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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

14 July 1988

TO: Roy Godson

Roy -

As you may know, Brad Roberts at The Washington Quarterly has asked me to do an article to accompany your and Anne Armstrong's articles. I have offered a revised and updated version of this earlier article with the advantage of nearly eight years more perspective. There are a number of things I would change or update although the basic message would remain the same. I would appreciate your not sharing it with anyone else until I have the opportunity to do that.

I think it does get at the underlying premise of the "second school" of intelligence that you discuss in your Introduction, particularly with respect to the relationship with the policymaker.

Regards,

RMG.

Robert M. Gates

Enclosure:
As Stated

CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
16 JUNE 1988

THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALLED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A \$2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.

AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNITY PARTY.

Winter 1980

*"Intelligence is like money and love:
there is never enough."*

— A Senior White House Official

AN OPPORTUNITY UNFULFILLED

The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence Analysis at the White House

Robert M. Gates

OUR GOAL

"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at one goal—producing accurate reliable intelligence. . . . Who are the customers who get this finished product? At the very top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency's most important customer."

—Intelligence: The Acme of Skill
(CIA Information Pamphlet)

And what have our most important customers and their principal assistants had to say about how well we achieve that goal?

"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence."

— Jimmy Carter, 1978

"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"

— Richard Nixon, 1970

"In the 1960s and early 1970s, for eleven years in a row, the Central Intelligence Agency underestimated the number of missiles the Russians would deploy; at the same time the CIA also underestimated the totality of the Soviet program effort and its ambitious goals. . . . Thanks in part to this intelligence blunder we will find ourselves looking down the nuclear barrel in the mid-1980s."

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"CIA Director McCone . . . made recommendations for checking and improving the quality of intelligence reporting. I promptly accepted the suggestions. . . ."

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"During the rush of . . . events in the final days of 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the interests of the United States."

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14 JUL 88

Date

3637 (10-81)

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

July 14, 1988

Mr. Arnold Beichman

[redacted] B.C.

Canada [redacted]

Dear Arnold:

I just read your piece in The Washington Times of 13 July. I think you may be one of only a handful of people in the world who picked up on Zagladin's comments on the Soviet approach to warfighting and the winnability of nuclear conflict. As Fritz Ermarth said to me, it is nice after all these years for those of us who were in the minority to have had such clear confirmation of our views.

There is nothing in this letter for use in your writings; just a kudo for your sharp eye.

I am headed to the Olympic Peninsula next week to do some backpacking and make contact with the real world. Enjoy B.C.!

Regards,

Bob.

Robert M. Gates

PS: You made life a bit uncomfortable for me when you explicitly put me in opposition to the President in your column.

DDCI/RMGates [redacted]

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ARNOLD BEICHMAN

The Zagladin revelations

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Many startling revelations about the squalid Soviet past have surfaced since Mikhail Gorbachev's "glasnost" ("glasnost" + "perestroika") became a fact of Soviet life. None has been as striking and as disquieting as a public statement by a high Soviet official, Vadim V. Zagladin, at a press conference in Moscow June 25. I want to quote it word for word as it appeared in the Los Angeles Times the next day under the byline of Michael Parks:

"While we rejected nuclear war and struggled to prevent it, we nevertheless based our policy on the possibility of winning one." (emphasis added).

This admission by the deputy head of the international department of the Communist Party's Central Committee is riveting because it confirms a finding by Professor Richard Pipes published in *Commentary Magazine* in July 1977 — 11 years ago! — under the unambiguous title, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight & Win a Nuclear War." It took only 11 years for this confession finally to emerge from the lips of a Soviet spokesman.

The article by a leading Harvard historian and analyst of Soviet affairs created a sensation at the time because it flew in the face of the belief widely held by liberals in and out of Congress, the media, the scientific academy and the CIA, plus not so surprisingly, Henry Kissinger, that the MAD (mutually assured destruction) Doctrine had been accepted by both sides. Therefore, it was claimed, (1) a "first strike" Soviet Union nuclear attack on the United States was precluded and nuclear superiority was meaningless and (2) the Soviet strategic buildup was no menace to American national security.

On the contrary, said Mr. Pipes, the Soviet Union in no way shares the MAD Doctrine. Mr. Kissinger, however, was arguing that, "The traditional mode of military analysis which saw in war a continuation of politics but with its own appropriate means is no longer applicable." As

Mr. Pipes wrote, Mr. Kissinger "can always be counted upon to utter commonplaces in the tone of prophetic revelation." Not until the Reagan administration came to power (and Mr. Pipes became a staff member of the National Security Council) was MAD dismissed as an article of U.S. strategic faith.

The Pipes article repudiated the conventional wisdom, held so tenaciously, which minimized the Soviet strategic threat. He quoted Soviet journals in which military spokesmen were arguing that it was erroneous to claim that there would be no victor in a thermonuclear world war. While Soviet military thinking was patently concentrated on how to win a war, U.S. strategic thinking was concentrated on arms control.

The reason for the attack on Mr. Pipes was that he was apprehensive about the quasi-unilateral disarmament

of the United States in the mid-1960s. Believing in MAD, the United States froze its ICBMs at 1,054 and dismantled nearly all its defenses against enemy bombers. Meanwhile the Soviet Union deployed 11 new strategic systems in the 1970s as against just one by the United States.

In the summer of 1976, the Harvard historian had been appointed by President Ford chairman of what was called "Team B," established at the recommendation of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, to prepare an alternative estimate of Soviet strategic objectives to the estimate prepared by the CIA. Team B's subsequent report was a devastating refutation of MAD, the CIA analysis of the Soviet arms buildup and of the scientific community's political beliefs in "deterrence-through-agreement" as against Edward Teller's advocacy of deterrence through strength. Team B concluded that the Soviet Union was developing a first-strike capability which could only mean that the Soviet Union thought it could fight and win a nuclear war.

The attacks on Mr. Pipes and Team B came fast and furious from

Democratic Sens. Gary Hart of Colorado and William Proxmire of Wisconsin, from a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report prepared under the egregious William G. Miller, its then staff director, from the Harvard chemist, George Kristiakowsky, and, inevitably, from The New York Times and The Washington Post editorial pages. Sens. Malcolm Wallop, Wyoming Republican, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, New York Democrat, stood with Mr. Pipes and Team B. All of this Mr. Pipes reported in another Commentary article, October 1986, commemorating the 10th anniversary of Team B's report which President Reagan adopted after his inauguration in 1981.

And now at long last comes the vindication of Mr. Pipes by Vadim V. Zagladin. Sweet though that vindication may be, disquieting questions, despite the Zagladin deposition, still remain:

Has the Soviet Union given up the idea of strategic superiority? Does the Soviet Politburo still think its military forces could fight and win a nuclear war? Please put the answers in writing and a guarantee of on-site inspection.

Arnold Beichman, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a Washington Times columnist.

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[Signature]
Executive Secretary
14 JUL 88
Date

Washington, D.C. 20505

July 14, 1988

Mr. Brad Roberts
Executive Editor
The Washington Quarterly
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006


Dear Mr. Roberts:

Enclosed is the declassified version of my Studies in Intelligence article on the use of intelligence analysis at the White House. It was published in the winter of 1980.

I have reviewed it and, depending upon the time available, could update it. (There are a number of things that I would change or revise from this more distant vantage point and I could include some material relating to the Reagan Administration.) I note also that there are some typographical and other errors that would need to be corrected.


Why don't you take a look at it and either write back or call me to discuss further. I would appreciate no further copies being made and no use of the article or any part of it without the revisions I described above and my review of the final version. I will be leaving town the end of next week. If you can get back to me before next Friday, I may be able to do some work on it while I am out of town.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

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WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

Office of the Editor

July 1, 1988

Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:


Thank you very much for your letter of June 22 following up my invitation to you to contribute an essay to The Washington Quarterly. I would like to pursue your suggestion.

Your existing but unpublished essay on the use of intelligence at the White House could make a strong complement to the essays by Anne Armstrong and Roy Godson. We are not at all averse to having an author rework existing material, so long as it has not been published elsewhere.

How do we proceed? Perhaps it would be best if you sent me a copy of the existing draft and then we could trade ideas about how it might be revised and updated and in what timeframe.

Thank you again for your interest in contributing an essay to our pages.

Best regards,



Brad Roberts
Executive Editor

The Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20006, Telephone: (202) 887-0200
Cable Address: CENSTRAT Telex: 7108229583

Winter 1980

*"Intelligence is like money and loaves:
there is never enough."*

— A Senior White House Official

AN OPPORTUNITY UNFULFILLED

The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence Analysis at the White House

Robert M. Gates

OUR GOAL

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Opportunity Unfulfilled

become too routine they lose all significance; when reports are not called specifically to the attention of the top leadership they are lost in bureaucratic background noise, particularly since for every admonitory report one can probably find also its opposite in the files."

— Henry Kissinger, *Memoirs*

"During the past year, I have seen no clandestine reporting from Soviet sources that significantly influenced my judgment on how to deal with the Soviet Union. . . . The Intelligence Community must find ways to sharpen and improve its analysis. . . . We see too many papers on subjects peripheral to our interests. . . . Too often the papers we see explain or review events in the past and give only a bare nod to the future."

— Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1978

During the darkest days of revelations about CIA by the Rockefeller Commission and the Church and Pike Committees, professional intelligence officers clung to the notion that, whatever misdeeds might have occurred, throughout its history CIA had rendered exceptional service to American Presidents by producing the finest analysis based on the best human and technical sources in the world. We judged our contribution to White House decisionmaking on issues of moment and events great and small, and found it outstanding. This contribution made us, in our view, indispensable and cemented a special relationship between several Presidents and CIA. Have we been so long and so deeply mistaken? Has an entire Agency of people who specialize in political nuance, subtle signals and human relationships deluded itself and over a generation totally miscalculated the value of its work to six very different Presidents? The above quotations would suggest so. After all, they *did* in fact say those terrible things about us—and still are.

The way intelligence is processed at the White House and how it is received and regarded behind the scenes has never been clear to CIA, even at senior levels, except in broadest outline. It is time to lift a corner of that curtain in order that intelligence professionals might better understand what happens at the White House to the product of our collection and analysis, what the President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs expect, what they see, how it is processed, how they react—and, finally, whether they really mean what they say about us.

SETTING THE SCENE

To understand how intelligence is used and regarded at the White House first requires an understanding of the context in which it is received. The sheer volume of paperwork addressed to the President is staggering. Hundreds of federal employees in more than 200 agencies seek to draw his attention to this or that program, proposal or vital piece of information. An astonishing amount of their work survives departmental review and finds its way to the White House. There these papers join a river of correspondence to the President from countless consultants, academics, think tanks, political contacts, family and friends, political supporters, journalists, authors, foreign leaders, and concerned citizens. (Lest you think such correspondence can easily be disregarded, it is my view that most Presidents often attach as much—if not more—credibility to the views of family, (old) friends and private contacts as they do to those of executive agencies. Vice President Rockefeller once asked my office if Denmark really was planning to sell Greenland. Wondering all the while if he was in the market, we confirmed with CIA that this rumor from a private source was untrue. But Rockefeller had taken it seriously.)

It is the responsibility of the Domestic Policy Staff, the NSC, other Executive offices, and the White House Office itself to impose order on this avalanche of pulp and to reduce it to proportions manageable by someone who works 15-16 hours a day, often seven days a week. The NSC alone processes 7,000-10,000 "action" papers a year—not including intelligence analyses or other purely "informational" papers. Dr. Brzezinski once asked me to calculate how many pages of reading he sent to the President weekly; the total averaged many hundreds of pages—and among White House offices the NSC is among the most stringent with respect to the length and number of items going to the President. These, then, are the first hurdles that an intelligence product faces: a president with a heavy schedule, inundated by paper and demands for decisions, surrounded by senior assistants who have as a main role trying to keep that President from being overwhelmed by paper; and a President with vast and varied non-intelligence sources upon which he also relies and in which he often has considerable confidence.

WHAT HE GETS

The President routinely receives only one intelligence product that is not summarized or commented upon by someone outside the Community: *The President's Daily Brief*. He is handed this by his National Security Adviser early every morning, along with a package that has varied little from President to President: a few (3-6) State and CIA cables of special significance; occasionally a typescript, sensitive intelligence report from the DCI; selected wire service items; State or CIA situation reports (never both) if there is a crisis abroad; and often from the NSC and State/INR morning cable summaries. Contrary to what is commonly believed, this is the only regularly scheduled package of current intelligence the President receives during the day. However, through the course of the day, the National Security Adviser keeps the President apprised of significant developments overseas and may handcarry especially important cables directly to the President. In a crisis, the flow of information increases. More analysis and reports will be given to the President. He will receive current intelligence orally in meetings with his senior White House, State, Defense and Intelligence advisers, as well as from the media—often the first source of information. Nevertheless, on a day-to-day basis apart from the *PDB*, successive Presidents generally have seen only that current intelligence selected by the National Security Adviser, who works to make that morning package as succinct and small as he responsibly can.

It was not always this way—even in modern times. Before the Kennedy Administration, the President, his National Security Adviser and the NSC Staff relied almost entirely on CIA and State to provide incoming current intelligence as soon as it was processed by their operations centers and circulated to substantive officials who could decide what to send to the White House. This system was revolutionized, however, when President Kennedy created the White House Situation Room to which CIA, State, NSA and the Pentagon began to provide unprocessed intelligence information electronically. Thus, the NSC and President began receiving intelligence and diplomatic cables on developments abroad often as soon as, and often before, intelligence analysts. (The present system is not without flaws, however. Henry Kissinger observes in his memoirs, for example, that, "*It is a common myth that high officials are informed immediately about significant events. . . . It happens not infrequently—much too frequently for the security adviser's emotional stability—that even the President learns of a significant occurrence from the newspapers.*" He notes that President Nixon learned of the historic 1969 meeting in Beijing between Kosygin and Chou En-Lai when he read about it in *The Washington Star*. One result of the establishment of the Situation Room was a significant diminution in the value of current intelligence publications that to this day has not been fully grasped by the

Opportunity Unfulfilled

Intelligence Community. Only analysis by experienced intelligence specialists lent (and lends) value to current intelligence provided the White House. Daily publications reporting purely factual information without trenchant analysis—apart from Situation Reports on crises—too often have been duplicative, too late and irrelevant. Thanks to the Situation Room, urgent information from abroad is often in the President's hands before reaching the DCI, other senior intelligence officials, and sometimes the media.

Naturally, the President receives information through channels other than the early morning folder and the occasional cable during the day. For example, President Carter routinely received current and longrange intelligence analysis through regular briefings by the DCI. Such frequent sessions specifically devoted to analysis were an innovation under Carter and provided an opportunity that did not exist before 1977 for interchange among the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and National Security Adviser on substantive intelligence issues. DCI Bush on occasion gave President Ford personal analytical briefings and, of course, analytical matters would often come up spontaneously during Bush's twice-weekly meetings with the President. All DCIs also have briefed the President and his senior advisers routinely in formal meetings of the National Security Council. Moreover, discussion at such meetings serves to convey information to the President from diverse sources. The President also receives abbreviated versions of intelligence assessments which are included in policy options papers.

President Carter saw fewer CIA assessments, NIEs, research papers and other longer range studies than either Presidents Ford or Nixon. This is due primarily to greater encouragement during the latter two Administrations for the NSC Staff to prepare "Information Memoranda" summarizing for the President the salient points of such longer intelligence papers and attaching the full text. The only longer intelligence reports to reach President Carter were those the DCI delivered personally or the infrequent instances when the National Security Adviser forwarded an exceptional one for the President's reading. Thus, while under Nixon and Ford virtually no major intelligence study reached the President without an NSC cover memorandum summarizing it and perhaps making independent comments or judgments, many more reports reached their desks than reached Mr. Carter. The NSC Staff was not encouraged to forward such studies, due in large measure to reluctance to burden the President with additional—and optional—reading: again, the consequence of the volume of paper coming into the White House. This was due in part to President Carter's penchant to read an entire paper—not just the summary—and the consequent effort to avoid diverting him with "interesting" versus "essential" reading.

In sum, each of the last three Presidents has received through regular channels only a tiny portion of published intelligence and only a fraction even of analysis specifically prepared for senior policymakers. This has placed a premium on the *PDB*—an opportunity neglected until recently—and on the willingness of the DCI to give important assessments (published or oral) directly to the President or call them to the direct attention of the National Security Adviser. (Even personal transmittal slips to the latter are of little value since as everyone resorts to this device and thus render it too common to be effective.) Disinterest or reluctance on the part of a DCI to take an activist role is a severe—even irreparable—handicap to ensuring that intelligence assessments are read by the President and the National Security Adviser.

WHAT PRESIDENTS THINK OF WHAT THEY GET

Perhaps in recognition of how busy Presidents are for years there has been an adage at the White House that the absence of criticism should be regarded as praise. Along these lines, Presidential comment on intelligence assessments are so rare that we

are understandably tempted to assume satisfaction with what is being received. Regrettably, however, this is doubtful. Many of the infrequent comments we do receive are critical and, more importantly, Presidents have repeatedly (during or after their term of office) expressed general dissatisfaction with broad aspects of intelligence analysis—as for example President Carter did in his well-known note to the Secretary of State, DCI, and National Security Adviser in November 1978, and as President Nixon did both while in office and in his memoirs. Mr Nixon often criticized CIA analysis of the Soviet Union and Europe for not being sufficiently "tough-minded." Kissinger also presumably reflected both Nixon's and Ford's dissatisfaction when he would assail CIA's failure to predict various developments or events abroad, or for preparing "flabby" assessments that he regarded as written from the standpoint of a bureaucrat of the subject country rather than of the United States Government.

These and other principals—note the introductory quotes of this article—also have faulted the Agency for lack of imagination in anticipating the needs of the President and for insufficient aggressiveness in keeping itself informed on policy issues under consideration. Neither these Presidents nor their Assistants for National Security Affairs felt it their responsibility to keep senior Agency officials well informed in this regard, to provide day-to-day detailed tasking or to provide helpful feedback. The Agency had to depend for such guidance on what the DCI could pick up in high-level meetings and contacts—and the skill and interest of different DCIs has varied greatly in both.

Of the three Administrations I served at the NSC, the Carter team worked most conscientiously to inform CIA of the analytical needs of the President and constructively to advise the Agency of perceived shortcomings in its analysis, especially with respect to subject, timing and form. President Carter personally communicated his concerns and criticisms.

Perhaps the most comprehensive White House guidance (and indication of the President's views) in recent years was provided by Dr. Brzezinski in January 1978, when he sent a memorandum to the DCI that made the following points:

- Greater attention needs to be paid to clandestine collection targeted on the thinking and planning of key leaders or groups in important advanced and secondary countries, how they make policy decisions and how they will react to U.S. decisions and those of other powers.
- Political analyses should be focused more on problems of particular concern to the U.S. Government. Too many papers are on subjects peripheral to U.S. interests or offer broad overviews not directly linked to particular problems, events or developments of concern to the U.S. Government.
- There needs to be greater attention to the future. More papers are needed that briefly set forth facts and evidence and then conclude with a well-informed speculative essay on the implications for the future: "We expect and hope for thought-provoking, reasonable views of the future based on what you know about the past and present. . . . Analysts should not be timorous or bound by convention."
- Chiefs of Station often have great understanding of the situation in their host countries and should be encouraged to submit more frequent field assessments.

The Carter White House took other steps to ensure better communication of high-level substantive concerns as well as perceptions of analytical shortcomings. The Political Intelligence Working Group, set up to organize remedial action in response to the President's November 1978 note, interpreted its charter broadly and worked to

Opportunity Unfulfilled

improve and better focus field reporting by State, CIA and Attaches; to improve cover so critical to good reporting; to resolve bureaucratic impediments to good reporting; and a number of other issues aimed at improving analysis and making it more responsive. As part of the work of this informal group, senior staff representatives of Dr. Brzezinski met periodically with representatives of the Secretary of State and the DCI to review foreign developments or issues of current concern to the President and to provide feedback on intelligence coverage. I believe all involved would agree that these efforts had a salutary effect in improving communication between intelligence and the White House and thus improving intelligence support to the President.

Presidents and their senior advisers will never be fully content with intelligence support and analysis. First, and despite occasional protestations to the contrary, Presidents expect that for what they spend on intelligence, the end-product should be able to predict all manner of coups, upheavals, riots, intentions, military moves and the like with accuracy. Intellectually, they know most such specific events are incredibly hard to predict—and that we are incredibly lucky when we do. Nevertheless, in the early morning hours when the National Security Adviser must repair to the President's study with the (usually) bad news about such events, the Chief Executive will not unnaturally wonder why his billions for intelligence do not spare him surprise.

Second, Presidents do not like internal controversy in the Executive Branch—especially if it becomes public. And, from time to time, intelligence analyses provoke dispute, often in public. DCI Helms' disagreement with Secretary of Defense Laird a decade ago before Congress on whether the SS-9 was a MRV or a MIRV is a case in point. Internal Executive Branch disputes over energy estimates, technology transfer, Soviet civil defense, and verification of aspects of SALT are others. Such controversies have become more frequent as disputes to contain within the Executive Branch become harder by virtue of greater Congressional access, journalistic aggressiveness and leaks. The White House's general unease with unclassified CIA analysis is rooted in this dislike for what is regarded as needless controversy. Our own citizens, not to mention foreign readers, cannot be expected to assume that a CIA publication does not reflect an official U.S. Government view—and this confusion is of concern to the White House and often a public relations and policy headache. Thus, to the extent intelligence analysis results (in White House eyes) in internal government controversy, problems with the Congress, or embarrassing publicity, it will draw Presidential ire or at a minimum leave the Chief Magistrate with unflattering and enduring feelings toward intelligence.

Third, Presidents do not welcome new intelligence assessments undercutting policies based on earlier assessments. As professionals, we are constantly revisiting important subjects as better and later information or improved analytical tools become available. When this results in changing the statistical basis for the U.S. position in MBFR, substantially elevating estimates of North Korean forces at a time when the President is pressing to reduce U.S. forces in South Korea, or "discovering" a Soviet brigade in Cuba, it is no revelation to observe that Presidents regard us less than fondly. Presidents do not like surprises, especially those that undermine policy. Intelligence is most often the bearer of such surprises—and pays the price such messengers have suffered since antiquity.

Finally, successive Administrations have generally regarded with skeptical the growing direct relationship between Congress and CIA above and beyond the actual oversight process. In recent years, the provision of great quantities of highly sensitive information and analysis to Members of Congress and their staffs has eroded the Executive's longstanding advantage of a near monopoly of information on foreign affairs and defense. The flow of information to the Hill has given the Congress a

powerful tool in its quest for a greater voice in the making of foreign and defense policy vis-a-vis the Executive—and Presidents cannot be indifferent to the fact that intelligence has provided Congress with that tool and that the White House is nearly helpless to blunt it except in very rare cases.

OVERCOMING ISOLATION (OURS) AND SUSPICION (THEIRS)

Presidents expect their intelligence service to provide timely, accurate and farseeing analysis. Thus, nearly all Presidential comments on the quality of intelligence are critical—prompted by our failure to meet expectations. Indeed, all but one quote at the outset of this article was in response to a *specific* situation where intelligence was perceived to have failed to measure up. In short, Presidents often consider intelligence as much another problem bureaucracy to be dealt with and warily watched as it is a source of helpful information, insight and support.

To the extent intelligence professionals isolate themselves from White House/NSC officials and are unresponsive to White House *analytical* needs, this adversarial nature of the relationship will be emphasized and understanding of what we can and cannot do will be lacking. Thus, the Intelligence Community must take the initiative to establish and maintain close personal ties to White House and NSC officials from the President on down. It must also aggressively seek new ways to get the maximum amount of analysis before the President, even while experimenting with old mechanisms, such as the *PDB*. White House procedures and relationships are always dynamic; accordingly, we must always be searching for new and better ways to serve our principal customer.

Although the routine order of business and internal organization may vary greatly from Administration to Administration, I would suggest several general rules:

- Senior intelligence officials must establish and maintain a network of personal contacts in the NSC Staff and the immediate office of the National Security Adviser to ensure that we are well informed as to the issues of concern to the President; policy matters under consideration in which intelligence analysis can make a contribution; and the overall foreign and defense affairs agenda so that we can anticipate the President's needs.
 - For intelligence to be useful, it must be timely. Insofar as policy issues, foreign visitors and such are involved, often a day or two makes the difference between a vital or irrelevant contribution.
 - Periodic visits to NSC staffers on a quarterly, semiannual, or annual basis to seek guidance during the coming period is worse than useless; they can be misleading and eventually waste valuable analytical resources. Most NSC staffers do not think about their work in these terms. The ordinary result of such an approach is that the staffer will respond off the top of the head (or off the wall) or ask for work related to what he has just completed or knows to be in his in-box. We will do ourselves more good by establishing daily dialogue.
 - Similarly, as has been done occasionally in the past, the terms of reference of major papers should be shared with the NSC to ensure that what we have in mind best meets the policy need and to obtain suggestions of additional points to be covered to be most helpful.
- The role of the DCI is central to understanding the President's needs and conveying analysis to him. Few DCIs before Admiral Turner took a sustained interest in analysis or an active role in getting substantive matters before the

Opportunity Unfulfilled

President either orally or in writing. Few have been so brash as literally to hand the President published intelligence reports to read. Future DCIs must be persuaded that these undertakings are central to their role as the President's principal intelligence adviser. Moreover, the DCI should assume a similar role with the National Security Adviser—perhaps the best source of information on issues of topical interest to the President and the foreign affairs and defense agenda. Finally, the importance of routine, detailed feedback by the DCI from policy meetings, briefings and conversations with the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser and Chairman, JCS to analytical managers, NIOs and senior analysts must be impressed upon DCIs. The dearth of feedback before 1977 was damaging to our work and contributed to a sense "downtown" that we were unhelpful and unresponsive. Contrary to the views of some intelligence professionals, we cannot properly do our work in splendid isolation.

- We must exploit every opportunity to get analysis to the President. When exceptional analysis is available, an appropriate senior intelligence official should *telephone* his personal contact(s) noted above and alert him to the paper (but judiciously to preserve credibility). Meanwhile, DCI briefings, NSC meetings, intelligence contributions or annexes to policy options papers, type-script memoranda, spot reports, and all other means need to be used to get information to the Security Adviser and to the President.
- Intelligence should be unafraid to speculate on the future. Everyone else around the President does—and most are far less experienced or capable analysts than we. A preferred approach would be to alternative futures and then above all state clearly our best estimate, however we caveat it. Waffling conclusions have too long made intelligence estimates a laughingstock among policymakers. "On the one hand . . . but on the other . . ." is no help to a policymaker and clearly undermines confidence in our analytical capacity. If we have no confidence in our judgment, why should the President?
- In all but two or three cases National Intelligence Estimates as presently prepared have been ignored by the White House in recent years. They are usually too late, too formalistic, and too equivocal to be of value to senior policymakers—much less the President or his Security Adviser. This need not be so. A return to the practice of issuing brief, short-deadline special NIEs that would focus on specific policy relevant issues would mean that intelligence would be available before decisions are made—and would better serve the President and his senior advisers. It would also ensure that the intelligence assessment is not buried in long options papers which rarely reach the President anyway.
 - Such SNIEs would have to be disseminated on a restrictive basis. On important issues, the circle of policy players is kept small; the contribution of any intelligence paper will be enhanced by its limited circulation and, more importantly, by the perception by its readers of its limited high-level readership. If the President or his closest advisers make a special request of analysis, they do not like to see a response apparently published in the hundreds of copies. We are mistaken as well when we become preoccupied with format and presentation to the detriment of analytical (vice reportorial) content—a problem in the past.
- The responsibility for making intelligence more relevant, timely and helpful is that of senior officials of the Intelligence Community alone. Analysts and

managers at all levels must assume the burden of keeping better up to date on events and policy issues relevant to their area of professional concern. Such awareness must infuse all analysis from drafter to Director. Only when priority attention is given at all levels to the relevance and value of intelligence to the consumer from President to desk officer will intelligence analysis be better received and, in the end, be better.

The above "rules" apply to doing our work better. They will not resolve the several causes of Presidential displeasure—our support of Congress, changing assessments that have policy implications, surprises, and so forth. Even here there are some steps we can take. For example:

- We should take the initiative to let the Security Adviser or the NSC Staff know that we are preparing an estimate or other form of analysis that will revise earlier assessments and have an impact on the President's policies. This would include advance warning of new and important conclusions in military estimates

- Intelligence needs to develop a mechanism for better informing the White House about support provided to the Congress. The intelligence agencies are part of the Executive Branch; the DCI is appointed by and reports to the President. It is not improper or inappropriate for us to keep the President's foreign affairs staff more completely and regularly advised of papers we provide the Congress, possibly controversial testimony or briefings, etc. Again, some of this has been done—but a mere schedule of planned appearances or an occasional phone call are not enough. Keeping the Executive informed about our dealings with Congress is an important aspect of building Presidential confidence that we are not trying to undercut him or his policies by responding to legitimate Congressional requests.

- Finally, it would be helpful to continue keeping the White House informed in advance when we plan to publish an unclassified substantive intelligence and to highlight possible controversial points. This will become important as pressure for such unclassified publications increases. We should acquiesce in those rare circumstances in which the Security Adviser or the President asks us not to publish certain information for public consumption. Our charter is to serve the President and, secondarily, the Congress. Once information and analysis is provided to them, our responsibility is fulfilled. Unclassified publications are indeed a public service but also, frankly, a public relations enterprise. If such a service/enterprise complicates life for the President, we should be prepared to forgo it. Only a fraction of unclassified publications would be affected—and our willingness to withhold them would help build confidence at the White House that we seek to be supportive.

Although several of the above "rules" and suggestions may be controversial, the reader should be aware that all have been pursued by CIA at one time or another and by one official or another. I wish to emphasize that *haphazard*, occasional implementation has not ameliorated the underlying suspicion and dissatisfaction of successive Presidents and their advisers with intelligence analysis or their perception that we often peddle our product to the Congress and public in a freewheeling manner designed to benefit us, regardless of the problems caused the policymaker.

Some will argue that the steps I propose would subvert the independence of the analysis process and subordinate our judgments to policy considerations. That is not so!

Opportunity Unfulfilled

None implies any interference with the analyst or his judgments—except to make the latter relevant to the needs of the President and to improve the odds someone at the White House will value the analyst's work. Most are intended to allot the analyst his rightful voice in policy deliberations and to ensure that receptivity to his work is not diminished by irritation or pique resulting from controversy we have sparked on the Hill; the White House being caught unawares by analysis that undercuts policies based on earlier intelligence conclusions; or because the White House has been embarrassed by publication of unclassified analysis.

Above all, we in intelligence should appreciate the primacy of personal relationships in making government work. We have neglected to develop fully such relationships at the White House and NSC in recent years—although of course there have been exceptions. We must pursue such contacts—bearing in mind that we start all over every four or eight years and, indeed, every month as familiar faces at CIA and downtown are replaced by new. These personal contacts and a greater sensitivity to White House needs and perceptions (including of us) are essential to mitigating Presidential criticism and ensuring that the best possible intelligence product in fact reaches our "most important customer" in time to make a difference. [REDACTED]

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

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Executive Secretary

19 JUL 88

Date

3637 (10-81)

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

July 19, 1988

Mr. Robert Timberg




Dear Bob:

Thanks for your letter of July 10th. You take an awful risk in asking to receive copies of any public official's speeches. The risk is two-fold: inundation and terminal boredom. With the consumer thus duly warned, I enclose two speeches and an article. The first speech, "What is Going on in the Soviet Union," I gave at the Naval War College in Newport last month. In all respects but one it is identical to a speech I gave in May at the LBJ Library to the Austin World Affairs Council. (The one difference is that the Newport version has several more pages on arms control and what's in it for Gorbachev.) The speech has been well received and given a lot of private circulation. Reference has been made to some of the points in it by several of your colleagues, including Meg Greenfield. I hope you find it of interest. The other speech was a commencement address to the Defense Intelligence College. Finally, the article appeared in the winter issue of Foreign Affairs -- you may already have seen it.

I look forward to lunch soon. I'm off to the cool Pacific Northwest for some backpacking and serious eating but will be back in town on August 13th.


By the by, in our dialogue on broad scale citizen participation in war, I think you are right that in this modern age of mass communications selective participation does set in motion a dynamic with tremendous political consequences. This is an issue best discussed over dinner and a brandy but I guess we'll have to make do with a sandwich and a beer.

Warm regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosures:
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS



THE CIA AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Robert M. Gates

WINTER 1987/88

No. 66201

CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
16 JUNE 1988

THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALLED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A \$2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.

AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNITY PARTY.

COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE
17 JUNE 1988

BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL PERROOTS, ADMIRAL ROOP, DOCTOR SCOTT, COLLEAGUES,
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I AM HONORED TO HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AS YOUR COMMENCEMENT
SPEAKER. GIVEN SOME OF YOUR PREVIOUS DISTINGUISHED SPEAKERS,
INCLUDING GENERAL HERRES LAST YEAR, THIS IS A SINGULAR HONOR
AND A DAUNTING CHALLENGE. I THOUGHT A GOOD DEAL ABOUT WHAT I
SHOULD SAY TODAY SINCE THIS IS NOT THE USUAL COMMENCEMENT
AUDIENCE. UNLIKE OTHER COMMENCEMENT SPEAKERS, IT WOULD HARDLY
BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME, NOW THAT YOU ARE GRADUATING, TO
ENCOURAGE YOU TO LEAVE THE INSTITUTION AND GO MAKE MONEY. NOR
IS IT PARTICULARLY INSPIRING TO ASK YOU TO STAY HERE AND FOREGO
THE TEMPTATIONS OF LIFE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

AS THIS IS A COMMENCEMENT AND AS WE ALSO CONTEMPLATE THE
CLOSE OF ONE ADMINISTRATION AND ADVENT OF ANOTHER, I THINK THE
MOST APPROPRIATE TOPIC TO ADDRESS IN THESE FEW MINUTES IS THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. NOW, SOARING FLIGHTS OF

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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
July 10, 1988

Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

I've been on my leave of absence for nearly two months now and seem finally to be picking up the vastly different rhythm of a book writer rather than a daily newspaper reporter. But it remains a struggle, if only because there are few concrete indicators of accomplishment, even such illusory ones as daily by-lines.

Your April 28 letter raised interesting questions. Troubling, too. I think your suggestion that World War II was an anomaly in terms of broad-scale citizen participation is probably correct (though where does Korea fit in?), but once that standard was established, it seems to me you cannot go back to more selective participation without paying a price. In particular, with mass communications on the current scale, when one member of society, the better educated and politically savvy one, analyzes the situation and decides that someone else will do the dying for him, I believe a dynamic is set in motion that may ultimately mean there is hell to pay. But who knows? Hopefully I'll have part of the answer when I finish this project. For the moment, it seems to me that I may be looking at this a little too emotionally, something I'll have to guard against, while you may be viewing it a bit too intellectually.

I enjoyed reading your Jackson, Miss., speech on the traditional functions of national intelligence. You took what could have been a predictable, prosaic topic and pointed out a variety of pitfalls and impediments that stand to corrupt the process and quite cogently explained why the agency often finds itself serving as the whipping boy for the mistakes of policy-makers. I would love to see any other speeches you care to send along.

I had an interesting experience last Wednesday. I went back to Annapolis to watch the induction rites of the new plebe class. I wasn't looking for anything special, but rather hoping the day would trigger some old memories that might come in handy down the line. All I can remember from my first day is stenciling my name and/or laundry number on a lot of clothes, some homesickness and a vague sense of dread. I got there last week at about 6.30 a.m., when the check-in process started, and stayed till about 7.30 p.m., long after reporters with daily deadlines had left to

file. So far as I can tell, none of the others realized that John Poindexter's son was in the new plebe class, something I had been tipped to earlier in the day. If that wasn't enough, Admiral Poindexter, because he holds flag rank, I guess, was seated with the official party--commandant, superintendant, other senior officers, etc. There he was, in full uniform, no less. Tom, the son who entered the academy that day, becomes the third of his sons to become a naval officer. Another son graduated the academy in 1985 and a second entered the Navy after Georgia Tech. I wondered about both Poindexter and Tom. After all that had happened to him, much of which I guess he brought on himself, he was sitting up there, preparing to see another son into the service of his country. And the kid, his father's manifold problems notwithstanding, ready to follow in his footsteps. I'm not sure what it all means--I'm a notoriously slow study--but somehow I think it fits in with what I'm doing.

You probably think I'm a deadbeat. I promise a luncheon invitation, then fall off the edge of the earth. Actually, I plan to call in the next week or so to try to set something up. I'd prefer some terrific dank spook spot, but I'll let you call it.

Best regards,

A rectangular box with a black border, used to redact the signature of Robert Timberg.

Robert Timberg


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Timbers
Washington Bureau
1627 K Street
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20006-1792
202-452-8250



*Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505*

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Washington, D.C. 20505

ER 1781-88

April 28, 1988

Mr. Robert Timberg
The Baltimore Sun
1627 K Street N.W., Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Bob:

I finally got around to reading the Jim Fallows' article you sent me from the Washington Monthly, "What Did You Do in the Class War, Daddy?". You may be amused to know that I was two-thirds of the way through the article before I realized that it was written more than a dozen years ago.

I found it a very insightful, self-revealing and thought-provoking piece. By the same token, it brought out my historian's instincts. For example, while World War II may be an exception, I wonder if a similar article could have been written in 1866 or in 1919 about the class status of those who had served and those who did not. I wonder about the degree to which the level of popular support for a war correlates with broad participation across lines of class and wealth (e.g., WWII).

And in that respect, it seems to me that Fallows' article ties in directly to Stockdale's speech on "Our Personal and National Resolve." To what degree do America's own leaders establish the pre-conditions for the kind of class phenomenon described by Fallows when they involve the country in a controversial conflict, or one in which the purposes are unclear, or one in which the strategy is muddled, or one in which chicanery is used as a means to shoehorn a nation into the conflict. And do the more politically astute or informed simply better grasp these problems of leadership and strategy, and act accordingly?

The articles individually are quite interesting. But I wish I had the time to pursue the historical and philosophical connections in the articles taken together. I envy you your opportunity to take on even a part of that challenge.

It was good to see you at the White House Correspondents dinner. Stay in touch.

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Regards,

RMG
Robert M. Gates

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DCI
EXEC
REG



Washington Bureau
March 28, 1988

Return to me

Dear Bob--

Enjoyed seeing you at the Gridiron. Kind of a strange institution but a charming one, I think. Thought Cuomo's remarks about Reagan were especially gracious and touching. Assume you and Senator Cohen had a pleasant chat. Figured things had been smoothed over since the unpleasantness of early '87, but you never know so I split.

Enclosed are a couple of pieces I mentioned to you Saturday night. The Fallows article, written in 1975, strikes me as perceptive and illuminating. Forgot until after we separated that you were at the NSC when he was writing speeches for Carter. Admiral Stockdale's speech is both trenchant and passionate, especially at the top of the last page.

In my book, I hope to explore that generational faultline created by Vietnam (Fallows argues, pretty persuasively, I think, that social class played a major role). But I also plan to look into its corrosive effect on our national resolve, perhaps the state of our integrity as a nation. The key to doing so successfully, though, is not to rub the reader's nose in the theme, but to bring it alive through the personalities and experiences and actions of the central figures. For the moment, I find myself both excited and intimidated by the project. But I know if I just hold it together for awhile, sheer panic will set in, I'll feel right at home and get the damned thing done.

Thanks for giving me a copy of the speech you gave in Dallas. I was particularly taken by the section on glasnost and the potential problems even a minimally successful Gorbachev could create for the United States. I passed on copies to Steve Broening, our diplomatic correspondent, and Frank Starr, our bureau chief. Both are old Moscow hands. Didn't think you'd have any objection.

Thanks again for lunch. Hope to see you soon. If you're at the White House Correspondents dinner, please stop by our reception. No Fawn Hall this year, but our guests include Holly Hunter and Donna Rice.

Best regards,

[Redacted signature box]

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1100 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20006
202-452-8250
202-29-8214 Home

The Times Mirror
Newspaper

What Did You Do the Class War, Daddy?



by James Fallows

Many people think that the worst scars of the war years have healed. I don't. Vietnam has left us with a heritage rich in possibilities for class warfare, and I would like to start telling about it with this story:

In the fall of 1969, I was beginning my final year in college. As the months went by, the rock on which I had unthinkingly anchored my hopes—the certainty that the war in Vietnam would be over before I could possibly fight—began to crumble. It shattered altogether on Thanksgiving weekend when, while riding back to Boston from a visit with my relatives, I heard that the draft lottery had been held and my birthdate had come up number 45. I recognized for the first time that, inflexibly, I must either be drafted or consciously find a way to prevent it.

In the atmosphere of that time,

each possible choice came equipped with barbs. To answer the call was unthinkable, not only because, in my heart, I was desperately afraid of being killed, but also because, among my friends, it was axiomatic that one should not be "complicit" in the immoral war effort. Draft resistance, the course chosen by a few noble heroes of the movement, meant going to prison or leaving the country. With much the same intensity with which I wanted to stay alive, I did not want those things either. What I wanted was to go to graduate school, to get married, and to enjoy those bright prospects I had been taught that life owed me.

I learned quickly enough that there was only one way to get what I wanted. A physical deferment would restore things to the happy state I had known during four undergraduate years. The barbed alternatives would



James Fallows is a contributing editor of The Washington Monthly.

The Washington Monthly/October 1975

James Bond Stockdale

speaks on

**Our Personal
and National Resolve**

to the

American Society of Newspaper Editors
San Francisco, California

April 8, 1987

OPENING REMARKS
NFIC Meeting -- 19 July 1988

1. I have convened this NFIC early in the budget decision process in order to give you an overview of the budget picture for the National Foreign Intelligence Program. As you will see it is not a good one.
2. I have asked the Intelligence Community Staff to review today the overall program, additions to the program proposed by the Senate Select Committee, our priorities, the pay raise and its implications, the DCI programming wedge or reserve, and, finally, major candidate issues for additional investment.



4. We have a lot to cover. I suggest we get started.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS
NFIC Meeting -- 19 July 1988

1. We have some very tough choices to make over the next two to three months for our 1990-94 budget. Program managers already have made some very difficult decisions; now we must make additional ones on the Community level.
2. I have asked the Requirements and Evaluation Staff to analyze your candidate proposals for claiming part of the DCI wedge for investment to ensure that there is a rational basis to make decisions that will give us the most return on the dollar against our requirements.
3. We must use the DCI wedge to make some additional investments on important issues such as mobile missiles, narcotics and certainly others as well.
4. I agree with you that one percent compounded real growth for the DCI wedge takes too much money out of your programs. I will decide in the next few days at what level finally to set that wedge but I can assure you it will be considerably lower than the current figure while still large enough to do some good. All the money will be allocated in the end.
5. I want to thank you for your participation and your views on these priority issues. You can be assured I will take them into account as I make some very tough decisions over the next two to three months.

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Washington, D.C. 20505

July 19, 1988

Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army
Director, National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

Dear Bill:


Because I know we will have little chance to talk at the dinner Friday night, I want to tell you privately how sorry I am to see you leave NSA and the government and how much I will miss having you around. I have thoroughly enjoyed our collaboration and work together over the past dozen years. I have learned a great deal from you.

From the first time I called on you in early February 1977 (for which I got into hot water with Turner) through our sharing of an office for two years and then the experiences of this Administration, working with you has always been interesting, insightful and fun.

With your departure, one of the few genuine substantive expert members of NFIB departs as well. The quality of the dialogue at those meetings -- always limited to a handful of people in any event -- will inevitably decline. Our shared enjoyment in being provocative and our occasional skulduggery (remember when you as Army/ACIS and I as DDI threatened our staffs with a joint footnote on ABM, to the consternation of the entire Community!) I think, improved the quality of the intelligence products and certainly made the process more interesting.

I have really appreciated our close contact over the past couple of years and your steadfast support and help, including through some fairly difficult times. I had hopes at one point that we could work together officially as a team one more time, but it was not to be. You have been -- and will remain -- a good friend. I guess all I want to say is that I will miss having you around a great deal. Once you return from Vermont in September I hope we can stay in fairly regular contact. Best of luck.

Warm regards,



Robert M. Gates

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

July 20, 1988

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 624
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Zbig:

Enclosed is a copy of the speech I described to you. I originally gave it at the LBJ Library and then again in Newport. It is the one President Nixon found of interest.

Again, I can't tell you how disappointed I am to miss the dinner next week. Not only would it be good to see you again but the group you are gathering should be fascinating, especially with the guest of honor.

I will be in touch after Labor Day. Have a good August in Maine.

All the best,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosure:
As Stated

13

CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
16 JUNE 1988

THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALLED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A \$2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.

AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNITY PARTY.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 19 July 1988
TO: DDCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
	Hqs.	
REMARKS:		
FROM: SOVA		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
4E58	Hqs.	



Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

20 JUL 1988

NOTE TO: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Soviet Financial Balance Sheet

SOVA tells me that the lack of alternative views in the letter prepared for your signature reflects a true consensus within this building on the issues raised by Armitage. I wouldn't be surprised, moreover, to find that Armitage is unaware of the body of existing work in this area.

While Armitage may have his numbers wrong, he is right on the mark in terms of the need to keep close tabs on the opportunities Soviet economic difficulties may present for the United States. SOVA has a number of papers listed in next year's research program which are pertinent to this issue.

[Redacted Signature Box]

STAT

Richard J. Kerr

Deputy Director for Intelligence

*The response was coordinated
with WIOs and OGI
JK*

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

O/ODI Registry
02553X/88

21 JUL 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Soviet Financial Balance Sheet

REFERENCE: Your Memo to DDCI, dtd 2 July 88, Same
Subject

1. Gorbachev's difficulties in revitalizing his domestic economy--as you clearly point out--have potentially significant ramifications for Soviet foreign policy with both the developed West and its surrogates in the Third World. It remains to be seen, however, whether Moscow is willing to turn to the West for assistance. There are numerous accounts of an intense ongoing debate on this very issue, with opponents of expanding reliance on the West citing the poor results from past buying sprees and the need to avoid giving the West the very "leverage" you point out in your 2 July letter.

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2. The Office of Soviet Analysis has allocated substantial resources to examining Soviet trade and financial flows and plans to do even more over the next several months. In particular, I would draw your attention to the evidence and analytical argument presented in the four attached assessments. Based on this body of work and subsequently available evidence it is our view that:

--The leadership has heretofore sought an indigenous solution to its economic problems but may well decide to turn to the West for the technology, equipment, and consumer goods needed to get its modernization program on track. We are in a strong position to monitor both the flow of goods and services and financial initiatives which make these purchases possible.

SECRET

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SUBJECT: Soviet Financial Balance Sheet

--Moscow has the ability to increase substantially its hard currency indebtedness without threatening its fundamentally strong balance of payments position or otherwise leveraging itself to the West. [redacted]

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3. The Soviets have clearly taken a harder line with their Third-World clients on the terms for Soviet economic and, in some cases, military assistance. Only a portion of these flows, however, involve hard currency; specifically we have yet to see evidence that hard currency constraints are forcing Moscow to make hard choices regarding active measures campaigns, clandestine technology acquisition, overseas KGB activities, and the like. We have levied additional collection requirements and undertaken additional analyses to get a better handle on these activities but this type of information understandably remains hard to obtain. [redacted]

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4. We are confident, moreover, that the annual overall hard currency cost of Soviet foreign involvements is less than \$3 billion as opposed to the \$15-20 billion cited by Rand:

--The Rand estimate of \$15 billion--last made in 1983-- includes nearly \$12 billion in "trade subsidies" based on the below market fuel prices charged to Soviet clients and the premium prices Moscow paid for imports such as Cuban sugar. Although the hard currency opportunity costs are relevant, this subsidy "cost" is fundamentally different from the cash outlays cited above. Moreover, this "subsidy" has turned into a "tax" because the price Moscow now charges its clients for oil is above rather than below world market prices.

--The balance of Rand's \$15 billion "burden" estimate is comprised of Soviet arms deliveries which do not require payment in hard currency. We do not agree that such deliveries equate to a hard currency "burden" as there is no evidence that Moscow has lost out on hard currency arms sales by virtue of its sales and gifts of arms to soft currency clients. Our own analysis shows Moscow taking a tougher line with some of its clients over payments for arms deliveries but, at the same time, increasing the grant element in some of its contracts and offering easier credit terms in order to boost sales.

SUBJECT: Soviet Financial Balance Sheet

--Our annual balance of payments estimates consistently show errors and omissions averaging less than \$4 billion which we believe incorporate hard currency expenditures for overseas activities. This order of magnitude seems reasonable when one considers that the US budget for 1986 lists US expenditures on the conduct of foreign affairs and foreign information and exchange at \$3.3 billion. Given Moscow's more austere approach to funding its foreign missions abroad, the soft nature of Soviet expenditures in much of the Third World, and our confidence in the ability to track aggregate Soviet foreign exchange flows, we are comfortable in the judgment that actual Soviet hard currency outlays are in the \$3 billion range. [redacted]

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5. This evidence leads us to conclude that hard currency "shortages" have yet to affect substantially Soviet behavior. Soviet intransigence on the Northern Territories, for example, demonstrates that non-economic issues continue to play a key role in foreign policy decisions. A desire to achieve a more benign world environment and otherwise improve the atmosphere for expanded trade and technology flows clearly plays an important part in Gorbachev's foreign policy strategy. At the same time, one should not overlook the more general impact of perestroika on Soviet foreign policy thinking and decisionmaking. Only time will allow us to sort out the economic variables in this equation. [redacted]

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/s/ Bob

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Attachments:

[redacted]

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3
SECRET [redacted]

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SUBJECT: Soviet Financial Balance Sheet

DDI/SOVA (19 Jul 88)

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Distribution:

- Original - Addressee w/atts
- 1 - DI Registry w/o atts
- 1 - DDI w/o atts
- 1 - Executive Registry w/o atts
- 1 - DCI w/o atts
- 1 - D/SOVA w/o atts

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SECRET

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22 July 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Call from Powell on Candidate Briefings

1. Colin called me from California today (Friday) to say that the NSC had been thinking about an intelligence briefing for Mr. Dukakis now that he has been nominated. He said that the recollection at the NSC is that McFarlane, as the NSC Advisor, gave the briefing in 1984 and that in any case they believe the contact with the Dukakis people should come from the NSC. He said he thought CIA should begin thinking about a briefing or a contribution to a briefing and what subjects should be covered. He subsequently commented that he heard that the Dukakis camp had perhaps been sniffing around the State Department along these lines. He said he thought State should not give the briefing. [REDACTED]

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2. I told him that you also had been giving thought to this and that we had heard that Senator Boren was encouraging such a briefing -- and that he believed it should be given by CIA. I said my recollection is that the original contacts with the candidates' camp over the years have come from the White House and that, while there have been exceptions, CIA has usually done the briefings. [REDACTED]

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3. I said that you believe the briefing should be done by CIA and were thinking about who should make the original contact. I said that the likelihood of a briefing taking place at all and the credibility of that briefing would be significantly enhanced if it were done by Bill Webster, perhaps with one or two other CIA people along to help. I noted that Powell had opened the conversation by underscoring the desirability of a briefing so that the candidate would not inadvertently say things that were harmful to the national interest, and that this goal would be best achieved if the briefer were perceived to be professional and non-partisan -- like the DCI. [REDACTED]

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CL By Signer
DECL OADR

4. Powell tentatively indicated that he agreed and suggested that we begin thinking about such a briefing. I repeated that the DCI had been giving this some thought and told Powell that the DCI likely would give him a call on this the week of 25 July.

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Robert M. Gates

cc: DDI

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