While the review yielded ten statements about Soviet ground forces by top U.S. policymakers in the months after the missile crisis, there was no evidence that ground forces had been covered by the 1962 understanding or its 1970 addendum. But from these statements, as well as President Carter's commitment in 1978 against Soviet bases in the Western hemisphere, State drew the conclusion that a combat force could be regarded in conflict with unilateral, but publicly expressed American policy.

Secretary Vance announced at a September 5 press conference that he would "not be satisfied with the *status quo* in Cuba."<sup>22</sup> He added that the Administration might not object if SALT II were held up until the U.S.S.R. met American concern about the troops.

#### Soviet Response

The Soviet reaction to the U.S. charge was rapid and indignant. Vasev responded to Newsom's initial questioning by demanding to know what was the "legal basis" for the U.S. charge. A lengthy *Pravda* editorial on September 11, entitled "Who needed this and why?," debunked the U.S. concern. "For almost 17 years there has been a training center in Cuba, where Soviet military personnel help Cuban military men learn about Soviet military technology which is used by the Cuban Army," *Pravda* argued.<sup>23</sup>

21. *The Washington Post*, September 6, 1979, p. 1.

22. "Press Conference by the Honorable Cyrus R. Vance," Department of State Press Release No. 216, September 5, 1979.

23. *Pravda*, September 11, 1979, p. 1; *Foreign Broadcasts Information Service/USRR*, September 11, 1979, p. A1.

1970, the affair had to be handled very carefully. Church felt that it would be politically inept to have the information leak, and not be announced by someone in a position of authority in the government.

Finally, Frank Church had put his name on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee statement a month earlier, affirming that no change had occurred in Soviet forces in Cuba. Fighting a National Conservative Political Action Committee campaign in Idaho which branded him "soft" on defense and the Soviet Union, Church was worried that the news leak would make his earlier denial of Soviet forces look either gullible or irresponsible. An anti-Church commercial on Idaho television just the night before had shown Church and Fidel Castro smoking cigars together on Church's recent trip to Havana. Soviet Americanologist Georgi Arbatov's reported comment a day or two later, "There is nothing as dangerous as a scared dove," may be unjust, but to the extent that Church was politically sensitive, the issues of Cuba, defense policy, and Soviet behavior were particularly salient at this moment. Church's natural reaction was to take matters into his own hands.

After two hours of discussion with his staff, Church's conclusion was that if the Administration didn't intend to take a stronger profile in announcing the news, he would. Church placed a call to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Church asked Vance whether either he or the President intended to make the announcement. No, Vance said. Church responded, "if you're not going to make the announcement, then at least the news should come by way of a responsible announcement." He told Vance that he intended to make it himself. Vance replied, "We'll trust you to use your judgment on that, Senator," and cautioned Church not to blow the affair out of proportion. He reported that the State Department was "working on" the prospect of negotiations with the Soviets. Church took this to mean that Vance had no objection if he wanted to divulge the information.

Church next placed a call, through the White House operator, to President Carter, in Plains, Georgia. When he reached White House Congressional Liaison Frank Moore, he was told that the President was "out of pocket," or unavailable through the weekend, and would not be returning the Senator's call that evening. Church and his staff then wrote a statement, delivered to a hastily convened press conference in the living room of his home an hour later. Church told the local media of the new developments, and said that the brigade must be removed. While pressed by local reporters that evening and on a Boise television show the next day, Church refused to speculate on the link between the brigade and SALT II.

Called back to Washington from the deathbed of his father in Moscow, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met with Secretary of State Vance on September 10 and four more times in the next two weeks. On September 27, Vance met in New York with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

According to many reports, the U.S. position towards the Soviets initially was to ask for withdrawal of the Soviet brigade. Zbigniew Brzezinski had convinced the President that the U.S. must take a firm position on this issue to strike at the broader problem of Soviet-Cuban military collusion. Vance seemingly hoped for Soviet accommodation, based partly on early indications from a Soviet source he trusted that the U.S.S.R. might be flexible on this point. While Secretary Vance admitted on September 19 that the U.S. had no right to demand that the troops be removed under the 1962 and 1970 understandings, he reiterated that their presence ran "counter to long-held American policies."<sup>24</sup>

The Soviets stressed repeatedly in private and in their press that the Soviet forces in Cuba had training functions. A continuing review of intelligence established the distinct possibility that this Soviet unit, while its hardware had recently been upgraded, had been in place for a number of years, if not indeed since 1962. In the words of a U.S. intelligence official, "In 1963, the Soviet unit was withdrawn, and the Soviets consolidated what they had left. We observed the disappearance of these four (combat) units, and equated this with their movement out, rather than their redistribution. . . . When we searched back through all the information, we found that one camp was always a little different from the others." And while no specific training functions could be identified for the force, no airlift or sealift capabilities could be found to lend it the capability of engaging in combat outside of Cuba. Finally, a variety of other possible missions—from guarding the largest Soviet electronic intelligence-gathering facility in the world located nearby at Los Palacios, to serving as a guarantee of Soviet commitment to the Castro regime while 20,000 Cuban troops were fighting in Angola and Ethiopia—were identified.

The Soviets refused to consider the U.S. demand for the brigade's withdrawal or to formulate a way to alter the equipment of the brigade so that its actual status agreed with its stated training function, as the Carter Administration eventually requested. The Soviets were incapable of understand-

24. Robert C. Toth, "Soviet Brigade in Cuba: No Easy Solution," *The Los Angeles Times*, September 19, 1979, p. 8.

ing the complex way in which American domestic politics had produced the U.S. request that the brigade be removed or altered. The Soviets perceived the U.S. position as a deliberate attempt to exact concessions from the U.S.S.R. in return for the ratification of the SALT II treaty. This, they felt, could open a "Pandora's box" of other demands upon the Soviet Union. As one Soviet analyst of the U.S. in Moscow told *Washington Post* correspondent Murray Marder at the time, "They will end up demanding that Castro leave Cuba and that Cuba should abandon Marxism."<sup>25</sup>

The nature of the U.S. position, after American tolerance of Soviet ground forces in Cuba for 12 years, underlined Soviet suspicions. Given the magnitude of U.S. intelligence coverage of Cuba, and the rapidity with which the submarine base construction and the arrival of the MiG-23 fighters had been detected by the U.S. in 1970 and 1978, the Soviets had difficulty believing that the U.S. had only discovered the troop presence in mid-1979. Even if the Soviets knew that they had successfully hidden the brigade from American intelligence, U.S. linkage to SALT II convinced the Soviets of American designs beyond the direct issue of the military threat to the U.S. represented by the unit.

The Brezhnev regime began in 1964 on a note of succession to a predecessor who had unsuccessfully attempted to extend Soviet military influence using Cuba as a base. In one sense, the entire import of the Brezhnev leadership in the military realm has been to build Soviet strength to the point that the U.S.S.R. would not be obliged to curtail the promotion of its foreign influence at the behest of the U.S., as it had so sharply in 1962. The notion that Soviet leaders in 1979 would agree to compromise on an issue where no hard evidence could be presented to show a change in their behavior from that which had been tolerated for 17 years by the U.S., on which concession could have serious ramifications for the image of the reliability of Soviet commitment to military allies, which reawakened historically painful and humiliating memories, and where compromise could yield little of benefit to the U.S.S.R. was simply preposterous.

Three perceptions contributed more specifically to Soviet unwillingness to compromise on the issue of the brigade. Unable from their own mindset or unwilling to understand how the American political system could irrationally or unpremeditatedly produce a demand that they alter the brigade, the

25. Murray Marder, "Soviet Views of Troop Issue Colored by 1962 Debate," *The Washington Post*, October 1, 1979, p. 1.

Soviets suspected ulterior motives. They failed to see how the U.S. could regard the brigade as a genuine military threat. The linkage of the brigade's removal to SALT II which seemed necessary for political reasons in the U.S. was the kiss of death for persuading the Soviets to actually change the force. The most the U.S.S.R. agreed to accept was a series of statements reaffirming the training mission of the brigade, promising not to change its function or status, ensuring that it would not be a threat to the U.S. or any other nation, and reaffirming the 1962 and 1970 agreements.<sup>26</sup> The statements held only the force of a verbal understanding, committed to paper in the form of a diplomatic "non-letter" for purposes of clarity in communication.

In the third week of September, President Carter apparently decided that an aggressive stance towards the brigade, prolonging the crisis and deepening the public sense of confrontation with the U.S.S.R., might doom the SALT treaty in the U.S. Faced with Soviet inflexibility, Carter went on nationwide television on October 1 to announce a series of unilateral U.S. actions to deal with this threat. Increased surveillance of Cuba and of Cuban and Soviet military activities elsewhere in the world, establishment of a Joint Caribbean Military Task Force, and expanded regular U.S. military maneuvers in the Caribbean were among the measures Carter outlined.<sup>27</sup> He also cited Brezhnev's assurances about the troops, received via the U.S.-Soviet hotline on September 27.

#### *Effects of the Crisis*

While this sequence of events was indeed a "storm in a teacup," a crisis need not threaten to provoke a direct military showdown in order to pose dangers to international peace and stability. The brigade "mini-crisis" of 1979 had two important consequences. First, it contributed greatly to the political demise of the SALT II treaty signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev at Vienna in July 1979, and under debate in the United States in the fall of 1979. Secondly, the American position in the affair may have actually been counterproductive to the goal of frustrating Soviet military activity in the Third World, the fundamental issue which the brigade crisis brought into focus.

When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee completed several weeks of intensive hearings on SALT II on August 2, the prospects for its passage looked at least equitable. When the brigade crisis occurred, Committee Chairman Frank Church linked the treaty to the fate of the brigade, and postponed reporting it from the Committee to hold hearings on the Cuban imbroglio and await its resolution. Not until November 9 did the Committee complete its consideration and report the agreement out for floor debate. Then, in December, as Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd sought to find the space on the Senate calendar for the treaty debate, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred, bringing in its wake President Carter's formal tabling of the treaty.

Even had the treaty come up for debate in October or November, the brigade crisis would have made its passage doubtful. Focus by the public and Congress on the brigade had shifted the terms of the national debate away from the substance of the treaty and onto the issues of Soviet foreign behavior and Soviet-Cuban military relations, of which the brigade was symbolic, where deeper emotions about the U.S.S.R. could come into play. The moderate coalition in the Senate supporting the SALT agreement suffered substantial attrition as the brigade crisis allowed Senators wavering on SALT to find a reason to oppose the treaty. Russell Long, a senior and influential member of the Senate, changed his vote to oppose SALT II on September 12, giving as his reason Soviet "bad faith" as evidenced by the troop brigade.<sup>28</sup> And linkage of SALT to the much more objectionable Soviet behavior in Afghanistan in December was nearly inevitable, given the previous linkage to the Cuban brigade.

With our lack of access to Soviet decision-makers, speculation about the effect one experience in international politics has upon subsequent actions by Soviet leaders rests to a certain extent upon guesswork. But Soviet leaders most likely base their expectations for the behavior of the U.S. on past experiences, among which instances of great importance or recent vintage may particularly stand out.

Discussions with Soviet officials at the time and interviews afterwards reveal a growing Soviet attitude after the brigade crisis that further positive benefits from the relationship with the United States were unlikely, given the accusatory, confrontational, and, to the Soviet mind, somewhat irrational

26. "Background on the Question of Soviet Troops in Cuba," U.S. Department of State Release No. 93, October 1, 1979, p. 2.

27. "Soviet Troops in Cuba," U.S. Department of State Release No. 92, October 1, 1979. (Full text of Carter speech.)

28. *The Washington Post*, September 13, 1979, pp. A1, A16.

face the Carter Administration presented over the brigade issue. The Soviets may have made a political calculation that the Carter Administration was not capable of delivering a ratified SALT treaty at a price that would be acceptable to the U.S.S.R. At the same time, the disorganized and contradictory U.S. handling of the matter, and eventual U.S. retreat from its stated aim to ensure removal of the brigade, revealed to the Soviets an American administration unwilling or unable to exert leverage upon the U.S.S.R. U.S. policy in the brigade case failed to act as either an inducement or a deterrent towards the U.S.S.R.<sup>29</sup>

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan three months after the brigade affair occurred mainly for reasons indigenous to Soviet-Afghan relations, persisting long before the fall of 1979. But U.S. behavior in the brigade case acted to remove any positive constraints that expectations for productive relations with the U.S. might have exerted on Soviet calculations in dealing with Afghanistan. This same U.S. behavior demonstrated the hollowness of American statements of commitment against Soviet policies.

#### *Managing Events to Avoid Mangled Crises*

Despite his concern with Soviet behavior in the Third World, Paul Nitze, head of the Committee on the Present Danger in 1979, criticized the choice of the brigade issue as an occasion to attempt to demonstrate U.S. will. "Our anger," he later said, "should be concomitant with our leverage." A conspiracy of circumstance, deficiencies in political leadership, and above all, pressure from the political right on the Carter Administration spurred the United States to ignore this first principle of international politics in the 1979 brigade incident. The U.S. staked out an untenable position with the Soviets, based upon partial intelligence which had been forced into the public limelight before it had been adequately analyzed. This mistaken effort to increase the image of U.S. strength left the U.S. with less credibility than before.

If a really dangerous crisis were to strike Washington during the last week in any August, the nation could well suffer. A surprising amount of political life in the capital cycles around the activities of Congress. Sometime after

29. Meeting with Soviet intransigence, Secretary Vance eventually decreased the U.S. demand for Soviet removal of the force to a request that some of the unit's equipment be dispersed to Cuban units, to remove any possibility of a combat capability. The Soviet government rebuffed this second demand, as well as the first.

August 15, the Congress generally recesses. Members disperse to their home districts or on trips abroad until after Labor Day. In the absence of congressional hearings and consideration of bills which require their attention, top officials of many executive agencies also choose the end of August to take their vacations, and Washington becomes a sort of ghost town.

When the new intelligence about the brigade maneuver surfaced in late August of 1979, most of the key Carter Administration and congressional foreign policymakers were out of town. It was particularly unfortunate that Senator Church received the partial and misleading news of the new intelligence and word of the intelligence leak while he was in Idaho campaigning, where he felt the pressure of criticism of his foreign policy approach very strongly. Secretary of State Vance, Dr. Brzezinski, and White House counsel Lloyd Cutler were all on vacation as the new intelligence surfaced. Even Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin was not in Washington to give his input as the initial American commitments to remove the brigade were made.

Once the State Department learned of the leak, however, steps could still have been taken to prevent a public crisis until further information about the Soviet force could be collected. The State Department could have refrained from talking to Church about the brigade until he returned to Washington. Cyrus Vance told Church on the telephone when Church called on the evening of August 30th that the Senator would "have to use [his] judgment" about whether to announce the presence of the brigade. What Vance doubtless intended as a gentlemanly way of discouraging precipitous actions by Church, the Senator interpreted to mean that the Secretary planned no significant response of his own and would not take strong exception to Church's action.

This construal of Vance's meaning was clearly self-serving for Church, given the precariousness of his political situation. But, then again, Vance's wording did legitimately leave open the inference which was preferred by Church. Church says ruefully, in retrospect, that if he had it to do again, he would have slept on the information before calling a press conference. Had the Secretary thought more carefully about Church's position, he might have cautioned Church more strongly to wait until more was known about the unit in Cuba, and things might have looked different to Church back in Washington.

Similarly, Frank Church might have thought more carefully about his announcement linking SALT II to the removal of the brigade. At the time, Church says, he meant to make a statement about the probable fate of the

treaty in Congress, based on his reading of the mood of his colleagues. He later said that he had not been prescribing linkage for the treaty, only stating a political judgment. But the press interpreted his comments as a call for linkage, and Church did nothing at the time to contradict that notion.

When Cyrus Vance told the press on September 5 that he would not be satisfied with the status quo in Cuba, he chose his words to allow for maximum flexibility and definition. But once again, the press ignored the nuance of ambiguity to imply that the Secretary had said the force must be removed. The public perception of commitment which Vance's statement produced later turned into a severe credibility problem for the Administration, when no change was forthcoming in the Soviet presence in Cuba. Vance, like Church, made no concerted effort to explain what he meant, much less to contradict the interpretation of the media.

In the case of the brigade affair, the wording of statements by American officials, and the way they were heard by other American leaders, Soviet representatives, and the public when filtered through the medium of the press, influenced the course of events at several points. Reports in the press, when unclarified at first and uncorrected later, take on a political life of their own.

Inadequate understanding of Soviet interests in Cuba encouraged Senator Church and Secretary Vance to make unrealistic commitments to change Soviet behavior. Few Senators and even fewer Congressmen have access to informed interpretations of Soviet behavior. Senator Church says that he did not even think about how the Soviets would react to linkage of the brigade to SALT. Extraordinary as this seems, even had he sought a prediction of Soviet reactions, he had no adviser to whom to turn for this information. Far too few qualified analysts of Soviet history and policy are found within the U.S. government to provide insight in a crisis.

Beyond the misperception involved in making the initial commitment to remove the Soviet brigade, the attempt to force concession by linking the brigade to SALT backfired completely. Direct linkage of this sort seems generally doomed to failure. It presents a challenge to the U.S.S.R., threatening the Soviet leaders with loss of face with their internal and external constituencies if they cave in to the pressure of linkage.

But one simple reality underlies these many mistakes in the brigade fiasco. At every step of the way, the Carter Administration and Senator Church were pushed beyond the bounds of prudence by their perception of political vulnerability. Behind Senator Church's overly hasty announcement was fear

of criticism from groups such as the National Conservative Political Action Committee. Secretary Vance felt he had to use the ambiguous yet fateful phrase "status quo unacceptable" to deal with popular pressure. The Administration felt pressured to begin negotiations with the Soviets before they were even certain what the situation was in Cuba, and to elicit concessions in order to protect the SALT II agreement from further criticism.

The Carter Administration was on the defensive, as a result of the concerted attempt by critics of the SALT process and détente to discredit the Administration's management of foreign policy. The attack on the Carter leadership and the Administration's inability to match its critics with careful political management led not only to internal chaos and conflict in the brigade case. The affair was a diplomatic defeat for the U.S., and a sure sign that politics can have an ill effect on American foreign policy.

86/87 NWC UNIT IV, Crs 2, T-4C, R-a

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## THE CIA IN TRANSITION

# Casey Enforces 'Reagan Doctrine' With Reinvigorated Covert Action

*First in an occasional series*

By Patrick E. Tyler and David B. Ottoway

*Washington Post Staff Writers*

Joao Baptiste, a foot soldier in the Angolan rebel army of Jonas Savimbi, watched in horror one day last August as a Soviet T62 tank broke through the dense bush in eastern Angola, firing at his fellow guerrillas and crushing one of them beneath its clanking treads.

Armed only with an automatic rifle and a grenade, Baptiste scrambled up the side of the tank, yanked the turret lid up and dropped the grenade into the hatch, according to accounts later told and retold in Washington. The explosion stopped the tank's attack on the lightly armed soldiers in Battalion 07 of Savimbi's guerrilla army, which has been fighting the Soviet-armed Marxist regime for a decade.

Such tales of heroic "freedom fighters" pitted against vastly superior Soviet weapons—the Rambo archetype in the Angolan bush—have captured the imagination of President Reagan and provided the administration with an emblem for a new direction in U.S. foreign policy that conservatives have begun calling "the Reagan doctrine."

It is a doctrine that seeks to roll back Soviet and Cuban gains in the Third World by supporting anticommunist insurgencies. To translate theory into practice, the administration has turned to a Central Intelligence Agency reinvigorated and greatly expanded under the activist leadership of William J. Casey.

The former international banker and lawyer has unsurpassed stature among senior Cabinet members, making him perhaps the most influential CIA director since Allen W. Dulles in the 1950s in shaping American foreign policy. Casey has used that influence and his own enthusiasm for covert operations to expand CIA paramilitary involvement in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Cambodia and now Angola.

The resignation last week of CIA Deputy Director John N. McMahon, who reportedly was wary of American entanglements in the Third World, appears to have removed one of the principal brakes in the agency against such growing operations.

Since Reagan took office in 1981, Casey has rebuilt the CIA into a lethal and controversial

See CIA, A10, Col. 1

## CIA Enforces 'Reagan Doctrine'

CIA, From A1

instrument for carrying out covert operations. The agency's annual budget for secret missions far exceeds \$500 million, far higher than at any time since the Vietnam war. The administration's request for \$70 million to underwrite the rebels fighting the Sandinista government of Nicaragua would push the sum even higher.

In recent months, the administration has established a secret interagency committee to oversee the increasingly complex patchwork of covert operations. Although for-

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mally nameless, the group meets in Room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building and sometimes refers to itself as the "208 Committee." Its members are the micromanagers of America's new secret diplomacy, supervisors of a widening array of local conflicts around the globe where American and Soviet interests collide.

These brush-fire wars—known as low-intensity conflicts in military jargon—have come to dominate Reagan's foreign policy agenda in his second term. Some officials believe that they will be the main battleground of East-West rivalry for years.

Information for this article was gathered during several weeks of interviews with officials in Congress, at the White House and in other government agencies including the State and Defense departments. Other information was provided by sources with past or current connections to the U.S. intelligence agencies. Some information was drawn from published accounts. In many instances, officials spoke only on the condition that they not be identified.

Reagan's interagency group resembles in many respects the legendary "40 Committee" established in the Nixon administration to manage an earlier set of secret wars in the 1970s. The 208 Committee meets periodically to determine which weapons will be shipped, which secret warehouse goods used, which middlemen will deliver them to clandestine airstrips. The committee sets budgets, goals and timetables for each operation, again with the CIA serving as the principal agent.

Members of the committee include Donald R. Fortier, deputy national security affairs adviser; Clair George, head of the CIA's clandestine service; Michael H. Armacost, undersecretary of state; Fred C. Ikle, undersecretary of defense for policy, and Morton I. Abramowitz, head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Regional experts are summoned as needed to serve on subcommittees; decisions are ratified by the National Security Planning Group, consisting of the president and his key national security affairs advisers.

They have plenty to do, according to informed sources. Around the globe, the CIA's new activism can be seen in a number of ways other than its covert paramilitary role. In

Chad, the agency helped engineer the rise to power of Hissene Habre. In Liberia, it provided security assistance to President Samuel K. Doe. In Ethiopia, Suriname and Mauritius it has dabbled in opposition politics.

The newest and most sensitive covert program targets Libya. CIA and Pentagon planners are working with the opposition and Libya's pro-American neighbors to destabilize the regime of Col. Muammar Qaddafi, who has been denounced by the administration as a patron of international terrorism.

At its heart, the Reagan doctrine seeks a historic turnabout in which American aid underpins a new generation of national liberation struggles aimed at throwing off what American conservatives have dubbed "Soviet colonialism."

The policy, coincidentally, mirrors a Soviet doctrine unveiled a quarter-century ago. In 1960, Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev warned the West that Moscow's military muscle would be thrown behind "wars of national liberation" in the Third World, where colonial and leftist groups were struggling against colonial or pro-American regimes.

The resort to an increasing number of undercover operations run by the CIA has drawn fire from conservatives and liberals in Congress worried that covert action with obscure U.S. objectives is becoming a substitute for a well-defined foreign policy. The critics also worry that the agency once again will bog down in "dirty little wars."

Not only are Democrats mobilizing to block the new trend, but also the House and Senate intelligence committees have voiced alarm. Committee leaders are pushing to openly air the secret diplomacy; they want a congressional majority to either endorse or reject each paramilitary venture.

Much of the congressional anxiety centers on the complaint that covert paramilitary operations—secret wars—are initiated by the White House which then informs the congressional oversight committees. Under law, the committees are powerless to halt the operations and many members would like to absolve themselves from the appearance of consenting to such controversial undertakings.

Over the past year, presidential rhetoric has elevated the U.S. commitment to these anticommunist movements from moral and political backing to the resounding proclamation in Reagan's State of the Union message last month: "Amer-

ica will support . . . with moral and material assistance your right not just to fight and die for freedom but to fight and win freedom."

In his speech Feb. 26 justifying the administration's defense budget, Reagan used a map with arrows darting across the globe to pinpoint pro-Soviet Marxist regimes around the world. "We set out to show that the long string of governments falling under communist domination was going to end. And we're doing it," he said.

Despite this apparent escalation in administration commitment, there is still scant evidence that either the CIA or any branch of the armed services is gearing up to make a military victory possible through major U.S. support for any of these insurgencies, administration officials acknowledged. Nor is there analytical support among many—perhaps most—intelligence officers showing that military victories are likely in the conflicts despite the increased CIA presence.

Proponents of the Reagan doctrine argue that the potential for real military gains is being undercut by resistance at the CIA, the State Department and the Pentagon by bureaucrats leery of involving the United States in uncertain wars with uncertain public support.

In fact, public enthusiasm for the goals of the Reagan doctrine seems elusive. A December sounding by Republican pollster Robert Teeter found that "arming freedom fighters" was at the bottom of the list of national concerns for most Americans, a list topped by concerns about unemployment, arms control, inflation, deficit spending, national defense and tax revision.

Indeed, interviews with administration national security officials suggest that the most convinced advocate for the winning strategy recently articulated by the president is Ronald Reagan himself. Some officials believe the policy's real value is in "bleeding the Russians" at low cost to the United States. Others regard these Third World conflicts as bargaining chips in U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

There is even sharp disagreement in the White House about whether the administration should formally adopt the term "Reagan doctrine" to describe its "freedom fighters" policy.

At a recent Defense Department-sponsored conference, White House communications director Patrick J. Buchanan repeatedly used the term. "I think what you are getting at in the Reagan doctrine," Buchanan explained, "is that wars of liber-

ation can be conducted against the extremities of the Soviet empire by people trying to recapture their country for freedom or for liberty."

However, Fortier, the president's deputy national security affairs adviser, disagreed. "We are not eager to see it labeled as a doctrine because the cases are complex and no rigid set of answers or mechanical formula can be applied," he said in an interview. "Still, the pattern of activity we are now seeing is quite real and we have a coherent policy for dealing with it."

Regardless of the label, Fortier said that the two primary impulses behind "a policy" are "promoting democracy and regional stability." To reach a U.S. objective of "national reconciliation" in these conflicts, Fortier said sustained U.S. pressure is essential.

"Obviously if we don't mount and sustain credible pressure over time, the Soviets are not going to reassess," he added, "but the point is to reach a solution, not just to drain them indefinitely in these areas for the sake of doing it."

However, the principal objective of "national reconciliation," so often cited by Reagan and his advisers, has virtually no successful precedent in post-World War II global politics. Nowhere has a hardened Marxist-Leninist government agreed to form a coalition with its anticommunist or democratic opponents or hold free elections.

Despite the administration's rational construct, the evolution of U.S. involvement in the four principal insurgencies under way today has been marked by shifting objectives and ad hoc decision-making, often in response to domestic political pressures.

In Afghanistan, Reagan inherited from the Carter administration a policy of aid to the resistance to the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Under Reagan, CIA funding of the Afghanistan resistance has leaped from less than \$100 million to almost \$500 million annually, but the White House has resisted congressional demands to double the administration's budget request.

Nicaragua marked the first major administration initiative toward anticommunist resistance movements. The program began in 1982 as a plan to build a 500-man paramilitary force to combat Cubans and the "support structure" they were implanting in Nicaragua to consolidate the Sandinista regime. Unable to find any Cubans in the jungle, the U.S.-backed commandos, also known as counterrevolutionaries or contras, sought next to interdict

arms shipments headed for El Salvador's leftist guerrillas.

When the contras failed in this mission, the administration then recast its goal as one of pressuring the Sandinista government to hold elections and negotiate with its neighbors. Most recently, Reagan has said that the U.S. goal is "to prevent the consolidation of a Soviet-supported communist client state on the mainland of this hemisphere," which, he noted, is "just two days' driving time from Harlingen, Texas."

Even some strong supporters of the contras acknowledged that their poor military performance and lack of a political base inside Nicaragua represent a disappointing return on America's investment, which now exceeds \$100 million. Though the contras' military strength is reported at 20,000 men, only a fraction of them are conducting operations inside Nicaragua.

In Angola, the administration belatedly endorsed a drive by conservative political action groups, which had first engineered the repeal of the Clark amendment banning U.S. military aid to Savimbi and then lobbied intensively for military aid to his forces. Not until the fall of 1985 did the president officially embrace Savimbi's struggle. In November, the president approved a two-phased covert CIA operation that would begin providing first intelligence and communications support before graduating to the kind of antiarmor weapons needed by Joao Baptiste against the Soviet-made T62 tank.

Cambodia has remained the lowest-level commitment of the administration and the CIA to any of the anticommunist movements, with CIA nonlethal support estimated at \$5 million to \$12 million a year.

The realities of U.S. involvement in each of these operations have provoked questions about whether the Reagan doctrine will take on substance and momentum beyond the rhetoric of some presidential aides and speech writers.

"We have no national policy. We have no national strategy," Rep. Earl Hutto (D-Fla.) said recently. "On a national level we are treating all of these [conflicts] as random events only remotely linked by a vague, generalized ideology from which we are for individual freedoms and against totalitarianism."

Conservatives also hasten to point out the inconsistency in Reagan's embrace of the Nicaraguan contras, Angola's Savimbi and Afghanistan's mujaheddin, while ignoring anticommunist guerrillas

fighting in Mozambique and Ethiopia. Indeed, in Mozambique, the Reagan administration is providing economic assistance to the Marxist government in hopes of wooing it away from Moscow.

But one senior administration official said that selectivity reflects case-by-case analysis of how best to pursue U.S. interests; in countries where the United States has become involved in paramilitary operations, the administration is closely supervising them to ensure a continued "political purpose," he added.

This was part of the impetus behind establishing the 208 Committee, to guarantee that the White House and State Department—and not the CIA—have ultimate control over this instrument of secret diplomacy.

Some officials feel that such control is badly needed now because of Casey's well-known enthusiasm for covert action. Criticized by his detractors as an inveterate wanderer, Casey is constantly on the move, plotting covert strategy with his station chiefs around the world, inspecting life at the front, interviewing defectors before he briefs Reagan on Soviet intentions. After five years on the job, the director is considered to be in control of his agency now more than ever.

In a few weeks, Robert M. Gates, a Casey favorite, will ascend to the No. 2 post at the CIA in place of McMahan, who was regarded as the "nervous Nellie" of the agency's covert operations.

Gates' first assignment at the CIA in the Reagan era was to whip the analytical arm of the agency into a higher production rate of intelligence estimates on everything from Soviet military trends to Islamic fundamentalism. Most officials believe that Gates will now promote Casey's activist policy for clandestine paramilitary actions with the same zeal.

According to Fortier, the administration's main concern now is proving to the Soviets that the United States has "staying power" in its support of anticommunist resistance groups.

"Staying power is the most essential element" he said, "both in terms of building confidence in the region, but also in terms of demonstrating to the Soviets that cheap solutions are not available, that the problem is going to get worse, that they have to reckon with us."

*Staff writers Charles R. Babcock and Walter Pincus contributed to this report.*

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## THE CIA IN TRANSITION

# Casey Strengthens Role Under 'Reagan Doctrine'

By Patrick E. Tyler  
and David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writers

When the Soviet Union shot down a Korean Airlines plane in September 1983, an angry President Reagan told CIA Director William J. Casey that the United States should send U.S.-made anti-aircraft missiles to Afghanistan to help the rebels shoot down a few Soviet military aircraft in retaliation.

Casey was willing, but the plan was never approved, in part because of a reluctant Central Intelligence Agency bureaucracy, according to one source. Some top CIA officials argued that introducing U.S. weapons into that conflict would escalate it dangerously, end any possibility of "plausible denial" of U.S. involvement for Washington and alienate Pakistan, the main conduit for covert American aid to the rebels.

Now, with the decision to begin supplying U.S.-made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the rebels in Angola and Afghanistan, the Reagan administration apparently has



dispensed with such cautionary diplomacy. In so doing it has thrust the CIA into a far more public role as the lead agency in carrying out the United States' secret diplomacy.

This stepped-up commitment, under what some administration officials have called the "Reagan Doctrine," is dedicated to the president's vision of effectively supporting anticommunist "freedom fighters" in their struggle against Sovi-

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# CIA Buildup Strengthens Casey's Role In Policies

CIA, From A1

et-backed Marxist governments in the Third World.

An earlier article in this occasional series examined the evolution and debate over the "Reagan Doctrine." This one focuses on the role of the CIA in implementing that doctrine and the agency's remarkable growth during the tenure of Casey, the former Reagan campaign manager turned spymaster. Casey's influence, both in rebuilding the CIA and as a trusted counselor to the president, has made him a critical and sometimes controversial player in the administration.

During his five years as CIA director, the intelligence budget has grown faster than the defense budget and the agency has rapidly rebuilt its covert-action capabilities with a goal of restoring the prestige of the CIA's Directorate of Operations. The "DO," as it is called, suffered a series of purges and investigations during the 1970s and its image was smeared by disclosures of past assassination plots, use of mind-altering drugs and spying on U.S. citizens.

Since that time, a new generation of senior managers has ascended to the top of the CIA, and they in general have been a more cautious breed, eager to avoid risky operations that would embarrass the agency if disclosed.

But Casey is not a prisoner of that past.

He is one of the anti-Soviet "activists" in the top echelon of an administration that has promoted stepped-up U.S. involvement in the struggle to "roll back" recent Soviet gains in the Third World. While supporting the CIA's more cautious career bureaucracy, Casey also has moved quietly—sometimes in his political channels—to prepare his agency for a more aggressive role in countering Soviet influence in the Third World.

In theory, Casey serves as the czar of all U.S. intelligence agencies: the CIA, National Security Agency (NSA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). But in practice, three-quarters of the intelligence budget is spent by the Pentagon, leaving him as the titular head of a divided community.

His weakest performance, according to a number of officials, has been in living with congressional oversight. Casey's pugnacious style has at times led to confrontations with the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees. Such senior members as Sens. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), David F. Duranberger (R-Minn.), Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) and Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.) have challenged Casey's way of doing business.

Some in Congress have criticized the CIA director for politicizing the agency and its intelligence reports to promote the administration's goals in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the Third World. More than once, according to sources, Casey has angrily rejected CIA analyses that did not mesh with the anti-Soviet pronouncements of White House policy-makers and speech writers.

One key senator has said that relations between Casey and the committees are at an all-time low. The penalty for Casey could come in the next two months as the committees prepare to make the largest cuts in the intelligence budget since the Carter administration.

Some officials see Casey's most formidable challenge in Reagan's second term as facing severe budget cuts mandated by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit-reduction act. This comes as the U.S. intelligence community is projecting multibillion-dollar outlays for a new generation of high-technology spy satellites that some officials say are badly needed to guard U.S. interests until the end of the century.

Some critics charge that Casey is 40 years out of touch with intelligence management and shows obsessive interest in mounting covert operations in the style of the World War II Office of Strategic Services, where he cut his teeth on clandestine warfare under Gen. William J. Donovan. His critics point out that these were tactics of a bygone era. The country was at war; the more covert operations the better.

"Casey loves covert operations," according to one congressional overseer. "He'd mount a covert operation in the Vatican if he could."

Among members of the White House staff, Casey is often disparaged as alternately clownish and conniving. His speaking style and his sometimes sleepy demeanor in meetings have earned him the sobriquet of "Mumbles." One official once joked that Casey is the only CIA director who does not need a scrambler on his telephone.

Yet Casey's role at the policy table is not discounted, in large part because of his close relationship with the president and the virtually identical outlook the two men share on the global Soviet threat.

"Policy is really made by very few people in this administration," said one influential member of Congress, "and Casey is one of them."

Casey has separate weekly breakfast meetings with Secretary of State George P. Shultz to coordinate intelligence collection and foreign policy goals and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger to iron out the competitive demands of military intelligence with those of the CIA and State Department.

Several officials familiar with his leadership assert that he has logged more miles traveling around the world than any previous CIA director. Just this month, Casey toured Middle East and African countries, meeting with foreign officials and CIA station chiefs as the first new covert aid shipments were in transit to Angolan rebels.

Signs of the CIA's remarkable growth and transformation are as evident as the twin seven-story office additions at the agency's Langley headquarters, which will house the swelling payroll of analysts and consolidate in 1.1 million square feet of new offices the thousands of CIA employes scattered around metropolitan Washington.

The agency today commands roughly 15 percent—\$2.5 billion to \$3 billion, according to sources—of the more than \$24 billion intelligence budget this year. In five years, it has had three deputy directors and four directors of the clandestine service, which supervises both covert paramilitary operations as well as the traditional "clandestine-collection" activities of CIA officers and agents.

The rapid buildup has strained the agency's ability to recruit and screen quality candidates for undercover work from among an estimated 250,000 applicants annually. One sign of strain, according to some congressional critics, was that the CIA prepared relatively new

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and untested CIA officer Edward Lee Howard for a sensitive assignment in Moscow in 1982. Howard, hired in 1981 after a polygraph exam revealed past drug use, was later charged with espionage.

The pressures arising from changes in administration policy and the agency's growth have been felt even at the top of the CIA.

Last month, the agency announced the retirement of John N. McMahon, a 34-year CIA veteran who left his post for "personal reasons." Sources said McMahon was the main voice of caution against CIA involvement in large-scale covert paramilitary operations that could provoke public opposition, invite congressional criticism and bring news media exposure to the agency. His departure, some officials said, removes the last obstacle in the top ranks of the CIA to a more activist agency role.

This week McMahon will be replaced by Robert M. Gates, 42, regarded as a Casey favorite. A Soviet specialist, Gates served as a special assistant on the National Security Council during the Carter administration and returned to CIA as Casey's special assistant in 1981.

Much of the CIA's personnel growth—as many as 3,000 new positions—has gone toward beefing up the Directorate of Operations, where spy networks are managed and where covert action is planned among paramilitary experts in the International Affairs Department.

The CIA's paramilitary arm has become a large and sophisticated weapon available to the president, according to Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), one of a handful of Senate conservatives who have been urging the administration to unleash its covert forces against terrorist groups and Marxist regimes.

But even as this capability is being restored, a new interagency turf battle has broken out over which agency should run it. Noel C. Koch, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, said in an interview that both the CIA and Defense Department want a role in paramilitary operations, but that both are suffering from bureaucratic inertia.

At the CIA, Koch said, a generation of top officials, led by McMahon, has been reluctant to exercise the agency's paramilitary capabilities out of fear of failure, political risk or the embarrassing consequences of getting caught. "The CIA is internally divided between those affected by Vietnam and the new activists," Koch said.

At the Defense Department, on the other hand, the military services see their primary mission as preparing for conventional and nuclear war and, therefore, resist attempts by its civilian leadership to foist upon the Pentagon the task of training and equipping paramilitary forces, according to Koch.

"Neither CIA nor Defense alone can implement the Reagan Doctrine," said Michael Pillsbury, assistant undersecretary of defense for policy planning. "Horror of horrors," he added, "we have to work together."

As the lead intelligence agency, the CIA is in charge of analyzing the mass of information that comes in daily from human agents and from U.S. spy satellites and turning it into useful information for the president and his national security affairs advisers. This requires an army of professional intelligence officers grouped within the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence.

One of Casey's first initiatives in 1981 as CIA director was to beef up the productivity of this branch under Gates' direction. His goal was to improve the number and quality of the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), the basic, detailed intelligence reports on political, economic and military trends and trouble spots around the world.

But internal critics have voiced concern that Casey and Gates have sought to impose their globalist view of the Soviet threat in many countries and regions. For example, in 1982 Casey ordered an intelligence review of the African continent, according to one official.

When the rough draft came to his desk, it included scant reference to Soviet interests in Africa and concentrated on the indigenous problems of agriculture, education, poverty and development. Casey was reportedly incensed at the draft and replaced the analyst with another senior official whose well-known views on Soviet subversion in the Third World dramatically revised the tone and conclusions of the intelligence report.

The final product was a CIA study that "reeks of Moscow's footprints in Africa" and largely ignored indigenous problems, according to this official. A similar dispute over the intelligence estimate for Mexico erupted in 1984 when analyst John Horton resigned his CIA post, charging that Casey had unduly politicized its conclusions.

But Casey has also been credited with a number of innovations that have made intelligence forecasts

more crisp and responsive. One is the Weekly Watch Report on trouble spots around the globe. Another is an annual report in graphic form that ranks countries according to their importance to U.S. policy interests and also ranks them according to the likelihood that they may suffer "surprise events" of political or economic instability.

One Casey victory over his bureaucracy, according to sources, has been the inclusion of an "intelligence gaps" footnote to each NIE, distinguishing for the reader which conclusions are based on hard information and which are speculative. In many cases, these "gaps" sections candidly state that the CIA has no agents or sources for information in key foreign governments, political parties and military commands. One source said this innovation was achieved despite the traditional reluctance of the clandestine service to reveal anything about sources.

Nonetheless, the quality of CIA estimates is hotly disputed. Its reporting on the deteriorating situation in the Philippines last year was generally regarded as outstanding, although Casey was among the last of Reagan's advisers to counsel the abandonment of president Ferdinand Marcos, according to officials involved in the controversy.

Recent CIA estimates on Soviet military expenditures, missile development and oil production, criticized at first, also have stood the test of time. The most recent estimates on Mexico also carefully tracked corruption and economic problems there.

But some congressional and outside critics say CIA reports for the White House are often politically motivated. They charge that Casey has damaged the agency's credibility by producing flawed or incomplete analyses to sell the president's controversial policy toward countries like Nicaragua.

Among the examples cited are the White Paper in 1981 on arms smuggling through Nicaragua to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador, later challenged by the House intelligence committee; a report in January exonerating the U.S.-backed counterrevolutionaries of atrocity charges, and another report, passed out by Casey at a congressional leadership meeting at the White House, on an alleged "disinformation campaign" here by Nicaragua's ruling Sandinistas.

Durenberger, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intel-

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ligence, has criticized Casey for failing to give agency analysts "a sense of direction" about what the U.S. government needs to know and faulted its reporting on such widely different countries as South Africa and the Soviet Union.

Under pressure from Durenberger, the CIA has produced for the first time a national intelligence strategy that attempts to give the agency more direction and a sense of national priorities. But critics say the CIA and the vast intelligence community under Casey still fall far short of giving the president and his national security affairs advisers the kind of comprehensive and penetrating information they need in today's world, where terrorism has become a more immediate threat than a Soviet nuclear attack.

CIA defenders reply that even if the \$24 billion intelligence budget were doubled, it still would not accommodate all of the satellites, listening posts and undercover spies Casey and his agency chiefs would need to provide that kind of blanket and "real-time" coverage of the world 24 hours a day.

Some CIA analysts charge that the Pentagon and military services hog the satellite systems for their tactical intelligence needs, leaving CIA analysts without the photos, radio intercepts and spy reports they need to make timely judgments on hot spots.

And, finally, due to the increasing need for security against espionage and leaks, intelligence "consumers" often do not know the source of the information they receive and seldom give feedback to the intelligence "producers" on whether the U.S. government is getting its money's worth for the vast array of technology and agent networks it deploys around the globe.

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*Staff writers Charles R. Babcock and Walter Pincus contributed to this report.*

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 "Overseeing of C.I.A. by Congress Has Produced Decade of Support."  
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## ***Overseeing of C.I.A. by Congress Has Produced Decade of Support***

The following article is based on reporting by Stephen Engelberg and Leslie H. Gelb and was written by Mr. Gelb.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 6 — Despite some highly public skirmishes over the last decade, Congressional committees that oversee the Central Intelligence Agency have provided almost unbroken support for the agency and other intelligence activities, according to past and present committee members and Reagan Administration officials.

"The C.I.A. got what it wanted," said Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, who was vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee until his eight-year membership ended two years ago.

"Like other legislative committees, ours came to be an advocate for the agency it was overseeing," Mr. Moynihan added, reflecting the views of most of his colleagues.

### **Questioning the Future**

The Senate committee celebrated its 10th anniversary last month with some members of Congress and the Administration questioning the future of the relationship. Some were calling for the House and Senate to put together a smaller, single oversight panel while others were suggesting that the two committees should have the power to block major covert, paramilitary actions like the decision to aid the Angolan rebels.

But Administration officials and members of the committees alike expect few changes in the oversight process. The current friction, they say, belies a broader, established pattern of cooperation by Congress with the intelligence activities of the executive branch.

Over the last decade, for example, the Senate and House oversight committees have pushed through Congress a tripling of the overall intelligence budget to its present level of about \$25 billion. Almost all this rise has been for intelligence collection and analysis.

### **Covert Actions on the Rise**

The committees have also supported more than a doubling of covert actions in recent years. The sources said the number of actions rose from about a dozen or so small-scale ones at the end of the Carter Administration to some 40-odd today, many of which are described by officials as major undertakings.

The generally supportive relationship has been obscured in recent years by mutual recriminations between the legislative and executive branches over unauthorized disclosures to the

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press, by personality clashes, and by sharp conflicts about a handful of covert paramilitary operations.

The Administration is conducting only about five such actions: in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia and northeast Africa. In budgetary terms, this amounts to about \$500 million out of a \$25 billion total. But a number of legislators and some C.I.A. officials maintain that these few programs are taking up too much of the time and energies of Administration leaders and top intelligence officials, thereby seriously distorting intelligence priorities.

Often Congressional objections focus on means rather than ends: Members of the committees, for example, have questioned the \$30 million military portion of the \$100 million covert aid package for the Nicaraguan rebels, or whether shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft weapons should go to the Angolan rebels.

But on a deeper level, they are debating the philosophy and goals that inspire President Reagan's doctrine of containing or even overthrowing Communist-backed regimes and promoting democracy in the developing world by covert means as well as overt assistance.

As Senator Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota Republican who heads the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, put it, "For at least a generation, we're in for a series of smaller conflicts that shape our national security policy." The problem, as he sees it, is that "in some way the American public is going to be involved in that without knowing how it's being involved."

Mr. Durenberger and most of the other intelligence committee members interviewed said they felt extremely uncomfortable using the committees' secret sessions as a forum to debate broad foreign policy issues that could lead to war.

By all accounts, the committees have rarely been able to stop those few covert programs that the members thought unwise or dangerous.

One plan aborted after objections on the committee involved an Administration proposal several years ago to mount a paramilitary action against a small island country. This country had just elected a leader who proceeded to rename a central square in his capital in honor of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, the Libyan leader.

Another was thwarted in the early 1980's. The C.I.A. reported that Cuban squads had entered a Central American country, and, as a former committee member related, "The agency said their purpose was to band together with opponents of the Government and overthrow it." The Administration launched a paramilitary response, but legislators were able to prevail on officials to wait and see before taking further action. The C.I.A. waited, and the Cuban threat never materialized, according to legislative and Administration sources.

## Institutional Oversight: How It Developed

Until the early 1970's, the executive branch and Congress dealt with each other on a personal basis when it came to intelligence budgets and covert operations.

"I recall when we came to classified programs, we would all look over at Richard Russell, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and he would say, 'I have discussed this matter with the appropriate officials and I have found everything is in order.'" recalled Senator Daniel K. Inouye, the Hawaii Democrat who was the first chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. "But no one ever told us what was in order."

This cozy relationship came to an abrupt end under the Nixon Administration. As articles appeared alleging C.I.A. misdeeds such as assassinations or domestic spying, the sense spread through Washington that the agency was out of control, a rogue elephant. Congress quickly decided to end the era of oversight by a few individuals and begin a period of institutional oversight. Eight committees with almost 100 members were given jurisdiction over portions of intelligence.

Between unhappy legislators and disaffected C.I.A. officials, the agency's secrets started to pour into the public domain. Agency personnel and budgets were slashed. These were "the very dark ages," as John N. McMahon, who held the post of deputy director of the C.I.A. until last year, told Congress in 1982.

The symbolic height of this era was reached in 1975 when Congress, for the first time, voted openly to stop a covert paramilitary operation in Angola.

In May 1976 the Senate approved the establishment of one oversight committee, the Select Committee on Intelligence, with 15 members. "I doubt if the majority of the committee knew the whereabouts of the C.I.A. in Virginia," Mr. Inouye said. "I had never been there myself."

The next year the House followed suit, creating the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, with 17 members. To Mr. Inouye and others interviewed, it was a period of surprises. Most of the covert actions the committee was briefed on seemed "innocent" to Mr. Inouye. In one example he gave, the C.I.A. was passing out books illegally in the Soviet Union.

He said he wished he never knew about some things he was told. "How would you like to know a very, very high official of a certain government was on our payroll?" he asked as a rhetorical example.

## From Hostility To Cooperation

The new committees moved rapidly to establish a relationship of trust with the C.I.A. and other intelligence departments. By the late 1970's, they moved to rebuild intelligence operations that were by then generally considered to be in a shambles. And according to Mr. Inouye, after an initial period of distrust that lasted more than a year, the agency began to share with the committee its most sensitive secrets. Today all of the C.I.A.'s intelligence reports are routinely provided to the committees. Also, according to Congressional testimony, the C.I.A. briefed the committees 500 times last year in addition to formal appearances by top officials.

Mr. Moynihan saw this as a natural development. "Anyone who has followed American Government knows that an activity that wishes to prosper in the executive branch gets itself a pair of committees to look after it in the legislative branch," he said.

Some in the executive branch understood this full well. "I was looking for an advocate because we had no one beating the bushes up on the Hill for us," Mr. McMahon told a Congressional committee. "We were left without a father, so to speak, and I wanted an oversight committee much like the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, so that someone up on the Hill who understood and appreciated us could carry our message to the rest of Congress."

Mr. Inouye, among others, was concerned that cooperation would go too far. For this reason, he said, he proposed that the committee chairman serve only for two years of a committee member's eight-year term. This became the rule, Mr. Inouye said, "to get out before you got too intimate and too close."

The workload of the committees was substantial. They had to oversee the budget and activities of the C.I.A.; the National Security Agency, which deals with communications; the intelligence operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is part of the Pentagon, and the National Reconnaissance Organization, which carries out satellite spying within the Air Force.

To keep track of these enterprises required expertise. The committees sought this in the quickest possible way, namely by hiring people who had worked in the agencies. According to legislative sources, 10 of the 14 professional staff members of the House committee have worked previously for one of the intelligence agencies. The present Senate staff director, Bernard F. McMahon, and his House counterpart, Thomas K. Latimer, both served in the C.I.A.

The role of the committees' staffs looms large, because only about one-third of the committee members generally come to meetings and take an active part in proceedings, according to the members. But by all accounts, the staff reflects the general attitude of the members.

William S. Cohen, Republican of Maine, who is to be the next chairman of the Senate committee, spoke for most of his colleagues when he said of Congressional-executive relations:

"We're not looking at each other as enemies. We're on the same side, but we still maintain some degree of distance and skepticism about certain programs. Then we can go to our colleagues on the floor and we can say we've looked at this budget. As a result of that kind of approach, the intelligence agencies have done very well in their funding requests."

As Mr. Cohen and others pointed out, the problems between the branches have rarely been about budget and programs. They have mainly centered on disclosures to the press and matters of procedure.

## Communication Of Secrets

Unauthorized disclosure of classified material has long been an irritant in the relationship between Congress and the intelligence agencies. Members of Congress blame officials in the Administration for using the disclosures to advance particular policies, while critics within the Administration accuse the lawmakers of doing the same.

The feuding burst into the public view several months ago when William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, released a stinging letter to Mr. Durenberger. That dispute has since largely subsided, but the relationship between Mr. Durenberger and the C.I.A. remains testy.

An equally painful point of conflict between the branches has been over when and to what level of detail the Administration should notify the committees about a covert operation. By law, the President is required to give the committees "prior notice" of covert actions. If for extraordinary reasons he fails to do so, he has to inform them "in a timely fashion."

Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, who is the current vice chairman of the Senate panel, expressed the prevailing view on the committees. "I think we are often informed in a timely fashion and often kept informed as we go along, but not always," he said. In any event, legislative sources said, it is difficult for the committees to try to change this procedure.

Another problem raised by the legislators, who spoke on condition they not be identified, concerned escalations or changes in covert actions about which they were previously notified. Legislators said and officials acknowledged that the Administration has typically avoided calling attention to the changes on the ground that they were not significant. After a number of spats, it is now agreed that any change in the nature of a covert action is significant if it requires Presidential approval.

The committees do not have the power to disapprove covert actions. The President simply notifies the committees and dips into an existing contingency fund. If Congress wants to disapprove, it must pass specific legislation to that effect, and in the case of the program to aid the Angolan rebels, the House committee has moved to do just that.

The view expressed by a number of legislators was that the C.I.A.'s briefers often did not provide much detail about operations. "Only if you ask precisely the right question will they give



you precisely the right information," one committee member said. "And even though we're given things like places, dates, money and the like, Administration goals are often vague and usually evolve."

## Paramilitary Operations And Reagan's Doctrine

Covert actions range from planting an article in a foreign newspaper to provision of military equipment and on-the-spot training. According to legislative and Administration sources, the committees have backed the expansion of these activities with few exceptions.

The sources said the committees had been particularly helpful in recent years in providing the money and impetus to hire more agents at the C.I.A. and other agencies. A good many of these new agents have become involved in the management of clandestine paramilitary operations in such places as Nicaragua. There rebels known as contras are backed by the United States.

"It takes a lot of people to manage 15,000 contras, 25,000 or more Angolan rebels, some 200,000 or so Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, and odds and ends around the globe," a committee member said.

In Afghanistan, the C.I.A. was responsible for a \$250 million program for delivering a variety of supplies and arms to the rebels through the Pakistani Government. The difficulties of managing this became so prodigious, according to a range of sources, that John McMahon, Mr. Casey's deputy until a year ago, began to raise serious questions. Those questions were drawn to the attention of a number of committee members and other legislators who strongly backed the program, and they forced Mr. McMahon from office, the sources said.

There have been similar questions raised about managing the Nicaraguan rebels. Recent reports have alleged that their leaders are involved in drug trafficking and money laundering and have failed to supply their own troops.

But the drain on C.I.A. manpower and the testing of management skills is only one of the problems between the branches. Committee members like Mr. Durenberger are expressing increasing concern that the committees are getting into basic foreign policy issues, going well beyond discussion of technical operations. "My view has always been that either you want these questions moved over to the Foreign Relations Committee, or if it's going to stay in the intelligence committees, we've got to see the Secretary of State and we have to see the policy in its larger context," Mr. Durenberger said, and most of his colleagues agreed.

These and other committee members past and present found themselves torn. On the one hand, many of them support aid for non-Communist rebels and recognize the advantages of covert actions. On the other hand, many of the same legislators said they feared that the operations and the doctrine that lies behind them are moving the United States toward risks of direct military involvement and into diplomatic quagmires. Thus, they want more public scrutiny.

Essentially, the committees have tried to walk the line between these considerations by limiting operations that they consider questionable rather than killing them. But as the fighting heats up in places such as Central America, Angola and Afghanistan, many committee members expect to revisit the issues.

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## C.I.A., Evaluating Soviet Threat, Often Is Not So Grim as Pentagon

By MICHAEL E. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 15 — When Representative John Edward Porter was contesting the Pentagon's case for developing new chemical weapons last year, he adopted an unusual tactic.

He turned to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Porter, an Illinois Republican, arranged a closed briefing for the House Appropriations Committee at which the C.I.A. delivered an evaluation of the Soviet chemical warfare threat. The analysis was less ominous than that of the Pentagon, as the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. John A. Wickham Jr., has acknowledged in Congressional testimony. The C.I.A. view, General Wickham said, is that "there is less intention to use chemical weapons and, therefore, probably less of a threat."

### Independent Role Continues

The C.I.A. still views Soviet military capabilities as a threat. But on a number of major issues, the C.I.A. has presented a less grim picture of Soviet military programs than that offered by the Pentagon under Caspar W. Weinberger and by other senior Administration officials.

To many Administration officials and members of Congress, this suggests that the agency, under William J. Casey, has generally maintained its tradition of independence and objectivity on Soviet military issues even as the Reagan Administration has taken policy in a more conservative direction.

This independence, they say, stems in part from the fact that the C.I.A. provides intelligence to a variety of Government agencies and increasingly to Congress and thus is less vulnerable to bureaucratic pressures than it would be if it reported to only one agency.

The C.I.A. analyses also suggest to some members of Congress that some Administration officials have exaggerated Soviet military capabilities in order to win support for the Pentagon's spending requests.

"I think that the C.I.A. has probably driven Secretary Weinberger and some in the Department of Defense up the wall by reporting accurately on Soviet threats and not just saying what everybody wants for a budget hearing," said Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Pentagon officials say, however, that military intelligence officials generally err on the side of caution in projecting Soviet capabilities so that the American military will not be caught short in a conflict.

The C.I.A. has challenged a number of important Pentagon assertions and has issued findings that undermine arguments made by White House and

other Administration officials:

¶ It has disputed Pentagon assertions that the Soviet SS-19 missile has the accuracy to be an effective first-strike weapon.

¶ It has concluded that the United States previously exaggerated the yield of the Soviet underground tests of nuclear weapons and has adopted a new method for estimating the tests' explosive power, which has the effect of lowering United States estimates. This has raised questions about White House allegations that the Soviet Union has violated the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

¶ It has provided a more cautious reading than that of some Administration officials of the pace of Soviet research on antimissile systems. It has also raised questions about the military usefulness of a new Soviet radar facility that is under construction in central Siberia, which the Administration has repeatedly suggested may be part of a future Soviet antimissile network.

¶ It has contradicted some Administration statements that the Soviet Union could not significantly expand its forces if the limits in the second strategic arms treaty are dropped.

¶ It has disputed Pentagon estimates of Soviet military spending and has concluded that Soviet spending on new weapons has been flat for years.

The agency's assessments on these and other issues have clearly become a source of consternation for hard-line conservatives on Capitol Hill.

Senator Jesse Helms, for example, sent Mr. Casey a letter last fall that castigated the agency for "the longstanding habit of the C.I.A. of underestimating Soviet intentions and military capabilities." Senator Helms suggested that the C.I.A.'s estimates be revised to present a more threatening view of Soviet military programs.

It is not possible to assess independently the validity of some of the C.I.A.'s findings. But some of the agency's conclusions, such as the one on the yield of Soviet tests, are supported by studies by experts outside the Government.

### C.I.A. Has Some Shelter From Political Pressures

The C.I.A. is generally regarded as less subject to institutional pressures than other Government intelligence agencies. Unlike the Defense Intelligence Agency, which produces intelligence reports solely for the Pentagon, the C.I.A. serves a number of Government agencies and, increasingly, Congress.

As a result, officials say the C.I.A. does not have to worry that the agency receiving an intelligence estimate has a stake in how the estimate comes out.

But the C.I.A. has not been immune from some political pressures. In the mid-1970's, some conservatives assailed the agency for understating the Soviet threat. A panel of hard-line former officials and experts, called "Team B," was established by the White House to critique the agency's performance.

After Ronald Reagan was elected

President, conservatives continued their effort to influence the agency and make it a special target for "re-education," as one conservative put it at the time.

These initial efforts by conservatives and the appointment of Mr. Casey as Director of Central Intelligence led to worries on the part of some members of Congress, including some members of the intelligence committees, that the C.I.A. might alter its analyses to reflect the policies of the new Administration.

By all accounts, Mr. Casey has held to his conservative views on matters of policy. In private White House meetings, he has sided with Defense Secretary Weinberger and other critics of the second strategic arms treaty in urging President Reagan to repudiate the treaty, officials report. And Mr. Casey has played up the Soviet threat in his speeches and has sometimes described Soviet military programs in terms that are starker than his agency's own analyses.

But while Mr. Casey has shown an interest in improving the quality of his agency's analyses, there is no evidence that he has sought, for political reasons, to influence the substance of intelligence reports on the Soviet Union or East-West relations.

Officials say he appears to have left considerable latitude to his professional or career deputies, such as Robert M. Gates, an expert on the Soviet arms control who was deputy director of the C.I.A. for intelligence and who now is the agency's No. 2 official.

"I am generally satisfied with the quality of the information we receive," said Senator William S. Cohen, Republican of Maine, a member of the Intelligence Committee and the Armed Services Committee. "I do not think that it is biased or ideologically slanted."

"Whether Casey is delegating authority to Gates or whether Gates is taking the ball and running with it, the reports are pretty high grade," said Mr. Cohen.

"We get good stuff," said Senator Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota Republican who heads the Senate Intelligence Committee, referring to agency reports on Soviet military developments and strategic issues. "I believe that Bill Casey knew that he had a real good President but one that was an inexperienced international politician. This President is only served by hard fact."

Another sign of independence is that analysts who are ideologically diverse have been appointed to important positions under Mr. Casey, said Stephen M. Meyer, an associate professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who specializes in Soviet military matters and serves as a consultant to the agency.

Some experts, such as Mr. Durenberger, drew a distinction between C.I.A. analyses on Soviet military development, which they deem to be objective, and the agency's reports on Central America.

"In terms of Central America, we sometimes get something that looks like an analyst's product that really ain't. Like reports that the contras will be able to win under certain circumstances," said Mr. Durenberger. "Some of that stuff is cooked."

But other members of Congress, such as Mr. Leahy, said that even in this area, the C.I.A. had been objective.

Asked about C.I.A. findings on Soviet

military issues, a senior intelligence official said the agency had prepared three main analyses that have not become publicly known.

"This matter of differences between policy and intelligence assessments, including on strategic and arms control issues, is vastly exaggerated," the senior official said. "The overwhelming number of policy decisions are based on, or consistent with, the intelligence policy-makers receive."

But some experts say agency officials do not want their independence to be highlighted because they fear it will make them more vulnerable to conservative pressure. "They want to be perceived as being on the right so that they will be left alone," said Mr. Meyer.

Robert B. Sims, chief Pentagon spokesman, said, "We know that intelligence analysts do differ and it is worthwhile to have different analyses, but on the basic issues, we believe there is considerable agreement." Mr. Sims noted, for example, that both the C.I.A. and the Defense Intelligence Agency agreed that the Soviet Union was producing a "staggering" amount of weapons.

### Differing Assessments About Soviet Missiles

The C.I.A. has prepared a number of important assessments in the area of Soviet strategic forces that run counter to assertions by the Reagan Administration and the White House.

One critical judgment has to do with the SS-19 missile. In the late 1970's, intelligence officials expressed concern that the accuracy of Soviet missiles, particularly the SS-18 and the SS-19, was improving more quickly than expected.

This concern had important political significance and figured in the heated debate in the late 1970's and in the 1980 Presidential campaign. In that campaign Mr. Reagan said the Carter Administration had allowed the opening of the "window of vulnerability," the notion that American missiles were becoming vulnerable to Soviet attack.

But last year, a C.I.A. analysis circulating through the Government said the SS-19 missile was less accurate than previously supposed. Based on the new estimates, the missile should no longer be considered an effective first-strike weapon, according to government experts. Senior Pentagon officials continue to disagree with this C.I.A. view.

Both the Pentagon and the C.I.A. agree that the Soviet Union's 308 SS-18 missiles still give the Soviet Union a substantial capability to attack United States missile silos.

In another important development, the C.I.A. revised its methodology for estimating the yield of Soviet underground nuclear tests based on seismic monitoring, an action that has undercut the Administration's charge of Soviet arms control violations.

The old methodology had led the Administration to conclude that the Soviet Union has probably violated the limits of the unratified threshold test ban treaty. But questions had been raised by experts on seismology as to whether that methodology took sufficient account of geological differences in the United States and the Soviet Union.

While panels of nongovernmental experts commissioned by the Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research

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Projects Agency had suggested that the procedures be changed, Richard N. Perle, Assistant Defense Secretary, opposed the move, arguing that seismic readings are not a sound basis for evaluating Soviet testing.

Despite these objections, the C.I.A. adopted the new procedures in January. This move has the general effect of lowering Government estimates of the yield of Soviet underground tests by about 20 percent.

Under the new estimating procedures, some Soviet tests still appear to be over the limit, but seismologists generally believe that the results are within the realm of uncertainty.

**Radar Facility in Siberia Is Focus of One Debate**

C.I.A. analyses have also raised questions about Administration assertions on Soviet research and development of antimissile technologies.

Administration officials have suggested that a large phased-array radar that is under construction at Abalakova in central Siberia may be part of a future nationwide missile defense of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the suggestion that the Soviet Union may be moving to deploy a defensive system has become one of the principal Pentagon arguments in behalf of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative.

But C.I.A. analysts have provided a more cautious reading of the purpose and capabilities of the Abalakova radar, an interpretation that Mr. Leahy said reflected one of the "biggest differences" between Pentagon and C.I.A. officials.

While not excluding the possibility that the radar could be intended as an element of an antimissile system, the C.I.A. has raised questions in a carefully worded statement about whether the facility would be effective in that role. It is the only Government agency publicly to do so.

The C.I.A., for example, has noted that the facility would be very vulnerable to American attack. In written response to questions from Senator William Proxmire, Mr. Gates, the agency's No. 2 official, said, "Because such radars are fixed and they are key nodes for an A.B.M. system's capability, there will always be an issue of whether an A.B.M. system is worth having, which depends to a great extent on a few potentially quite vulnerable facilities."

This view was in line with a classified 1984 assessment entitled "Implications of a New Soviet Phased Array Radar," which Administration officials have said was drafted by C.I.A. officials with input from other parts of the intelligence community.

In another case, the C.I.A. has disputed Energy Department assessments about the pace of the Soviet program to develop antimissile systems powered by nuclear explosions.

Last year Secretary of Energy John S. Herrington, whose department is sponsoring American research on nuclear antimissile systems, said the Soviet Union was "substantially ahead" in this area. Mr. Herrington said the Soviet Union might be able to deploy an X-ray laser, which is powered by a nuclear explosion, "with no additional testing."

But the C.I.A., in a letter to Representative Edward J. Markey, said, "The C.I.A. does not believe that the Soviet Union can deploy nuclear-driven directed-energy weapons without conducting additional explosive tests."

The C.I.A. has also generally said it will take the Soviet Union longer to develop laser and particle-beam antimissile and anti-satellite weapons than has been forecast in Soviet Military Power, an annual publication of the Pentagon that primarily reflects the view of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Recently, however, the publication has tended to take a more cautious view that more closely resembles C.I.A. assessments.

**Sometimes, It Is C.I.A. Painting Grim Picture**

Still, it is clear that the C.I.A. does not always view Soviet systems as less threatening than other agencies do. And officials said there also were cases in which Pentagon intelligence officials had lowered their estimates of the capabilities of Soviet weapons, bringing them more in line with C.I.A. assessments.

Officials report that Lawrence K. Gershwin, the national intelligence officer for strategic programs at the C.I.A., gives greater credence than do Defense Intelligence Agency officials to the possibility that Soviet SS-18 missiles may be deployed with more than 10 warheads.

The C.I.A. view, reflected in the National Intelligence Estimate, a high-level Government intelligence analysis provided to the President, is that the missile may have up to 14 warheads, while the Defense Intelligence Agency view is that the missile probably has 10 warheads. The missile has never been tested with more than 10 warheads.

On the second point, the Defense Intelligence Agency last year lowered its estimate of the range of the Soviet Backfire bomber and brought it within the scope of previous C.I.A. estimates. In the view of some Administration officials, the move undercut the Administration assertion that the bomber should be treated as a weapon with intercontinental capability in Geneva arms talks.

But while acknowledging these cases, officials also point to arms control, East-West policy issues and military spending as areas in which the C.I.A. has departed from some Administration assertions.

**Strategic Arms Treaty An Object of Contention**

C.I.A. analyses, for example, differ

with some of the arguments used by the Administration to support its decision to repudiate the second strategic arms treaty of 1979.

Administration critics of the treaty have argued that the unratified treaty had no restraining effect on Soviet military programs and that dropping it would not make much difference.

But C.I.A. officials have publicly suggested otherwise. In 1982 Congressional testimony, Mr. Gates said the strategic arms treaties might have had a restraining effect on Soviet military spending. The "decisions to comply with SALT I and the unratified SALT II treaty also may have slowed the pace of procurement in certain areas," he said.

The C.I.A. has also noted that abandoning the treaty limits would allow a further expansion of the Soviet force with little additional effort by Moscow.

According to the agency analyses, the Soviet Union could build up its force from about 9,000 warheads to about 16,000 if treaty limits are maintained until the mid-1990's. But if the treaty limits are abandoned, the Soviet Union could expand its arsenal of missile warheads to 21,000 by stepping up its strategic program, though the C.I.A. has said that even this would not involve a "maximum effort."

In another difference, C.I.A. analysts have also questioned in internal deliberations some of the Administration's arguments for its proposed ban on Soviet long-range mobile missiles in a new arms treaty, officials report.

The Reagan Administration, in a policy switch last November, proposed a ban on long-range mobile missiles, where the Soviet have a lead, and justified the ban on the ground that limits on mobile missiles cannot be verified.

But one Administration official said, "the C.I.A. does not want to be associated with the mobile ban," adding, "it does not think that verification prob-

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lems are all that different" from intermediate-range forces, where the United States has proposed verification measures for Soviet mobile missiles.

On general East-West issues, the C.I.A. prepared analyses early in the Reagan Administration that did not support the Administration's assertions that Western allies could be induced to support the United States effort to block construction of a pipeline to transport Siberian natural gas to Western Europe and that such an effort could be successful. The analyses upset some National Security Council staff members who wanted to mount an effort to block the pipeline.

**Disagreements Continue On Soviet Arms Budget**

A further area where there has been

open disagreement between the C.I.A. and the Pentagon is the level of Soviet military spending.

The C.I.A. says that Soviet spending from 1974 to 1982 has increased at a rate of about 2 percent a year, once the effects of inflation are discounted. The C.I.A. analyses have also concluded that Soviet spending on new weapons has been essentially flat from 1974 to 1982. This represents a change from the mid-1960's through the early 1970's when Soviet military spending was growing at a more rapid rate.

The Defense Intelligence Agency has now come around to the C.I.A. view about past spending trends, but the two agencies continue to differ over the current rate of Soviet spending, with the Defense Intelligence Agency seeing a somewhat higher level.

The significance of the C.I.A. assessment is that it indicates that Soviet military planning operates somewhat

independently of the swings in military spending in the United States and suggests that the Soviet military industry suffers from industrial bottlenecks.

This analysis runs counter to initial Administration assertions that the Soviet Union is engaged in a continued escalation of the arms race.

The estimates also "weaken the view that the Soviet Union is a dual economy composed of an inefficient, relatively backward civilian industry and a modern defense industry," wrote Richard F. Kaufman, the assistant director of the Joint Economic Committee, which holds annual hearings on the issue of Soviet military spending.

"Casey sometimes shoots from the hip," Mr. Kaufman said. "But he has not tried to impose his views on the institution when it comes to the analytical side. The analysts on Soviet and East European developments are objective. They deserve a lot of credit."

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