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THE CIA AND ACADEME

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Possibly - useful reprints from Studies in Intelligence.

Close ties between the Central Intelligence Agency and American colleges and universities have existed since the birth of the Agency in 1947. The bonds between national intelligence and the academic world actually predate the Agency, for William J. Donovan, President Roosevelt's Coordinator of Information, established a research team of distinguished academicians to assist him in 1941. Donovan proposed a novel idea: have the information that he was collecting, mostly from the military services and the Department of State, analyzed not only by the intelligence components within the War and Navy Departments but by his team of "scholars, economists, psychologists, technicians, and students of finance." To head his research group, Donovan chose James Phinney Baxter, president of Williams College and a noted specialist in American diplomatic history.

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Research and Analysis Branch of what became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) rapidly expanded. After Baxter's departure in 1942, William L. Langer, the distinguished historian from Harvard, took over direction of the branch and remained in that post until disestablishment of OSS in late 1945.

While many of the scholars who had participated in the analytic part of OSS returned to their campuses after the war, some remained with the government. Those who had been in the Research and Analysis Branch were transferred to the State Department. Then, as the Central Intelligence Group and, after 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency grew in size and responsibility, a number of academicians who had served with OSS returned as analysts in the new Office of Research and Evaluation.

During the great expansion of CIA following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Agency recruiters appeared in significant numbers on academic campuses across the nation. Also in 1950, the Director of Central Intelligence, General Walter Bedell Smith, called upon William Langer to return to Washington to organize the new Office of National Estimates (ONE). This office had seven board members, including four historians and an economist drawn from the ranks of academe,* a combat commander, and a lawyer. One of the historians, Sherman Kent, succeeded Langer as Director of ONE in 1952 when Langer again returned to Harvard. At roughly the same time, the noted economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Max Millikan, was brought to Washington to organize the economic intelligence effort in the newly created Office of Research and Reports.

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* The four historians were Sherman Kent, Ludwell Montague, De Forrest Van Slyck, and Raymond Sontag; the economist was Calvin Hoover.

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Meanwhile, as the Agency expanded, its recruiters turned to established figures in the academic world for leads and referrals to the best among their students.* Many of the personnel already on board similarly informed their colleagues still on the university campuses of the need for and opportunities awaiting those who had the requisite background for work in the Agency.

As a large number of the members of OSS and the early recruits to CIA came from prestigious private schools in the Northeast and the Far West, with some representation from the large Midwestern universities, it is not surprising that a disproportiate number of the new recruits came from the same schools. Similarly, professors who had joined the Agency often turned to their former colleagues still on the campuses for consultation and assistance. This "old boy" system was quite productive in providing new employees in the professional ranks. Thus, there was an early linkage between the Agency and the Ivy League, or similar schools.

A Souring in the Sixties

Relations between academe and the CIA were cordial throughout the 1950s. During much of that period the Cold War was at its height and the nation's need for the Agency and its activities were seldom questioned by faculty or students. There was no criticism worthy of note following the Agency's alleged involvement in Iran in 1953 or Guatemala the following year. The 1960s were to be different.

There was some criticism on campuses over CIA involvement in the Bay of Pigs expedition in 1961 and the barrage of denunciation increased as the Agency, along with the rest of the government and the "establishment," found itself under intensified attack as the war in Vietnam continued. In part to mitigate this opposition, the Office of Personnel in 1962 established the Hundred Universities Program in which recruiters and senior officials of CIA made presentations before selected faculty members and placement officers in an effort to publicize CIA's role in national security and to emphasize the Agency's recurrent personnel needs.

Meanwhile, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, aware that the close ties that had bound Agency officials and analysts with their colleagues on the campuses were loosening, and concerned about developments in China (explosion of an atomic device in 1964 and the subsequent beginning of the Cultural Revolution), asked the Deputy Director for Intelligence in 1966 to take action to improve the Agency's expertise on China. The DDI created the office of Coordinator for Academic Relations (CAR), a part-time job for John Kerry King, a former professor at the University of Virginia who had been with the analytic part of the Agency for several years.

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* Beginning in 1951 and continuing for several years thereafter, the Agency tried, without much success, to establish a "University Associates Program"—a program of using professors at a selected list of 50 colleges and universities as consultant-contacts who would receive a nominal fee for spotting promising students, steering them into studies and activities of interest to the Agency, and eventually nominating them for recruitment.

The DDI specifically charged the CAR with, *inter alia*, responsibility for exploiting the capabilities of the various China studies centers in the universities, devising means for attracting China specialists to work for the Agency, and developing and managing relations with academic consultants on China.

One of the nation's best China centers was at Harvard. It was logical that the Agency would seek help from that institution. Subsequently, several DDI analysts were enrolled in the graduate program at the Harvard East Asian Research Center. Unfortunately, by 1967 the local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society was aware of the participation of these analysts and a campaign against their presence on campus was launched. Attempts by Professor John K. Fairbank, director of the Center, to explain the difference between operations officers and analysts at CIA fell on deaf ears.

King also set about organizing a number of "China seminars" in Boston, New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, in which a few noted China scholars engaged Agency experts in low-profile and informal discussions. King, during his four-year tenure as CAR, also initiated a program of passing unclassified reports prepared by the Agency to a select group of academicians in an attempt to gain comment on the reports and good will for the CIA.

Despite individual examples of continuing cooperation with the Agency, relations with academia as a whole continued to sour. The deterioration was given impetus in February 1967 by the disclosure in *Ramparts* magazine that the CIA had been funding the National Student Association for a number of years. Additional disclosures of Agency involvement with private voluntary organizations and foundations resulted in President Johnson's appointment of a three-person committee, chaired by Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, to review government activities that might "endanger the integrity and independence of the educational community."* Following its investigations, the Katzenbach Committee recommended that federal agencies halt covert financial relationships with "any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations." While the recommendation was never issued as an executive order or enacted as a statute, it was accepted by the President and led to major adjustments within the Agency.

Recruiters for the Agency, meanwhile, were experiencing increasing problems on college campuses. Many of the schools that had provided superior candidates in the past were now home for the most militant of students. Picketing of recruiters began in 1966, rapidly spread across the nation, and peaked in 1968 when 77 incidents or demonstrations occurred. Procedures were changed with interviews held off campus and, whenever it appeared that a visit might precipitate incidents, the visit was canceled. The Hundred Universities Program was suspended in 1968.

The Academic Coordinator, working on behalf of the analytic offices, continued to expand contacts with academicians wherever possible. By 1970, seminars on Soviet matters were added to those on China. By 1974, scholars on

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* The other two members were Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John Gardiner and DCI Richard Helms.

Cuba and most of the rest of the world had been added to the list of academicians with whom the CAR kept in touch. The CAR was promoting visits by academicians to CIA Headquarters to confer with those in the DDI having similar interests and he was assisting analysts and administrators in securing the participation of outside experts in Agency-sponsored conferences and seminars.[*]

Sensational allegations of wrong doing by CIA and other components of the intelligence community, which erupted in the media in the early 1970s, led to congressional demands for investigations and the creation in 1974 of select committees in the House, under Representative Pike, and in the Senate, under Senator Church. (Two other groups also were formed to investigate intelligence activities—a Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, known as the Murphy Commission, and a commission appointed by President Ford and led by the Vice President, the Rockefeller Commission.) The various investigating bodies focused much of their attention on CIA's covert action, most of which had little to do with the Agency's relations with academia. There was some discussion, particularly in the Church Committee final report, which tended to lump relations with schools along with Agency relations with the media and religious organizations.

The final report of the Church Committee (the Pike Committee report was never formally released) interpreted "academic community" far more broadly than had the Katzenbach Committee. In particular, the former focused more heavily on individuals whereas the latter had concentrated on institutions. The Church Committee found that hundreds of academicians in over 100 colleges, universities, and related institutions had a covert relationship with the Agency providing leads and "making introductions for intelligence purposes." Others engaged in intelligence collection abroad, assisted in the writing of books and other propaganda materials, or collaborated in research and analysis.

While the Church Committee recognized that the CIA "must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce," it recommended that that advice and judgment be openly sought. The committee concluded by placing the principal responsibility for altering the existing relationship between CIA and academe on the backs of the college administrators and other academic officials. "The Committee believes that it is the responsibility of . . . the American academic community to set the professional and ethical standards of its members. This report on the nature and extent of covert individual relationships with the CIA is intended to alert (the academic community) that there is a problem."

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[*] Harold Ford succeeded John Kerry King as CAR in 1970 and was followed in 1974 by Gary Foster. In late 1976, with the reorganization of the DDI as the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC), relations with academics were coordinated by two professional staff employees working full time. [redacted] were the original incumbents and were followed by James King and [redacted] In January 1981, the author became CAR as the post reverted to one-person status. In 1982, the CAR was transferred from the Office of the DDI to the Office of External Affairs under the DCI and in mid-1983 to the newly created Public Affairs Office.

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The report set off a flurry of activity within academic ranks and led to numerous articles in newspapers and periodicals. Among several letters addressed to DCI George Bush was one from William Van Alstyne, president of the American Association of University Professors, demanding that Bush give the same assurance against covert use of academics that he had earlier given to missionaries and journalists. The DCI replied that the Agency sought only "the voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States." Where relationships are confidential, noted Bush, they are usually so at the request of the scholars rather than of the Agency. He refused to isolate the Agency from the "good counsel of the best scholars in our country."

Bush's argument was to be adopted and enlarged upon by his successor, Stansfield Turner, who engaged in a long and eventually unsuccessful effort to reach agreement with Derek Bok, president of Harvard University, on relations between that university and the Agency. Bok, acting on the Church Committee suggestion, appointed a committee to prepare guidelines to assist members of the Harvard community in dealing with the CIA. The guidelines were accepted by Bok and published in May 1977. It was immediately apparent that some of Harvard's concerns (unwitting employment of academics and use of scholars in preparing propaganda materials) were no longer at issue due to changes in Agency policy and issuance of Executive Order 11905 by President Ford. There were still two issues on which no meeting of the minds was possible. One of these had to do with what the guidelines termed "operational use" of faculty and staff by the CIA. The other concerned covert Agency recruitment of foreign students for intelligence purposes. Additionally, the guidelines specified that all faculty and staff "should" report any and all relations with the Agency to their deans, who should report them in turn to President Bok.

Attempts by the DCI to point out that these were exceptional cases of academics who might be employed by the Agency on a strictly confidential mission abroad because of their unique access to foreign individuals or information failed to change Bok's mind as did Turner's contention that the confidentiality of a relationship with an academic was frequently at the professor's, rather than the Agency's, request. Finally, Turner pointed out that the CIA's responsibility to provide secret foreign intelligence left the Agency with no alternative to engaging in the activities which Bok deplored, but Bok was assured that "the rein" would remain tight in such cases.

Publicity regarding the dispute over the Harvard guidelines allowed Morton Halperin and John Marks of the Center for National Security Studies to launch a campaign to have other colleges and universities adopt similar or more stringent restrictions on intelligence activities on campuses. While some ten academic institutions took action toward adoption of similar guidelines, in most cases modifications were included which limited the impact of any restriction on Agency operations. For the great majority of schools where the issue arose, the faculty and the administration rejected any guidelines, usually on the ground that existing regulations and practices were adequate to protect both the institution and the individual from corruption.

Scope of Current Cooperation

Relations between the Agency and the academic world have slowly improved since 1977, more or less in inverse correlation to the state of East-West relations.[*] The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, in particular, opened new doors to cooperation with CIA on many campuses. The depressed state of the economy in recent years has also been cited as a catalyst for greater interest in Agency employment on the part of recent graduates as well as the cause of increased willingness to cooperate with CIA by those who sell their services as consultants or external research contractors.

A number of recognized authorities who could be of value to the Agency's research effort decline all attempts to gain their assistance. Most are political scientists, or in an allied social science, and many have expertise in the Third World. Many scholars on the developing nations of the world, aware that reports that they have collaborated with American intelligence could prejudice their research activities (including their sources), are reluctant even to come to Langley. Interestingly, some of these scholars are prepared to discuss substantive issues if an Agency analyst is willing to visit them in their homes or at their offices.

Specialists on the Soviet Union or other communist countries have traditionally been less reluctant to work with the intelligence community, presumably because they are believed to be in touch with the Agency anyway. Experts on Western Europe and other developed nations, in their willingness to cooperate with the Agency, fall somewhere between the general cooperativeness of the Sino-Soviet specialists and the reluctance of the Third World experts.

At present the Agency enjoys reasonably good relations with academe and gains much from its contacts with faculty and students. The Office of Training and Education uses a large number of academics in its courses. Other offices within the Directorate of Administration, specifically Logistics and Medical Services, have contracts with educational institutions or with individual academicians. This fall, 27 professors spent two and one-half days at Headquarters in the Conference on US Intelligence: the Organization and the Profession, conducted by the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

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The Foreign Resources Division has relationships with scores of individuals in US academic institutions. In all cases these links are voluntary and witting. Many of the individuals also are contacts of the DCD. These American scholars do not "recruit" foreign students or researchers for the Agency, but assist by providing background information and occasionally by brokering introductions.

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[*] Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University has written extensively on the CIA. He maintains that congressional attempts to restrict Agency activities are strongest and most likely to be implemented during periods of detente in East-West relations; conversely they are most unlikely to succeed in periods of increased tension. The charting of relations between the CIA and academe would appear likely to show a similar pattern of close ties during periods of heightened tension between the US and USSR and strained relations during periods of detente.

Many academicians are willing to provide expert assistance to Agency analysts and the research components. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] Additionally, scores of 25X1
other academicians were willing to consult on an ad hoc basis, some without reimbursement. Components within the National Intelligence Council and the Directorates of Intelligence and of Science and Technology sponsored nearly 50 conferences during 1982 at which specialists from colleges, universities, or "think tanks" were present.

The DDI, the DDS&T, and the NIC also sought help from the academic world through contracts for external research, with the results usually [redacted] 25X1

Since 1977, the Intelligence Directorate has also brought in [redacted] 25X1
scholars, usually on sabbatical, to the Agency as contract employees to assist analysts through an exchange of ideas, a review of written reports, and the production of finished intelligence for dissemination to policy makers. In exchange, these "Scholars-in-Residence" are, for one or two years, privy to information that would never be available to them on campus.

The Supreme Court decision in the Snepp case in early 1980 had some dampening effect on the willingness of professors to work with the Agency. Some of them feared that if they signed the requisite secrecy agreement, their future independence to publish would be severely restricted. Another potential Scholar-in-Residence declined to take the polygraph test, describing it as "demeaning."

The Agency also provides numerous services for the academic community. Since 1972, unclassified CIA reports have been available to the public and have been widely sought by colleges, universities, and individual scholars. The FBIS —Daily Reports have long been standard items on the shelves of many university libraries.

Requests for unclassified briefings of students or faculty members at CIA Headquarters or on campuses normally receive a positive response. During 1982, 31 groups containing over 1,100 individuals were given briefings on intelligence or on some substantive topic at Headquarters. In the same year, at least 60 Agency officials spoke at various schools throughout the nation.

Fourteen college presidents were brought to Langley in 1982 to meet the Director and other senior officials and to be briefed on Agency activities. This program, which has generated considerable good will and understanding for the Agency, was begun in 1977 and has involved a total of 58 presidents from large and small schools throughout the nation, all of the schools important to the Agency as sources for recruitment of staff employees or consultants, or for other operational requirements.

The Office of Personnel presently is active at approximately 300 schools. Several offices in the DDI and DDS&T also recruit directly from colleges and universities. Recently there has been a program, originating in the Directorate of Operations, sending special representatives onto campuses in an attempt to attract high-caliber career trainees.

The Graduate Studies Program, which began in 1967, provides summer internships for students who will be attending graduate school in the fall. Most of the 57 graduate students from 42 schools accepted in 1983 were attached to the Intelligence Directorate. A number of "alumni" of earlier Graduate Studies programs subsequently became staff employees.

For undergraduates, the Agency maintains a cooperative Student Trainee Program. The goal of this program today, as it was when it began in 1961, is to provide a long-range method of recruiting occupational skills which are in short supply. The program allows the student, who must be registered in a college with an established coop program, to gain practical work experience by alternating periods of study at school and work at the Agency. Originally, the program sought engineers exclusively but in recent years has added those who major in computer science, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and accounting.

The Office of Equal Employment Opportunity since 1969 has been recruiting at, and negotiating contracts with, minority schools. Faculty members and placement officers from traditionally black schools have been brought to Headquarters for briefing sessions.

Finally, the Agency has long sought to gain recognition for itself as a center for intellectual activity comparable to the best institutions in the academic world. The claim has often been made that CIA could staff a major university because of the diversity of disciplines represented among its employees. Graduate degrees earned by staff employees give some indication of the training acquired—over 600 Ph.Ds and more than 2,300 Masters' degrees.

To gain recognition for the Agency's employees among their counterparts in academe, overt employees have been encouraged to participate in meetings of academic and professional societies. Of the over 700 attendees in 1982, a significant number joined in panel discussions or presented unclassified research papers.

Work for the Future

The wide ranging program described above puts the Agency on generally good terms with the academic community. There is, however, considerable work for the future if CIA is to continue to count on securing the best possible recruits for its staff employees and the participation of faculty members in improving its analytic product. One of the problems, a long-term trend in academic institutions toward ever decreasing numbers of students in area studies programs, is currently being examined by a joint committee made up of representatives from the universities, business, and the federal government, including CIA.

There is also a continuing need to improve the Agency's image at many colleges and universities. While the number of demonstrations against CIA has drastically diminished over the past decade, there are still occasional minor incidents, as happened when CIA and NSA recruitment was protested at Middlebury College last winter.

Some recent Agency activities, including expanded recruitment efforts by substantive intelligence officers on the campuses, increased numbers of CIA participants at academic conventions and conferences, and a growing use of external research contracts with non-annuitants, are all valuable tools in breaking down barriers and increasing confidence betweeen the Agency and the academics.

One promising recent activity involves visits to selected college campuses by intelligence officers who are seeking to locate, or create, a body of faculty members favorably disposed toward the Agency. This is accomplished principally through conversations with faculty members and by briefings, when requested, to classes or to faculty groups. These friendly contacts in the ranks of academe can be of inestimable value. The goals are to have professors remind their best students that CIA is a potential employer, to correct erroneous accusations on campus against the Agency, and, perhaps, to identify other faculty members who might be willing to attend conferences or participate in substantive consultations at Langley.

There is some danger from an uncoordinated rapid expansion of recruitment trips by the many Agency components now engaged in the effort. Unless oversight of the campaign is centralized, it could result in several Agency representatives appearing on a campus in rapid succession or even concurrently. This "overexposure" could have negative repercussions; specifically, irritation on the part of Agency friends and consternation among others—both faculty and students. All recruitment visits to academic institutions should be cleared in advance at some point within the Agency—possibly within the Office of Personnel, possibly at the Academic Coordinator's office.

The opportunity exists, of course, for any overt employee attending an academic convention or symposium to assist in furthering good relations for the Agency. Understandably, many academicians are most impressed by the participation of Agency employees on panels. Beyond that, any Agency officer attending a professional meeting can gain good will for CIA by being friendly and, within the limitations of security, informative about the Agency. Most academicians are curious about CIA and grateful for any clarification of its mission and its activities.

The occasional vigorous criticism of the Agency from faculty members or students tends to focus on covert action. While some critics will not be satisfied by any argument, others can be reconciled to the need for covert action through a dispassionate explanation of its synergistic role with other more conventional means of conducting international relations and a reminder of the oversight function of the Congress.

From the author's own experience with a number of college groups briefed at Headquarters over the last few years, it is obvious that there is a vital need to correct misconceptions held by a large percentage of students and also by some faculty members. Illustrative of this point were the comments on a short written quiz given by an Agency briefing officer *prior* to her presentation before a student group. To the question, what is your reaction and that of your classmates on campus to the words "Central Intelligence Agency?" the recurring response was "fear."

Yet, when the briefings are over there are often voluntary expressions of support for the Agency, inquiries regarding careers, and, from the faculty, offers to meet with DCD or to serve as Agency consultants. If the students and their teachers are made aware of the truly symbiotic relationship between the academic and intelligence worlds, there is little question but that the great majority will support the continuing efforts of what Ray Cline terms this "peculiarly American combination of spies and scholars, working in tandem."

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Academic studies in international relations might usefully be supplemented by a course in intelligence processes.

FOR COLLEGE COURSES IN INTELLIGENCE

The transition in the U.S. national posture accomplished during the first half of this century, from a seeking of security in isolation to recognition that our national welfare depends upon active participation in international politics, had its corollary in the academic world. Many non-government organizations, foundations, universities, and colleges have played an important role in increasing the public knowledge and administrative skills prerequisite to effective U.S. action in the international arena. A wide variety of new courses and entire schools have been devoted to foreign affairs and international relations, and additional ones still continue to be established.

The new public interest in global matters has by and large, however, not been extended to intelligence and the principles and processes by which it is prepared. At the end of World War II there was, to be sure, the debate about Allied intelligence in the Bulge, the congressional inquiry into the Pearl Harbor surprise, and a good deal of general regret for the lack of pre-war interest in intelligence, to which General Eisenhower contributed with comments in *Crusade in Europe*. But this kind of soul-searching was confined largely to official circles. In the academic world, I believe, U.S. intelligence is treated only in its strictly military aspect, in specialized ROTC courses. There have been academic studies dramatizing business espionage[1] and some pedagogical treatment of research methods applicable in intelligence, but no college training in the subject as a coordinated whole.

There are good reasons why this has been so. Intelligence traditionally and for the most part necessarily does its work behind the scenes, and its influence on the national welfare seldom strikes the public eye. Nor does this country have be-

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[1] For example *Competitive Intelligence*, by students at the Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, reviewed in Intelligence Articles IV 2, p. A46.

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hind it the centuries of international leadership which developed the acknowledged British competence in intelligence and made the British public proud of it. Now that the United States has come to occupy the center of the international scene, the role of intelligence is well recognized among officials of the government; public interest and academic concern have yet to be awakened.

There are signs of a public awakening, however. Commentators showed concern over faltering intelligence on Chinese Communist participation in the Korean War, on the strength of the Ho Chi Minh forces in Indochina, and on the British-French-Israeli Suez venture. More recently a persistent and widespread discussion of intelligence processes has been set off by the Senate inquiry into the "missiles gap." Cartoonist Berryman's J. Q. Public, worried by the intelligence estimates controversy and saying, "I wish someone would explain it to *me*," seems to represent truly a deep interest and a legitimate requirement of the U.S. citizen. The U-2 incident and its repercussions at the summit are certain to give this interest a new impetus.

It is the thesis of this paper that the awakening public concern with intelligence offers our universities and colleges an opportunity and a challenge—the opportunity to take advantage of a rising interest and to meet a clear need, and the challenge to meet it effectively and thereby ultimately contribute to improving U.S. intelligence doctrine and competence.

It is suggested that a good beginning could be made by establishing a basic course of study in the meaning of intelligence, its significance as the foundation for policy planning and a guide for operations, how it plays those roles, and the principles and processes by which it is produced and formulated. Such a course should not be narrowed to the specialties of political or military intelligence, but develop broad principles applicable in all fields. It should highlight the concept of intelligence and intelligence processes as a critical factor in almost every form of human social endeavor—economic, scientific, and cultural, as well as military and political—being essentially a processing and use of facts and a making of judgments in a logical program for a specific purpose.

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The intelligence course would apply the teachings of many academic disciplines. Specialists in economics, politics, sociology, and logic, in written, oral, and visual presentation could among others be used in the instruction. The program should be framed and guided, however, by a competent teacher with extensive and well-rounded intelligence experience, not merely a few years in some particular intelligence field. The course would need to run through two semesters at three class hours per week, and should be offered to students at the graduate or at least immediately pregraduate level. Lectures should be minimized in favor of reading, discussion, conferences, and practical exercises. It would not be proposed in this basic course to cover the history of intelligence or to go deeply into special problems involved in the guiding of the intelligence effort by its users and its application in the conduct of operations. Some of these subjects could be incorporated into existing courses in international affairs, others would be left to separate advanced courses as the program developed.

The course in intelligence fundamentals, taken by the student at point of maturity, would have the broad educational advantage of employing and expanding his earlier learning and making it meaningful within a single coordinated, purposeful program. It would be of direct value to students contemplating government service, whether in intelligence or elsewhere, and of cogent interest to the intellectually inquisitive heading for careers in most fields of private enterprise. More importantly, perhaps, since our government is one responsive to the will of informed citizens, it would provide an indispensable ingredient to those studies of the policy-making and decision-reaching process which presently loom so centrally in university courses devoted to creating an informed citizenry in the fields of public administration, foreign affairs, and international relations.

All too generally such courses treat only the policies made and the mechanisms through which they are effected. The heart of effectiveness, however, in public administration or the conduct of international affairs is the making of sound decisions, and these must be based on what in broad sense we call intelligence. In present curricula the student seldom has the opportunity to learn what kinds of raw materials are needed or how they are collected and consolidated to give the unitary understanding essential in formulating sound plans and guiding their execution.

Even a prospective business executive should learn not only the principles of economics, commercial and industrial organization, corporate finance, and the other usual subjects, but also what kinds of facts he needs to know in applying these principles and how such facts can be collected, evaluated, and consolidated for use in planning. Study of the intelligence process can bring home to him the need to take into consideration kinds of factors of which he might otherwise not be aware. For the student in foreign relations the study of the production and use of intelligence is of more immediate application, bringing out the importance of factors such as cultural differences, economics, and religion, which present college courses rarely treat in a meaningful way. In short, such study should round out a student's understanding of his chosen field, no matter whether it lies in sociology, politics, or business, and help him to become the kind of citizen demanded by the role this country must now play on the stormy international scene.

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[1] Doubleday, 195

The following article is the summary of a detailed study prepared for the Center for the Study of Intelligence of the Office of Training on the recurrent topic of the intelligence dilemmas arising from security requirements within the framework of a free society. We hope this statement of the problem will stimulate further thoughts on the subject.

The Editor

SECRECY AND INTELLIGENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY

James E. Knott

In discussing what I believe to be the major areas of concern that our free society has evinced regarding secrecy and intelligence, I hope to make it clear that I feel there are no final answers. They are not problems that can be solved; they are focal points that will demand continuing attention in pursuit of a balance which must be worked out between the opposing factors.

The central problem which demands attention does not stem from the question whether secrecy, intelligence, or even clandestine operations are compatible with a free society. The central problem is the structure through which that free society oversees its processes of secrecy determination, intelligence production, and the conduct of clandestine operations.

This may appear to be a mechanistic conclusion, but I make it because I am convinced that our free society is in basic agreement as to the kinds of things on which secrecy is justified. I am also convinced that—if the society knew more about the subject—there would be a consensus on the criteria which should be applied to deciding whether or not a foreign clandestine operation was an appropriate activity for a free society. And, in complement to such agreement, there is the fact that the virtue and blessing of a free society is that there is a constant and continuing process which defines and refines the values the society expects to be applied by its institutions. These values themselves do not change radically—but neither are they absolute. They adjust to the efforts the society is called upon to undertake, and they adjust in particular in accordance with the threats the society feels it faces. In other words, the free society will relinquish some of its freedom if that is necessary, but it will wish to see readjustment take place once such relinquishment is no longer necessary.

The inherent feature of secrecy is the limitation of access to the secrets. The free society as a whole cannot make the judgment as to whether or not individual matters are legitimately kept secret. It must place its trust in an oversight body or bodies to act in its behalf. The smaller the number of people it decides it needs to establish such a condition of trust, the better it will be for the secrecy system.

The free society must have confidence that its oversight mechanisms have adequate access to secret material to make judgments, and that this judgmental process is being exercised independently. There has to be trust that secrecy is not being used against the best interests of the free society; that the activities which are being protected by secrecy are being conducted effectively; and that necessary

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readjustment of these activities takes place in conformance with changed domestic and international circumstances. It is this confidence and this trust in the oversight mechanisms which has broken down

In exploring the means by which confidence and trust can be restored, the free society must bear in mind the fact that its consensus does change. The lessons of the past must not be ignored, but it would be an error to judge what was formerly done—or what might be done in the future—by a consensus of the current moment deprived of historical perspective. It would also be mistaken to concentrate too much on preventing the abuse of secrecy without also recognizing that there are legitimate secrets. The free society owes it to those it holds responsible for producing secret information and conducting secret activities to maintain an oversight process which protects legitimate secrecy.

What then are some of the suggestions for improvement which should be considered? I have grouped them under five headings:

Redefinition of Government Secrecy

"National security" alone is an inadequate base for a government secrecy classification system. Some suggest expanding this to "national defense or foreign policy." Executive Order 11652 uses "national defense or foreign relations" and then combines the two into "national security." However, as I have noted, the Freedom of Information Act not only excludes from its procedures those national defense or foreign policy secrets which have been "properly classified," but also excludes eight other areas, such as trade secrets and certain investigatory records. Such matters are not part of the classification system, but one suspects that a good many of them get mixed up in the classification system of those agencies dealing with national defense and foreign relations secrets.

If it could be granted that there is overall confusion about governmental secrecy in our free society, wouldn't it be better to have a comprehensive system? Or would formalizing what already exists in practice only compound the already overwhelming problems of dealing with government paper? Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, discussing this only in the foreign policy field, comes down in favor of major surgery on the classification system and relying "on the good sense of bureaucrats to keep confidential what should be confidential most of the time, without employing bloated concepts of national security to do so."* Perhaps so, but I believe the opposite course of inclusiveness is worth exploration.

In any case, whether the lesser secrets are dropped out of the currently overblown "national security"-based classification system into a system of government-wide applicability, or whether they are dropped to the level of reliance "on the good sense of bureaucrats," there can be no doubt of the need for drastic reduction in what has formerly been placed in the national security category. What is needed is much greater clarity as to what this category should *really* contain. Better guidelines would help immensely in the judgmental factor which will always be involved. At the same time, the numbers of persons entitled to make such judgments must continue to be reduced. Some such clarifications and further reductions, it seems to me, will be the inevitable results of current attempts to cope with the major changes brought about by the Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order 11652.

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*Katzenbach, "Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Secrecy," *Foreign Affairs* (Oct., 1973) p. 17.

Another area that needs clarification has to do with abuse of the classification system. On the one side, it has been much too easy to overclassify. A Subcommittee headed by Congressman William S. Moorhead conducted a study in 1971 that found there had been 2,433 investigations by government agencies of classification system violations over a four-year period. Of these, only 2 involved cases of overclassification and "not a single administrative penalty was imposed against overclassification."* On the other hand, great concern has been expressed about dangerous leakage in the system—"unauthorized disclosure." No one would deny that there are legitimate secrets which deserve greater protection. Clearly the current Espionage Act is inadequate for this purpose. One doubts, however, that it will be improved upon until secrecy has been reduced to the level the national consensus will feel is justified and our free society becomes more convinced than it is at present that there are adequate intra-executive means of airing and reconciling legitimate dissent.

Congressional Oversight

It is, of course, up to the Congress as to how it organizes its oversight role. The current system has come under a great deal of attack, notably from members of Congress itself. At least some modification, and possibly even major change, in the four-subcommittee system appears to be in the offing. Whatever means of rebuilding trust and confidence are found, there is one primary fact of life about secrets which must be faced: those who have been made responsible for secrets they feel are important cannot be expected to continue a system which endangers the secrets. There must be trust and confidence on both sides of a secrecy-sharing process. In a free society, the official who feels secrecy has been and will be violated cannot have and should not have the option of evasion of legislative oversight. His only option is to point out the consequences of poor security and the fact that the activity must cease if the secrecy necessary to its continuance cannot be preserved. And, does anyone deny that the publicity-attracting nature of clandestine operations creates special problems in establishing mutual trust and confidence?

Another matter to be considered with regard to oversight are the interests of the men concerned. The primary role of the intelligence community will undoubtedly remain one dealing with military security matters. However, other fields have been increasingly added, notably international economics, narcotics intelligence, and international terrorism. Further, there is a special need to view the intelligence community as a whole, and the members of that community relate to quite a variety of authorization committees. There needs to be a means of promoting greater Congressional cohesion between these differing jurisdictions.

Other than including people who have the trust of their Congressional colleagues, whose composition unifies the field of intelligence yet reflects its diversified content, who can follow methods preserving secrecy, there is the key question of how much detail the oversight body needs. British intelligence authority John Bruce Lockhart's central thesis on this question is: "the operations of Secret Services must remain secret, but the principles by which Secret Services can best be directed and controlled should be considered carefully, discussed, and understood by those at government level who are responsible for controlling Secret Services."** Not having a

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*Rep. W. S. Moorhead, "Operation and Reform of the Classification System in the U.S.," in Frank and Weisband, ed., *Secrecy and Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1974) p. 101.

**John Bruce Lockhart "The Relationship between Secret Services and Government in a Modern State." *RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies*, (June 1974) p. 3

parliamentary system, we in the United States need to have such consideration, discussion, and understanding shared by the executive and legislative bodies. It is extremely important to note that what Lockhart urges be left out of the discussion are the details of the "*operations of Secret Services*." The application of such a concept to CIA is not as radical as it might appear, inasmuch as only a portion of what CIA does is made up of the "Secret Service" kind of operation—and much that is supposed to pass as clandestine, really isn't.

Perhaps such exclusion of clandestine operations from examination may not be found satisfactory, however. Sometimes detail is needed for making evaluations. Sometimes knowledge of specifics is needed to be able to ask the right general questions. Does examination of detail need to be seen as an ongoing process, or might it be seen as temporary—until confidence was restored? Would examination of detail need to be across the board, or could the need be met by periodic or spot checks? Could detail be restricted to one type of operation, and the others left alone?

Lastly, when an examination or follow-up probe involves very sensitive material, does the full committee (or committees) need to be a part of such an examination? Couldn't one or two members, possibly on a rotating basis, be assigned to the task? Or, preferably, could such a question be transferred to some such body as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which would then have the responsibility of standing behind a reassurance of the oversight group. Or, could such inquiry be undertaken by a very small number of particularly trusted and reliable Congressional staffers? And what open record is at all possible on such matters to help reassure the free society and improve acceptance of appropriate joint responsibility? Could, for instance, some sort of quarterly listing of general topics covered by oversight proceedings be made public?

Executive Oversight

Executive oversight is not as critical a matter at the moment as legislative oversight, but it too merits attention. The primary concern of our free society at this time does not seem to be whether or not the Executive knows what CIA does, but whether the Executive will be able to abuse the secret capabilities represented by CIA. The meeting of the problem of legislative oversight and the functioning of a much more open Presidency should result in overcoming this fear.

This does not mean that there should be a return to the secrecy which used to surround the clearance procedures for CIA activity. The channels for executive approval of CIA activities should be uniform and not competitive or duplicatory, so that no future charges of CIA selecting the most favorable channel can be made. The channels should be publicly known, and so should the people in them. Again, it should be as much a matter of principles rather than details on operations whenever possible, but obviously when details are required in order to make risk/gain assessments, they must be readily provided. Clearly, such details will be required very often. Full knowledge can sometimes provide a better base for cooperation on the preservation of secrets than a partial knowledge leading to shared speculation between those partly "in the know." How often an operational activity needs to be reviewed, and the number of people who need to give their approval, can depend on the type of operation involved.

The "grey" area between CIA's domestically-based but foreign-related activities and those of the FBI must be reduced to an absolute minimum. There must be clearly understood procedures for an accountable ruling in case of any doubt. Domestic activities must be governed by the standards and institutional arrangements of the domestic scene, and it must be clear to the free society that this is the case. There must be a very minimum of overlap between the decision-making process for domestic activity and the decision-making process for foreign activity. The two must be judged by different standards.

Lastly, there is the problem of efficiency and effectiveness. There is a great deal more of the administrative side of the intelligence organizations which could be open to Congressional scrutiny. However, the major responsibility obviously rests with the executive branch, which must continually improve its management practices. More rigorous, not less rigorous, review by the Office of Management and Budget is needed. Continued progress must be made on the community-wide framework of requirements against which evaluations can be made. The techniques of evaluating programs must also be improved. There must be evaluation in depth on a selective basis—a requirement, a source, a station, etc.

Reduction of Agency Secrecy

Without the shadow of a doubt, a sort of Gresham's Law operates with regard to respect for security systems. If an employee is asked to treat worthless material with the respect due only to worthwhile secrets, the bad practices will drive the good practices out of circulation. Similarly, if a free society is asked to respect a security system and then finds that the system has protected "bad" or worthless secrets, it may well result in damage to the system's ability to protect "good" secrets. From both the standpoint of the employee's observance of the security structures and the free society's respect for maintaining security systems, there can be only one conclusion: the matters which need to be kept secret must be reduced to a minimum.

For a conclusion so obviously correct for a free society, it is hard to see why there should be any disagreement or serious problems. But it is vastly easier to state such a conclusion than it is to implement it. It seems to me that the problems of implementing it for the Agency stem from three main sources. The first of these is an insufficient differentiation between the security needs of the varied personnel of CIA. To draw again on the wisdom in this field which John Bruce Lockhart has set forth:

> Those in control of Secret Services must have a realistic and disenchanted understanding of "security." This is not as simple as it sounds, because possibly more follies have been committed in the name of security than in any other governmental activity in a modern state. These broad principles must continually be borne in mind if this area of folly is to be reduced.
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> In secret operations there are only two degrees of security. One is the suit of armour, where the man's identity or objective remains a total secret. The other is the fig leaf, where a facade of respectability is imposed on functions or individuals whose real purpose is widely known and accepted. Security trouble arises when it is believed by those who control them that there are degrees of security in secret operations between the suit of armour and the fig leaf.*

Those who are *really* operating in secret need the "suit of armor" and need every help in keeping it impervious. Those who are operating under "fig leaf" conditions should not be treated the same way as those within armor. It should also be fairly unlikely that the "fig leaf" operator would revert to or become a truly clandestine operator. A great many of the Clandestine Service personnel now have the trappings which are the due of the "suit of armor" operators but they are in fact engaged in "fig leaf" operations. The easily identified large-scale operations of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia come most easily to mind. However, this is also true of many of the liaison arrangements with foreign intelligence services. It may also involve such new missions as anti-narcotics and anti-terrorism activities conducted in cooperation with local authorities.

**Ibid.*, p. 5

Such "fig leaf" operations may well be fulfilling agreed and necessary functions; they may well require some clandestine skills; and in some cases they may well be dangerous. But they do not require the high degree of protection of identity, skills and movements necessary for the truly clandestine operator. Add to this need to differentiate between operators requiring "suit of armor" protection and operators who need only fig leaves, the further differentiation between operators and the rest of the CIA personnel. Do people who are only handling secrets even need a fig leaf?

This area of difficulty can be compounded by the "one Agency" concept—the idea of interchangeability of Agency careers. In my personal opinion, this is a mistake in so far as it presumes a movement from the analytical side into the Clandestine Service. It has been done, but how often? And how many of those who did make such a transfer actually become clandestine operators?

Possibly the greatest source of difficulty on this differentiation problem could be the extent to which there may be an effort to hide the operators within the larger group of Agency employees. According to Roger Hilsman: "the original idea of CIA had been to conceal the cloak and dagger activities behind the much larger mass of 'overt' intelligence work—research and estimating, monitoring foreign propaganda broadcasts, and so on."* I do not personally know if this was indeed the intent. To the extent that it may be, such "cover" should be questioned as to its usefulness. At best it far more resembles a fig leaf than it does a suit of armor. And society would really not need to blush if this particular fig leaf were dropped.

In sum, the "one Agency" concept deserves a very hard look in terms of its consequences for personnel security practices. And the degree to which the personnel security practices of the Clandestine Service are based upon "suit of armor" assumptions also needs close examination. Are the justified needs of truly clandestine operations being endangered by being too widely applied? Shouldn't the truly clandestine be set apart as urged by another of Lockhart's principles: that the "operational front of secret operations should be as narrow as possible?"**

The second main source of problems in reducing security practices to a minimum are what must be regarded as national bureaucratic tendencies inherent in any organization, but particularly large ones. Bringing about some uniformity in judgmental matters is extraordinarily difficult and in practice the "lowest common denominator" is subject to continual decline—particularly if there is no penalty for "playing it safe." Such penalties should be set up *and used*. There is no final answer, of course, but some clearer criteria need to be set up and there must be an improvement in systems of review—an excellent function to assign to deputy chiefs.

Another major factor to be attacked are practices stemming from tradition and precedent. Such practices do not necessarily represent accumulated wisdom.

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*Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, (Doubleday, New York, 1967) p. 79

**Lockhart, *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

Sometimes they do, but they can also represent outmoded ways of doing things which historical circumstances may have once justified—circumstances which subsequently departed the scene. There are, for instance, "worst case" regulations. These were set up when a "worst case" did occur or when someone had the imagination to think that it might. Such "worst case" regulations need to be examined to see what the probability really is of such an event occurring. All too often such regulations stay on the books, are not enforced by the authorities, but are available as a basis for supervisory thunder "just in case." This is dishonest administration, natural as it may be. Another group of practices undoubtedly stem from a "weakest-link" concept. At some particular point a given security practice may well have been set up or reinforced to prevent it from being the "weak-link" in a chain of security practices. Its chain may no longer exist, or other parts of the chain may have become of a much weaker gauge. It is absolutely right to view security practices in a systems approach flow context. But differentiated flow channels are possible and can be treated differently so that what would be a "weak link" in one wouldn't necessarily be so in another.

Besides being looked at in a systems approach chain method, security practices should be examined as a layered concept. Is the secret at the core still a secret? Are the various layers of protection ("derivative" secrets) still needed or can some of them be relaxed or dispensed with? How many practices may have come from the requirements of some other body as part of the process of establishing the mutual trust needed for the exchange of secrets? Are these still needed?

A third main source of problems is the necessity of not disclosing too many clues as to your intelligence successes—or lack thereof. This is what is involved in the reluctance to disclose too much information about Agency organization or budgeting. It is held that such information could show trends which ought to be concealed. One suspects that some such trends would be fully evident from open policy documents, i.e., increased concentration on the Mid-East, decreased attention to Indochina, increased interest in economic information, etc. Further, even in the open parts of our system, it is often very difficult to track expenditures from budget year to budget year. Without denying that some trends merit concealment, one can't help wondering in how much of the agency this may be a problem, and at what level of budgetary listing it becomes a problem. Much information is justifiably withheld because it meets the statutory protection provided in the 1949 Act for intelligence sources and methods. But isn't there a good deal of such *organizational information* which would not endanger sources and methods?

Turning from organizational information, what about making more of the intelligence end-product available to Congress and the public? If this can be done without endangering sources and methods, or endangering what I regard as legitimate executive leadership rights and administrative responsibilities, I feel much more such information in an appropriately usable form should be made available. Such sharing is indeed on the increase. The more that it is possible to do this with central intelligence, the less possible parochial manipulation through partial release of information becomes. It has been suggested that the Congress should be able to levy its own estimate requirements on CIA, and this is an idea worth exploring.

Procedures for promoting change

The discipline of the marketplace brings change. Much of what CIA does cannot be out in the marketplace. Being responsive to a need to change and adjust poses very special problems for a closed organization. There is a need not only for CIA to be much more closely attuned to the consensus of our free society, but also for a reinforcement of its processes of eliminating the mediocre and the outdated.

CIA has had procedures to promote change, but I believe it is fair to say that they did not work well enough. Undoubtedly a part of the reason for resistance to change stems from a humanitarian concern about men whose services might no longer be required. Another part might stem from a cautious reaction to preventing an over-use of the Agency such as had marked certain periods in the past—an over-use which can produce failures not balanced in the public mind with successes. It might have derived from a realization that it would be much more difficult to operate in a multi-polar world where the choices were less clear and where the cement of common assumptions characterizing the Cold War period would be lacking. It may well be prudent in some cases to keep standby capabilities until you are more certain that you won't need them. However, much necessary change didn't take place simply because it didn't have to.

Beyond the need to reinforce external procedures of promoting change, there is a need to examine CIA's internal methods serving this purpose. Where did recommended change take place and where did it fail to take place? What was the record as regards Inspector General surveys? Where was lip service paid to their recommendations but little actually ended up being changed? There were processes of feedback and some attempts at evaluation. What happened to these? What is the record on Management Advisory Groups? What was the upshot of training programs designed to help challenge assumptions and promote rethinking? There should be a considerable body of material available for analysis on what must be one of the key problems of secrecy and intelligence in a free society.

To conclude: free society needs intelligence. It needs secrecy. But there has been a loss of proportion, a loss of confidence and trust, and a lack of understanding on all sides. These must be overcome because the free society needs to make wise use of the capabilities at its command—and I include covert capabilities in this. It is high time that a mending took place.

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NOTES ON QUALIFICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH AS OPPOSED TO ACADEMIC STUDY

Government organizations for research in foreign political, cultural, social and economic fields depend heavily on research training programs in the academic world as sources of bright new recruits. The meaning of research as a function is clear to both sides, but research in government agencies has in some details of practice moved away from the pattern of action familiar to academic research groups. With this thought in mind, I venture to set down a few pointers to the special qualifications which we in Washington are finding desirable in candidates for jobs with us.

Let me dispose of one point at once. We want young recruits who are well trained in research, who know their subjects, and who know how to evaluate fresh information and apply it to the growing pattern of knowledge which they possess. We want them, furthermore, familiar with as many approaches and disciplines as possible. Above all, we want recruits who are used to looking beyond the "What happened?" to the question "Why did it happen?" We fortunately know that on all these matters the academic programs, especially area programs, are in agreement with us and have precisely these objectives in their training. These are, however, not all the qualities for which we look.

Let me sum up our needs by saying that our recruits must be capable of presentations that are clear, brief, bold and prompt; that their jobs will require them to be cooperative, patient and often anonymous. Behind these simple words lurk serious considerations.

Government researchers work, of course, for operating officials who make decisions on action. It would be useless to pretend that these officials are themselves all stylists; in some, however, the nature and urgency of their work have produced a direct, concise form of writing; in all, whether or not they write gobbledygook of their own, is a firm determination not to master the gobbledygook of another tradition. Unfortunately, we have seen no evidence that education, and especially higher education, has modified its indifference to style and form. It appears that too great emphasis is still put on assim-

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Evans was Director of State/INR

ilation of learning, too little on exercises of active presentation. Facts may speak for themselves, but all too easily they may speak to an empty hall—and the effectiveness of a report in helping officials varies directly with its clarity.

In the modern world, government officials are inordinately busy; they simply cannot contemplate large accumulations of detail. This imposes a singular responsibility upon the supporting researcher. He must not only accumulate information but also condense it—and this not by compressing his accumulation, by reducing a picture to a miniature, but by selection and distillation. In short, he must often act not as an amanuensis but as an authority, whose statement of conclusions will be guaranteed, not by a mass of footnoted detail, but by his reputation for well founded judgments. The responsibility is flattering but awful. One of the great services any training program can do is to insist upon practice in the art of briefly distilling out ideas and conclusions from massive compendia—and, indeed, there is no better device for revealing any flaws or hollowness in externally impressive monuments.

The third quality flows from these two. Any writer will realize that to expose his essential ideas baldly in brief compass requires confidence. Yet the researcher is always contributing towards decisions, and decisions require the stripping down of qualifying factors to essential issues. Decisions further require departing from the footnoted past into a future which cannot be documented but which must be analyzed under the head of possible consequences. We benefit by any curriculum which includes exercise in general ideas beyond the scope of footnotes, and speculation beyond the confine of the documented present.

Lastly, these clear, brief, and forceful presentations have to be accomplished under pressure. Even worse than writing a paper that no one will read is to write one that reaches an officer after he has made his decision—yet the succession of crises is nowadays so close that deadlines come upon the very heels of requests. Promptitude is, we know, part of every course of training. Another aspect of the problem is, however, perhaps less open to action by a training program. Decisions can often not be postponed, and although little knowledge may be dangerous, surely none is worse yet. The researcher may, despite all proper planning and foresight, be called upon for

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judgment founded on information that is insufficient but the best *available*, and again he may need boldness if he is to be prompt in fulfilling his advisory responsibility.

Besides these peculiar arts of presentation, certain more general qualities will make the recruit happier and more effective. He is likely to find himself in an organization where few research jobs are performed by a single individual. It is not for us to tell up-to-date academic research authorities that modern problems require a fusion both of disciplines and of regional views; the authorities may not, however, realize the extent to which our agencies are organized to effect fusions of this sort under pressure. Through often feverish processes of consultation, submission of fragmentary drafts, and joint composition, our analysts are collaborators to a degree seldom required in private research, and must possess well developed abilities to cooperate.

By the same token, our analysts in their written production remain largely anonymous. It is impossible to sort out credit for the joint compositions that issue from our shops, though through consultations with other officials and through committee work any analyst can very soon gain sound personal recognition. Even in this respect, however, he must sometimes remain behind the scenes. Higher officials, in attending their own committees, cannot trail clouds of witnesses along with them. The analyst must often be content with briefing some superior to present his ideas, and obtain his satisfaction from any effect, even though indirect, that his thought has had upon policy. Some experts have found this procedure strange, and recruits may well be prepared for it in advance.

Finally, we in our research agencies must be patient. It is generally known that frustration is a besetting evil of government work. The machine is very large, very complicated, very ponderous, and often very slow. It is strange, however, that annoyance at the delays should be so common amongst academic folk whose private work is so often performed *sub specie aeternitatis*—yet we find researchers who get miffed because their first written words are not at once whisked into a public proclamation. The wheels are large; it takes a great spate of words to move one of them a tiny inch; but every inch it moves makes history. This is the reward our business offers to patience.

NATIONAL INTEREST, MORALITY, AND INTELLIGENCE [*]

John P. Langan, S.J.

In the second book of Plato's *Republic*, Glaucon challenges Socrates to expound the nature of justice and to establish its superiority to injustice. In setting this challenge, he does two things: he reports the view of justice held by the sophists, the Greek intellectuals and rhetoricians; and he tells the story of Gyges' ring. The sophistic view of justice is put in simple terms.

> By nature, they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than the excess of good in doing wrong, so that when men do wrong and are wronged by one another and taste of both, those who lack the power to avoid the one and take the other determine that it is for their profit to make a compact with one another neither to commit nor to suffer injustice, and that this is the beginning of legislation and of covenants between men, and that they name the commandment of the law the lawful and the just, and that this is the genesis and essential nature of justice—a compromise between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent to get one's revenge. Justice, they tell us, being midway between the two, is accepted and approved, not as a real good, but as a thing honored in the lack of vigor to do injustice, since anyone who had the power to do it and was in reality "a man" would never make a compact with anybody neither to wrong nor to be wronged, for he would be mad.[1]

In this sophistic view, which in some ways anticipates Hobbes's speculations about the state of nature, it is asserted that people will not merely do what is to their advantage but that they will even prefer unjust activity. Because of external pressure they will, in fact, come to accept justice only as a necessary second-best, not as a moral virtue or value in itself. This view presupposes an egoistic conception of human motivation, and it severs the links between human nature (which is seen as grasping and self-centered) and virtue. It presents justice as the result of coercion and convention, something not intrinsically valuable or worth pursuing for itself. It lacks, however, the radical individualism of Hobbes's famous thought-experiment, in which all the various bonds of cooperation and organization are dissolved. Instead, as the accompanying story of Gyges' ring makes plain, it imagines individuals who are free to work their will on an existing society which is powerless to control them.

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[*] This article is adapted from a talk Father Langan gave in May 1983 at the Conference on Ethics and the Profession of Intelligence conducted by the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

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Gyges would have made a useful, though baffling, addition to the intelligence community. But he started out humbly enough as a shepherd, pasturing his flock in the mountains. When an earthquake occurred, he descended into the ground and found there a gold ring on the body of a dead man. This ring had the remarkable property of rendering its wearer invisible. After Gyges had checked this out carefully, he arranged to be sent back to court to report on the flocks' progress. Being a fast worker and ambitious, "on coming there he seduced the king's wife and with her aid set upon the king and slew him, and possessed his kingdom." Glaucon then draws out the philosophical point of this tale:

> If now there should be two such rings, and the just man should put on one and the unjust the other, no one could be found, it would seem, of such adamantine temper as to persevere in justice and endure to refrain his hands from the possessions of others and not touch them, though he might with impunity take what he wished even from the market place, and enter into houses and lie with whom he pleased, and slay and loose from bonds whomsoever he would, and in all things conduct himself among mankind as the equal of a god. And in so acting he would do no differently from the other man, but both would pursue the same course. And yet this is a great proof, one might argue, that no one is just of his own will but only from constraint in the belief that justice is not his personal good, inasmuch as every man, when he supposes himself to have the power to do wrong, does wrong. For that there is far more profit for him personally in injustice than in justice is what every man believes, and believes truly. . . .[2]

This text could perhaps be given a place of honor in security offices, and it does build on certain suspicions that we have about people, ourselves sometimes included. The story of Gyges also offers comfort to the cynical and to the vicious; for it assures them that there is no ultimate difference between the just and the unjust: given suitable pressures or opportunities, everyone gives in and does what is wrong. In fact, the just may even be looked down upon because they are more malleable, more influenced by social pressures, less persistent and clear-eyed in pursuing their own interest. Many centuries later, Nietzsche was to take up this line of reflection in arguing for the values of supermen who would not be restrained by conventional moral values designed to protect the herd. But such cynical views were not held by Plato or by his teacher Socrates. For the challenge put to Socrates by Adeimantus, the other interlocutor in the dialogue, is to "prove to us in argument the superiority of justice to injustice" and "show what it is that each inherently does to its possessor—whether he does or does not escape the eyes of gods and men—whereby the one is good and the other evil."[3] There have been different ways of interpreting this challenge; but the basic division is between those who have attempted to argue that acting justly will work out to one's interest or advantage (on the lines of Benjamin Franklin's maxim, "Honesty is the best policy") and those who have held that such a claim is demonstrably untrue and debases morality, by making it an instrument to satisfy selfish desires and that the position of Socrates and Plato must have been that justice is an intrinsically better or more valuable thing. There are, I think, grounds in Plato's text for both lines of interpretation.[4]

Prosperity of the Wicked

But we are not dealing here with a problem merely of Platonic exegesis, but rather with one of the central themes of moral and religious reflection in the West. Thus the first psalm assures us that the just man who walks not in the counsel of the wicked "in all that he does, he prospers," whereas "the way of the wicked will perish." (Psalm 1.1-6). But the author of the seventy-third psalm confesses that "I was envious of the arrogant, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked; for they have no pangs; their bodies are sound and sleek. They are not in trouble as other men are; they are not stricken like other men." (Psalm 73.3-5). Whether in contemplating the sufferings of Job or the exile of Israel, the oppression of the poor or the destruction of martyrs, Biblical faith, both Jewish and Christian, has had to struggle with the double problem of the prosperity of the wicked and the suffering of the innocent as well as with a God who promises a land of milk and honey but first leads his people through the desert. To put the problem in the more homely theological language of Charlie Brown, "If we're so sincere, why do we lose so many ball games?"

Religious believers have generally proved more willing than secular individualists to accept either communal or long-range resolutions of the conflict between the demands of morality and the pursuit of the individual's happiness or interest. It was Kant who at the end of the eighteenth century insisted on the necessity of recognizing the fundamental difference between a way of life aiming at happiness or satisfaction (Epicureanism) and a way of life aiming at moral virtue (Stoicism). He held that we should regard the basic concepts of these two ways of life as distinct in their meaning and as giving shape to two quite different projects.[5] But Kant also went back to a view that had been standard in the mainstream of Christian theology, when he postulated that God "the cause of the whole of nature" contains "the ground of the exact coincidence of happiness with morality."[6] This postulation arises precisely from our recognition that in the present order of things virtue is not rewarded by happiness, that happiness is not found only among the virtuous, and that this state of affairs is unsatisfactory. The present order of the world is a "vale of tears," in which the righteous are often not vindicated. Moral philosophy in this century, which has been at best agnostic on religious matters, has generally moved away from Kant's postulation that God eventually makes the virtuous happy. It has adopted either the Epicurean and utilitarian pursuit of general satisfaction ("the greatest happiness of the greatest number") with its willingness to modify moral principles if these have negative consequences for group happiness or the Stoic rejection of non-moral reasons and rewards for being moral and the commitment to moral value for its own intrinsic worth without regard to the consequences.

Much of the philosophical and theological debate over reasons for being moral and about why justice is better for us than injustice has centered on the destiny and hope of individuals rather than on entire societies. The Hebrew

Bible clearly deals with the problem as it affects the fortunes of Israel. But the problem seems to be even more intractable on the national level than it is on the individual level. There is the famous contrast drawn in Reinhold Niebuhr's early work, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* or as he later proposed to put it, "The Not So Moral Man in His Less Moral Communities."[7] National survival and success do not seem to be correlated with the moral worth of the culture involved or with the moral character of the policies that states pursue, whether we are thinking about the Assyrians or the Russians. We do not expect nations to be deterred by moral considerations from the pursuit of what they take to be their national interest. We even suspect hypocrisy if this seems to be the case. Our realistic mentors have taught us to question whether the categories of morality are really applicable to the behavior and policies of nation-states. In interpreting the actions of nations, we are inclined to move back to Glaucon's suspicion that nations regard justice as a lesser evil to be tolerated rather than as a goal to be pursued and that in the absence of countervailing power they would act very badly indeed.

Now it must be admitted that considerable evidence always exists for this view. Nation-states do act badly—we need think only of the Soviet Union, Libya, Iran, Argentina, in the very recent past. We also have abundant theological warrants in Augustine, in Luther, in Calvin, in Jonathan Edwards, in Dostoyevsky for thinking very badly of what human beings will do to each other without a rigorous social discipline being imposed on them. We know our own hearts well enough to understand our proneness to temptation and our need of external restraints and community support. We know that we are not completely unlike Gyges, once we are not taken away from the common limits that we share with other human beings. And this, of course, is the crucial point. It is not really possible to draw a line between innocent and uncorrupted individuals and a realm of dark and evil social forces. Just as we experience ourselves as moral beings capable of failure and evil but also capable of repentance and renewal, so also we have to acknowledge potentialities for good and evil in our various societies and communities. This conviction, it should be said, goes against one of the dominant tendencies in middle-class radicalism, which combines a profound distrust of organized social power with a comforting sense of its own virtue and enlightenment.

Moral Value of Governments

The political communities to which we belong are themselves of moral significance and weight. In the present order of things, they carry with them the hopes of their peoples and most of the resources that individuals need for their survival and for their continued functioning as persons possessing human dignity. This is a point that holds true for most of the governments of the world, whether they are morally sound regimes or not. But governments that are substantially just, that derive their powers from the consent of the governed, and that do not engage in serious and persistent violations of the rights of their people, have a greater moral value. This is not to say that such a government's behavior or its policy is always morally right. Our own experience should convince us that this is not so. But it does imply that the maintenance of such a government is itself a morally valuable end, though not one of absolute and overriding importance. Such a government constitutes a political agent which can rightly be concerned about its own survival and about its possession of the natural, political, military, financial, and intellectual resources necessary for its own survival and for the continued well-being of its citizens. Its exercise of authority over its citizens is constrained by legal and moral limits; and its responsibility for their protection is itself morally weighty. A government's concern for these matters is not merely a matter of national or institutional selfishness or self-aggrandizement, though it can easily degenerate into that.

The point here is not to establish that everything undertaken for the sake of the national interest and national security is morally justifiable or appropriate, but that there is a morally valuable and important aspect to the pursuit of the national interest. This results both from the existence of an ordered polity of any sort and from the further achievement of a substantially just political community. It may well be, as Reinhold Niebuhr argued, that a free political community is not capable of the altruism, self-renunciation, and moral conversion which occasionally can be found in individuals. Or it may be that these notions have to be applied to nations in a very extended way. Converting a nation may be something like trying to turn a supertanker around; it takes miles and miles. But here I am less concerned with political units as moral actors than with their well-being and survival as morally worthy concerns.

The other side of this matter is that, however much we may hope that the path of national interest and the path of morality may converge, we must not make on the national level the mistakes which Kant so vehemently deplored on the individual level, the mistakes of identifying happiness and virtue, interest and morality. In an open and non-totalitarian form of government such as ours, in which there is no official monopoly of ideology or of opinion on moral and political questions, there is a publicly acknowledged possibility both that the government may act immorally and that it may act against the national interest. Both these weighty normative concepts are only imperfectly grasped and haltingly implemented by even the wisest and boldest of our leaders. There is no infallibility or incorrigibility in the practical life of any nation, including our own. Furthermore, in the great public documents of our political and legal culture, there has been a steadfast affirmation of a common morality in terms of which the actions of all governments, including our own, can be judged. There may be considerable disagreement about the theoretical and religious foundations of this common morality as well as on applications and interpretations of particular elements within it. But it is an essential part of this common morality that we must show a "decent respect" not merely for the opinions of mankind, but also for their rights; that we share a common condition of vulnerability, need, and dignity with distant friends and foes and with those who would prefer to be simply distant, that we are all subject to the same fundamental moral norms. In this view there is a moral order with regard to which the various political systems of the world have a basically instrumental and subordinate role and which can serve us as a basis for criticizing and assessing these political systems. Whether we conceive this moral order in terms of a higher law, whether this be natural or revealed, or in terms of orders of creation, or as a system of natural and human rights, or as a universal common good, we affirm a set of universal moral norms which exceed in their scope and applicability the particular set of values that constitute the interest of any one nation.

Especially in the period since 1945, the United States has espoused values which are universal in scope and which are not logically restricted to advantages for this country and its citizens alone. When we label ourselves "the party of freedom," when we bring pressures to bear on other governments to observe human rights norms, when we undertake to defend embattled democracies, we renew a commitment to moral values which reach beyond older conceptions of the national interest. This appeal to universal moral values has been made partly to counter the comprehensive ideological system of our adversaries and partly to legitimate the exercise of American power. But it also comes out of deep convictions in the American people about the exemplary value of our own experiment in democracy and about the universal appeal and binding force of certain values which have shaped our own society. This moral and ideological element in our approach to the world has been a source of some distress to many political realists, but it has been a constant presence in American administrations over the last fifty years, and it is common ground to both Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan.[8] Just as there is a moral element connected with the survival and well-being of any political community, there is a further moral element connected with the moral purposes of American foreign policy. This element is subject to debate and revision in a way in which the continued survival of a political community is simply not a matter for debate within that community. We can give more or less prominence to explicitly labeled moral elements in US foreign policy. We can expand our concept of national interest to include these moral concerns, or we can adhere to a more classically pure conception of national interest of the type that would have been intelligible in European chanceries of the last century. There are arguments for and against a broader conception of national interest, but I personally do not think that we as a people can rest content with the narrow conception.

In either case, however, we should recognize that there are elements whose place in the national interest is subject to decision or revision. On the basis of experience, of changed expectations, and of altered conditions both internal and external, nations can and do redefine their national interest. This is often a difficult and even painful process, as we can see from looking at the experience of our British allies; but it is always possible and is often necessary. This process has parallels in the way we manage our personal lives and define our personal interests, as for instance when we decide that the love or the job of our dreams is simply unattainable. This task of redefining interest on the national level is often difficult to get hold of since nations can be both reticent and confused about precisely what constitutes national interest and what means are necessary to satisfying it. In addition, reality factors of various sorts gradually and intermittently force us to redraw the shifting line between our druthers, our preferences, our hopes and dreams on the one hand and what we regard as the hard core of our interests on the other. When the discipline and the pressure exerted by these reality factors grow weak, the line between preferences and interests blurs. When this happens, imperial ambitions and overextensions of power are likely to result. In the case of Gyges, this line, like the man himself, becomes invisible. Let me observe in passing that uncertainty and division about what constitutes our national interest and just how military and political means are to be directed to preserve the core of that interest are a central difficulty in working out sustainable policy in Central America.

Framework for Policy Decisions

It should be clear that determining the national interest is a political process that does not achieve a finished, permanently valid result. It is a corrigible and fallible process, not totally arbitrary, but with considerable room for freedom and discretion. Within our system it is in a crucial way the responsibility of the administration currently in office to determine and to articulate a conception of the national interest which is capable of generating a working public consensus and of providing a coherent framework for policy decisions. The executive is in an authoritative position to determine national interest in the concrete; but it is characteristic of our political system that its authority to do this is never beyond challenge. To make this point is not to say that all challenges are well thought out or appropriate or justifiable, only that they are never in principle illegitimate.

A final general point about the interplay of national interest and morality. If something like my line of argument is correct, then conceptions of national interest which construe it as an amoral term or as a manifestation of collective egoism are fundamentally mistaken. I also want to argue something like this on the individual level as well. Interest always retains certain moral elements, even when it is directed to immoral or unjust ends. It should not be construed on the pattern of lust as Shakespeare characterized it in one of his sonnets—"had, having, and in quest to have, extreme"—[8] or on the lines of Hobbes's insatiable desire, always craving new means "to assure forever, the way of his future desire." [9] Interest is fundamentally a category for adult calculation, not a rationale for the acting out of childish fantasies. In this respect the ring of Gyges is a misleading model for thinking about interest. Interest is not simply desire, but desire rationalized and organized into a plan of life or direction for social activity. The coherent pursuit of interest is not really possible without at least some of the moral virtues, particularly temperance and fortitude.[10]

The picture which I have been sketching of the relationship between national interest and morality implies that there is a significant and expandable overlap between the two. It is neither appropriate nor culturally acceptable for us as Americans to develop an amoral conception of national interest as the basis of our public policy. But this view does not in any way exclude the possibility of serious conflict between morality and national interest. The two notions remain logically distinct. National interest concerns the well-being and security of US citizens and their social institutions, whereas morality deals with principles and rules protecting the well-being and the rights of all human beings. Promoting the universal human interest and observing the rules that protect it may require some sacrifice or revision of the national interest. Conflicts can be softened somewhat by stressing long-range rather than short-range aspects of the national interest so that short-term sacrifices or restrictions are accepted for the sake of long-range gains. They can also be alleviated by adopting a conception of morality as closely linked to universal human interest, where the interest of the part is seen as a constitutive element in the interest of the whole.

But the possibility of conflict remains real, and we can all think of many areas in which actions aimed at promoting the national interest might well conflict with the demands of morality. We also have to recognize that the possibilities for conflict in this area extend beyond the legitimate range of national interest. For it can happen that particular claims are advanced as being appropriate to or even demanded by the national interest which more careful or more disinterested reflection reveals not really to be in the long-range national interest. Thus proposals can be advanced under the rubric of national interest by corporations, by ethnic and religious groups, by unions, by allies, by pressure groups of various sorts; these can be challenged either on moral grounds or by arguing that they are not really compatible with the national interest. But I believe that any universalist ethic, whether it be religious or secular, Protestant or Catholic, Jewish or Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist, utilitarian or Kantian, has to affirm the possibility of significant conflict between national interest and moral norms. Individuals and communities committed to such moral views have to resist efforts to identify the national interest and the cause of virtue. White hats can and do fall off.

Having made these observations on the concepts of national interest and morality as very general notions, now turn to look at the ways in which they are affected by the adversarial world situation within which intelligence work is carried on. From one standpoint, morality is a matter of setting limits on what human beings may do to each other.[11] We are not to lie, cheat, steal. In an adversarial situation, there are normally both inner motives and external pressures urging us to violate these norms. The test of moral character is commonly thought to consist in our adherence to these moral norms precisely despite the temptations created by the adversarial situation, and by our own desires. Let us reflect at least briefly on the most violent of organized adversarial relations, namely war. It is clear that in war morally earnest people attempt to do things to each other which they would regard as unacceptable and depraved in any other context (with the exception of personal self-defense). It is also true that the organized violence of war has often brought with it a more general breakdown of moral behavior manifest in episodes of pillage, rape, etc. But it has been a common basic element in Western philosophical and theological reflections on the problem of war in the tradition of just war theory and in the practical development within the military of what Michael Walzer describes as "the war convention,"[12] that the use of violence and the effort to harm are to be limited even in this most starkly threatening of adversarial situations. This gives us a rough model from which to construct an understanding of the place of moral limits in the more complex and problematic adversarial situation in which a great deal of intelligence work has to be done.

In the first place, it prepares us to admit and to expect a certain amount of conduct which is not normally acceptable in the ordinary contexts of life. Here I have in mind primarily the use of deception in order to preserve secrecy. One of the unresolved difficulties in my mind with regard to this analogical extension of just war theory is that the context of war within which violence can justifiably be used is more clearly bounded than is the context of intelligence work within which deception may be justified. In the second place, deception and other departures from the norms of common morality would then have both the need and the possibility of justification. When these practices are justified on grounds of national interest or national security, this, if my account of the notion of national security is correct, involves an appeal to considerations about human well-being and social institutions which have moral standing. Third, it is crucially important that such departures from the norms of common morality be limited, and that they not be generalized into the establishment of an amoral and antimoral counterculture within the intelligence community. The decisive point is that departures from specific moral norms, when justified by morally weighty reasons, do not constitute the abandonment of the moral way of life or of the moral point of view. Fourth, the adversarial relation is not conceived in the intelligence context or in the war context as a situation in which every loss for the adversary is ipso facto a gain for our side. Not every harm inflicted on the enemy advances our cause. Even in war, there is a common interest in preventing the degeneration of hostilities into butchery and barbarism. The acknowledgment of a common interest is present in President Reagan's interesting proposal that we might eventually share defensive military technology with the Soviet Union. Some elements of this common interest are permanent and unalterable since they arise from our common humanity and our sharing a single planetary habitat. The general human interest in avoiding a nuclear holocaust which would destroy our societies and which might render much of the earth uninhabitable belongs here. Others are fleeting and depend on temporary political conditions. Thus both an American president and a general secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union may need an arms control agreement at a given moment in order to manage their respective political coalitions. Others fall somewhere in between depending on political and economic analyses and policies which we can readily imagine changing, but which rest on relatively stable factors in the situation, for instance, the judgments in Washington and Moscow that a default on foreign loans by Poland is not in the interest of either power.

Burdens on a Democratic System

Many have observed that the management of a permanent adversarial relationship puts heavy political and psychological burdens on a democratic political system. I would argue that these burdens are manifest on both sides of current debates about defense expenditures, nuclear weapons, and arms control, and the ways in which the US can and should resist Soviet projects in various parts of the world. Here my concern is mainly with the way in which these psychological, political, and economic burdens may give rise to desires to break the bounds of the adversarial relationship. They can do this in one of two ways. First, by encouraging us to take the justice of our cause and the moral significance of the values we want to defend as the warrant for an ideological crusade. Morality then ceases to serve as a check on the kinds of things that we are prepared to do in the name of the good cause and the national interest, and a zero-sum conception of the struggle leads us to damage the enemy in any way possible. Second, by leading us to yearn for a new pattern of relationships in an unrealistic and possibly dangerous way, which would jeopardize morally significant aspects of our national interest. This is not to deny that unilateral initiatives of various sorts aimed at improving the climate of the relationship may not have important beneficial effects, nor is is to deny the value of exploring imaginative routes out of current impasses. But it does draw a line against those who regard national interest as a purely amoral category and who would then dismiss it in favor of their own moral aspirations.

The morally appropriate manner of conducting the adversary relationship while both struggling to protect and to enlarge areas of common interest and showing regard for the rights and interests of other parties is clearly a topic that needs much fuller reflection by moral philosophers and theologians as well as by practitioners and theorists of national policy. This requires doing a contextual applied ethics, which takes seriously the tangled history and the often confused and impenetrable perceptions and expectations which constitute this adversarial relationship. It might even make moral theorists think a bit more like intelligence officers.

In the meantime, how can intelligence officers think a bit more like moral theorists about the dilemmas and complexities of their daily decisions? Here I will simply put before you a very general set of reflections which may have a useful orienting function. It seems to me that we can expect intelligence officers to be aware in their decisions of considerations that bear on morality, on national interest, on agency interest, and on personal interest. An intelligence officer works within a structure of command and authority which is given policy direction by the President and within which information is compartmented. Moral decisions have to be undertaken with imperfect knowledge of situations, of alternatives, and consequences. On the other hand, agency officers by virtue of their training and ability are presumably better equipped than most people to draw sound inferences and to reach prudent judgments about significant issues, at least within their area of expertise. Furthermore, it is precisely their professional task and responsibility to provide relevant and accurate information to policy makers. This is, however, a task to be accomplished collectively through the agency rather than individually.

Now I would offer as a definition of the standard situation in an intelligence officer's work the presence of a harmony among the four types of considerations that I have mentioned. When morality, national interest, agency interest, and personal interest all point in the same direction, the intelligence officer is able to confront the intrinsic and unavoidably difficulties of his or her task of gathering and analyzing information. The requirements that are inherent in an individual officer's carrying out this task in our American social context, which aims at respecting and promoting individual freedom and responsibility within effective and well-organized institutions, can then be met without conflicts of interests and motive. This sunny situation, of course, does not always prevail; different considerations often point in different directions and people begin to find themselves divided, anxious, and uncertain. What principles can be offered to guide decisions, both personal and institutional, that involve conflicts among these different considerations?

1) Individuals in the public service within intelligence agencies are expected to have a concept of their interest which includes morally significant elements. They are expected to be prepared to take significant, even catastrophic, losses affecting the non-moral elements of their personal interest. Restraining personal interest as a motivating force and as a possible source of distorted judgment is a fundamental moral obligation for intelligence officers. It can be fulfilled on the day-to-day level of harmonious integration with others in performing the various tasks of the agency or in more heroic forms when the performance of duty involves the possibility of great dangers and sacrifices as illustrated by the recent bombing in Beirut. Collapse of this restraint can be extremely damaging for the agency and for the national interest, as the Wilson case illustrates. Control of personal interest can and should be sustained by appropriate training, supervision, and evaluation within the agency; but in a primary and fundamental sense it remains a matter of self-control, with all the variability and uncertainty that that implies. Correlative to this requirement of moral integrity on the part of agency officers is the responsibility of providing support and protection for them and their dependents which the agency undertakes and which is so important in sustaining morale and effectiveness.

2) Agency interest should be conceived as both a criterion and an instrument. How well people contribute to the working of the agency and to the accomplishment of its tasks, both of which are essential aspects of agency interest, provides a criterion for assessing both personnel and projects. But the well-being of a government agency is not so much a good to be valued in itself as it is an instrumental or contributory factor for the well-being of the persons it serves and for the pursuit of the national interest. Continuing awareness of this secondary and instrumental role should serve as a check on tendencies to bureaucratic aggrandizement and political infighting. Here we find a cluster of problems where the requirements of professional judgment and of moral responsibility converge, especially for senior officials. The waste of resources, the jeopardizing of the agency's reliability and reputation as a result of politicization or as a result of breaches of security, and adversarial relationships with other agencies or groups within the government are damaging to long-term agency interest and have a significant moral component to them. Agency leadership also has an important integrating function in relating the moral

beliefs, perceptions of national interest, and personal interests of agency officers to the themes and objectives of national policy and national interest as articulated by the executive.

3) While it is abstractly desirable that personal interest, agency interest, national interest, and morality all point in the same direction and that conflicts among them should be kept to a minimum and while it is also true that, as this paper has been arguing at some length, they are interwoven in complex ways, we have to maintain a realistic expectation of intermittent and occasionally severe conflicts. The root of conflict lies in the distinctions of these four types of consideration or four elements in the practical thinking of agency officers. Denial of the possibility of conflict is a form of self-deception and will be profoundly corrupting over time. The function of moral criticism and of creative leadership is not to deny the possibility of conflicts, but to find ways for people to work out these conflicts in a responsible, non-disruptive way which does not exacerbate the conflicts.

4) At this late point in the paper, I will not attempt to square the circle and show how to effect an easy reconciliation of morality and national interest. But let me conclude with one final suggestion, which is that we have to distinguish between the justification of departures from standard moral norms on grounds of national interest, departures which, if limited and carefully justified, can be reconciled with most contemporary ways of understanding morality,[13] and those situations where a particular conception of the national interest is invoked in support of policies which bring serious suffering or even death to large numbers of innocent people. Situations of the second type are especially likely to produce dilemmas for intelligence officers, dilemmas in which the demands of morality and the requirements of national interest are felt to be in painful conflict. Resolving specific dilemmas is not within the scope of this paper. But I would maintain that in a democratic society such as ours the most important, difficult, and morally significant choices about national interest and security are not made within the intelligence community but in the public political process which this community has been fashioned to serve. This brings us back to the gray and difficult world of political judgment and political choice, and reminds us of the enormous difficulty of achieving a world order structured according to principles which will promote the interests and safeguard the rights of all, that is to say, a moral world order.

NOTES

1. Plato, *Republic*, II, 358E-359B, tr. Paul Shorly in Plato, *Collected Dialogues*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Bollingen, 1961), pp. 606-607.
2. *Ibid.*, 360A-D.
3. *Ibid.*, 367D-E.
4. An important and influential exposition of the second line of interpretation of Plato can be found in H.R. Prichard, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?", *Mind* 21 (1912), reprinted in his *Moral Obligation*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
5. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, tr. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), pp. 115-117.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
7. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Man's Nature and His Communities* (New York: Scribner's, 1965), pp. 22.
8. An interesting discussion of some of the uncertainties that arise from national declarations of policy that have explicit moral objectives can be found in Peter L. Berger, "Democracy for Everyone?" *Commentary* 76 (1983), pp. 31-36.
9. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch 11, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1968), p. 161.
10. See Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," in *Theories of Ethics*, ed. Philippa Foot (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 96-100.
11. See H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 189-195.
12. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
13. For a treatment of this issue, see my article, "Moral Damage and the Justification of Intelligence Collection from Human Sources," *Studies in Intelligence*, (Summer 1981, Vol. 25, No. 2), pp. 57-64.

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Soviet economic slowdown and CIA make headlines.

CIA MEETS THE PRESS

Rush V. Greenslade

Long before the growth race between the US and the USSR became news, a Soviet propaganda theme, and a presidential campaign issue, CIA had organized a large-scale research effort on the economy of the USSR. This effort was started about 1950 in the Office of Research and Reports, the predecessor of the Office of Economic Research. The research developed in the CIA as a result of the unavailability of reliable information from open sources. Prior to the death of Stalin, officially released Soviet economic statistics were fragmentary, ambiguous, and unusable for analysis or policy support. Academic research on Soviet economic growth was under way but, hampered by the lack of open data, it was many years from fruition.

CIA studied production in various sectors in great detail and constructed independent measures for agricultural production, industrial production, and gross national product (GNP). The effort was a great deal larger than private groups could undertake and it benefitted by access to classified information unobtainable outside. The results were much timelier than academic efforts even after the USSR began releasing voluminous statistics in 1956. Soviet aggregative statistics, even though more prompt and more numerous than before, still suffered from biases and a non-comparability with statistics of Western countries.

Economic intelligence research acquired new importance in the mid-1950's when Khrushchev challenged the US to a growth race. This peaceful competition was to take the place of the cold war and would establish the superiority of one of the two economic systems—capitalism or socialism. During the late 1950's and early 1960's, Khrushchev inaugurated a succession of campaigns for catching up with US economic performance. The Soviets were "catching up with the US" in meat and milk production, in steel production, and in industrial production. These several campaigns were accompanied by a barrage of statistics purporting to show progress in various fields, faster growth on the part of USSR than the US, and a closing of the gap between the USSR and the US.

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Through 1960 Soviet economic growth was impressive while that of the US was a little sluggish. Aided by the grain production from the "new lands," Soviet statistical performance compared favorably with that of the US, and the achievements of Soviet science in space made the statistics appear even more impressive and plausible. CIA estimates showed the growth rate of Soviet GNP to be about twice that of the US. For industrial growth the ratio was even more unfavorable to the US: in 1956-1960, 8½ percent in the USSR against 2½ percent in the US. The most thorough and respected academic estimate, that of Professor Abram Bergson of Harvard, was very close to CIA estimates for the 1950's. Bergson calculated the average annual rate of growth of GNP from 1950 to 1958 was 6.8 percent. CIA's estimate was 6.5 percent.

Soviet Slowdown in the 1960's

By the end of 1962 the rapid growth of the USSR relative to that of the US was widely known. CIA estimates had been publicized by the Director of Central Intelligence (Allen W. Dulles) in open testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in November 1959. This testimony was reported in the press and was printed in its entirety in a Congressional document. Mr. Dulles made another public speech in December 1959 before the National Association of Manufacturers repeating the same message. This also was widely reported in the press. However, for the following two years, 1961 and 1962, CIA estimates indicated a slowdown in growth. These estimates had not yet been made public. Suddenly, in August of 1963, the Soviet government began negotiating with Canada for a massive purchase of wheat. It soon became known that the USSR had suffered a severe drought and crop failure and did not have sufficient grain reserves to feed its population. The USSR contracted with Canada and the US for the surprising total of 11 million tons of wheat for delivery in 1963 and 1964 to be paid for by sales of gold.

At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence (John A. McCone), ORR prepared an assessment of the Soviet economy. This was incorporated into a briefing given by the DCI to President Johnson and the National Security Council in December 1963. The highlights of the economic portion of the briefing were:

1. Growth of Soviet GNP in 1963 would be about 1½ percent.
2. Growth in 1962 had already slowed, so the average of the two years was only 2½ percent, drastically lower than the previous rates of 5 and 6 percent.

3. Agriculture accounted for a large part of the slowdown in both 1962 and 1963 but not all of it. Industrial growth had also slowed noticeably since 1958.

4. In trying to raise meat production, Khrushchev had prodigally used up his surplus grain production of the preceding years, 1958-1961, and had much smaller grain reserves than CIA had previously estimated.

5. The slowdown in industry was in large part the result of competition of defense for scarce investment and R&D resources.

6. Gold production and stocks were significantly lower than current public estimates.

7. The Soviet campaign to obtain long term credits from Western Europe for the purchase of advanced Western equipment was a natural consequence of its dwindling gold stocks.

The President was very interested in this assessment of the Soviet economy and suggested that it be made available to the public. How this was to be done was apparently left up to the Director.

The Press Conference

The objectives in releasing the story were fairly straightforward. After years of hearing that the USSR was rapidly and inexorably catching up with the US, the American public would surely be glad to hear that this was no longer true, at least temporarily. Secondly, the reported developments supported the US policy of discouraging the extension of long-term credits to the USSR. Thirdly, the report could be declassified without affecting its substance. In addition to releasing the story, however, the Agency decided to permit reference to itself as the source. This was uncommon but not unprecedented. In *The New York Times* of 23 June 1960, page 36, an article by Harry Schwartz had reported on some estimates prepared by CIA for a Congressional committee. The headline had read: "CIA Forecasts Soviet Output Will Grow 80 percent in Next Decade." The object of allowing attribution to the Agency in 1964 was simply to get the story on page one, if possible, rather than on page forty-one.

In short, the Agency had a good story to tell and wanted to be sure it was heard.

The main points in the Director's briefing appeared on 29 December 1963 in an article by Charles Bartlett on an inside page in the Washington *Star*. This article featured the limited Soviet gold stock and production, and the need for import credits. This was the first time the CIA gold estimates had been made public. In the body of the article the CIA was named as the source of the information in the article. On 5 January 1964 a similar article appeared in *The New York Herald Tribune* by Tom Lambert, datelined Washington. He attributed his information to "intelligence analysts here."

These two articles caused no particular stir. However, on 8 January 1964 an article by Edwin L. Dale, Jr. appeared on the front page of *The New York Times* under the headline, "Sharp Slowdown in Soviet Growth Reported by CIA." The article reported the CIA analysis at length and also discussed CIA's responsibility for research on the Soviet economy. Dale had received no special favor or dispensation and his article said nothing essential that was not in the previous articles. But somehow it caused a furore. Front page, *The New York Times*, with attribution! The Washington press corps raised an immediate clamor for equal briefing.

In response to this demand the Agency scheduled its first press conference for the following day, at CIA headquarters. Twenty reporters attended. The conference was conducted by the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Ray Cline. A press release, entitled "Soviet Economic Problems Multiply," was passed out. But by this time Soviet economic problems were no longer news. The first question asked by a reporter was, "Why? Why this public apparition, this naked materialization of CIA?"

The DDI replied: "Well, we thought we had a good story, so . . . ."

Twenty eager faces radiated frank and open disbelief.

The press conference made headlines all around the world. However, the message of Soviet economic slowdown was subordinated to speculation about CIA's motives in seeking the publicity. The most frequently cited motives were (1) a supposed CIA-State Department conflict over European long-term credits for the USSR—CIA opposing, the State Department approving; and (2) an alleged attempt to rebuild CIA's public reputation after the Bay of Pigs episode. The CIA-State Department rivalry hypothesis was illustrated by the famous Herblock cartoon in *The Washington Post* which showed a black cloaked figure offering to peddle some "hot statistics" to a foreign service officer on the steps of the State Department building.

The Reaction

The CIA analysis and estimates met with a mixed reaction in the US press, among the academic specialists on the Soviet economy,

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and in foreign countries. In the US many commentators accepted the CIA position, but a substantial number reserved judgment pending further information, and a small number openly disagreed. On 9 January, the day after the first *Times* article by Dale, Harry Schwartz, who was the *Times'* Soviet economic expert, published the results of a telephone survey of academic experts. All five who were canvassed were surprised by the CIA's conclusions about rates of growth. One said, "It is impossible." Another said, "Fantastic." On the other hand, Professor Abram Bergson, whose own calculations of Soviet GNP growth up to 1958 were the most widely accepted of all estimates, said, "I am a little surprised but I can't rule it out." It was hard, as Schwartz pointed out, to understand how Soviet growth could plunge from 6 or 7 percent a year to 2½ percent. The explanation was primarily the decline in agricultural production for two successive years, a development not yet known to the academic specialists.[1]

The British press was generally doubtful of the accuracy of the estimates of growth and of gold stocks. In particular, the London *Economist* thought that the proper estimate of the growth rate should be around 5 percent instead of 2½ percent. However, most British commentators agreed that Soviet growth had slowed noticeably. The British press unanimously interpreted the CIA action as an attempt to support the US policy of opposing the granting of long-term credits to the USSR, something the British Board of Trade was eager to do. The British, unlike some of the American press, knew that this was also US administration and State Department policy and not just CIA's policy.

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[1] Schwartz's later analysis of the American reaction is interesting. The following quote is from his book, *The Soviet Economy Since Stalin*, Lippincott, 1965, pp. 33-34.

> "The depth of this concern [with the rapid Soviet growth relative to that of the US] became strikingly clear in early 1964. The CIA—from which Mr. Dulles had retired—made public its calculations for 1962 and 1963, which showed that Soviet economic growth had slowed down dramatically, to less than 2.5 percent annually. It added that the gap separating American and Soviet production levels was once again widening so that Moscow's prospects for victory in the economic competition during the foreseeable future had dimmed substantially. A naive observer might have thought that a wave of joy would have swept the United States at this good news. The reality was the reverse, however, and numerous American voices were quickly raised to criticize the CIA and its new estimates. Having finally been convinced that there was such a thing as a Soviet economic threat, many Americans seemed reluctant to believe that even temporarily Moscow had received a setback and Washington was doing comparatively well."

The CIA press release took the Russians very much by surprise, appearing as it did even before the official Soviet announcement on the economic results for 1963. When these appeared later in January, the usual percentage increase in national income was absent. All that was given was a figure of 5 percent growth in gross social product. Gross social product is a heavily double-counted statistic summing the outputs of all sectors of the economy without netting out the intermediate sales from one producing sector to another.

In several letters to US newspapers, Soviet writers denounced CIA on a variety of grounds but could find no answer to the 2½ percent GNP growth rate except to cite the announced 5 percent growth in gross social product. When the statistical handbook, *Narodnoye Khoziaistvo, SSSR v godu 1963*, was finally released in early 1965—several months late—it showed the growth of national income (Soviet definition) to be 3½ percent for 1963, and a 4.2 percent average for the two years, 1962 and 1963, compared to an average of 7½ percent for 1959-1961. National income (Soviet definition) excludes most services, which grow slowly, and hence systematically increases faster than national income or product by Western definition. In the light of that bias the Soviet announcement came closer to supporting the CIA estimates than the Soviet economists' (or the London *Economist's*) estimate of 5 percent.

The reaction of Eastern European countries was the most interesting of all. As reported in a *New York Herald Tribune* dispatch of 10 February 1964, satellite officials accepted the CIA estimates and were using them to oppose Soviet policies, such as economic integration through CEMA, and to support their own hopes for increased policy independence.

The Final Outcome

In January and February 1964, the Director and his deputy for intelligence visited the major capitals of Western Europe, briefing the NATO governments on the Soviet economic and military positions. A representative of ORR accompanied them to brief economic specialists in the governments on the methodology and data underlying the economic estimates. All except the British Board of Trade were persuaded that the CIA estimates were generally valid.

The validity of CIA's analysis became generally acknowledged in the US press after the official Soviet report on economic performance

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in the first half of 1964. Harry Schwartz of *The New York Times,* a former skeptic, wrote a *Times* story in July 1964 with the following headlines: "Soviet Economy Seen Stumbling—Growth in Industrial Output During First Half of 1964 Falls Short of Hopes—Bright Spots are Few."

The US academic community was brought around by the appearance of carefully explained calculations of Soviet GNP by Dr. Stanley Cohn, of Research Analysis Corporation. Although his estimated growth rates were not identical with those of CIA, they were reasonably close, and his methods and procedures were essentially the same as the Agency's. Cohn's analyses appeared in successive volumes of studies on the Soviet economy published by the Joint Economic Committee. The latest revision of Cohn's estimates shows 4.5 percent growth in 1962 and 2.7 percent in 1963 for an average of 3.6 percent.

The CIA gold estimate, which rested on highly classified data, was accepted and published by the US Bureau of Mines in 1964. In due time it was also accepted by the Joint Intelligence Board in London and by the banking community in London.

An Endorsement from Siberia

The most unexpected support for CIA's economic estimates came from a prominent young Soviet economist, Dr. Abel Gezevish Aganbegyan, who is the head of the Laboratory of Economic-Mathematical Methods in Novosibirsk, and a corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He was one of a large number of economists who were urging radical economic reform on the Soviet leadership prior to 1965. In December 1964, he delivered a private lecture in Moscow, reportedly to the Central Committee, and again in June 1965 to the staff of a publishing house in Moscow. Notes taken by someone present at the latter lecture leaked to the press in England and Italy, and also were acquired by the American Embassy in Moscow. These notes may not be accurate in every particular, but their general authenticity has been substantiated.

Aganbegyan, according to the notes, vigorously criticized the operation and management of the Soviet economy. In addition, he criticized the statistics produced by the Central Statistical Administration and objected to the policy of secrecy regarding economic information. He alleged that Soviet economists are often forced to rely on American sources. He cited the report by the American CIA on the decline in Soviet economic growth. This report, he said, was accurate and the Central Statistical Agency had been unable to refute it.

The notes were disavowed by the Soviet press and by Aganbegyan. However, he is not the only Soviet economist to have expressed grave doubts of the State's economic statistics, either privately or in print.

Epilogue

CIA's first press conference was also its last. The Director was earnestly advised to get CIA out of the news and keep it out.

Two years later, in October 1965, after the poor Russian harvest of 1965, the CIA again prepared a press release on Soviet growth, repeating estimates for preceding years and estimating growth of GNP in 1965 at 3 percent. This time the State Department issued the release. It was described as "prepared by the Department of State in consultation with other interested agencies." The report of this release did not make the front page of *The New York Times*.

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