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Washington, D.C. 20505

01 JUN 1988

OCA 88-1614

The Honorable Henry Hyde  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Hyde:

This is in response to your letter of 9 May 1988 which forwarded the correspondence of your constituent, [redacted] who has asked for your assistance in seeking employment opportunities with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

I have forwarded [redacted] resume to the Office of Personnel. Once our recruiters receive his resume, they will review his qualifications to determine whether there is a suitable position available at the Agency. They will contact [redacted] directly within 30 days if they are able to identify a position.

Thank you for writing on behalf of [redacted]

Sincerely,

/s/ Robert M. Gates

Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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-The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

6-3-88

Dear Sophia -

Enclosed is a copy of  
Bill's resignation letter, as  
you requested.

It was good talking to  
you.

Warm regards.

Bob.

3

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

29 January 1987

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

I herewith submit my resignation as Director of Central Intelligence effective this date, January 29, 1987. It has been a great honor serving you.

Respectfully,

*W.J.C.* <sup>By</sup> *Sophia Casey*

William J. Casey

Witnessed by:

*Robert Gates*

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505


3 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carle E. Vuono, USA  
Chief of Staff, United States Army

It is my pleasure to send you the attached comments on Major General Larry D. Budge. These cover the initial nine months of his detail to the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

General Budge is a well-read, sophisticated officer with broad political-military interests. The Director of Central Intelligence and I have been pleased with his quick understanding of the national intelligence resources and his translation of these resources into action and solutions to problems. General Budge clearly perceives the broader strategic issues facing his senior intelligence customers and works those issues, leaving mundane details to the ordinary attention of the bureaucracy.

We have benefited from his service in the Office of the DCI and are grateful to the US Army for providing such a fine officer for this important task. We hope that you share our conviction that the US Army and the Department of Defense derive as much from his service here as does the Director and the Intelligence Community.

  
Robert M. Gates

Attachment:  
As stated

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14 June 1988

NOTE TO: Doug MacEachin  
Larry Gershwin

I am giving a speech on developments in the Soviet Union and implications for US strategy at the Naval War College Thursday. I am using my old standby Soviet speech but I have added something more to it on arms control and strategic developments. I have drawn this primarily from a recent SOVA paper on how the Soviets might look at START.

I would appreciate your looking at these three pages and giving me any corrections or suggestions you might have. I would appreciate hearing back some time this afternoon.

Robert M. Gates

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IN MY JUDGMENT, THE <sup>near term</sup> BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV, (SOVA)  
PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. WHILE HE SEEKS TO AVOID NEW, UNANTICIPATED COSTS THAT DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS SDI MIGHT REQUIRE, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET BUDGET, AND FEW OF THE PRODUCTION OR RESOURCE CAPABILITIES ARE TRANSFERABLE TO CIVILIAN PURPOSES. ONLY THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY KIND OF ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO A VERY GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.

THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE EVIDENT. AS THE CENTERPIECE OF A DETENTIST POLICY, AS I NOTED

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EARLIER, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM A FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE PARTNER IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.

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(SOVA)  
(START  
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ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
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14	D/PAO				
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18	D/SOVA/DT	X			
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Remarks

→ Bob Gates

STAT

From:

*[Signature]*

L. Gershwin

Executive Secretary

14 JUN 88

Date

3637 (10-81)

14 June 1988

NOTE TO: Doug MacEachin  
Larry Gershwin

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BENEFIT TO  
CONCLUDE  
SUCH AN  
AGREEMENT,

This  
is not  
true,

I recommend deleting this whole  
issue:

- US not really reduced to 6,000
- Soviet targets ability is affected, particularly their ability to retaliate

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

June 17, 1988

Rear Admiral Howard Roop, USNR (Ret)  
Commandant  
Defense Intelligence College  
Washington, D.C. 20340-5485

Dear Howard:

I want to thank you and the Defense Intelligence College for inviting me to give the Commencement Address on June 17th. You honored me greatly with the presentation of the Honorary Doctorate in Strategic Intelligence. I am very proud to have been so recognized.

Your obvious pride in the college, its faculty and students is evident and most understandable. This is the second commencement I have attended, and both times I have been enormously impressed by the calibre of the students and faculty. I know a number of people who have taught at the college and hold them in the highest respect. While the College has been in existence for some years now, I have a sense of new momentum and challenge.

Again, thank you for your hospitality, your kind words and for the honor done me by the College.

As you requested a copy of my remarks are enclosed.

Warmest regards,



Robert M. Gates


Enclosure:  
As Stated

DISSEM

Orig - ADDSSEE

~~1 - DDCI~~

1 - ER



COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE  
17 JUNE 1988

BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL PERROOTS, ADMIRAL ROOP, DOCTOR SCOTT, COLLEAGUES,  
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I AM HONORED TO HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AS YOUR COMMENCEMENT SPEAKER. GIVEN SOME OF YOUR PREVIOUS DISTINGUISHED SPEAKERS, INCLUDING GENERAL HERRES LAST YEAR, THIS IS A SINGULAR HONOR AND A DAUNTING CHALLENGE. I THOUGHT A GOOD DEAL ABOUT WHAT I SHOULD SAY TODAY SINCE THIS IS NOT THE USUAL COMMENCEMENT AUDIENCE. UNLIKE OTHER COMMENCEMENT SPEAKERS, IT WOULD HARDLY BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME, NOW THAT YOU ARE GRADUATING, TO ENCOURAGE YOU TO LEAVE THE INSTITUTION AND GO MAKE MONEY. NOR IS IT PARTICULARLY INSPIRING TO ASK YOU TO STAY HERE AND FOREGO THE TEMPTATIONS OF LIFE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

AS THIS IS A COMMENCEMENT AND AS WE ALSO CONTEMPLATE THE CLOSE OF ONE ADMINISTRATION AND ADVENT OF ANOTHER, I THINK THE MOST APPROPRIATE TOPIC TO ADDRESS IN THESE FEW MINUTES IS THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. NOW, SOARING FLIGHTS OF

RHETORIC BACKED BY ANTIPHONAL CHOIRS OF PRAISE ARE NOT OUR STYLE -- YOURS OR MINE. IN OUR BUSINESS WE DEAL IN HARD REALITY. THEREFORE, LET ME SIMPLY REVIEW FOR YOU BRIEFLY THE TRENDS THAT I BELIEVE WILL DOMINATE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THIS CENTURY, THE PERIOD WHEN YOU, AS GRADUATES OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE, WILL ATTAIN SENIOR GRADES AND POSITIONS AND ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF US INTELLIGENCE.

FIRST, OUR MARGIN FOR ERROR WILL STEADILY SHRINK. WHETHER ESTIMATING SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES, WARNING OF TERRORISM, HELPING TO GUIDE ANTI-NARCOTICS CRUSADES, OR ADDRESSING A MULTITUDE OF OTHER PROBLEMS, A HIGHER DEGREE OF ACCURACY AND TIMELINESS WILL BE EXPECTED OF US AND WILL BE CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF US POLICY IF NOT OUR NATIONAL SURVIVAL. AN ERROR MARGIN OF 15-20% IN ESTIMATING SOVIET STRATEGIC WARHEADS MAY BE TOLERABLE IN AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THERE ARE MORE THAN 10,000 OR 12,000 WARHEADS, BUT IN AN ARMS CONTROL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THAT NUMBER IS RADICALLY REDUCED, SUCH MARGINS OF ERROR ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE AND PUT THE NATION IN PERIL. A WARNING OF A TERRORIST ATTACK RECEIVED TOO LATE IS USELESS. TRACKING INFORMATION ON NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS OR TERRORISTS, REACHING LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER AUTHORITIES TOO SLOWLY, SPELLS FAILURE. OUR ACCURACY AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH WE DELIVER INFORMATION MUST DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

SECOND, AND RELATEDLY, WE MUST REVOLUTIONIZE THE DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. WE SPEND BILLIONS ON NEAR REAL TIME COLLECTION SYSTEMS, COMPUTERS, WORD PROCESSORS SO THAT WE RECEIVE IN WASHINGTON INFORMATION FROM THE FARTHEST CORNERS OF THE WORLD IN SECONDS. AND WHAT DO WE DO WITH IT? WE WAIT UNTIL THE NEXT MORNING AND DELIVER IT BY AUTOMOBILE OR TRUCK TO THE RECIPIENT. WE MUST BEGIN MOVING TOWARD THE ELECTRONIC DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS DIRECTLY TO THE POLICYMAKERS' DESK, PROVIDING NOT ONLY GENUINELY NEAR REAL TIME INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT BUT ALSO PROVIDING FOR AN INTERACTION BETWEEN THE RECIPIENT OF THE INFORMATION AND THE PROVIDERS AT THE OTHER END OF THE WIRE. SPACE AGE COLLECTION AND HORSE AND BUGGY DISSEMINATION CAN NO LONGER BE TOLERATED.

THIRD, WE ARE GOING TO HAVE GROWING DIFFICULTY OBTAINING NECESSARY INFORMATION. THE SOVIETS ARE DEVOTING EVER MORE EFFORT TO DENYING US INFORMATION ON WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENTS. THEY ARE RELYING INCREASINGLY ON CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION. WE CONFRONT THE PARADOX THAT AT A TIME WHEN MORE AND MORE DATA IS EMERGING BECAUSE OF CURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, TRADITIONAL FORMS OF INFORMATION, FOR EXAMPLE ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY, ARE BECOMING EITHER LESS RELIABLE OR LESS AVAILABLE. WE ARE SPENDING MORE JUST TO STAY AT THE SAME LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE WE HAVE HAD IN RECENT YEARS -- AND IN SOME CASES, WE ARE FALLING

BEHIND. THIS PROBLEM IS WORST IN THE SOVIET UNION BUT, UNHAPPILY, THE LESSONS ALSO ARE BEING LEARNED BY A GROWING NUMBER OF NATIONS ON HOW TO AVOID OUR LEARNING OF THEIR ACTIVITIES.

FOURTH, IN THE FUTURE, AS IN RECENT YEARS, WE CONFRONT A GROWING DIVERSITY OF SUBJECTS WE ARE ASKED TO ADDRESS AND A GROWING DIVERSITY OF USERS. FROM SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, FROM TERRORISM TO NARCOTICS, FROM PORTENTS OF INSTABILITY IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND LITERALLY SCORES OF OTHER ISSUES, POLICYMAKERS AND CONGRESS INCREASINGLY ARE TURNING TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR INFORMATION AND ANSWERS. AND WHERE WE ONCE SUPPORTED JUST THE PENTAGON OR STATE DEPARTMENT OR THE WHITE HOUSE, WE NOW COUNT AMONG OUR USERS THE DEPARTMENTS OF AGRICULTURE, COMMERCE, TREASURY AND MANY OTHERS. MANY OF THEM HAVE NEITHER A REALISTIC APPRECIATION FOR WHAT WE CAN AND CANNOT DO OR FOR THE SENSITIVITY AND FRAGILITY OF OUR INFORMATION.

FIFTH, WE ARE CONFRONTING INCREASINGLY THE USE OF OUR INTELLIGENCE BY ADMINISTRATIONS BOTH TO PROVE TO OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS THE RECTITUDE OR EFFICACY OF US POLICY AND TO INFORM AND PERSUADE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. AND NO MATTER HOW MUCH INFORMATION WE PROVIDE ON ANY GIVEN SUBJECT, IT ONLY WHETS THE APPETITE. WE FACE THE TWIN RISKS OF POLITICAL ABUSE OF OUR

INFORMATION AND COMPROMISE OF SENSITIVE SOURCES AS WE BECOME A UNIQUELY RELIABLE AND TRUSTWORTHY SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR AUDIENCES FAR BEYOND OUR POLICY LEADERS.

SIXTH, WE FACE A PRESENT AND A FUTURE IN WHICH INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS INCREASINGLY CENTRAL TO THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. AS THE RECENT RATIFICATION DEBATE OVER THE INF TREATY DEMONSTRATED, WITHOUT ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE FOR MONITORING SOVIET COMPLIANCE, ARMS CONTROL IS POLITICALLY UNATTAINABLE. WITHOUT BOTH STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE, SUCCESS IN IMPEDING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE SOVIET UNION BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE. WITHOUT OUR INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS, WARNING OF TERRORIST ACTS AND THE INFORMATION REQUIRED TO DISRUPT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IS NOT TO BE FOUND. THIS GROWING DEPENDENCE ON INTELLIGENCE IS TRUE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST DRUG DEALERS AND A HOST OF OTHER NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS TO THIS COUNTRY AND ITS WELL BEING. MORE AND MORE, THE POLICY COMMUNITY AND THE CONGRESS ARE FORCED TO TURN, EARLY OR LATE, TO INTELLIGENCE AS CRITICAL FOR THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY. AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE TRUE REGARDLESS WHO IS ELECTED IN NOVEMBER.

SEVENTH, AFTER A PERIOD OF LARGE SCALE GROWTH THAT BASICALLY RETURNED US TO WHERE WE WERE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1970S IN TERMS OF RESOURCES, WE NOW FACE A CRISIS PRODUCED BY

AN EXPLOSIVELY EXPANDING NUMBER OF REQUIREMENTS IN A PERIOD OF SHRINKING DOLLARS. SOME IN CONGRESS -- AS A DECADE AGO -- ARE TAKING A LEADING ROLE IN TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO BE HELPFUL IN OVERCOMING THIS CRISIS. BUT ABSENT NEW RESOURCES, AT SOME POINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE SENIOR MANAGERS OF US INTELLIGENCE WILL BE CONFRONTED WITH THE CHOICE OF EITHER REDUCING QUALITY OR TELLING THE POLICY COMMUNITY THERE SIMPLY ARE ISSUES WE NO LONGER HAVE THE RESOURCES TO TACKLE. WE CANNOT REPEAT THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1970S IN CRIPPLING OUR CAPABILITIES OR THE QUALITY OF OUR WORK ACROSS THE BOARD.

EIGHTH, WE WILL FACE A GROWING PROBLEM IN RECRUITING AND RETAINING THE SKILLED CADRE OF ENGINEERS, ANALYSTS AND OPERATORS THAT WE REQUIRE TO MEET OUR NEEDS. IT IS A SAD REFLECTION THAT A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF APPLICANTS FAIL TO MEET EITHER OUR INTELLECTUAL OR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE ALL FACE A CRISIS IN THE DEARTH OF PEOPLE TRAINED IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES. ALSO, IT IS A SAD FACT THAT WORKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT IS STEADILY BECOMING A LESS ATTRACTIVE CAREER NOT JUST BECAUSE WE ARE BECOMING LESS COMPETITIVE IN PAY AND BENEFITS BUT BECAUSE OF DIMINISHING REGARD ON THE OUTSIDE FOR PEOPLE IN PUBLIC SERVICE. THESE TRENDS, TAKEN TOGETHER, WILL MAKE RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION A PROBLEM.

NINTH, WE ARE SEEING A CONTINUING REVOLUTION IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE CONGRESS. I BELIEVE THIS IS HEALTHY. DESPITE CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM OF US INTELLIGENCE FROM THE CONGRESS, THE LEGISLATURE HAS BEEN ENORMOUSLY SUPPORTIVE OF ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR INTELLIGENCE OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS. AS I NOTED A MOMENT AGO, THE INITIATIVE TO TRY TO REMEDY OUR CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IS COMING FROM THE CONGRESS. FOR THE FIRST TIME, DUE TO THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO HAVE SERVED ON OUR INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES AND UNDERSTAND OUR WORK, INTELLIGENCE QUIETLY HAS ACQUIRED A POWERFUL CONSTITUENCY THAT WHILE CRITICAL ON SPECIFICS IS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE AND TRIES TO BE HELPFUL IN IMPROVING WHAT WE DO AND THE TOOLS WE HAVE. NOW, THE PASSAGE OF ENORMOUS QUANTITIES OF INFORMATION BY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO THE CONGRESS HAS CREATED TREMENDOUS AWKWARDNESS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POLICY DEPARTMENTS. THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONGRESS FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS OFTEN IS FRACTIOUS. BUT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT IS HERE TO STAY AND, IN MY JUDGMENT, BRINGS WITH IT A HERETOFORE ABSENT LEGITIMACY AND BROAD BASE OF SUPPORT FOR OUR WORK THAT WE MUST HOPE WILL GIVE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE VALUE OF WHAT WE DO.

TENTH, AND FINALLY, ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TRENDS I SEE BOTH NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE IS THE UNIQUE ROLE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ARE PLAYING IN LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, IN LOOKING OUT



FIVE OR TEN YEARS OR EVEN INTO THE 21ST CENTURY, IN TRYING TO IDENTIFY PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES THAT WILL PRESENT THEMSELVES TO THE UNITED STATES AND HOPEFULLY IN TIME THAT ACTION CAN BE TAKEN BEFORE CRISIS OCCURS. WHETHER ECONOMIC TRENDS, THE AVAILABILITY OF FOOD OR ENERGY, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, THE AIDS PANDEMIC OR A HOST OF OTHER ISSUES, OR SIMPLY IN GATHERING AND STORING TACTICALLY USEFUL INFORMATION, WE INCREASINGLY FIND THAT INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS ARE THE ONLY ONES IN GOVERNMENT "SCOUTING THE FUTURE." IT IS BY SUCH WORK THAT WE CAN DIMINISH FEARS AND MISCALCULATIONS BORN OF AN OTHERWISE UNFATHOMABLE FUTURE. WHILE THE WORK IS REMARKABLE, THE REAL CHALLENGE IS IN GETTING POLICYMAKERS DRIVEN BY DAY TO DAY CONCERNS TO PAY ATTENTION.

AS WE LOOK TO THE FUTURE AND THE ROLE OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IN IT, I CANNOT HELP BUT REFLECT THAT THOSE OF US IN THIS BUSINESS, IN MANY RESPECTS, HAVE JOINED A PRIESTHOOD; APART FROM VOWS OF POVERTY AND SILENCE, LIKE PRIESTS, YOU HAVE DEDICATED YOURSELVES TO A LIFE OF SERVICE AND SACRIFICE FOR A HIGHER CALLING -- A CALLING DEDICATED ABOVE ALL TO KNOWLEDGE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH. AS CHURCHILL SAID IN 1915, IN WORDS THAT GO TO THE HEART OF OUR WORK, "THE TRUTH IS INCONTROVERTIBLE. PANIC MAY RESENT IT; IGNORANCE MAY DERIDE IT; MALICE MAY DESTROY IT; BUT THERE IT IS." INDEED, THERE IT IS -- WITHOUT TRUTH, WITHOUT INTEGRITY OUR WORK IS FATALLY FLAWED. THESE VALUES ARE THE FOUNDATION FOR ALL WE DO.

LET ME CLOSE BY ASKING YOU TO PONDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF INTELLIGENCE WORK.

- MANY SERVE IN INHOSPITABLE CLIMATES AND DANGEROUS PLACES, SOME OF THEM OUTSIDE OF WASHINGTON.
  
- ALL WORK EXTRAORDINARY HOURS UNDER ENORMOUS PRESSURE AND STRESS WHETHER IN WASHINGTON, AT MILITARY BASES OR OVERSEAS.
  
- THERE ARE MANY DIFFICULTIES FOR OUR OFFICERS AND THEIR FAMILIES. OUR PEOPLE MAKE MANY SACRIFICES. MANY HOLIDAYS, FAMILY GATHERINGS, AND ANNIVERSARIES FIND OUR PEOPLE IN THE OFFICE, IN DISTANT PLACES, OR, TOO OFTEN, GONE FOREVER. AND, PERHAPS HARDEST OF ALL, WE ALMOST NEVER ARE ABLE TO EXPLAIN WHY.
  
- THE NEEDS OF THE SERVICE ALWAYS COME FIRST.
  
- YOUR SUCCESSES ARE UNHERALDED AND WE ARE SUBJECT TO CONSTANT AND PUBLIC CRITICISM. FOR THE MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKS, WE WILL ALWAYS HAVE DONE TOO LITTLE OR TOO MUCH, TOO SOON OR TOO LATE.

-- AND TOO MANY AMERICANS WILL NEVER KNOW OF OR BELIEVE THE EXTRAORDINARY TALENT, INTEGRITY, DEDICATION AND FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.

BUT THERE ARE COMPENSATIONS.

-- IN YOUR ROLE AS AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER YOU PLAY A KEY ROLE IN PRESERVING AND PROTECTING THE NATION. INDEED, I BELIEVE THAT THE NATION IS AT PEACE IN SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE BECAUSE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IS UNCEASINGLY AT WAR.

-- YOU ARE TRUSTED AS NO OTHERS ON EARTH WITH EXTRAORDINARY RESPONSIBILITY, FROM THOSE OF YOU WHO HOLD THE LIVES OF AGENTS AND OTHERS IN YOUR HANDS, THOSE WHO MANAGE MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR PROGRAMS AND SERVICES, TO THOSE WHO MUST TELL PRESIDENTS, MILITARY LEADERS AND CONGRESS UNPOPULAR THINGS OR UNWELCOME NEWS.

-- YOU HAVE THE SPECIAL SATISFACTION AND INNER CONFIDENCE THAT FLOWS FROM EXERCISING INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT AND HAVING A UNIQUE BLEND OF THOUGHT AND ACTION.

-- YOU HAVE THE CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE THAT WHAT YOU DO MAKES A DIFFERENCE.

-- YOUR INTEGRITY, DEDICATION, LOYALTY AND COMPETENCE ARE REPAID MANY TIMES OVER WITH THE FRIENDSHIPS OF A LIFETIME, PRIDE IN WHAT YOU DO, UNIQUE EXPERIENCES ALL OVER THE WORLD, AND THE CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE AT THE END OF YOUR CAREER THAT YOU HAVE SERVED YOUR COUNTRY WELL.

SHORTLY YOU WILL REENTER THE FRONT LINE OF THIS COUNTRY'S DEFENSE. YOU WILL BE THE NATION'S EYES, ITS EARS, AT TIMES ITS HIDDEN HAND, AND, IN TURBULENT TIMES, ALWAYS ITS COMPASS -- RELIABLY POINTING TO THE FUTURE WHILE INFORMED BY THE PAST. YOU WHO TODAY GRADUATE FROM THIS COLLEGE, AND THE OFFICERS WHO WILL FOLLOW YOU, REPRESENT THE STRONGEST AND MOST RELIABLE ASSURANCE OF THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND ITS CENTRAL ROLE IN PROTECTING THE NATION AND ITS WELL-BEING. I CONGRATULATE YOU AND WISH YOU THE BEST. THANK YOU.

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

88-2053/1

17 JUN 1988

Mr. Benjamin Huberman  
Chairman, Technical Advisory Committee to  
US Space Command  
1616 H Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Ben:

I'm pleased to hear of your work as Chairman of the Technical Advisory Committee to the US Space Command, and in particular of the Committee's interest in the question of the threat to the ground-based segments of our space assets. While it is true that we have not put together in a single publication a comprehensive Intelligence Community assessment of the threat, we have addressed the issue in some detail in a variety of related contexts. Specifically, I believe you will find some very useful material in a number of publications put out by the National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency over the last two years.

I would suggest that you get in touch again with Larry Gershwin, who will make this material available to you at your earliest convenience. Once you have reviewed it, please feel free to discuss with Larry any additional intelligence needs you and the Committee may have beyond what already exists. Although I would be somewhat reluctant to direct a completely new assessment on the subject at this point, I feel certain we can meet your needs through some combination of existing publications, briefings, and meetings with principal analysts.

Sincerely,

/s/ Bob

Robert M. Gates

All portions classified CONFIDENTIAL

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DCI  
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SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. Benjamin Huberman

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DCI/NIC/NIO/SP  (16 Jun 88)

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

June 17, 1988

Lt.Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, USAF  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Room 3E258, The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Lenny:

I just want to send a note of special thanks for the very kind things you said in your introduction at the Defense Intelligence College Commencement. One of the most important legacies Bill Casey left was a degree of harmony in the Intelligence Community unparalleled in its history. You were instrumental in helping Bill create that harmony and have had a critical role in helping Bill Webster to sustain it. I am a beneficiary of that legacy.

Perhaps the most important lesson I learned from my years at the NSC -- and there were many lessons -- was the damage to our national interest from parochial turf fights and the lack of cooperation among the agencies of government in supporting the President. So many in Washington fail to remember that we all work for the same man and through him the country at large. Casey and I used to discuss whether the harmony in the Community would survive a shrinking budgetary pie. He would be enormously pleased at the way we have all been able to work together, with your and Bill Webster's leadership, to keep that harmony intact. The irony is that because the personal relationships are so good -- thanks in no small measure to your example -- the competition of ideas and candid presentation of differences to policymakers is better than ever before. This is as it should be.

I don't know how your conversations with Carlucci will end up today but, I hope, as you suggested, you can stay through the transition. I had hoped for your extension for another year. Your integrity and leadership at DIA have been unparalleled, certainly in my career. You are a very special friend and every day longer we can keep you is a day to the good.

My best to Mickey.

Warmest regards,



Robert M. Gates

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DATE

14 June 1988

**TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

**TO:** DDCI

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**REMARKS:**

**FROM:** D/OSWR

**ROOM NO.**  
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HQS

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Bob -

Here is the speech  
text, as promised.

Call when it is  
convenient to come by for  
a sandwich (or better).

Bob.

mailed 20June88  
Mr. R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.  
Editor-in-Chief  
The American Spectator  
1101 N. Highland  
P.O. Box 10448  
Arlington, VA 22210

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CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
16 JUNE 1988

THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALLED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A \$2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.

AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNITY PARTY.

~~SECRET~~

ER 2557-88

20 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: SIS Promotions

1. While I have approved your recommendations for promotion in the SIS ranks for this cycle, the DCI and I are troubled by the total absence of minority nominations from the DI out of ten eligible, and the fact that only one member of a minority group (out of 13 eligible) has been recommended for promotion in the DA.

2. Such small numbers of both eligible and recommended officers make any generalization questionable, but if there are no recommendations for the promotion of blacks or other minorities in the winter promotion cycle, your recommendations should be accompanied by a memorandum explaining the circumstances.

*R. Gates*  
Robert M. Gates

cc: EXDIR  
D/Pers

DDCI

~~SECRET~~

CL By Signer  
DECL OADR

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25X1

~~SECRET~~

ER 2556-88

20 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations  
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: SIS Promotions

17

1. I have approved your recommended promotions for this cycle. However, I note that your recommendation is not responsive to my memorandum of 15 April 1988 asking that you devote one-third of your additional FY-88 ceiling to the promotion of experts or specialists. [redacted]

[redacted] but there are none.

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

2. I know that you are establishing a supergrade specialist program for senior case officers -- and I believe these positions should be for case officers. Accordingly, I hope that the program will have been implemented by the time of the next promotion cycle and expect that in December I will [redacted]

25X4  
25X1

*R. Gates*

Robert M. Gates

cc: EXDIR  
D/Pers

DDCI

~~SECRET~~

CL By Signer  
DECL OADR

~~SECRET~~

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

20 June 1988

The Honorable James C. Miller, III  
Director  
Office of Management and Budget  
Old Executive Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Jim:

Bill and I thoroughly enjoyed your company at lunch last week. We're glad you could come over.

Apropos of our conversation about future-oriented assessments, I am enclosing a daunting packet -- as requested -- of ten papers that I think you would find of interest. Several of them are particularly sensitive and perhaps the best way to handle this is for you simply to read or scan them and then return them to me when you are finished. To each his own, but I was especially impressed with the papers on Africa in the 1990s (very depressing), the national estimate on the AIDS pandemic, and the paper on East Asia in the 1990s.

Enjoy!

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosures:  
As Listed

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DECL OADR

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16	D/Ex Staff				
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_  
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Remarks

Executive Secretary

21 Jun 88

Date

3637 (10-81)



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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry  
2577/2-88

21 June 1988

19

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Craig Alderman, Jr.  
Chairman  
Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Policy)

FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Improving Our Counterintelligence and  
Countermeasures Posture

25X1

1. The Chairman of the SIG(I), Director Webster, has approved and signed to the National Security Advisor the third biannual report for the President on the President's Report to the Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. He was pleased with the report, especially the continuing progress it reflects toward implementation of measures to improve our counterintelligence and countermeasures posture.

25X1

2. While the report is an accurate one, Judge Webster and I believe that its very positive tone may obscure some real problems in addressing the unfinished agenda for strengthening CI and CM. In fact, there is very little indication in the submitted reports of problems and obstacles to further progress.

25X1

3. Accordingly, the Chairman of the SIG(I) would value a personal report from you on outstanding problems in the area of responsibility of your interagency group. For example, in what areas specifically have parochial or turf problems inhibited faster or better progress? In what areas is there a genuine resources problem? Are there elements of the bureaucracy simply going through the motions? If, as  memo indicates, an estimated 70% of the assigned tasks have been completed or programmed, to what degree are the really tough problems in the other 30%?

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25X1

4. In short, the DCI would appreciate having from you, a personal, uncoordinated memorandum outlining problem areas within the purview of your interagency group. While there is no question that significant progress has been made over the


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Cl By Signer  
DECL OADR

SECRET

past year or so, we are concerned that important problems are either being set aside or haggled to death in the bureaucracy. If there were no such problems, this undertaking would be unique in the history of government. To be able to address these problems in a sensible and effective way we need more specific information and solicit your help in that regard. We hope you will be candid; your replies will be held tightly. We would appreciate your report by 15 July 1988.

25X1



Robert M. Gates

cc: Director, Community Counterintelligence and  
Security Countermeasures Office,  
Intelligence Community Staff

SECRET

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8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
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12	Compt				
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17	D/CCISCMO		X		
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_

Date

Remarks

Executive Secretary

21 Jun 88

Date

**3637** (10-81)

~~SECRET~~

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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20

21 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Charles A. Hawkins, Jr.  
 Chairman  
 Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Technical)

FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Improving Our Counterintelligence and  
 Countermeasures Posture

25X1

1. The Chairman of the SIG(I), Director Webster, has approved and signed to the National Security Advisor the third biannual report for the President on the President's Report to the Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. He was pleased with the report, especially the continuing progress it reflects toward implementation of measures to improve our counterintelligence and countermeasures posture.

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2. While the report is an accurate one, Judge Webster and I believe that its very positive tone may obscure some real problems in addressing the unfinished agenda for strengthening CI and CM. In fact, there is very little indication in the submitted reports of problems and obstacles to further progress.

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3. Accordingly, the Chairman of the SIG(I) would value a personal report from you on outstanding problems in the area of responsibility of your interagency group. For example, in what areas specifically have parochial or turf problems inhibited faster or better progress? In what areas is there a genuine resources problem? Are there elements of the bureaucracy simply going through the motions? If, as  memo indicates, an estimated 70% of the assigned tasks have been completed or programmed, to what degree are the really tough problems in the other 30%?

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4. In short, the DCI would appreciate having from you, a personal, uncoordinated memorandum outlining problem areas within the purview of your interagency group. While there is no question that significant progress has been made over the

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past year or so, we are concerned that important problems are either being set aside or haggled to death in the bureaucracy. If there were no such problems, this undertaking would be unique in the history of government. To be able to address these problems in a sensible and effective way we need more specific information and solicit your help in that regard. We hope you will be candid; your replies will be held tightly. We would appreciate your report by 15 July 1988.

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Robert M. Gates

cc: Director, Community Counterintelligence and  
Security Countermeasures Office,  
Intelligence Community Staff

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Remarks

Executive Secretary

21 Jun 88  
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry

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21 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William S. Sessions  
Chairman  
Interagency Group/Counterintelligence

FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Improving Our Counterintelligence and  
Countermeasures Posture [redacted]

25X1

1. The Chairman of the SIG(I), Director Webster, has approved and signed to the National Security Advisor the third biannual report for the President on the President's Report to the Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. He was pleased with the report, especially the continuing progress it reflects toward implementation of measures to improve our counterintelligence and countermeasures posture. [redacted]

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25X1

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
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Robert M. Gates

cc: Director, Community Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Office, Intelligence Community Staff



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Executive Secretary

22 JUN 88  
Date

3637 (10-81)

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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June 22, 1988


Mr. Brad Roberts  
Executive Editor  
The Washington Quarterly  
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 400  
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Roberts:

Thank you for your kind letter of June 7 inviting me to contribute an essay to the winter issue of The Washington Quarterly on intelligence policy issues. I regret that I do not see how I could find sufficient time in the next weeks to write an article of the quality that would satisfy you or me. I find your invitation most tempting and even considered updating an earlier, formerly classified article I did on the use of intelligence at the White House, but I am not convinced this would be adequate. The article has never appeared in public.

If you have some interest in a revised and updated article on my perceptions of the use of intelligence at the White House over four administrations, I would be happy to talk further with you. If not, thanks again for the invitation to contribute to The Washington Quarterly and I hope I will some day have the opportunity to make a contribution to the journal.

Regards,

  
Robert M. Gates

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THE  
**WASHINGTON  
QUARTERLY**

June 7, 1988

*Office of the Editor*

Mr. Robert Gates  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Anne Armstrong suggested that I write you about a project of possible mutual interest.

She and I have been working together to develop a cluster of essays for the winter issue of The Washington Quarterly on intelligence policy issues. She is authoring an essay analyzing the way in which the executive branch "consumes" intelligence and offering some lessons based on her years at PFIAB. Roy Godson is authoring a complementary piece drawing together conclusions from his three-year research project on intelligence and the 1990s.

Mrs. Armstrong suggested that you might consider contributing an essay of your own to this cluster. As someone with a strong practical sense of the intelligence business as well as a broader perspective on the role of the intelligence community in the nation's business you could make an important contribution to the policy community's understanding of the issues we face in the years ahead.

I understand that there are many demands upon your time. But I hope that you might look upon this as an opportunity to distill some lessons from your experience for an important community. The Washington Quarterly is well read in senior policy circles in the executive and legislative branches; we also have subscribers in over 50 other countries. A copy of the most recent issue is enclosed for your reference.

I look forward to an opportunity to discuss this proposal with you or a member of your staff some time in the next week or so. Thank you for giving this your consideration.

Sincerely,



Brad Roberts  
Executive Editor


cc:Armstrong

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The Sunday magazine section of The Topeka Capital-Journal

June 12, 1988



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

24 June 1988

TO: Mr. Eli S. Jacobs  
E.S. Jacobs & Company

Kathy --

As promised to Mr. Jacobs by  
Mr. Gates.

Thank you

25

CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
16 JUNE 1988

THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

26

INTRODUCTION

THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALLED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

24 June 1988

The Honorable James A. Courter  
United States Representative

Attn: Lesa

Per your phone request attached is a copy of the speech the Deputy Director gave at the Naval War College on the 16th of this month.



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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

June 24, 1988

Mr. Anthony R. Dolan  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
(Director of Speechwriting)  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Tony,

As an amateur, I think twice about sending a professional a speech text, but you might find the enclosed of some interest. I wrote this speech with a view to explaining to layman what is going on in the Soviet Union. I have delivered it to audiences in a variety of places with one or another titles but the text has remained essentially the same. I think you will find it is not exactly the prevailing view in Washington today. I would welcome any comments you might have.

In exchange, I would like to impose upon you to send me a copy of the text of the President's Guildhall speech in London. I saw a tape of it and found it deeply moving. You guys did yourselves proud on his trip generally but Guildhall was surely the high point.

We are overdue for lunch again. Give me a call.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosure:  
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CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
16 JUNE 1988

THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALLED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A \$2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.

AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNITY PARTY.

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

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*[Signature]* Executive Secretary

24 Jun 88

Date

**3637** (10-81)

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

24 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Intelligence Information  
Handling Committee

SUBJECT: Multilateral Counterterrorist Data System  
(MCDS)

1. I believe that it is premature to spend time and resources on MCDS until we resolve the fundamental issue of who will have access and what information will be provided. I believe the first step must be to reach agreement with the agencies that control the data, most particularly CIA and NSA, on exactly what data will be provided and the groundrules governing who will have access to it.

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2. I understand that data sharing has been a continuing problem with the existing DESIST system and has led to user complaints about the inadequacies of the system and the difficulty of using it. I suspect that neither NSA or CIA will be willing to make a substantially larger body of information available to the wide variety of agencies represented in the counterterrorism community. If that is the case, then I do not see how the present proposal is a significant advance beyond the DESIST system.

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Robert M. Gates

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ICS 4227-88  
1 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Acting Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM:   
Chairman, DCI Intelligence Information Handling Committee

SUBJECT: Multilateral Counterterrorist Data System (MCDS)

1. This is to amplify the recent memorandum to you on this subject (Reference) by Fritz Ermarth and Andre LeGallo. The IHC-proposed MCDS design and operations concept referred to therein is outlined in Attachment A hereto. Attachment B is a draft Terms of Reference for a follow-on, fast track system definition effort to examine: (a) the technical and operational implications of implementing the concept; (b) the projected cost of doing so; and (c) the willingness of the Community and other governmental agencies involved in counterterrorism to actively participate in development and support of MCDS. Favorable determinations in these areas would be logical prerequisites to any system implementation action. The proposed study would require funding  for contractor technical and administrative support.

2. I am prepared to further discuss this initiative with you at your convenience.

Attachments:  
As stated

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NIO/CT

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MCDS

Issue

The priority given by the National Security Council and by Agency management to the establishment of a computer data base for use by the counterterrorist intelligence community is not reflected in the current rate of progress toward this goal.

Background

Responding to the Congress and to NSDD 30 calling for better interagency handling of counterterrorist-related information, Director Casey committed the CIA to develop a community-wide data-base which was implemented through the creation of the Decision Support and Information System for Terrorism (DESIST) in 1984. DESIST was absorbed by the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) upon its creation in 1986. The following year, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) requested the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS), which concurred, to take the lead on questions related to systems interface and shared funding while CTC continued to run DESIST. ICS then began to develop a more comprehensive Intelligence Community program, not necessarily including DESIST, envisioning a possibly new community data base that would be more "user-friendly" than DESIST and promote community funding support. In November 1987, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) notified National Foreign Intelligence Board principals that he had designated the ICS to coordinate the effort within the Community to ensure compatibility of systems and data structures. In December 1987, the Chairman of the Information Handling Committee (IHC) of the ICS forwarded a proposed concept of design and operations to the Office of Information Technology (OIT), CTC and to the National Intelligence Officer/Counterterrorism (NIO/CT) offering suggestions on solving the operational efficiency against security dilemma. The NIO/CT held a meeting of interested CIA representatives, which surfaced divergent views, and subsequently sent the IHC concept paper to the members of the Counterterrorism Community. Responses were supportive. Exceptions included the National Security Agency, which wanted more details before committing itself, and from Information Management Staff (IMS) of the DO which, while stating the proposal was "on track", proposed additional, and problematic security constraints (e.g. recipients of MCDS information to be polygraphed).

Problems

There is no agreement between IHC and CIA on the concept for a Community-wide database system.

There is not a designated hitter for CIA, i.e. one voice.

The role of the IHC as the coordinator and of CIA as the executive agent is unclear.

There is a chicken and egg problem; that is, whether to decide first on the system or ensure that the policies of the various players will allow their information to be included on the system.

Funds are necessary to better define the concept.

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Attachment A

MCDS: Concept of Design and OperationsPrincipal Operational Objective

To facilitate counterterrorist operations and intelligence analysis by providing improved communications, information handling and data base access in a secure operating environment.

Basic System Design Concept

MCDS would be designed to function as a community-specific system, meaning that it would be technically and functionally structured to support a limited, pre-defined body of users, i.e., the counterterrorism community. This approach would permit adoption of technical and procedural security controls needed to maximize protection of intelligence sources and methods while facilitating a relatively uninhibited interchange of information within the community the system supports. It would also aid in tailoring system capacities and capabilities to maximize responsiveness.

MCDS would be a closed system without interactive connection to any other system. Data could be entered into the system online, but could not be transferred out of the system electronically. Outputs would be limited to system controlled peripherals (display terminals, printers, etc) that could not further transfer the data without human intervention. Additional security features would include:

- o centrally monitored terminal access control (personal identification verification)
- o automatic collection of audit trail data: user activity, internal data transfers, outputs, interstation communications, etc.
- o automated monitoring of audit data (intrusion detection expert system)
- o superencryption of data transmitted via multiuser networks, e.g. DODIIS.
- o operate as a compartmented mode system per DCID 1/16.

Operationally, MCDS would view its subscribers as members of the defined counterterrorism community rather than of a spectrum of separate agencies and commands. Dissemination of reports and access to data bases within MCDS would, therefore, be determined on a functional rather than organizational basis. An authorized MCDS subscriber would have access to all data within the system that corresponded to an established need-to-know profile reflecting the scope of his or her assigned counterterrorism operations or analysis duties.

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MCDS would be established as an addressable entity for communications purposes, and would be made a direct addressee of terrorist-related message reporting and other traffic its subscriber community found operationally useful. The system would automatically route incoming traffic and provide for specific alerting. It would also accumulate daily acquisitions and make them available for retrospective search in accordance with established user profiles.

The basic system development objective would be to provide the MCDS user a fully integrated suite of facilities, data bases, and information handling services needed to support counterterrorist operations and analysis.

The underlying operational objective would be to establish channels for effective interaction among the people and organizations conducting counterterrorist analysis and operations. The episodic nature of terrorist activity and its intelligence manifestations create situations that are not readily predictable and, therefore, require ad hoc interpretations, decisions, and actions. Given the involvement of numerous, physically separated organizations with differing perspectives, knowledge bases, and operational imperatives, such situations generate discontinuities that can degrade the efficacy and timeliness of counterterrorist action. While MCDS would not of itself resolve such difficulties, it can provide a critical medium for enhancing the interaction of the people who could. Operational experience with even the limited capabilities of FLASHBOARD attests to the value of such facilities.

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Attachment B

DRAFT  
5/19/88TERMS OF REFERENCECOMMUNITY MULTILATERAL COUNTERTERRORIST DATA SYSTEM DEFINITIONIntroduction

Intelligence support to counterterrorist (and antiterrorist) activities is characterized by operating circumstances and conditions that require significant premium be placed on effective coordination among participating organizations and the concomitant timely and appropriate dissemination of relevant data. A high level of uncertainty or ambiguity is created, in part, by the relatively unstructured nature of the terrorist intelligence target, the fragmentary nature of the insights it reveals, and the consequent difficulty in determining the probability and imminence of events against which counteraction or precautions should be taken. Compounding factors are the large number of organizations and media involved in acquiring, processing and using terrorist intelligence; differences in their missions and operating methods; geographical dispersion; and the absence of a common command and control infrastructure. The use of sensitive intelligence sources and methods in acquiring terrorist-related intelligence necessitates compartmentation and restricted dissemination of reporting. However unavoidable, such measures do increase uncertainty, particularly where their implementation is uneven.

Since uncertainty is a deterrent to timely decisions and appropriate action, reducing and controlling it (elimination cannot realistically be expected) must be a major management objective. The role of an automated information handling system in this context is to facilitate interactivity and coordination among the functionally disparate and geographically dispersed organizational elements and support capabilities of the counterterrorist intelligence community. To be effective, such a system must, at a minimum, provide for:

- a relatively uninhibited, predictable flow of relevant data among members of the counterterrorist community;
- security protection and monitoring sufficient to safely permit implementation of the foregoing;
- secure intercommunication among Community elements to facilitate exchanges of data and expertise, as well as coordination to reduce uncertainty; and
- access to useful data bases and related services.

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Task Objective

To define a projected Multilateral Counter Terrorist Data System (MCDS) to a level of specificity and with sufficient detail to:

- provide senior Community management, a description of projected system capabilities and concept of operations necessary to support an implementation decision;

- serve as the basis of a contingent agreement among participating organizations to support development and operation of the MCDS as defined;

- assure that the proposed concept of operations and associated capabilities are functionally and technically achievable at an acceptable level of cost and risk;

- establish the basis for technical and functional system security design acceptable to Community accrediting authorities;

- support reliable estimation of the cost to build and operate the system;

and

- serve as the point of departure for a system development program, following a DCI/DDCI decision to implement.

Task Execution Methodology

Definition of the MCDS will be based on: (1) the concept of operations outlined by the Intelligence Information Handling Committee (attached) and reviewed by the Interagency Committee on Counterterrorism, and (2) the MCDS Follow-On Study Report of 25 March 1988 (to be provided separately) prepared under the auspices of the CIA Counterterrorism Center. The projected system will supplant the current Decision Support and Information System for Terrorism (DESIST) and FLASHBOARD as either a lineal improvement or a substantial replacement, the determination to reflect, inter alia, the findings of this system definition effort. Commensurate with MCDS operating and security requirements, as much of the current DESIST information handling system as possible should be utilized. Its associated International Terrorist Profile and CENTIPEDE data bases will, in any event, be continued in MCDS, regardless of its configuration.

The MCDS definition will be developed in three segments, the first to address functional and performance requirements, the second to explore the system design and capabilities implications of those requirements, and the third to assess the cost of implementation and operation. While it is logical to address the segments consecutively, aspects of all three will need to be considered in parallel if the effort is to result in a pragmatic development program. A follow-on fourth segment will seek to structure a multi-year implementation strategy based on the findings of segments two and three.

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To facilitate rapid development of the MCDS system definition, its major components, will be addressed separately, but simultaneously, by working groups comprised of appropriate personnel from participating agencies. The working groups will have technical and administrative contractor support. They will identify first the functional and performance requirements within their respective components and then their system design implications in terms of information handling capabilities and capacities. The latter will then be integrated to form a composite system description. The IHC Staff will coordinate the overall effort to insure necessary interaction among the working groups and completeness of the integrated product.

Upon completion of the system description, the technical support contractor will prepare an estimate of system implementation costs, taking into account, as appropriate, the prospective use of existing assets and capabilities, such as DESIST, FLASHBOARD, DoDIIS, etc. Finally, a phased implementation strategy seeking to achieve an initial operating capability as rapidly as possible, commensurate with available funding, will be prepared. All of the foregoing will be coordinated with participating Community organizations prior to submission to the DCI/DDCI.

#### Level of Detail

The key to the foregoing methodology is the specificity and detail to which the MCDS system definition is developed. Too little will preclude useful estimation of system development and operating costs; too much will bog down the working groups and obscure the functional and economic questions most relevant to senior management.

The system definition should be limited to establishing significant functional requirements and their technical design implications, the latter being necessary to implementation cost estimation. No extensive detail regarding how the requirements are to be met will be documented; however, the working groups, in translating requirements into the system definition, will include only those which are technically and operationally achievable, as well as cost effective. Technical design implications will be elaborated only to the extent needed to derive cost estimations. An example of the foregoing is the functional requirement that MCDS subscribers be able to informally communicate with one another through the system. Provision of this capability, in turn, implies a system architecture featuring a central processing or switching facility through which all terminals are interconnected. A related requirement that a record be made of such communications for security auditing purposes yields additional implications regarding configuration of the central facility, etc.

#### Working Group Organization

The following is the proposed working group structure and major system elements that should be addressed by each. The working groups will operate simultaneously, with the system architecture group lagging, insofar as its findings must reflect the output of the other groups.

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System Architecture and Communications Working Group

- Central processor specifications and capacities
- Operating system
- Data base management system
- Intermediate processors, switches etc.
- System redundancy/survivability
- Access terminal specifications
- Central processor-terminal connectivity
- Common user network utilization
- Transmission capacity requirements (photos, graphics, etc.)
- Message traffic direct input

Security Working Group

- Access control
- Auditing
- User profiling
- Internal compartmentation
- Physical security requirements
- Electronic security requirements
- Network Security Requirements

User Services Working Group

- User terminal facilities
- Query and retrieval; data integration
- Report generation
- Interstation communications
- Graphics
- Analytical aids
- Alerts
- Message traffic dissemination
- Retrospective query and retrieval
- System databases and maintenance procedures
- Data handling and storage capacities

Concept of Operations Working Group

(See below)

Concept of Operations Definition

In parallel with the system definition effort outlined above, the concept of MCDS operations must be developed to the level of specificity needed to serve as the basis of a formal Community understanding concerning MCDS operations, support responsibilities, and security. MCDS design will be substantially influenced by the dual goals of providing less inhibited intelligence support to counterterrorist operations and analysis while adequately safeguarding the intelligence sources and methods involved. Achieving them will require functional, procedural, and technical trade-offs in system configuration and operation that will, in turn, reflect policy and management decisions by the Community agencies sponsoring MCDS. Those decisions will be a prerequisite to MCDS implementation.

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The Concept of Operations Working Group will serve as the medium for development of the above. It will comprise representatives of the agencies principally affected by MCDS requirements and operations; however, all agencies participating in MCDS support and utilization will review and contribute to the working group's findings. The formalized understanding reached will be included in the MCDS implementation proposal submitted to the DCI/DDCI.

Questions to be addressed in the MCDS Concept of Operations will include:

- Access terminal deployment
- Access control and monitoring responsibility
- Need-to-know determination and administration
- Dynamic data input contributions
- Reference database contributions and maintenance responsibilities
- Interstation communications policy and procedures
- System security administration
- System configuration control management
- System operational management
- System operating and maintenance cost underwriting

SUBJECT: Multilateral Counterterrorist Data System (MCDS)

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SUSPENSE		_____			
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Remarks Ltr w/Attachment to Amb Adams,  
 1600 hrs, 28 Jun 88.

\_\_\_\_\_  
 Executive Secretary  
 28 Jun 88

STAT

\_\_\_\_\_  
 Date

~~SECRET~~

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

28 June 1988

NOTE TO: Ambassador Alvin Adams  
Office of the Secretary of State  
Deputy Director for Counter-Terrorism

A1 --

Attached is the Memcon I read to you over the  
telephone. I hope I am now out of the loop.

*Bob.*

Robert M. Gates

Attachment:  
As Stated

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C1 By Signer  
DECL OADR



29



28 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. I received another call [redacted] today. He said that he has more details on the initiative to try to free the hostages. [redacted]

25X1

25X1  
25X1

[redacted]  
Ambassador Adams at State. I told him there was nothing that we could do with this information but ourselves pass it along to State. [redacted]

25X1

2. I told him that even though I suspected that people would be skeptical about this proposal, he should still deal through regular channels to avoid getting cross-threaded with the government. He responded that he sensed hostility when he had talked to Ambassador Adams and that there was a "not invented here" attitude toward his information. He said it was his impression that Adams regarded him as an amateur who was meddling and had nothing to contribute. [redacted]

25X1

3. I said he might try to speak to Ambassador Bremer this time, but that whatever reaction he got, he needed to work through that channel. I told him that his calls to me were not moving the problem along and that I had become nothing more than an intermediary since I simply would refer him to State. He said he understood what I was saying and that he would not

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Cl By Signer  
DECL OADR

bother me again with this but would contact State. He also understood my concerns about him getting at cross-purposes with the government and avowed his desire to work within the system. He indicated he would call Bremer this afternoon and I urged him to give me a little time to alert that office to his call.

25X1



Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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OGC  
DDO

Ambassador Alvin Adams

Office of the Secretary of State


Deputy Director for Counter-Terrorism

(Ambassador requested the Deputy Director read contents of Memcon over phone and that a copy be sent to him.)

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

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2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
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7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC		X		
11	IG		X		
12	Compt				
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_

Date

Remarks	
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STAT

[Signature Box]

Executive Secretary

22 Jun 88

Date

**3637** (10-81)

22 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The Deputy Director spoke with General Perroots about [redacted] (BGen USAF Retired) and his purported hostage ransom efforts. The Deputy Director wanted to alert Perroots that Pettyjohn might try to come to DIA for assistance or information. Mr. Gates advised he could not vouch for [redacted] present intentions or plans, but believed he is free-lancing in a dangerous and trouble prone arena -- and had so warned [redacted]. Mr. Gates suggested that any DIA official contacted should refer [redacted] to Ambassador Bremer at the State Department, whose deputy already has given [redacted] "a shot across the bow." [redacted]

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 25X1

[redacted signature box]

O/DDCI

25X1

Distribution:

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- OIG
- DDO

~~SECRET~~

Cl By Signer  
DECL OADR

22 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations  
FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: More on [redacted]

25X1

Further to my earlier memorandum concerning [redacted] based on my reflections on [redacted] comments to me as well as what [redacted] and Ambassador Adams have told me about [redacted] other activities, I have serious reservations about any CIA dealings with him. While it may be worth having your people talk to him about his contacts on the foreign materiel side or [redacted] I believe we should discourage him from pursuing these activities and then we should have no further contact with him. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1

*about his judgment according*

*RG.*  
Robert M. Gates

cc: DCI  
OGC  
IG

ORIG - DDO  
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OGC  
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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**ROUTING SLIP**

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
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9	Chm/NIC				
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_

Date

Remarks

STAT

 Executive Secretary

21 JUN 88

Date

3637 (10-81)

20 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Ambassador Alvin Adams

1. In Ambassador Bremer's absence, I talked with Ambassador Adams today to alert him to a possible call from [redacted] concerning a private hostage ransom effort. I told Adams the story that [redacted] had earlier related to me on 15 June. I told Adams that I believe that [redacted] sincerely wants to help but is in over his head, and that I warned him he could get himself into trouble. I said that while I could vouch for him as a serious person while still on active duty, I did not know what he had gotten into over the last year. I said that I could not and would not vouch for his present intentions and that my hope in referring him to Bremer's office was that State might be able to gain some useful informaton from him about his contacts but also discourage him from pursuing this issue further. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

2. Adams indicated that they had gotten some kind of report that [redacted] represented himself as US government and may even have seen [redacted]. I said he had represented the activity very much as a private initiative to me. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

3. I subsequently called Adams back and suggested that if [redacted] doesn't call them they may wish to get in touch with him to warn him away from this effort. I gave them telephone numbers from his card. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1

Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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Cl By Signer  
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**Declassified**

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CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9



15 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations  
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Visit from [redacted] (USAF Retired)

25X1

1. I had a visit today from [redacted] who is a retired Air Force Intelligence officer. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

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Cl By Signer  
DECL OADR

4. [redacted] "hypothetically" what my reaction would be if a private individual had an opportunity to help get the hostages out of Lebanon. I told him that my reaction would be one of enormous skepticism -- that there had been so many scams and so many occasions of both con men and sincere citizens trying to help that it would be difficult to place any credence at all in a proposal of this kind. He went on to say that he had been approached several times [redacted]

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25X1


5. I told him that he was engaged in a very high risk undertaking that had the potential for getting him into trouble. I urged him to get in touch with Ambassador Bremer at State, tell him what he had told me with additional specific details, and to abide by Bremer's guidance. I said if Bremer discourages any further contact or participation, take his counsel seriously. I said it was not clear to me that, even if it could be achieved, paying ransom was smart in terms of the future and US counterterrorism policy and in fact our policy was against it. He acknowledged that, and said that while he was not worried about paying money and then getting nothing in return, the implications of paying ransom troubled him as well. [redacted]

25X1

6. At the end of the conversation, I told him that I would call Bremer and indicate that [redacted] giving him a call. I concluded by saying that my main concern at this point was that he not get himself into trouble because of all of the implications in terms of policy, law and so forth and therefore I felt that any pursuit of release of the hostages by someone in the private sector should be done in close coordination or contact with Ambassador Bremer at the Department of State. I told him I considered there to be a much higher probability of him getting into trouble than him getting the hostages out. [redacted]

25X1

25X1



25X1

8. [redacted] clearly ranging widely since his retirement a year or so ago, and frankly, I believe he is into some of these things way over his head. I tried to steer him in the direction of people who knew both the rules and what was going on in the hope that he could get some wise counsel both from our experts and at the Department. I think he is a sincere individual although he was very vague with me about his business interests and those with whom he is in touch. [redacted]


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Robert M Gates

cc: DCI  
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
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

June 29, 1988

Mr. Herbert E. Meyer



Herb --

Thanks for your note. Enclosed is a copy of  
the Newport text.



Regards,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. Gates".

Robert M. Gates

Enclosure:  
As Stated

STAT

STAT

30

CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
16 JUNE 1988

THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALLED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A \$2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.

AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNITY PARTY.

**HERBERT E. MEYER**

June 24, 1988

Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington DC 20505

Dear Bob,

My compliments on that talk you gave up in Newport. From what I've read, you really laid it all out there. Good for you. Is there a full text of your remarks? If so, I would very much like a copy.

All goes well here -- lots to tell you about. I still have that odd habit of getting hungry about 12 pm each day, and as I recall you do likewise. Any chance you can bust loose and join me one of these days?

*Herb*

*Herb*

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

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**HERBERT E. MEYER**



Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington DC 20505

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

June 29, 1988

The Honorable Arlen Specter  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Specter:

This is to confirm our conversation of 27 June 1988 in which we discussed [redacted] request for one year's leave without pay from CIA. You concluded that this would not pose a problem for you. At the end of the year (13 July 1989), her employment here will be terminated, unless she should decide to return.

Although [redacted] will remain a CIA employee for administrative purposes during this leave-without-pay period, it is important to state for the record that she is under obligation not to report back to this Agency concerning the activities of your office. We expect her new employee-employer relationship to be confidential.

You have selected a very capable and highly respected professional for your staff. Our loss is your gain. [redacted]

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates

cc: [redacted]

DDCI/RMGates/de [redacted]

DISTRIBUTION:

- 0 - Addressee
- 1 - [redacted] (NIC)
- 1 - C/NIC
- 1 - D/OCA
- 1 - DCI Admin
- 1 - D/Pers
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DDCI Chrono



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27 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

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1. I called Senator Specter this morning to tell him that  who he has hired to be his personal secretary, has asked for LWOP for one year and to ascertain if he had any problems with that. In response to his questions I told him that we rarely grant LWOP for more than a year and that while not common, such an arrangement is not unusual. I said that she would retain her clearances and Agency employment for the period of a year although we would not pay her.

STAT

2. The Senator said she had committed to work for him through 1992 when he is up for reelection and mused that such a "safety net" for her was not unreasonable. He finally said that LWOP for a year does not give him a problem.

3. I said we would be sending him a note for the record confirming these arrangements and defining  relationship with CIA during the year of LWOP. He seemed appreciative of the telephone call.

STAT

*RG.*

Robert M. Gates  
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

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ER 2749-88

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

29 June 1988

Mr. Secretary:

I cabled Bill the text of your letter on the Security Evaluation Office. Attached is his reply as I received it on Wednesday. We look forward to sitting down with you on this at the earliest possible time after his return.



Robert M. Gates

Attachment:  
As Stated

DDCI/RMGates/de

DISTRIBUTION:

- 0 - passed by PDB briefer (2July)
- 1 - copy provided by ADCI to DSecState (30June)
- 1 - copy provided by ADCI to Powell (30June)
- 1 - D/SEO
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DDCI Chrono
- 1 - DCI Chrono

SECRET

C1 By Signer  
DECL OADR

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DCI  
EXEC  
REG

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

June 29, 1988

The Honorable George P. Shultz  
The Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear George:

Bob Gates has relayed the contents of your letter regarding the Security Evaluation Office. It seems to represent a material departure from the clear language of our instructions from the President based on our joint letter to him and the PFIAB and the Intelligence Community recommendations which preceded it. I agree we should meet to talk upon my return as any change in concept will require revisiting the problem with PFIAB, the Intelligence Community and the NSPG.

25X1

Sincerely,

William H. Webster

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Cl By Signer  
DECL OADR

**Page Denied**



Washington, D.C. 20505

June 30, 1988

Mr. Philip V. Fellman  
Cornell University  
Department of Government  
McGraw Hall  
Ithaca, New York 14853

Dear Mr. Fellman:

Thank you for your letter of 16 June seeking advice and assistance with respect to your doctoral dissertation, Critical Dimensions in Intelligence Policy 1974-1980.

We can be of some assistance to you. Our Coordinator for Academic Affairs, [redacted] would be pleased to meet and talk with you and suggest a variety of publicly available sources that would get you started on your research. At some future point, we could revisit the issue of access to Agency material if you can make a stronger case for access. You would have to be quite specific about what you want, and the material would have to be at least ten years old for us even to consider declassification, according to regulations and law.

We consider growing academic interest in intelligence and its role in national security affairs to be a salutary development, although researchers such as yourself will always be hampered by the lack of ready access to primary materials.

We wish you the best in your research. You may reach Mr. [redacted]

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence



34

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STAT



27 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Coordinator for Academic Affairs, PAO

You asked me to review a PhD dissertation proposal by Philip V. Fellman of Cornell University. Mr. Fellman wants the Agency's assistance in investigating aspects of Intelligence Policy, including relations between the White House, the CIA and the Congress, during the period 1974-80. He asks for help because he says he wants his work to reflect favorably on the Agency.

I see no reason, at least based on the material Mr. Fellman has submitted, why he needs internal Agency data to investigate the issues he has in mind. A great deal of material is available on the public record. If, after digging into it, he makes a more cogent case for access, perhaps we might reconsider. He also must think about the effects in academic circles of having his thesis supported by the CIA.

I think Mr. Fellman has some interesting notions, although he seems to have concluded already that intelligence policy in the period 1974-80 hurt the Community and national security--a conclusion that is certainly open to some debate. Nevertheless, I would be happy to meet and talk with Mr. Fellman. I could suggest a variety of unclassified sources that would get him started on his research, and then we could revisit the issue if he can make a stronger case for access to our data. I think he would have to be quite specific about what he wanted, although it would have to be at least ten years old, according to present rules.



Coordinator for Academic Affairs

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