

Page Denied

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9 August 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DCI Administrative Staff

SUBJECT: Payment for Charges Incurred by the
DDCI for Representational Purposes

Payment from U.S. Government funds for representational expenses incurred by the DDCI for the purpose of conducting official business of the United States Government is authorized under the policy set forth in [redacted] (Official Reception and Representational Expenses) for the following functions:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Organizational Affiliation</u>
88.06.14	Robert M. Gates (host) [redacted] Leo Cherne	DDCI D/OGI/DI PFIAB
88.06.15	Robert M. Gates (host) Eli Jacobs	DDCI New York banker
88.06.22	Robert M. Gates (host) [redacted] Ronald Spiers Robert Lamb	DDCI D/SEO Department of State Department of State

[redacted]
O/DDCI

2

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE <i>8/11/88</i>
TO:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: <i>RG - FYI</i> <i>DE-file</i> <i>DHc Chrop</i>		
FROM: <i>ER</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

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15 August 1988

TO: Jim McCullough, A/DDI
Helene Boatner, D/LDA/DDI
Bill Baker, D/PAO
[redacted] DD/PAO
Academic Coordinator
OD/ICS
Bill Donnelly, IG

STAT

I have been asked to do an article for The Washington Quarterly Fall issue on the use of intelligence at the White House. I have significantly revised an article I did for Studies in Intelligence in 1980.

Attached is the draft. Because the publication deadline is short, I would appreciate any comments, suggestions or criticisms by COB Thursday, 18 August.

STAT

[redacted]

Robert M. Gates

Opportunity Unfulfilled
The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence at the White House

Robert M. Gates

"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at one goal -- producing accurate reliable intelligence.... Who are the customers who get this finished product? At the very top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency's most important customer."

Intelligence: The Acme of Skill

(CIA Information Pamphlet)

And what have our most important customers had to say about how well we achieve that goal?

"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence."

Jimmy Carter, 1978

"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"

Richard Nixon, 1970

"CIA Director McCone...made recommendations for checking and improving the quality of intelligence reporting. I promptly accepted the suggestions...."

Lyndon Johnson, Memoirs

"During the rush of...events in the final days of 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the interests of the United States."

Dwight Eisenhower, Memoirs

A search of Presidential memoirs or those of principal assistants over the past 30 years or so turns up remarkably little discussion or perspective on the role played by Directors of Central Intelligence or intelligence information in Presidential decisionmaking on foreign affairs. What little commentary there has been, as suggested by the introductory quotes, is nearly uniformly critical. Similarly, in intelligence memoir literature, while one can read a great deal about covert operations and technical achievements, there is little on the role of intelligence in Presidential decisionmaking. Thus, on both sides of the relationship there is a curious, discreet silence. As research by numerous scholars has documented, intelligence information and assessments, however, have played a central role in many of the critical decisions of the last seven Presidents.

Why the dearth of first-hand reflection and evaluation in a major area of foreign affairs and national security history? Partly, perhaps it is because even still there is a reluctance to discuss what both parties perceive as sensitive information. I believe, however, that this void is more likely explained by factors that continue to dominate the relationship between Presidents and the CIA and Intelligence Community: intelligence collection and assessment are a black hole for most Presidents and their key advisers, neither understood nor adequately exploited; for intelligence officers, Presidential and senior level views of the intelligence they receive and how they use it (or not) are just as unfamiliar, giving rise to perceptions dominated by wishful thinking and peculiar conceit. In short, both historically and contemporaneously, year after year, because of ignorance, inattention, and passivity, both the White House and CIA fail to take maximum advantage of the opportunity for better intelligence support for the President and decisionmaking.

As a new administration prepares to take office it is perhaps timely to examine the relationship between Intelligence and a President so that new officials, intelligence officials, and others might better understand what happens at the White House to the product of intelligence collection and analysis, and so both the White House and CIA can work to improve intelligence support to the President.

SETTING THE SCENE

To understand how intelligence is used and regarded at the White House first requires an understanding of the context in which it is received. The sheer volume of paperwork addressed to the President is staggering. Federal employees in more than 200 agencies seek to draw his attention to this or that program, proposal or vital piece of information. An astonishing amount of their work survives departmental review and finds its way to the White House. There these papers join a river of correspondence to the President from countless consultants, academics, think tanks, political contacts, family and friends, political supporters, journalists, authors, foreign leaders, and concerned citizens. (Lest you think such correspondence can easily be disregarded, it is my experience that most Presidents often attach as much -- if not more -- credibility to the views of family, (old) friends and private contacts as they do to those of executive agencies. Vice President Rockefeller once asked my office at the NSC if Denmark really was planning to sell Greenland. Wondering all the while if he was in the market, we confirmed with CIA that this rumor from a private source was untrue. But Rockefeller had taken it seriously.) There are many other, less innocuous examples of Presidents and senior advisers being misinformed where intelligence knows the facts to be otherwise.

It is the responsibility of the Domestic Policy Staff or its equivalent, the NSC, other Executive offices, and the White House itself to impose order on this avalanche of pulp and to reduce it to manageable proportions. The NSC alone year in, year out processes 7,000-10,000 "action" papers a year -- not including intelligence analyses or other purely "informational" papers. Dr. Brzezinski once asked me to calculate how many pages of reading he sent to President Carter weekly; the total averaged many hundreds of pages -- and among White House offices the NSC was among the most stringent with respect to the length and number of items going to the President. These, then, are the first hurdles that intelligence faces: a president with a heavy schedule, inundated by paper and demands for decisions, surrounded by senior assistants who have as a main role trying to keep that President from being overwhelmed by paper; and a President with vast and varied non-intelligence sources upon which he also relies and in which he often has considerable confidence.

WHAT HE GETS

The President routinely receives only one intelligence product that is not summarized or commented upon by someone outside the Community: The President's Daily Brief. He

receives this, usually via his National Security Adviser every morning, along with a package that has varied little from President to President: a few (3-6) State and CIA cables of special significance; occasionally a sensitive intelligence report from CIA; selected wire service items; State or CIA situation reports (rarely both) if there is a crisis abroad; and often NSC and State morning cable summaries. Contrary to what is commonly believed, this is the only regularly scheduled package of current intelligence the President receives during the day. However, through the course of the day, the National Security Adviser keeps the President apprised of significant developments overseas and may handcarry especially important cables directly to the President. In a crisis, the flow of information increases. More analysis and reports will be given the President. He will receive current intelligence orally in meetings with his senior White House, State, Defense and Intelligence advisers, as well as from the media -- often the first source of information. Nevertheless, on a day-to-day basis apart from the PDB, successive Presidents generally have seen only that current intelligence selected by the National Security Adviser, who works to make that morning package as succinct and small as he responsibly can.

It was not always this way -- even in modern times. Before the Kennedy Administration, the President, his National Security Adviser and the NSC Staff relied almost entirely on

CIA and State to provide incoming current intelligence as soon as it was processed by their operations centers and circulated to substantive officials who could decide what to send to the White House. It was an approach that led to considerable competition, redundancy and placed a President at the mercy of the bureaucracies for ^{information} ~~confirmation~~.

This system was revolutionized, however, when President Kennedy created the White House Situation Room to which CIA, State, NSA and the Pentagon began to provide unprocessed intelligence information electronically -- an approach with its own readily apparent shortcomings. (Many a time, an over eager White House aide has run to a President with a dramatic but unevaluated intelligence report, gotten him charged up, and later sheepishly had to return to acknowledge the source was poor or there had been a mistake.) Thus, the NSC and President began receiving intelligence and diplomatic cables on developments abroad often as soon as, and often before, intelligence analysts. Henry Kissinger observes in his memoirs that, "It is a common myth that high officials are informed immediately about significant events.... It happens not infrequently -- much too frequently for the security adviser's emotional stability -- that even the President learns of a significant occurrence from the newspapers." He notes that President Nixon learned of the historic 1969 meeting in Beijing between Kosygin and Chou En-Lai when he read about it in The Washington Star.

One result of the establishment of the Situation Room was a significant diminution in the value of current intelligence publications that to this day has not been fully grasped by the Intelligence Community. Only analysis by experienced intelligence specialists lent (and lends) value to current intelligence provided the White House. Daily publications reporting purely factual information without trenchant analysis -- apart from Situation Reports on crises -- too often have been duplicative, too late and irrelevant. Thanks to the Situation Room, urgent information from abroad is often in the President's hands before reaching the DCI, other senior intelligence officials, and senior government officials.

Naturally, the President receives information through channels other than the early morning folder and the occasional cable during the day. For example, Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan routinely received current and longrange intelligence analysis through regular briefings by the DCI or intelligence specialists. All DCIs also have briefed the President and his senior advisers routinely in formal meetings of the National Security Council. Moreover, discussion at such meetings serves to convey information to the President from diverse sources. The President also receives abbreviated versions of intelligence assessments which are included in policy options papers.

Presidents Carter and Reagan saw fewer CIA assessments, National Intelligence Estimates, research papers and other longer range studies than either Presidents Ford or Nixon. This is due primarily to greater encouragement during the Ford and Nixon Administrations for the NSC Staff to prepare "Information Memoranda" summarizing for the President the salient points of much longer intelligence papers and attaching the full text. The only longer intelligence reports to reach Presidents Carter and Reagan were those the DCI delivered personally or the infrequent instances when the National Security Adviser forwarded an exceptional one for the President's reading. Thus, while under Nixon and Ford virtually no major intelligence study reached the President without an NSC cover memorandum summarizing it and perhaps making independent comments or judgments, many more reports reached their desks than reached Carter and Reagan. The NSC Staff was not encouraged to forward such studies, due in large measure of a reluctance to burden the President with additional -- and optional -- reading, a function of very different personal idiosyncracies.

In sum, each of the four Presidents I have observed has received through regular channels only a tiny portion of published intelligence and only a fraction even of analysis specifically prepared for senior policymakers. This has placed

a premium on the PDB -- an oft neglected opportunity -- and on the willingness of the DCI to give important assessments (published or oral) directly to the President or call them to the direct attention of the National Security Adviser. Disinterest or reluctance on the part of a DCI to take an activist, even aggressive role in this respect is a severe -- even irreparable -- handicap to ensuring that intelligence information and assessments are made available to or read by the President and the National Security Adviser.

WHAT PRESIDENTS THINK OF WHAT THEY GET

Perhaps in recognition of how busy Presidents are, for years there has been an adage at the White House that the absence of criticism should be regarded as praise. Along these lines, Presidential comments on intelligence assessments are so rare that we are understandably tempted to assume satisfaction with what is being received. Regrettably, however, this is doubtful. Many of the infrequent comments are critical, as illustrated at the outset of this article. I believe the negative perceptions of Intelligence of most Presidents and their advisers while in office or afterward are due to five factors:

-- The first and most significant is failure. Whether Nixon's unhappiness over misestimates of planned Soviet ICBM deployments or Carter's over failure to forecast the Iranian revolution or untimely upward revisions of North Korean troop strength, these Presidents -- with justification -- believed CIA assessments either contributed importantly to policy disasters or made them vulnerable to later criticism. Moreover, Presidents expect that for what they spend on intelligence, the end-product should be able to predict all manner of coups, upheavals, riots, intentions, military moves and the like with accuracy. Intellectually, they know most such specific events are incredibly hard to predict -- and that we are incredibly lucky when we do. Nevertheless, in the early morning hours when the National Security Adviser must repair to the President's study with the (usually) bad news about such events, the Chief Executive will not unnaturally wonder why his billions for intelligence do not spare him surprise. Further, Presidents want the kind of tactical intelligence that informs and facilitates day-to-day decisionmaking and where intelligence performance is hardest.

-- Second, Presidents do not like internal controversy in the Executive Branch, especially when it becomes public. Nor do Presidents welcome debate over basic facts once they have made a decision. Whether Johnson's aggravation with troublesome assessments on Vietnam, Nixon's over the public dispute between CIA and Defense whether the SS-9 was a MRV or MIRV, Carter's over energy estimates, or Reagan's over the Soviet gas pipeline, these and other intelligence debates over technology transfer, verification of arms control, Soviet defense spending, Soviet weapons programs and many more have caused controversy and weakened support for policy. The White House's general unease with CIA-originated unclassified analysis is rooted in this dislike for what is regarded as needless controversy. Our own citizens, not to mention foreign readers, cannot be expected to assume that a CIA publication does not reflect an official US Government view -- and this confusion is of concern to the White House and often a public relations and policy headache. Thus, to the extent intelligence results (in White House eyes) in internal government controversy, problems with the Congress, or embarrassing publicity, it will draw Presidential ire or at a minimum leave the Chief Magistrate with unflattering and enduring ill-will toward intelligence.

-- Third, Presidents do not welcome new intelligence assessments undercutting policies based on earlier assessments. As professionals, we are constantly revisiting important subjects as better and later information or improved analytical tools become available. When this results in changing the statistical basis for the US position in MBFR, substantially elevating estimates of North Korean forces at a time when the President is pressing to reduce US forces in South Korea, or "discovering" a Soviet brigade in Cuba, it is no revelation to observe that Presidents regard us less than fondly. Presidents do not like surprises, especially those that undermine policy. Intelligence is most often the bearer of such surprises -- and pays the price such messengers have suffered since antiquity.

-- Fourth, successive Administrations have generally regarded with skepticism the growing direct relationship between Congress and CIA above and beyond the actual oversight process. In recent years, the provision of great quantities of highly sensitive information and analysis to Members of Congress and their staffs has largely eliminated the Executive's longstanding advantage of a near monopoly of

information on foreign affairs and defense. The flow of information to the Hill has given the Congress a powerful tool in its quest for a greater voice in the making of foreign and defense policy vis-a-vis the Executive -- and Presidents cannot be indifferent to the fact that intelligence has provided Congress with that tool and that the White House is nearly helpless to blunt it except in very rare cases.

-- Finally, I believe Presidents and their national security teams usually have unrealistic expectations of what intelligence can do for them. Given the extraordinary capabilities of US intelligence for collecting and processing information -- and the cost, the uninitiated (including Presidents) often see intelligence as a magic bullet. When they too soon learn it is not, they are inevitably disappointed. Policymakers usually learn the hard way that while intelligence can tell them a great deal, it only rarely -- and usually in crises involving military forces -- provides the kind of unambiguous and timely information that can make day-to-day decisionmaking simpler and less risky. And intelligence officers encourage such exaggerated expectations occasionally by pretending a confidence in their judgments they cannot reasonably justify and by failing to be candid about the quality

and reliability of their information and the possibility of other outcomes. Once bitten by an erroneous or misleading intelligence assessment, most White House officials -- including Presidents -- will be twice-shy about relying on or accepting unquestioningly a second.

Presidents and other principals up to the present time also have faulted the Agency for lack of imagination in anticipating the needs of the President and for insufficient aggressiveness in keeping itself informed on policy issues under consideration. Neither Presidents nor their Assistants for National Security Affairs have felt it their responsibility to keep senior Agency officials well informed in this regard, to provide day-to-day detailed tasking or to provide helpful feedback. The Agency had to depend for such guidance on what the DCI could pick up in high-level meetings and contacts -- and the skill and interest of different DCIs has varied greatly in both.

Indeed, this lack of feedback and, more broadly, intelligence policy guidance from the President (and other senior officials) in the four Administrations I have observed first hand has been a major obstacle to improved and more responsive intelligence performance. If Executive Branch and especially White House officials view Congressional influence

on intelligence strategy, priorities and investment as excessive, it is in part because policymakers in successive administrations have largely abdicated their own responsibilities in these areas. Changing the structure of the Intelligence Community or creating a so-called Director of National Intelligence at the White House will not remedy this situation (and would in my view do great harm). A President and his national security team (the Secretaries of State and Defense, and National Security Adviser) should view intelligence as an important asset in foreign policymaking and should be prepared to devote the time and energy to working with the DCI to provide useful guidance and direction to the collection and analysis efforts of CIA and the rest of US intelligence. Contrary to the view of those who are apprehensive over a close relationship between policymakers and intelligence, I believe it is not close enough -- that more interaction, feedback and direction as to strategy, priorities and requirements is critical to better performance, and that this can be accomplished without jeopardizing the independence and integrity of intelligence assessments and judgments.

Of the four Administrations, the Carter team worked most conscientiously at a high level to inform CIA of the analytical needs of the President and constructively to advise the Agency of perceived shortcomings in its analysis, especially with respect to subject, timing and form. President Carter personally communicated his concerns and criticisms.

Perhaps the most comprehensive White House guidance (and indication of the President's view) in recent years was provided by Dr. Brzezinski when he sent a memorandum to the DCI that made the following points:

- Greater attention needs to be paid to clandestine collection targeted on the thinking and planning of key leaders or groups in important advanced and secondary countries, how they make policy decisions and how they will react to US decisions and those of other powers.
- Political analyses should be focused more on problems of particular concern to the US government. Too many papers are on subjects peripheral to US interests or offer broad overviews not directly linked to particular problems, events or developments of concern to the US government.
- There needs to be greater attention to the future. More papers are needed that briefly set forth facts and evidence and then conclude with a well-informed speculative essay on the implications for the future: "We expect and hope for thought-provoking, reasonable views of the future based on what you know about the past and present.... Analysts should not be timorous or bound by convention."

The Carter White House took other steps to ensure better communication of high-level substantive concerns as well as perceptions of analytical shortcomings. The Political Intelligence Working Group (the Deputy National Security Adviser, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and later the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), set up at the White House to organize remedial action in response to the President's November 1978 note, interpreted its charter broadly and worked to improve and better focus field reporting by State, CIA and Attaches; to improve the cover for CIA officers that is so critical to good reporting; to resolve bureaucratic impediments to good reporting; and a number of other issues aimed at improving analysis and making it more responsive. As part of the work of this informal group, senior staff representatives of Dr. Brzezinski met periodically with representatives of the Secretary of State and the DCI to review foreign developments or issues of current concern to the President and to provide feedback on intelligence coverage. I believe all involved would agree that these efforts had a salutary effect in improving communication between intelligence and the White House and thus improving intelligence support to the President.

A major innovation of the Reagan Administration in this regard was the President's decision in 1981 that his President's Daily Brief should be provided each day also to the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Adviser and later the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They all were to have the same information as the President. Most significantly, primarily for security reasons, the PDB was to be delivered to these principals in person by a senior analytical officer of CIA, who would sit with the principal and then carry the document back to CIA. These arrangements provided an opportunity unique in US intelligence history for intelligence professionals to get immediate feedback from principals, their follow-up questions, tasking for further analysis and a sense of policymaker priorities and concerns. Intelligence support was thereby improved as was the understanding of intelligence officers of policy dynamics and reality of the decisionmaking arena which they were supporting. The principals were remarkably candid with their CIA briefers, and their confidence to my knowledge was never breached -- and the quality of intelligence support was greatly enhanced.

OVERCOMING CIA ISOLATION AND WHITE HOUSE SUSPICION

Presidents expect their intelligence service to provide timely, accurate and farseeing information and analysis. Thus, nearly all Presidential comments on the quality of intelligence are critical -- prompted by our failure to meet expectations. Indeed, all but one quote at the outset of this article was in response to a specific situation where intelligence was perceived to have failed to measure up. In short, Presidents often consider intelligence as much another problem bureaucracy to be dealt with and warily watched as it is a source of helpful information, insight and support. The dynamics of the relationship between the White House and CIA (not to mention the less familiar agencies of US intelligence) and the lack of understanding of each other's perspective and motives -- abetted by bureaucratic rivalries -- that separates them are usually unclear to the players themselves, and much less so to outside observers. While most journalists and academicians focus on alleged distortions of intelligence to support Administration policy, the players know that the relationship actually is usually dominated on key issues by disagreement and suspicion.

To the extent intelligence professionals are isolated (or isolate themselves) from White House/NSC officials and are

unresponsive to White House informational and analytical needs, this adversarial nature of the relationship will be emphasized and understanding of what we can and cannot do will be lacking. Thus, the DCI and his senior managers and the White House must both promote and maintain close personal ties between the White House and NSC officials from the President on down on the one hand, and the DCI and his principal subordinates on the other. Both must aggressively seek new ways to get intelligence information and assessments before the President, even while experimenting with old mechanisms, such as the PDB. White House procedures and relationships are always dynamic; accordingly, the search for new and better ways to serve the President must be constant.

Although the routine order of business and internal organization may vary from Administration to Administration, I would suggest several general rules:

- Senior Intelligence, State, Defense and NSC officers must establish and maintain personal contact to ensure that intelligence officers are well informed as to the issues of concern to the President; policy matters under consideration in which intelligence analysis can make a contribution; and the overall foreign and defense affairs agenda so that the President's needs can be better anticipated.

-- The role of the DCI is central to understanding the President's needs and conveying analysis to him. DCI interest in analysis and aggressiveness in getting substantive matters before the President has varied greatly, though. Directors Webster, Casey and Turner have worked hard at the problem, as did some of their predecessors. Future DCIs must be persuaded that these undertakings also are central to their role as the President's principal intelligence adviser. Moreover, the DCI should assume a similar role with the National Security Adviser -- perhaps the best source of information on issues of topical interest to the President and the foreign affairs and defense agenda. Finally, the importance of routine, detailed feedback from policy meetings, briefings and conversations with the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser and Chairman, JCS must be impressed upon DCIs. Turner and Webster have done this effectively. Contrary to the views of some, we cannot properly do our work in splendid isolation.

-- The responsibility for making intelligence more relevant, timely and helpful is not that of the DCI and senior officials of the Intelligence Community alone.

To be sure, intelligence managers at all levels must assume the burden of keeping up to date on events and policy issues relevant to their area of professional concern. Such awareness must infuse intelligence officers at all levels. Only when priority attention is given by all to the relevance and value of intelligence to the consumer from President to desk officer will intelligence analysis be better received and, in the end, be better. But, also, the President and his senior national security team, must take seriously their responsibility for the quality of intelligence support they get. They must be willing to make time for regular dialogue with intelligence specialists; for understanding intelligence capabilities, the impact of competing priorities for collection and analysis, and major investment decisions; and they must be willing to play an active role in guiding intelligence strategy and determining priorities.

The above "rules" apply to improving the quality and usefulness of intelligence to the President. They will not resolve the several causes of Presidential displeasure -- intelligence support of Congress, changing assessments that have policy implications, surprises, and so forth. Even here, however, there are mitigating steps that can be taken. For example:

- Intelligence professionals should take the initiative to let the Security Adviser or the NSC Staff know when an estimate or other form of analysis will revise earlier assessments and have an impact on the President's policies. This would include, in particular, advance warning of new and important conclusions in military estimates.

- Intelligence needs to develop a mechanism for better informing the White House about support provided to the Congress. The intelligence agencies are part of the Executive Branch; the DCI is appointed by and reports to the President. It is not improper or inappropriate for the Intelligence Community to keep the President's foreign affairs and Congressional affairs staff more completely and regularly advised of papers provided to the Congress, possibly controversial testimony or briefings, etc. Again, some of this has been done -- but a mere schedule of planned appearances or an occasional phone call are not enough. Keeping the Executive informed about CIA dealings with Congress is an important aspect of building Presidential confidence that we are not trying to undercut him or his policies by responding to legitimate Congressional requests.

-- Finally, ground rules should be developed for the disclosure of declassified intelligence. The current lack of a systematic approach contributes to leaks; to White House suspicion of obstructionism, bureaucratic gamesmanship or pursuit of a contrary policy agenda by intelligence professionals; and concern on the part of intelligence officers over the appearance (and sometimes the reality) of politicization of intelligence by White House or other policymaker-directed declassification of information. These are not new problems, but they all have worsened over the years. All, including many in Congress, agree intelligence information undergirding policy decisions must often be made available for public education or to gain support for national security decisions. There is widespread demand for unclassified publication of intelligence assessments or research on issues of moment to the country. But who should make these decisions? This is not the place to propose solutions, but the problem exists, affects the relationship between the President and the intelligence agencies on the one hand and the Executive and Legislative on the other.

The usefulness of CIA to Presidents in that area for which CIA was primarily established -- collection, analysis and

reporting of information -- for many years has often suffered because of self-imposed isolation by CIA and lack of interest, understanding and involvement by the President and his national security team. Self-promoting though true stories of extraordinary intelligence successes -- untempered by candor about problems in collection and analysis -- have in the past led to exaggerated expectations that are inevitably dashed. Lack of White House involvement has often left intelligence professionals adrift, and uncertain amid conflicting priorities and requirements, with the inevitable price in relevance and timeliness.

CIA and the Intelligence Community represent an extraordinary national asset. The rebuilding of the Community over the past decade has vastly augmented our collection and analysis capabilities and sharpened our skills. Congress has greatly enhanced its understanding of intelligence and shown a willingness to provide guidance and direction. It is time for the White House to assert its proper intelligence policy direction and guidance role and for CIA to welcome this role. Communication and dialogue on such broad matters must be improved. Only thus can intelligence and the use of it by the President be improved and the concomitant opportunity to better inform the policymaking process be seized.

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 August 1988

TO: Eli Jacobs

Eli -

Attached is the draft article I discussed with you. It still needs some more work; some useful innovations under the Reagan Administration need to be mentioned following on page 19. There are some other places where I need to do a little more work as well. Nonetheless, I think this is sufficient for you to review and comment upon.

I will be in the office until early evening Friday and Saturday morning. You can, of course, call me at home

I am envious of your gastronomical if not your political experiences this week.

Robert M. Gates

Attachment:
As Stated

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IMMEDIATE

Central Intelligence

D.C. 20505

Form 3-65 160c

(13)

17 August 1988

ILLEGIB

TO: Barry Kelly
National Security Council

Barry

Attached is the draft article I mentioned on the telephone I was asked to write for the Washington Quarterly at Anne Armstrong's suggestion. It will appear in late November.

Let me know if you have any comments or suggestions. I think you will find the general approach congenial to your own views, based on our previous conversations. I will be providing the final version to the journal Friday afternoon. (We are long overdue for lunch; let's set something up.)

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

STAT

Attachment:
As Stated

(I want to strengthen p 19 on Reagan Administration - suggestions welcome.)

"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"

Richard Nixon, 1970



ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

18 August 1988

7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DCI Administrative Staff

SUBJECT: Payment for Charges Incurred by the
DCI for Representational Purposes

Payment from U.S. Government funds for representational expenses incurred by the DDCI for the purpose of conducting official business of the United States Government is authorized under the policy set forth in [redacted] (Official Reception and Representational Expenses) for the following functions:

STAT

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Organizational Affiliation</u>
88.07.13	Robert M. Gates (host) Don Gregg	DDCI Office of the Vice President

/s/

STAT

[redacted]
O/DDCI

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY



The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

19 August 1988


TO: Roy Godson
National Strategy Information Center

Roy -

Attached is the draft article I called about and Diane described. I was asked to write it for the Washington Quarterly, as a companion piece to those you and Anne Armstrong are doing.

There are some places where I need to do more work. Nonetheless, I would appreciate any suggestions or comments you might have. Please let me hear by Wednesday.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

(P.S. Please keep to yourself and destroy after we talk. As you will see, it's pretty candid.)

2nd version

STAT



Distribution:

STAT

STAT

- Orig. - Addressee
- 1 - DDCI [redacted]
- 1 - ER [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - D/PAO
- 1 - PAO Registry
- 1 - PAO Ames
- 1 - MED(Subject)

19 August 1988

DDCI:

RE: Speaking Invitation
 Security Affairs Support Association
 Department of State
 6-7 October
 Washington, D.C.

Executive Vice President of the Security Affairs Support Association (SASA), General John E. Morrison, has invited you to give the keynote address at the second session of the Fall '88 Symposium on Thursday, 6 October. The symposium will be hosted by and conducted at the Department of State. The proposed format is 20 minutes of remarks followed by 10 minutes of questions and answers or any other format that you would prefer. You are asked to direct your remarks to "the examination of potential changes in intelligence requirements, particularly treaty monitoring, Third World activities, high technology weapons, space programs, and Soviet conventional military forces." The Symposium will be held at the SECRET level. Approximately 200-250 senior people from government and industry, all US citizens will make up the audience. Members of the media will not be present.

The overall theme of the program is "Glasnost and Perestroika - Implications for US Intelligence." Secretary of State George Shultz is invited to participate along with Max Kampelman, Admiral William Crowe, General Edward Heinz, and Maynard Anderson. (See opposite for tentative agenda.) Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Robert Lamb will host the symposium. General Morrison would appreciate your recommendations on other speakers who would be appropriate.

Since you are a new member of the SASA Board and this is the type of audience that we are interested in addressing, I recommend that you accept this invitation. If you agree, attached is a letter of acceptance for your signature.

STAT

[Redacted signature box]

Bill Baker

~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~



Washington, D. C. 20505

General John E. Morrison, Jr. (ret.)
Executive Vice President
Security Affairs Support Association
Suite 120, 2662 Riva Road
Annapolis, Maryland 21401


Dear John:

I accept with pleasure the Security Affairs Support Association (SASA) invitation to address the Fall '88 Symposium on Thursday, 6 October at State Department. I will look forward to meeting with you and the other SASA members and their guests. A member of our Public Affairs Staff will contact you concerning the arrangements.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence



4 August 1988

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John N. McMahon
Lockheed Corp.

EXECUTIVE

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The MVM Group, Inc.

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The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

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Defense Intelligence Agency

Dear Bob:

We are now in the process of developing our program for the Fall '88 Symposium which will be hosted by and conducted at the Department of State, Thursday and Friday (half day), 6-7 October 1988 and would be extremely pleased if it were possible for you to address the attendees.

The theme of the program, which will be presented at the SECRET classification level, is "GLASNOST and PERESTROIKA - IMPLICATIONS for U.S. INTELLIGENCE". The undergirding rationale for the theme is that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are in a process of change. Whatever the changes, national security considerations will be preeminently involved.

The principal objective of our organization, as you well know, is to "enhance the relationships and understanding among those in government, industry and academe who are involved in and concerned with the well-being and success of the national intelligence endeavor". In consonance with that objective, our members have a special interest in learning more about the aforementioned changes and how they might impact our current and future intelligence modus and program developments. Some changes are now perceived, others may be emerging but have yet to take definite form and still more may only be speculated. The objective of the Fall '88 Symposium is to examine the aforementioned categories of changes--those that now appear to be of substance and those of future possibility--hopefully gaining from that examination some perspective on their implications for U.S. Intelligence.

120 2142 River Road

A copy of the draft ^{agenda} is enclosed. You will see that we have tentatively identified you as the SESSION II Keynote Speaker, 1315-1345 hrs., on 6 October 1988. Even as this letter is being mailed, letters to the other speakers identified are being dispatched at the same time. As you can see from the agenda, we have three speaking slots for which speakers have not yet been identified. I have highlighted those periods and topics. Of most importance, of course, is gaining your agreement to participate. Beyond that, I sorely need and request your assistance by way of recommendations on who might be able to address the topics for which we have no speakers as yet. If you could give me some names, I'll do the rest and with much appreciation.

Secretary Shultz is being invited to participate by our host, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, Mr. Robert Lamb. The latter is also asking Mr. Max Kampelman to join us. Also invited is the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.; the Director, Intelligence Community Staff, Lt. General Edward Heinz, USAF, and the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Counter Intelligence and Security), Mr. Maynard Anderson. When the agenda becomes completely firm, hopefully within the next two weeks, the final version will be forwarded to you.

One final note--we anticipate an attendance of 200-250, senior people from government and industry, all U.S. citizens with SECRET clearances or higher. There will be no foreigners nor press representatives.

We will be looking forward to hearing from you.

Many, many thanks. All the best.

Kindest personal regards,


John E. Morrison, Jr.
Executive Vice President

Encl.

Hope you had a great travel!
P.S. Have also invited the new ASD C³I Gordon Smith.

DRAFT 4 AUGUST 1988

SASA FALL '88 SYMPOSIUM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

6-7 OCTOBER 1988

"GLASNOST and PERESTROIKA - IMPLICATIONS for U.S. INTELLIGENCE"

THURSDAY, 6 OCTOBER 1988

0730-0900 REGISTRATION

0900-0905 ADMINISTRATIVE ANNOUNCEMENTS

0905-0910 WELCOMING REMARKS
The Honorable Robert E. Lamb, Assistant Secretary
of State, Diplomatic Security

0915-1200 SESSION I
(An assessment of major developments in the Soviet
Union, Glasnost, Perestroika and the long term
consequences of changes in political, economic,
and military structures. Impacts on our National
and International Security interests and on
US-USSR relations).

✓ 0915-0945 Keynote Address - US-USSR RELATIONS
*The Honorable George P. Shultz,
Secretary of State

0945-1025 POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE USSR
(Speaker tbd)

1025-1040 Break

1040-1115 THE ECONOMIC UPHEAVAL
(Speaker tbd)

1115-1200 THE MILITARY SITUATION
*Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1200-1315 Lunch

✓ 1315-1700 SESSION II
(An examination of potential changes in
intelligence requirements, particularly treaty
monitoring, Third World activities, high
technology weapons, space programs and Soviet
conventional military forces).

- ✓1315-1345 Session Keynote Address
*The Honorable Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
- 1345-1445 ARMS TREATIES-MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES AND REQUIREMENTS
*The Honorable Max M. Kampelman, Chief of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State
- 1445-1515 COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
*Mr. Maynard Anderson, Assistant Deputy Under-secretary of Defense, Counter Intelligence and Security
- 1515-1530 Break
- 1530-1615 SOVIET MILITARY FORCES; I&W STRUCTURE AND DISPOSITION, READINESS
(Speaker tbd)
- 1615-1700 SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD (POLITICAL, TRADE, TECHNOLOGY)
(Speaker tbd)
- 1700-1900 Reception

FRIDAY 7 OCTOBER 1988

- 0730-0900 REGISTRATION
- 0900-0905 ADMINISTRATIVE ANNOUNCEMENTS
- 0905-1200 SESSION III
(Intelligence systems forecast, fiscal prospects, Congressional priorities and concerns and impacts on intelligence systems).
- 0905-0945 NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS-A FORECAST
*Lt. Gen. Edward Heinz, USAF, Director, Intelligence Community Staff
- 0945-1015 DoD INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS-A FORECAST
*The Honorable Gordon A. Smith, Assistant Secretary of Defense, C I
- 1015-1030 Break
- 1030-1145 CONGRESSIONAL-COMMUNITY ROUND TABLE
(Representatives of the SSCI, HPSCI, HAC and the Intelligence Community)
- 1145 Closing Remarks

*Invited

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
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
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	6 DDA	X			
	7 DDO		X		
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	9 Chm/NIC				
	10 GC				
	11 IG				
	12 Compt				
	13 D/OCA				
	14 D/PAO				
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	18 D/SEO		X		
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Executive Secretary

30 Aug 88

Date

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

29 August 1988

Ms. Linda Crowl
The Washington Quarterly
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Linda:

Enclosed is the Deputy Director's article entitled "An Opportunity Unfulfilled: The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence at the White House" for your winter 1989 issue of The Washington Quarterly.

Mr. Gates would appreciate your not sharing this article with anyone prior to its publication. Also, it is his understanding that your publication will not be distributed until the end of November. If there have been any changes in the understanding Mr. Gates has with Mr. Roberts as stated above please call immediately.

Thanks for your help.

Sincerely,



Office of the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence

13

STAT

An Opportunity Unfulfilled
The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence at the White House

Robert M. Gates

"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at one goal -- producing accurate reliable intelligence.... Who are the customers who get this finished product? At the very top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency's most important customer."

(CIA Information Pamphlet)

What have our most important customers had to say about how well we achieve that goal?

"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence."

Jimmy Carter, 1978

"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"

Richard Nixon, 1970

"CIA Director McCone...made recommendations for checking and improving the quality of intelligence reporting. I promptly accepted the suggestions...."

Lyndon Johnson, Memoirs

"During the rush of...events in the final days of 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the interests of the United States."

Dwight Eisenhower, Memoirs

A search of Presidential memoirs and those of principal assistants over the past 30 years or so turns up remarkably little discussion or perspective on the role played by Directors of Central Intelligence (DCI) or intelligence information in Presidential decisionmaking on foreign affairs. What little commentary there has been, as suggested by the introductory quotes, is nearly uniformly critical. Similarly, in intelligence memoir literature, while one can read a great deal about covert operations and technical achievements, there is little on the role of intelligence in Presidential decisionmaking. Thus, on both sides of the relationship there is a curious, discreet silence.

Why this dearth of first-hand reflection and evaluation in a major area of foreign affairs and national security history? Partly, perhaps, it is because even still there is a reluctance to discuss what both parties perceive as sensitive information. Partly, it may be because senior officials find it difficult to distinguish what they learn or see in intelligence reports from other sources of information, ambiguities in the role of intelligence in policymaking, confusion over what is intelligence, the inclination of senior officials to believe they already knew what they just read in an intelligence report, and the common predilection of senior officials to rely on and recall personal contacts as opposed to the written word or anonymous experts.

I believe, however, that this void in the study of Presidents, intelligence and decisionmaking -- apart from covert action -- is also explained by factors that continue to dominate the relationship between Presidents and the CIA and Intelligence Community: intelligence collection and assessment are black arts for most Presidents and their key advisers, neither adequately understood nor adequately exploited. For intelligence officers, Presidential and senior level views of the intelligence they receive and how they use it (or not) are just as unfamiliar, giving rise among intelligence officers to wishful thinking and even conceit. In short, over the years, both the White House and the CIA have

failed to take maximum advantage of the opportunity for better intelligence support for the President and decisionmaking.* This situation is not peculiar to any single Administration or particular view of the CIA, but rather is a problem of personal relationships, bureaucratic cultures, and the policy process itself.

* This article addresses the CIA-White House relationship in terms of intelligence assessments and substantive support to the policy process. While CIA's involvement in operational activities abroad, especially covert action, plainly affects the relationship with the White House and the President, I do not address that aspect in this article. A complex and controversial subject warranting separate treatment, I do not believe the operational/covert action element of the relationship significantly affects the analysis or conclusions of this article.

SETTING THE SCENE

To understand how intelligence is used and regarded at the White House first requires an understanding of the context in which it is received. The sheer volume of information flowing to the President is staggering. More than 200 agencies seek to draw his attention to programs, proposals or vital pieces of information. An astonishing amount of their work finds its way to the White House.

Policy agencies such as State, Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and others prepare and send great quantities of paperwork to the President. Most Presidents also get considerable information and analysis on foreign affairs from the media. These sources of information join a river of correspondence to the President from countless consultants, academics, think tanks, political contacts, family and friends, political supporters, journalists, authors, foreign leaders, and concerned citizens. (Lest you think such correspondence can easily be disregarded, it is my experience that most Presidents often attach as much -- if not more -- credibility to the views of family, friends and private contacts as they do to those of executive agencies.) In sum, despite the mystique of intelligence for the public, for most Presidents it is just one of a number of sources of information. Intelligence

reporting must compete for the President's time and attention, and that competition is intense.

It is the responsibility of the White House Staff, including the National Security Council (NSC) Staff, to impose order on this avalanche of paper and to reduce it to manageable proportions. The NSC alone processes some 10,000 "action" papers a year -- not including intelligence analyses or other purely "informational" papers. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, once asked me to calculate how many pages of reading he sent to President Carter weekly; the total averaged many hundreds of pages -- and among White House offices the NSC was among the most disciplined with respect to the length and number of items going to the President. These, then, are the first hurdles that intelligence faces: a President with a heavy schedule, inundated by paper and demands for decisions, surrounded by senior assistants who have as a main role trying to keep that President from being overwhelmed by paper; and a President with vast and varied non-intelligence sources upon which he also relies and in which he often has considerable confidence.

WHAT INTELLIGENCE DOES THE PRESIDENT GET

The President routinely receives only one intelligence document that is not summarized or commented upon by someone

outside the Intelligence Community: The President's Daily Brief -- CIA's principal vehicle for reporting and analyzing current developments for the President. He receives this, usually via his National Security Adviser every morning, along with a package that has varied little from President to President: a few (3-6) State and CIA cables of special significance; occasionally a sensitive intelligence report from the CIA; the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the National Security Agency; selected wire service items; State or CIA situation reports (rarely both) if there is a crisis abroad; and often NSC and State morning cable summaries. Contrary to what is commonly believed, this is the only regularly scheduled package of current intelligence the President receives during the day.

Through the course of the day, however, the National Security Adviser keeps the President apprised of significant developments overseas and may handcarry especially important cables directly to the President. In a crisis, the flow of information increases. More analysis and reports will be given the President. He will receive current intelligence orally in meetings with his senior White House, State, Defense and Intelligence advisers, as well as from the media -- often the first source of information. Nevertheless, on a day-to-day basis, apart from the PDB, successive Presidents generally have seen only that current intelligence selected by the National

Security Adviser, who works to make that morning package as succinct and small as he responsibly can.

It was not always this way, even in modern times. Before the Kennedy Administration, the President, his National Security Adviser and the NSC Staff relied on the CIA and State to provide incoming cables and information as soon as they were processed. It was an approach that led to considerable competition, redundancy and placed a President at the mercy of the bureaucracies for information.

This system was revolutionized, however, when President Kennedy created the White House Situation Room to which State, the National Security Agency, the Defense Department, and the CIA began to provide unevaluated or "raw" intelligence information electronically -- an approach with its own readily apparent shortcomings. (Many a time, an overeager White House aide has run to a President with a dramatic but unevaluated intelligence report, and later sheepishly had to return to acknowledge the source was poor or there had been a mistake.) Thus, the NSC and President began receiving intelligence and diplomatic cables on developments abroad often as soon as, and often before, State desk officers and intelligence analysts.

One result of the establishment of the Situation Room was a significant diminution in the value to the White House of CIA's

and other agencies' current intelligence reporting that to this day has not been fully grasped by the Intelligence Community. Only analysis by experienced intelligence specialists lends value to current intelligence reporting provided the White House. Even so, because of the Situation Room, intelligence information from abroad is sometimes in the President's hands before reaching the DCI, other senior intelligence officials, senior policy officials -- and the experts.

Naturally, the President receives information through channels other than the early morning folder and the occasional cable during the day. For example, most Presidents routinely have received current intelligence reports in meetings and the key judgments of important National Intelligence Estimates (and other intelligence as well) either directly from the DCI or through the National Security Adviser. All DCIs also have briefed the President and his senior advisers both individually and in formal meetings of the National Security Council. Moreover, discussion at such meetings serves to convey information to the President from diverse sources. The President also receives abbreviated versions of intelligence assessments in many policy papers.

Nevertheless, each of the four Presidents I have observed has received a infinitesimal part of published intelligence and only a fraction even of analysis specifically prepared for

senior policymakers. This has placed a premium on the President's Daily Brief, on the willingness and ability of the DCI to give important assessments (published or oral) directly to the President, and on the willingness of the National Security Adviser to forward key intelligence reports to the President. Disinterest or reluctance on the part of a DCI (or National Security Adviser) to take an activist, even aggressive role in this respect is a severe -- even irreparable -- handicap to ensuring that intelligence information and assessments reach the President.

WHAT PRESIDENTS THINK OF WHAT THEY GET

Perhaps in recognition of how busy Presidents are, for years there has been an adage at the White House that the absence of criticism should be regarded as praise. Along these lines, Presidential comments on intelligence assessments are so rare that we are understandably tempted to assume satisfaction with what is being received. Regrettably, however, this is doubtful. Many of the infrequent comments are critical, as illustrated at the outset of this article.

I believe the negative perceptions of Intelligence of most Presidents and their senior advisers while in office or afterward are due to several factors:

-- The first and most significant is failure. Whether Nixon's unhappiness over misestimates of planned Soviet ICBM deployments or Carter's over failure to forecast the Iranian revolution or untimely upward revisions of North Korean troop strength, these Presidents and their advisers -- with justification -- believed CIA assessments either contributed importantly to policy disasters or made them vulnerable to later criticism. Moreover, Presidents expect that for what they spend on intelligence, the end-product should be able to predict coups, upheavals, riots, intentions, military moves and the like with accuracy. And, in the early morning hours when the National Security Adviser must repair to the President's study with the (usually) bad news about such events, the Chief Executive will not unnaturally wonder why his billions for intelligence do not spare him unpleasant surprises.

-- Second, Presidents do not like controversy within the Executive Branch, and they like it even less when it becomes public. Nor do Presidents welcome debate over basic facts once they have made a decision. Whether the issue is troublesome assessments on Vietnam (Johnson), the public dispute between the CIA and Defense on whether the SS-9 was a MRV or MIRV (Nixon),

North Korean force levels (Carter), or the Soviet gas pipeline (Reagan), these and other intelligence debates over technology transfer, verification of arms control, Soviet defense spending, Soviet weapons programs and many more have caused controversy and weakened support for policy. To the extent intelligence information results (in the eyes of White House officials) in internal government controversy, problems with the Congress, or embarrassing publicity, it will draw Presidential ire or at a minimum leave the President with unflattering views of his intelligence services.

-- Third, Presidents do not welcome new intelligence assessments undercutting policies based on earlier assessments. As professionals, we are constantly revisiting important subjects as better and later information or improved analytical tools become available. When this results in changing the statistical basis for the US position in MBFR, substantially elevating estimates of North Korean forces at a time when the President is pressing to reduce US forces in South Korea, or "discovering" a Soviet brigade in Cuba, it is no revelation to observe that Presidents regard us less than fondly.

-- Fourth, successive Administrations have generally regarded with skepticism the growing direct relationship between Congress and US intelligence agencies. In recent years, the provision of great quantities of highly sensitive information and analysis to Members of Congress and their staffs has largely eliminated the Executive's longstanding advantage of a near monopoly of information on foreign affairs and defense. The flow of information to the Hill has given the Congress a powerful tool in its search for a greater voice in the making of foreign and defense policy vis-a-vis the Executive -- and Presidents cannot be indifferent to the fact that intelligence has provided Congress with that tool and that the White House is nearly helpless to blunt it except in very rare cases.

-- Fifth, I believe Presidents and their national security teams usually are ill-informed about intelligence capabilities and therefore often have unrealistic expectations of what intelligence can do for them, especially when they hear about the genuinely extraordinary capabilities of US intelligence for collecting and processing information. When they too soon learn of our limitations, they are inevitably

disappointed. Policymakers usually learn the hard way that while intelligence can tell them a great deal, it only rarely -- and usually in crises involving military forces -- provides the kind of unambiguous and timely information that can make day-to-day decisionmaking simpler and less risky. Intelligence officers occasionally encourage such exaggerated expectations by pretending a confidence in their judgments they cannot reasonably justify and by failing to be candid about the quality and reliability of their information and the possibility of other outcomes. Once bitten by an erroneous or misleading intelligence assessment, most White House officials -- including Presidents -- will be twice-shy about relying on or accepting unquestioningly a second.

-- Finally, beyond these broad factors affecting the White House-Intelligence relationship are narrower, more parochial bureaucratic stresses. Often, staff at the White House do not know how to use effectively the vast system they direct -- and, too often, an intelligence bureaucracy that does not want "outside" direction offers little help. There is a longstanding perception at the White House that changing the way the intelligence bureaucracies do business -- for example, even the presentation of intelligence information to

the President -- is just too hard, takes too much time and energy, and ultimately yields little.

A useful case study illustrating the simultaneous contribution of intelligence to Presidential policymaking and the problems it can bring, is the ratification proceedings of the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces. The capabilities of US intelligence to monitor deployed Soviet INF weapons and associated treaty provisions, made the treaty possible in the first place. However, our uncertainties in some areas relating to the Treaty, disagreements within the intelligence community on the number of non-deployed INF missiles, public disclosure of these disagreements and exploitation of them in the Senate's ratification proceedings, all presented problems to Executive policymakers. For the White House, on this issue -- as so many others -- intelligence was a bittersweet player.

Presidents and other principals over the years have faulted the CIA for lack of imagination in anticipating the needs of the President and for insufficient aggressiveness in keeping itself informed on policy issues under consideration. Neither Presidents nor their Assistants for National Security Affairs have felt it their responsibility regularly to keep senior Agency officials well informed in this regard, to provide day-to-day detailed tasking or to provide helpful feedback. For guidance, the CIA thus often has had to rely on what the

DCI can pick up in high-level meetings and contacts -- and the skill and interest of different DCIs in this has varied greatly. Indeed, some DCIs have neither sought nor wanted guidance or feedback from the White House, or have sought it on some issues and resisted it on others.

Irregular feedback and intelligence policy guidance -- or the lack of any at all -- in the four Administrations that I have observed first hand has been an obstacle to improved and more responsive intelligence performance. The lack of receptivity on the part of senior intelligence officials on those infrequent occasions when guidance or advice has been offered is equally to blame. Even so, if Executive Branch and especially White House officials view Congressional influence on intelligence strategy, priorities and investment as excessive, it is in part because senior policymakers in successive administrations have neglected their own responsibilities in these areas.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

A President and his national security team (the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and National Security Adviser) should view intelligence as an important asset in foreign policymaking and should be prepared to devote the time and energy to working with the DCI to provide useful

guidance and direction to the collection and analysis efforts of CIA and the rest of US intelligence. Contrary to the view of those who are apprehensive over a close relationship between policymakers and intelligence, I believe it is not close enough -- that more interaction, feedback and direction as to strategy, priorities and requirements is critical to better performance, and that this can be accomplished without jeopardizing the independence and integrity of intelligence assessments and judgments.

There has been progress in the last ten years, though much more can be done. The Carter and Reagan administrations have worked constructively at a high level to inform CIA of the analytical needs of the President and to advise the Agency of perceived shortcomings in collection and analysis.

In 1978, Dr. Brzezinski sent a memorandum to then DCI Turner that made the following points:

- Greater attention needs to be paid to clandestine collection targeted on the thinking and planning of key leaders or groups in important advanced and secondary countries, how they make policy decisions and how they will react to US decisions and those of other powers.

- Political analyses should be focused more on problems of particular concern to the US government. Too many papers are on subjects peripheral to US interests or offer broad overviews not directly linked to particular problems, events or developments of concern to the US government.

- There needs to be greater attention to the future. More papers are needed that briefly set forth facts and evidence and then conclude with a well-informed speculative essay on the implications for the future: "We expect and hope for thought-provoking, reasonable views of the future based on what you know about the past and present.... Analysts should not be timorous or bound by convention."

After the Iranian Revolution, the Carter White House took other steps to ensure better communication of intelligence needs. A Political Intelligence Working Group (the Deputy National Security Adviser, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and later the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), was established at the White House to organize remedial action in response to the President's November 1978 note. The group interpreted its charter broadly and worked to improve and

better focus field reporting by State, CIA and Attaches; to resolve bureaucratic impediments to good reporting; and to tackle other problems in order to improve collection and analysis and make intelligence more responsive. As part of the work of this informal group, senior staff representatives of Dr. Brzezinski met weekly with representatives of the Secretary of State and the DCI to review foreign developments or issues of current concern to the President and to provide feedback on intelligence coverage. These efforts had a salutary effect in improving communication between the Intelligence Community and the White House and improved intelligence support to the President.

A major innovation of the Reagan Administration in this regard was the President's decision in 1981 that his President's Daily Brief should be provided each day also to the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Adviser and later the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They all were to have the same information as the President. Most significantly, primarily for security reasons, the PDB was to be delivered to these principals in person by a senior analytical officer of the CIA, who would sit with the principal and then carry the document back to the CIA. These arrangements provided an opportunity unique in US intelligence history for intelligence professionals to get immediate, informed feedback from principals -- their follow-up

questions, tasking for further collection and analysis, and a sense of the priorities and concerns of the top officials in the government. Intelligence support was thereby improved as was the understanding of intelligence officers of policy dynamics and reality of the decisionmaking arena which they were supporting.

The day to day dialogue between intelligence officers and policymakers at all levels has increased significantly in recent years. Intelligence officers have been more aggressive in this regard and policymakers more receptive. Routine weekly meetings between the DCI and, separately, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the National Security Adviser have contributed to improved relevance and timeliness of intelligence support. The NSC Staff and several Reagan NSC advisers worked with intelligence managers to improve responsiveness to Presidential intelligence needs and to remedy shortcomings in intelligence support. With the encouragement of the President, his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board studied substantive and bureaucratic problems in the Intelligence Community and offered recommendations for improvement.

In sum, the dialogue essential to better intelligence support has improved, but such progress is highly perishable with frequent turnover in senior policy officials. Moreover,

this improved dialogue until recently focused primarily on current intelligence or crisis-related subjects. Much remains to be done in institutionalizing improved White House intelligence guidance policy, attention to requirements, investment, and dialogue on strategy and longer-range issues.

OVERCOMING WHITE HOUSE SUSPICION AND CIA ISOLATION

Presidents expect their intelligence service to provide timely, accurate and farseeing information and analysis. Thus, nearly all Presidential comments on the quality of intelligence are critical -- prompted by our failure to meet expectations. Indeed, all but one quote at the outset of this article was in response to a specific situation where intelligence was perceived to have failed to measure up. In short, Presidents often consider intelligence as much another problem bureaucracy as a source of helpful information, insight and support.

This point is perhaps most graphically illustrated by a story involving President Johnson. Former DCI Richard Helms recounts a private dinner in the White House family quarters during which President Johnson engaged John J. McCloy in a discussion about intelligence. He told McCloy things were going well in intelligence, but then continued: "Let me tell you about these intelligence guys. When I was growing up in

Texas, we had a cow named Bessie. I'd go out early and milk her. I'd get her in the stanchion, seat myself and squeeze out a pail of fresh milk. One day I'd worked hard and gotten a full pail of milk, but I wasn't paying attention, and old Bessie swept her shit-smearred tail through that bucket of milk. Now, you know, that's what these intelligence guys do. You work hard and get a good program or policy going, and they sweep a shit-smearred tail through it."

The dynamics of the relationship between the White House and CIA and the lack of understanding of each other's perspective and motives are usually difficult for the players themselves to discern. They are even less clear to outside observers. While most journalists and academicians focus on alleged distortions of intelligence to support policy, the players know that the relationship actually is often characterized by disagreement on substance and suspicion of motives. To the extent intelligence professionals are isolated (or isolate themselves) from White House/NSC officials and are unresponsive to White House informational requirements or suggestions on strategy, this adversarial nature of the relationship will be emphasized.

Although the routine order of business and internal organization may vary from Administration to Administration, there are ways to improve this relationship and intelligence

support to the President. None is new. Efforts have been made to carry out most of the suggestions but they have been haphazard, transitory or obstructed by bureaucratic, cultural or attitudinal problems. This must change.

-- The DCI and his senior managers and the President and his staff must both promote and maintain close personal ties at all levels. Both must aggressively seek new ways to let intelligence officers in on policy initiatives under consideration or underway to figure out how intelligence can make a contribution, and how best to get intelligence information and assessments before the President. There should be closer contact on questions of long term intelligence strategy, investment and performance.

-- The role of the DCI is central to understanding the President's needs and conveying analysis to him. DCI aggressiveness in getting substantive matters before the President (and DCI access to the President) has varied greatly, though. The DCI should work closely with the National Security Adviser -- perhaps the best source of information on issues of topical interest to the President and the foreign affairs and defense agenda. Finally, the importance of feedback from the President and his national security team is critical.

Contrary to the views of some, we cannot properly do our work in splendid isolation -- and should not. Timeliness, relevance and objectivity are not incompatible.

- The responsibility for making intelligence more relevant, timely and helpful is not that of the DCI and senior officials of the Intelligence Community alone. The President and his senior national security team must take seriously their responsibility for the quality of intelligence support they get. They must be willing to make time for regular dialogue as to their intelligence requirements; for understanding intelligence capabilities, the impact of competing priorities for collection and analysis, and major investment decisions. They must be willing to play an active role in guiding intelligence strategy and determining priorities.


The above "suggestions" apply to improving the quality and usefulness of intelligence to the President. They will not resolve the several causes of Presidential displeasure -- intelligence support to Congress, revised assessments that have policy implications, surprises, and politically disagreeable assessments. Even here mitigating steps can and have been taken. More can be done. For example:

- Intelligence professionals should take the initiative to let the Security Adviser, the NSC Staff, or a Cabinet officer know when an estimate or other form of analysis will revise earlier assessments and have a significant impact on the President's policies. This would include, in particular, advance warning of new and important conclusions in military estimates. There is, of course, a risk that someone will try to change or stop publication of an unwelcome or embarrassing estimate. Here the DCI must and, I am confident, will, stand his ground to protect the integrity of the assessment and the process.

- Intelligence needs to develop a mechanism for better informing the White House about support provided to the Congress. The intelligence agencies are part of the Executive Branch; the DCI is appointed by and reports to the President. It is not improper or inappropriate for the Intelligence Community to keep the President's foreign affairs and Congressional affairs staff more completely and regularly advised of papers provided to the Congress, as well as possibly controversial testimony or briefings. Keeping the Executive informed about CIA dealings with Congress is an important aspect of building Presidential confidence that we are not

trying to undercut him or his policies when responding to legitimate Congressional requests.

- Finally, ground rules should be developed for the disclosure of declassified intelligence. The current lack of a systematic approach contributes to leaks; to White House suspicion of obstructionism, bureaucratic games or pursuit of a contrary policy agenda by intelligence professionals; and concern on the part of intelligence officers over the appearance (and sometimes the reality) of politicization of intelligence by White House or other policymaker-directed declassification of information. This is not a new problem, but it has worsened over the years. Many in the Executive Branch and Congress agree that intelligence information undergirding major policy decisions must often be made available for public education or to gain support for national security decisions. There is widespread demand for unclassified publication of intelligence assessments or research on issues of moment to the country. But who should make these decisions? This is not the place to propose solutions, but the problem exists and it seriously affects the relationship between the President and the intelligence agencies on the one hand and the Executive and Legislative Branches on the other.



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

DICK CHENEY
WYOMING

September 16, 1988

Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your get-well wishes, which meant a lot to me and my family. I am feeling better each day, and look forward to getting back into the swing of things in the near future.

It helps a lot to have good friends like you. Your thoughtfulness was most appreciated. Thanks again.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Dick Cheney', written in a cursive style.


Dick Cheney
Member of Congress

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
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515



Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505



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DICK CHENEY

80

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Washington, D.C. 20505

29 August 1988

The Honorable Dick Cheney
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Dick:

I have been following at a distance your travails in recent weeks. Please know that our thoughts and prayers are with you for a quick recovery.

Just to show my confidence that you will be "back in battery" soon, I hear all kinds of rumors about possible changes in your status in the House. Speaking personally, I hope that whatever changes occur, it will be possible for you to remain a member of the House Intelligence Committee. You are a highly constructive and well-informed member, and I very much enjoy working with you.

Again, we look forward to seeing you back on your feet just as soon as possible.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

DISSEM:

0- Addressee
~~1 - DDCL~~
1 - ER
1 - OCA



The usefulness of the CIA to Presidents in that area for which the CIA was primarily established -- collection, reporting, analysis and production of information -- at times has suffered because of self-imposed isolation by CIA and the lack of sustained interest, understanding and involvement by a President and his national security team. Lack of White House involvement at times has left intelligence professionals adrift amid conflicting priorities and requirements, with the inevitable price in relevance and timeliness.

CIA and the other US intelligence agencies represent an extraordinary national asset. The rebuilding of the Intelligence Community over the past decade has vastly augmented our collection and analysis capabilities and sharpened our skills. Congress has greatly enhanced its understanding of intelligence and shown a willingness -- even determination -- to provide guidance and direction, as well as funding. I believe the White House should assert more aggressively its proper intelligence policy direction and guidance role, and that CIA should welcome this role. Only thus can we seize the opportunity further to improve intelligence support to the President and, concomitantly, better serve the policymaking process.

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

29 August 1988

Maj Gen Stanley H. Hyman
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff
Army Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-1001

Dear Stan:

I have just been informed that it is now official that you will be the new Commander of U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, replacing Ed Soyster. They could not have chosen a better man for the job, and I wish you every success.

I look forward to continuing to work with you in the Intelligence Community.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Dissem:

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1- C/PCS/DO
1- ~~DDCI~~
1 - ER



15

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

New Commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff

DATE

25 August 1988

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED FORWARDED

1. O/DDO
Rm. 7E26, OHB

MG Stan Hyman informed me this morning that it is now official that he will be the new Commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) replacing MG Harry "Ed" Soyster, who is moving to be Director of DIA. The change of command ceremony for INSCOM is scheduled for 22 November 1988.

cc: 3 / DDCI
DI/CPAS
O/DDA
D/DA/OS
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C/DO
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

30 August 1988

Adm. Bobby R. Inman, USN (Ret.)



Dear Bob,

It was good to talk to you after too long a time since our last conversation. I am glad you and Nancy were able to get away on the cruise despite the incredible undertaking in the business world in which you were engaged.

Enclosed is the article that I agreed to do for The Washington Quarterly. It will be published at the end of November.

Hope to see you soon.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosure
As Stated

16

An Opportunity Unfulfilled
The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence at the White House

Robert M. Gates

"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at one goal -- producing accurate reliable intelligence.... Who are the customers who get this finished product? At the very top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency's most important customer."

(CIA Information Pamphlet)

What have our most important customers had to say about how well we achieve that goal?

"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence."

Jimmy Carter, 1978

"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"

Richard Nixon, 1970

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA	X			
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
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15	D/PERS		X		
16	D/Ex Staff				
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Remarks

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ER 88-3374/1



Executive Secretary

30 AUG 88

Date

3637 (10-81)

Washington D.C. 20505


30 August 1988

Mr. William J. Lavery
Professor
History Department
Furman University
Greenville, South Carolina 29613

Dear Bill:

It was good to hear from you after so long a time. You must be something of an institution by now. Whoever thought any of us would settle down for so long in one place. I didn't dream of a career here; it just sort of happened. In any event, you must be enjoying it there.

STAT



If at some point you find that you are going to be in Washington with some advance notice, please send me a note. I would very much like to have a sandwich with you and catch up on the last twenty years.

Regards,

STAT



Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence




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FURMAN UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
GREENVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA
29613



Dr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505



Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/31 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000300100001-6

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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16	D/Ex Staff				
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SUSPENSE _____

Date

Remarks

STAT

[Signature] Executive Secretary

30 Au-88

Date

3637 (10-81)

Washington, D.C. 20505

30 August 1988

Lt Gen James A. Abrahamson, USAF
Director
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-7100

Dear Abe:

STAT
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Just a note to thank you for your completion of tour comments on [redacted]. There have been few instances in my experience in which a DCI detailee to a military organization has made as great a contribution -- and been as favorably regarded -- [redacted] has in the SDIO. I think that his substantive knowledge and personal approach to dealing with both SDIO and the Intelligence Community have made his tour an exceptionally successful one, as you so clearly describe in your memo.

STAT
He could not have had such success, however, had it not been for your continued support and cooperation. I want to thank you for that. His replacement has a big pair of shoes to fill, but I have no doubt he will build on the strong foundation put in place [redacted].

STAT
Again, thanks for your comments. You may rest assured they will be included in his personnel file.

STAT
Regards,

[redacted]

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

18

ROUTING SLIP

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	4 D/ICS				
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	7 DDO				
	8 DDS&T				
	9 Chm/NIC				
	10 GC				
	11 IG				
	12 Compt				
	13 D/OCA				
	14 D/PAO				
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		SUSPENSE _____			
		Date			

Remarks
 To #17: Please ensure that a copy of the att memo is placed in personnel file.

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ER 88-3386X

Executive Secretary
 29 Aug '88
 Date

3637 (10-81)

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ROUTING SLIP

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8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	D/CCISCMO	X			
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SUSPENSE _____

Date

Remarks To # 17: Please Note suspense date of COB, 9 Sep 88.

STAT _____

Executive Secretary

30 Aug 88

Date

3637 (10-81)

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2012/07/31 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000300100001-6

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2012/07/31 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000300100001-6

30 August 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

Director, Community Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Staff

FROM:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Improving Our Counterintelligence and Countermeasures Posture

1. As you know, on the Director's behalf on 21 June I asked the Chairmen of the IG-CI, IG-CM(P) and the IG-CM(T) for their candid views on outstanding problems in the areas of their responsibility.

2. We now have the submissions from the three Chairmen. They are, as we had hoped, substantive and forthright. Both the DCI and I have read them. We believe there is considerable food for thought. There are also items for action in the submissions.

3. We would appreciate your examining the three reports and identifying for us those areas in which the IG Chairmen identify significant resource problems, those in which bureaucratic difficulties pose problems, specific tasks that have proven impractical, and other possible areas where concrete recommendations can be assembled from the submissions. Where there are resource issues, we would appreciate your working with [Redacted] to rank these in importance both for our information and for consideration for the DCI's investment wedge.

4. We would appreciate your views along the lines addressed above by COB 9 September.

[Redacted Signature]

Robert M. Gates

Attachments:
As Stated

cc: Director, Intelligence Community Staff

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

19

~~SECRET~~

SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP (INTELLIGENCE)
INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
CHAIRMAN
SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP/INTELLIGENCE

FROM: *WSS* William S. Sessions
Chairman
Interagency Group/Counterintelligence

SUBJECT: IMPROVING OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERMEASURES POSTURE

This communication is classified "Secret" in its
entirety.

This communication responds to a memorandum from Acting
Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates, dated June 21,
1988, captioned "Improving Our Counterintelligence (CI) and
Countermeasures (CM) Posture." Mr. Gates requested that I
outline the problem areas within the purview of the Interagency
Group/Counterintelligence (IG/CI) as they relate to the
"President's Report to the Congress on the Nation's
Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Plans, Programs,
and Capabilities."

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SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP (INTELLIGENCE)
INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERMEASURES (POLICY)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

ICS 0884-88
20 July 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Craig Alderman, Jr.
Chairman

25X1 SUBJECT: Obstacles to Task Implementation


25X1 REFERENCE: Acting Director of Central Intelligence memorandum,
21 June 1988; subject: Improving our Counterintelligence
and Countermeasures Posture

25X1 1. This correspondence responds to cited reference, which requested my personal, uncoordinated assessment of problems impacting those outstanding tasks currently assigned to the IG/CM(P). The principal focus of this request was on the unfinished agenda accrued from issues detailed in the September 1986 President's Report to Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. However, IG/CM(P) deliberations have also included several recommendations contained in the related SSCI report. The comments in this memorandum therefore pertain to issues assigned and accepted from both reports.

25X1 2. From the outset, let me say that comparing the number of actions completed with the number remaining to be accomplished is not a valid measure of progress in any but the grossest sense. Admittedly, there is no agreed measure of intrinsic worth of individual tasks in the security arena. Nevertheless, much has been accomplished that is meaningful and of significant benefit to our overall security posture. Many of the tasks or problems that remain before us are, however, intractable, impractical, or both.

25X1 3. I find it revealing that, to date, none of the more traditional problems of interagency work have played a significant role in efforts to resolve tasks assumed by the IG/CM(P). Parochial and turf considerations have been minimal, the bureaucracy has been largely cooperative, and difficult issues are receiving adequate attention as appropriate. The SIG-I system has proven to be workable, but I have also found that it must be led aggressively.

25X1 Downgrade to CONFIDENTIAL when separated
from SECRET attachments



~~SECRET~~

25X1 SUBJECT: Obstacles to Task Implementation

4. I see the dominant obstacles inhibiting faster or more thorough completion of my assigned tasks as falling into four generic, but often overlapping, categories. The impact of each category of obstacle varies. These categories are outlined below without regard to what would necessarily be a subjective judgment as to priority of importance. The discussion of each category also identifies an attachment that contains examples of tasks impacted by the cited obstacle(s).

Pending Decisions and Authorities

Action on several outstanding issues is in large part directly dependent on pending National Security Council and White House decisions regarding a proposed personnel security executive order and the Information Security Oversight Office's initiatives. At this point, additional contingency planning on the potential outcome of decisions would be nonproductive. Please see Attachment 1.

Time to Implement

This category is directly affected by general perceptions as well as by interpretation of the word "resolution." Both factors have the potential to generate criticism. In several instances we have initiated the mechanisms that can cause ultimate resolution of tasks assigned. Completion of these tasks, in some cases, will take time, and some are even open ended. Immediate results, therefore, may be difficult to define. Without immediate results there may be a tendency by some to perceive either non or slow accomplishment since no move to closure of the task may be apparent. On the other hand, "resolution" by development of a task-facilitating mechanism is only a first step. It will be important to guard against a dusting of the hands and a walk away attitude of "look what I did!" We must take exceptional care, therefore, to ensure effective follow up on those tasks that fall into this category.

Many tasks in this category are also impacted by the obstacle of pending decisions and authorities outside the purview of the SIG-I. Please see Attachments 1 and 2.

Desirable but Impractical

The atmosphere surrounding the period of development of the Presidential and SSCI reports promoted a super-conscientious review of our counterintelligence and security countermeasures needs and desires. In that environment it was perhaps inevitable that, despite careful review, a number of noble, but ultimately impractical, tasks were sanctioned or accepted as policy intentions.

25X1 SUBJECT: Obstacles to Task Implementation

25X1 It was in making the subsequent detailed examination of how these tasks might reasonably be implemented that we ascertained their true parameters. As a result, attempts are being made to salvage the intent of the tasks where possible by tailoring the scope. In a few instances, it may be that we will have forged a consensus among member departments and agencies that certain tasks are not "doable." There are a limited number of other tasks that may have to be left undone because of the dubious value in return versus the resources required to carry out the tasks. Please see Attachment 3.

Dollar Resources

25X1 This obstacle cuts across every assigned issue. There are no real surprises here. As recognized in your budget guidance letter, resource constraints and mounting requirements demand that we continually reassess our programs to reduce the resources we devote to activities that are "nice to do" or even "important to do." We are now entering a period when the criterion should be "must do." As previously suggested, our enthusiasm, as well as that of the Congress and the executive, to do the "right things" regarding national security has put on our plate many issues which, on reflection, do not fall under the "must do" heading. Sustaining Congressional interest in funding important security initiatives appears to become proportionally more difficult as time elapses between significant security incidents. A variety of issues is affected by these circumstances. Please see Attachment 4.

25X1 5. In specific regard to the President's report only, the IG/CM(P) was assigned 45 tasks. To date, 25 have been completed and the completion of another 12 is imminent, bringing the total to 37. Of the remaining eight tasks, three relate to the authorities obstacle, two are impacted by time, one is impractical, and two are affected by available dollar resources. These tasks are further discussed in the attachments.

25X1 6. The IG/CM(P) will continue to pursue resolution of all assigned issues. As mentioned, a prominent role for the IG will be that of following up on the solutions that have been put into place. Obtaining expeditious national authority decisions, structured followup on the implementation of in-place policy decisions, and sustaining an adequate dollar flow into both necessary security initiatives and ongoing security programs are the keys to continued effective progress. We can manage the followup requirements; I view that as a prominent role for the IG. We will need assistance, however, with the first and last requirements.

25X1 SUBJECT: Obstacles to Task Implementation

25X1 7. My next input to the President's status report will diminish the emphasis on percentages of tasks accomplished and will reflect more on the approach presented in this memorandum report to you.


Craig Alderman, Jr.

Attachments:

1. Discussion Paper -- Pending Decisions and Authorities
2. Discussion Paper -- Time to Implement
3. Discussion Paper -- Desirable but Impractical
4. Discussion Paper -- Dollar Resources

cc:

Chairman, IG/CI
Chairman, IG/CM(T)
Director, ICS

25X1 SUBJECT: Obstacles to Task Implementation

25X1 CCISCMO/ICS

Distribution of ICS 0884-88

Original - Addressee (DCI) (w/atts)

1 - DDCI (w/atts)

1 - William Sessions, Director, FBI (Chairman, IG/CI) (w/atts)

1 - Charles Hawkins, Dep Asst Sec Def (Intelligence)
(Chairman, IG/CM(T) (w/atts)

1 - Director, Intelligence Community Staff (w/atts)

1 - Craig Alderman, DUSD(P) (w/atts)

25X1 1 - D/OS/CIA (Chairman, Personnel Security Committee)
(w/atts)

1 - Marvin Doig, State (Chairman, Physical Security Committee (w/atts)

1 - Ray Pollari, OSD (Chairman, National OPSEC Advisory Committee)
(w/atts)

1 - Maynard Anderson, OSD (Chairman, Information Security Committee)
(w/atts)

1 - IG/CM(P) subject (w/atts)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Improving our Counterintelligence and Countermeasures Posture (U)				
FROM: Charles A. Hawkins Dep Asst Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)		EXTENSION	NO. ER 88-2577X/3	
			DATE 15 Jul 88	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DDCI		<i>14 Jul 88</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<p>ES to DDCI: Haven't received Sessions or Alderman's response, as yet.</p> <p><i>DCI - This is a good, thoughtful memo from Hawkins (response to our request to chairmen of the IGs for their personal views of problems in CI & CM.)</i></p> <p><i>I suggest we not disseminate any copies until we get all three. We can then discuss</i></p>
2.				
3. DCI				
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STAT Diane _____

Have made no dissem = at some point
cy to ICS? []

not yet



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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

2577-88

21 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William S. Sessions
 Chairman
 Interagency Group/Counterintelligence

FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Improving Our Counterintelligence and
 Countermeasures Posture

25X1

1. The Chairman of the SIG(I), Director Webster, has approved and signed to the National Security Advisor the third biannual report for the President on the President's Report to the Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. He was pleased with the report, especially the continuing progress it reflects toward implementation of measures to improve our counterintelligence and countermeasures posture.

25X1

2. While the report is an accurate one, Judge Webster and I believe that its very positive tone may obscure some real problems in addressing the unfinished agenda for strengthening CI and CM. In fact, there is very little indication in the submitted reports of problems and obstacles to further progress.

25X1

3. Accordingly, the Chairman of the SIG(I) would value a personal report from you on outstanding problems in the area of responsibility of your interagency group. For example, in what areas specifically have parochial or turf problems inhibited faster or better progress? In what areas is there a genuine resources problem? Are there elements of the bureaucracy simply going through the motions? If, as memo indicates, an estimated 70% of the assigned tasks have been completed or programmed, to what degree are the really tough problems in the other 30%?

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25X1

4. In short, the DCI would appreciate having from you, a personal, uncoordinated memorandum outlining problem areas within the purview of your interagency group. While there is no question that significant progress has been made over the

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past year or so, we are concerned that important problems are either being set aside or haggled to death in the bureaucracy. If there were no such problems, this undertaking would be unique in the history of government. To be able to address these problems in a sensible and effective way we need more specific information and solicit your help in that regard. We hope you will be candid; your replies will be held tightly. We would appreciate your report by 15 July 1988.

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25X1

Robert M. Gates

cc: Director, Community Counterintelligence and
Security Countermeasures Office,
Intelligence Community Staff

~~SECRET~~

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

2577/1-88

21 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Charles A. Hawkins, Jr.
Chairman
Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Technical)

FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Improving Our Counterintelligence and
Countermeasures Posture

25X1

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Robert M. Gates

cc: Director, Community Counterintelligence and
Security Countermeasures Office,
Intelligence Community Staff

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

2577/2-88

21 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Craig Alderman, Jr.
Chairman
Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Policy)

FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Improving Our Counterintelligence and
Countermeasures Posture

25X1 1. The Chairman of the SIG(I), Director Webster, has approved and signed to the National Security Advisor the third biannual report for the President on the President's Report to the Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. He was pleased with the report, especially the continuing progress it reflects toward implementation of measures to improve our counterintelligence and countermeasures posture.

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25X1
25X1

Robert M. Gates

cc: Director, Community Counterintelligence and
Security Countermeasures Office,
Intelligence Community Staff

31 August 1988

DDCI:

RE: Speaking Invitation
Institute for Risk Research
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
22 September 1988

Associate Director of the Institute for Risk Research at Waterloo University, John H. Shortreed, has invited you or a senior representative to participate in a short course in strategic decisionmaking, on Thursday, 22 September 1988 in Toronto. The one-day course, Conflicts: Managing, Resolving, Winning, is being sponsored by the Institute for Risk Research and its purpose is to teach formal techniques for solving complex management problems in conflict situations. The course will involve workshops in which several real case studies are analyzed, based on attendees' personal experiences or their current concerns.

While this appears to be an excellent issue to address, a foreign university is not an appropriate forum. Therefore I recommend that you decline this invitation. If you agree, a letter of regret is attached for your signature.

[Redacted Signature]

Bill Baker

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STAT DCI/PAO/WMB [Redacted]

STAT Distribution: [Redacted]

- Orig. - Addressee
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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

01 SEP 1988

Mr. John H. Shortreed
Associate Director
Institute for Risk Research
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1

Dear Mr. Shortreed:

Thank you for your invitation to participate in Conflicts: Managing, Resolving, Winning in Toronto on September 22nd. I am sure that it will be a most interesting course. However, my schedule is such that I cannot make a commitment for that date, and unfortunately, our other senior Agency officers' time is also heavily committed so that they are not able to attend.

I wish you all a very successful day.

Sincerely,

/s/ Robert M. Gates

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

University of Waterloo

Institute for Risk Research
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1

(519) 885-1211
Telex 069-55-259



Executive Registry

88-3183X

August 12, 1988

Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Gates:

An important function of an organization's leadership is the skillful management of conflict situations. Decision making under conditions of uncertainty and conflict, whether external or internal to the firm, is the essence of the executive's task. In the long run, the vitality and even the viability of the organization are governed by the sound management of conflict.

During the past few years, conflict analysis has been developed into a fully operational set of procedures that can be applied to virtually any conflict arising over the spectrum of human activities. Leaders of well-managed institutions can greatly benefit from a knowledge of this valuable set of tools. A short course on strategic decision making, Conflicts: Managing, Resolving, Winning is being sponsored by the Institute for Risk Research and will be held in Toronto on September 22, 1988. We invite you to take part.

This course is aimed at executives and their advisors in industry and government. Its purpose is to provide understanding of and experience with the techniques of conflict analysis. The subject comprises a set of general methodologies, implemented in easy-to-use computer programs. Strategic problems are modelled by placing the information into a structured framework to predict the possible outcomes that are feasible socially, politically and technically. A participant in a dispute can behave optimally by selecting a course of action leading to the most preferred joint position.

The course presents the analytic procedures and includes extensive workshops as a forum where several real case studies are examined. The case studies are based on the attendees' personal experiences or reflect their current concerns. The sessions are small and off-the-record, and you should be prepared to be active in the discussion so that a realistic study can be made of conflicts of current interest.

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The Course Leaders are internationally recognized for their development of the modern discipline of conflict analysis:

Dr. Niall M. Fraser, P.Eng.
Department of Management Sciences, University of Waterloo

Dr. Keith W. Hipel, P.Eng.
Department of Systems Design Engineering, University of Waterloo

Dr. D. Marc Kilgour
Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University

I enclose a detailed announcement and a registration form. Telephone registration will be regarded as firm and should be made to Jean Webster at this institute (Telephone: (519) 885-1211, ext. 3355; Telex: 069-55-259). I hope that you or a senior representative will take the time to join us for the course.

Yours sincerely,



John H. Shortreed
Associate Director

/am

Encl.