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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

1 March 1988

TO: Dr. Roy Godson
Consortium for the Study of
Intelligence

GN
IRS

Per your request attached are
copies of the last several speeches
the DDCI has presented. Looking
forward to seeing you on the 29th
of March for lunch.

Regards,



STAT

THE CIA AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Robert M. Gates

WINTER 1987/88

No. 66201

DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS
19 JANUARY 1988

WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALLED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A \$2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.

AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNIST PARTY.

YOUNG PRESIDENTS' ORGANIZATION - DALLAS CHAPTER
16 FEBRUARY 1988

LOOKING AT STRUCTURAL CHANGE
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AT CERTAIN POINTS IN HISTORY, ABRUPT CHANGES IN THE DIRECTION OF A NATION, A GROUP OF NATIONS, OR THE WORLD HAVE BEEN SO PROFOUND AS TO NAME AN ERA. ARCHEOLOGISTS SPEAK OF THE "BRONZE AGE" OR THE "IRON AGE." HISTORIANS SPEAK OF THE "AGE OF DISCOVERY" OR THE "INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION." IN EACH OF THESE CASES, A NEW TECHNOLOGY OR COMPLEX OF TECHNOLOGIES -- MINING, SMELTING, NAVIGATION, THE STEAM ENGINE -- WENT FAR BEYOND SCIENTIFIC OR ECONOMIC EFFECTS TO FORCE CHANGE IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND THE RELATIVE POWER OF CLASSES AND NATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, ACCORDING TO SOME HISTORIANS, THE INVENTION OF THE STIRRUP MADE KNIGHTHOOD -- AND EUROPEAN-STYLE FEUDALISM -- POSSIBLE, THE INVENTION OF FIREARMS MADE IT AN ANACHRONISM.

IN RECENT CENTURIES, THESE "STRUCTURAL CHANGES" HAVE ACCELERATED. TECHNOLOGIES RISE, FLOURISH, DECLINE, AND ARE SUPERSEDED WITHIN A FEW DECADES, AND THE CHANGES FORCED UPON SOCIETIES AND NATIONS ARE EQUALLY RAPID. POLICY DECISIONS MADE

AMERICAN ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATION TEXAS COUNCIL
16 FEBRUARY 1988

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TODAY ABOUT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, SPECIFICALLY, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WARSAW PACT STATES. WHILE THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES HAVE SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE EXPORT OF MILITARILY USEFUL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TO THE WARSAW PACT FOR SOME 40 YEARS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTINUES TO BE THE SUBJECT OF DEBATE AND DISHARMONY HERE AT HOME AND ABROAD. THE SUCCESS THE SOVIETS HAVE ENJOYED IN USING OUR KNOW-HOW TO DEVELOP AND ENHANCE THEIR OWN SYSTEMS POSES A GENUINE THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

NOW, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IS NOTHING NEW TO RUSSIA. PERHAPS THE EARLIEST EXAMPLE OF MASSIVE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO STRENGTHEN RUSSIA MILITARILY WAS DURING THE REIGN OF PETER THE GREAT AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. PETER HIMSELF TRAVELED TO THE WEST -- TO SWEDEN, GERMANY, HOLLAND AND ENGLAND -- WHERE HE DREW THE PLANS OF WESTERN FORTIFICATIONS; WORKED IN A SHIPYARD; BOUGHT TWENTY FACTORIES, HIRED SOME 800 TECHNICAL

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

March 1, 1988

Mr. James Hackett
Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

Dear Jim:

Thanks for your consideration in being willing to change the date of our lunch. I really look forward to seeing you.

Enclosed is a speech that I gave in Dallas last month on "What is Going on in the Soviet Union". It seems to me that the recent problems with the nationalities underscore the message I was trying to leave. I would be most interested in your reactions when we get together.

See you on the 18th.

Regards.



Robert M. Gates

Enclosure:
As Stated



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

2 March 1988

NOTE TO:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of the letter of recommendation Mr. Gates sent to Cleveland State University.

Hope everything goes well for you.

O/DDCI

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

March 2, 1988

The Honorable Richard Helms
SAFEER Company
1627 K Street, N.W.
Suite 402
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dick:

Thanks for your kind comments on the speech.

As we discussed, here are a few additional copies.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

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DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS
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Executive Registry
88-0861

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

March 2, 1988

Ms. Elizabeth G. Weymouth



Dear Lally:

Thanks for sending me a copy of your Outlook piece on Afghanistan. I read it when it first came out and thought it a fine report. I note in this morning's Post that Bill Buckley cites it favorably and quotes extensively from it.

It was insightful of you to visit China. I personally believe the Chinese element plays a much larger part in Soviet calculations with respect to Afghanistan than has been noted in our press.

Again, thanks for sending it along.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

*Thought you might find the attached
Speech of passing interest.*

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CIA-RDP89G00720R000300050001-2

ELIZABETH (LALLY) G. WEYMOUTH

STATIBUTING EDITOR
WASHINGTON POST

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CIA-RDP89G00720R000300050001-2

The Washington Post

OUTLOOK

Commentary and Opinion

Does Moscow Really Plan On Leaving Afghanistan?

By Lally Weymouth

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan—"I have never seen a test case like this," says French diplomat Jean-Francois Deniau of the proposed Soviet pullout from Afghanistan. "It's the only way we can see if Gorbachev can do what he says. It's so important for freedom and for hope. It's like D-Day . . . We can't accept that a question like this will receive a false solution."

A real solution, says the French special envoy on Afghanistan, would be the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops and the creation of a truly independent country—as friendly with Pakistan as with the Soviet Union.

The French diplomat is asking the right questions: Is Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement that the Soviets will withdraw from Afghanistan—trumpeted around the world this month—for real?

Does Moscow plan a "real solution," or just a cosmetic one that maintains a Soviet proxy government in Kabul? And will the Reagan administration, anxious for a foreign-policy success, accept a false solution?

Answers to these question could begin to surface tomorrow, as Secretary of State George P. Shultz holds talks in Moscow on Afghanistan. Conservatives worry that he may accept a deal that would halt U.S. aid to the *mujahedin* at the start of a 10-month period of promised Soviet troop withdrawal. Such a deal, made without the participation of the Afghan resistance fighters who waged the war, could well collapse—with the resistance fighting on and Afghanistan becoming a second Lebanon.

A clear picture of what's at stake in the current diplomatic debate over Afghanistan emerges from conversations with some of the key players—in the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China. What comes through above all is a sense of uncertainty about what really lies ahead in Afghanistan. Many of those most closely involved are skeptical about Soviet intentions and doubtful that it will be possible to create the neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan that nearly everyone proclaims as the goal. These comments provide a healthy antidote to the optimistic expectations prevalent now in Washington that a lasting settlement of the Afghan conflict is in sight.

Here's a summary of what some of the key officials told me in interviews during the last two months:

■ **The Soviet Union.** Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, Yuli Vorontsov, claims that as a result of the so-called "new thinking," the Soviets have decided to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan and to arrive at a political settlement. But Vorontsov insists that withdrawal from Afghanistan does not mean defeat. Indeed,

See AFGHANISTAN, B2, Col. 1

Lally Weymouth writes regularly about foreign affairs for *The Washington Post*.



The Afghan Question

AFGHANISTAN, From B1

he notes that "we haven't used all the military power we could have applied."

Anatoly Dobrynin, head of the Soviet International Department, says he favors withdrawal but warns that if the withdrawing Soviet troops come under attack, "it will make the process of withdrawal more difficult. We are not prepared to withdraw at any cost."

The future Afghanistan that Dobrynin says he envisions is a "neutral or nonaligned country with no foreign bases." (The Soviets use the words neutral and nonaligned interchangeably, ignoring the differences between Austria, a neutral, pro-West country, and Angola, a Marxist regime that describes itself as nonaligned.) Asked where the neutrals will come from—in a country where one side has been killing the other for the last eight years—Dobrynin admits it is difficult to say.

The Soviets expect that the Geneva accords between Pakistan and Afghanistan will stop western aid to the *mujaheddin* from coming across the Pakistani border. But Iran, home to another 1.5 million Afghan refugees, is another gateway for aid, and Iran is not part of the Geneva talks. Vorontsov says the Soviets are hoping to get the Iranians to seal their border, too.

Even if the Soviets withdraw their troops, says ambassador-at-large Nikolai Kozzyrev, they will continue "to provide assistance to Afghanistan." Economic relations, he said, have good prospects. After all, the Soviet Union has signed about 300 economic treaties with the Soviet-backed Afghan government and it is hoping that the "next government will assume the obligations in these treaties. One treaty is thought by Pakistani intelligence to cede the Wakhan corridor to the Soviet Union. Both Kozzyrev and Vorontsov say that

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Soviet advisors will remain in Afghanistan even if troops are withdrawn. At present there are said to be 9,000 Soviet advisors in Afghanistan—directing every aspect of Afghan life.

■ **Afghanistan.** In Kabul, signs of Soviet control are evident everywhere from the moment you land at the airport. My Aeroflot plane was encircled as it landed by other Soviet planes that dropped flares to distract the Stinger missiles the *mujaheddin* possess.

It's easy to spot Soviet convoys rolling down the road. And you can't overlook the large KGB headquarters, which is centrally located. The KGB, and its Afghan counterpart, known as KHAD, are said to rule the city. Remarks one western diplomat: "Here, there is not one centimeter of change."

"It's a complete and methodic colonization," explains one diplomat in regard to the Sovietization of Afghanistan. Since 1980 when they invaded, the Soviets have taken about 60,000 young Afghans to the Soviet Union to be "educated." "All the main officers in the Afghan administration were formed in the USSR," says a knowledgeable western source in Kabul.

In Kabul, I found the diplomatic community surprisingly united in their conviction that the Soviets aren't likely to withdraw from Afghanistan—and that even if they do withdraw some troops, Soviet influence will not disappear.

One senior western diplomat in Kabul made the case most effectively. "The Soviet Union doesn't want to abandon Afghanistan," he says. "The Soviets want you, by diplomatic means, to help them stay in Afghanistan . . . They want to deceive your country . . . Afghanistan isn't Vietnam. Afghanistan is at the border of the Soviet Union. They want to stay and they want the guarantee of the United States that they can stay."

The West is overestimating the *mujaheddin*, says this veteran diplomat in Kabul. He

insists that western analysts are wrong in predicting a bloodbath if Soviet troops withdraw, as the *mujaheddin* take their revenge on the puppet Afghan regime: "Even if the Soviets troops pulled back, the Kabul regime will be aided by advisors, weapons and money. It is possible that it is strong enough to resist and the *mujaheddin* are divided and will not succeed."

■ **Pakistan.** There is pressure on Pakistan to agree to a settlement at the upcoming Geneva meeting with the Afghan government, scheduled for March 2. Gorbachev said a week ago that if an agreement is signed by mid-March, then the Soviets will start to pull out their troops in mid-May. With a summit coming up in June, American officials would like to have the Afghan war settled so that it won't obstruct disarmament talks.

The Geneva negotiations have been underway since 1982. So far, Pakistan and Afghanistan have managed to agree on three points: reciprocal assurances of non-interference and non-intervention by Afghanistan and Pakistan; guarantees of this non-interference by the Soviet Union and the United States; the right of Afghan refugees to return to their homeland. A fourth item that would provide a time-frame for withdrawal of Soviet troops hasn't yet been resolved.

Gorbachev's recent proposal of a 10-month withdrawal period seemed to close the gap, and some analysts thought a settlement was near. Then Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq introduced a new element when he told me in an interview last month that he would not sign the Geneva Accords with the Soviet-backed president of Afghanistan, Najibullah. Zia said he would sign the accords with a coalition government formed of and by Afghans and controlled by the *mujaheddin* and Afghan exiles.

The reason for President Zia's demand for an interim government is that he wants to be sure that an agreement, is a real agreement—that it will insure both the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the ability of the 3.5 million Afghan refugees housed in Pakistan to return to their homes.

A former senior Pakistani official explains that Islamabad is worried that if Pakistan signs the Geneva accords with Najibullah, it

will achieve what Demau calls a false settlement—one in which the *mujaheddin* are excluded and continue to fight, one that gives Najibullah the legitimacy he has been denied for so long and one which leaves Pakistan stuck with the Afghan refugees, who won't return home as long as Najibullah reigns.

The present Soviet strategy, explains one senior Pakistani official, is to improve relations with both Iran and Pakistan so that "sandwiched between the two, Soviet security in Afghanistan can be insured." In five to 10 years, according to one knowledgeable Pakistani, the Soviets expect to have pro-Soviet governments in both Tehran and Islamabad: "That could be not an unreasonable expectation," he says. "Then Soviet influence could extend into India, Pakistan, Iran and Syria, and you would have a whole belt."

As for Afghanistan's future, a Pakistani defense analyst explains: "I think the Soviets will withdraw but leave Afghanistan in a state of civil war like Lebanon so they retain the option of returning."

Summing up Afghanistan's future with an analogy, one Pakistani official asks: "Is it possible for Mexico to have any other influence than the United States? A superpower expects its shadow to fall on Afghanistan."

■ **China.** Although President Zia is often portrayed as a hardliner, Chinese officials and analysts take an even tougher position—skeptical of Soviet intentions to withdraw from Afghanistan and convinced that increased aid to the resistance is the key to removing the Soviets from Afghanistan. (An end to the conflict in Afghanistan has been one of China's three conditions for improving relations with the Soviet Union.)

Chinese defense analysts at the Beijing Institute of Strategic Studies express doubt that the Soviets are sincere in their stated intention to withdraw from Afghanistan. "The Soviet condition is that the United States and other countries stop interference," says one expert. "For the United States and China to cut off the resistance is a condition that must not be accepted."

The Chinese analysts agree that the so-called "southern strategy" of the Soviet Union—the drive to control warm-water ports—hasn't changed. "It started back in

the Czarist period," says one. "It's their dream. They won't give up what they have achieved: They have got Afghanistan and it's a springboard for the Soviet Union."

President Zia of Pakistan had disclosed in our interview that Chinese aid to the resistance was as important as U.S. aid. A senior Chinese official, speaking anonymously, confirmed Beijing's role: "We have been helping the Afghan resistance forces for many years now with arms and money and are still continuing to do that." The defense analysts advocate increased aid to the resistance from both the United States and China as the most effective way to persuade the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan. Argues one: "The right approach isn't to reduce our bargaining position but to reduce theirs. We should increase our aid to the Afghan resistance and not stop until after the Soviet Union withdraws its troops."


One senior foreign ministry official warns that "some U.S. friends are too optimistic about the Soviet withdrawal." Huan Xiang, a senior official, puts it this way: "I guess the Soviets do want to withdraw but how to withdraw is the question. They want to leave a pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan and are finding it difficult."

■ **The Mujaheddin.** The last word belongs to Younis Khalis, one of the leaders of the Afghan resistance, and it doesn't bode well for a negotiated settlement. "We said the Russians should leave Afghanistan. This is our suggestion," says Khalis. But he isn't interested in Zia's idea of forming an interim government that would give even a minor role to Najibullah's party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, or PDPA: "We will never accept any communist element in a future government of Afghanistan."


Khalis says the resistance groups "reject the Geneva negotiations because the real parties [to the conflict], the *mujaheddin* and the Russians, were not participating. Any outcome of such a negotiation would not be acceptable to the *mujaheddin*. The Russians, if they really want to leave Afghanistan, should suggest negotiations with the *mujaheddin*. Then we will be ready to sit down and negotiate about a peace settlement. There is nothing in between."

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

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Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505



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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

ER 0865-88

March 2, 1988

Dr. Constantine C. Menges
American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036


Dear Constantine:

Many thanks for your note and the attachments. You can be sure that your concern about the end game in Afghanistan is widely shared. I will share your thoughts, but I hope you have written to others as well.

If you have not read Lally Weymouth's Post Outlook piece (February 21, 1988) I urge you to do so. It strikes me as sound reporting and thinking.

Good to hear from you.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

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American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 862-5800
Telex: 671-1239

26 February 1988

Dr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bob:

At AEI I have been writing a book on the implications of the success or defeat of the pro-western resistance movements for the U.S.-Soviet balance in the world. As a result, I have studied the situation in Afghanistan in some depth.

For seven years President Reagan's policy has been that until all Soviet troops are withdrawn and a genuinely independent government controls Afghanistan, the free world should continue aid for the armed resistance there. This policy, if sustained, can succeed in accomplishing these objectives.

But I am deeply concerned that if the State Department accedes to the Gorbachev offer of February 8 there will be a defective political settlement which will result in the communists retaining power and the resistance being severely cut back within the next year.

In my judgment this would be a tragedy for the people of Afghanistan and open the way to substantially increased dangers of the dismemberment of Pakistan, a pro-Soviet Iran, and pro-Soviet groups taking power in some of the Persian Gulf oil states.

This issue and potential dangers, it seems to me, need to be explored by the President in the context of a full meeting of the National Security Council. I hope you will look at the attached items and consider exercising the leadership needed to bring this issue before the President in a full NSC meeting. Naturally, I would be pleased to provide further information if that would be helpful.

With all good wishes.

Sincerely,

Constantine C. Menges, PhD
Resident Scholar

CCM/tg
Enclosures

February 26, 1988

Suggested Actions for the President

Afghanistan

1. President Reagan should continue with his correct policy: no cutoff of aid to the Resistance until all Soviet troops are out and a genuinely independent government exists.
2. Reagan should convene a weekly full meeting of the NSC to assure that State follows his policy in the coming weeks of intense negotiations leading to the Soviet proposed signing date of March 15th.
3. Otherwise State is likely to fall into the Soviet trap represented by the February 8th Gorbachev proposal: sign on March 15 and on May 15th Soviet troops start to withdraw (with the promise of all being out in ten months); no arrangements are made for a genuinely independent Afghanistan; all U.S. aid to the Resistance is terminated at the start not the end of the Soviet withdrawal.
4. The likely result -- some Soviet troops withdraw, the Soviets stir up combat among Resistance groups, the "international verification group" overlooks Soviet violations but prevents Pakistan from helping the Resistance and when the U.S. presidential season is over the Resistance has been gravely weakened and a communist government controls Afghanistan. In turn this defective settlement would sharply increase the threat of Soviet supported destabilization in Pakistan and the Persian Gulf oil states.

Central America

1. Soon, the President should submit a request through the regular appropriations process for the full aid needed by the Contras for this fiscal year (Kemp and Helms had proposed about \$270 million in August 1987 and the Administration had seemed to agree in September 1987).
2. The President should seek an up or down vote before the July 4, 1988 recess and make this a major prospective political issue for the November 1988 election saying: the Democrats seem to be trying to lose Nicaragua to communism twice (in 1979-81 the Carter Administration failed to assure implementation of democracy as promised to the OAS; now they are abandoning the Contras).
3. As both the late Senator Henry Jackson and Reagan have said -- the national security risk is both a communist Central America and a communist Mexico.
4. With a full scale political and communications effort this vote can be won.

The New York Times

February 26, 1988

ON MY MIND | A. M. Rosenthal

A Little Time Left

There is still time for President Reagan to make sure that a great victory in the making does not become a tragedy. But not much time.

The Soviet Union has agreed in theory to pull its troops out of Afghanistan. This can be a smashing political, military and moral triumph for the Afghan resistance fighters, for Pakistan, which gave them refuge for a decade, and for a strong bipartisan American policy of military and economic support to the resistance.

But there is a critical debate taking place in Washington to which neither the President nor the country has paid enough attention. It did not rate a Presidential statement or even a question at his news conference.

The debate in Congress, the State and Defense Departments, the White House and among intelligence specialists is not among political caricatures — war-minded kooks and mushy-headed peaceniks. On both sides are rational people who range from mildly radical to devotedly conservative.

The heart of the debate is this:

Will the pullout mean that Afghans will be able to choose their own government or is the Soviet Union planning and the U.S. failing for a withdrawal plan that will keep Moscow's puppet Government in power in Kabul?

Two specific questions are involved:

Will the U.S. cut off aid to the resistance while Moscow openly or covertly supplies the Kabul Communist regime with arms and economic assistance?

Should the U.S. accept the Soviet determination to leave the Kabul regime intact and in power after the pullout or should we insist on an interim government in which the Afghan resistance, which fought not only against the Russians but their

Kabul satellites, has a dominant role as the fruit of its victory?

In Congress and the Administration, there is a strong inclination to make the pullout deal quickly, to insure Soviet troop withdrawal. As for aid cut-offs, they say, we will make the best deal possible. It doesn't matter that much, anyway; once the Red Army is out, the Kabul regime will soon be torn apart by the Afghan resistance.

But there are also Congressmen and specialists convinced that the Administration's eagerness for agreements with the Russians can turn an anti-Communist victory into a Communist triumph.

They believe it is naïve, self-deluding

Ending secret diplomacy on Afghanistan.

and pantingly optimistic to assume Moscow will not keep up the struggle for Afghanistan. So do I. The Russians will leave behind a well-armed Kabul government that will fight from fortified cities. Moscow will keep supplying the Afghan Communists after we cut off aid to the resistance.

The resistance forces will indeed triumph over Kabul one day. But we owe it to them and ourselves not to leave them with a clap on the back and very best wishes as they face more years of war against a Soviet-backed Kabul government.

There is confusion and double-talk about what the United States has

promised or hinted at. In a day or two, the President will get a letter from at least 29 senators of almost every political shading urging him to step in and clear things up. They want him to make sure himself that aid to the resistance is not cut off until all Soviet troops leave Afghanistan and Moscow ceases aid to Kabul.

The letter is signed by conservative Republicans like Gordon J. Humphrey of New Hampshire, one of the strongest backers of the resistance, and Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. It also has signatures of the Democrats Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York and Christopher Dodd of Connecticut. Alfonse D'Amato of New York and Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, Republicans, have signed and so have the Democrats Joseph Biden of Delaware and Dennis DeConcini of Arizona.

So it is now up to the President to call a meeting of the National Security Council, find out what has been committed and decide what he is willing to stand by.

But that's not enough. The next round of talks starts in Geneva on March 1. The agreements should be made public before the United States commits its power and honor to them.

The U.S. need not agree with the resistance on every point nor satisfy every demand. But at least the President should pay attention to the last sentence in the letter he will be getting from the senators of both parties:

"We have no right to endanger the gains the Afghans have made at a terrible price to their nation."

Then let's hear from the President fully, openly and soon. Secret diplomacy is now unjustified. Whatever Washington tells Russians is exactly what it should tell Afghans, Pakistanis and Americans. □

The New York Times

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1988

A35

ON MY MIND | A. M. Rosenthal

The Great Game Goes On

Mikhail Gorbachev faces a challenge entirely worthy of his abilities as a master politician.

The task before him is to make sure that a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, if it takes place, does not diminish full Soviet control of the country.

His predecessors spilled Soviet blood to invade Afghanistan. Mr. Gorbachev will build on what they achieved — Soviet domination of Afghanistan for the first time in history. He will struggle to keep Soviet control without more cost in Soviet lives. If he succeeds he will be a hero at home and in the world and still maintain Soviet power in South Asia.

You do not have to be a cynic or even particularly skeptical about Mr. Gorbachev to realize that this is his immediate goal. He already has established much of the political and military structure in Afghanistan necessary to achieve it. This will be left behind when Soviet troops march out.

He would fail in his duty as guardian of Soviet power if he did not at least try. He would be turning his back on what Moscow historically has believed are deep Russian interests in Afghanistan. He would be betraying the Soviet Army's sacrifices. He could not last long in power if he just gave up and walked away from Afghanistan.

For almost 200 years, Russian rulers, Czarist or Bolshevik, have tried to conquer Afghanistan. Kipling called it "the Great Game."

Now, control of Afghanistan puts the Soviet empire at the doors of the Indian subcontinent. Moscow need not invade Pakistan and India. All it has to do is knock firmly; it will be heard.

Afghanistan also puts Soviet power within tank distance of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. From Af-

ghanistan, the Soviet Union can move deep into Iran. A true prize, Afghanistan, for a great imperial power.

But the Afghan resistance made Moscow pay a price: 10,000 Soviet lives, a wound that never was stanching, bitterness in the mouths of Soviet parents. Mr. Gorbachev is flexible enough to see that perhaps control can now be maintained without the Red Army and that in the future only Afghan blood need be shed.

Soviet troop withdrawal will leave behind a puppet Government whose ministries are laced with Soviet "advisers." This regime has international recognition. It also has a well-trained army, years of military supplies, and a

ance, to struggle for it.

1. Moscow must agree to meet with the Afghan resistance. Three countries — the U.S., Pakistan, the Soviet Union — are determining the fate of a fourth. Something like this happened once before, in 1938, in Munich.

2. The U.S. should try to wiggle out of its incredible commitment to end aid to the resistance when the Russians begin to pull out, replacing it with a phased cutoff.

3. The withdrawal agreements should remove not just Soviet troops but the small army of "experts."

4. The powerful Soviet air and communication bases must be dismantled, not turned over to Kabul and the "experts."

5. Territory along the Soviet-Afghan frontier that has been annexed de facto by Moscow should be returned. So should the 10,000 Afghan children in the Soviet Union.

6. The secret police should be disbanded.

7. Afghanistan should be ruled not by the Kabul regime but by an interim government selected by a traditional council of elders in which Kabul would be a participant — along with resistance politicians and military leaders and representatives of Afghan clans and refugees. The permanent government should be chosen by an election in which the Communists can run, after the millions of refugees return.

This would mean a concession by the resistance, which loathes the Communists and wants them out or dead, preferably both. It would also mean the end of total Soviet domination.

It would be a new, more difficult challenge for Mr. Gorbachev to show whether in the end he will choose peace for Afghanistan or is just playing another card in the game. □

What Soviet pullout will leave behind.

Soviet-created air force. It has a powerful secret police with close ties to the K.G.B. It has the prospect of unending Soviet-bloc economic assistance.

The Afghan resistance will find itself alone, without the U.S. military assistance that has kept it fighting. It will be under pressure to join a Communist-dominated government. If it does not the world will shake its finger, call them naughty and turn away.

One million Afghans have died. Five million, a third of the nation, are in exile. The Afghans deserve an honorable peace. It is up to the United States, which profited from the stunning bravery of the Afghan resist-

February 26, 1988

Afghan Diplomacy -- Opportunity or Trap?*

Is the Soviet Union's proposal to withdraw from Afghanistan an effort to win by diplomatic cunning what the Red Army has failed to achieve by military force? On February 8 Kremlin chief Mikhail Gorbachev heightened expectations of an early settlement to the war. If the United States cut off aid to the Afghan resistance, he suggested, a Soviet troop withdrawal could begin on May 15 and be completed within ten months, provided diplomats in Geneva reach a settlement by mid March. He indicated that this pullout would proceed whether or not an agreement was reached on a new or interim Afghan government to succeed the current communist regime.

On the day after Gorbachev's announcement, the Washington Post said that the possibility of "a good settlement" was nearing. Two days later a New York Times editorial hailed the pledge as "an extraordinary statement" that "eliminates the biggest outstanding obstacle in the talks" and indicates that "from all appearances, Moscow has made the painful decision to lose a war."

Afghanistan's tragic recent history should be kept in mind as we consider these developments. In 1978, after twenty-five years of active Soviet subversion of Afghanistan, the Communist

*Dr. Constantine C. Menges is Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington D.C. He served in the Reagan Administration for five years, including from 1983 to 1986 as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

party seized power there in a bloody military coup. In twelve months the new regime executed tens of thousands, imprisoned many more, and tried to destroy religion and all other independent institutions. Since the Communist takeover, more than 1 million of Afghanistan's 15 million people have died in warfare or prison, and nearly 5 million have fled to Pakistan and Iran as refugees.

Within weeks of the 1978 coup, an armed Afghan resistance began to oppose the Communist regime. Now, nearly a decade after Soviet troops invaded in December 1979, the resistance has fought them and the Kabul Communists to a standstill. The Soviet Union has therefore given new emphasis to the UN-sponsored "proximity talks" in Geneva.

Where does the United States stand on these fast-paced diplomatic developments? President Reagan's longstanding policy, restated during and after the December 1987 summit and in his 1988 State of the Union message, requires U.S. aid to the resistance to continue until all Soviet troops have withdrawn and a genuinely independent government is in place in Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, a faction within the State Department appears to have followed a different policy. These career officials are working for a settlement based on a 1985 draft treaty, negotiated under UN auspices in Geneva. It requires a Western aid cut-off once a Soviet troop withdrawal begins.

This State Department action became public in May 1986 when

a key supporter of the Afghan resistance, Senator Gordon Humphrey (R,N.H.), questioned a senior State Department official during Congressional hearings. He admitted that State had agreed to guarantee this Geneva draft treaty and that Shultz knew about it, but he would not answer whether President Reagan had approved or even been informed of the action. On February 11, 1988, the New York Times published a report headlined "Reagan didn't know of Afghan deal." According to the White House and State Department officials it quoted, "an American commitment in 1985 to end military aid to the Afghan guerrillas at the beginning of a Soviet troop withdrawal was made without the knowledge or approval of President Reagan."

Will the State Department follow the President's policy or its own inclinations on Afghanistan? If it follows its own inclinations the United States risks being misled into approving a defective political settlement. History has shown that the Soviet Union and its allies know how to use false political settlements as a strategy for Communist victory. The 1945 Yalta agreement served that purpose for Eastern Europe, as have four subsequent war termination agreements -- Korea in 1953, Vietnam in 1954, Laos in 1962, Vietnam in 1973. The communist side violated all of them.

As a 1986 Defense Department report stated, in these four war termination agreements the communist side undertook "significant violations, including military ones...immediately after the agreements went into effect, suggesting that the

communists were planning the infringements even as they were negotiating." The 1962 settlement on Laos for example, required North Vietnam, "in the shortest time possible," to remove its estimated ten thousand troops through designated checkpoints, but "only forty left the country through International Control Commission checkpoints."

The 1973 Paris Accords required North Vietnam to withdraw all of its forces from Cambodia and Laos and to refrain from introducing additional forces into South Vietnam. In fact, "North Vietnam never observed the cease fire and troop withdrawal requirements. Within three months...Hanoi had already illegally infiltrated some thirty thousand additional troops." The 1986 report goes on to say about all four agreements that "despite the elaborate supervisory and control mechanisms...the communist signatories were able to circumvent key provisions...with relative ease."

To this disturbing history can be added the conclusions reached by President Reagan in his four annual reports on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. The 1984 report concluded that "over a twenty-five year span the Soviets had violated a substantial number of arms control commitments." And in 1985 the president noted "a pattern of Soviet noncompliance" with arms control accords.

Since the West has made no effective response to these repeated violations, Gorbachev might well intend to offer a Soviet troop withdrawal - with no clear-cut way to monitor the

number of troops remaining or secretly reintroduced - as a lever to terminate U.S. aid. Will the Soviets then permit a genuinely free Afghanistan?

Seventy years of history suggest that Moscow will seek ways to keep Afghanistan Communist. It might try to divide and demoralize the resistance groups as they begin to discuss with Afghan exiles and Kabul regime representatives the composition of the new government and the methods of Soviet withdrawal. United principally by hatred of Soviet occupation, the resistance alliance would be vulnerable to Communist destabilization in such a new political context.

Three groups within the alliance seek a secular government, including a constitutional monarchy or Western-style parliament, but the four "fundamentalist" groups unconditionally reject the pre-Communist institutions--including the monarchy--and seek an Islamic state. The Soviets have likely proposed a role for former Afghan King Zahir Shah (deposed by a leftist coup in 1973) in order to aggravate these differences and perhaps to spark warfare within the alliance.

While they create public expectations of an imminent withdrawal, Moscow and Kabul will probably secretly attempt to maintain Communist control over the premiership, the army, the secret police, and the ministries of education and communication. As in 1980, when the Soviets tried to mask their domination of Afghanistan with a cosmetic "broad front," they may try to control the "new" government through ostensibly non-

communist Afghans who are clandestine communist partners.

If aid to the Afghan resistance is cut off before all Soviet troops are withdrawn and a genuinely independent government is in place, a Soviet strategy of provoking fights among resistance groups inside Afghanistan and in refugee zones along the Pakistan border might well succeed.

Although the resistance wants a new government without Communists, the differences among the groups could allow the Soviets and their proxies to support some groups against others and bring them into cooperation with the pseudo-independent government they will try to establish. Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq sensibly refuses to have anything to do with the current Kabul regime of Najibullah, but he has reportedly begun to pressure resistance groups to join a new government that might include Communists.

If some resistance leaders reject the emerging settlement as a Soviet trap while others embrace it as a vehicle to power, divisions and even warfare among the groups might increase. The spectacle of freedom fighters at war among themselves could undermine Western support. And Pakistan might sharply reduce its help for whatever effective resistance remained.

These possibilities will be furthered by the UN-created verification system, which would probably overlook or fail to detect Soviet violations while vigilantly monitoring and limiting movement from Pakistan into Afghanistan. In the past, international verification groups have often stood by while the

Communist side violated its agreements.

The Soviets may well calculate that the U.S. aid cut-off, the infighting within the resistance alliance, and the problems between the resistance and Pakistan, along with unobstructed Soviet violation of the settlement, could cumulatively and dramatically weaken the resistance. Then in late 1988, with the United States preoccupied with presidential politics, Soviet troops and secret police could be secretly reinfilitrated to cut down the resistance until it no longer jeopardized Communist control.

This destructive scenario is a real possibility. It can still be avoided if President Reagan makes sure that his administration carries out his publicly stated policy. He should clearly reaffirm that policy in public statements and use regular meetings of the National Security Council to ensure his control. The United States should be willing to increase military aid to the resistance unless the Soviets agree to a genuine settlement, withdraw their forces, and permit a truly independent Afghan government.

The resistance leaders might also increase their pressure for such a genuine settlement. They could notify Moscow and Kabul that unless a truly independent Afghanistan is attained by autumn 1988, they will not provide cease-fire zones for Soviet troop withdrawals or give amnesty to members of the Communist Afghan government. And the resistance could demand full reparation -- valued at tens of billions of dollars -- for the immense human suffering and economic destruction the Communists have caused.

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Washington, D.C. 20505

DDC

7 March 1988

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Wolf:

I appreciate your letter of 19 February 1988 in which you describe the recent mark up of H.R. 3757, the Federal Employees Leave Transfer Act. I share your enthusiasm for what this measure can accomplish.

The amendment to the bill which permits the Agency to establish its own program was made necessary by the need to protect sensitive personnel information. Having gained this authority, I now take very seriously my responsibility to establish a leave transfer program which will not only meet the unique needs of our employees, but which will be exemplary for other agencies.

I am pleased to hear that the prospects for passage in the House are excellent and that the Senate is also likely to act favorably. This bill is indeed one in which everyone wins.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Robert M. Gates".

Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

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Washington, D C 20505



07 MAR 1988

OCA 88-0594

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Wolf:

I appreciate your letter of 19 February 1988 in which you describe the recent mark up of H.R. 3757, the Federal Employees Leave Transfer Act. I share your enthusiasm for what this measure can accomplish.

The amendment to the bill which permits the Agency to establish its own program was made necessary by the need to protect sensitive personnel information. Having gained this authority, I now take very seriously my responsibility to establish a leave transfer program which will not only meet the unique needs of our employees, but which will be exemplary for other agencies.

I am pleased to hear that the prospects for passage in the House are excellent and that the Senate is also likely to act favorably. This bill is indeed one in which everyone wins.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ William H. Webster

William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

- 1 - DCI
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- 1- OCARead



STAT OCA: eb (29 Feb 88)

07 MAR 1988

OCA88-0616

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Transmission of FY '89 Intelligence Authorization
Bill to Congress

1. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has just cleared our draft Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence Authorization Bill.

2. The next step in the process is the bill to be formally transmitted to the House and Senate under letters signed by you.

3. Attached at Tab No. 1 is a memo to me from explaining the issues in more detail. At Tab C of that memo are the two transmittal letters for your signature.

John Helgerson

Attachments

- Tab 1 - DDL/OCA memo to D/OCA
- Tab A - Draft Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence Authorization Bill (bill, section-by-section analysis, cost analysis and changes in existing law)
- Tab B - OCA 87-6026 (8 December 1987)
- Tab C - A/DCI Letter to Speaker and A/DCI Letter to President of the Senate



SUBJECT: FY '89 Intelligence Authorization Bill:
Transmission to Congress

STAT

OCA/Leg, (9 February 1988)

Distribution:

Original - Addressee (w/att)

1 - D/OCA (w/att)

1 - ER (w/att)

1 - Ex Dir (w/att)

1 - DDCI (w/att)


1 - OCA/Registry (w/att)

1 - OCA/Leg/Subject File: FY '89 Intel. Auth. Bill (w/att)

1 - JR Signer (w/o att)

1 - PS Signer (w/o att)

1 - OCA Read (w/o att)



4 March 1988
OCA88-0615


MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Congressional Affairs

FROM: Deputy Director for Legislation
Office of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: FY '89 Intelligence Authorization Bill:
A/DCI Transmission to Congress


1. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has just given Administration clearance to the draft Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence Authorization bill. The bill as cleared with supporting materials is attached at Tab A.

2. With the Acting Director's concurrence, the bill had been sent to OMB for clearance on 24 December 1987 after a preliminary circulation for comment within the Intelligence Community. Attached at Tab B is a memo explaining the issues at the time the bill was sent to OMB.



3. The next step is for the bill to be formally transmitted to the Senate and the House under cover of letters from the Acting Director at Tab C. The Acting Director's signature on those two letters is requested.

STAT



Attachments

- Tab A - Draft Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence Authorization Bill (bill, section-by-section analysis, cost analysis and changes in existing law)
- Tab B - OCA 87-6026 (8 December 1987)
- Tab C - A/DCI Letter to Speaker and A/DCI Letter to President of the Senate



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OCA 87-6026
8 December 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Congressional Affairs

FROM:

SUBJECT: Draft Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence Authorization Bill:
Submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
for Clearance

1. Attached at Tab A is a letter to OMB for your signature. The letter seeks Administration clearance for the draft Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence Authorization Bill and draft transmittal letters (Tab B). We hope to have clearance on the bill in time for the Director to transmit it to the Second Session of the 100th Congress in January 1988.

2. The first draft of this legislation was circulated throughout the Agency and the Intelligence Community. This draft, which we are sending forward to OMB, is the result of comments received on the first draft and the Congress' action on the Fiscal Year 1988 Intelligence Authorization Act, signed by the President on 1 December 1987 (Public Law No. 100-178). The following is a summary of the provisions and issues involved.


3. Title I through III are standard "boilerplate".

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

OCA 88-0678

9 March 1988

The Honorable George Bush
President of the Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

This letter transmits for the consideration of the Congress a proposed "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989".

A detailed section-by-section explanation accompanies the proposed Act. Timely consideration of the bill would be greatly appreciated.

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that enactment of this proposed legislation would be in accordance with the President's program.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Robert M. Gates". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "R" and "M".

Robert M. Gates

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

OCA 88-0677

9 March 1988

The Honorable James C. Wright, Jr.
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

This letter transmits for the consideration of the Congress a proposed "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989".

A detailed section-by-section explanation accompanies the proposed Act. Timely consideration of the bill would be greatly appreciated.

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that enactment of this proposed legislation would be in accordance with the President's program.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Robert M. Gates".

Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
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8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC	X			
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA	X			
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Remarks To 10, 13 & 18. FOR compliance with Paragraph 5, please.

STAT

[Signature]
 Executive Secretary
 9 Mar 88
 Date

3637 (10-81)

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DATE

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

STAT FROM:

[Redacted]

OWSR/STD/SB

STAT ROOM NO.
5F43

BUILDING

HQS

EXTENSION

[Redacted]

FORM NO.

REPLACES FORM 36-8

(47)

Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

9 MAR 1988

NOTE TO: Deputy Director for Intelligence

The enclosed responds to a request from the Defense Science Board for CIA support in reviewing developments in high-temperature superconductor research. People from this office and OGI are preparing the requested

STATiefings.




Director
Scientific and Weapons Research

Enclosure



Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence




1 0 MAR 1988

NOTE TO: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

The attached letter responds to a request for CIA briefings, to help a Defense Science Board task force to examine the potential military applications of high-temperature superconductors. OSWR and OGI are preparing the requested briefings on the state of research in the USSR, China, Japan and NATO countries.

STAT



Richard J. Kerr
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

10 MAR 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. George P. Millburn
Executive Director
Defense Science Board
Office of the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Task Force on Military
Applications of Superconductors

REFERENCE: Memo for Director of Central Intelligence, dated February 26, 1988

1. We would be pleased to provide briefings to the Defense Science Board Task Force. Our briefing team will be prepared to address Soviet, Chinese, Japanese and West European research on high-temperature superconductors, and possible military applications.

2. We have contacted Dr. Rhyne's office as you suggested, and are arranging for a specific time for the briefing. Our team will consist of representatives from our Office of Scientific and Weapons Research and our Office of Global Issues.

3. Our point of contact will be [redacted] Chief of the Science Branch,
Office of Scientific and Weapons Research [redacted]

/s/ Robert M. Gates

Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence



13

SUBJECT: DSB Task Force on Military Applications of Superconductors

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee
- 1 - DCI
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- 1 - Executive Director
- 1 - Executive Registry
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- 1 - ADDI
- 1 - DDI Registry
- 1 - OSWR Chrono
- 1 - D/OGI
- 1 - C/OGI/TICD
- 1 - OGI [redacted]
- 1 - STD/Chrono
- 1 - STD/SB Chrono

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OSWR/STD/SB/ [redacted] (08 March 1988)

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

88-0927X/1

10 March 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Nancy J. Risque
Assistant to the President and
Cabinet Secretary

SUBJECT: Presidential Medal of Freedom

Your memorandum came to me inasmuch as Bill Webster is out of the country for the next week or so. I regard that as a fortunate coincidence because it gives me the opportunity to suggest Bill Webster himself for the Medal of Freedom. I cannot think of anyone more deserving of this honor than Bill. As jurist, Director of the FBI for nine years and now Director of Central Intelligence, Bill Webster has put aside his private life and the opportunity for personal gain to serve this country. I think he very much was looking forward to returning to private life and a law practice a year ago when the President asked him to step into the breach and succeed Bill Casey as Director of Central Intelligence. Only a man with Bill Webster's patriotism and dedication to public service would have remained in government having already given such noteworthy service.

No one can quarrel with Bill's "especially meritorous contribution" to "the security or national interest of the United States". It may be said of Bill Webster that he took the reins of the FBI and of CIA at a time when each was confronted with enormous criticism and challenges to its professionalism and integrity. By dint of his own reputation and efforts, Judge Webster restored effectiveness and public esteem to these organizations so vital to America's national security and well-being. Taking over each agency during dark days of controversy and difficulty, he successfully led them through trying times -- thus more than justifying the

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confidence reposed in him by successive Presidents of the United States.


I can think of no one whose sacrifice and achievements more warrant recognition with the Presidential Medal of Freedom than William H. Webster.

STAT



Robert M. Gates

STAT

DDCI/RMGates/de/ 
DISTRIBUTION:

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- 1 - DDCI Chrono, w/Inc.
- 1 - ER, w/Inc.

Executive Registry

88-0927X

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1988

MEMOPANDUM FOR BILL WEBSTER

FROM: NANCY RISQUE *Nancy*

SUBJECT: Presidential Medal of Freedom

The Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honor given in the United States, is awarded to persons who have made especially meritorious contributions to "(1) the security or national interests of the United States, or (2) world peace, or (3) cultural or other significant public or private endeavors." The award was established in 1963, replacing the Medal of Freedom initiated by President Truman in 1945 to reward meritorious, war-connected acts or services.

Do you have any suggestions for this award -- if possible, by March 14?

Thank you.

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505


March 11, 1988

Mr. Richard F. Staar
Coordinator International
Studies Program
Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305-6010

Dear Mr. Staar:

It is a pleasure to provide you with a copy
of the speech I delivered to the Dallas Council
on World Affairs last January. I hope you will
find it of interest.

Sincerely,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosure:
As Stated

STAT

17

DCI
EXEC
REG

DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS
19 JANUARY 1988

WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALLED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A \$2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.

AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNIST PARTY.

HOOVER INSTITUTION

ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

Stanford, California 94305-6010



8 March 1988

REFERENCE

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Would you kindly send me a copy of your speech, given earlier this year and quoted by Craig Whitney in the New York Times of 2 March?

Thank you for this courtesy.

Sincerely,

Richard F. Staar
Coordinator
International Studies Program

RFS:jcc

Encl (1)

The Soviet Tumult: Some U.S. Views

2 March 1989, p. 8

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 1 — Despite the challenge to Mikhail S. Gorbachev's authority posed by the current unrest among Soviet ethnic minorities, the consensus among United States Government experts is that he and his policies of change have not yet been seriously endangered.

But some of the Americans say that the ethnic ferment is a direct consequence of Mr. Gorbachev's own calls for more openness in discussing the country's problems. If the rioting in Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan grows worse, they say, his opponents in the Communist Party leadership could use it to slow the pace of change and weaken Mr. Gorbachev's position.

"Recent events in Armenia and Azerbaijan have raised questions in the community here about whether this might have repercussions for the stability of his leadership," a State Department expert said. "But until now the debate has been not over whether he's in real trouble but rather how fast he can continue to move the country where he wants it to go."

Americans at the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the National Security Council staff, the Pentagon and various other branches of the Government have been trying to figure out just how Mr. Gorbachev is faring and what he is trying to do ever since he was named leader of the Soviet Communist Party in the spring of 1985.

Americans Reach a Consensus

At first, many in the Administration dismissed his efforts at domestic reform as illusory moves. Now most of them do not question whether he really wants reform — they wonder whether the collective leadership of which he is a part will continue to support it, and for how long.

The consensus within the United States Government that Mr. Gorbachev intended far-reaching reforms, to save the Soviet system from fatal decline, began to emerge about the time of the summit meeting in Washington last December. Even then, the Americans agreed that Mr. Gorbachev's plans were contentious, and speculated about how firm his authority was.

"With the selection of Mikhail Gorbachev," said Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, in a speech earlier this year that was cleared by the White House and apparently reflects the Government consensus, "the Politburo signaled its recognition that the Soviet Union was in deep trouble — especially economically and

spiritually — trouble that they recognized would soon begin to have real effect on military power and their position in the world."

Mr. Gates went on: "Nearly every step Gorbachev seeks to take toward structural economic or political change is a struggle, and support in the Politburo for his initiatives shifts constantly. He must rely on a long-term, largely nonviolent purge of party and bureaucracy and placement of his supporters if he is to remain in power and to succeed at all. The central question is whether he will get enough time."

Reagan on Gorbachev

President Reagan, according to one aide, said after he started the talks last December that Mr. Gorbachev looked like a man who was "scared to death."

The President thought, the aide said, that Mr. Gorbachev needed a success at the summit to strengthen his hand over more cautious colleagues like Yegor N. Ligachev and Viktor Chebri-

Gorbachev's goals: still reachable, experts say.

kov, the head of the K.G.B., who have often spoken out against the dangers of carrying perestroika and glasnost too far.

Mr. Gates said that "many who oppose Gorbachev's policies believe those policies to be inherently mistaken and bad for the country" because they could destabilize domestic conditions so badly that the party's control over the country could be seriously threatened.

"He'll get thrown out if his reforms so threaten the system that his colleagues would prefer to go after him than suffer the consequences," another senior Administration official said. "But he is very familiar with what happened to Khrushchev and will be cautious about pushing ahead too rapidly." Nikita S. Khrushchev's colleagues threw him out of power in 1964 for being "reckless."

Mr. Gates said this week that it was too soon to tell whether Mr. Gorbachev's opponents would try to use the demonstrations in Armenia against him. But one intelligence official said they would almost certainly criticize

him for letting the situation get out of hand.

"Any changes he makes will cause a lot of dysfunction, that's clear," a State Department official said.

The last serious challenge to Mr. Gorbachev's authority was in November, when one of his closest supporters, Boris N. Yeltsin, lost his position as the leader of the Moscow party organization. A few days ago, he was also dismissed as a nonvoting member of the Politburo, but Mr. Gorbachev filled the vacancy with two more allies.

Within the Politburo, Mr. Gates said, there seems to be general agreement that "for now, economic modernization requires a more predictable, if not benign, international environment."

The Soviet Union appears poised to begin the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, if the final details on how to do it can be ironed out in negotiations that begin Wednesday in Geneva.

Experts here say they believe the Soviet Army and the political leadership decided on withdrawal because the cost of staying had simply become too high, with no prospect of easy victory over the American-supplied guerrillas.

The American experts fear Mr. Gorbachev could try to use the diplomatic leverage he would gain from withdrawing from Afghanistan to try to drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies.

If the Soviet Union does actually begin pulling out of Afghanistan this spring, there will be debate within the Administration about how easy to make it for the Russians to leave, in light of the American commitment to halt aid to the Afghan rebels as soon as the withdrawal starts. "It might have been a mistake," a senior official said, "but the President has said it would be unacceptable for the resistance to be cut off if faced with an armed regime supplied by the Soviets."

There is still the question whether it is in Washington's interest for Mr. Gorbachev to succeed or fail as leader of the Soviet Union. Mr. Gates of the C.I.A. answered that question this way: "Gorbachev intends improved Soviet economic performance, greater political vitality at home, and more dynamic diplomacy to make the U.S.S.R. a more competitive and stronger adversary in the years ahead."

Dealing with that situation, he said, "will be an extraordinary challenge for the United States and the Western democracies in the years ahead."

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ROBERT M. GATES

15 March 1988

Mr. Herbert Meyer
President
Storm King Press
P. O. Box 3566
Washington, D.C. 20007

Dear Herb:

I finished Real-World Intelligence last night. I think it is the best, most succinct account I have read on what intelligence is all about. While best sellers on intelligence (up to now) are either fiction, historical accounts, or provide information on covert actions and/or collection techniques, virtually none talk about the purpose of intelligence or the intelligence process (either intellectual or institutional). As you say, "secrets can be so titillating and so distracting that spilling them often stops the serious discussion of intelligence dead in its tracks".

Your discussion of intelligence, collection, analysis and, above all, marketing, addresses these issues with an insight and freshness -- and a sense of reality -- that is, I think, unique. You clearly have "ground truth". Moreover, your discussion of the dynamic of the relationship between the policy-maker (or executive) and the intelligence officer is very well done.

In short, Herb, I think you have written a great little book. You have captured and expanded upon many of the points I was trying to make in my Foreign Affairs article and have done so with style. The book is a good read. It's lively and entertaining. In my article, I referred to the fact that often even writers who have served inside an intelligence organization never understood what it's all about. Your book plainly proves that in the few years you were here, you picked up a genuine understanding of what the business is all about -- the reality and the smell of it.

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ROBERT M. GATES

Page 2

You mentioned the possibility of my doing a review. I have given it a lot of thought, and have concluded that I should not. Any review I would do would be embarrassingly and one-sidedly positive, thereby suggesting our friendship or former professional association had clouded my critical faculties. Also, I think questions would be raised about the appropriateness of my reviewing a book on intelligence while in my present position.

Nevertheless, I want you to know that I think so highly of the book that I am recommending that it be used in our training courses. I am impressed and intend to share my view with others. I don't know of any other single publication that tackles the nature, purpose, and dynamics of this business better than this little volume of yours. Congratulations!

Warm Regards,



Robert M. Gates

STAT

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

DCI/DDCI Executive Staff

15 March 1988

NOTE FOR: DDCI

SUBJECT: DCI's Friday Schedule

The Director responded to my cable of last evening and concurs with your attendance at the SSCI/INF hearing. The DCI wondered, however, if it was necessary for him to go to the Carlucci breakfast with you and suggested that perhaps he could meet with Admiral Hayes for breakfast Friday morning and then go to the SSCI hearing with you. Apparently, however, he has no strong feelings one way or the other, and I would recommend we go with our original plan and that you attend the SSCI hearing alone. Unless you indicate otherwise, I will leave the schedule as we originally set it up.

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

16 March 1988

TO: Director of Personnel

Red

Attached is the letter and resume from
[redacted] that I called you about.

I have already mentioned it to Dick Kerr.
I would think an internship either in the
NIC or SOVA would be most appropriate.
Keep me informed as things progress.

[redacted]

Robert M. Gates

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Central Intelligence Agency

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Washington, D. C. 20505

20 March 1988

Mr. Arnold Beichman
Research Fellow
Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305

Dear Arnold:

I am sorry I had to cancel our breakfast. I had very much wanted to see you. Unfortunately, the Director was out of town and, when that happens, I am all too subject to last-minute changes of schedule to fill in for him.

I am pleased that you received the 1969 Agency informal compilation of materials on "The Trust." The paper is available for release to any requestor, and therefore we have no objection to any plans the Hoover Institution might have for publishing it.

I am also enclosing a copy of a thesis on the subject completed in 1985 at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. On pp. 27-28 the author quotes from a Rand Corporation study, The Trust, yet at least one of these quotations appears to be an almost verbatim quotation from the 1969 Agency study. You may wish to sort this out with Rand.

Finally, I am enclosing a speech I gave in Dallas several weeks ago. I hope you will find it of interest -- I would be interested in your reaction.

Sincerely,



Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosures

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STAT

21 March 1988

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DCI Administrative Staff

SUBJECT: Payment for Charges Incurred by the
DDCI for Representational Purposes

Payment from U.S. Government funds for representational expenses incurred by the DDCI for the purpose of conducting official business of the United States Government is authorized under the policy set forth in [redacted] or the following functions:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Organizational Affiliation</u>
88.02.11	Robert M. Gates (host) Herbert Meyer [redacted]	DDCI [redacted]
88.02.26	Robert M. Gates (host) R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.	DDCI American Spectator

LS/

[redacted]
O/DDCI

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9A	/Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	NIO/EA	X			
18	VC/NIC		X		
19	SRP		X		
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE _____
Date

Remarks

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[Redacted Signature]

Executive Secretary
21 Mar 88

Date

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

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		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
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3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
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8	DDS&T				
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10	GC				
11	IG				
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13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
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SUSPENSE _____
Date

Remarks

Original mailed, 21 Mar 88.

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D/Executive Secretary

21 Mar 88

Date

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

J

March 21, 1988


Dr. Roy Godson
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W., Suite 601
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Roy:

You did a nice job of editing. I have only one minor correction -- on page 7.

I look forward to seeing you for lunch on the 29th.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosure:
Discussant Remarks

STAT



DISCUSSANT REMARKS
Hon. Robert Gates

To a substantial degree, the essays here, although addressed to intelligence requirements for analysis in the 1990s, could also have applied to intelligence analysis in the 60s, 70s, and 80s.

My comments are divided into three categories. First, the relationship between the analyst and the policymaker. Second, the analysts' background, recruitment, and training. Third, intelligence requirements.

First, the analyst and the policymaker. Paul Seabury writes that "intelligence should not crave, for itself, a puristic, aloof, independence akin to academic freedom." I couldn't agree more. I recall during James Schlesinger's brief tenure as Director of Central Intelligence his complaint that the people at the CIA had forgotten they worked for the United States Government. It seems to me that support for the policymaker also means, on a fairly regular basis, telling them things they don't like to hear. In fact, unless intelligence officers are down in the trenches with the policymakers and understand the issues, know what US objectives are, how the process works, and who the people are, they cannot possibly provide either relevant or timely intelligence that will contribute to better informed decisions.

I have spoken recently of a significant degree of institutional autonomy for the CIA, and Seabury's paper addresses this topic. Autonomy is positive in that intelligence analysis is not subject to the parochial views of one or another policy agent. By the same token, autonomy is negative if it somehow involves being aloof or apart from the policy process and from those who seek intelligence support. I am also very sympathetic to Eliot Cohen's concern over the concept of no-fault intelligence, that all our problems somehow derive from the failure of policymakers or failures inherent in the intelligence problems we deal with.

I agree with Cohen that in the past inaccurate intelligence analysis either has contributed to faulty decisions, or has allowed policymakers to go on their way without having to deal with at least an alternative perspective. Some of these shortcomings in the past have been due to inadequacies in the way we approached the analysis itself as well as the substantive advice of the analysts involved. In recognition of this, significant changes were made in the Directorate of Intelligence in the CIA, both in its organization and approach to analysis in the early 80s.

With respect to background, recruitment, and training, to which both authors devote considerable attention, let me first acknowledge Cohen's point about the large number of relatively

new analysts both in the CIA and in other intelligence agencies. The fact is that some, probably half the analysts in the CIA, have on the order of only five to ten years' experience. The exodus of officers from CIA's clandestine service in the second half of the 1970s has been widely commented upon. It is less well-known that at least as high a percentage of people left from the analytical side of the house as well. They did so for three reasons. First, a generation that had come into the Agency in the late 40s or early 50s came to the end of their careers. Second, during the late 1970s the government made it financially very attractive for people to retire. But, third, and equally important, many people in both directorates, operations and intelligence, simply found after the travails of the 70s that the business was no longer very much fun, and many who could have stayed longer in fact left. So new analysts had to be hired simply to replace those who departed. Additionally there was a significant growth in the size of the analytical directorate. The result of all these factors was a substantial number of relatively new analysts, with the attendant loss of experience and institutional memory.

But, I perhaps reflect a certain generational difference in saying that there was a good side to this as well. Newer people came in who did not carry a lot of baggage from the past, including old fights with other intelligence agencies, who did not carry a lot of scars from old wars with policymakers, and

especially whose backgrounds were in many respects superior to those of the people they replaced in terms of area and language expertise.

Now, on recruitment, Seabury speaks of the overreliance on "highly homogeneous young, inexperienced white Caucasians with top records of academic performance, coming from nice, good middle-class families." I share this concern that our recruitment brings us a heavy percentage of these people. In a 1973 article critical of our work on the Soviet Union, I noted "There is a wide cultural gap between a college-educated analyst in the West, and the Soviet leadership. The same thing might be said of Iranians, Chinese, and a variety of others."

This cultural gap can be overcome in two ways: first, by looking for people with intensive foreign studies backgrounds and languages who have lived abroad, and secondly, by immersion in the culture of a country for a long period. To the extent we are unable to hire immigrants from other countries for our own employees, we should look at them for insight in our analysis of other cultures. It seems to me we have been deficient in this respect in taking advantage of both emigres and defectors.

I agree with both authors that we need language skills, analysts with a great deal of history, and significantly greater cultural diversity. I further agree that the cadre not only of

US intelligence analysts but US officials generally is today considerably more parochial culturally than was the case in the 1950s. In fact, some of those who helped found the clandestine service probably couldn't get in the CIA today.

Now, let me address training. The Cohen essay draws on an article entitled, "Managing/Teaching New Analysts." He cites the article as saying that "the manager's first task is akin to deprogramming--undoing habits formed in four to ten years of college-level work." Cohen suggests, "The remark about deprogramming reveals a disdain for universities." Seabury in his essay observes: "The analytical intelligence community has no other *raison d'etre* other than that of furnishing information, reasoned judgments and estimates on which rational action is possible. In this the intelligence community differs greatly from the ethos of the academy."

It seems to me there are three areas where academic training should contribute to the formation of an intelligence analyst. The first is in making the analyst understand that brevity is critical. Second is the amassing of detail according to a clear line of analysis, and drawing clear conclusions. Third, insuring relevance and timeliness so as to enable action. But this is hardly what most graduate programs teach.

I agree that training and education in the interrelation of foreign cultures is critical. Cohen cites Abram Shulsky, "that the problem of penetrating another government's workings does not resemble the challenge of unraveling 'a hidden, but ultimately knowable, process of nature.' Rather, it a 'struggle between two human intelligences, each of which is trying to outpsych the other.'" I concede that in the past too many intelligence managers have placed little value on the idea that peoples of other cultures have different habits of thought, different values, and different motivations. They apparently rejected the idea that somebody who presumably has an intimate knowledge of cultural difference has any particular usefulness. But that view--and that view did exist to a considerable extent--is largely a thing of the past, or least I hope it is.

Citing again the article I wrote in '73 I said, "The fact remains that our perception of situations is widely divergent from the Kremlin's perception. The Soviet Union has a strange and idiosyncratic policy not to be dealt with without conscious effort." I added: "An analyst trying to understand the Soviet leaders or their approach to problems is seriously handicapped without a background in Russian history and culture, and the importance of this can hardly be overemphasized. I recommend that intelligence agencies should take steps to insure that future analysts have training in Russian and Soviet history and culture, that analysts without such training should be sent to

school to acquire it." In 1973, I was a fairly lonely voice arguing for this. At that time I was the only person in my unit in the DDI with an academic background in Soviet studies. My first branch chief was an expert on the Middle East and the other in Southeast Asia. Because of hiring policies in the last decade, this situation has changed dramatically.

Both essays speak of mirror-imaging. I believe it is this lack of regional expertise that contributes significantly to mirror-imaging. This problem has diminished in recent years, in part because of this change in hiring practices and in the number of people who have area expertise and experience. I accept totally Dr. Cohen's emphasis on the importance of intelligence highlighting the "otherness of the enemy."

With respect to training and education of analysts in the 1990s, I'd like to ^{*quote Fritz Ermarth in dividing*} ~~divide~~ what we don't know into two categories: secrets and mysteries. Secrets are those things, to use Cohen's reference, such as the physics underlying a Soviet barrage attack, that are potentially knowable. Mysteries, again to use Cohen's point of reference, have to do with the interpretation of foreign cultures, with that struggle between two human intelligences, each trying to outpsych the other.

In the latter there are often no clear-cut answers, often because the other leaders themselves do not know what they are

going to do or have not worked out their problems. And here our best contribution can be to help the policymaker understand the thought processes involved, the other guy's approach to the problem and how it is consistent with his culture, the alternatives that are open to them, and our estimate about which they are most likely to choose.

We have taken a number of steps to deal with the need for varied backgrounds and languages described in both essays. In an ideal world, every analyst we hired would have specialized background knowledge and one or more foreign languages as a usable tool. In the real world of American education and people who can meet our security qualifications, those two don't necessarily coincide entirely. We can not do that well. Between 40 percent and half of all those we hire as political analysts do meet these substantive qualifications, and we try to give the others additional education so they can do as well.

For example, over the years we have sent a number of people to Chinese and Russian studies programs, both for language and history. We also try to educate our analysts to deal with problems not addressed in universities. For example, we have a deception analysis course on the techniques and practices of deception, and methodology for identifying them. For two years we have been teaching a seminar on intelligence successes and failures, that uses case studies to illustrate causes of

intelligence failures and how to encourage more effective analysis. I might add it is one of our most popular courses. And we have added others as well in an effort to help improve our understanding of foreign cultures and add "ground truth" to our analyst's view.

Let me close my discussion of training with several observations, beginning with Dr. Seabury's reference to Angelo Codevilla's paper several years ago discussing empiricism in our culture. It seems to me that intelligence analysis must combine an examination of empirical factors with a range of other considerations, including not only motivation, commitment and determination, but also history, logic, and motive. In those areas where our empirical evidence or intelligence is ambiguous or even absent, there is always the danger in an analysis of saying that because nobody heard or saw the tree fall, it must not have fallen. If a question arises about whether or not a foreign nation is doing something, and if the information is scanty, we must take into account the nation's past behavior, whether they had a motive for such activity, and whether that action would be a logical extension of that. I think our experience with terrorism is an example. So I think there is no question that we have to take into account "nonempirical" considerations.

The analyst has to build a case regardless of the nature of the project. He has to bring together both empirical data and subjective considerations in describing events that have taken place or policies as they have been developed. Only if the analyst thus establishes a presumptive and persuasive base of argumentation--a case, if you will--can he then bring the reader along when he begins to speculate about the future. It seems to me the analyst has to persuade the policymaker that he, the analyst, knows what he's talking about, has mastered the material and understands the culture he is dealing with before he has any credibility to forecast the future.

In dealing with the so-called mysteries we have to discuss the alternative ways events may develop. At the same time, the intelligence community owes the policymaker a clear-cut best estimate. We are not paid to simply provide an array of alternatives or options. The policymaker wants to have some sense of what we think will happen. We simply need to be honest with the policymaker as to the quality of our evidence and the degree of confidence we have in our judgments.

Today, high priority is being attached to hiring analysts who have lived abroad, who have area expertise and foreign languages. We also are attaching high priority to developing extensive contacts with experts in the academic community and think tanks in order to have people challenge the analysts' views

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and bring other information and perspectives to bear on our problems. As for problems of deception and denial, thanks in substantial measure to the efforts of Senator Wallop and Angelo Codevilla, they have become a growing part of our analyst training curriculum. These and all other changes I have been speaking about proceed at different paces, but substantial progress has been made. We have to keep the pressure on to keep these going.

Finally, because both authors focus primarily on training, the need for analysts familiar with foreign, and shall we say alien, cultures, there is very little focus in either paper on substantive requirements. Let me address what they do say and make a few observations on my own.

Paul Seabury focuses on the need for analysts who can see connections between widely-separated trends and events. One of the disadvantages of a regional organization for analysis is that it tends to make the interconnection of such events more difficult. It was in recognition of this that we created several organizations to try to bridge these regional patterns. We created an insurgency center, an organization to deal with subversion worldwide so we could track patterns, particularly of Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan involvement in insurgencies around the world. So we have tried to establish some connective tissues, if

you will, that will enable us to address these transregional phenomena.

One of the most important assets we have in connection with this is with academics and think tanks. It is often the people in these pursuits who can give us the macro analysis that at least points us in the right direction or gives us the right questions to try to answer.

I think Dr. Cohen, however, has put his finger on a larger issue with respect to requirements for the 1990s. He writes: "Henceforth the United States will no longer have the luxury of concentrating its intelligence assets overwhelmingly on its chief target, the Soviet Union." He then points to a number of other problems that are certain to become significant intelligence challenges. I not only agree, I would have to say this trend began several years ago. We now have something on the order of 50 percent of the assets of the intelligence community focused on the Soviet problem.

My principal worry for the 1990s is that the absence of intelligence guidance and priorities from the senior levels of the policy community will result in a continued diffusion of our efforts as we are pushed in the direction of satisfying an increasingly wide range of problems. In anticipation of the 1990s, the intelligence community itself is going to be forced to

reexamine its priorities and at some point inform the policy community and the Congress it can no longer carry out an open-ended program of collection and analysis on every conceivable subject of interest to the American government.

Beginning with the Soviet Union, we are going to have to identify the hard-core issues where we will devote all the necessary resources to working the problem satisfactorily, knowing in advance that this choosing will withdraw an intelligence effort from areas that are peripheral to national security concerns but which have influential bureaucratic and congressional constituencies. Identifying those areas other than the Soviet Union will be a difficult and painful task.

Let me close with several observations.

While I am a strong supporter of the idea of specialized area training and having analysts who not only have lived in a foreign country but have studied its language and culture and are steeped in its history, I must say that often regional experts are less competent in forecasting discontinuities. It is often forgotten that the CIA's analyst on Iran in the 1970s had worked on Iran for 20 years. That, in my view, was part of the problem. While a deep understanding of a country's politics and history will help in understanding their actions and reactions, the fact is that in most countries actions are part of long, continuous

chains of events. Thus those most familiar with these long, slow processes are those who will find reasons to say that the warning signs of instability have occurred before, fit into a historical pattern, and therefore can be dismissed. Maybe they are right and maybe they are not. In short, there needs to be a combination of people with area expertise and those who fly broadly, who ask hard and sometimes even simple questions. We also need to seek out those who have unorthodox views or challenge the conventional wisdom.

Dr. Cohen speaks of short-term analysis rather than long-term research. This was a significant problem until a few years ago. With the drawdown in the 1970s, the CIA was forced to abandon its long-range research on Soviet defense industries and also the Third World. The mail of the day always had to be answered. One of the principal benefits of the significant new resources provided over the last eight or nine years by both the Administration and the Congress has been to allow us to establish a significant foundation for a long-term research program where the resources are protected for carrying out these projects. The analytical directorate of the CIA has been able to produce 500 to 700 new billets for this purpose. Thus, this long-standing problem has been largely brought under control. Most analysts now understand that an inability to produce longer-range research could have a deleterious effect on their careers.

Finally, I would like to say that Robert Butterworth's paper on collection notes that collection and analysis are inseparable and that intelligence errs in making the division bureaucratically and in other ways between them so great. In the abstract, I endorse this but I would also say that in reality, from the management standpoint, it is difficult to avoid this division. Rather, it is important to have many bridges connecting these two intimately related subjects.

Consortium for the Study of Intelligence

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International Studies,
Georgetown University

Dr. Stephen P. Gilbert
Professor of Government,
and Director, National
Security Studies Program,
Georgetown University

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington
Professor of Government
Harvard University

Professor Myres McDougal
Yale University Law School

Professor John Norton Moore
University of Virginia
Law School

Dr. Robert Nisbet
American Enterprise Institute

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
Professor of
International Politics,
Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy

Dr. Richard E. Pipes
Professor of History
Harvard University

Dr. Paul Seabury
Professor of
Political Science,
University of California,
Berkeley

Dr. Richard F. Staar
Senior Fellow
Hoover Institution on
War, Revolution and Peace

Dr. Allen Weinstein
Professor of History
Boston University

Dr. James Q. Wilson
Professor of Government
Harvard University

Dr. Roy Godson
Associate Professor
of Government,
Georgetown University
(Coordinator)

March 15, 1988

Honorable Robert Gates
Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob,

Please find enclosed a slightly edited version of your discussant remarks at our last Consortium meeting. I should be grateful if you could review the text and make any necessary changes in the next couple of weeks.

The volume is now scheduled to be published by Lexington Books (D.C. Heath) in November.

Many thanks for your attention and cooperation.

Sincerely,


Roy Godson

Enclosure

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

27

March 21, 1988

Admiral B. R. Inman, USN (Ret.)
Westmark Systems, Inc.
301 Congress Avenue, Suite 2000
Austin, Texas 78701

Dear Bob:

Thanks again for breakfast last Saturday; I am glad that we have been able to get together a little more frequently in recent months. It's always good to see you and talk.

I received the invitation to Austin today and have accepted. I enclose my speech on "What Is Going On In The Soviet Union". I would be interested in any reaction. If you think it appropriate, I would probably give an updated version of this in Austin -- or would you prefer that I talk about something else?

Best to Nancy.

Warm regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosure:
As Stated

STAT

28



Washington, D.C. 20505

21 MAR 1988

28

Mr. Lawrence F. Guillemette, Jr.
Conference Director
Congressional Youth Leadership Council
1511 K Street, N.W., Suite 842
Washington, D.C. 20005

*Jefferson Blvd
Dept of Ag*

Dear Mr. Guillemette:

I accept with pleasure your invitation to address the National Young Leaders Conference on Friday, 25 March at the National Press Club. I look forward to the opportunity of meeting with you and speaking with these outstanding high school students.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ Robert M. Gates

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

STATI/PAO/WME

Distribution:

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DCI
EXEC
RE

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

PAO 88-0090

3 March 1988

DDCI:

RE: Speaking Invitation
National Young Leaders Conference
Congressional Youth Leadership Council
National Press Club
Washington, D.C.
25 March or 29 March 1988

Director of the National Young Leaders Conference, Larry Guillemette, has invited you to speak at the Conference sponsored by the Congressional Youth Leadership Council on Friday, 25 March or Tuesday, 29 March at the National Press Club. The suggested format is 10 minutes of remarks followed by 40 minutes of questions and answers. You are asked to speak on how the Agency fits within the Executive Branch or any other topic of your choice. The audience would include 350 outstanding high school students from throughout the US. The meeting is not open to the media. The Council is expecting Secretary of Energy John Herrington, Secretary of Interior Donald Hodel, and Secretary of HUD Samuel Pierce to speak at the Conference session covering the Executive Branch. (See opposite for background material.)

Since this is a high school audience, and we normally reserve our student briefings for the college level, I recommend that you decline this invitation. If you agree, a letter of regret is attached for your signature.

STAT

[Redacted Signature]

STAT

DCI/PAO/WMB [Redacted]

Bill Baker

STAT

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ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY



January 20, 1988

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director C.I.A.
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Gates:


This spring the Congressional Youth Leadership Council will once again sponsor the National Young Leaders Conference. During a five week period, over 1,600 outstanding high school students will come to our nation's capital for an intensive educational program. This group represents the best and brightest of today's youth - tomorrow's leaders. The enclosed information will serve to illustrate the scope and content of our program.

The National Young Leaders Conference provides a unique opportunity for the students to gain an insider's view of government by interacting with those individuals who shape public policy. I know you share our concern for educating youth for responsible citizenship and join us in promoting active involvement in the democratic process. We are a non-profit, non-partisan organization which encourages our students to consider all viewpoints as they endeavor to come to an understanding of current issues facing our nation. We certainly hope you can assist us by contributing to the balance of our program and will honor us by accepting our invitation to address the young leaders of tomorrow during one of the Conference weeks this spring.

It is our philosophy that we can be of no greater service to our country than by instilling an appreciation of our American heritage and democratic institutions in the "successor generation." It is our hope that your calendar can accommodate this request and we trust that you will respond favorably.

For your convenience I have enclosed an RSVP memorandum. If you have any questions or need any additional information, please contact Rick McDonald at (202) 638-0008. Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,



Lawrence F. Guillemette, Jr.
Conference Director

Enclosures
1511 K Street, N.W., Suite 842
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 638-0008



CONGRESSIONAL YOUTH LEADERSHIP COUNCIL
NATIONAL YOUNG LEADERS CONFERENCE

REPLY-MEMORANDUM

TO: Lawrence F. Guillemette, Jr.
Conference Director
The Congressional Youth Leadership Council
1511 K Street, N.W., Suite 842
Washington, D.C. 20005

FROM: The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director C.I.A.
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

YES, I accept your invitation to be a speaker at the National Young Leaders Conference. (Approximately 375 scholars attend each session.)

I would prefer to participate on the following date(s):

- Friday, February 26, 1988
- Friday, March 4, 1988
- Wednesday, March 16, 1988
- ✓ Friday, March 25, 1988
- ✓ Tuesday, March 29, 1988

STAFF CONTACT: _____ PHONE: _____

If you have any questions or need any additional information, please call Rick McDonald at (202) 638-0008.

No, I cannot participate.

COMMENTS:

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

21 March 1988

STAT

[Redacted]

DCI/NIC

Dear Gwen:

Thank you for your participation in the Secretarial/Clerical Management Advisory Group over the past year and a half and particularly for your willingness to take on the extreme demands of serving as chairman. Your initiative and dedication lifted the MAG out of the doldrums and gave the group the cohesion and sense of purpose it needed. The time you gave to the MAG after hours and weekends resulted in the successful running of the Third Annual Secretary of the Year Awards and the extensive MAG input to the implementation of the IS pay system and training program.

The Director and I hope you will remember your time on the MAG as having been an opportunity to learn about the Agency as well as to contribute. The group's comments on secretarial and clerical issues are helpful to senior Agency officials and clearly played a role in our recognition that the secretarial profession should be enhanced with new opportunities and a new pay scale. The awards program in particular proves that MAGs can make a difference in providing fresh ideas to Agency management.

I encourage you to support the new MAG members and to continue your interest in making the Agency a better place for all employees.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Robert M. Gates

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

cc: C/DCI Admin
O/Personnel

STAT

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence ER 1257 88
Washington, D.C. 20505

23 March 1988

NOTE TO: [redacted]
Director, Office of Training and Education

Stan,

On 22 March, I had the opportunity to visit [redacted] and meet with mid-level officers from the offices of Personnel, General Counsel, and Medical Services. At OGC, several officers noted their lack of knowledge of the CIA as an institution -- its various offices, structure, associated jargon, and traditions. One officer noted that recent CT graduates, with about the same amount of time on board, seem to have a better understanding of the Agency than OGC lawyers have. The officer attributed this to the absence of an appropriate orientation course for their office.

I would like you to investigate the possibility of offering a training course which would provide an introduction to the CIA for career specialists such as OGC and OMS staffers, and possibly DDS&T engineers. I think an appropriate orientation for this group of officers could be accomplished in a two or three week course given once or twice a year.

[redacted signature box]

Robert M. Gates

Orig -- D/OTE
1 -- DDCI
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23 March 1988

NOTE TO: DDCI


FROM: Alan

Bob:

I talked to Stan this morning to run by him informally your thoughts on a training orientation course for specialists. He noted that there is a requirement that every new officer in the CIA take the course, "Introduction to the CIA". Currently, the course runs for 4 to 5 days and is offered once a month. Stan noted that the course would be given before an officer went to work at his assigned office, and in most cases, was given within the first or second week on board. Stan and most of his staff believed that running the course in the first or second week was too soon. Consequently, three months ago they started a system whereby new hires are assigned dates for the course sometime within their first year on board. Since it is a new system, there is little feedback from the participants to measure the effectiveness of the new system.

I told Stan that it was my sense that what you had in mind was more like an abbreviated mid-career course in substance for a selected group of officers -- specialists who were a bit older, hired at a higher grade, but who still lacked exposure to the Agency. Stan indicated that he would look into it after he received your note.

STAT



CONFIDENTIAL

24 March 1988

NOTE TO: [redacted]
Chief, DCI Security Staff
FROM: [redacted]
O/DDCI

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The Security Protection Officers assigned to the DCI/DDCI suite have a most difficult job. They must be a "jack of all trades" and be able to accomplish their tasks quietly and quickly. It is a job where each day truly is a new day full of ever changing requirements and challenges. [redacted] did an extraordinary job of accomplishing what needed to be done day after day and met the challenge of rapidly changing requirements -- sometimes literally moment to moment -- without hesitation. He is a person who can think on his feet. We are sorry to see Mike move on but wish him the best and want to thank him for a job well done.

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

ICS 7041 88

Washington, D.C. 20505

March 25, 1988

Mr. Angelo M. Codevilla
Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305-6010

Dear Angelo:

STAT I am writing as a followup to my letter to you of 10 February. [redacted] has reported back to me on his discussions with senior Intelligence Community managers about feasibility, accesses, and alternatives.

Without beating around the bush, there was agreement in the Community that the topic of your proposed study fits into a category "too sensitive to be done fully with complete access by anyone outside of government." More specifically, the proposed study would involve access and clearances substantially beyond those you had when you worked for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

At the same time, there is a major effort about to begin within the Department of Defense on a subject very closely related to your proposal.

The idea of a classified outside examination or design of a different 1990s from that which would otherwise be the case for US intelligence seemed interesting to me, and I regret we cannot go forward. Even so, I appreciate the spirit and initiative behind your proposal and hope that you will continue to send along ideas, articles and, when you think appropriate, proposals.

Give me a call the next time you plan to be in Washington. Maybe we could catch up over a sandwich.

Regards,

[redacted signature]

Robert M. Gates

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REFERENCE

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

February 10, 1988

Mr. Angelo M. Codevilla
Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305-6010

Dear Angelo:

Many thanks for your letter of January 22 following up on my meetings with both you and Bill Harris. I have asked [redacted] [redacted] (who you may know is now Deputy Director of the Intelligence Community Staff for Requirements) to discuss the proposal with selected senior Community managers in terms of feasibility, access and alternatives. I have asked [redacted] to get back to me by the end of February. Either I or [redacted] will be back in touch with you as soon as possible after that.

Regards,

[redacted]

Robert M. Gates

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HOOVER INSTITUTION

ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

Stanford, California 94305-6010



January 22, 1988

Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia 23665

Dear Bob:

As you know, the technical systems for intelligence collection that the United States possesses today, and that it will possess ten years hence (unless budgets change substantially) were conceived in the mid-1970s on the basis of certain assumptions about the world. Among these were peace between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, compliance with certain kinds of arms control agreements, and a host of details about Soviet weapons systems. But in recent years many have realized that the nature of the Soviet target is not what was assumed in the 1970s. Moreover, it should be no surprise that peacetime intelligence collectors would not be particularly useful in time of war.


We propose to study how the intelligence community might modify current intelligence systems (including ground based components), and/or modify how they are used, in order to maximize their usefulness against the Soviet target that will exist five to ten years from now, and above all to maximize their usefulness in time of war. We also propose to study how the intelligence community's (including some D.O.D. elements) plans for procurement and R&D would have to change in the next two to three years in order to provide for better mix of peacetime and wartime capabilities about the mid 1990s. We would provide a framework for deciding on a mix of collection assets. Moreover, we wish to consider alternative strategies for procurement that may increase the availability and utility of intelligence in wartime, even under budgetary constraints.

We propose to do this as consultants to you. Bill would take leave-of-absence from RAND. We propose also to obtain the help of the following people: Peter Stan, RAND Corporation; Roland Herbst, R&D Associates; [redacted] retired from Lockheed and consultant to C.I.A.; and possibly others as mutually agreeable. We expect this initial task to take about eight months from completion of clearances, and approximately 250 man-days.

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We would require access to collection programs across the community, at a level at least equal to that which Bill and I have had in the past. Needless to say, the study would be for the Director and yourself.

Sincerely,



Angelo M. Codevilla
William R. Harris

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA	X			
7	DDO	X			
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
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16	D/Ex Staff				
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SUSPENSE _____
Date

Remarks

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Executive Secretary
28 Mar 88
Date

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Draft
18 March 88

REFERENCE: 1 March 88 letter to DCI from SSCI
Hearing on 29 March

Attachment:
item (4)

Establishment of a security standards and auditing capability
under the DCI

The President accepted the recommendation that Secretary Shultz and I made to establish an independent unit responsible for setting standards to protect embassies from penetration by foreign intelligence activity and for monitoring conformance. This unit will be responsible to the DCI, enabling him to prepare an annual report to the President and the Congress on the status of security at US foreign missions. This organization, tentatively designated the Foreign Mission Security Office, will be an independent office of the DCI. I have appointed as the Director and have asked the Department to nominate a senior Foreign Service Officer as his deputy. The office will build toward a strength of people, capable of establishing a program of aggressive, objective audits of our overseas missions.

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We will establish two advisory groups in connection with this new office. One will be a working-level group, chaired by the Director, Foreign Mission Security Office, to facilitate communication and resolution of issues with the Director of Diplomatic Security and other elements of the Intelligence Community. The second group will be a high-level board,

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including the Secretary of State, chaired by the DCI and meeting as required. I envision this high-level group as the forum where the Secretary of State and the DCI will discuss recommendations of the Foreign Mission Security Office. If there is disagreement, either of us can appeal to the President.

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Q. What will the auditing unit, the Foreign Mission Security Office, do?

A. This independent office will:

- analyze the vulnerabilities of our foreign missions and the hostile intelligence threat to them
- set security standards to protect our missions against foreign intelligence activity
- monitor conformance with those standards, and
- report problems and recommendations to the DCI.

Q. How independent is this Foreign Mission Security Office?

A. Very independent. It . . .

- reports to me;
- is set up as an independent office, similar to my National Intelligence Council;
- is not a part of State or its Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

Q. How closely will it be associated with the working levels of State? And, the working levels of the Intelligence Community?

A. The Foreign Mission Security Office will have close ties to the Department, and the Intelligence Community. The Director of the Foreign Mission Security Office will establish and chair a working group to facilitate communications with the Director of Diplomatic Security and comparable levels in the Intelligence Community who have common security concerns and can help with solutions. We expect most problems to be solved and improvements to be made at this level.

Q. What if problems of security in an embassy are not solved at that level?

A. The DCI will chair a high-level group consisting of the Secretary of State and other appropriate people to resolve such difficulties.

Q. What if the DCI and the Secretary of State continue to disagree on a problem, or a solution?

A. The DCI is obligated to take the issue to the President.

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- Q. How will Congress, the oversight committees at least, be informed?
- A. The DCI has been directed to prepare an annual report to the President and the Congress on the status of security at US missions.
- Q. Will the Foreign Mission Security Office have any State people in it?
- A. Yes, the Deputy Director will be a State officer and we hope that some of the working level people will be selected from State.
- Q. Will any other Intelligence Community people be in the Foreign Mission Security Office?
- A. Yes, we would expect people to be selected for assignment based on the FMSO needs and skills available. We probably will find NSA, CIA, DoD, and the FBI in the Foreign Mission Security Office as well.

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23 March 88

Questions Posed by John Elliff of SSCI Staff

Q. Will the FMSO combine positive collection experts and defensive experts in its organization?

A. Yes. We will include people with those skills and experience in the staffing complement.

Q. Will FMSO provide guidance to security R&D projects?

A. Yes. The FMSO will set standards in all aspects of personnel, physical and technical security concerns; therefore it will be important to ensure that R&D projects are appropriately designed.

Q. Will the FMSO produce all-source threat and vulnerability assessments worldwide?

A. Yes, the FMSO will have an intelligence analysis function for determining threats and vulnerabilities. The FMSO will draw upon the full resources of the Intelligence Community to perform this function.

Q. Will FMSO establish liaison with foreign governments to obtain information on threat and vulnerability of US facilities?

A. The Director of FMSO will obtain foreign government information through the established liaison channels such as are maintained by the FBI, NSA, and CIA.

Q. Will FMSO conduct tiger-team operations that are entirely black to test security at foreign missions? Will FMSO have specialized personnel assigned to conduct such tiger team operations?

A. The FMSO has a clear responsibility to monitor State Department conformance to security standards. It will monitor conformance through appropriate inspection techniques and report audits. Some activities may not be fully visible to members of a particular embassy, if that is what you mean by "black," but we do not anticipate any need to surprise the Director of Diplomatic Security.

Q. How will FMSO be funded? -- separately from other Intelligence Community organizations or, for example, funded like the DCI Special Program?

A. We will fund it in whatever way seems to be appropriate, in consultation with OMB and the Committees. Initially, we probably will fund from the NFIP but we can advise you of changes if we make them. We will have FMSO in the FY90 submission.

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- Q. How will people be initially assigned to FMSO and from where will they be drawn?
- A. We will draw people from throughout the Intelligence Community where we find the appropriate skills and experience. I expect these to be reimbursable detail assignments.
- Q. State Department has established security standards. Under those standards certain small missions must be closed. In those small missions where intelligence collection is important, what is the DCI's position on the closing of these small missions?
- A. The Director, FMSO will evaluate the threats and vulnerabilities of these missions and make recommendations on improving security or changes in operating procedures. We will consider cost vs. gain in these circumstances carefully; I can't be more specific at this time.

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ICS 0785-88
25 February 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of FMSO Working Group

FROM:

[Redacted]
Acting Director, Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Office, Intelligence Community Staff

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SUBJECT:

Foreign Missions Security Office Charter [Redacted]

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1. In an interagency meeting held on 9 February 1988 under auspices of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), the Foreign Missions Security Office (FMSO) organization was discussed. Without recounting elements of discussion here, it is significant to this memorandum to note that the Chairman, NSPG, directed that a charter for FMSO be drafted for consideration by the NSPG. The Chairman set a 30-day deadline for completion of the charter draft. [Redacted]

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2. A first draft has been prepared and is attached. It is requested that addressees review the draft and provide comments to this office not later than 4 March 1988. Brief comments may be offered via telephone to myself or my action officer for this matter. [Redacted] My numbers are [Redacted] [Redacted] secure. Please be prepared for a meeting during the week of 7 March to review the proposed final revision of the draft charter. [Redacted]

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Thomas F. Burns, Jr.

Downgrade to CONFIDENTIAL When
Removed From Classified Attachment

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DRAFT

FOREIGN MISSIONS SECURITY OFFICE (FMSO)

--CHARTER--

1. MISSION: The Foreign Missions Security Office (FMSO) will provide Intelligence Community (IC) guidance and support to the Diplomatic Security Program of the Department of State. Its mission will be to insure that U.S. diplomatic missions abroad meet minimum acceptable standards for the handling and storage of classified information and for the conduct of classified activities.

2. AUTHORITIES: The development and implementation of security programs at our diplomatic missions abroad remains the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The DCI is given new responsibilities to insure that acceptable minimum standards for security of those missions are established; and for certifying compliance with the established standards. The DCI's executive agent for carrying out these responsibilities will be FMSO.

3. The Director of FMSO will be named by the DCI from within the Intelligence Community. FMSO will be subordinate to the DCI and will be independent of the organization of the Department of State. The Secretary of State will nominate a candidate from within the Department of State to serve as Deputy Director of FMSO.

4. The Director of FMSO will establish an advisory group, with membership consisting of the Director of Diplomatic Security and equivalent-level personnel from the other agencies involved. This group will seek to insure that a constructive balance is maintained between the activities of FMSO and the needs and programs of the Department of State and the other tenants of diplomatic missions abroad. It will provide advice and guidance to the Director of FMSO and seek to resolve problems and issues as they arise.

5. A high-level board, with membership including the DCI and the Secretary of State, will also be established. This board will meet once each quarter or on call. The board will have the authority to recommend to the Secretary of State that he rescind the authority of a particular facility to receive, retain, or perform classified functions in the event of serious security problems. In the event of disagreement, an appeal can be made to the President. The board will also provide direction on other issues, as appropriate.

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6. FUNCTIONS: FMSO will carry out the following functions:

a. Setting of Minimum Security Standards: FMSO will establish minimum physical, technical, and personnel security standards for the handling and storage of classified information and for the conduct of classified activities at U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. These standards will include those applicable to the construction or renovation of diplomatic missions abroad.

FMSO will develop criteria for security standards, relying heavily on threat and vulnerability information. It will review existing standards in light of the criteria established and develop new standards, as appropriate. Standards may vary at different locations according to threat levels or other factors affecting security.

Standards will be coordinated with State Diplomatic Security and the tenant agencies, and issued under the authority of the DCI. An appeals process will be provided through senior advisory panels.

b. Inspection of Diplomatic Missions Abroad: Primary responsibility for reporting the security conditions at missions abroad remains with the Department of State. Reporting from tenant agencies will continue to supplement this reporting.

FMSO will maintain inspection units to provide an independent check-and-balance on security reporting by State and other residents of U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. FMSO may apply skills resident within the Intelligence Community to conduct these or other special inspections.

FMSO will conduct scheduled inspections of selected missions and will also conduct inspections in response to a special security situation or a particular threat or vulnerability. Inspection may also be requested by State or other tenant agencies. It will shape its inspection teams according to the particular need and may draw upon intelligence sources and methods in conducting its inspection. Team members with special skills may be drawn for temporary duty from within the Intelligence Community.

c. Audit and Certification: FMSO will audit all missions abroad for compliance with security policies and minimum standards, on a regular basis. Auditors will review, compile, and assess reporting by State, tenant agencies, and FMSO inspection teams; and assess compliance with specific policies and standards. Although primarily a desk function, auditors may travel to the field in some situations.

FMSO will develop schedules for audits. Frequency of audits will be based on threat and vulnerability information or other factors affecting security. Schedules for audits will be published in advance to insure that the necessary information is available. Special audits may also be undertaken in response to a particular need.

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Certification is based upon the results of an audit. Three results can be expected: Certification of compliance, conditional certification, or non-certification. Conditional certification allows continuance of classified activities, at a level determined by FMSO, while deficiencies are being corrected; a timetable for correction is specified. Non-certification requires cessation of classified activities until specific deficiencies are corrected.

FMSO will produce an annual report for the DCI reflecting the status of security at U.S. diplomatic facilities. This report will be forwarded to the President and to Congress along with any recommendations necessary to achieve enhanced security at such facilities.

d. Intelligence Support: FMSO will provide intelligence support to Diplomatic Security and in support of its own activities. The FMSO intelligence support unit will conduct liaison with the Intelligence Community regarding the hostile intelligence threat to diplomatic missions abroad. This unit will request and coordinate specific studies of vulnerability.

Its objectives will be to assist in the formulation of policies and standards; to determine the appropriate level of security response at each mission; to provide support in audit and certification; and, to provide other support, as required, such as in the direction of RDT&E programs. It will have a special responsibility in providing close intelligence support to FMSO inspection teams. It will also issue collection requirements to fill gaps in specific knowledge concerning the threat.

While the FMSO unit will have a small analytical staff, it will draw primarily on work conducted elsewhere in the Intelligence Community.

e. Other Services of Common Concern: FMSO will provide other services of common concern, as appropriate. Coordination of RDT&E efforts to support the various security activities, and liaison with other elements of the Intelligence Community are likely.

7. ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT:

a. Program and Budget: Resources to support FMSO will be programmed as a line item in the National Foreign Intelligence Program. All positions and funding necessary to carry out the FMSO mission will be included.

b. Manning: FMSO staff personnel will be drawn from across the Intelligence Community. Full-time staff personnel will serve rotational tours, usually a minimum of two years in duration. Positions will be provided by FMSO and assignees will be detailed on a reimbursable basis.

c. Support: FMSO will have an integral staff to provide and coordinate support for its operations. It will draw upon the established

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support capabilities of State, CIA, and others, as appropriate. It will likely be necessary to augment the resources in these programs to support FMSO requirements.

d. Security: All personnel assigned on a full-time basis to FMSO will meet minimum personnel security standards, as established by the DCI. Part-time assignees who will have access to sensitive information must also meet these clearance requirements.

8. ACTION PLAN: It is estimated that three years will be required to bring FMSO to full operational capability. The primary pacing factor will be the availability of skilled personnel. FMSO development should not unnecessarily jeopardize the capabilities of departmental security programs.

Development of FMSO should occur in three general phases:

a. Phase I: Phase I is the initial building phase. It will require a major portion of the first year following FMSO's establishment. Detailed organizational planning and development will begin after the appointment of a Director of FMSO and a core staff. Early recruiting will focus on personnel to review and prepare minimum security standards in the most critical areas. A nucleus of personnel will be established in each of the other functional components of FMSO.

b. Phase II: Phase II is the initial operating phase, beginning during FMSO's second year. Limited inspections will be conducted, the intelligence unit will begin initial operations, and a few high priority audits and certifications will be undertaken.

c. Phase III: Full operational capabilities will be attained during FMSO's third year.

SECRET

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

28 March 1988

TO: Ted Price
Director of Personnel

Let me explain the attached employment application. First -- the DDCI has no special interest in this case. The connection is with [redacted] is Admiral Inman's personal assistant.

[redacted] called me a few weeks ago telling me about this applicant. He wanted to be sure somebody really took a look at her and her resume wasn't just left in the stack of thousands that come in. I suggested that she send it to my attention and my only promise was that I would send it along to the appropriate people.

Thanks,

[redacted]

O/DDCI

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25X1

36

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ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA				
7	DDO	X			
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17					
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22					

SUSPENSE

_____ Date

Remarks

STAT _____

Executive Secretary

28 Mar '88

Date

3637 (10-81)

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30 March 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Training and Education
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Attached Book

1. Herb Meyer has written the attached book on intelligence -- what it's all about and how it's done. He states up front that he has no intension of spilling any secrets or providing any particular detail on how US intelligence or CIA does their work. What he does describe in the book is what intelligence is (the organization of information), the mechanisms by which this information is assembled and provided to users (whether in government or business), and on the relationship between producers and users of intelligence.

2. I think it's as fine and succinct an overview of this business and how it's done as I have ever seen. I think that for people coming into this Agency, in all parts of our work, this would be as good an introduction as I can imagine to help them understand why we are here in the first place. It's freshly written and only takes about an hour and a half to read. I think that it should be used widely in our introductory and CT courses. (I understand that it is being used or is going to be used at the Defense Intelligence College.) Read it and let me have your reaction.

Robert M. Gates

Attachment:
Real World Intelligence by Herbert E. Meyer

cc: DDI, w/att
 (DD/R&E/ICS), w/att

~~DDCI w/o att~~
ER w/o att


CONFIDENTIAL

REAL • WORLD INTELLIGENCE

HERBERT E. MEYER

*Organized Information
for Executives*


Intelligence isn't spying.
It's the hot new management tool
for competing—and winning—
in today's business world.



The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

March 31, 1988



STAT


Dear Dr. McFrazier:

I had the pleasure this week of spending some time with two of your students, Jason Newell and Mark Roeder, who are involved in the oral history program at Topeka West. I want to tell you how deeply impressed I and others in Washington were with these two fine young men. We do not get too many uplifting experiences in this city, especially in my line of work. However, spending some time with these two smart, well informed, responsible and mature high school seniors was both inspiring and a real treat. All who met Jason and Mark agreed that, based on what we saw of them, the future of the country is in good hands.

I want to commend Topeka West and Mike Printz for an immensely ambitious and creative history program. It is testimony to the confidence of the community in these high school seniors, as well as the maturity of the students themselves, that you are willing to send them to distant cities to carry out these projects and to do so with obvious trust in how they will conduct themselves. Your trust and confidence in them is admirable and clearly well founded.

As a native Kansan, I can only applaud you, Topeka West and the Topeka community for sending such extraordinary ambassadors around our country. Jason and Mark made an enormously favorable impression on everyone they encountered. Their parents must be quite proud of them. And I am reassured.

Sincerely,



Robert M. Gates

STAT

STAT)DCI/RMGates/de [redacted]
DISTRIBUTION: w/incoming

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - D/PAO
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DDCI Chrono



The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

March 31, 1988



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Dear Mark:

I want to thank you for coming to Washington and including me in your program. I certainly enjoyed the time I spent talking with you and Jason, both on camera and at dinner. All those with whom you came in contact here in Washington were deeply impressed with your character and intelligence.

The program in which you are participating is a remarkable one and I know an honor and pleasure for you. By the same token, you will never know what a positive and reassuring experience it was for us here to get to meet you. It is hard to imagine better ambassadors than you and Jason for Kansas and for your generation. Your parents should be very proud.

Best wishes for a very successful future.


Sincerely,



Robert M. Gates

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1 - DDCI Chrono

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

March 31, 1988



STAT

Dear Jason:

I want to tell you how much I enjoyed the opportunity to meet and spend some time with you. I am flattered that I was chosen to participate in your program. You certainly made a very positive impression on me and everyone you encountered here in Washington. Your evident intelligence and character had a profound impact and, frankly, were immensely reassuring and inspiring to all of us.

It is hard to imagine better ambassadors than you and Mark for Kansas or for your generation. Your parents should be very proud.


Best of luck in what I expect will be a very successful future.

Sincerely,



Robert M. Gates


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Washington, D.C. 20505



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22 February 1988 (1230)

Bob --

The attached arrived almost at the same moment that I received a call from OCA. The message was from Senator Dole's Topeka Kansas office requesting an interview with you.

It seems a group of students is ready to jump on a plane and come see you at a moment's notice.

I suggested OCA not return the call as yet since you will be in tomorrow. In the meantime I will get a reading from Public Affairs.

March 31, 1988

STAT

TO:
Chief, DCI Admin Staff

The DDCI was asked to participate (be interviewed and provide names of friends and family to be interviewed) in the Topeka (Kansas) West High School oral history program. This program honors native Kansans who have gone on to distinguish themselves in their respective fields. The history will become property of the Kansas State Historical Society. In order to facilitate this project the DDCI hosted dinner for the students conducting the interviews (Jason Newell and Mark Roeder) on 29 March at The Tivoli Restaurant (receipt attached).

The DDCI was given an advance of \$150. The DDCI invited his daughter (Eleanor Gates) to attend dinner bringing the total dinner bill to \$130. The Deputy Director wishes to cover the cost of his daughter's dinner therefore the cost of dinner (for expense purposes) is \$105 and the remaining \$45 is returned.

STAT

O/DDCI

Tivoli

130.00

CHECK NO
02278
DATE
AMOUNT

1700 N. MOORE ST. ROSSLYN, VA 22209 (703) 524-8900

STAT

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date
23 Feb 1988

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)		Initials	Date
1.	D/PAO <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2.	DDCI <i>ok - passed to</i>	<i>J.</i>	
3.			
4.			
5.			

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

STAT

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DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)		Room No.—Bldg.
<input type="text"/> PAO		7000 Hqs
		Phone No.
		27676

5041-102

☆ GPO: 1983 O - 381-529 (232)

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206



February 19, 1988

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

During the Bicentennial, Topeka (Kansas) West High School Library Media Specialist Michael Printz developed an oral history program to honor native Kansans who have gone on to distinguish themselves in their respective fields. A few of the one hundred twenty-six (126) past Oral Histories include projects on Dwight D. Eisenhower, Alf Landon, Senators Nancy Landon Kassebaum and Bob Dole, astronaut Steve Hawley, actors Gordon Jump and Ed Asner, Pulitzer Prizewinning poet Gwendolyn Brooks, and Amelia Earhart.

Completed Oral Histories become the property of the Kansas State Historical Society, where they are made a permanent part of the Society's research and educational materials. Scholars and writers from across the country travel to Kansas to use the over two thousand seven hundred-seventy (2,770) hours of audio and video recorded interviews that the two hundred one (201) students who have worked with the Oral History Program have accumulated in the past twelve years. For example, since the project on Amelia Earhart was completed in 1978 over two thousand two hundred-twenty (2,220) writers have come to the Kansas State Historical Society to use the materials prepared by the students that produced her oral history.

The students that work on each project also present their finished product to various civic, service, and political organizations throughout the state. Obviously, a first rate oral history requires extensive travel, time, and money to interview and research the subject of the documentary and those that have influenced his life. All expenses are covered by funds raised by the students through community contributions from the people of Kansas.

We are extremely excited this year to have been selected to complete a documentary on the life and accomplishments of Robert M. Gates. Our project will involve extensive research into your life in Wichita and the years since

TOPEKA WEST HIGH SCHOOL, 2001 FAIRLAWN RD. 66604, 913/272-1643

TOPEKA PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Dr. Robert M. Frazier



you left Kansas. We will be interviewing your family, friends, teachers and other colleagues that have influenced your life. Our research will culminate with a trip to Washington, D. C. to trace your life in our nation's capitol.

We are hoping to meet with you at your convenience to conduct a personal interview for use in our documentary. In addition, we would also like to interview several of the people associated with your work in Washington, and we would appreciate any suggestions you might have regarding others that would contribute to our project.

We are interested in discussing dates that we would be able to meet with you in Washington. Please feel free to call one of us collect at home this weekend, or if this is not possible we will contact you Monday, February 22.

The people of Kansas are always excited to hear about the success of other Kansans, and we are very enthusiastic about the project. Your cooperation will enable us to complete a quality documentary, and look forward to speaking with you soon.

Sincerely,


Jason Newell



Mark Roeder



Mike Printz



Topeka West Library
(913) 272-1643, Ext. 80

TOPEKA WEST HIGH SCHOOL, 2001 FAIRLAWN RD. 66604, 913/272-1643

TOPEKA PUBLIC SCHOOLS